CHAPTER-6

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES OF THE E.U. AND THE SAARC: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

"The problem of our time is not how to keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together".( David Mitrany;l996,28)

This chapter has tried to review the role of Regional Organisations in the field of

environment .The two regional organisations, EU and SAARC, have been chosen to

verify-the success and failure of environmental policies in their respective

organizations, and to see how far the member states of each organisation abide by the

environmental laws. As it has been seen in the previous chapter pressure groups have a

definite role in their countries. So issues such as climate change and global warming

may not keep the same attention in their agenda as the fast growth economy. In this

condition the role played by other structures been the more important. The EU has

always been an inspirational source to guide the other regional organisations in the

adoption of environmental policy at the constitutional level. However, the politics of

climate change is an open ended discussion which can be seen within the context of the

differences of opinion between the developed and developed countries.

The traditional role of regional institutions has been in the areas of peace, security, and

economic development. The significance and role of regional arrangements in

maintaining international peace and security, for example, are recognized in the UN

Charter. Chapter 8 of the Charter deals with the role of regional arrangements in the

context of the UN system for maintaining international peace and security. In practise,

peace and security are among the key concerns of the regional organisations in all parts

of the world. Similarly, regional arrangements to promote economic development have

been common since 1945. Regional environmental co-operation, however, is relatively

new and can be traced to the 1970s. Since then regional arrangements and agencies

pertaining to the environment have proliferated in nearly all parts of the world.

Increasing awareness of environmental problems and their growing magnitude, and

recognition of the transnational character of many of these problems and the close

interconnection between environment and socio-economic development, account for

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the growth in environment-related regional arrangements. Regional institutions are

becoming an important component of the global architecture for environmental

governance.

The role and effectiveness, and hence the significance, of regional institutions,

however, vary widely. They depend on the nature of the problem (global issues,

specific regional and sub-regional concerns, bilateral problems, or issues of concerns

within state boundaries), the level at which it is addressed, and the nature of the specific

regional institutions and its capacity to address such problems. All these factors vary

widely. In practice, therefore, the role of regional institutions in the managing the

environment is not uniform across regions and sub regions. Some, like those policy in

Western Europe, are more effective and have a much higher role capacity than those in

other region and sub-regions.

Regional arrangements or Regionalism (these two terms are used interchangeably in

this chapter) may be defined as "co-operation among governments or non­

governmental organisations in three or more geographically proximate and

interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue areas"

(Alagappa 1997:423). Regional agencies refer to formal and informal regional

organizations (with and organizational infrastructures, staff, budgets, etc.) with

responsibility from regional arrangements. Such agencies may be region wide

sometimes spanning a continent like the Organization of American States (OAS) and

the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), or may be sub regional like the Association

of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional

Organization (SAARC). Regional agencies are usually the coterminous with regional

arrangements, but not necessarily so.

Regional environmental arrangements may be sector-specific, like the 1979 Geneva

Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the 1992 Helsinki

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and

International Lakes. Or they may be case specific like the Nile Basin Action Plan,

Ganga Action Plan, Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against

Pollution. Sectoral and case specific arrangements are often interrelated, with the

former providing an umbrella framework for the latter. Sectoral and case specific

arrangements may lead to the creation of separate specialized agencies or they may be

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nested in existing multi-purpose regional institutions like the European Union, the

OAS, the OAU, MERCOSUR and ASEAN.

The Role of Regional Institutions

In generic terms, regional institutions can play a number of roles, including:

•

•

•

•

•

Provision of high-level forums to map the regional environmental agenda,

articulate regional goals, and build relevant regional norms;

Facilitation of regional input into the formulation of global conventions and the

implementations of such conventions through their translation into regional

conventions and national action plans;

Development and management of regional initiatives and action plans to address

transboundary environmental problems in the region;

Mediation of disputes between member states; and

Harmonization of national efforts on issues that fall under the domestic jurisdiction

of the member states.

In this chapter, two regional organisations have been taken for the comparative study.

First, the European Union (EU), as it has tremendously influenced the environmental

problems which are global and regional in nature and even fight for them at all the

Multilateral and International forums. EU has made the 'environment criteria' an

important condition for any new state to become the m«:?mber of the organization. EU is

also actively participating in influencing the other regional organizations in the areas of

environmental issues, adaptation and mitigation process of green house gas emission,

climate change, biodiversity, pollution, agriculture etc. the second organization which

has been discussed in the chapter is the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC). It is an organization which has not come into existence due to

any economic, but it has been collectively interested in the peaceful political existence

of each other. SAARC as an organization is yet not as successful as EU because it has

long way to go in understanding the basic functions of the regional organisations. In

this scenario, several times the meetings were not been held due to some political or

security reasons. All these hurdles affect the fundamental growth of this regional

organization. Not only this, SAARC is trying hard to cope with these small problems

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and move a head for the regional development of it. Other than the economic, political,

and social problems, the member countries are also facing the extreme climatic

conditions because of the global warming phenomena. Therefore, environmental

problems and their solutions has also taken a special position in the SAARC

constitution. The current meetings and conferences have shown the active participation

of all the member countries and their concern on this issue. Both the organisations have

been dealt in the context of developed and developing countries and their expectations

with each other in the environmental sphere. The G-77 has been discussed to highlight

the depth of the issue at such an international platform which unites both the north and

south countries.

SAARC Environmental Challenges and Opportunities

The South Asian sub-region comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Islamic

Republic of Iran, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Given the economic,

social and cultural context of the countries of South Asia, similar challenges confront

them in protecting their environment and natural resources. For instance, high rates of

population growth, urbanization, and widespread incidence of poverty are common,

although improvements have been witnessed in all major indicators of human

·development over recent years (UNDP 1998). South Asia is also home to a significant

but shrinking array of terrestrial and marine biodiversity. For example, the Hindu Kush

Himalayan belt is home to some 25 000 major plant species, comprising 10 per cent of

the world's flora (Shengji 1998). In addition, Sri Lanka is one of the most biologically

diverse countries in the world, and India contains extensive savannah and forest

habitats, including many endemic species of international importance. South Asia is

also home to around 14 per cent of the world's remaining mangrove habitat, in addition

to having the highest percentage of threatened wetlands, 82 of which are in Bangladesh.

Shared Environmental Problems

A growing population reduces the per capita availability of land and water, which

consequently impairs the people's ability to produce food. Land degradation and water

scarcity are thus closely tied to food security concerns. Urbanization and poverty,

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particularly the concentration of population in a few large South Asian cities, is another

important challenge. It poses a strain on the limited resources of these cities, where

infrastructure is already overstretched. In prioritizing shared environmental concerns in

the sub-region, the most important are:

Land degradation: South Asia has the largest area of irrigated land in Asia and the

Pacific (nearly 90 million ha). However, unplanned and badly engineered irrigation

developments have resulted in land degradation through factors such as water erosion

and salinity. Irrigated croplands of many countries, such as India and Pakistan, are

severely affected by salinity. Wind erosion also presents a serious regional issue.

Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and India suffer most from

desertification (UNEP 1997). The worst sufferers as a result ofland degradation are the

poor.

Water scarcity and degradation: A number of areas within Afghanistan, India, the

Islamic Republic of Iran, and Pakistan are suffering from water scarcity. Groundwater

depletion has also emerged as a major concern in parts of India, Bangladesh and Sri

Lanka in recent years, and depletion of freshwater aquifers is threatening water supplies

in the Maldives. Adding to these problems is the cross border degradation of existing

sources specifically through uncontrolled release of sewage (the problem of pathogenic

water pollution has grown to alarming proportions in the sub-region, (UNEP 1997),

industrial wastes, agricultural run-off, commercial pesticide and arsenic contamination.

Deforestation and Biodiversity Loss: South Asia shares approximately 19 per cent of

the Asian and Pacific region total forest cover, providing cross-border habitats for a

wealth of species. Within the sub-region, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan are

the countries with the highest rates of deforestation. The effect of habitat loss on

biodiversity has still to be quantified, though overall habitat losses have been the most

acute in the Indian subcontinent (UNEP 1997). Diverse habitats such as mangrove have

also faced severe pressures through aquacultural developments in Bangladesh, India

and Sri Lanka (UNEP 1997). Impacts to the marine environment Pollution and over

extraction of resources are both key concerns in relation to South Asia's marine

environment. Unplanned developments are also affecting the coastal zone, and leading

to erosion, while changes in the region's seawater temperatures are impacting on its

coral systems.

