Critical Perspectives on Accounting 22 (2011) 510– 515

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Critical Perspectives on Accounting

j ourna l ho me pag e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /cpa

Enlightenment and emancipation: Reflections for critical accountingresearch

Kerry Jacobs ∗

The College of Business and Economics, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 23 June 2010Accepted 9 November 2010

Keywords:EnlightenmentEmancipationAccountingCriticalSymbolic violence

a b s t r a c t

Molisa (2011) offers a presentation of the work of Eckhart Tolle (1997, 2005) and a cri-tique of critical and social accounting research, particularly the notion of emancipation.While taking issue with some of both Molisa (2011) and Tolle’s (1997, 2005) arguments, Icontend that their conclusions have some interesting implications. The religious traditionsreferenced by Tolle (1997, 2005) recognise a distinction between positive and negative the-ology. In effect our notions of what is real (and what is God) get in our way of understanding‘what is’. A similar theme can be found in the ‘Transactional Analysis’ school of psychol-ogy and in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu argues that institutions or fields (inhis terminology) reflect the interests and values of the powerful and elite. Passive accep-tance of these structures leads to repressive processes of symbolic violence. Emancipationrequires both recognition of the taken-for-granted nature of values (habitus) and a will-ingness to change external structures and institutions (fields). In concluding, I argue thatinternal value change and external institutional change cannot be separated in a process ofemancipation. However, in seeking ‘accounting and emancipation’ we must question ourown values, assumptions and motives.

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1. Introduction

Molisa (2011) acknowledges that his paper is far from a usual research presentation in both content and style and iswritten in a way that ‘speaks from the heart’. In my response to his paper I attempt to retain a connection to notions ofargument and rational dialogue, while acknowledging that a paper which connects spirituality and emancipation in therealm of accounting is not necessarily appealing to the rational. Molisa (2011) presents an exposition of Eckhart Tolle’steachings found in his books – ‘The Power of Now’ (1997) and ‘A New Earth: Create a Better Life’ (2005) and an application ofthis teaching to the area of critical and social accounting research, particularly to the issue of emancipation. In effect, Molisa(2011) challenges critical and environmental researchers to shift away from a legalistic or contractual approach to issues ofaccountability to one based on love.

While recognising the value in Tolle (1997, 2005), it is important to understand where these ideas come from and whatthey reflect. Tolle is quick to announce that what he teaches is not his own but is a re-presentation of the teachings ofothers. First, in dropping his name Ulrich and adopting the name Eckhart, Tolle signalled his link with the 14th centuryGerman writer, mystic and theologian Meister Eckhart. Teachers such as Meister Eckhart firmly defended their orthodoxyin the context of Christianity (over and against challenges by the inquisition) and similar defences of orthodoxy are made

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 6 6125 0541; fax: +61 2 6125 5005.E-mail address: Kerry.Jacobs@anu.edu.au

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by mystics in other religious traditions such as Sufi’s tradition in (Islam) and the Cabbalists (Judaism). However, elementsof Tolle’s interpretation of religious writings and teachings would not be accepted as orthodox in any of these traditionsas they reflect the teachings and interpretations of esoteric groups such as Theosophy, the new-age prophet Alice Baileyand ‘the Course in Miracles’ channelled by the psychic Helen Schucman. Examples of core Theosophy teachings in Tolle(1997, 2005) are ‘the Christ essence’ the ‘law of attraction’ and ‘awakened teachers’, while the term ‘energy frequencies’reflect Alice Bailey’s new-age ideas. Tolle’s quotations and interpretations of the writings of Christianity and other religioustraditions are filtered through the lens of these esoteric and new-age writers and therefore are dangerously insufficientas a primary source to understand issues of theology and spirituality. Having noted these concerns, I would argue thatTolle’s contribution is not his theological exposition but his account of his own experience of the negative consequence ofcompulsive thinking and the steps he took to break away from this thinking, which he labelled successively as ‘the ego’ and‘the pain body’.

Care needs to be taken with Molisa’s (2011) appropriation of theological material. In addition some of the argumentsMolisa (2011) makes are based on highly debatable interpretations of particular religious texts. However, despite theseissues Molisa (2011) makes some interesting and valuable points which I want to discuss and extend.

