Equine Influenza Response 2007-08 DPI Victoria Internal Revie › tve › photos › 0708ei › EIReview ReportDPI... · Victoria. Some recommendations relate to DPI wide emergency

Equine Influenza Response 2007-08

DPI Victoria Internal Review

SUMMARY REPORT

Animal Standards Branch

Biosecurity Victoria

August 2008

EI Review Report_DPI_summary_20080827.doc Page 2 of 18

Acknowledgments

Special thanks are given to the Farm Services Victoria personnel who facilitated the review workshops and to Ms Tiffany Haw who collated and prepared data generated by the review workshops.

Glossary

AHFS Animal Health Field Services

AUSVETPLAN The Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan

ANEMIS Animal Disease Emergency Information System

ASB Animal Standards Branch

BAW Bureau of Animal Welfare

Bioweb Secure DPI intranet site, managed by Biosecurity Victoria

BLO Border liaison officer

CCEAD Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases

CGRC Central Government Response Committee

CSB Chemical Standards Branch

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

DHS Department of Human Services

EAD Emergency Animal Disease

EADP Emergency Animal Disease Preparedness

EI Equine Influenza

FOM Field Operations Manager

FSV Farm Services Victoria

HR Human Resources

IAP Incident Action Plan

IRIS Incident Resource Information System (DSE)

IMT Incident Management Team

IT Information technology

LIMS Laboratory Information Management System

NMG National Management Group

OHS Occupational Health and Safety

RRT National EAD Rapid Response Team

Sitrep Situation Report

SDCHQ State Disease Control Headquarters

SMS Short message service

SOP Standard Operating Procedure


Equine Influenza Review Summary Report of the internal review of the Victorian Department of Primary Industries’ response to the 2007 outbreak of Equine Influenza in Australia.

Animal Standards Branch, Biosecurity Victoria.

August 2008.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction....................................................................................................4

2 Lessons learned ............................................................................................5

3 Communications............................................................................................7

4 Resourcing.....................................................................................................10

5 Contract management ...................................................................................12

6 Other key emergency management themes ................................................13

7 Movement controls ........................................................................................15

8 Disease surveillance......................................................................................17

Annex 1: Equine influenza response time-line..................................................18


1 Introduction

This report describes the findings of the internal review of DPI’s response to the 2007 outbreak of equine influenza (EI) in New South Wales and Queensland. The purpose of DPI’s response was to keep Victoria free of disease and thereby protect livelihoods of the many people directly and indirectly associated with equine-related activities. DPI also provided assistance to New South Wales and Queensland where response efforts of those jurisdictions successfully eradicated the disease.

Between August 2007 and March 2008, more than 350 DPI personnel were directly involved in the emergency response to EI. A time-line of the key events during this period is provided as Annex 1 of this report. While DPI supports a range of emergency activities, the response to EI was the largest and longest DPI-led emergency response in the history of the department.

The internal review had two key evaluation questions:

• How effective were the plans, processes and systems used in the response?

• What are the key things learned for integration into future response plans?

The internal review focused on the effectiveness of DPI plans, processes and systems and did not directly address any national issues. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Victorian response was based on the arrangements laid out in the national EAD cost-sharing agreement and AUSVETPLAN disease strategies and management manuals.

Review data was collected from August 2007 to May 2008 through a range of methods including questionnaires, one-on-one interviews and facilitated group discussions. Data was collected from DPI personnel, representatives of equine-related industries and other key stakeholders.

The consistent message from DPI staff and external stakeholders was that DPI’s response to the EI outbreak was generally well managed. As with all significant emergency responses, there are lessons that DPI can learn that will enhance its ability to respond to similar incidents in the future.

This report describes 12 lessons learned and 63 recommendations. The report and recommendations have been endorsed by the Acting Executive Director, Biosecurity Victoria. Some recommendations relate to DPI wide emergency preparedness rather than animal health specifically, and these will be addressed in consultation with the DPI Emergency Management Standing Committee and the DPI Emergency Response and Recovery Project Team.