Atmospheric pollution, rapid growth in energy demand and the reliance on coal have

translated into significant increases in the emission of air pollutants. Urban air pollution

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has emerged as a major problem in many cities, in addition to fly-ash generated through

coal mining (see Box 16.3 ). Effects of acid deposition in excess of critical loads have

been recorded in areas of North-eastern India and Bangladesh (UNEP 1997) and the

pristine forests of Bhutan (Communication by the Government of Bhutan, May 2000).

An increase in slash-and bum agriculture is also contributing to incidents of haze in

certain areas.

Deficient Urban Infrastructure: The capacity of urban infrastructure (water supply and

sanitation, waste management etc.) has not been increasing at a rate commensurate to

urbanization. Surmounting deficits are growing particularly acute in sub-urban sprawls

and inner-city squatter settlements, where it is the poor who are the most vulnerable.

Natural Disasters: The north-eastern Indian sub-region represents the greatest area of

seismic hazard in the Indian subcontinent. Floods, cyclones and landslides are other

common hazards. Floods regularly cause widespread havoc in India and Bangladesh,

and also occasionally in Pakistan and Nepal. Average population has been growing at

the rate of 1.8 per cent per annum (UNFPA 1997), and widespread incidence of poverty

characterize much of the-sub-region, although improvements have been witnessed in all

major indicators of human development over recent years (UNDP 1998). Per capita

GNP is lowest in Nepal and highest in Islamic Republic of Iran, and varies from

US$21 0 to US$1 650 respectively. Overall, the region is home to more than 500 million

poor people living below a 'dollar a day' poverty line (World Bank 1999), representing

an average of nearly 34 per cent of South Asia's population. 29 per cent of the

population is urban, and urbanization is growing at 3.4 per cent (UNFPA 1997). The

economies of countries of the sub-region are primarily agricultural although in recent

years the pace of industrialization has increased. Nevertheless, industrialization has not

been able to completely absorb the growing labour force presented by the region's

demographic trends.

Policy Response

- National Initiatives

Notable initiatives have been undertaken by the governments of South Asia in recent

years to strengthen institutions; improve regulatory systems; implement financial and

policy reforms towards sustainahle development; and enhance private sector

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involvement. Many new public sector institutions have been established, including

environmental ministries, while independent environment agencies, departments and

pollution control boards have also been created to support them. A number of common

limitations are, however, observed in relation to achieving sustainable development in

the sub-region. These relate to bottlenecks facing the legal, industrial, policy, and NGO

communities and are as follows.

Legal Legislation in several countries of the sub-region has failed to respond to

changing paradigms of development, and many resource laws and statutes have been

rendered obsolete by recent developments. Moreover, there is a weak regulatory

framework, and problems of implementation and enforcement are acute. This is

manifested in slow adoption of EIA practices, and inadequate public participation in

formulation and implementation of laws. The paucity of financial resources to

implement laws, inadequate penalties for violation and lack of political commitment

are also observed. Industrial Environmental awareness among the industrial sector is

increasing and is substantially better today than a decade ago. However, the region is

dominated by small and medium scale industries, a significant number of which

produce hazardous wastes. The scale of industry in the sub-region is analogous with

meagre budgets and scant, if any, resources for allocation to research and development.

A need for closer ties between industry and the universities is recognized, together with

the development of appropriate environmental management capacity.

While it may be difficult to gauge the overall impact of environmental policies on the

environment, it appears from the existing literature that local level decentralized

approaches are having a far greater impact on resource management than other policy

instruments. This is borne out, for instance, by the success of water user organizations

in much of India and Nepal and also through similar approaches in forestry. A critique,

however, has been that such approaches have focused exclusively on the

accomplishment of physical targets, often to the detriment of participatory goals (Khan

1996).

Several factors hamper the working of NGOs in the sub-region, including lack of

financial resources, training and strategic goals. In addition, numerous cases have been

identified where, even when funds have been available, NGOs remain unable to access

them due to insufficient organizational capabilities.

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-Sub-Regional Cooperation

Opportunities for sub-regional policy cooperation are promoted through two principal

programmes:

• The South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP); and

• The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAAR C) .

-The South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP)

Since its inception in 1982, SACEP has initiated a number of projects, which are

building national capacity to manage environmental issues. The overall focus of

SACEP's activities includes capacity building and institutional strengthening;

conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; ecosystems conservation and

management; environmental information and assessment; and education and

awareness-raising. SACEP's members include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,

India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

(a) The SACEP South Asian Regional Seas Programme

The formulation of the Regional Seas Programme was a major achievement under the

aegis of SACEP, and it is one of the few major transboundary environmental

programmes of South Asia. Under this programme, South Asian Seas Action Plan was

also prepared along with national and regional overviews and action plans. The

implementation activities relate to integrated coastal zone management; development

of national and regional oil and chemical contingency plans; and protection of the

marine environment from the impacts of land-based activities.

(b) Improvement ofthe Legal and Institutional Framework

Another major programme undertaken by SACEP has been the improvement of the

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legal and institutional framework in the countries of the sub-region with technical

assistance from UNEP Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. Under this programme,

national workshops were organized in Bangladesh and Nepal covering environmental

Jaw from both national and international convention implementation perspectives. In

the Maldives, support was given for a National Planning Meeting to develop Draft

National Environmental Legislation. In Sri Lanka, activities were carried out m

development of regulations; preparation of a model statute; establishment of

environmental standards; preparation of the state of environment report; training

programmes; and, an environmental awareness raising programme for children.

(c) Private and Public Cooperation Initiative

SACEP launched this initiative to promote cooperation between governments and the

private sector, with support from UNEP and NORAD. Under the initiative, a Regional

Seminar on Cooperation for the Promotion of Environmentally Friendly Business

Practices is being convened. The objective of the seminar, which will be attended by

representatives of the Governments and business sectors of the seven South Asian

countries, is to share experiences in improving industrial, agricultural and business

management and to identify present and future challenges for advancing towards

sustainable development goals. The seminar expects to initiate a regional dialogue by

promoting networking among national private sector institutions including Chambers

of Commerce and Industry; Employers Federations; and Industrial/ Agricultural

Research Institutions.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

SAARC was established in 1983, with its headquarters in Kathmandu, and includes the

countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

SAARC has a particular focus on economic cooperation, although it also covers many

aspects of regional cooperation (including environment). SAARC has grown steadily

and, as a result of recent coordination initiatives between the two programmes, its

environmental activities are complementary to those of SACEP. SAARC has set up

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several technical committees in many fields. The Committee on Environment was

given the status of a Technical Committee in 1992, in which year a special session of

this Committee was held in Pakistan to prepare modalities and programmes of action.

The implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Study on Greenhouse

effects has also been mandated to this Committee.

International Programmes & Projects

Countries of the sub-region are also participating in four transboundary efforts being

promoted by the World Bank in Asia and the Pacific. URBAIR and the Two-Stroke

Vehicle Engine Initiative address the rapidly-worsening air pollution problem in South

Asia's largest cities. The Bay of Bengal Environment Programme funded by GEF and

jointly implemented with F AO, addresses fisheries research, environmental

emergencies, large marine ecosystems, and coastal zone management in and around the

bay. Both South and East Asian countries are involved in this programme. The South

Asia Development Initiatives seeks to improve regional cooperation in the poorest part

of South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and eastern India) in water resource

management, energy development and trade and transport and commerce. Lastly, a

programme for the preservation of Cultural Heritage in South Asia is being

implemented in Bangladesh, India and Nepal to promote active involvement and

financial support of the public, NGO, and private sectors to rehabilitate and protect

national heritage sites.

A distinctive feature of the South Asian sub-region, is that, while the last five years has

seen a growth in cooperation and coordination of intraregional sustainable development

initiatives, historically this has been Jacking. However, many of the South Asian

countries, like those of other sub-regions, are also party to several international

agreements, covering many aspects of economic development and environmental

conservation, and as such their intra-regional cooperation on these could be of

considerable future mutual benefit. What is imperative in the region is the continued

move toward the decentralization of environmental management, the increased

involvement of the public sector in environmental decision making, and importantly,

concentration on the key concern of poverty alleviation. In this respect, SACEP and

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SAARC are considering several further proposals. Indeed, it is expected that within the

next few years, there will be a substantial portfolio of sub-regional environmental

programmes underway, which will benefit the individual countries as well as the

sub-region as a whole, and improve the quality of life of the population. It is hoped

these programmes will also yield positive results that will spread far beyond the

boundaries of South Asia.

Debate of Developed and Developing Countries

One of the persistent trends of major international environmental negotiations

beginning at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

(UNCED), Stockholm 1972 and continuing through to Rio and the Johannesburg

summit has been the emergence of irreconcilable differences between the North and

South. Current negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC) suggest that North-South economic inequality will also

play a significant role in the efforts to reach a multilateral agreement on how to

proceed after the period of commitment within the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012. The

First section will emphasis the historical overview of how North-South relations have

impacted on the framing of the problem of global warming and the consequences for

creating and implementing viable solutions. The second section will feature a

summary historical overview of the global warming debate. In the third section, we

will identify and analyse some of the major areas of disagreement that divide the

North and the South.

