Environmental Change, Food Crises and Violence in ... · 2 Although they do not share physical borders, the Arbore, the Kara, the Somali, the Toposa in Southern Sudan, and the Pokot

Arbeitsschwerpunkt Friedens- und Konfliktforschung

Research Unit Peace and Conflict Studies

Yntiso Gebre

Environmental Change, Food Crises and Violence in Dassanech, Southern Ethiopia

Research Report Series • Peace and Conflict Studies

No. 1 • September 2012

Research Unit Peace and Conflict Studies

Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science

Freie Universität Berlin

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Gebre, Yntiso 2012: Environmental Change, Food Crises and Violence in Dassanech, Southern Ethiopia. Research Report

Peace and Conflict Studies No. 1. Freie Universität Berlin, Research Unit Peace and Conflict Studies. Berlin, September 2012.

ISSN 2194-9573

Research Report Series Peace and Conflict Studies

Edited by the Research Unit Peace and Conflict Studies, Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin

The Research Report Series Peace and Conflict Studies serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to

publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series should

not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.

Copyright for this issue: Yntiso Gebre

Editorial assistance: Bettina Engels and Verena Namberger

Layout: Natascha Nassir-Shahnian

Research Report Series • No. 1 • September 2012 | 3

Environmental Change, Food Crises and Violence in Dassanech, Southern Ethiopia

Yntiso Gebre

Abstract

This paper examines pastoral conflicts in Dassanech area, Southern Ethiopia, against the

background of environmental change and food insecurity. The study reveals a relationship

between environmental stress and the escalation of inter-ethnic pastoral conflicts in the area.

Nevertheless, pastoral conflicts in Dassanech are complex and strongly challenge the idea of

a direct causal link between concrete environmental factors and specific conflict incidents.

Socio-cultural and economic factors cause or trigger conflicts independently or in conjunc-

tion with ecological processes. Furthermore, infrastructure and large-scale agricultural deve-

lopment project are likely to influence the social configuration in the Omo River basin and

therefore, possibly, also local conflict dynamics. The paper argues that local social and cultural

factors play an important role for conflict action, and that, therefore, the study of resource

conflicts must not be reduced to economic, agricultural, and ecological aspects.

Zusammenfassung

Das Papier analysiert Konflikte zwischen Gruppen mobiler Tierhalter_innen in Dassanech,

Südathiopien, im Zusammenhang mit Umweltwandel und Ernährungsunsicherheit. Die Stu-

die verweist auf eine Beziehung zwischen Umweltveränderungen und der Eskalation von

inter-ethnischen Konflikten im Untersuchungsgebiet. Gleichzeitig betont der Autor, dass

Intergruppenkonflikte zwischen mobilen Tierhalter_innen komplexe Phänomene sind und

kein unmittelbarer Kausalzusammenhang zwischen ökologischen Faktoren und Gewalt-

handeln besteht. Gesellschaftlich-kulturelle und ökonomische Faktoren verstärken und ve-

ursachen Konflikte unabhängig von oder in Wechselwirkung mit ökologischen Prozessen.

Darüber hinaus beeinflussen in der Region Infrastrukturprojekte sowie die Entwicklung

großflächiger Landwirtschaft die sozialen Bedingungen und infolge möglicherweise auch die

Konfliktdynamiken. Gebre Yntiso argumentiert, dass lokale soziale und kulturelle Faktoren

eine bedeutende Rolle für Konflikthandeln spielen und Konflikte um natürliche Ressourcen

deshalb nicht auf ökonomische und (agrar-)ökologische Aspekte reduziert werden dürfen.

Research for this paper has been conducted within the project „Local conflict dynamics: Environ-

mental change, food crises, and violence in sub-Saharan Africa“ (2010-12). Funding was provi-

ded by the German foundation for peace research (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung - DSF).

Pastoral conflict in Dessanech | 4

Table of Content

1. Introduction 5

2. Local Conflicts in Dassanech 8 2.1Intra-ethnicconflicts 8 2.2Inter-ethnicconflicts 9 2.2.1Dassanechvs.Hamar 9 2.2.2Dassanechvs.Nyangatom 10 2.2.3Dassanechvs.Turkana 12 2.2.4Dassanechvs.Gabra 12 2.3Majoractorsinconflict 13 2.3.1Theyouth 13 2.3.2Seniorgeneration-set 14 2.3.3Women 15 2.3.4Diviners/magicians 16 2.3.5Governmentinstitutions 16 2.3.6CEWARNandNGOs 16 2.4Recentchangesinconflicttrends 17

3. Food security/insecurity and its relation to conflict in Dassanech 18 3.1Livelihoodstrategies 18 3.2Perceptionandrealityoffoodsecurity/insecurity 21 3.2.1Theleveloffoodsecurity/insecurity 21 3.2.2Meaningandreasonsoffoodsecurity/insecurity 22 3.2.3Trendsinfoodsecurity/insecurity 23 3.3Drought,rainfall,food(in)securityandlocalconflicts 24

4. Conflict Management/Resolution in Dassanech 25 4.1Copingwithconflicts 25 4.2Institutionsofconflictmanagement:TheArra 26 4.3Conflictmanagement:Levelsandparticipants 27

5. Conclusion 29

References 31InterviewsandFocusGroupDiscussions 33


1. Introduction

Inter-ethnicconflictsinthelowerOmovalley(wheretheDassanechpeoplelive)havesteadilyincreasedinintensityandfrequency.Itappearsthatresourcescarcity(whichcouldbeexplainedintermsofnaturalandsocialfactors),thegrowingpressureoverfastdwindlingresources,andcertainculturalfactorsarethedrivingforceofconflictdynamics.Thereareclearindicationsthat thehumanand livestockpopulations in the studyareahavebeen increasing.Althoughadequatemeteorologicalrecordsarelackingtosupportarguments,climatechangemayhavecontributedtothefrequentdroughtthat(togetherwithotherfactors)causedscarcityofwaterandpasture.Basedontheavailableevidence,thelineofargumentpursuedinthisreportisthatenvironmentalchange,populationgrowth,andincrement in livestocksizecombinedwithahostofotherfactorsexacerbatedcompetitionovervitalresourcesandtheescalationofintra-andinter-ethnicconflictsinthestudyarea.

Thelinkbetweentheconditionofresources(scarcityorabundance)andconflicthaslongbeentheorized.Whilesomewritersarguethatcompetitionoverscarceresourcesleadstointer-groupconflict,otherscontendthatplacesendowedwithplentifulresourcesarealsocondemnedtosuffer fromconflict (Butler/Gates2010).Bothargumentsmayhold true indifferentcircum-stances.However,theintra-andinter-ethnicconflictsinDassanechareacannotbeexplainedintermsofthe‘curseofabundance’.CritchleyandTerriff(1993inTeshome2010:183)convin-cinglystatethatresourcesleadtoconflictwhentheybecomeincreasinglyscarce,whentheyareessentialforhumansurvival,andwhentheycanbephysicallyseizedorcontrolled.ThislineofargumentseemstobeconsistentwiththeexperienceoftheDassanech.

TheDassanechpeople(alsospeltasDaasanach,Dasenach,andDassanetch,andcalledGeleb,Merile, andGabarich),who speak anEastCushitic language, live inEthiopia andKenyaonthenorthernshoreofLakeTurkanaandfurthernorthalongtheOmoRiver.TheEthiopianDassanech(themajority)liveinDassanechWoreda(District),SouthOmoZone,SouthernNa-tions,NationalitiesandPeoplesRegion(SNNPR).ThepopulationoftheEthiopianDassanechisestimatedat48,067(CSA2007:84).AccordingtounpublisheddatafromtheSouthOmoZoneAdministration, the landareaof theDassanechis2,575sqkm.Until2006, theareawaspartoftheadministrativeunitofKurazworeda.Followingthe2006administrativerestructuring,DassanechlandwaselevatedtoadistrictlevelwithitscapitalatOmorate,some852kmsouthofAddisAbaba.TheDassanechdistrictisdividedinto40unitscalledkebele.Akebeleisthelowe-stadministrativeunitresponsibleforgovernmentfunctionssuchaslocaladministration,thecollectionoftax,provisionofextensionserviceandfoodaid,elections,etc.ExceptforOmorate(thecapitalofthedistrict),whichhostsmigrantsandlocalpeople,allotherkebelesareinhabi-tedbyagro-pastoralDassanechcommunities.

Traditionally, theDassanecharedivided intoeight territorialsections (emeto).These includetheShirr,Inkoria,Narich,Elele,Riele,Oro,Randal,andKuoro.Despitetherecentre-organiza-tionoftheDassanechsocietyinto‘modern’administrativeunitsbythegovernment,theemetostructureremainsstrongandfunctionalthroughouttheDassanechterritory.Territorialsec-


tions,whichareseenasidentitymarkersoftheresidents,areautonomousintermsofmanag-inginternalaffairssuchasresourceuse,transferofgenerationalpower,religious/ritualfunc-tions,offensive/defensiveactions,raiding,andconflictresolution.Furthermore,theDassanecharedividedintoeightexogamousandnon-territorialclans(turo),namely,Turinyerim,Fargar,Galbur,Turat,Ili,Mur,Edze,andTiyeme.Theclansresideinallterritorialsections,althougheachsectionmaynothavealleightclans.

Today,theDassanechpeoplearepredominantlyagro-pastoralists,whocomplementtheirin-comefromlivestockproductionwithcultivationofcropsonthefloodedbanksof theOmoRiverandfishing.TheDassanechclaimtohavelostmuchoftheirlandstoKenyainthesouthandinthewestduringthelastcentury.Thelossoflandtranslatedtomassivedecreasesinthenumbersoftheirlivestock,whichforcedmanypeopletoadoptalternativelivelihoodstrategies:cultivationandfishing.1Itwasthishistoricalprocessthatturnedtheprimarilypastoralpeopleintoprimarilyagro-pastoralcommunities.Cattleandgoatsrepresentthemostcommonlyrai-sedandhighlyvaluedlivestock.Besides,theDassanechalsoraisesheep,donkeys,andinsomepartscamels.Sorghumisthestaplefoodcropgrowninthearea.Inadditiontosorghum,theDassanechgrowsomemaizeandbeans.

ThedegreeofdependenceoftheDassanechonthesedifferenteconomicactivitiesvaryfromoneterritorialsectiontoanother.TheShiir (the largestgroup), theNarich, theOro,andtheKuorocombinelivestockandcropproduction.TheInkoriaandtheRandalrelyheavilyonlive-stockproduction,whiletheEleleandRielecountmoreoncultivationandfishing1andlessonanimalhusbandry.Thevariationsinthedegreeofdependenceondifferenteconomicactivitiesmaybeexplained in termsofproximity to theOmoRiver, lossofanimals thatnecessitatedrelianceonotheractivities, and the suitabilityof locations for the typesofproduction.Thelakeshoreisreportedtobemoresuitableforcattlethanforgoats.Theriverbankisbestsuitedforfloodretreatcultivation.Whilethosewhoraiselargenumbersofgoats(e.g.,theInkoria)tendtoselltheirgoatstobuyfood,thosewhoraisecattlehavetogrowtheirownfoodbecausesellingcattletobuyfoodislesscommoninDassanech.

