Environmental Degradation of Russian Coastal Regions: The Case …€¦ · part of efforts to diversify Russia’s outlets for energy exports, Ust’-Luga would become the pipeline

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Environmental Degradation of Russian Coastal Regions: The Case of the Gulf of Finland

Nathaniel Trumbull and Oleg Bodrov1

Abstract: An American geographer and Russian ecologist discuss current and prospectiveenvironmental hazards precipitated by large-scale infrastructure projects on Russia’s southerncoast of the Gulf of Finland. The region, investigated by both authors during the course ofregular field research from 1999 to 2009, is one of the best environmentally preserved coast-lines of the Baltic Sea with abundant potential greenfield sites, largely due to its closed-bor-der-zone status during the Soviet period. A favorable location for trade also places the regionunder intense development pressure. The authors devote particular attention to two majordevelopments, a multifunctional port complex (which inter alia serves as a major pipeline ter-minus and oil export port) and expansion of an existing nuclear power plant. Based on exten-sive personal observations and government documents, they analyze the emergingenvironmental threat posed by these initiatives as well as the challenging political environ-ment that discourages public participation and local involvement in spatial planning. Journalof Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O180, O290, Q280, Q530. 7 figures, 35 ref-erences. Key words: Gulf of Finland, Russia, St. Petersburg, Primorsk, Ust’-Luga port, Lenin-grad Nuclear Power Plant, Batareynaya Bay, Baltic Transportation System, oil export ports,gas pipeline terminus, aluminum production, polycrystalline silicon, nuclear waste, naturereserves, wetlands.

INTRODUCTION

n May 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin paid a helicopter visit to the site of the Ust’-Luga port complex, currently under construction on the southern coast of the Gulf of

Finland (e.g., see Kommersant, May 15, 2008, p. 1). The former President announced that, aspart of efforts to diversify Russia’s outlets for energy exports, Ust’-Luga would become thepipeline terminus and oil transfer point of the Baltic [Pipeline] Transport System–2.2 Notingthat the new pipeline would strengthen Russia’s energy security and that of its European cus-tomers as well as bolster the country’s economic potential, Putin observed that Ust’-Lugawould “. . . be a very large complex, probably, the largest in the country” (BTS-2, 2008, p. 1).Yet six years earlier, this closed-border-zone territory of Russia3 was an almost totally unde-veloped, largely pristine coastline. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the recent intensive

1Respectively, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, University of Connecticut/Avery Point, Groton,CT 06340 ([email protected]) and Chairman, NGO Green World, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast,Russian Federation ([email protected]).

2The Baltiyskaya truboprovodnaya sistema–2, hereafter abbreviated BTS-2, is a northward spur (from Unecha,Bryansk Oblast) of the Druzhba pipeline.

3The border zone included a ca. 120 km stretch of coastline extending along the southern coast of the Gulf ofFinland from Staryy Petergof to the Estonian border (Fig. 1).

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Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2009, 50, No. 5, pp. 1–15. DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.50.5.1Copyright © 2009 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved.

TRUMBULL AND BODROV 2


development of the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland (SCGF) within the context of theenvironmental threats it poses to the region and its inhabitants.4

Oil and natural gas exports in particular have shaped a critical geostrategic role for theconstruction of new port and pipeline infrastructure on the Baltic and Black seas and in theFar East coastal regions. The new construction of the Primorsk oil port on the Gulf ofFinland’s northern shore (Fig. 1), the development of the northeastern coast of Sakhalin Islandto support construction of a network of pipelines and offshore oil drilling platforms as part ofthe Sakhalin-2 project, construction of the Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka oil terminal on the BlackSea for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, the Blue Stream gas pipeline compressor station andseabed pipeline entry at Arkhipo-Osipovka on the Black Sea, and the Ust’-Luga port on thesouthern Gulf of Finland5 have in each case occurred on previously undeveloped coastlines,essentially greenfield sites preserved during the Soviet period as closed border territories.6

4Both authors have undertaken research field trips along the SCGF (including the Ust’-Luga site) each summerover the last decade as part of an ongoing coastal monitoring project organized by the environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) Green World, based in Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast.