2 Lessons learned

This section presents key lessons learned from DPI’s response to the 2007 outbreak of equine influenza in NSW and Queensland. The wide range of activities of the response and the significant experience gained by DPI personnel at all levels of management provided a unique opportunity to assess the effectiveness of DPI plans, processes and systems. Further detail on each of the areas described below can be found in sections 3 to 8 of the report, together with recommendations of how the lessons learned can be acted upon.

2.1 Protocol to declare an emergency

A documented protocol is needed to describe how and when the DPI Executive will a) declare an emergency and b) communicate this widely within DPI and the Victorian Government. This is needed not just to activate DPI emergency provisions but to create an environment of informed cooperation and support within DPI and the whole public sector.

2.2 Emergency response in non-infected jurisdictions

Previous EADP planning scenarios focused on the response activities required in infected jurisdictions. The 2007 equine influenza outbreak demonstrated that extensive emergency response work is also required in non-infected jurisdictions. Future EADP planning should take this into account, especially regarding human resource requirements.

2.3 The livestock (equine) standstill

The livestock (equine) standstill was a critical measure for protecting Victoria and preventing spread of the disease. The final pattern of disease in Australia reflected very closely the pattern of disease when the standstill was declared. The importance of having appropriate legislation and up-to-date communications plans for a livestock standstill cannot be overstated. This is a well described lesson from EAD outbreaks around the world.

2.4 Stakeholder engagement

The success of the standstill and effectiveness of subsequent movement restrictions and other disease control measures were underpinned by comprehensive stakeholder engagement both before and during the response. For some years prior to the 2007 equine influenza outbreak, DPI has been proactive in engaging equine-related industries on issues of EADP planning.

The non-racing horse industry sector is a very diverse and fragmented group. This presented difficulties for effective consultation during the response, especially at the national level where there was no effective representation. There is a need to develop strategies for ongoing engagement of this group (and other disparate livestock owner groups) for both EAD preparedness and response.

2.5 Livestock information system

Up-to-date information about the location and populations of livestock is essential for the effective management of an EAD incursion. This information had been lacking for horses in Victoria.

2.6 Access to specialist support

Improved arrangements are needed to allow the DPI animal health group to effectively draw on specialist support early in an emergency response for the management of contracts, OHS issues and payroll functions.


2.7 Access to non-animal health emergency management support

In the past, in smaller EAD responses, there has been limited need to recruit personnel from outside the DPI animal health group to perform emergency response roles. For the equine influenza response, support from outside the group was needed from the very beginning of the response. The DPI animal health group need mechanisms in place to recruit emergency management personnel from outside the animal health group during an emergency. Furthermore, animal health personnel should be engaged primarily in areas requiring their animal health technical skills, and not in areas that could be performed by other appropriately qualified personnel.

2.8 Emergency management role suitability and training

The suitability and training of personnel for emergency management roles is an area requiring ongoing development. Personnel who do not regularly participate in emergency responses tend to bring their day-to-day management styles to the emergency response environment. This can undermine the effectiveness of the response effort. Learning and development activities (including emergency exercises) can help address this problem if appropriate selection, training, evaluation and feedback mechanisms are applied.

2.9 Human resource management in emergency response

A “one size fits all” approach to staffing and rostering during an emergency response is inappropriate for EAD responses. It is important to achieve the right balance between continuity and work load. Some phases or operational areas of an EAD response are better managed as projects with personnel working full time, regular hours. Approaches to rostering and deployment personnel in EAD responses should be further investigated. Guidelines for the management of roles, work areas and phases of a response should be developed and incorporated into training for all emergency response managers.

2.10 State Disease Control Headquarters at the CVO Unit, Attwood.

SDCHQ was established at the CVO unit at the very beginning of the response. At the busiest time, most SDCHQ personnel were crowded into two rooms with some spill over into work areas of CVO unit personnel, Bureau of Animal Welfare and Chemical Standards Branch areas. If the CVO unit is to be used again for an emergency control centre, then a detailed plan should be developed for how it will be set up so that adequate work areas are provided and disruption to other businesses is minimized.

2.11 Information management infrastructure and systems

The immediate and efficient set up of information management infrastructure at the SDCHQ was a key factor in enabling an efficient and effective emergency response. It is equally important that information management systems (flow and storage processes) are also set up at the beginning of the response.