TheDassanech are surrounded by four ethnic groups (namely, theTurkana, theGabra, theNyangatom,andtheHamar),whoareconsideredasenemies(kiz)becauseofalonghistoryofconflict.2 TheTurkanaandtheGabraarelocatedinKenya,whiletheNyangatomandtheHamarareEthiopians.As indicatedearlier, theconflictbetweentheDassanechandtheirneighborsmaybeexplainedlargelyintermsofpastureandwaterscarcityandcertainculturalfactors.Theallegedinvolvementofexternalagencies(e.g.,commercialraidersandelementsoftheKenyansecurityforce)seemstobechangingthedynamicsofcross-borderconflict.3Localcommunities,

1 AsmallgroupofDassanechcalledDhies(partoftheRieleterritorialsection)livesaroundthenort-hernshoreofLakeTurkanaandlargelydependsonfishing.

2 Althoughtheydonotsharephysicalborders,theArbore,theKara,theSomali,theToposainSouthernSudan,andthePokotinKenyaarecalledgaalkunno(‘ourpeople’)andtreatedasfellowassociates.

3 Sincecross-borderconflictisnotthefocusofthepresentresearch,theissuewillnotbecoveredindetail.


localandregionalgovernments,andNGOsoperatingintheareahavebeenorganizingrepeatedpeacemeetings.Despitetheseefforts,theconflictbetweentheDassanechandtheirneighborscontinuetoescalate.

TheDassanechhavebeenstudiedbymanyresearcherssuchasUriAlmagor(1978,1979,1983,1986)onaffinityandbondpartnership,thegeneration-setsystemandconfrontations,andthecenter-peripheryrelations;ClaudiaCarr(1977)oncrisisinpastoralism;NealSobania(1994)oncenter-periphery relations;PeggyElfman (2005)onwomenand theirparts in society;YvuanHoutteman(2007,2010)onconceptsofillness,healing,andhomicide;ToruSagawa(2008,2009,2010)onpeaceandwar,automaticrifles,socialorderandinter-ethnicrelations;YohannesGe-bre-Michaelandothers(2005)onconflict;andYntisoGebre(2011)oninter-ethnicconflictsandcustomaryconflictresolutionmechanisms.Noneofthestudiesconductedthusfarseriouslyexploredtheconnectionbetweenenvironmentalchange,foodinsecurity,andconflict.

Thepresentresearchwasundertakenbetween1 Juneand23 July2011 in two trips toSouthOmoZone.Duringthefirsttripthatlasteduntil11June,relevantdocumentsfromzonalofficeswereobtained;fivezonallevelgovernmentofficialsandexpertswereinterviewed.Duringthesecondtrip(10to22July2011),sevenworedalevelofficialsandexpertsand13Dassanechpasto-ralistsfromthreevillages(Hadho,Koro,andRate)wereinterviewed.4Moreover,fivefocusgroupdiscussionswereheldwiththeelderlymen(twogroups),adultwomen,amixtureofmenandwomen,andtheyouth.Additionally,differentliteraturesources(e.g.,ethnographicaccounts),officialdocuments(e.g.,unpublishedreports),andstatisticalrecords(e.g., livestocksize)havebeen reviewed and incorporated in different parts of the report as deemednecessary.Dataacquiredduringapreviousresearchonpastoralconflictandconflictresolutionmechanismsconductedin2009/10havealsobeenusedinthisreport.

Thereportisorganizedintofivesections.Thisintroductorysectionisfollowedbyadiscussiononthestateoflocalconflictinthestudyarea.Inthissectionattemptsaremadetodescribethetypesofconflict,themajoractors,andthetrendsintheconflictdynamics.Sectionthreefocusesontherelationshipbetweenfoodinsecurityandconflict.Morespecifically,thissectiontouchesonperceptionsaboutandreasonsforfoodinsecurity,thelinkbetweenproductionshort-fallandconflict,andtheimplicationofdependencyonfoodaidforconflict.Thefourthsectionisdevotedtothepresentationofconflictresolutionmechanisms,especiallytheinstitutions,ac-tors,andlevelsinvolved.Theconclusionrepresentsthelastsectionofthereport.

4 TheKoroliveclosetotheDassanech-Turkanaborder,theHadoclosetotheDassanech-GabraandDassanech-Hamarborder,andRateinhabittheborderbetweenDassanechandtheNyangatom.Thethree specific research sites, located far apart,were selected to understand the dynamics of inter-ethnicconflictfromdifferentplaces.


2. Local Conflicts in Dassanech

2.1 Intra-ethnic conflicts

ThemostcommonandseriousdisputeswithinDassanechsocietyarerelatedtowomenandlivestock.Disputesrelatedtowomenarecausedbyactsofadultery,takingamarriedwomanasawife/lover,causingpre-maritalpregnancy,rape,forcedmarriage(bride-capture),andfailuretocompletebride-wealthpayment.Sometimessomeindividuals/familiesareagitatedtoforce-fullytakethelivestockofotherswhenthelatterfailtofulfilltheirduties,suchascompletingthepaymentofbride-wealth,servicingdebt,or takingresponsibility foranywrongdoing. Inaddition,theftandotherformsofmisconductmayleadtointer-personaland/orinter-familyconflicts.

Howabout intra-ethnic conflictover landandwater?The cultureof sharing (including thesharingoflandandwater)representspartofthesurvivalstrategyoftheDassanechpastoralists.Thespatialandtemporalvariabilityofthesevitalresourcesnecessitatedinterdependenceandcooperationratherthanconflictoversuchresources.Althoughterritorialsectionsarebelievedtocontrolcertaingeographiclocations,accesstopastureandwaterhasalwaysbeenopentoguests fromotherDassanechsections that areexpectedonly toacknowledge theoccupancyrightsofthehosts.Thishasbeenthenormratherthantheexceptionandstillistoday.Das-sanechherdersarereportedtoengageinargumentsandsometimesphysicalfightsoverthearrangementandprioritizationofresourceuse.Traditionally,accordingto informants,suchlowprofiledisputeswerenevermeanttodenyaccesstoresourcesandneverledtokillings.

Inrecentyears,however,resourcescarcitycauseddeadlyintra-ethnicconflictsoverpastureland.In1987, twoDassanechgroupsfromthesameterritorialsection (Shiir)clashedovergrazinglandinaplacecalledQorobilil(aroundthenorthernshoreofLakeTurkana)andtwoherderswerekilled.Second,in1989,twoothergroupsfoughtoverpasturelandinLokdinya(aroundthesamelakeshore)andexchangedgunfire.AthirdincidentthatledtothedeathofoneherderisreportedtohaveoccurrednearNeberemusareainthelastfiveyears(informantsdonotremem-bertheexactdate).Fourth,theNarichpeopleinHadhoareareportedtohaveexperiencedar-medconfrontationwiththeirhosts(fellowDassanech)overtheuseofgrazinglandandwaterinthelakeshore.Theeldersfromthehostgroupintervenedtopreventbloodshedandensuredthattheguestshadaccesstotheresourcesasusual.

TakingthelifeofafellowDassanechisnyogich (crudeequivalentofsinorpollution)andthekillergetspollutedorbecomes ritually impure.Killing anotherDassanech in revenge for apreviouskillingorevensociallyinteractingwithakillerisalsoconsideredaspollutingoneself.ManyDassanechseemtobeinastateofdisbeliefthatnowadaystheyarekillingeachotheroverlandandwaterthattheyshouldbesharing.Aneldzzerlymanremarked:


“ADassanechdoesnotkillanotherDassanechbecauseitisnyogich […]Whenwequarrel,

sometimeswefightwithsticks.Killingyourownpeopleevenbymistakewouldcausethe

swelling of the belly anddeath. Peoplewhokilled otherDassanech live in the bushon

theirown.Theyarenotallowedtoliveandinteractwithotherpeoplebeforeundergoing

cleansingrituals[…]Youdonotkillsomeonewhokilledyourfamilymemberinrevenge,as

thatislikecommittingadoublenyogich.”(Koro,18July2011)

TheDassanechhavecustomarydisputeresolutionmechanismstoaddress intra-ethniccon-flicts.Wheneverpossible,disputesbetweenindividualsorfamiliesareresolvedatthefamily,age-set,orneighborhoodlevelwiththehelpofsomebodywhohasmediationskills.Casesthatcannotbemanagedattheselevelsarereportedtothearra–thetraditionalcouncilofjudgesfoundineverymajorDassanechvillage.TheDassanechrarelyreportintra-ethnicconflictstotheformallawenforcementagenciessuchasthepoliceorthecourt.ThisisconfirmedbytheDassanechinformantsinthestudyvillagesandauthoritiesofthedistrictcourtandthepolicedepartmentlocatedinOmoratetown.

2.2 Inter-ethnic conflicts

Asnotedintheintroduction,theDassanecharesurroundedbyfourethnicgroupswhomtheyconsiderasenemies,duetoahistoryofconflictlargelyovergrazinglandandwater.Inthepast,fromtheDassanechperspective,conflictsoccurredintermittentlyandreconciliationlastedforseveralyears.Sincerecentyears,accordingtoinformants,thefrequencyandintensityofcon-flictsincreasedandpeaceinitiativesrepeatedlyfailed.ThissectionpresentsthehistoricalandcurrentstateofconflictsbetweentheDassanechandtheirfourneighbors.

2.2.1 Dassanech vs. Hamar

TheDassanechandtheHamarhadtimesofpeaceandtrustaswellastimesofconflict.Accor-dingtotheperspectivesofDassanechinformants,theirHamarneighborslivedinaplacecalledAshoandMountGoromsawastheborderbetweenthetwogroups.Itappearsthatsome150yearsago,theDassanechandtheHamarlivedinpeaceandusedtovisiteachotherandsharegrazinglandandwaterpoints.Anelderlymannoted:

“Weusedto invite them[theHamar] fromtheirhomelandinAsho.Ouranimalsgrazed

together.Conflictstartedduringmygrandfather’s time, it intensifiedduringmyfather’s

days,andgotworsetoday.Overtheyears,theHamarkickedusoutofsuchbordergrazing

areasasZersia,Dhibile,Goromsa,Dara,Aymun,Gerlanta,Duf,Loya,Qadite,Longia,Nangay,

andNapay.5Then,weretreatedtoNaremaarea,whichagainbecameaconflictscene.”(Hado,

5 Theinformantwasassistedbyotherpeoplesittingaroundinlistingthenames.HestatedthatDhibleandGerlantaaretakenbytheHamar.Lateron,itbecameevidentthattheDassanechusethesetwoplaceswhentheyareinpeacewiththeHamar.