The three themes which will be dealt in the chapters are: the mitigation versus

adaptation quandary, technology transfer and knowledge inequities; and finally the

role of multilateralism in global climate policy. The fourth and final section of the

chapter is a summary examination of possible implications for the South of the

proposed emissions trading schemes.

It has been seen mainly in the centre of political economy, as it will be used with the

analytical lens for examining the material at hand and, more specifically, the core

propositions found in the world systems and dependency (WSD) approaches for a

number of reasons. One is convenience: through the use of an analytical framework,

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one can select a small number of significant observations to illustrate a broader point

in a way that a strict chronological account would not allow. Another is to ascertain

whether employing an alternative analytical frame to the dominant regimes

framework (Vogler, 1995) will shed new light on the problem at hand. A third is that

the WSD approach is among those scientific perspectives that allow one to understand

the theoretical reasoning behind the arguments that have hitherto influenced the

political positions of Southern states. While few WSD analyses take up the global

environmental problematique or aspects thereof, political economic approaches

generally and world systems in particular are becoming increasingly popular frames

for tackling the analysis of the global environmental problematique. Roberts et al.

(2003) examined the issue of carbon dioxide emissions from a WS perspective while

Gorg and Brand (2000) have analysed the problem of biodiversity in global

perspective (see also Coban, 2004).

WSD is not a coherent theoretical perspective, but a tradition with a number of

diverging views that find a common source of inspiration in the work of Ferdinand

Braude! and Raul Prebisch and others in the 1960s. Despite the heterogeneity of the

perspective, the following number of postulates may be said to be command

consensus among proponents:

(i) The current World economy took on its defining features in Europe between 1500

and 1650 (Frank and Gills, 1993);

(ii) Among these features are a stable tri-part international stratification system of

core, semi-periphery, and periphery through which individual countries may move (up

or down), but which itself has not changed;

(iii) The ability of countries to achieve upward mobility is constrained by their trade

relations with the world economy and their geopolitical role and power, which

together condition their structural location within the hierarchy (see, e.g., Evans et al.,

1985; Gereffi and Wyman, 1990); and

(iv) This structural location- their world-system 'position'- plays an important role in

shaping their class structure and internal political battles.

The dynamics of core-periphery relations would, according to WSD, determine how

the international relations of the global environmental problematique develop and the

range of possibilities available to given nation states. Our main thesis in this paper is

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that the logic of centre-periphery relations as outlined in WSD both explains the

positions of different countries on the issue of global warming and contributes to the

absence of trust that characterizes the negotiations between the North and the South.

Global Warming and North-South Relations: Historical Overview

The problem of climate change was first placed on the international political agenda

at the Stockholm conference on the Human Environment ( 1972). A number of

preparatory reports had pointed to the problem of adverse human impact on the

climate. The official documents from the preparatory process recognized that 'the

Earth's temperature may rise as a result of the increased atmospheric content in

carbon dioxide due to future consumption of fossil fuel' (UN, 1972a, para. 42). A two

centigrade increase of the global average surface temperature over a period of

centuries would cause melting of the polar ice caps, rising sea levels and

corresponding loss of land areas. On the other hand, the Earth could experience global

cooling caused by particle emissions. More research was called for to determine the

effects of increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Even so, in addition to natural

climatic variations, the official background document to the conference concluded

'we now realize that man's activities may also add a powerful destabilizing factor to

the interplay of the natural forces that determine the climate' (UN, 1972a, para. 44).

The action plan of the Stockholm meeting advised a general precautionary approach

on climate and governments were recommended to 'be mindful of activities in which

there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate' and to 'carefully evaluate the

likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects' of planned activities and to fully consult

states that could effected (UN, 1972b, rec. 70). The end of the 1970s witnessed an

intensification of focus on climate and greenhouse gases (GHGs) and the 1980s might

be dubbed the decade of climate meetings. The kick-off event for this was the First

World Climate Conference which was organized by the World Meteorological

Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the

International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The conference concluded that

climate change was a serious problem that called for political planning to counter its

consequences for social and economic development (WMO, 1979). In the wake of the

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first world climate conference came a series of other intergovernmental meetings on

the same topic.

The Villach workshop on climate change is perhaps the best known of these meetings

since it was at Villach that decades of research was crystallized into well publicized

warnings about an anthropogenically induced climate change due to rising

concentrations of C02 and other GHGs (World Climate Program, 1985). Two

follow-up conferences in 1987 provided additional sources of support for an

international convention and WMO was able to conclude that it was time to

investigate further the 'need for law of the atmosphere as a global commons' (WMO,

1988). These meetings are commonly referred to as an important background to the

climate convention (Jager and Ferguson, 1991; Franz, 1997; Samhat, 1998; Bodansky,

2001 ). The increased political attention devoted to anthropogenically induced climate

change in the 1980s was the result of a confluence of events in which science was one

factor. Other contributing factors included growing public concern for the

environment and unprecedented media coverage of environmental events. A third

contributing factor was the preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and

Development (UNCED). The last was also prompted by the dismal situation reported

by UNEP in its ten-year review of the events after the Stockholm conference. UNEP

concluded that the situation was gloomy in virtually all areas at issue (UNEP, 1982).

This failure was among other things attributed to the structure of the global economy.

It was argued that 'worsening of environmental problems in developing countries

arising from the present international economic order which has slowed down their

development and the protection of the environment' (Holdgate, 1982).

The following year (1983), the World Commission on Environment and Development

was formed and charged with the task of proposing long-term environmental

strategies for achieving sustainable development by the year 2000 and beyond.

Critical to this task was 'to help define shared perceptions oflong term environmental

issues' (WCED, 1987, p. ix). Our Common Future covered virtually all international

environmental concerns of its time and ranked climate change as one of the more

serious threats for global sustainable development. In addition to the commonly

referred scientific climate meetings held in the North, the UN resolution in 1989

preceding the decision for a framework convention listed a large number of other

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meetings which also formed a basis for the General Assembly's decision (UN,

1989a). Several of these meetings expressed concern about the effects of global

warming on poorer countries and called for a framework convention (Commonwealth

Heads of Government Meeting, 1989; Conference of Non Aligned Heads of State,

1989). Other declarations referred to in the UN General Assembly resolution, such as

the 1989 Caracas Declaration adopted at the special ministerial meeting of the Group

of 77 (G-77), did not explicitly mention climate but underscored the dependent

relationship between environment protection and the development process (G-77,

1989). The UNGA decision also referred to declarations from developing country

meetings, stressing the serious consequences of sea-level rise for low-lying coastal

and island states (e.g. South Pacific Forum, 1989). In a UN resolution passed the same

day as the decision to launch a climate convention, the General Assembly urged the

international community to provide effective and timely support to these countries so

they could adapt to these threats (UN, 1989b ).

The Road to the Convention

Given the above, one might contend that the road was well paved for formation of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by WMO and UNEP. Two years

later, this body published its First Assessment Report which confirmed the scientific

basis for concern for human induced climate change and called for a global treaty to

address the problem (IPCC, Working Group III et al., 1991 ). This report had a

substantive political influence as it provided an important basis for negotiations on the

1992 Convention (quoted in Bodansky, 2001, p. 28). In the same year, the General

Assembly underscored ' [ c ]onservation of climate as part of the common heritage of

mankind'. The resolution concluded that climate change had to be dealt with in a

'global framework'. Referring to other recent resolutions and reports such as Our

Common Future, it stressed that 'changes in climate have an impact on development'

(UN, 1988).

The UN resolution deciding on a conference on environment and development to

some extent reflects these concerns. It emphasized that one of the rationales for the

decision was that the 'largest part of the current emission of pollutants into the

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environment originates in developed countries, and recognizing therefore that those

countries have the main responsibility for combating such pollution' (UN, 1989c).

The climate convention was a part of the Rio package. The UN stipulated that this

was to be ready for signature at the Rio conference. A month before the Rio Earth

Summit, the UNFCCC was adopted at the United Nations Headquarters in New York

and was opened for signature at the conference. It entered into force almost two years

later in March 1994. To date, it has been ratified by 188 countries. The ultimate

objective of the convention is to stabilize human-induced greenhouse gas emissions at

safe levels. Since it is a framework convention, these levels were not specified, but

were to be negotiated afterwards. This objective continues, however, with conditions

which have been very important in the polemics surrounding the Kyoto Protocol.

'Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems

to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened

and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner' {UN, 1992,

art. 2).

The convention distinguishes between two groups. Annex 1 countries are the

industrialized countries which have historically predominantly contributed to GHGs

in the atmosphere (the OECD, Russia and several other Central and Eastern European

countries). Under the convention, these 'are committed to the non-legally binding aim

of returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000' (UN,

1992). Non-Annex 1 Parties are mainly the developing countries. They are to report in

general terms on their actions to address climate change and adapt to its effects.

Almost all countries, except some of the oil producing states, agreed in principle with

the objectives of the convention. The differences in opinion centred on more detailed

goals and obligations. Three issues divided the opinions: 1) target and timetables; 2)

financial and technology transfer; and 3) implementation mechanisms. The European

Community and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) argued for explicit and

concrete targets and timetables for limiting emissions from industrialized countries.

The US and the oil-producing states dismissed such commitments. Many developing

countries supported the idea with the proviso that it would apply to industrialized

countries. A second controversial issue was the financial assistance and technology

transfer. Industrialized countries wished to use the Global Environment Facility

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(GEF) for this end, while developing countries pressed for the establishment of a new

fund. Countries such as India also requested additional financial resources from

industrialized countries to assist developing countries to implement the convention.

Third, the OECD countries generally favoured the introduction of strong institutional

arrangements to oversee implementation with recurrent meetings of the parties to the

convention. It included a scientific advisory body, a body to assist implementation,

detailed reporting requirements, as well as established procedure to handle

non-compliance. Developing countries feared that such strong institutional regulation

might violate national sovereignty and advocated a more voluntary framework

convention (UN, 1992). In particular Article 4. 7 of the convention was instrumental in

bridging the conflicting positions of North and South in the negotiations, which was

important to make the Group of77 more inclined to agree to the convention.

The extent to which developing country parties will effectively implement their

commitments under the convention will depend on the effective implementation by

developed country parties of their commitments under the convention related to

financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that

economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding

priorities of the developing country parties (UN, 1992). In the end, the convention

reflects a careful balance between these positions. Many issues were also referred to

the Conference of the Parties (COP) 15 which did not lead to a final result and were

forwarded to the upcoming Mexico conference.

When the time came for more thorough decisions, two major conflicts erupted. The

EU and the USA came to blows over emission reductions and North and South

engaged in another clash over developing countries' participation in agreements. The

North pushed for manifest targets also for developing countries, whereas Southern

countries pointed to the historical responsibility of the industrialized countries. A few

months before Kyoto, the US Senate unanimously decided that the US should not

accept a treaty that would not require all countries, including developing, to commit

to emission reduction (Byrd and Hagel, 1997). In the negotiations leading up to the

Kyoto Protocol, there was also strong pressure from the United States for flexible

arrangements to meet the targets of the protocol. After intense negotiations, three

instruments were defined: Joint Implementation, Emissions Trading and Clean

Development Mechanism (COM).

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Prior to the Kyoto meeting, Brazil proposed that responsibilities to mitigate GHGs

should be based on each country's historic contribution to the earth's mean surface

temperature increase, rather than present emissions. This would give developing

countries some time for economic development before taking on emissions reductions

targets. Annex I parties that did not comply were to make a contribution to a fund for

each effective emissions unit above its emissions ceiling. The COM originated from

this proposal. In contrast to Brazil's proposal, it shifts the focus to mitigation projects

undertaken by developing countries. The COM is intended to contribute to the

ultimate objective of the UNFCCC with a two-tier solution: (i) transfer of cleaner

technology to developing countries which will reduce emissions; and (ii) certified

emissions reductions by Annex 1 parties (UNFCCC, 1997, 1998).

In the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in February 2005, Annex I parties

committed themselves to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by at least 5%

below 1990 levels in the first commitment period between 2008 and 2012. Specific

targets varied between the countries. The Kyoto Protocol left many of the operational

details for coming COPs and subsidiary bodies to work out during further

negotiations. The protocol was criticized by the South for not having sufficiently

recognized the need for economic and social development in non-industrialized

countries. In addition, it was argued that it downplayed adaptation issues, which were

of immediate concern for the vulnerable poor countries (Bhandari et al., 1999).

Despite the efforts to achieve compromise represented by the carefully crafted course

set by the convention and the Kyoto Protocol, a number of important tensions remain.

In the next section of this chapter, we intend to outline two issues of this type.

Expectations and Demand of Developing Countries to Developed Countries

(a) Technology Transfer

The problem of global warming is seen by developing countries as one which has

been created by Northern countries who in tum have benefited from the activities that

have led to environmental damage. This perspective not only links global

environmental change to development in the North, but to the prospect of future

development in the South. It is also a view that may be argued to have some support

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in the Brundtland report. Depending on how one reads the debate on global warming

and the various conventions, resolutions and agreements passed, one could

conceivably argue that this position is widely accepted and enshrined in several of the

proposed arrangements, example; the GEF and IPCC's recommendations that

developing countries should be given assistance and compensated. This view has even

been recognized in Article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change.

Although some aspects of the discussion suggest that there might be winners and

losers in climate change, the dominant approach that has characterized the

negotiations has been to avoid framing the global warming issue in terms of winners

and losers. The two most common reasons advanced for this are that: (i) absolute

winners and losers in climate change are difficult to establish because what is defined

as a win or a loss is ultimately dependent on level of aggregation or scale; and (ii)

mitigating warming of the climate will lead to net benefits for society as a whole so

there is little point in establishing individual winners and losers since losses are

acceptable because the net benefit for the whole is greater (Nordhaus, 1991 ). This line

of reasoning frames the problem of global warming in biophysical terms and avoids

any discussion of social and political determinants or consequences of the issue. Thus,

GHG emissions from fossil fuel use in developed countries is treated as the same as

emissions from agricultural activities in developing countries (Agarwal and Narain,

1991; Shue, 1993). The South's position issues from a political economic framing of

global warming similar to that of WS in that it argues that global warming cannot be

framed in purely biophysical terms since some countries benefited socially and

politically from generating environmental damage. Further, the proposed solutions

imply a greater burden for the South.

Since the Stockholm conference in 1972, it has been increasingly apparent that

development cannot continue to be defined in terms of high growth and high

consumption that was synonymous with the trajectory followed by OECD and other

industrialized nations. Global sustainable development depends on, among other

things, the ability of Southern nations to outline and follow development visions

based on low impact lifestyles. The ability of the South to achieve this is in tum

dependent on it having access to environmentally-efficient technology at affordable

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prices. This implies that in adopting policies to mitigate global warming, the South

can be expected to incur both political and economic costs. Political costs in terms of

being able to justify to the populace why the affluent lifestyles that have hitherto been

promised as a possible future are no longer attainable and the high upfront economic

costs of pursuing an alternative technological trajectory.

Even within the biophysical frame, it is acknowledged that some Southern nations,

such as those located in low-lying coastal areas, will be particularly disadvantaged by

global warming. Southern states have taken the line that the above arguments come

together to imply that they should be awarded compensation and at the very least

assistance to overcome the additional challenges that adopting policies for mitigating

and/or adapting to global warming would present to them. According to the WSD

perspective, state behaviour is strongly determined by history and position in the

world system. Reasoning from this, it may be argued that core states will, despite the

fact that the issue clearly warrants a departure from the norm, have difficulty in

adopting a new frame. Further, even if they were to do so, it would hardly produce

much effect since only a radical restructuring of the system itself can bring about

significant change. This logic not only explains the behaviour of the core (Northern)

states vis-a-vis their peripheral (Southern) counterparts, but also the fact that little

attention has been given to the problem of disadvantaged peripheries in the North

itself.

(b) Knowledge Disparities

More important than but related to the problems associated with technology and

future development possibilities is the problem of the disparities between the North

and South with respect to knowledge production and absorption in relation to global

warming. Since the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development in

1979, it has been well understood that the majority of Third World countries do not

possess the necessary scientific infrastructure or capacity (personnel, capital) to

support their development aspirations. This has consequences for the ability of Third

World countries to negotiate successfully on issues ranging from trade to

environment. The area of global warming is a particularly strong case of this general

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problem for two closely-related reasons. One is that the preparations for the

negotiations depend on investments in expensive equipment and highly skilled

scientific labour (Demerrit, 2001 ).

Prioritizing this expense in the face of other needs in the South is neither politically

justifiable nor desirable. Similar arguments can be made by some Northern countries

as well so this position is not unassailable. The other is that the science and politics of

climate change are inextricably interlinked. Science drives and has driven the national

and international politics of climate change and expectations of policy relevance

shape the scientific agenda in terms of methods, questions posed, standards of proof

and other epistemological aspects of scientific practice. Even the game between

climate sceptics and the environmental lobby involves a bewildering series of

interpretations and reinterpretations of data, charges of political partisanship and

emphasis on the indeterminacy of scientific knowledge as a basis for political action.