2.12 Emergency helpline

An emergency specific helpline, directed to the DPI Customer Service Centre, should be established at the earliest opportunity. A dedicated technical liaison officer role should be developed to supply the call centre with appropriate protocols and information resources, and to report to the emergency control centre on emerging themes.


3 Communications

Key themes that emerged in the review process are described in this section, covering internal and external communications, the role of communications manager, community meetings and interstate communications. Communications activities during the response were generally seen to be effective although there was sometimes a lack of clarity about the relative importance of various communications functions and how they should be managed.

There was a very broad range of successful media and communications activities carried out as part of the response. There was not, however, an overarching media and communications strategy and plan addressing both internal and external communications needs and functions.

The DPI internal communications at the beginning of the response were seen to be managed very well at the executive and ministerial level, but less well at the divisional, branch and regional level. The rapid setting up and effective management of IT systems, including the dedicated EI website on Bioweb were key supports of effective internal communication and operational efficiency.

The majority of personnel working in the EI response considered they were well informed about the response through access to daily briefings, situation reports and the daily incident action plan (IAP). Some field personnel however, felt isolated during the response and remote from the decision making processes.

Information flow and management within SDCHQ, from SDCHQ to field teams, and regarding laboratory data and reporting, were identified as areas requiring improvement. Other internal communication issues regarding the quality of briefings and supervision are addressed in Section 6.

There were limited communications with Victorian government bodies other than those directly involved in the response. There seemed to be a perception that an emergency would not occur until there was an outbreak of equine influenza in Victoria. One of the key lessons learned in this response is that when there is an EAD incursion in Australia, disease control and management strategies require an emergency response in both infected and non-infected jurisdictions.

DPI participated in regular teleconferences and meetings of both the CCEAD and the NMG, as provided for in the EAD cost sharing agreement and AUSVETPLAN. These were the key forums that endorsed the jurisdictional EAD response plans and developed agreed policies on key national issues such as vaccination.

The success of the equine standstill and the effectiveness of subsequent movement restrictions and other disease control measures were underpinned by comprehensive engagement with affected industries both before and during the response

An industry liaison officer worked full time with DPI for the duration of the response and provided a key role in communicating with affected industry groups. There was a significant reliance on one person to perform this role.

During the response, the CVO and Principal Epidemiologist met regularly with racing and non-racing industry groups. This was seen as critical for facilitating consultation and information flow. Information packs were developed and a programme of community meetings was planned and implemented.

The situation report distributed daily to representatives of affected industries was an important method of keeping the private sector informed of developments.

The non-racing horse industry sector is a very diverse group. This presented difficulties for effective consultation during the response, especially at the national


level. Some people involved in this sector felt voiceless, powerless and left to carry the burden of disease control measures with little recognition or support. In Victoria, the industry liaison officer played a key role in liaising with the individual groups that made up this sector. In Victoria regular meetings were held with representatives of this group and members of the Incident Management Team.

A significant amount of misinformation was spread and reported by professionals working outside the response, despite the efforts of DPI to communicate and provide ongoing situation updates. This proved immensely frustrating to those involved in the response. It is possible that this risk could be mitigated by improving communications with the veterinary profession.

A large and successful publicity campaign was developed and implemented. Affected industries expressed the wish that this campaign had commenced much earlier in the response. There was also a perception by some affected industries that the fear-inducing content of some messages was too severe and caused unwarranted negative impact on their businesses.

Although the media campaign was very effective at delivering messages to help keep equine influenza out of Victoria, is was not as effective at keeping the public updated with information on the changing situation regarding progress of the disease eradication work and the freeing up of horse movements. A greater number of proactive media communications were needed throughout the response.

The programme of community meetings was seen as an important way of delivering accurate information to the wider community, and to help end the mischief caused by false rumour. It was seen to be important for such meetings to be held sooner in the response and to place responsibility on regional personnel for setting them up.

Recommendations:

R.1 Consideration should be given to developing a DPI communications management manual for emergencies describing all key communication functions, roles and responsibilities. The proposed “Media Plan for Biosecurity Emergencies” would form a section of this manual.

R.2 Following on from the above, when communications roles and responsibilities have been clearly described, a training plan should be developed to ensure that there are adequate numbers of trained personnel to perform the required roles.