19July2011)

Atthepresent,theresource-relatedconflictsariseovertheuseofsuchgrazingareasasSurge,Elzante,Gerlem,Fejej,Narema,Matachew,Dhibile,andGerlanta.Duringpeacetime,thetwogroupssharetheresourcesandwhenconflictarises,theyeitherabandontherespectiveareaorcontinuetouseitwithcautionandworries.TheDassanechabandonedplaceslikeKarberet,Elgente,Markulte(Kizo),andDongiaduetothedryingupofpermanentwaterpoints. Themain sources of conflict between theDassanech andHamar include competition overpasture andwater points, livestock raid/theft, andkillings for retaliationorhonor.Conflictbetweenthetwogroupsoftenoccursalongtheircommonborderwherepastureandwaterareavailable.DroughtandresourcedepletionisincreasinglyforcingtheDassanechandtheHamartomaintaincontroloveravailableresources.ManyDassanechvillagersdisplacedbytheTur-kanafromthewesternsideoftheOmoRivertookrefugewiththeirfellowDassanechontheeasternsideoftheriver(inthedirectionoftheHamarterritory).Duetothesteadygrowthofhumanandanimalpopulations,thecarryingcapacityofDassanechlanddwindled.Informantsindicatedthatduetothedepletionofgrazingareas,theyhavebeenforcedtotaketheircattletoriskyborderplaces.TheHamarhavealsobeenadvancingsouthwardtoexploitpastureandwa-terintheborderareas.Livestockraids/theftsandhomicidesintensifywheneverthetwogroupsconvergeinthesamearea.

AccordingtotheDassanechworedapolicedepartment,betweenSeptember2009andJuly2010,theHamarattackedtheDassanechtwelvetimes,killedeightpeople,injuredtwoothers,andrai-dedanunknownnumberoflivestock.Thestudyrevealed(thoughdetailedrecordsarelacking)thattheDassanechhavealsobeeninvolvedinoffensiveactions(inretributionorotherwise)thatledtolossoflivesandpropertyinHamar.FurtherresearchisneededtounderstandtheHamarsideofthestory.

2.2.2 Dassanech vs. Nyangatom

TheDassanechandtheNyangatomethnicgroupshadbeenunderoneadministrationforalongtime(firstasGelebworeda andlaterasKuraz woreda).In2006,Kuraz woredawassplitintoDassanechandNyangatomworedasaspartoftherestructuringofcertaindistrictsindifferentparts of Ethiopia based on population size, logistic factors, and justified local demands fordistrictstatus.Accordingtoinformantsandhistoricalrecords(Tsega-Ab2005),thetwoethnicgroupshadamicableco-existenceandcooperationduringthereignofEmperorMenelik.Thehistoricallycooperativerelationshipandpeacefulco-existencegavewaytoanimositylaterintime.Thefirst serious conflict is reported tohaveoccurredaround1950whenaDassanechherderkilledanelderlyNyangatomwomaninNakwa(orKibish),wherethetwogroupslivedtogether(Sagawa2010).Inthelate1970s,sporadicconflictbetweenthetwogroupsculminatedinamajorwaratLophitararoundKibishwhentheDassanechattackedtheNyangatom.Soonafter,theNyangatomlaunchedaretaliatoryattackonKelemareainDassanech.AftertheKelem


war,theDassanechcarriedoutanassaultontheNyangatomatNawoyahafearoundKibesharea.Inthe1970s,theDassanechhadanadvantageovertheNyangatom,partlybecausethelatterhadbeeninvolvedinbattleswithotherneighbors,mainlytheKaraandtheHamar(Sagawa2010).

Inthe1980s,theintroductionofmodernarms,suchasAK-47automaticriflestoNyangatomfromthesouthernSudanchangedthebalanceofpower,andtheDassanechbecamethefirstvictims.TheNyangatomobtainedweaponsfromtheToposaofSudanduringtheSudanesecivilwarthatincreasedmodernarmstradeintheregion.TheToposa,withwhomtheNyangatomshare a common language and culture, hadnot only suppliedweapons but also formed analliancewiththeNyangatomagainsttheirenemies.Inthelate1980s,thetwogroupsattackedtheDassanechanddestroyedthreevillages.ThemostviolentclashwastheonethattookplaceatSelegnvillage,duringwhichhundredsofDassanecharereportedtohaveperishedinafewhours(Sagawa2010).Afteracquiringmodernarmsintheearly1990s,theDassanechrecoveredfromthedevastatingcrisisandtriedtolaunchattacksontheNyangatomatNakwa.Althoughnolarge-scaleassaultstookplacesincethe1990sNakwawar,theNyangatom-Dassanechrela-tionsremainverytensetodate.Thenatureoftheconflicthaschangedfromlarge-scalearmedconflictandraidstosmall-scaleambushesandraids/theftsbysmallgroups,andthishaspo-sedatremendouschallengeforpeaceefforts.In2010,smallgroupsofDassanechperpetratorsenteredtheNyangatomterritorysixtimes,killedfourpeopleandinjured16others;inthesameyear,theNyangatomperpetratorsenteredtheDassanechterritoryseventimesandkilledthreepeopleandinjuredoneother(Gebre2011).

ThestudyrevealsthattheconflictbetweentheNyangatomandtheDassanechincreasedandthemultiplepeaceagreementsreachedwiththehelpofworedaofficialsandNGOsfailed.TheDassanech-Nyangatomconflictsmaybeexplainedintermsofcompetitionoverlandandwater,thestrongcultureofretaliation(revengekillingsandraids),andthefailuretoattaingenuinereconciliation.6Astheresultoftheconflict,theDassanecharereportedtohavelosttheirtra-ditionalgrazinglandtotheNyangatom.Forexample,theDassanechinformantsclaimedthattheNyangatomforcedthemoutoftheirtraditionalpasturelandssuchasGima,Hamite,Kuraz,Lochober,Loroqoy,Loturtur,andNakwa.Moreover,becauseofsecurityconcernsbothgroupscurrentlydonotusetheresource(pasturesandwater)richKareandQoreiAbowoleareasattheircommonborder.ItisalsoimportanttonotethattheDassanechabandonedsomegrazingland(e.g.,Borkonech)duetodryingupofwaterpoints.Asaresultofallthis,theDassanechlivingontheWesternsideoftheOmoRiverareleftwithasubstantiallyreducednumberofgrazingareaslocatedinKalam,Toltale,andaroundthenorthernshoreoftheLakeTurkana(e.g.,Abalakua,Korema,Lokdinya,Qesel,Qorobilil,Tirte,Yerle,etc.).ThelakeshorepasturelandisthelastresortandthemostreliablesourceofgrassandwaterfortheDassanech,whodependheavilyoncattleraising.

6 Conflictusedtoeruptduetothefailureofonepartytoimplementdecisionsmadeduringpeacein-itiatives.Whenonepartyfailstoreturnraided/stolenanimalsand/ortobringcriminalstojustice,theotherpartyisagitatedtotakerevenge.


2.2.3 Dassanech vs. Turkana

TheDassanechlosttheirtraditionalpasturelandtotheTurkanapastoralistssincethecoloni-alperiod(seealsoAlmagor1979,1986).NeneMburu(2003)reportedthattheBritishcolonialgovernmentcontrolled livestockherdingby localpastoralistsaroundtheborderareaofKe-nya,Sudan,andEthiopiatherebyincreasingcompetitionforscarcepasturesbetweenpastoralpeoples.ThesepoliciescausedanintensificationofhostilitybetweentheDassanechandtheneighboring communities, particularly theTurkana andGabra inKenya (Sagawa 2010).ThelongstandingconflictbetweentheDassanechandtheTurkanafurtherescalatedinrecentyears.FragmentedreportsfromDassanechWoredaPoliceDepartmentrevealthatbetweenNovember2008andOctober2010,theTurkanaattackedtheDassanech24timesduringwhichtheformerkilled19people,injurednineothers,andraided3,423goatsandsixdonkeys.

Onthewhole,therootcausesoftheconflictbetweentheDassanechandtheTurkanaincludelandalienation,frequentlivestockraids,waterclaimsforfishing,theftoffishingnets,andkill-ingofherdersandotherpeople.Sincethecolonialperiod,theDassanechlostcontrolovertherichpastureinBerbere,Ilam,Herum,Lomodhan,Lumiyana,Narwot,andNeswat(Todonyang)–allcurrentlyunderTurkanacontrol.Moreover, theremaininggrazing lands in theborderareassuchasLoqongoleandNatadehaveoftenbeenabandonedduetosecurityconcerns.TheDassanechinformantsunderlinedthatthecross-borderconflicthastakenanewforminthatthefighters/raiderscomingfromtheTurkanasidearehighlysophisticatedandallegedlysup-portedbycertaininterestgroupssuchaslivestocktraders,corruptofficials,andelementsoftheKenyanGeneralServiceUnit.Thesophisticationof theTurkanafighters isexplained inrelationtouseofvehicles,betterweapons(e.g.,G3),communicationequipments,helmets,etc.Raidedanimalsareoftenimmediatelysoldorsharedamongdifferentpeopleanddispersed,whichmakesretrievalratherdifficult.

2.2.4 Dassanech vs. Gabra

TheGabraofKenyawhoshareaborderwiththeDassanecharepredominantlypastoralists.TheInkoria,oneoftheeightterritorialsectionsoftheDassanech,liveincloseproximitywiththeGabra.ThehistoricalrelationshipbetweentheDassanechandtheGabraischaracterizedbybothconflictandpeacefulco-existence.TheDassanechremembercertainlandmarksthatshapedthenatureoftheirrelationshipwiththeGabra.Theso-calledIlleretmassacreofseveralDassanechboysduringtheircircumcisionseclusionremainedvividinthememoriesofmanypeople.TheDassanechcultureprovidesthatduringseclusionperiods,newlycircumcisedboysshouldnottouchweapons.Therefore,thevictimsoftheIlleretmassacrewereunarmedeasypreyfortheGabraattackers.ThesecondincidentthatpoisonedtherelationshipbetweenthetwoneighboringgroupswastheassassinationofaprominentGabraleaderbyaDassanechmanduringapeacemeetingatIlolo,nearIlleret.Afterthisincident,theGabramountedrepeatedattacksontheDassanechtorevengefortheirleader’sdeath.Thethirdmajorincidentwasa


large-scaleattacktheDassanechlaunchedontheGabraandthenearbyKenyansecurityforceduringwhichmanyGabraperished.

ThemajorcausesofconflictbetweentheDassanechandtheGabraarelandclaims,livestockraiding,andindividualizedkillings.TheDassanechontheGabraside,indefianceoftheinter-nationalboundarythatdividestheirancestralhomelandintoEthiopianandKenyanterritories,continuetousetheirtraditionalgrazinglandslocatedupto200kmdeepinsidethelegalter-ritoryofKenya.TheGabraareopposedtothefactthattheDassanechcontinuetoenjoyaccesstograzinglandinKenyanterritory.Mostofthesmall-scaleconflictsbetweenthetwogroupstookplaceinsuchplacesasNaibarandAsumaontheKenyaterritory.Sometimes,however,theGabraperpetratedattacksonEthiopiansoil.InNovember2009,forexample,theyraided675goatsandtencattlefromaplacecalledKokeiinaborderkebeleknownasBubua.Inter-ethnicraids/theftsoflivestocktomeetsocialandeconomicdesiresseemtobecommonbetweenthetwogroups.MembersoftheDassanechandtheGabraethnicgroupskillmembersofethnicgroupsconsideredenemiesforhonorandstatuschange.