5For background, see Sagers (2006, 2007) and Ericson (2009). An exception is the Black Sea coast, whichalthough constituting a border region of the Soviet Union, was not administered as a closed region with the excep-tion of the naval city of Sevastopol’ on the Crimean Peninsula. The new closed-territory rule for foreigners travelingoutside of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on Sakhalin was only introduced in March 2008 (Sakhalin Independent, March 27–April 10, 2008).

6Only in the case of the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline project, the terminus of which originallywas planned for a greenfield site in Perevoznaya Bay, was the site of development eventually shifted to the existingport of Kozmino Bay near Nakhodka. The originally planned terminus for the ESPO pipeline at Perevoznaya wasquite near to the Kedrovaya Pad’ nature reserve. Only after national and international protest was the terminuschanged to Kozmino (e.g., see Kozmino Bay, 2007).

Fig. 1. General map of the Gulf of Finland showing selected locations mentioned in the text.

3 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS


In addition to Ust’-Luga, a second major project currently under way in the SCGF, andalso related to energy, is the planned expansion of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant(LNPP). The addition of two new reactors (and ultimately as many as six) is planned both tomeet the region’s projected burgeoning electricity needs as well as to provide inputs for anumber of complementary industrial facilities (see below).

These coastal infrastructure projects have been completed within a general environmentof partially (or temporarily) loosened restrictions on development in these formerly closedterritories since the early 1990s, but with virtually no local input regarding the environmentalrisks and hazards to those territories posed by the proposed port activities. In the absence ofstrong local authority, powerful financial interests allied to greater or lesser degree with fed-eral government authorities have stepped into the vacuum, implementing increasingly large-scale development in these quasi–closed border regions.

The Ust’-Luga port is located in close proximity to the European Union and isexpected to become an important and diversified transportation hub in the region.7From a Kremlin perspective, the Baltic Sea’s role as a transport corridor for Russia’s naturalresource exports and imports is strategically critical. With the completion of the Primorskport on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea has already become Russia’smost important transit route for energy, accounting for 40 percent of all exports. Most deci-sions concerning the implementation of large-scale, strategic infrastructure projects (such asat Ust’-Luga and the LNPP expansion designed to support it) are made in Moscow. Conse-quently, the rapid development of the SCGF over a short timeframe might be considered aresounding state success (e.g., see Gustafson, 2000; Hanninen and Rytkonen, 2004; Nicolland Delaney, 2007; Goldman, 2008).

However, an increasing polarization of federal and local interests has emerged over spe-cific plans for the development of the SCGF region, as federal interests are increasingly at oddswith those of the local populations and their environment (ZumBrunnen and Trumbull, 2003).While the federally approved commercial investment and infrastructure development has pro-ceeded almost unimpeded along the coast of the SCGF, small-scale, local initiatives (both busi-ness ventures, including tourism, and recreational activities) have been restricted due to thecontinued semi-closed, border-zone status of the region.8 Because small-business activity hasnot yet been officially permitted to develop in the border zone, the local residents have had lit-tle choice but to protect their livelihoods by accepting the new large-scale infrastructureprojects. Thus, the semi-closed nature of the SCGF provides a skewed investment and socialenvironment affording a development monopoly to the government and to the privileged, alliedlarge quasi-private sector interests. The current Kremlin practice of appointing, rather thanelecting, governors further reduces state accountability to residents at the local level. Thus, abalance of federal, regional, and local interests has not been achieved in the region.

Not surprisingly, public participation in the environmental planning process involvingthe region is almost non-existent. Only a small number of NGOs and fledgling initiativegroups have been able to challenge the exclusion of local residents from the spatial planningprocess.

7In addition to oil exports, cargo handling facilities for imports are being expanded. Germany has been thelargest source of goods imported into Leningrad Oblast since 2000, and German exporters are expected to be amongthe most important customers of the Ust’-Luga port (Petrostat, 2008, p. 228).

8Local authorities and residents are only notified (rather than consulted) about federal infrastructure develop-ment, and when public hearings do occur, they are strictly pro forma events (e.g., Radioaktivnyy, 2009). And a spe-cial permit continues to be required to access the SCGF, for both Russian and foreign nationals.