R.3 An integrated media and communications strategy and plan should be developed early in future responses, in close consultation with affected industries.

R.4 SOPs for information and data management should be developed taking into consideration the new functionality of Bioweb and related technologies for electronic storage of data and information.

R.5 The following information management and communication tools should be incorporated into future exercises and responses:

- Issues management registers for IMT and key sections

- Generic email accounts for all control centre roles

- SMS broadcast messaging to DPI personnel

R.6 The communications manual (see R.1) should include descriptions of the internal communications functions needed during an emergency response and the roles/personnel that should be responsible for those functions.


R.7 Incident managers should consider scheduling time to visit regional centres and operational sites to facilitate good communication and boost morale of field personnel.

R.8 The induction of new ministers and departmental heads should include familiarization with their roles in EAD response

R.9 The communications plan (see R.3) should ensure that response personnel and all DPI centres have effective access to daily updates about new information released in the public domain.

R.10 The practicality and appropriateness of live webcam broadcasts on Primarysource of control centre briefings should be investigated. This could provide a very useful source of information for response personnel and the wider DPI.

R.11 The communications capability of regional vehicles should be assessed to determine whether there are adequate numbers of vehicles fitted with trunk radios for emergency responses.

R.12 When an EAD response is initiated, a dedicated helpline should be set up immediately and managed by the DPI Customer Service Centre. SCDHQ should provide a dedicated liaison officer to support the management of call centre information, so that trends are identified and appropriate information is kept up to date. A role description should be developed.

R.13 An alternative media spokesperson to the CVO should be identified and trained during “peace time” to perform a back-up role during emergency responses.

R.14 Community meetings (“facing the public”) should become part of the EAD response culture and should commence early in the response.

R.15 Communications / public relations managers recruited to emergency control centres should be trained in the role prior to a response, and inducted into the role with clear role description that has been adapted by the incident manager to meet the needs of the particular response.

R.16 Consideration should be given to appointing a fulltime website manager for the duration of DPI emergency responses to manage the DPI external website. A well developed website could effectively address many information and communication needs.

R.17 Options should be investigated for the recruitment of Industry Liaison Officers who have the skill sets needed to work effectively as part of an EAD response, and who would be available to participate in an EAD response.


4 Resourcing

Key themes that emerged in the review process are described in this section, covering the resourcing of the State Disease Control Centre (SDCHQ) and border surveillance and the management of personnel selection, recruitment and rostering. Overall the resourcing for the Victorian EI response was considered adequate, with significant support from some divisions and branches of DPI.

Personnel from Animal Health Field Services (AHFS), Animal Standards Branch (ASB) and the Chief Veterinary Officer’s unit were recruited to perform SDCHQ and field surveillance roles on the basis of their experience and skills. As the response continued, it became increasingly difficult to consistently select highly trained and experienced personnel to all key SDCHQ positions.

The majority of personnel recruited to work at either SDCHQ or on border liaison duties indicated that the recruitment process was well-handled, despite some confusion in the early stages of the EI response. The deployment email was informative and useful. Personnel availability spreadsheets for a number of DPI businesses, when they became available, were very worthwhile in improving recruitment processes and communication with the managers of those businesses.

There was some confusion about the deployment of the Rapid Response Team (RRT). While the national coordinators of the RRT indicated that RRT members, particularly from non-infected states, could be recruited at short notice to work in the infected states, Victoria’s view was that if Victorian RRT members were required for Victoria’s EI response, then they would not be released for duty in another state.

At SDCHQ, the effective management of shift handovers became increasingly important given the many rapid changes and developments throughout the EI response. A number of personnel working in SDCHQ and in the field expressed a need to have fewer personnel rotating through key roles to ensure there was continuity in the handling of important issues.

AHFS personnel worked in some SDCHQ roles that did not necessarily require specific animal health technical expertise. There was view expressed that non-animal health DPI personnel could have been called upon to perform more of these roles.

Recommendation:

R.18 A DPI emergency resourcing strategy and process is needed that enables the recruitment and deployment of the required number of appropriately trained personnel while ensuring continuity of DPI’s other core business.