The South has also been engaging in this game despite its limited scientific capacity.

The result has been that it is now a recognized problem in the negotiations that

countries routinely question scientific arguments because they distrust the source.

The South's distrust of 'the science of global warming' is in part rooted m

vulnerability arising from its inability to rely on its own scientific resources. Another

reason for distrust is that science tends to favour the biophysical framing of climate

change rather than the political economic lens that the South would prefer to use to

understand climate change and its policy consequences. The reductionism inherent to

scientific practice as well as the fact that Northern scientists dominate the climate

change science community all converge on favouring a biophysical approach that

ignores the social and political implications of proposed actions. It is important to

bear in mind, however, that these very features of scientific practice were instrumental

in getting the problem of climate change on the political agenda in the first place.

Another less acknowledged but equally important point of division has to do with the

differences in national policy cultures generally and more specifically variations in

national preferences for constructing the science-policy interface. Nations often differ

in the way that they construct the demarcation between scientific expertise and

political authority. This means that in some instances, policymakers may lose

legitimacy if they appear to be allowing scientists to be 'calling the shots'. This also

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holds true for Northern states; some of the misunderstanding between European

Union and the United States on global warming may in part be attributed to

differences in how these countries view the role of scientific expertise in decision

making.

(c) Diverging Interests and Common Expectations: G-77 and Global Warming

In discussions about North-South relations on problems such as global warming, the

South is often seen as and represents itself as a homogeneous group. This

homogeneity is a deliberate political construction which is as much sustained by the

real vulnerability developing countries feel vis-a-vis their wealthier counterparts in

negotiations as by the fact that it is the divergences among Northern countries that

often take centre-stage. Nowhere is this more evident than with the issue of global

warming. The position of developing countries may be briefly described as one which

argues for a multilateral response to global environmental problems. Developing

countries further argue that the industrialized countries have a historic responsibility

as they are the predominant source of pollution and should therefore shoulder the

burden of the costs of global environmental conservation. This burden includes

compensation to developing countries for additional expenses incurred in promoting

environmental conservation.

Despite the persistence of the traditional groupings in international negotiations such

as the G77, the US and some other OECD countries as one group and the EU as a

third group, the problem of global warming has created a number of new interest

coalitions which threaten the solidarity of the traditional groups. One of these is the

differences between the interests of the A OS IS and the OPEC countries; another is the

role of the larger Third World states such as India, China, Brazil and Argentina whose

interests in issues like technology transfer and debt relief have grown in complexity

since the initial formation of the G-77 group. The much vaunted peace dividend from

the end of the Cold War has come to developing countries chiefly in the form of the

decoupling of economic development from political ideology. This means that liberal

economic globalization is as much alive in the South as it is in the North. Within

Third World countries, many of the intellectual elite now challenge the narrative of

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development as a Western myth intended to perpetuate underdevelopment while the

political elite struggle on the international stage for the right to pursue this very myth.

In practical terms, many developing countries are turning to each other in bilateral

agreements to get access to knowledge and assistance that they traditionally sought in

North-South negotiations. India, China and Brazil in particular are now and will

increasingly in the future become exporters of technology to other Third World

countries.

The continued existence of the G-77 group as a political entity in the face of these

tensions may be explained theoretically by the WSD argument that although

individual countries may change their relative positions in the system, the system

dynamic remains unaltered. More practically, the G-77's persistence may be

explained by a number of other factors. One is a shared understanding among

developing countries of global environmental negotiations as a starting point for

negotiations over the unequal consumption of resources rather than for the protection

of the environment from the excesses of industrial capitalism. The other is that both

the weaker and the stronger nations need the group for leverage on issues such as

global warming. A third is that the failure of the G-77 to break into smaller groups

with stronger ties may have to do with the interaction between the G-77 as a group

and the North. To the extent that the Northern countries themselves find it convenient

to treat the South as an amorphous whole whose constituent parts exist independently

only when it may be convenient for the exercise of power then the G-77 will need to

persist as G-77.

One potential test case in this respect is climate change, since developing countries on

aggregate are expected to increase their GHGs emissions as they pursue industrial

development. These increasing emissions, it is believed, will provide them with a

bargaining chip vis-a-vis developing countries that are pressing for global

commitments of mitigating GHG emissions (Miller, 1995). Climate change will hurt

some of the developing countries more than others for a variety of reasons. This

makes the bargaining chip hypothesis only partially valid for developing countries.

Some may strengthen their negotiating positions, whereas others have too much at

stake to attain a favourable bargaining situation. The emergence of this scenario is

dependent on the willingness of the international community to actually take

responsibility for the global commons from rhetoric to reality.

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Emissions Trading: A Way Out of the Impasse?

In the post-2012 period, developing country GHG emissions are expected to exceed

industrialized countries' emissions some time between 2010 and 2012 according to

IPCC model projections (IPCC 2001 ). This, for many observers, implies that

large-scale reduction of GHG emissions has to include participation of non-Annex 1

countries, in spite of development concerns and the North's historic responsibilities.

This particular line of argument is seen as one of the more difficult points of

negotiation. It may be that a stronger emphasis on synergies between sustainable

development and climate change policy is one way out of this impasse.

At present, the linkage between climate policy and sustainable development rests

almost exclusively on the market based COM operating on a prima~ly local project

level. The purpose of COM as it was defined in the Kyoto Protocol was to help direct

foreign corporate investment to facilitate sustainable development. What is meant by

sustainable development is basically up to national definitions. However, at the same

time, it is in the present round of UNFCCC confined to a local phenomena and

realized by foreign corporate investment (Grubb, 1999: xxxix). It remains to be seen

whether the trust in the COM is warranted given the historical legacy of failure. In the

Kyoto Protocol and subsequent COPs, sustainable development is predominantly

associated with COM, and as such it is predominantly confined to local issues.

However, climate change policy is intimately linked to sustainable development

dimensions of global resource and material flows. By creating a platform for a

potential global emissions market, the Kyoto Protocol is merging the present liberal

economic globalization with climate change policy. According to Grubb, COM 'gives

the Kyoto Protocol commitments the global investment scope which the United States

and most other countries had been desperately seeking, and explicitly enshrines the

role of the private sector (Grubb, 1999, p. 136). Some actors in the global South argue

that technological transfer and the monetary flows connected with COM and Joint

Implementation will follow the line of most foreign investment and go to the larger

economies of developing countries and leave Least Developed Countries on the

margin (Najam et al. 2003). Since the poorer countries do not produce high enough

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quantities of emissions for effective projects that will render good return in emission

credits, they run the risk of being left out in the investment calculations (Gupta, 1997;

Anand, 2004).

The emissions trading schemes seem to follow the logic of the global warming issue

as a whole in so far as it challenges the traditional grouping of developing countries as

one negotiating bloc. One potential way forward may be for countries to adjust their

negotiation strategy to the evolution of their particular interests. The G-77 formation

has been very good at delivering rhetorical victories for the South such as the concept

of sustainable development and arguments for the historical debt of the North to the

global commons. The translation of these rhetorical gains into real advantages for the

South and ultimately for the future of the global commons may rest in sacrificing the

comfort of the solidarity of the G-77 at the altar of conservation goals of the South.

This approach may also be advantageous in view of the fact that discussions about

large scale arrangements for technology transfer are no longer relevant in the context

of nation state discussions. Northern countries do not own these resources and the

increasing globalization of capital has meant that, on their own territory, many

Northern states are as powerless as their Southern counterparts in the face of business

decisions to transfer resources from one context to another.

India's Negotiating Position at Regional and International Platform

India as a case study has been taken to understand the view point of most of the

developing countries in South Asia and in the other continents which are not part of

the Annex- I of the Kyoto Protocol, but then also they have been burdened with the

shared responsibility of the "emission and mitigation syndrome". India is not only the

largest democracy in the world, but also a responsible nation in all spheres of world

affairs. It is a full member or observer member of almost all the regional

organisations, which shows that it tries to exert its significant influence on world

politics. India has legislated the first Forest Act in 1927 and later on after

independence it made an amendment related to the Environmental Protection Act in

1986. Thus, it shows the same awareness and concerned for the sustainable

development of the country as the developed countries do. India has been struggling

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with innumerable problems for the development of the country since independence

such as: poverty, unemployment, energy efficiency, illiteracy, food shortages and

global warming.