UST’-LUGA PORT CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS

The development of the Ust’-Luga complex is taking place within the framework of thefederal program named “Modernization of the Transport System of Russia” (Modernizatsiya,2001). In the same way that the BB-1 termination at the port of Primorsk permitted Russia tocircumvent export ports in the Baltic States, the BTS-2 is planned to alleviate dependence onthe Druzhba pipeline through Belarus and Ukraine (Ust’-Luga, 2009). Constructed on anentirely undeveloped coastline (most spectacular from an elevated perspective, as in Fig. 2),the massive complex occupies some six km of coastal frontage.9 In May 2008, Putin sug-gested that up to 650 billion rubles (US$25 billion at the then-current exchange rate) ulti-mately might be invested in the complex, of which 300 billion was to be in the form offederal budget expenditures on railway development and the dredging of harbor; the remain-der is to come from private investors.10 A General Development Plan guiding construction ofthe port complex until 2015 has already been approved (BTS-2, 2008, p. 1). Year-round useof the port with the exception of an approximately 40-day period of ice is expected to makethe port highly competitive in comparison with the largely overburdened port of St.Petersburg. The water depth of the Ust’-Luga port (16 m) and its short distance (3.7 km) to amain shipping channel in the Gulf of Finland will permit it to accept dry-cargo ships with a

9In 2007 alone, excavation of new territory for the automobile-railway terminal at Ust’-Luga created 301,400m2 of additional port area through infilling of Luga Bay, which is located 110 km from St. Petersburg and occupiesapproximately 20 km of shoreline between the Kurgal’skiy Peninsula to the west and Koporskaya Bay to the east(Fig. 1; Petrostat, 2008, p. 166).

10The private funds are earmarked for the construction of a settlement for port workers as well as oil transferterminals. Completion of the oil transfer/export terminals and the first stage of the BTS-2 project with a capacity of30 million tons/year is planned for completion in the third quarter of 2012 (Ust’-Luga, 2009). The future settlementis projected to house 34,500 port workers and their families, and would be the first planned town built in the RussianFederation in more than a decade (Ust’-Luga, 2008, p. 1).

Fig. 2. Construction of the Ust’-Luga port. All photos were taken by Gennadiy Shabarin, NGOGreen World, in July 2008.



deadweight of 75,000 tons and liquid-cargo ships with a deadweight of 120,000 tons (ibid.).The Russian Railways company has completed construction of new rail approaches to theport (Fig. 3), and road linkages to major highway corridors also are being built.

Terminals that are already operational (a total of four) include the necessary facilities forcoal, sulfur, general cargo, and automobile–rail ferry service. Container and marine fuel oil ter-minals, in addition to those for the transfer of general (dry bulk) and liquid freight, are under con-struction. Completion of all terminals currently under construction will eventually allow for themovement of more than 20 different categories of freight, with a projected overall traffic volumeof 50 million tons in 2010 (Ust’-Luga, 2008, p. 2).11

With respect to the environmental impacts of Ust’-Luga port developments, Putin haspointed out that the Ust’-Luga route for the Baltic Transport System-2 was selected as the“most ecological” variant of all routes proposed (BTS-2, 2008). More specifically, he wascomparing the Ust’-Luga site with another proposed terminus, namely the existing oil exportport at Primorsk, whose expansion would be necessary to accommodate the increased through-put and which would require additional construction of a new oil pipeline tunnel underneaththe Neva River, St. Petersburg’s main source of drinking water (Trumbull, 2007).12

Similarly concerned about the hazards, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Devel-opment (EBRD) conducted an extensive environmental assessment of the proposed

11The development of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at the port also is being considered. Eventuallysmall volumes of LNG could be shipped to North America’s East Coast from the planned LNG terminal (Stern,2005, p. 218).

12The environmental risks associated with the Ust’-Luga port site appear to be less severe than at Primorsk, butonly in a relative sense. The Ust’-Luga site requires a considerably shorter pipeline route to reach the Gulf ofFinland and to a port where ice is a problem for fewer days than at Primorsk. Less dredging also is required at Ust’-Luga to access the main shipping lanes. It should be noted, however, that environmental impacts are associated bothwith the construction of the port and with its longer term use.