R.19 Arrangements should be established for setting up IRIS for immediate use in future EAD responses.

R.20 Personnel selection processes should be established that ensure individuals are deployed to roles for which they have been trained and for which they are well-suited. (This will require training of non-animal health DPI personnel in the EAD response context.)

R.21 Recruitment of personnel needs to be on the basis of a whole of DPI business response, rather than on the basis of individuals volunteering themselves.

R.22 A register should be developed of suitably trained and qualified ex-DPI personnel who are willing to consider assisting EAD responses.

R.23 The DPI emergency response resourcing strategy (R.18) should include processes describing how and for what duration DPI personnel are made available to work in emergency responses.


R.24 The DPI policy and processes for deployment of RRT members interstate should be clarified and communicated to RRT managers and members.

R.25 Models to manage continuity in state/local disease control centres should be investigated and evaluated. Guidelines for the management of roles, work areas and phases of a response should be developed and incorporated into training for all emergency response managers.

R.26 Procedures and templates for written hand-overs and issues registers should be developed.

R.27 The importance of local knowledge in effective EAD response work cannot be overstated. This should be a key consideration in resource planning.

R.28 Identify the DPI businesses whose expertise would be required during an emergency response. Key contacts in those businesses should be identified and arrangements put in place so that the appropriate level of support can be accessed for emergency responses.

R.29 AUSVETPLAN roles should be reviewed in the light of the EI response experience to identify roles that require animal health technical expertise and roles that could be performed by other personnel.

R.30 A DPI representative should visit New South Wales and Queensland to learn from their experience, especially regarding resourcing.


5 Contract management

The services, equipment and facilities provided by a number of external providers were essential to the success of the equine influenza response. These included the provisions of border surveillance services (personnel and cameras) by Wilson’s Security, electronic signage by Coates, post-import quarantine facilities by Werribee Park, and disease surveillance by private veterinary practitioners.

It became clear during the response and review that contract management is an area where significant improvements are needed. The underlying issue seems to be that although DPI contract management expertise was consulted during the development of contracts, a higher level of support was needed. The review data highlights the need for there to be a high level of relevant expertise and scrutiny applied to contract development and management during emergency responses.

Recommendations:

R.31 Arrangements should be developed for engaging DPI contract management expertise in emergency responses, so that a high level of support can be provided to effectively develop and manage contracts in emergencies.

R.32 Rostering of DPI personnel should take into account the need for maximum continuity in contract management and liaison roles.

R.33 Contractual arrangements must include protocols for how issues and incidents that arise during the emergency response are to be managed and resolved.

R.34 Contracts must clearly lay down the responsibilities assigned to each party in relation to risk management, especially regarding OHS and associated liabilities.


6 Other key emergency management themes

Other key themes that emerged in the review process are described in this section, covering overall management of the emergency, the response structure and culture, human resource policies and procedures, financial management, recognition, reward and motivation, team management, inductions, briefings and debriefings.

Overall the management of the emergency was seen to be competent and efficient. DPI senior managers expressed a high level of satisfaction with the response activities and their management.

The following key areas were identified for improvement: occupational health and safety, personnel resourcing and deployment, personnel management (including induction, briefing and debriefing), timekeeping and payroll functions, application of DPI policies, the physical location and set up of SDCHQ, information management and flow, knowledge of roles and application of the AIIMS structure.

Concerns were expressed about OHS responsibilities of contractors, especially in relation to personnel deployed at border crossing points.

The financing of the response was seen to be managed effectively. The official financial audit of the response went well and DPI was seen to have good record-keeping and accountability systems in place.

The commitment and technical competency of DPI personnel were widely acknowledged both internally and externally.

SDCHQ was seen to have been set up quickly and efficiently, however there was both support and lack of support for the physical location (CVO UNIT, Attwood) and layout. A positive aspect was proximity to the CVO. Negative aspects were the lack of space and the long distance between SDCHQ and the border operations.

Overall the level of satisfaction with team management was high. Field operations personnel felt well supervised and supported. SDCHQ personnel felt there was a high level of teamwork displayed and a willingness to help others was shown.

There was a general satisfaction with the briefing, debriefing and induction process. However as is always the case with these processes some personnel missed out and others were unhappy with the standard of briefing, debriefing etc.