India's position on climate change has been articulated with a conviction and

determination probably unmatched by any other issue in recent years. India is at the

centre of the developing world argument, viewing climate change from the

developmental framework and welfare system. At the heart of India's position on

climate change is the notion that it must be allowed to pollute on a per capita basis

on par with the West. India has thus been propounding the "per capita emission"

line.38It is a strong unconditional position that immediately shifts the responsibility to

developed countries to drastically cut emission if the world is to meet the target of

keeping global warming within the generally agreed "safe limit" of two degrees

Celsius.39 It allows India the space, and time to grow at a sustained pace and

strengthen its poverty alleviation and developmental programmes. But even more

significant, particularly when it comes to the international fora, is the assurance that

its per capita emission will never exceed that of developing countries (G8 Summit, 9

July 2008). It is a position of confidence and self -belief in its economic policies, a

challenge and a message to the developed world that it will not be pressurised in the

negotiation process.40

In the face of increasing international pressure and mounting domestic concern,

India's response, given its developmental creed, has remained remarkably consistent.

The National Environmental Policy, 2006, (NEP 2006) lists the element that comprise

India's response:

38 Per capita emission is central to India's position on carbon emission reduction. This has formed the basis of India's criticism of the l_!NDP Report's stipulation of 80 percent reduction in carbon emission developed countries and 20 percent reduction by developing countries by 2050.While it seems egalitarian, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia stressed: "if we consider per capita emission, countries like India will have to bear a bigger burden as per the UNDP recommendation." Instead, he reasoned • "developing countries should be allowed to increase their per capita emission and the developed world should reduce it". His remarks were quoted extensively in the newspapers on 8 Nov. 2007.

39 This safe limit has been set by the Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change(IPCC).

40 The climate change negotiations are being carried out under the UN Frame\vork Convention on Climate Change, as well as work on emission reduction rules and tools under the Kyoto Protocol. This part of the negotiating process will be concluded in Copenhagen at the end of 2009.

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Adherence to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and

respective capabilities;

Prioritisation of the right to development;

Belief in equal per capita entitlements of all countries to global environmental

resources;

Reliance on multilateral approaches; and,

Participation in voluntary partnerships consistent with the FCCC .

In international fora, India, a party to the FCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, drawing on

these identified elements refuses to accept greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation targets.

It has characterized efforts to engage India and other developing countries in

mitigation targets as "shrill", "surreal" and a threat to poverty alleviation efforts (ENB

2006). India argues that given its limited role in contributing to the problem thus far,

its overriding development needs and the historical responsibility of developed

countries, India cannot be expected to take on mitigation targets (TOI 28 Nov. 2007).

It argues that even a 9.7% reduction in GHG gases by 2036 would cost it $2.5 trillion

dollars, even a fraction of which it cannot afford to divert from development activities

(Climate Change Talks, Vienna 2007). India also highlights increasing emission in,

and the Jack of real leadership from, developed countries (The Indian Express 2007).

At a more pragmatic level, India argues that its emission will not have a significant

impact on the trajectory of climate change given its low emissions, and the existence

of single polluters outside the regime. Modelling based on the integrated Energy

Policy demonstrates that in the worst case full- coal scenario by 2031-32, India's per

capita emission will be 3.75 metric tons per capita, and in the best case scenario with

full use of renewable, maximum use of nuclear ,hydro, and natural gas, significant

increase in thermal efficiency, demand side management and increase in coal

efficiency, and 50 percent rise in fuel efficiency of motorized vehicles, per capita

emission will be 2.66 metric tons per capita (Parikh 2008 ). Negotiators argue that this

reduction, given the tremendous cost and pain that it will come at, is not worth the

benefits even to the international climate effort.

These demands have lead India to the path that what India wants from the

International Organisations and developed countries for the sustainable future of the

country.

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India advocates for the equitable emission entitlements to the atmosphere (The

New York Times, March 9, 2008). India and China have been at the forefront of

the campaign for per capita entitlements. In the words of the former

Environmental Minister Saifuddin Soz, at Kyoto, "per capita basis is the most

important criteria for deciding the rights to environmental space. This is a direct

measure of human welfare. Since the atmosphere is a common heritage of

humankind, equity has to be the fundamental basis for its management.

(UNFCCC, Dec.8, 1997)" Equity in the climate treaties, to India, signifies an

acceptance that developing country emission will grow, and that developed

countries will aim to lower their emission with a view to reducing per capita

inequities in emission between developed and developing countries (FCCC,

Sep.l4 2000). This is the view that Germany has endorsed (JPC 2007), but few

others have.

India also, being a responsible nation, put a theory of the inter-generational equity

argument- that is, unless the current generation generates and sustains high levels

of economic growth, future generations will inherit an earth that is highly

vulnerable to climate change. Inter- generational equity would, therefore, demand

that the current generation prioritize development and sustained economic growth

as a matter of urgency (Dasgupta July 1 0, 2007).

Assessing the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) in his 2008 address to the Indian Science Congress, the

Prime Minister acknowledges that the "recent global concern about climate

change and global warming is in fact based on painstaking statistical work(95'11

Indian Science Congress 2008)." India argues in international fora that action on

climate change must be based on science, and not treated as a "post - modernist

religion(Sen 2007)." The PM further said that "the science of climate change is

still nascent and somewhat uncertain," and asks Indian scientists to "engage in

exploring the links between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change(94'11

Indian Science Congress 2007). He nevertheless stressed the need for

improvement in data collection and analysis in India (951h Indian Science

Congress 2008).

India has also stressed on the fact that the technologies that can help the nation to

decarbonise are out of its reach because of intellectual property rights (lPR) and

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prohibitive costs. India proposes the establishment of a "Clean Technology

Acquisition Fund". At Gleneagles 2005, at the UN General Assembly in 2006 and

at the fifteenth session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development,

2007(Commission on Sustainable Development 2007). The PM recently reiterated

that "climate justice" in India's view means "a fair, equitable and transparent

global regime for technology transfers (DSD Summit, 2008)." Thus far, there has

also been limited discussion domestically of the specific technologies and

activities that this fund could service and facilitate.

India reads the FCCC as requiring inaustrialized countries to provide "new,

additional, adequate and predictable financing" to implement the FCCC(UNFCCC

2008). It argues that "only a grant that results in resource transfers" can truly

recompense incremental costs without impacting social and economic

development and poverty alleviation- a recognized priority for developing

countries(submission by India, Financing:2008 ). Even the more progressive

European Commission, in a recent Communication (January 28, 2009), laid stress

primarily on the potential of the carbon market to deliver what is required. The

Commission proposes that "low cost actions" be undertaken by the developing

country in question, and it has for new, held fire on what precisely, if anything,

will be forthcoming from the industrialized world in terms of resource

transfers(ESC 2009 ). India in relation to this argument has sent a delegation to

the FCCC meeting and said that financial transfers under the FCCC are an

"entitlement not aid", and that such transfers under the framework for future

action must be 'legal obligations not repayable loans'(UNFCCC 2009).

In reference to these above arguments, it has come to an end that what India is willing

to do in these International situation where environment is used as a tool by the

developed countries in such a diplomatic manner that will burden the developing

countries to pay their share without being a culprit of the pollution game. Here are

some options given by the environment scholar communities:

• The Prime Minister in the G-8 Summit at Helingendamm, m June 2007,

committed that India will not exceed its per capita emissions at the levels of

developed countries(TheHindu,2001). He mentioned that India's per capita

emission are 1.2 metric tons, while the average among countries that belong to the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is 13.2(HDR

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2007). This commitment shows two stands of India; Firstly, if industrialized

countries could bring their per capita emissions down to 2 metric tons, India

would be committed to not exceeding it; and secondly, it marks a subtle or

perhaps unintended shift away from India's emphasis on historical responsibility.

India has recommended that all developing countries must take practical actions to

"decarbonise" their economies. Decarbonisation, according to India, refers to an

economy with lower carbon intensity over time. It does not refer to a reduction in

the absolute level of GHGs or to the reduction in the rate of GOP growth (the

Gleneagles Summit 2005). Decarbonisation includes: enhanced energy efficiency;

shift in primary energy use from fossil fuels to renewable energies (including

hydropower) and nuclear energy; and changes in production and consumption

patterns(the Gleneagles Summit, 2005). In India's Initial National Communication

(UNFCCC web report), presentations at the Dialogue (UNFCCC web report), and

other submissions to the FCCC, it lists actions that it has taken to contribute to

decarbonisation. These include initiatives to promote renewable energy(web

report), energy efficiency(web report) and energy conservation (UNFCCC:

196-202), ensure cleaner transport (through imposition of Euro norms), and

conversion of all public vehicles to compressed natural gas in New Delhi, develop

fuel- efficient appliances, and implement afforestation and land restoration

(UNFCCC : 196-202).