Fig. 3. Rail lines and traffic at the Ust’-Luga port complex.



Ust’-Luga port project in 2003.13 The published EIA, subcontracted to the Swedish firmScandiaconsult, concluded that the land and shoreline areas on which the port complexwould be built (Fig. 4) contained a large number of rare plants that would be destroyed byconstruction in roughly 30 locations (EBRD, 2003, p. 13). Furthermore, dredging (requiredon a regular basis) and infilling of Luga Bay would destroy large areas of benthic animalhabitat, and shallow-water areas used for fish spawning and feeding would disappear.14

Other threats are associated with routine port operations, with accidental discharge of oilor other hazardous cargo generally considered to pose the greatest risk (such cargoes accountfor roughly one-fifth of all freight carried on the Baltic), especially given the Sea’s shallowdepths (EBRD, 2003, p. 15; Alimov and Golubkov, 2008; Kondrat’yev, 2007). A relatedthreat is accidental rupture of a vessel’s fuel tank. Such accidents occur regularly throughoutthe world when ships run aground or are involved in collisions (and the Baltic already hassome of the busiest shipping routes in the world). The EBRD’s environmental impact assess-ment predicts that overall traffic on the Baltic Sea will increase by 10–15 percent due to thenew capacity at Ust’-Luga port.15

13The Russian Federation Ministry of Transport had originally invited the EBRD to participate in the fundingof the construction of the Ust’-Luga port, a proposal that eventually was withdrawn. Nevertheless, EBRD proceededto conduct some preliminary analysis of the project, determining that it would require an Environmental ImpactAssessment (EIA) to qualify for EBRD funding (EBRD, 2003).

14The well-being of the wild Baltic salmon population in the region has been of particular concern to biolo-gists. Overall, feeding, spawning, and nursery territories for juvenile salmon in Luga Bay can be expected todecrease significantly (Sagitov and Merriman, 2007).

15Helsinki Commission statistics show that there were 145 accidents on the Baltic Sea in 2004 and 151 in2005, compared with an average of 63 annually from 2000 to 2003 (Nicoll and Delaney, 2007, p. 1). Similarly, 117ship accidents occurred in 2006, 120 in 2007, and 135 in 2008. According to 2000–2008 data of the Helsinki Com-mission, 7 percent of those reported accidents resulted in some form of pollution (HELCOM, 2009).

Fig. 4. Shoreline vegetation at the mouth of the Khabolovka River and fish spawning ground inclose proximity to construction of the Ust’-Luga port complex.



Vessel activity at ports has an inevitably negative impact on marine life in shallowwaters surrounding those ports. Anti-fouling paints on ship bottoms, applied to preventmarine species from attaching themselves to hulls, leach substances like tributyltin, irgarol,and copper into the benthic environment. Those anti-fouling substances are most harmful inshallow bays, especially during the reproduction cycles of marine flora and fauna. Other neg-ative impacts on the environment from ports include likely increases in levels of eutrophica-tion from non-point pollution runoff from large impervious surfaces. The discharge byvisiting ships of ballast water containing alien organisms from water bodies far from theBaltic Sea also constitutes a threat by introducing non-native species into the well-preservednatural habitat of Luga Bay.16 Increased atmospheric emissions from ship traffic at the portwill be compounded by those generated by road and railway transport connecting the portwith its landward hinterland.

THE TWO LENINGRAD NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

The strategic and commercial value of the new port complex is enhanced by a large-scale, proximal complementary energy resource—the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant(LNPP) in Sosnovyy Bor. The LNPP, which began operation in 1974, is the largest nuclearpower plant on the Baltic Sea (4,000 megawatts [Mwe] capacity) with four RBMK-1000(Chernobyl’-design) reactors (Fig. 5). A second nuclear power plant (LNPP-2) is now underconstruction in the vicinity of the coastline and original LNPP (Fig. 6).17

16On this problem in the Baltic, see Sagitov and Merriman (2007).17The new plant will initially house two VVER-1200 (1200 MWe) reactors, a number that may ultimately

increase to six (Prirodnyye, 2007, p. 4). About 600 workers were observed to be working on the LNPP-2 foundationin July 2008.