2.3 Major actors in conflict

2.3.1 The youth

Theyouthareatthecenterofpastoralconflictsbecausetheyaretheonestocommitoffensiveand/ordefensiveactions.Theyoutharebroughtupinanenvironmentthatprovidesthesocialingredientstobecomefearless,courageous,andheroic.Thesocialenvironmentalsogeneratescompetitionandrivalry.Theyouthineachterritorialsectionareresponsiblefortheprotec-tionofterritorialbordersandrevengeagainstexternaloffenders.Successinoffensiveand/ordefensiveactionisattachedonlytothegeneration-setsorage-setsinvolvedratherthantotheentiregroup.Thisplacespressureongeneration-setsandage-setstoleaveanimpressivemarkbehind.Thosewhohavekilledmembersofanenemyethnicgroupandraidedanimalsfromsuchgroupsarepraised.It isnotuncommontoobserveunconstrained,uncoordinated,andindependentactionsbysmallgroups,whichmayhavedevastatingconsequencesforthelargercommunity.Thegreatestworryofmanyeldersisthattherecklessbehaviorofyoungsterspro-vokesunexpectedcounterattacks.Hence,thetraditionrequiresthatthefightersgetpermissionandblessingfromtheirizam (fathersintheage-system)andritualsperformedbytherelevantclansbeforetheyengageinoffensive/defensiveacts.

However, there aremomentswhencertain youths take actionwithout securingpermission.Basedonsuchincidences,someinformantsfeltthatthepowerofeldershasbeeneroded,whileothersnotedthattheyoungstersstillrespecttheauthorityofelders.Itappearsthatwhenthefrequencyofattacksandcounter-attacksincreases,thedegreeoftoleranceonthepartoftheeldersalsochanges.Theeldersareawareofthefactthatyouthactionorinactionmayleadtounpredictableconsequences.Giventhevolatilenatureoftheareaandinthefaceofrepeated


enemyattacks,itwouldbenaïveforthemtopreachpeaceandcursewar.Inthebestinterestoftheirsociety,theymakeadelicatebalancebetweenrestrainingtheyouthtoattainpeaceandapprovingtheiraggressivestancetomaximizedeterrence.

Thebehaviorandactionoftheyoutharetheresultsofanumberoffactorsratherthanafunc-tionofelderscontrolalone.Seniorage-setswithinthesamegeneration-setandpeersorage-mateswithinthesameage-setcouldmotivate,constrain,anddisciplinethebehaviorsoffellowyoungsters.Also,womenarereported toplayakeyrole in incitingviolence throughactsorbehaviorthatwouldhumiliatethecowardlyandrewardthebrave.

2.3.2 Senior generation-set

Apartfromtheirdivisionintoterritorialsectionsandclans,theDassanechpeoplehaveanagesystemthatdividespeopleintogeneration-setsandage-groups.Aparticulargeneration-setinpowerisledbythecouncilofarrathatconsistsofchalleba(theultimatedecision-makers),nemo(advisorsandcoordinators)andtolol(implementers,foot-soldiers).Thearraplaysacrucialroleininitiatingorresolvingmajorconflicts.Theyouthcannotengageinanymajorassaultagainstanothergroupwithouttheknowledge,permission,andblessingofthesehighlyrespectedandfearedelderly.Moreover,itistheelderlywhoparticipateinreconciliationrepresentingtheirterritorialsectionortheentireethnicgroup.Themanagementofinter-ethnicdisputesbyel-derscanencompassviolentactionsand/orpeacefulsolutions.Regardingviolentaction,accor-dingto the informants, fourtypesofoffensive/defensiveresponsesmaybe identified: large-scale,small-scale,emergency,andunauthorized.Large-scaleactionisorganizedwhenanethnicgroupsuffersamajorlossoflifeand/orlivestockinthehandsofitsenemy.Afterholdingpublicmeetings,theneedforretributionattheappropriatetimeisdecidedbytheseniorgeneration-setsinconsultationwiththerelevantparties,suchasthejuniorofficeholders,wise/influentialindividuals, theyoungsters,andtheritualspecialists.Whentheappropriatetimecomes, thewarriorsareblessedandseenoffinaritualizedceremony.

Asmall-scaleoffenseisorganizedbyaterritorialsectiontotakerevengeforasmallattackorraiditsufferedintherecentorremotepast.Theparticipationoftheseniorgeneration-setandotherrelevantpartieswithinthespecificsectionwouldsufficetogivepermissionandblessthefightersinalow-keyceremony.Emergencyoffensetakesplacewhencertainage-setsorfami-lymembersdecidetoconducthot-pursuitimmediatelyafteranenemyattackorraidwithorwithoutpermissionandblessingfromtheelders.Theintentioncouldbetotakerevengeortotrackraidedanimalsandgetthemback.Theabovethreeformsofactionsareconsideredjusti-fiedandapprovedbytheseniorgeneration-set.

Whenyoungstersrealizethattheeldersareunlikelytograntpermission,theytendtogoforunauthorizedoffense.Theelders,whogenerallyfavorpeaceoverwar,seriouslydisapprovepro-vocativeactions.Dependingonthegravityoftheaction,theymayorderthewhippingofthe


perpetrators,returnraidedanimalstotheowners,and/orsendawordofapologytothegroupthatwasbeingattacked.InJuly2011,severalyoungsterswhowereplanning/preparingtotakerevengeagainsttheHamarwithoutthepermissionoftheelderswerecaughtandwhippedinthenab(openmeetingplace)ontheordersofthechalleba.

Theeldersalsomakedecisionstoresolvedisputespeacefully.Aftermajorconflictsoraseriesofrepeatedsmallclashes,elderswouldexpress theneedto initiateapeaceprocess throughpeacemessengers,whowouldcarrywhiteostrichfeatherstiedtoatreebranchasapeacesym-bol.Whentheotherpartyagreestoresolvetheconflictpeacefully,theelderswouldorganizeinternalmeetingstodiscussaboutthereconciliation.Thendelegates(senior,wise,experienced,andarticulateelders)wouldbeidentifiedtoattendthepeacenegotiationsanddeliberations.Suchmeetingsalmostalwaysendwithagreementandritualperformances(byelders)suchassplashingmilkandwateronparticipants,placingthebellyfatofasacrificialgoatontheirneck,rubbinghands/bodywithstomachdischarges,holdingfreshgreengrass/leaves,breakingandburyingspearsorguns,cursingevildeeds,andblessingpeacefulactivities.

2.3.3 Women

ThemaleyouthsinDassanecharebroughtupinasocialenvironmentthatencouragesfearless-ness,selflessness,heroism,andsacrificeforhonor.Women,especiallygirls,arereportedtobeplayingasignificantroleintriggeringangeranddrivingmenintoviolence.Theytendtochal-lengedocilitythroughnaggingandridiculingdirectly,forexamplebyquestioningtheman-linessofaparticularpersonorage-setorindirectlybyexpressingtheirutterdefenselessnessdespite the presence of boys/men in the community.Moreover,women/girls praise aggres-sivenessthroughemotionalyelling,singing,andgiftgivingwhenthemenreturnhomewithvictoryinkillingand/orraids(Houtteman2010:140).Whilebringingasenseofultimateprideandheroismtothosewhoemergedvictorious,suchactsarereportedtomotivatemanyotherstofollowsuitinpursuitofsimilartreatment.AwomanexplainedhowshenaggedherhusbandovernighttotakerevengeagainsttheTurkana,whokilledtheirsonandstoletheircattle:

“Onemorning,myhusbandhassledmysontolookafterthecattleheadingtothegrazing

field.MysondidnotevenfinishthefoodIgavehim.[…]Hedidnotcomeback.Hewas

killed by theTurkana,who also stole the cows […]At night, I cried […] the calveswere

mooingbecausetheirmothersweretaken.Isaidtomyhusband,‘Whatareyougoingtodo

aboutourson,whodidnotreturntofinishhisfood?[…]Whatareyougoingtodoabout

thecalvesmooingallnight?’Myhusbandstartedtosighandsingwarsongsandleftearlyin

themorningwithhisfriendstotakerevenge[…]Thenextday,theyreturnedhomesinging

victorysongs.Ifeltvindicated.”(Koro,16July2011)


2.3.4 Diviners/magicians

Certainclansarebelievedtohavepowerovercertainnaturalphenomenasuchasdrought,di-seasesandsocialeventssuchaswarandraids.Forexample,theGalburarebelievedtohandlewaterandcrocodiles,andtheTurattohealfireburns.Likewise,theTurinyerimarebelievedtocuresnakebitesandmakerainattimesofdrought,andtheFargartohealanimaldiseaseandavoidflies.Moreover,theTurinyerimandtheFargararebelievedtohavedivineand/ormagicalpowertoensurevictoryoverenemiesduringwarand/orraids.Hence,membersofthetwoclansareaskedtoperformcertainpre-offenserituals,andtheyaccompanyorleadthefightersallthewaytotheenemyland.Differenttypesandlevelsofritualcontinuewhenthefightersreturnhomeafterkillingenemiesand/orraidinganimals.Allinformantsinterviewedbelievedinthepoweroftheclandiviners.

2.3.5 Government institutions

Atthedistrictlevel,theformalgovernmentinstitutionswithjurisdictionoversecurityandlaw-enforcementmattersarethe woreda administration,thepolice,andthecourt.Sincealmostallintra-ethnicdisputesareresolvedthroughcustomarydisputeresolutionmechanisms(atfamily,neighborhood,andarralevels),theformallaw-enforcementinstitutionsplayaverylimitedrole.However,externalattacksarebroughttotheattentionofthepoliceandtheadministration.ThepoliceforceinDassanechisinadequatelystaffedandequippedtomonitortheborderareasandpreventinter-ethnicconflict.Duetologisticalconstraints,incidentreportsreachpolicepostsoftenlongaftertheevent,whichmakesitdifficultforthepolicetotakeaction.Untilrecently,therehadbeenonlytwopoliceposts(atNeberemusandBubua)neartheEthio-Kenyanborder.

Withtheobjectivetoenhancecommunitypolicing,newpolicepostshavebeenestablishedatSelegn,Toltale,Sirimiriet,Hadho,andOcholoch.TheconstructionofanewpolicepostatNare-ma (Dassanech-Hamarborder) isunderway.Theseare someof theareaswhere inter-ethnicclasheshaveoccurred.TheestablishmentofsomeofthenewpolicepostsisreportedtohaveencouragedsomeDassanechpastoraliststoreturntovillagesthattheyhadabandonedduetosecurityconcerns.However,accordingtoinformants,theofficersassignedineachpostarefewinnumberandlackmanyresourcestodeterTurkanaandGabraattacks.

2.3.6 CEWARN and NGOs

InthecontextofconflictinDassanecharea,theroleofmanyNGOshasbeenthatofsupportingpeaceinitiatives(e.g.,peacemeetings/festivals)andcapacitybuildingofpeacecommittees.Inadditiontosupportingthelocalpeaceinitiatives(especiallyinsponsoringpeaceaccords),the


intergovernmentalConflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)undertakesearlywarningworksthroughitsfieldreporters,receivesandkeepsincidentreports,andfacilitatesbilateralcommunicationandbordercommissionmeetingsoninter-ethnicconflict.ThemajorNGOsthatusedtooperateinDassanechincludeMaryCorps,theEthiopian Pastoralist Research and Development Association (EPaRDA),PactEthiopia,andtheAtowokis Ekisil Pastoralist Develop-ment Association(AEPDA).Duringtheresearchtime,allbutAEPDAhadterminatedoperationinthearea.RegardingtheroleplayedbyNGOs,thelocalshavemixedreactions.Someinformantsunderlinedthatsomethreeyearsago,therewasrelativepeaceinDassanechduetotheactiveinvolvementofNGOsinsupportingpeaceinitiatives.