• India's membership of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and

Climate which focuses on "voluntary practical measures", and on "national

strategies, experience-sharing, and technology development and deployment", is

in keeping with India's preferred strategy (The Hindu 2007). As also are India's

bilateral partnerships with EU (web report), the US (web report of US Govt.), and

the UK (Oeptt. for EFRA, GOUK) on climate research and technology. India is

also a part of the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLFORUM web

report), the Methane to Market Partnership (web report), and the International

Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE web report). In this relation, the

PM's special envoy on the Indo-US Nuclear deal is also his special envoy on

climate change, tasked with leading India's negotiating team for the next two

years (TOI, 2008).

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• India and China have come up with the same argument in the Security Council

regarding the environmental implication of it on the states security issues. As they

had mentioned in the April 2007 meeting of Security Council that it did not have

any competence to deal with climate change, and they opposed any suggestion

that climate change, "an uncertain long term prospects," may have security

implications (TOI, 2007). India instead perceives more "immediate and

quantifiable threat from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resources for

development and poverty eradication as well as competition for energy" (Sen,

2007).

• According to the Indian special envoy on environmental issues, the COM, and the

carbon market, for now, should be the primary avenue for developing countries to

participate in reaching global GHG mitigation targets under the international

climate regime. India is the second highest in number of all registered projects

regarding COM 25.69%, after China at 34.04%, and Brazil follows India with

9.22% and 11.63 percent of all expected Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)

are from India (as compared to 58.81 percent from China, and 6.71 percent from

Brazil) (COM 2009). At present there is only a strong need of domestic norms on

environment in all the developing countries so that the developed countries should

not manipulate it at their own wishes at international fora.

Some other progress along this path can be seen in the Bali Action Plan where all the

countries have met and given their draft before the restructure of Kyoto Protocol. It

has entered into by countries in December 2007, launched a process scheduled to

come to an end in December 2009 at Copenhagen with the adoption of an "agreed

outcome" to advance the climate regime. In their different approaches, the developed

and developing countries have tried to project their concerns. The relevant paragraph

that prescribes actions required of developing countries in the future climate regime

reads :"nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the

context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing

and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner"(BAP 2007).

India, supported by the G-77/China, successfully, insisted that this phrase be placed at

the end of the sub- paragraph (Ghosh 2007 ).

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There was a lot of ambiguity on this phrase among the participatory countries as there

is a well considered comma that creates the embedded clause on technology,

financing, and capacity- building, and subjects it as well as "nationally appropriate

mitigation actions" to measurement, reporting, and verification. India has reiterated ,

in the wake of the EC communication of January28, 2009, that nationally appropriate

mitigation actions by developing countries "do not include national actions by

developing countries with their own resources and without external support"(GOI

February 2009 ). In its final set of submissions feeding into the first draft of the

negotiating text prepared in May 2009, India provided draft decision language for an

agreed outcome at Copenhagen that read, "Developing countries may on a voluntary

basis , propose mitigation actions that they offer to implement provided the agreed

full incremental costs are met by developed countries ..... "(GOI document 2009)

Finally, India is keen that the Copenhagen "agreed outcome" take the form of a set of

Conference of Parties' decisions. The use of the open ended term "agreed outcome" -

for Copenhagen leaves a range of legal form options available to Parties. Japan,

Australia , New Zealand and Canada have expressed a preference for a new legally

binding instrument that replaces the Kyoto Protocol and South Africa, Costa Rica

and Tuvalu for one that supplements the Kyoto Protocol. Brazil with India, and

many developing countries, is keen to limit this new agreement to COP decisions,

which are neither legally binding nor able to create substantive new obligations for

Parties.

EU and SAARC Co-operation Area:

As it has been discussed in the further chapters that EU is an organisation which has

taken a lead in following the clean environmental policy in a very stringent manner. It

has also given the lesson for some other regional organisation to open their eyes and

unite for the better sustainable future. A comparative look at both the organisation

raises some points:

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Environmental Cooperation

In the European Union there is a European Environment Agency and a special

programme of cooperation. A SAARC Regional Study was finalised in 1991 on

"Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and Preservation and Protection of

Environment". However, there is no South Asian Environment Agency. There is an

organisation called South Asian Cooperative Environmental Programme (SACEP)

based in Colombo, though it is not very active.

Solidarity

The European Union has some significant programmes for combating poverty and

social exploitation. Measures have been taken at regional level to help disabled and

disaster victims and to tackle issues of public health. SAARC has an on-going

programme for alleviation of poverty based on the recommendations of the

Independent Commission on Poverty Alleviation as approved by the SAARC Summit

held in 1993. Under this programme, there is an annual meeting of Plannig

Ministers/Finance in order to review work and to explore areas of regional cooperation.

While 1993 was observed as the SAARC year of the Disabled, there is no substantial

programme of regional cooperation in this area. However, in the field of public health,

some useful initiatives have been taken. There is a Regional Centre on Tuberculosis

which functions in Kathmandu and nodal institutions have been identified for

coordinating action on treatment and eradication of communicable diseases.

Common Commercial Policy

Common Commercial Policy is at the heart of the functioning of the European Union.

SAARC is yet to make serious headway in this area. Of late, there have been meetings

of Working Groups in the areas of custom cooperation, investment cooperation etc.

Cooperation with Asia

The European Union has participated in the two Summit meetings ASEM I in 1996 and

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ASEM II in 1998. SAARC has so far been excluded from ASEM meetings. The

Economic and Social Committee of the European Union has adopted its own initiative

opinion on relations with ASEAN countries. However, so far the Economic and Social

Committee of the European Union has not turned its attention to the question of

cooperation with South Asia. SAARC has also been excluded from APEC although

India is a member of some of its working groups. Two members ofSAARC- India and

Pakistan- are dialogue partners of ASEAN. The EU has an agreement and a substantial

programme of cooperation with ASEAN.

Bio-Ethics

The European Union has been giving considerable attention to bio-ethics and the

policies with regards to human cloning. In SAARC this matter has not attracted

attention at regional level. However, cooperation is growing in matters relating to

bio-technology, bio-diversity, gene bank etc.

Agricultural Policy

The Common Agriculture Policy of the European Union has always been the subject

matter of intense discussion. There is also a substantial programme of cooperation in

the field of agriculture amongst European countries. SAARC cooperation in the field of

agriculture has progressed within the framework of the work of the Technical

Committee on Agriculture. There is also a SAARC Agricultural Information Centre

based in Dhaka.

Information and Communication

In the EU there is a vast network of information, including representations abroad,

through which the official publications of the European Union are made available to the

general public and scholars. In SAARC the official publications can only be obtained

through the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu. The SAARC Documentation Centre in

New Delhi is not yet in a position to act as a repository of all SAARC documents.

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Principle of Subsidiarity

The subsidiarity principle has been laid down as a formula for an appropriate

distribution of powers between the EU and its member states .In SAARC detailed

attention has not been given to this matter. Recently the Independent Expert Group on

IPA has recommended the principle of subsidiarity as one of the factors that may be

taken into account while selecting activities to be undertaken under IPA.

Cooperation Possibilities between EU and SAARC

In light of the growing competence of the European Union and with the SAARC

moving into core areas of economic cooperation with commitment by SAARC leaders

to establish the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFT A) by 2001, there are good

prospects in the immediate and long term of EU-SAARC cooperation in the fields of

economic, scientific and technical cooperation. In terms of the Regulation 443/92,

SAARC can be a beneficiary of financial and technical assistance from the European

Union in the following fields:

• environment;

• the development of intra-regional trade;

• the strengthening of regional institutions;

• support for regional integration and the establishment of joint policies and activities

among developing countries;

• regional communications, particularly with regards to standards, networks and

services, including telecommunications;

• research;

• training;

• rural development and food security;

• cooperation in the sphere of energy.

However, the new priorities of the European Union will relate to economic cooperation,

the human dimensions of development, the promotion of human rights and the

environment. Aid and Development policies of the European Union towards SAARC

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and its Member States may have following elements:

1) Relationship of EC with all member countries of SAARC and with SAARC itself,

based on the concept of "Partnership and Development" just as in case of Maghreb and

CIS countries;

2) Assurance of long term support through protection and increase of aid levels on the

condition that SAARC countries will commit themselves firmly to acceptable

conditionalities to use such aid effectively with market friendly policies;

3) Extension of help to SAARC countries to integrate themselves into the global main

stream by, (a) assisting them to implement the programmes of economic reforms they

have launched; and (b) creating an appropriate trade and investment environment for

them;

4) Enhancing the capabilities ofSAARC countries to provide safety nets for the groups

adversely affected by the changes resulting from implementation of economic reforms;

5) Continuance of aid for serving traditional objective of supporting long term

development programs, of building infrastructure and financing projects of substantial

social benefits such as investment in rural development, health, nutrition, education and

poverty alleviation.