Fig. 5. Cooling water channel from energy blocks 3 and 4 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant.Water is released 10°C warmer than the surrounding Baltic Sea.



Nuclear power plants require large volumes of cooling water that are released at a signif-icantly higher temperature than the surrounding environment. The existing LNPP produces aheated seawater flow rate of 200 m3/second back into the Gulf of Finland. The two relatedenvironmental impacts of cooling are: (1) higher rates of eutrophication, including concen-trations of blue-green algae, and reduced spawning of fish in the vicinity due to thermal pol-lution of the maritime ecosystem; and (2) fish kills within the plant’s cooling system, asseawater is taken from the Gulf of Finland without adequate screening of the catch from thewater. LNPP-2 will be cooled by cooling towers that release up to 50,000 tons of seawater inthe form of steam for each of its six planned reactors. Thus, although eutrophication in theGulf of Finland will not be worsened by LNPP-2, the release of large volumes of water vaporinto the atmosphere may contribute to global warming.

On the horizon are a number of other potential hazards emanating from the existingnuclear plant as well as from its expanded variant. Small and isolated releases of radioactivegases into the atmosphere have been reported over the 35-year operation of the LNPP.18

Spent nuclear fuel containing plutonium-239, which is hazardous to the environment forhundreds of thousands of years, continues to be stored on site and within 100 meters of theBaltic Sea.19 It can be assumed that the spent fuel from the LNPP (and eventually fromLNPP-2) will remain on the shore of the Baltic Sea for decades after the plants close, as nei-ther LNPP nor the Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation20 has set aside significant

18In 1975 a fuel assembly at the plant burned and experts estimate that up to 1.5 million curies were releasedinto the atmosphere, raising the background gamma level in the area by a factor of 100 (Bodrov et al., 2008). At thetime, the local population was not informed about the hazard.

19More than 30,000 fuel assemblies (about 4,000 tons) are in temporary storage at LNPP, together with 18,500m3 of liquid radioactive waste (ibid).

20The state-owned holding company that regulates the civilian nuclear industry.

Fig. 6. Excavation pit (13–16 m deep) for foundation of the future LNPP-2.



funds for the unusually expensive task of decommissioning the LNPP some day.21 TheLNPP’s original planned lifecycle has already been once extended. Perhaps most trouble-some is the nearly ubiquitous absence of independent monitoring of environmental and long-term health indicators in the region.

Two additional radioactive waste processing enterprises in Sosnovy Bor continue tooperate and may even increase their level of production as a result of new port facilities atUst’-Luga. The first, ECOMET-S, processes low- and middle-level radioactive metals (e.g.,in spent equipment) from LNPP, and following a modernization program began to make itssmelter available for processing radioactive metal delivered from other Russian nuclearpower plants and related sources, such as oil pipeline segments that have acquired low levelsof radioactivity during their operational lifetimes.22 EKOMET-S has become the largest plantof its kind in Europe (capacity 10,000 tons/year). Although it belongs to a private company,the plant nonetheless has operated on LNPP territory since 1996. With the new Ust’-Lugaport facility, plant officials expect to increase capacity and to begin importing radioactivemetallic waste from other countries for processing (Henry, 2006).

A second facility at Sosnovyy Bor, the RADON plant, in operation since 1962, is aregional-level facility for storage of medium- and low-level radioactive waste from acrossnorthwest Russia, storing both solid (more than 60,000 m3) and liquid (1,200 m3) waste(Prirodnyye, 2007, p. 6).23 One of the most critical problems facing the RADON plant is lackof space for the disposal of new radioactive waste.

RELATED POWER-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES AND PORT FACILITIES

The prospect of completion of the LNPP-2 has led to other proposed large-scaledevelopment of power-intensive industries that could have significant environmentalimpacts on the SCGF. One such project is a polycrystalline silicon chemical plant (with aprojected initial annual capacity of 5,000 tons with a later expansion to 20,000). It wouldbecome the world’s largest plant of that kind at an estimated cost of $370 million(Prirodnyye, 2007, p. 5) Regional and federal authorities have already approved theproject and a 40-hectare site has been selected. The plant’s power requirements (500MWE) would be roughly half of one of the existing reactors at LNPP. An important feed-stock, metallurgical silicon, is to be shipped from the Urals and also imported fromNorway and Brazil.24