Central to Tolle (1997, 2005) and to the arguments presented by Molisa (2011) is idea of ‘not knowing’ which is associatedwith the negative or apophatic approach. Many religious traditions teach that acknowledgement of ‘not knowing’ is the criticalfirst step on the path to enlightenment. Key to the tradition reflected by Christian authors such as Meister Eckhart and the14th century English work ‘The Cloud of Unknowing’ were the writings of a 5th century author who called himself Dionysius(Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987) the Areopagite. Central to Dionysius’ approach is the view that that God cannot be understood butonly experienced. To use the theological terms, positive statements about God are affirmative or kataphatic while denial ornegation is negative or apophatic theology (also called via negative). So the statement that God is love needs to be followed bythe statement that God is not love in any sense that we have understood or experienced love. However, Dionysius’ writingswere not so much the creation of this notion, but reflected an idea expressed in many Jewish and early Christian sources;that it was impossible to adequately describe or represent God. Therefore what we think we know [about God] gets in theway of really knowing [God].

Tolle (1997, 2005) drew on this negative or apophatic tradition with his perception that the process of enlightenmentinvolves moving beyond the ego, letting go of our patterns of pain and moving beyond the chatter of the mind. In effectour ideas, expectations and experiences get in the way of experiencing what Tolle (2005) calls ‘Being’. However, the notionthat we need to move beyond the internal dialogue and self-criticism is not restricted to theology and it is also evidentin traditions of psychology and sociology. Berne (1964) argues that the experiences or ‘scripts’ from childhood constrainand govern action in what came to be called ‘Transactional Analysis’ psychology. As a consequence, the experience of anindividual and their perspective on the future is understood through the lens of these scripts and past experience rather thanreflecting an authentic response to the present lived-experience (see Stewart and Joines (1987) for a more recent review ofTransactional Analysis). Freedom can be achieved through becoming aware and changing these scripts.

Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence shows that similar ideas are present in the sociology literature. Bourdieuand Passeron (1977) argue that the social construction of taken-for-granted values and attitudes reflect the interests ofthe dominant and powerful in a given field. However, as individuals do not understand this but see the values as innate(which Bourdieu calls doxia) they disadvantage and damage themselves (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977), a process which hecalls symbolic violence. In effect the scripts, values and internal dialogue which we take to be ourselves are not ourselves,but reflect socialisation, family experience and the value-frames of the dominant and powerful. Both emancipation andenlightenment involve a re-evaluation and possible rejection of these taken-for-granted notions. Tolle’s (1997, 2005) ideathat dis-identification from the mind allows us to be present in ‘the Now’ can be interpreted as a rejection of personallydamaging scripts and patterns and taken-for-granted doxia, which advantage others but damage the self. In the same sense,forward-projection or worry is also based on the scripts and patterns, as any projection forward is based on past experience.The present, or ‘the Now’ as Tolle (and Molisa, 2011) call it, is the only point of true freedom and therefore constitutes thepath to enlightenment and emancipation.

2. Emancipation and enlightenment

The central debate about the nature of emancipation involves a distinction between an external and an internal reality.Is emancipation about changing the structures and circumstances of the external reality or is it about changing the internalattitudes towards or perception of the reality? In their book Accounting and Emancipation Gallhofer and Haslam (2003, p.10) quote Nederveen Pieterse (1992, p. 32) who says that “. . . emancipation refers to collective actions which seek to leveland disperse power, or seek to instil more inclusive values than the prevailing ones”. Gallhofer and Haslam (2003, p. 10)argues that while there are problems in the current social state, there is also potential to be fulfilled. Nederveen Pieterse’s(1992) quote illustrates the tension between external and internal change, with external change involving practical changesto physical and social conditions and internal change being a change to values and attitudes (habitus).

Classical structuralist approaches have focused on changing physical reality such as access to money, employment andeducation. Therefore the simple solution to the issue of emancipation is that we change merely the physical and structuralarrangements and then the problem will be solved. From this perspective issue of values are either irrelevant or will resolvethemselves following the structural changes. However, such change requires a model or template of what a better society

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would look like and this template carries its own kind of risk. Good and noble ideas of a better society hide a dark side, whichis the willingness to sacrifice the present in favour of an ideal future.