Forexample,theroleplayedbyEPaRDAintermsofestablishingandactivatingthelocalpeacecommitteesisbelievedtohaveledtorelativepeaceandstabilityatthetimeoftheprojectop-eration.TherecentescalationofconflictcoincidedwiththeendofNGOactivitiesinthearea.TheenactmentofthecharitiesandsocietiesproclamationinEthiopia(NegaritGazeta2009)significantlyrestrictedtheparticipationofcivilsocietyorganizationsorNGOsincertainareasincluding conflict.Hence, someNGOs (e.g., EPaRDA) abandoned theirmandate toworkonconflict,whileothers(e.g.,AEPDA)seemtobeoperatingunderlimitedspace,increasedscru-tiny,andunclearterrainduetolackofclearguidelines.7

InJuly2011, thepeacecommitteeswerenotactiveasevidencedbytheterminationofregu-larcommunitypeacemeetingsandtheabsenceofrefreshmenttraining.ItappearsthatsomeNGOswithdrewbeforethebeneficiarieswerereadytotakeoverandruntheprojectsontheirown.Apartfromcomplaintsontheissueofsustainability,informantsexpresseddiscomfortbythewaytheNGOsandworeda officialshassledsomeelderstoattendhastilyorganizedpeacemeetingswithoutadequatepreparation.Insuchmeetings,theparticipantsfeltpressurizedbytheorganizerstoacceptdealsthattheywouldotherwisereject.

2.4 Recent changes in conflict trends

Changes in theconflictdynamics inDassanechareahavebeenobserved.Thesechangesaremanifestedthroughtheonsetofintra-ethnicconflictoverresources,riseinthefrequencyofconflictoccurrence,allegedinvolvementofelementsoftheKenyansecurityforce,andanalle-gedcommercialinterestbehindraids.First,thoughverylimitedinscaleandoccurrence,deadlyintra-ethnicconflictsoveraccesstoland/watertookplaceinthelastsixyearsforthefirsttime

7 TheEthiopianCharitiesandSocietiesProclamationN0.621/2009recognizesthreemajorcategoriesofcivilsocietyorganizations:Ethiopiancharitiesandsocieties(ECS),Ethiopianresidentcharitiesandsocieties(ERCS),andforeigncharities(FC).TheECS,thatcanengageinallareasofcivilsocietyin-terventionsincludinggovernanceandhumanrights,areallowedtoreceivenotmorethan10percentoftheirfundsfromforeignsources.TheERCScouldreceiveupto90percentoftheirrevenuesfromforeigncountries.Theforeigncharitiescouldreceiveanyamountthattheycouldsecure.However,theERCSandFCarebarredfromworkingonrightsissues(governance,humanrights,etc.)usingfundsfromforeignsources.


inthehistoryoftheDassanech.Traditionally,disputesbetweenherdersoverthearrangementofresourceuse(i.e.,turn-takingorprioritization)wereresolvedthroughnegotiationorphy-sicalfightswithsticksratherthanwithfirearms.TheideaofdenyingaccesstovitalresourcestofellowDassanechandkillingeachotherforresourcesarereportedtobenewdevelopments.

Second,thefrequencyofconflictsinDassanechincreased,andthisbecameevidentmoreinthelastthreeyearsthaneverbefore.Althoughthereexistnobenchmarkrecordstocomparechangesinthefrequencyofconflictoccurrence,bothcommunitymembersandgovernmentof-ficialsunderlinedthat,inthepast,conflictoccurredintermittentlyandreconciliationlastedforyears(sometimesuptotenyears).Today,onthecontrary,peacedealsarebrokenshortly(withindays,weeksormonths)afteragreementsandunprovokedattacksareperpetratedrepeatedly. Third,theallegationsaboutcommercialraidingandtheinvolvementofelementsoftheKe-nyansecurityforceinattacksandraidsisanewdevelopmentintheconflictdynamics.Infor-mationobtainedduringthepresentresearchandrecentstudiesinthearea(Gebre-Michaeletal2005;Teshome2010)pointtothepresenceofcommercialinterestgroups(e.g.,traders,armsdealers,andpaidprofessionalraiders)behindlivestockraidingandconflict infishingareas.SomeDassanechinformantsreportedtohavepersonallywitnessedtheparticipationofsomeKenyansecurityforcesinDassanech-Turkanaconflicts.Othersreportedtohaveproducedevi-dencetoworedaauthoritiestosupporttheirclaims.Theproofsthelocalpeoplehandedoverto woredaauthoritiesincludedheavyweapons,shellsofheavyweapons,militaryuniforms,andidentitycardsofKenyansecurityforces.

3. Food security/insecurity and its relation to conflict in Dassanech

3.1 Livelihood strategies

TheeconomyoftheDassanechisbasedonlivestockproduction,cropproduction,andfishing(inthatorderofsocialimportance).Animals(especiallycattle)aregivenhighsocialvalueandrepresentstatussymbols.Hence,theyarenotmeanttobesoldorkilledexceptindrasticsitu-ations (e.g., food shortage) and socially/culturally justified reasons (e.g., festivity).The youth,thechildren,andthefewadults livinginthecattlecamplargelysubsistonmilkandblood.Occasionally,theyconsumesomegrainthattheybringfromthevillages,wherethemajorityofpeoplelive.Whilethemajorityofanimalsaresenttothecattlecamp,somemilkingcowsandsmallruminantsarekeptinthevicinityofthepermanentvillages.

AccordingtodatafromtheDepartmentofAgriculture,SouthOmoZone,thelivestocksizeinDassanechincreasedfrom599,420in2004/2005toover844,275in2009/2010.Thedataalsore-vealthatlargenumbersofanimalswerelostinthisperiod.Since2007/2008,forexample,the


numberofcattlehasbeendecreasingandthiscoincidedwiththeintensificationofdroughtandescalationofconflicts.Theanimalsmayhavebeenlostduetodisease,drought,orraids.

Table1.EstimatedlivestockpopulationinDassanechworeda,2006/2007-2010/2011

Year LivestockType TotalGregorian Ethiopian Cattle Goats Sheep Donkeys Camel2009/10 2002 224,621 381,427 224,637 13,285 305 844,2752008/9 2001 226,867 389,055 229,027 22,556 300 867,8052007/8 2000 280,380 206,185 156,700 41,172 265 684,7022006/7 1999 270,000 206,000 156,000 40,000 265 672,2652005/6 1998 219,380 206,185 105,405 14,144 250 545,3642004/5 1997 219,380 206,185 156,740 16,850 265 599,420

Source:DepartmentofAgriculture,SouthOmoZone

Socially,cropproductionisgivenasecondaryimportanceinDassanechsociety.However,thedailydietsofthoselivinginpermanentsettlementsdependmoreongrainthananimalpro-ducts.Cropproductiondependsonthetraditionalfloodretreatcultivation(whichconstitutesthemajorpart)and limited irrigationschemes (whichmakesmallcontributions).Normally,lightrainfallisexpectedinMarchandAprilandfloodfromhighlandEthiopiainthemonthsofJune,JulyandAugust.8ThefloodretreatproductionseasonspansfromSeptembertotheendofDecember.Duetotheseasonalvariabilityofrainfallcharacterizedbydelay,theproductionseasonsometimesspansfromNovembertoFebruary.TheirrigationschemesutilizewindmillssuppliedbythegovernmentandtheSocietyofInternationalMissions(formerlySudanInteriorMission,SIM)andengine-pumpsprovidedbythegovernment.Thenumber,thetotalirrigationcapacity,andfunctionalstatusofthewindmillsandthepumpsaresummarizedbelow.

Table2.IrrigationschemeinDassanechworeda

Irrigation Suppliedby No. Capacity(Totalha)

FunctionalStatus Remarks

Functional Out oforder

Windmill Government 22 0 22

SIM 63 31.5 63 63 capacityperunit=0.5ha

Pump Government 51 367 35 15 three different types ofpumps with their unitcapacity ranging from 3to22hectares

Source:OfficeofAgriculture,DassanechWoreda

8 Theseseasonalcyclesofrainandfloodingareusedtomonitorandpredictfoodsecurity/insecurity.


Asindicatedinthetablebelow,inthelastfiveyearsthesizeofcultivatedlandincreasedfrom6,722.5hato10,974.2ha. It isobviousfromthedata that thesizeoffloodretreatcultivation,especiallysorghumproduction,showssignificantincrease.Althoughthetotalareaofirrigatedlandisverysmall,thesizeincreasedbymorethantwofoldinfiveyears.Oneofthechallengeswitnessedwiththepumpirrigationisthecostoffuelandmaintenance,whichraisesserioussustainabilityconcerns.Theworedaisplanningtoconvincetheagro-pastoraliststoproducese-sameandonionascashcropsontheirirrigatedfields.Atleastfornow,however,thelocalpeopleareonlyinterestedinproducingfoodcrops–particularlysorghumandsomemaize.Afteroneyear,the woreda planstohandovertheentiremanagementresponsibility,includingcoveringthecostoffuel,tothecommunities.Itappearsratherambitioustoexpectthecommunitiestomanagethecostlypumpirrigationschemeatthisearlystage.Incontrast,thewindmillprovi-dedbytheSIMislikelytobesustainablebecauseoflowcost(onlyBirr500permill)andlesscomplicatedmaintenancerequirement.

Table3.CultivatedlandinhectareinDassanechWoreda

Year SorghumField MaizeField OtherCrops*CultivatedArea(ha)Flood

RetreatIrrigated Flood

RetreatIrrigated Flood

RetreatIrrigated

Irrigated Total

2010/11 9,538 6.5 495 115 489 330.66 452.16 10,974.16

2009/10 3,925 25 35 150 12.5 82 257 4,229.5

2008/9 3,776 80.25 1,081 79.88 153 20 180.13 5,190.13

2007/8 - - - 17 - 1 18 18

2006/7 5,704 50 666 143 137 22.5 215.5 6,722.5

Source:OfficeofAgriculture,DassanechWoreda

*Theothercrops(apartfromsorghumandmaize)growninDassanechincludebeans,sesame,onion,

tomato,pepper,banana,groundnut,sweatpotato,taro,andmango.Allbutbeanswereintroducedinto

Dassanechbytheworedadepartmentofagricultureinrecentyearsandarestillatthetriallevel.