Plans for another energy-intensive, large-scale project have been resurrected as well,namely the construction of a large-scale aluminum plant on the SCGF that would take advan-tage of relatively inexpensive electrical power of the LNPP and its proximity to the Ust’-Luga port for importing of alumina and other raw materials and exporting finished

21Cost estimates based on the decommissionings of German (Griefswald) and Lithuanian (Ignalina) plants runas high as US$7 billion. A reprocessing unit for solid radioactive waste is currently operating on the territory of theLNPP (Bodrov et al., 2008), although the environmental impact assessment mandated to accompany its constructionwas never undertaken.

22Repeated explosions at the ECOMET-S smelter have thus far resulted only in injuries of three workers.23Fires in 1976 and 1979 at the plant were extinguished with water and groundwater in the vicinity has been

contaminated with Cs137, Sr90, and Pu239 (Bodrov et al., 2008).24The project’s investors consist of two companies, OAO “Baltic Silicon Valley–International Project PoliSiL”

and the “Project Engineering Company” joint-stock company.



products.25 Raw material for the aluminum plant is to be imported from Africa and Australiausing the port of Ust’-Luga, whereupon it is processed into aluminum, and then re-exported.26 Such projects directly enhance the prospects for an extension of the service life ofthe existing LNPP, as well as provide a justification for constructing the LNPP-2.

The list of proposed “spinoffs” from the construction of the Ust’-Luga port and expan-sion of LNPP include a number of subsidiary ports along the SCGF. A relaunching of con-struction of a port on Batareynaya Bay, for which a widely publicized groundbreakingceremony was held in 1997, continues to be regularly discussed. In addition, a number ofother facilities are planned within the Gorkiy Harbor Area, a few kilometers north of theUst’-Luga complex, including the Baltic Kuzbass coal terminal and a nearby roll-on/roll-offterminal.27 Other projects under consideration in the region include a freight terminal atLomonosov (Fig. 1), a coal terminal at Ninas, and an enlargement of the existing Neste ter-minal in the vicinity of the anti-flooding protection barrier on Kotlin Island (city ofKronshtadt; e.g., see Trumbull, 2007). Also planned in the proximity of the closed borderzone of the SCGF, in the direction of St. Petersburg, is a new port of Oranienbaum, where theSwedish firm Nunes AB has planned a bituminum plant.

NATURE RESERVES UNDER THREAT

Among the most irreversible environment impacts that will result from construction andoperation of the Ust’-Luga port complex, the LNPP conglomeration, and any of the relateddevelopments are those that will be experienced on the protected nature reserves in the SCGFregion. Three officially designated nature reserves lie directly on coastal territory, namely theKurgal’skiy, Kotel’skiy, and Lebyazhiy. The Kurgal’skiy Reserve (60,000 ha), 56 km north-west of Kingisepp, includes the mainland and adjacent islands of the Kurgal’skiy Peninsula(well known as a breeding ground for Baltic seals). The reserve, a resting point for largenumbers of birds migrating between northern Siberia and Western Europe and Africa, con-tains 250 different species of birds28 and 750 species of vegetation. More than 40 percent ofits territory is under strict protection (no human activity permitted) and the remainder isavailable for limited tourist and recreational use, including mushroom and berry picking,herding, and fishing.

The Kotel’skiy Reserve (10,600 ha) is located partially on the coast and extends 10 kilo-meters inland toward the village of Kotly. Campfires outside of organized sites are prohibited

25The latest plans, by the Baltic Aluminum Company (a joint Russian-UK enterprise registered in Britain andthe Virginia Isles) call for the construction of an aluminum smelter with a capacity of 540,000 tons/year at a cost of$1.8 billion. The Baltic Aluminum Plant’s official “headquarters” is located in the nearby Kotel’skiy settlement inLeningrad Oblast, in a building that in reality does not exist.

26The destination of the plant’s output for export is underscored by the glut of aluminum on the Russiandomestic market. The country has many large producers, but a depressed domestic demand, as only 20 percent orless of the aluminum produced in Russia has been sold in the country in recent years, while the rest is exported. Forbackground, see Fortescue (2006, pp. 80–81).