One of the most disturbing examples of this was the killing fields of Cambodia where the Marxist ideology of the KhmerRouge leadership lead to the sacrifice of many people in the interest of a better society. The argument was that the existingsociety was unjust and some people were privileged at the expense of others. A better and more just society could be realisedif all people were equal. Therefore, people were shifted from the cities to work on the farms and those who were not willingto change were deemed to be part of the problem and therefore were killed. Bauman (1992, p. 21) criticised these notionsof political purity and utopian logic. He argued that positive motivations, such as the elimination of poverty, corruption andmoral laxity and the desire to ‘clean things up’, resulted in horrible outcomes, where those who did not fit or were deemedto be deviant were eradicated to allow the creation of a utopian ‘year zero’. For Bauman (1992) the most shocking example ofthese horrible outcomes was Auschwitz and the combination of both the crime committed there, in the name of purity, andthe meticulous record keeping in order that purity was seen to be done. Bauman’s (1992) criticism of the ideology of yearzero highlights the fundamental difficulty to the notion of emancipation. The danger is that in attempting to ‘emancipate’the other we may actually do damage rather than benefit; we may repress the voices and opinions of those we wish to help.This can happen, despite the best of intentions when we give someone what we think they need, rather than what theythink they need. However, just asking does not solve the problem because all values and expectations (including our own)are also socially constructed.

The counterpoint to the structuralist response of changing physical structures is the argument that emancipation can beachieved by changing values. One version of value driven change is the Buddhist position that the most important changeis to attitudes and mental patterns rather than physical situations. While suffering and difficulties are a part of normal andunavoidable human experience, we do have a choice about and control over our attitude towards those difficulties. The pointis that the main source of suffering and pain is not the circumstances in themselves but our attitudes and attachments. Inessence, we make ourselves miserable. The notion of acceptance of ‘what is’ or non-resistance is represented as a process ofdetachment and yielding rather than opposing the flow of life. This is sometimes misinterpreted as the new age/new thoughtdoctrine that ‘if we believe it enough it will come true’ (the ‘Law of Attraction’) reflected in the teachings of Theosophy andbooks such as ‘The Secret’ (Bryne, 2006) or ‘Think and Grow Rich’ (Hill, 1937). However, this is a distortion of religioustraditions, such as Buddhism, where the goal is to fit our desires to ‘what is’ not to fit ‘what is’ to our desires.

The notion of accepting ‘what is’ is more characteristic of enlightenment than emancipation. The danger of acceptanceis that it could easily devolve into a passive form of quietism criticised by Tinker et al. (1991). Yet that would also be amisunderstanding of the position. Religious teachers such as Meister Eckhart (see Fox, 1981) argued that the inner journeyof enlightenment could not be divorced from external engagement or, in the present terminology, emancipation. In effectacceptance of ‘what is’ involves a realistic look at, and recognition of existing institutions and arrangements, a recognition ofwhat actions are actually possible, then the courage to take those actions. This balance, between acceptance of ‘what is’ andemancipation, is probably best reflected in what has become known as the ‘Serenity Prayer’ written by Reinhold Niebuhr,which has been widely adopted by groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous:

God, grant me the serenityTo accept the things I cannot change;Courage to change the things I can;And wisdom to know the difference(Reinhold Neibuhr, around 1943)

As values and structures are intrinsically linked, the argument that empowerment can be achieved by changing eitherinner values or external structure should be rejected. Tinker (2004) acknowledges that values, particularly religious values,are a powerful form of social control and therefore individual social value and patterns cannot be separated from socialstructures and interests. In Bourdieu’s terminology, values and dispositions in the form of habitus both construct and arereflective of the institutional and structural field. Therefore, our scripts, programming, experiences and upbringing are notfree from the influence of social structure such as class and gender. Bourdieu hints at this when he argues that, “. . . in societieswhich have no self-regulated market, no educational system, no druidical [religious] apparatus and no State, relations ofdomination can be set up and maintained only at the cost of strategies which must be endlessly renewed” (Bourdieu, 1977,p. 183). In other words, institutions and practices, including accounting institutions and practices, are a powerful sourceof taken-for-granted cultural programming and scripts. It is only through becoming aware of, and reflective upon, thisprogramming that we can become emancipated.

On the whole Tinker (1985) and other critical accounting authors argue that accounting serves the interests of the powerfuland elite. While this may be the normal arrangement, both Tinker (1985) and Gallhofer and Haslam (2003, p. 7) argue thatthis outcome is not inevitable and that accounting can be turned to serve notions of justice, equality or democracy (Gallhoferand Haslam, 2003). Molisa (2011) criticises the use of metaphysical ideals such as justice, equality and democracy as the basisfor the critical accounting project and offers an ‘emancipatory accounting underpinned by love’. Yet, while criticising thesemetaphysical ideals, he does not address what is actually wrong with them. I would argue that these ethical approaches donot allow us to transcend the paradox of emancipation as highlighted by Bourdieu. In effect our notions of justice, equalityand democracy are western and self-serving and reflect our own institutional power arrangements. Asking those we wish

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to emancipate what they want does not solve the problem, as their notions of justice, equality and democracy are equallysubject to processes of symbolic violence which reflect the powerful interests and institutions of their own society.