Recommendation:

R.35 Regular training of emergency response managers is required in peace-time to ensure full awareness of relevant DPI policies and procedures (OHS, resourcing and deployment, management including induction, briefing, debriefing and return to work, timekeeping and payroll, IRIS, and contract management).

R.36 The use of a professional emergency management monitor for DPI emergencies should be investigated. This role provides real-time feedback to incident managers allowing them to undertake early corrective action where policies and procedures are not being followed.

R.37 Emergency control centres should recruit OHS coordinators into the control centre management structure to support the application and monitoring of OHS policies.

R.38 There is a need to refine DPI fatigue management policy and guidelines to support appropriate interpretation and implementation.


R.39 Information management issues identified in the review should be addressed by administration section workshops. Development of further SOPs may be required.

R.40 Consideration should be given to contracting external emergency response expertise to facilitate a risk assessment of DPI’s EAD response capability to support EADP business planning.

R.41 Reported problems with timekeeping arrangements, payroll issues and confusion about award conditions should investigated by an appropriate HR delegate to ensure that problems are identified and addressed.

R.42 A detailed plan should be developed and maintained for setting up SDCHQ at the CVO unit and incorporating other suitable locations at the DPI Attwood site.

R.43 Consideration should be given to establishing the requirement that emergency preparedness and response activities are included in all DPI personnel job descriptions and PPPs.

R.44 The most appropriate structure for SDCHQ and the strategic policy group should be further assessed. If there is to be a CVO policy unit that sits outside SDCHQ, then clarity is needed regarding roles, responsibilities and lines of communication.

R.45 Induction and hand-over processes should be further developed and standardized to ensure incoming personnel know their roles and to facilitate continuity and consistency.

R.46 A generic on-line emergency induction package should be developed for access via BMS which can be customized for each emergency response.


7 Movement controls

Legislated movement controls within Victoria only applied during the first week of the response. Subsequent movement controls were limited to importation restrictions from New South Wales and Queensland.

The requirements of Victoria’s Livestock Disease Control Act 1994 in relation to horses, horse products and equipment entering Victoria from infected jurisdictions, required that it be proven that an alleged offender had knowledge of the restrictions under the Order that were in place. This requirement made it difficult to proceed against offenders and to deter people from crossing into Victoria with horses and/or horse products and equipment.

The facilitation of horse imports by DPI was seen to have worked very well and was especially suited to a project management model. The electronic VHED process was seen as a blueprint for future movement control applications.

The equine standstill was the first livestock standstill that had ever been applied to Victoria. The standstill was initially declared for three days and then extended for a further three days.

The livestock (equine) standstill was an essential action to prevent the entry and possible spread of equine influenza in Victoria. The legal orders were in place several hours after the need for the standstill became apparent. This was essential, as were the communications (including media) efforts by government and affected industries to publicize the standstill.

If the livestock standstill had not been brought in early, it is highly likely that Victoria would have been infected with equine influenza. The final pattern of disease in Australia reflected very closely the pattern of disease when the standstill was brought in. The importance of having appropriate legislation and up-to-date communications plans for a livestock standstill cannot be overstated. This is a well described lesson from EAD outbreaks around the world.

Overall the border surveillance activities worked well. The border surveillance operations were seen to be generally well managed. There was good cooperation from both VicRoads and RTA throughout the response.

The border surveillance strategy aimed at deterrence rather than detection. In practice this involved setting up signage, promoting the 24/7 surveillance provided by a private security firm and maintaining a visible DPI presence in all border areas. There were limitations to the ability of these arrangements to detect breaches of the importation ban. From November 2008, surveillance cameras were introduced to border areas to replace the private security firm personnel.

The racing and harness racing industries quickly implemented voluntary measures on Saturday 25th August and announced the cancellation of events. These industries were highly organized and fully aware of the need of the standstill which came into force later that day. Biosecurity advice regarding horse movements after the standstill was well accepted within both the racing and non-racing sectors.

The DPI grants programme supported groups that were undertaking voluntary measures and assisted DPI’s relationship with them. However, representatives of the non-racing sector felt unable to sustain the collective agreement of all groups over the longer time frame of the response.