27Here, the indigenous ethnic Izhora group, who live in the village of Vistino (Fig. 1) and are only a few hun-dred in number, fear that the new facilities will impede or prevent them from accessing their existing dock area inorder to continue their traditional livelihoods as fishermen.

28The area is an internationally designated Ramsar Convention site (Ramsar is an international treaty for theconservation and sustainable utilization of wetlands) and is listed with the European NATURE 2000 network as aSpecial Bird Protection Area. Among the more important species protected are Bewick’s swan (Cygnus bewickii)and the osprey (Pandion haliaetus; for background, see Zimin, 2002).



and vehicle use and parking is forbidden beyond official roads. The reserve was designated topreserve a tract of southern-taiga forest and its lake-river network (including 3,000 ha of lakesand bogs) with its indigenous flora and fauna. A large number of deciduous trees grow herenaturally, unusual at this latitude, and the Peypia stream (flowing from Lake Kopanskoye tothe Baltic Sea) is home to Baltic trout and European pearl oysters. Larger wildlife includewild boar, moose, wolf, and fox. The zone of lake and rivers within the reserve is designatedfor strict protection. However, the capacity to enforce environmental protection regulations isquitte limited, and insufficient for the much greater recreational pressure that will accompanythe development of Ust’-Luga and the SCGF.

The third reserve under threat in the region, Lebyazhiy (6,300 ha), is an internationallyrecognized wetland reserve protected by both Russian Federation laws and the Ramsar Con-vention. Hunting or disturbance of fauna and flora in Lebyazhiy is expressly forbidden, andmotorized boats are permitted only in early spring and fall. As geographically closest of thethree to the city of St. Petersburg, this reserve is now experiencing substantial recreationalpressure.29 Lebyazhiy’s territory was reduced in the late 1990s when an oil port project forBatareinaya Bay was initially planned, and smaller tracts have been transferred for the con-struction of dachas. Erosion of coastal sections of Lebyazhiy is today accelerated due todredging off the coast for sand used for infilling to create new land for development withinNeva Bay (Prirodnyye, 2007; Trumbull, 2007).

The major threat to all three nature reserves is a significant oil spill, or even set of minorspills, a not improbable event considering the anticipated increase of shipping in the area. Allthree reserves would be subject to contamination (likely more or less simultaneously), fromspillage of oil or another hazardous substance in the vicinity of the Ust’-Luga port complexon Luga Bay. Secondary threats include disturbance of native fish and seal populations onthe water portion of the reserves’ protected areas and increased forest fire incidence reflect-ing elevated recreational activity. Industrial-scale logging, despite being officially banned,appears to be occurring and threatens the reserves’ biodiversity.30 Official enforcement ofmeasures to protect the territories of all three nature reserves remains a challenge, as effortsby local inspectors to enforce the rules in the region often are resisted by powerful commer-cial forces.31

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As a result of the unbalanced and largely unchecked commercial influence of federalgovernment interests in the closed border zone of the SCGF region, local and regional plan-ning suggestions and solutions offered by the local population are largely ignored. As such,

29In large part this is a reflection of increased rates of private automobile ownership.30An estimated 40,000 m3 of timber was logged in 2007 (Prirodnyye, 2007, p. 3). In the Kurgal’skiy Reserve,

felling designed to remove fuel and thus prevent larger-scale fires is permitted by the local forest service, but canbecome an alibi for larger-scale, illegal commercial timber (Kurgal’skiy, 2009; Vyrubki, 2009). This activity isclosely related to port development in the SCGF, as a medium-sized timber export port operates near the Kurgal’skiyReserve.