In effect, we are forced to question both institutions and values and therefore have no absolute or unsubjective positionavailable for emancipatory action. As a consequence, our ideals such as justice, equality and democracy must be treatedwith the same suspicion as our own institutions and the institutions and values of those we might wish to emancipate.Accepting the uncertainty associated with this position is not that different from the acceptance of subjectivity and ‘notknowing’ articulated by negative theology and Tolle. Therefore, there is a link between enlightenment and emancipation asemancipation is only possible when we step aside from our preconceived values and habitus and let go of our idea of whatemancipation is.

While the notion of enlightenment, as reflected in the tradition of negative theology and Eckhart Tolle, offers a use-ful path out of our paradox in terms of spiritual and psychological development, I would argue that Bourdieu is moreuseful in interpreting this situation as a basis for social action. Bourdieu insists on the importance of reflexitivity in thatthe researcher must conduct their research with conscious attention to their own position and values (habitus) learnedthrough social and institutional training. This is what he called the ‘sociology of sociology’ or the ‘objectification of objec-tification’. As a minimum a researcher should be aware of their own bias (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 16; Maton, 2003). The dangerof this bias is that we fit the world into our pre-existing categories and disciplinary boundaries, mistaking what Marxcalled ‘the things of logic for the logic of things’ (Bourdieu, 2000). From this perspective an absolute position for eman-cipation is rejected. However, the kind of practice discussed by Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) might be possible, to theextent that we can doubt, challenge and question our own values and assumptions (including our own notions derived fromaccounting).

Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) would lead us to question and examinethe taken-for-granted assumptions about those who are to be ‘empowered’. Individuals who hold less power in society (andtherefore have access to less resources and influence which he calls capital) will tend to comply with what they perceiveas legitimate values and expectations. However, these categories of thought and perception, which are seen as just andlegitimate, are imposed by more powerful actors (and/or reflected in existing institutions) and serve to benefit and preferencethose powerful actors. It is this misrecognition of the socially constructed nature of these values and their power to benefitsome and disadvantage others. In one sense both emancipation and enlightenment collapse into a single category, as actorslearn to challenge and question these values and attitudes in the same process of reflexitivity which Bourdieu recommendsfor the researcher. It is this learning to question our own programming which Foucault was touching on in his late work onthe care of self (Martin et al., 1988). Perhaps it is this kind of reflexive self-awareness that Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) areseeking with their notion of emancipatory practice.

To recap the argument, Molisa’s (2011) critique of the existing basis for the critical accounting project, in metaphysicalideas of justice, equality and democracy can be reinterpreted as a critique of the implicit symbolic violence inherent in theseconcepts, or to return to both Dionysius and Tolle, our notion of emancipation actually gets in the way of emancipatingothers. Molisa’s (2011) solution to this problem is to shift beyond the metaphysical ideal, to embrace an emancipatoryaccounting underpinned by love.

3. An ethic for emancipation

Molisa (2011) is not the first to suggest an ethic of love as the basis for emancipatory accounting. McKernan and MacLullich(2004) criticise the justice-oriented ethic of equality and equivalence, and argue instead for an active dialectic of love, whichreflects the logic of excess, of disproportionality, of superabundance and generosity. McKernan and MacLullich’s (2004)proposal is based on the work of Ricoeur (1979, 1984, 1990) who locates moral action and therefore emancipation in theprocess of narrative. Ricoeur (1990) argues that it is the process of narrative which forces us to recognise that our identityis created through connection with others. These notions of a dialectic of love, generosity and narrative construction ofidentity are a shift away from more structural or absolute notions of emancipation and towards more modest notions ofemancipatory practice (praxis) articulated by Gallhofer and Haslam (2003, p. 14). However, grounding an emancipatorypractice in notions of love is not a simple proposition. The term ‘love’ is over-used in a contemporary setting in which it isseen both as a metaphysical idea and as a consumer commodity. Therefore, while the idea has merit, a different terminologywould be more meaningful. Ricoeur (1991) reflects on the strangeness of love in the Christian/Jewish religious tradition andcontrasts the logic of equivalence, characterised by notions of justice, with a logic “of excess, of superabundance”, whichhe calls ‘love’ (Ricoeur, 1979, p. 279). What Ricoeur (1979) describes as love could equally be called compassion and thefundamental point of the bible verses which Ricoeur (1979) quotes is that love is best understood as practical or appliedcompassion.