Duetopoorrainfallandabsenceoffloodingin2008/2009,thetotalcultivatedlandin2009/2010(4,229.5ha)waslessthanthesizeinthepreviousyears.Apartfromthis,the22bigwindmillsandsomeoftheenginepumpswerenotfunctioning.Moreover,fuelshortage(duetounreliabilityofsupplyandfinancialconstraints)andmaintenanceproblemscontributedtothecropfailureinthatyear.Thetotalsizeoflandcultivatedin2008/2009wasalsolessthanthetotalareacul-tivatedin2006/2007forthesamereasons.The2010/2011harvestturnedoutmuchbetterthanthepreviousyearsbecauseithadrainedin2009/2010andalsotheworeda wasbetterpreparedtoprovideassistance.Theyear’scultivatedareaofirrigatedsorghum(6.5ha)wasverylowduetolackofinterestonthepartofthepeople.Sincethenumberofirrigationusersislow,peoplewereworriedthatsorghumcropsplantedinfewfieldswillbevulnerabletobirdattacks.Hence,


accordingtoanagriculturalexpertofDassanechworeda,theyexpressedinterestingrowingve-getables,andthatiswhytheirrigatedfieldofothercrops(330.66ha)washigherthatyearthaneverbefore.

3.2 Perception and reality of food security/insecurity

3.2.1 The level of food security/insecurity

Althoughintermittently,manyhouseholdsinDassanechworedahavebeenreceivingemergencyfoodaidfordecadesnowandalmosteveryyearsince2004/2005.AccordingtoaformerDas-sanechworedaofficial,in1998/1999and1999/2000,theentireDassanechkebelesreceivedemer-gencyfoodaid.In2009/2010,inall39kebeles,about30,000people(almosttwo-thirdsofthetotalpopulation)wereonemergencyfoodassistance.9In2011,only10,149individualsfrom14kebeles (includingOmoratetown)qualifiedforemergencyfoodassistance.Inotherwords,26kebeles (mostlocatedonthewesternsideoftheOmoRiver)areconsideredfoodsecure.

However,severalinformantsinoneofthe‚foodsecure‘kebeles visitedbytheresearcherindi-cated that theemergencyaid terminated,while theywere still inneedof assistance, simplybecausetheworedaexpertsreportedtohigherofficialsthatthecommunitieswerefoodsecure.TheyfurthernotedthatthosehouseholdswhogrewcropintheOmodeltaclosetothelakehadenjoyedgoodharvest,whilethosewhowaitedfortheriverbankfloodandsomeofthosewhodependedonirrigationhadgotnoharvestinthatyear.Interviewswithgovernmentofficialsrevealedthatinthelastfewyears,theamountoffloodsubstantiallydecreasedfortwomainre-asons:lackofrainandtheholdingbackofwatertofilltheGibedams.Someofthehouseholdswhotrustedtheirrigationschemesexperiencedproductionfailureduetotechnicalproblemswiththepumpsand/orfuelshortage.

Apartfromtheemergencyhumanitarianaid,atotalof9,514people,selectedfromall40kebeles,havebeenreceivingaidthroughtheproductivesafetynetprogramsinceJanuary2005.10Themajorityoftherecipients(over8,600people)aresupposedtoparticipateinpublicworksuchastheconstructionofroads,fences,toilets,andwaterholes.11However,theserequirementshave

9 Thegovernmenthasmechanismstodeterminethefoodsecuritystatusofcommunitiesandscreenthenumberofhouseholdsthatdeservehumanitarianassistance.Ineachfoodinsecurekebele,notallhouseholdsareentitledtofoodaid.Themaincriteriaemployedtoassessthefoodsecuritystatusofcommunities include food price, weather conditions, crop production, animal health, and humanhealth.Thedeterminationoffoodsecureandfoodinsecurehouseholdsdependsontheavailabilityofdependableeconomicassetsattheirdisposal.

10Theproductivesafetynetprogramisafoodsecuritystrategythataimsat(1)providinghouseholdswithenoughincome(cash/food)tomeettheirfoodgaptherebyprotectingtheirhouseholdassetsfromdepletionand(2)buildingcommunityassetstocontributetoaddressingtherootcausesoffoodinse-curity.

11Theaged,thesick,andthosephysicallyimpairedweregivenfreeassistance.


notbeenenforcedandnothingvisiblehasbeenaccomplishedthroughtheprogram.Noas-sessmenthasbeenmadetofindoutwhether the livingconditionsof thebeneficiarieshaveimprovedasaresult.Despitetheincreaseinthefamilysizeoftheparticipants,theamountofsupportpermonthremainedthesamesincethebeginning.Newrecipientshavenotbeenac-cepteddespitethegrowingnumberofdestitutehouseholdsintheworeda.

Ofthe39ruralkebeles,28arelocatedalongtheOmoRiverandsomeoftheresidentspracticecultivationwhilethoselivingintheremainingelevenkebelesresidefarawayfromtheriverandrelyheavilyonlivestockproduction.Overtheyears,agriculturalproductionintheriverbankisreportedtohaveexpanded,althoughrainfallshortageremainstobeaseriouschallenge.Theproductionincreaseisexpressedintermsoftheparticipationofmanyhouseholdsincultiva-tion,theexpansionofcultivableland,thesellingofagriculturalproductsinOmoratemarket,theintroductionofnewcrops,andtheuseofirrigationschemes.

Agriculturalextensionservicesarealmostnon-existent in theelevenkebeles locatedfarawayfromtheOmoRiver.Hence,mostpeople(ifnotall)intheseareashavecontinuedtoreceiveemergencyfoodaidformanyyearsnow.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheresidentsarepurelyno-madicpastoralists.Someofthem,particularlythoseinNaricharea,producesorghumonthealluvialdepositbroughtbytheseasonalrivercalledKeske.Itisimportanttonotethatsomehouseholds are considered food secure and denied access to emergency aid, although thiscausedresentmentonthepartofsomemembersofthecommunity.Frominterviewswithkeyinformantsitbecameevidentthatthosewhoreceiveaidsharewiththosewhodonot.

3.2.2 Meaning and reasons of food security/insecurity

ThereisnoDassanechtermthatadequatelyrepresentstheconceptsoffoodsecurityandin-security.Thephenomenonoffoodinsecurityisdescribedintermsofprolongedhunger(thatmayinvolverelatedsicknessanddeath)duetotheabsenceofsufficientfoodtoeat.AlthoughthecultureofsharingisstronginDassanech,thepoor(thosewithfewornolivestock,nofami-lymembersintheOmodelta,andthosewithoutirrigablelandalongtheriver)arethevictimsoffoodcrises.Thosehouseholdswithmanylivestockcouldsparesometobuyfood.Likewise,householdswithlivestock,familymembers,andfarmsintheOmodeltanearthelakeshorearelikelytosurvivebetterthanthosewithout.Hence,prolongedhungerdoesnotnecessarilyaffectallhouseholdsinthesameway.TheextremeleveloffoodinsecurityknowntotheDassanechwasmanifestedinmalnourishmentanddeathofchildren,increaseddeathoflivestock,large-scalemigrationofpeopleandanimalstothedeltaandotherresource-richareas,andrelianceonfoodaid.

Accordingtoinformants,foodinsecurityiscausedmainlybythelackofrainandprolongeddroughtspells.Thesephenomenadestroytheasset-baseofcommunitiestherebyrenderingthesocialnetworksandthesharingculturemeaninglesssimplybecausethereisn‘tenoughtosha-


re.AsthelivelihoodoftheDassanechpeopledependsonlivestockproductionandfloodretreatcultivationofsorghumalongtheOmoRiver,rainfallisacriticalfactorfortheirsurvivalstrate-gy.Duringtherainyseason,LakeTurkanafillsupandwaterflowsbackwardfloodingupstreamareas.Sincetherainmakeswaterandgrassavailableinareasawayfromthelakeandtheriver,peoplemovewiththeirlivestockindifferentdirectionstoexploittheseresources.Whentherainstopsandthewaterlevelintheriverandthelakerecedes,mostoftheanimalsaretakenbacktotheriverbank,thedelta,andotherpermanentwaterpoints.Thefertilealluvialsedimentalongtheriverandthedeltaiscultivated.

3.2.3 Trends in food security/insecurity

Itisdifficulttopredictfoodsecurity/insecurityinDassanechinthefuture.However,fromtheinterviewswithkey informants itbecameclear that food insecurityofhouseholdshasbeenincreasingdespitetheintensificationofcultivation.Severefoodshortageisnotviewedasso-methingabnormal.Regardingthefuture,therearetwodifferentindicativetrendsatplay.First,increasingtemperatureanddeceasingprecipitationchangemaynegativelyaffectlocalliveli-hoodsandfoodsecurity.Second,theEthiopiangovernmentistryingtomaketheOmo-Giberiverbasinoneofthedevelopmentcorridorsinthecountry,andthiswillhaveaneffectonfoodsecurity/insecurityofthearea.

Thedevelopmentprogramscurrentlyunderwayintheareaincludetheconstructionofdamsforhydroelectricpower(GibeI,GibeII,andGibeIII),thedevelopmentof150,000hectaresofsugarcaneplantation,andtheconstructionofsixsugarfactories.AfricaOilandothercompa-nies(namely,AgriterraandTullow)areexploringoilinSouthOmoZoneinanareathatcovers29,465km2.PartoftheDassanechterritoryiswithintheexplorationarea.12 Inthepast,theDas-sanechcommunitiesdidnotbenefitfromlarge-scaleagriculturalprojectssuchastheformerEthio-Koreanstate farmandthe threerecentcommercial farms.Neither irrigationschemesnorpasturelandshavebeendevelopedforthepastoraliststocompensateforthelandthattheylosttotheselarge-scalefarms.Inviewofthesefacts,thequestionofhowthedam,thesugar,andtheoilprojectswillaffectthepastoralcommunitiesinthearearemainstobeseen.

Accordingtotheauthorities,theplanforpastoralistsinthelowerOmovalleyistoestablishpermanentsettlementsandtopromotetheadoptionofirrigatedagriculture.Thenewlifestyleisbelievedtostoppastoralmovementinsearchofwaterandgrass,thesubsequentconflictoverresources, andallowefficientprovisionof social andextension services.The intention is toconvincethepastoraliststousetheirrigationopportunityandpursuelivestockproductionthatfocusesonqualityratherthanquantity.SomeoftheinformantsinDassanechdonotseemtohaveclearinformationabouttheplannedprojectandthewayitwillaffecttheirfuture.Otherswho knew about the dams and sugar project expressedworries that the newdevelopmentsmaydisrupttheirlivelihoodsandexacerbateinter-ethnicconflicts.Localofficials,development

12http://www.tullowoil.com/index.asp?pageid=429


workers,andsomeDassanechviewedtheplannedgrandprojectsasrepresentingagreatdeve-lopmentopportunityfortheareaatlarge.