31Revealing in this context are events that followed the official creation of a new Polyana Bianki municipal-level nature reserve (21 ha) on the SCGF on July 31, 2008. More than 1,000 local residents had collected 500,000rubles ($20,000) to purchase land for the reserve (for a combination of nature protection and limited recreational andecological educational uses; see Chistov, 2009), which was approved by authorities after public hearings. Nonethe-less, despite the territory’s new status, seven land parcels within the reserve subsequently were sold to new ownerswithout notice, raising suspicions that local officials profited handsomely from the sales.



spatial planning in the region has thus far been undertaken without genuine public participa-tion. Even the possibility of establishing an open information channel with federal leaders forsharing local concerns and preferences for the development of the region is challenging if notimpossible.32 Within a context of “sole stakeholder involvement” (Moscow in close coopera-tion with large commercial interests), the prospects for the region’s balanced economic andsocial development of the region are greatly diminished.33 This situation undermines consid-erably the chance for a favorable outcome in terms of even pursuit of a sustainable approachto the region’s development. An official roundtable event at the annual Day of the Baltic Seaconference in St. Petersburg in 2007 included a revealingly stated demand by the participantsthat mechanisms be introduced to ensure public access to appropriate information related toplanned and implemented infrastructure development in the region.34

Although the work of non-government organization (NGO) activists in the region hasachieved some successes,35 efforts to strengthen public participation can be stymied by

32One of the primary immediate concerns is the conditions of local roads around the Ust’-Luga port. As recentlyas five years ago, we observed these roads to be in excellent condition. However, the movement of heavy trucks usedin the port’s construction (Fig. 7) seriously damaged the roads, making normal passage increasingly difficult for localresidents. The single regular bus route in the area has been cancelled due to the poor condition of the roads.

33It can be further argued that the absence of past experience (and of democratic traditions as a whole to someextent) hinders the emergence of effective public participation in decisions on siting polluting industrial facilities(e.g., see Fish, 2005).

34The participants demanded that authorities “define a proper cross-sectoral spatial planning process for thecoastal land and coastal waters in the Russian Gulf of Finland, so that environmental values and exploitation inter-ests will be properly balanced” (Sagitov and Merriman, 2007, p. 1).

35The NGO Green World was successful in influencing a 2005 decision on the part of Sosnovy Bor town lead-ers not to permit the construction of a first attempt to build an aluminum plant in the vicinity of the city. Farther easton the SCGF, leaders in Oranienbaum are actively seeking a voice for public participation in environmental plan-ning.

Fig. 7. Heavy truck traffic on access road to the Ust’-Luga port.



emergence of government NGOs (GONGOs)36 that misrepresent the preferences and valuesof the public (Prirodnyye, 2007, p. 15) as well as government tactics to discreetly hold publichearings before organized public participation can materialize.37 More generally, public hear-ings related to infrastructure development on the SCGF have largely been formalities, per-forming more of an informational than consultative role. In the case of a hearing conductedfor the Ust’-Luga port complex, only 123 people attended despite the very large scope of theproject and significant environmental impact on the SCGF (EBRD, 2003). Similarly, publichearings held for the planned construction of compressor station and entry point of the pro-posed North Stream gas pipeline in the closed border area of Portovaya Bay in LeningradOblast, arguably the most visible future coastal infrastructure project in Russia today, havewidely been viewed by environmentalists as cursory and ineffective (Zernova, 2009).

The polarization of federal and local interests over strategically justifiable and commer-cially attractive, but also environmentally sensitive, development projects presents a criticalchallenge to Russia’s federal, regional, and local leaders and planners. The near absence oflocal participatory mechanisms for environmental and other spatial planning of such large-scale infrastructure on the SCGF would appear to threaten the environmental and socialhealth of the region as a whole. Similar challenges exist in other coastal regions of Russia,most prominently, construction plans related to preparations for the 2012 Olympic Games inSochi, which triggered environmental protests at the international level, and prompted PrimeMinister Putin to intervene personally, as he had previously done in the routing of the ESPOpipeline in the Lake Baykal region (e.g., Melikova, 2006). Similarly, illegal private homeconstruction on the Curonian Spit in Kaliningrad—a UNESCO World Heritage site fartherwest on the open Baltic (Raguzina, 2008)—and countless rigged auctions and unauthorizedsales of coastal property on the previously public recreational shoreline in the vicinity of St.Petersburg demonstrate that without effective public participation in spatial planning at alllevels, conditions bode poorly for the sustainable development of Russia’s coastal areas.

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Environmental Degradation of Russian Coastal Regions: The Case …€¦ · part of efforts to diversify Russia’s outlets for energy exports, Ust’-Luga would become the pipeline