Specifically, the European Union could consider (a) the possibility of measures that

will assist the least developed countries in the SAARC region to avail themselves of the

facilities provided by Agreement on SAARC Food Security Reserve; and (b) sourcing

of experts for SAARC countries under its technical assistance programs from within

SAARC countries.

The Maastricht Treaty permits the European Investment Bank (EIB) to take part in

activities relating to environmental protection and cooperation in the development of

third world countries. Also, with prospects of SAFT A, and likelihood of joint ventures

and regional projects being set up in the SAARC Region, the European Union may

consider allowing SAARC access to the sources of the EIB and the European

Development Fund (EDF). Because of the large population and burgeoning middle

class in the SAARC region and liberalisation of the economies of South Asian

countries, there is considerable mutuality of interest between EU and SAARC in

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expanding trade and investment cooperation. There is great potential in South Asia for

trade in services such as engineering services, software, banking, education and

medical services. The European Union may consider liberalising rules for importing of

services of skilled labour from SAARC countries. The European Union may also

consider with SAARC countries joint collaborative science and technology

development programmes. With the growing competencies of the European Union and

SAARC, it is now possible to identify areas of sectoral cooperation on the basis of

knowledge of ongoing programmes of the European Union. The following sectors are

amenable to cooperation between the EU and SAARC: agriculture, meteorology, the

situation of disabled persons, natural disasters, education, energy, environment, food

aid, health, science and technology, rural development, telecommunication and postal

services, tourism, transport and youth work.

In order to operationalise cooperation, inter-governmental discussions at both Track I

and Track II levels are desirable. Through them, appropriate modalities of cooperation

can be worked out such as exchange of information, publication and documentation;

technical and financial cooperation; familiarization visits, seminars and workshops etc.

In order to further such cooperation, non-official contacts may also be encouraged.

Private sector involvement can be very useful. Just as in the case of ASEAN, the

European Commission can organise business familiarisation programmes for

executives from SAARC countries. The European scholars need to take increasing

interest in affairs of South Asia. Up gradation of the level of studies and research in

Member States of SAARC about the European Union is necessary. There is also scope

for the promotion of joint research and studies of inter-disciplinary as well as sectoral

nature by interested institutions in Europe and South Asia having requisite resources for

undertaking such work. In some cases, the existing resources of the institutions

concerned may have to be augmented. Appropriate networking is necessary for

institutions of the European Union engaged in South Asian studies and those in

SAARC countries engaged in European studies.

There is considerable scope for promotion of cooperation through European

Non-Governmental Development Organisations (ENGDOs) and SAARC NGOs.

These can take the fonn of:

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•

•

•

•

•

Encouragement by the Community, inter alia, through provision of financial

assistance and establishment of cooperation between ENGDOs and SAARC NGOs,

especially in the fields of environment, women's rights, campaign against drug

abuse, and poverty alleviation through grassroot development projects;

Co-financing of ENGDOs developmental schemes that may be conceived and

implemented by SAARC NGOs on a regional basis;

Support by ENGDOs for local initiatives by SAARC NGOs for sustainable

development;

Jointly working out modalities and guidelines for;

Implementing the UNCED Agenda 21 .

To facilitate cooperation, the European Union and SAARC need to agree on objectives,

modalities, procedures and means of cooperation. In particular, it is recommended that

a substantial training programme may be organised by the European Commission for

SAARC officials and experts in its institutions and for deputing experts from the EU to

work in SAARC countries in areas where expertise of the European Union can be

useful.

Parameters of a Compact between Europe and South Asia

South Asia, with its rapidly expanding middle class represents an opportunity for

Europe. A compact between South Asia and Europe will necessarily have a big

component which relates to economic cooperation b.ased on mutual interest,

complementarity and which can be adapted to the current economic, social and political

characteristics of the partners in South Asia of the European Union. Politically, it is in

the interest of Europe and South Asia to base their relationship on the five principles of

peaceful co-existence and to work together for a new world order based on these

principles and for promoting the process of multipolarisation in the world. The

European Union may actively support the idea of India participating in ASEM related

meetings and activities. EU must help in strengthening the SAARC Integrated

Programme of Action. In terms of its declared policy, it should also promote regional

economic cooperation. Financial cooperation between EU and SAARC needs to be

strengthened and substantial contribution on bilateral and multi-lateral basis may be

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made by members ofEU to the recently set up South Asian Development Fund. Europe

and South Asia have a long record of interaction of over 500 years. South Asia was

linked to the English speaking world ever since the advent of the British colonalisation.

Recently a decision has been taken by ASEM to set up a Europe Asia Cultural

Foundation in Thailand.

In its activities, South Asian countries should also be included. The Twenty-first

Century should witness the European Union earmarking substantial grants for South

Asia to finance cultural exchange programmes. A lecture series may be organised on

topics related to Europe and South Asia in different member countries of European

Union and South Asia. A trilateral Commission may be set up in which academics,

businessmen and officials of the EU and South Asia may jointly discuss matters

concerning the future of European Union-South Asia relations. Cooperation in science

and technology has great potential, particularly because South Asia has a well

developed and large scientific and technological community and expenses for running

S&T establishments are relatively low. Joint research projects may therefore be

encouraged in fields of mutual interest. However, it will be important to set up proper

organisations under the aegis of which these projects may be carried out effectively and

a measure of continuity must be ensured. The first project between the EU and SAARC

relating to the elimination of the cattle "Mad Cow disease" or BSE, is currently being

discussed. The possibility for locating R&D units in South Asia should also be explored

by European firms.

Specific areas where there seems to be good scope are:

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Digital Information and Optical Communications;

Software;

Application of biotechnology to agriculture and of genetic engineering

to medicine and environment control;

Super conductivity;

Micro-electronics including the use of sixth generation computers in inventory

control;

New sources of energy;

Space technology .

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The twenty-first century will be the century of ardent efforts to prevent environmental

degradation, to preserve the environment in its pristine aspects, as well as to restore past

damage wherever possible, to increase the capacity of nations and peoples in the world

to cope with and manage disasters and to build a sustainable future. The European

Environment Agency may extend technical cooperation to affected South Asian

governmental and non-governmental agencies preferably within South Asian

Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP). The European Union can play an

important supportive role in extending technical and financial assistance to implement

agreed recommendations of the two important SAARC studies on environmentally

related matters, i.e. the regional study on "Causes and Consequences of Natural

Disaster and Protection and Preservation of the Environment" and "The Green House

Effect and its impact on the South Asian Region". It can also extend assistance to some

very competent South Asian environmental NGOs in the preparation of a detailed

report on "The State of Environment in South Asia for 2000 AD".

Europe and South Asia are both energy deficient. There are similarities in the energy

sources at the regional level in South Asia and there are enormous hydrocarbon

resources in Central Asia. Europe and South Asia can cooperate by exploiting both the

resources of South Asia; i.e. coal resources of India, natural gas reserves of Bangladesh

and Pakistan and hydroelectric potential of the Himalayan States. Also, Europe and

South Asia can be important partners in what would perhaps be a much bigger grouping

of countries involved in the production and transmission of energy from Central Asia.

The human, political and cultural network that South Asian countries have developed in

the Indian Ocean Rim area is considerable. Further development of ties between

Europe and South Asia could facilitate the establishment of a better relationship of

Europe with the Indian Ocean Rim Countries. In tum, growing relations of South Asian

countries with Europe may also facilitate evolution of a coordinated response of the

developed world to the emerging South Asian Order for cooperation, peace and

development that takes into account their legitimate concerns and interests. It is high

time that European and South Asian scholars jointly put forth the political, economic

and cultural agenda for the twenty first century, for a more cohesive world through

global partnership, in which the EU and SAARC will emerge as two important entities

cooperating on the basis of complementarity and common interests.

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The symbolic explanation of developed and developing countries-with the help of these

two regional organisations can be easily understood as they tackle the environmental

problems in all their limitation, with the help of their member states. The demand for

access to Green technologies and Clean Developed Mechanism are important issues in

the agenda of developing countries. If the exchange takes place between the North­

South blocks it can be seen that the major receiver of all environmental challenges are

the developing and countries. Their huge population, poor economic conditions and

desertification, etc. all create damage with one stroke of climate change. The unequal

burden sharing of GHG emission is an issue which protested by these countries who

suffer more by these environmental politics. The current status of the debate on

environmental protection definitely echoes M. L. King Junior's words - "We must

accept finite disappointment but never lose infinite hope".

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