3.3 Drought, rainfall, food (in)security and local conflicts

Whenthedryspellsintensify,peopleandlivestockconcentrateinresource-richareas,anditisatthistimethatresource-relatedconflictssurface.AmongtheDassanech,however,violentconflictisnotconsideredastheonlyoptiontoaddressscarcity.Informantsstressedtheim-portanceoftoleranceinthefaceofthreattosavehumanandanimallives.AnelderlymanfromRatevillagestated:

“Someyearsago,wemovedtoKare[anareabetweenDassanechandNyangatom]withour

animals.Karehassufficientgrassandwater. It isalsogoodforcultivation.Somepeople

decidednot togowithusbecauseof theNyangatomthreat […]Uponarrival,westarted

sharingthelandwiththeminpeace.Aftersometime,they[theNyangatom]killedmytwo

sons.Theykilledotherboys.Theystoleouranimals.Wecouldhavetakenrevenge.Butwe

said,‘letourlossbethepriceforthegrass’.Wethoughtthatrevengewoulddriveusinto

morekillingsandlossofaccesstograss.”(Rate,13July2011)

Despite the initial tolerance stance of theDassanech, tension and conflict between the twogroups inKare area escalated as thedrought intensified.Rainfall has the capacity topacifyresource-relatedconflictsinthatwhenitrainstensionoverresourcesreducesastheherderswouldhavefallbackoptionselsewhere.TheKareconflictmentionedabove,forexample,subsi-dedwhentheDassanechpulledbackfollowingrainfallthatmadegrassandwateravailableinotherplaces.Sometimesherdersarereportedtotolerateoffensiveactionsandtakerevengeattheendofthedroughtperiodimmediatelybeforeabandoningthecontestedarea.Oneinfor-mantexplainedhowhisgroupinthe1980stoleratedtheHamarattacksandretaliatedwhentherainfallgavethemabreathingspace:

“Therewasnograssandnowaterhere.SomeofourpeoplewenttotheOmo.Wewentto

Narema[anareabetweenDassanechandHamar].Naremawasourland.TheHamarclaim

thatitistheirs[…]Whenwearrivedthere,theHamarsaid,‘GototheOmo.Youhavean

optionthere.Wecannotgoanywhereforlackofotheroption’.Butwetoldthemthatsome

ofourpeoplealreadywenttotheOmo.Thedeltaisnotsufficientfortheresidentsandthe

manynewcomers[…]TheHamarstartedtokillourpeople.[…]Wedidnotwanttogive-up

Narema.Weagreedtopayabloodpriceforthegrass[…]Whentheraincame,westartedto

movesouth.Wesenttheelderly,women,andchildrentogetherwithmostofthelivestock.

Wekeptfewanimalsbehindwithsome30strongmenforfewdays.Welaunchedamajor

attackonaHamarvillageandraidedtheiranimals.Mostofuschasedtheanimalsdeepinto

ourterritory.Fewsharp-shootersandfast-runnersstayedbehindtostoptheHamarfrom

trackingus[…]Weallescapedunharmed.”(Hadho,19July2011)


AccordingtoDassanech informants,conflictsariseandescalate inwetseasonsandat timesofabundanceforanumberofotherreasons.Inwetseasons,theavailabilityofwaterandfoodallowsfighterstotravellongdistanceandhideinthebushfordaystoambushtheirvictims.Ab-undanceallowscommunitiestoorganizeculturaleventsandmajorceremonies.Duringfeastsheroesandtheirfamiliesarehonoredthroughsongsandspecialtreatments.Someinformantsnotedthatduringsuchceremoniessomeyouthareagitatedtoperpetratekillingforfameandprestige.

Asmentionedabove,theDassanechpeoplehavebeenreceivingemergencyhumanitarianaidfor severaldecades, though intermittently.Manyreliefaidrecipientsare reported tobesel-lingtheiremergencyfoodaidtobuyliquortransportedfromOmoratetowntothevillagesbyyoungdealers.TheconsumptionofalcoholisontherisethroughouttheDassanechlandandisbecomingoneofthecausesofdisputes.In2008,forexample,apeacedealsignedin2006betweentheDassanechandtheTurkanacollapsedwhenthreedrunkenDassanechboyskilledthreeTurkanainNesuwatvillage,Kenya.TheDassanechWoredaadministrationbrought theperpetratorstojusticeandtriedtoconvincetheTurkanacommunitiesthattheincidentwasaregrettabletragedycausedbydeviantyouths.However,theTurkanalaunchedrepeatedattacksontheDassanechinretaliation.

4. Conflict Management/Resolution in Dassanech

4.1 Coping with conflicts

TheDassanechseemtohavedifferentperspectiveson themanagementof intra-and inter-ethnicconflicts.Disputesbetweenindividuals,familiesorcommunitieswithinDassanechareexpectedtoberesolvedpeacefullywithorwithouttheinvolvementofthearra council.Cultu-rally,violentactionsandactsofretributionagainstfellowDassanecharestronglydisapprovedandpunished.Thisdoesnotmeanindividualsandfamiliesalwaysrefrainfromtakingthelawinto their hand. For example, physically harming someone in revenge and confiscating thelivestockofpeoplewhofailedtopaydebtarenotuncommon.However,ifreportedtothearra, suchactionswillhaveseriousconsequences.

Concerninginter-ethnicconflicts,bothpeacefulresolutionsandviolentactionsareviewedaslegitimateoptions.Dependingonanumberofconsiderations (e.g., restorationofpride, theneedtotakerevenge,retrievaloflivestock,risksofcounter-attack,etc.),theDassanechmayoptforanoffensiveactionratherthanforapeacenegotiation.Aslongastheviolentactionwasdirectedatoneofthetraditionalenemies,peoplewouldeasilyunderstandthejustification.Inthepast,peoplewaitedfortheopportunemomenttotakerevenge.Inrecentyears,however,thestronggovernmentpressureoncommunitiestoapprehendcriminalsandreturnraidedor


stolenlivestockchangedperceptionaboutthetimingofretribution.Oneinformantdescribedthesituationasfollows:

“Whenthey[theDassanech]takerevengeagainsttheirneighborsmonthsoryearslater,they

areconsideredasthefirstoffenders.Thisisbecausetheattackstheysufferedinthehands

oftheirenemiesareforgottenastimepassed.Nowadays,theyretaliateassoonastheyare

attackedtomakeitajustifiedself-defense.InMay[2011],theDassanechkilled22Turkana

followingthedeathofthreeDassanechinthehandsoftheTurkanaearlierintheday.This

iswhyconflictisescalatingtoday.”(Omorate,10July2011)

Byandlarge,however, theDassanechpeopleseemtopreferpeacefulresolutionsofconflict.Theeldersanddistrictlevelgovernmentofficialsmaderepeatedeffortstoreachouttotheircounterpartsintheneighboringethnicgroupstolaunchpeacetalks.Moreover,theofficialsandcommunitieshave trackrecordofapprehendingcriminalsandreturningraided/stolenani-malstotherightfulowners.InJuly2011,duringtheresearchperiod,theDassanechworedaoffi-cialswerebusyorganizingthree-prongedpeacenegotiationswiththeHamar,Nyangatom,andTurkana.ThenegotiationswiththeHamarandNyangatominvolvedtheretrievaloflivestock,and theDassanechnegotiators expressed readiness to respect the termsof the agreements.Giventhehistoryofrepeatedfailedpeacedealsatthelocal,district,andbordercommissionlevels,theDassanecharenotoptimisticthattheusualstyleofpeacenegotiationswouldmakeanydifference.Hence, thebelief in self-defense and violent retribution ashavingdeterrenteffectsisverystrong.

4.2 Institutions of conflict management: The Arra

Asindicatedearlier,thecouncilofthearraisthemostpowerfuldecision-makingentityineachterritorialsectioninDassanech.ThearraisformedthroughaninitiationceremonyheldonceinseveraldecadesfortheentireDassanech.13Allcircumcisedmembersofallgeneration-setsareeligibletoattendtheinaugurationceremony.However,experiencedeldersandinfluentialyoungmenarerecommendedandencouragedbytheirpeersandthecommunitytopartici-pateintheceremony.Underrarecircumstancessomewomen(speciallypregnantwomen)areallowedtotakepartintheinauguration.14Thedelegatesrepresenttheirsectionsandtheirre-spectivegeneration-sets.Afteramonthofritualperformances,thedelegatesreturntotheirre-spectivesectionstoserveasreligiousexperts,politicalleaders,andjudges.Theyexercisepoweroverthesecularandreligiouslivesofthepeople.Inworldlymattersthatconcerntheirsections,the arrarepresenttheultimatedecision-makingbody.Intherealmofdivinesanctity,theyare

13 Someinformantsnotedthatthearrainaugurationisheldevery100yearsandothersareoftheopini-onthatitcouldbeheldevenin50or60yearswhenthenumberofactivearradecreases.

14Thewomenwhoparticipatedinarraceremonybecomecooksforthearra councilinsession.


believedtocontrolthefertilityofbothhumansandanimals.Thelast arra ceremonywasheldsome30yearsagoinSelegnvillage,Shiirsection.

Although anyDassanech could participate in thearra inauguration ceremony, the rights tomakedecisionsarereservedtocertainmembersoftheseniorgeneration-setknownfortheirwisdom,fairness,andrichlifeexperiences.Thereexistsahierarchyofpowerstructurewithin

the arra institution.Thetopandultimatedecisionmakersarecalledthechalleba (withtheirleaderknownasarraba),towhomcasesarepresentedinthenab,asecludedopenspaceforde-liberationonimportantinternalmatters.15Thenumberofchallebapresidinginanyparticularnabwouldbefourorfive,andcommunitieslivingincloseproximitywouldhaveonenab.Thesecondimportantpositionisknownasnemo,whichisconstitutedbyinfluentialandknowl-edgeableeldersresponsibleforadvisingthechallebaandensuringtheexecutionoffinaldeci-sionsbygivinginstructionstothetolol,thethirdpositioninthehierarchy.Thetololarelikefoot-soldiers,whoareresponsiblefortheactualimplementationofdecisionsbytheseniorarra. Iftheuseofforceisneeded,thetololmayrecruitadditionalforcefromthegus–theyoungestandmostenergeticarra members.Thechalleba,thenemo,andthetolol areallowedtoenterthenab(withthechallebasittinginthecenter,thenemobehindthem,andthetololbehindthenemo),whiletheothermembersofthesocietyattenddeliberationsastheysitoutsideofthesecludedarea.Individualsinjuniorpositionsgraduallygetpromotedtotheimmediatelyhigherpowerstructure,althoughthisdoesnotprecludemerit-basedacceleratedpromotion.

4.3 Conflict management: Levels and participants

Theidentityandparticipationofplayersinconflictmanagementvarydependingonthetypeofconflictandlevelofitsmanagement.Almostallintra-ethnicconflictsaremanagedwithinthecommunityatdifferentlevels:family,age-group,neighborhood,andarra.Conflictsbetweenmarriedcouples,co-wives, siblings,andother familymembersmayberesolved throughtheinterventionofor initiative takenby any influentialmemberof thehousehold (usually, theheadofthehousehold).Seriousfamilyproblemsmaybetakentotheneighborhoodeldersoreventothe arraifdeemednecessary.Disputesbetweenneighborsandpeergroupsaretakentothearraonlywhentheyaretoodifficultorcomplicatedtoaddressatlowerlevels.Atthelowerlevelofconflictmanagement,thereexistsnostructureorproceduretofollow.Anypersonwithmodestreconciliationskillsistrustedtoarbitratebetweendisputingparties.However,mattersbroughttotheattentionofthearraareexpectedtofollowcertainprocedures,suchasritualizedgiftgivingbytheaccuser,presentationofclaimsandcounter-claims,verificationofevidence,thehearingoftestimony,etc.

15 Notallpeople,andnowomen,areallowedtoenterthenab.Therefore,commonpublicmeetings(e.g.,thoseorganizedbythegovernmentofficials)areheldundertheshadeofatree.