Recommendations:

R.47 The Livestock Disease Control Act and Regulations should be reviewed and improved, particularly in relation to the offence provisions for breaches of orders. This will enhance the operational effectiveness of DPI and Victoria Police.

R.48 An electronic permit system for EAD response should be developed.

R.49 The livestock (equine) standstill communication plan should be regularly reviewed and updated. It should include the capability to use SMS technology to broadcast key messages to all key industry contacts and DPI personnel.

R.50 Options for future 24/7 border crossing surveillance (for livestock movement control) should be further investigated and assessed by DPI as part of EAD preparedness.

R.51 SOPs should be developed for establishing checkpoints, managing traffic, setting up surveillance cameras, and containing a list of relevant contacts (e.g. VicRoads, RTA)

R.52 The experiences and lessons learned from “Operation Back-Off” (Fruit fly) should be reviewed for application to EADP planning.

R.53 DPI should continue to engage with the non-racing sector to build better communication channels and maintain the focus on biosecurity standards.

R.54 An emergency management plan should be developed for the non-racing sector, including a communication plan and protocols for a standstill that have been previously agreed to.


8 Disease surveillance

Up-to-date information about the location and populations of livestock is essential for the effective management of an EAD incursion. This information had been lacking for horses in Victoria.

The normal DPI animal health regional infrastructure was used to manage disease surveillance activities throughout the response. DPI Animal health staff arranged investigations and sampling of suspect horses directly or through the activities of private veterinary practitioners. These arrangements served the response well.

The sentinel practice program was developed to allow the collection and testing of large numbers of samples to support Victoria’s proof of freedom claim. This program worked well although progressed more slowly than anticipated due to the lack of continuity in key management roles at the SDCHQ.

DPI’s Bioweb managers modified ANEMIS and adapted it to the web-based environment in order to serve the needs of the Victorian response. This was an important development in EAD response data management.

The expertise and capability of the DPI Animal Health Laboratory at Attwood was acknowledged by everyone who had dealings with the laboratory. The ability of the laboratory to cope with the increased capacity of samples and to switch over to new tests as required was important for effective disease surveillance.

The provision of new PCR equipment to the laboratory was seen as critically important for the EI response. There was seen to be room for improvement in laboratory systems and procedures.

Recommendations:

R.55 The need for mandatory registration of properties with horses should be investigated. This would be an important enhancement to preparedness.

R.56 The development of web-based ANEMIS for disease control data management should be advanced as an important priority.

R.57 Laboratory procedures should be reviewed or developed for sample handling, and storage requirements during an EAD response.

R.58 The system for provision of viral transport media to the field should be reviewed and improved.

R.59 A clear, national policy should be developed concerning which laboratories should test samples during an EAD response.

R.60 During an EAD response, a courier should be employed to transport samples from Attwood to AAHL.

R.61 Arrangements should be developed for recruiting additional laboratory personnel from other DPI research groups to support EAD responses.

R.62 A web-based LIMS with an appropriate licence to enable statewide use is required as a priority.

R.63 Diagnostic workloads during an EAD response should be to be fully scoped and laboratory contingency plans reviewed, improved and maintained.

Annex 1: Equine influenza response time-line

DPI Response to Equine Influenza

AUG 2007 SEPT 2007 OCT 2007 NOV 2007 DEC 2007 JAN 2008 FEB 2008 MAR 2008

09-12-08 Last case in NSW

25-12-07 Last case in Qld

Epidemic peaks in NSW/Qld 28-09-07 EI Vaccine arrives in Victoria

22-08-07 Suspect EI in NSW

25-08-07 Standstill commenced 26-08-07 SDCHQ established EI Helpline 01-09-07 DPI border security 08-09-07 Wilson’s engaged

03-10-07 Premier launches Spring Racing Carnival & $2.2 mill package to keep Vic EI free

29-02-08 SDCHQ closed

25-02-08 Border Patrols end

Cameras removed

20-12-07 First horses allowed into Vic ex NSW

Documents

Equine Influenza Response 2007-08 DPI Victoria Internal Revie › tve › photos › 0708ei › EIReview ReportDPI... · Victoria. Some recommendations relate to DPI wide emergency