Inter-ethnicconflictsaremanagedattwoorthreelevelsdependingonwhethertheconflictisdomesticorcross-border.Theseincludecommunity-basedreconciliation,woreda-basedpeaceinitiatives,andbilateralbordercommissionmeetings.Thecommunity-basedapproachrepre-sentsthecustomarydisputeresolutionmechanismswherepeaceinitiativesaretakenbysen-dingpeacemessengerstoanotherethnicgroupwithinEthiopiaoracrosstheborderinKenya.Whentheotherpartyagreestoresolvetheconflictpeacefully,internalmeetingsareorganizedtodiscussreconciliation.Delegates(senior,wise,experienced,andarticulateelders)areiden-tifiedtoattendthepeacenegotiations.Duringtheselectionofdelegates,attemptsaremadetoensuretherepresentationoftheseniorgeneration-set(representedbymembersofthearra),membersofterritorialsectionpartiesoftheconflict,andmembersofcertainclans.Otherac-tiveplayersinconflict(e.g.,youthandwomen)donottakepartintheresolutionlargelybecausethecultureofDassanechdoesnotprovideforactiveparticipationofwomenandchildreninmajorpublicmatters.Youngmenmayaccompanythepeacedelegateslargelytoprovideprotec-tiontotheeldersratherthantoairthevoicesoftheyouth.Womenmaywatchtheproceedingandpreparefoodanddrinksfortheparticipants.However,thereisnoforumforthemtopre-senttheirviews. Theworeda-basedpeaceinitiativerelatestoofficialpeaceactivities(e.g.,meetings,accords,andfestivals)organizedbyauthoritiesofadjacentborderdistrictsontheirownorincollaborationwithotheragenciesworkingonpeace(e.g.,CEWARNandNGOs).Afteramajorconflictinci-denceorseriesofsmallconflicts,onedistrictofficialmayreachouttooneormoreneighboringdistrictsinEthiopiaand/orKenyawithaproposalforapeacemeeting.Whentheproposalisac-cepted,thedateandvenuearefixedinconsultation.Duringsuchmeetings,theDassanecharerepresentedbyworedaofficials,representativesofelders,andinsomecasesbyrepresentativesofNGOs.Inmostcases,therepresentativesofeldersarerandomlychosenbyworedaofficialsorpartnerNGOsratherthanbythecommunity.Hence,therepresentationofseniorgeneration-sets,territorialsections,andrelevantclansarerarelyensured.Sometimesthedelegatesfromthe woreda administrationandthepartnerNGOsarereportedtoputpressureontheelderstoaccepttermsofagreementthattheywouldotherwisereject.Theflawintheselectionofeldersandthepressuretomakethemacceptpeacedealssignificantlyreducetheircredibility,whichinturnreducespublicrecognitionandrespectforthereconciliation.

Bilateralbordercommissionmeetingsrepresentthethirdpeace-makingapproach.Whenthelocalpeaceinitiativesfailandconflictsescalateunabated,theGovernmentsofEthiopiaandKe-nyaorganizehigh-levelmeetingsthroughtheirbordercommissions.ThelatestsuchmeetingwasheldinlateMay2011inKenyafollowingthe4May2011incidentinwhich22TurkanaandthreeDassanechwerekilled.Twoyearsago,similarbilateralmeetingswereheldinOctober2009atNakuru(Kenya)andNovember2009atHawassa(Ethiopia).Thebordercommission‘sbilate-ralmeetingsareattendedbygovernmentofficialsofthetwocountries.AlthoughtheworedaandzonaladministratorsattendsuchmeetingsaspartoftheEthiopiandelegates,decisionswereoftenmadebytherepresentativesoftheadjacentregionalgovernments,sometimesthroughimposition and against the argumentsof theworeda officials.Except in follow-upmeetings(oftendesignedtoensuretheimplementationofearlierbilateraldecisions),representativesof


thelocalcommunityrarelyparticipateinbordercommissionmeetingsanddecisions.Sincethetwogovernmentsseemtobemoreinterestedinstabilizingtheexistingpeacefulrelationship,nationalinterestshavebeenovershadowinglocalconcerns.

5. Conclusion

ThispaperexaminedpastoralconflictsinDassanecharea,SouthernEthiopia,againsttheback-groundofenvironmentalchangeandfoodinsecurity.Thestudypointstothepresenceofanas-sociationbetweenenvironmentalstressandtheescalationofinter-ethnicpastoralconflictsinthearea.TheDassanechandtheirneighborshavebeendemographicallyexpanding.Populationgrowthandthehighsocialvaluesattachedtolivestockcontributedtoasteadyincreaseinthenumberofanimals.Humanandanimalpopulationexpansionoccurredinafragileenviron-mentfrequentlyhitbydroughtthatdiminishedthecarryingcapacityofthearea.Thepressureon thescarceand fast-depletingpastureandwater resourcesundoubtedlyescalatedcompe-titionandthesubsequentresource-relatedconflicts.Nevertheless,thecomplexityofpastoralconflictsinDassanechposestremendouschallengeinestablishingdirectcausallinksbetweenconcrete environmental factors and specific conflict incidents. Socio-cultural andeconomicfactorscauseortriggerconflictsindependentlyorinconjunctionwiththenaturalprocesses.Forexample,theftoflivestockandindividualizedkillingsforfameandtoacquiregunsflameinter-ethnictension.Theinvolvementofelementsofsecurityforcesinthecross-borderattacksandthefailuretorespectpreviouspeaceaccordsagitatepeopletooptforretribution.Finally,therecentintroductionofautomaticriflesandliquorscontributetotheoccurrenceofdeadlyconflicts.

Apartfromactionsthattriggerreactions,governmentinactionsallowedconflictstooccurandescalate.Theseincludelaxsecurityintheborderareastotakepreventiveactions;lackofinsti-tutionalmechanismstoenforcepeaceaccords;lackofcommondevelopmentprojectstocreatesocio-economicintegrationoftheconflictinggroups;absenceoflivelihoodstrategiestocoun-terthenegativeeffectsofclimatechange;andlackofcomprehensivepeaceplans.Neitherthetraditionaldisputeresolutionapproachesnortheofficialpeaceinitiativesorganizedbygovern-mentinstitutionsseemtobringanendtosuchconflicts.Evenworse,resource-baseddeadlyintra-ethnicconflictbegantooccurforthefirsttimeinDassanech.Thiswarrantstheneedtoidentifythefactorsthatcause,trigger,orexacerbateconflictanddeviseacomprehensivestra-tegyinwhichpeaceagreementsshouldbefollowedbyborderareadevelopmentinterventions(e.g., pasture, irrigation,waterpoints, schools, healthcare, veterinary facilities, extension ser-vices,etc.)topromotemutualcooperation.

Regardingdevelopment,somemajorprojectsarealreadyunderwayintheOmoRiverbasin:hydroelectricdams,sugarcaneplantation,sugarfactories,andoilexploration.Fromtheper-spectiveofsomeDassanech,someofthemajordevelopmentprojectsbeingimplemented(es-peciallythedamsandirrigationschemes)areviewedasthreatsratherthanopportunitiessim-


plybecausetheseprojectswilldraintheirlifeline–floods.GiventhelackofexperienceoftheDassanechpeopleinworkingonplantationsandinfactoriesasdailylaborers,onewouldexpectthesugarprojecttocauseinfluxofhighlandmigrants,whowillpossiblyoverwhelmthelocalsandseizeeconomicopportunitiesandsocialspace.

Ontheotherhand,paintingagloomypictureoffuturedevelopmentprojectsintheareawit-houtconcreteevidenceistantamounttodeconstructivedenialprospects.Thenewlarge-scaledevelopmentinitiativesinSouthOmoZonemaysignificantlycontributetothedevelopmentof theareatherebymarkinganendtoallsocialevils– that is,conflict,poverty,disease,andunderdevelopment.Thiswouldinfactdependonproperunderstandingoftheexistingsocialstructuresandpeople’slifechoices.TheDassanechpeoplehavesocialstructures,values,andbeliefsystemsthatgoverntheirinteractions,reassuretheirintegrityandcohesion,andprovidemeaningtoandcontrolovertheirlives.Suchissuesmattertothepeoplenolessthanmaterialbetterment.Hence,inordertoensuregreatercontrolandchoiceforthepeopleandavoidun-warranteddisruptionsintheirlivesandlivelihoods,itiscrucialtoundertakeneedsandenvi-ronmentalassessmentsthroughbaselinestudybeforetheimplementationofanydevelopmentproject in the area.


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Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

Date Location Interview/Focus Group Discussion With

02 June 2011 Jinka Official, Representative of Zonal Administration

05 June 2011 Jinka Official, Representative of the Office of Agriculture

06 June 2011 Jinka Expert, Livestock Unit, the Office of Agriculture

08 June 2011 Jinka Expert, Crop Production Unit, the Office of Agri

09 June 2011 Jinka Expert, Safety-net and Food Security Unit

10 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral, a former member of the Parliament

10 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral by from Hadho

11 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of Dassanech Woreda

11 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of the Office of Agriculture

12 July 2011 Omorate 2 Expert, Safety-net and Emergency Aid, Unit

12 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral, a former member of the Parliament

13 July 2011 Rate 2 elderly pastorals, members of senior generation-set

13 July 2011 Rate 2 pastoral women

14 July 2011 Rate FGD with elderly men, women, and youth

15 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of Women‘s Affairs

15 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral woman from Koro

15 July 2011 Omorate Expert, Crop Production Unit

16 July 2011 Koro FGD with elderly men including senior generation-set

16 July 2011 Koro FGD with adult women

17 July 2011 Koro FGD with youth

17 July 2011 Koro a youth herder

18 July 2011 Koro a young pastoral woman

18 July 2011 Koro an elderly man

19 July 2011 Hadho FGD with elderly men and boys

19 July 2011 Hadho an elderly man, member of the senior generation-set

19 July 2011 Hadho two pastoral school boys

20 July 2011 Omorate Expert, Water Development Unit

20 July 2011 Omorate Expert, Crop Production Unit

21 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of Dassanech Woreda

23 July 2011 Addis Ababa Official, Representative of the SNNPR


The Author

Yntiso Gebre, PhD ([email protected]), is assistant professor in the De-

partment of Social Anthropology at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. His

research focus is on population movement/displacement, conflict resoluti-

on mechanisms, and disadvantaged groups.

A number of individuals and organizations deserve recognition and ap-

preciation for their part in the research that led to the production of this

report. First and foremost, I would like to thank Sven Chojnacki and Bettina

Engels for providing the opportunity to undertake this research. I am grate-

ful to all Dassanech informants for sharing their experiences and valuable

insights without any reservation. Acknowledgements are further due to

government officials and experts at the district, zonal, and regional levels

for providing valuable information. Last but not least, Konya Nyermata, my

field assistant, deserves mention.

Acknowlegdements


Peace and Conflict Studies Research Reports

The Research Reports serve to disseminate the results of on-

going work at the Research Unit Peace and Conflict Studies,

Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science at Freie Universität

Berlin. Our research incorporates epistemological aspects of

knowledge production in peace and conflict research as well

as comparative empirical studies of violent conflict within and

between societies.

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