UK religious scholar and commentator Karen Armstrong (1997) argues that the notion of applied compassion is centralto the three monotheistic faiths. In 2008 Armstrong won the TED prize,1 calling for a charter for compassion based on this

1 While TED started as a conference to bring people together from the worlds of technology, entertainment and design (hence TED), today is bestunderstood as an online community devoted to the mission of spreading ideas. The TED prize is a $100,000 prize awarded annual to an individual tofacilitate their ‘one wish to change the world’. For further information see http://www.ted.com.

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notion of compassion as reflected in the golden rule. She argues that, at the core of every world religion is the virtue ofcompassion, which does not mean ‘pity’ but to feel or identify with the other:

Each one of the world religions has developed its own version of the Golden Rule – Do not treat others as you wouldnot like to be treated yourself – and maintained that this is the prime religious duty. Everything else in the Torahis “only commentary” said Rabbi Hillel; you can have faith that moves mountains, said St Paul, but without charity[compassion] it is worthless. The Prophet Muhammad said that a person who did not fulfill the Golden Rule could notbe called a believer. And each of the faiths also insists that you cannot confine your compassion to your own group.You must have ‘concern for everybody,’ love your enemies, and honour the stranger. (Armstrong, 2008)

Her charter for compassion takes this one step further, with the claim that compassion, which calls us totreat others as we wish to be treated ourselves, lies at the heart of all religious, ethical and spiritual traditions[http://charterforcompassion.org/]. In essence the notion of compassion shifts the argument from a conceptual or meta-physical basis to a practice basis and therefore bypasses both the problems of power and symbolic violence implicit in theearlier articulations. Compassion is not just an idea but also a practice.

The concept of compassion is strongly rooted in the religious and spiritual tradition advocated by Tolle. His religiousnamesake, Meister Eckhart, argued that the inner and the outer spiritual journey could never be separated (see Fox, 1981,p. 224). On the journey of spiritual development, the path of internal spiritual development associated with ‘letting go andletting be’ needs to be followed by compassion for others. For Meister Eckhart the processes of compassion associated with‘love for the neighbour’ is a central part of the spiritual journey which leads to the actions of renouncing the self and actingagainst injustice (Fox, 1981, p. 242). While Eckhart Tolle emphasises the teaching of ‘letting go and letting be’ he really onlyhints at how this leads to actions of compassion for others. Enlightenment, emancipation, compassion and sacrifice cannotbe separated as both enlightenment and emancipation require actions of sacrifice on the part of someone.

The impact of the notion of compassion on power arrangements is illustrated by the central Christian narrative of Godsurrendering power to become human, thereby empowering the weak. Therefore, compassion in the sense articulated byArmstrong and Eckhart (both the 14th century and the contemporary versions) involves the practice of displacing our ownposition of privilege and power, our agenda and even our ideas, to identify with ‘the other’. As we learn to identify with ‘theother’, a space is created where we can come to an understanding of what emancipation means in a particular time and place.In effect, it is the acts of compassion which allows us to live in the now advocated by Tolle. A radical ethic of compassiontranscends both ‘rule based’ and ‘ends focused’ ethical frames with the challenge to the powerful to displace their ownposition of power and act compassionately, in favour of the weaker party. This is the logic of excess or superabundanceexpressed by Ricoeur (1979).

As a consequence emancipation can only come at the cost of sacrifice. Someone must let go of resources, be they financial,social, political an institutional, in order for others to be emancipated. However, the most difficult ‘death’ as highlighted bythe traditions of mysticism and spirituality is not the release of resource and influence but of our taken-for-granted notionsand attitudes. In effect, an ethic (and practice) of compassion demands that those who are to be emancipated are not treatedas objects but participate as active subjects. Their opinions, views and reality must not only be considered together with ourown but, in the process of emancipation, may actually be more important than our own. Therefore, compassion provides apowerful basis for the kind of emancipatory practice advocated by Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) as it is focused on a processrather than an end state, it replaces our certainty with subjectivity and incompleteness, it focuses us away from ourselvesand to an identification with ‘the other’ and involves real costly action.

4. Conclusion

Molisa (2011) presents a stimulating and provocative position, which draws on the new-age teaching of Eckhart Tolle,which challenges the identification with the mind, to provide a basis for a critique of social, critical and environmentalaccounting literature. Molisa (2011) argues that social, critical and environmental accounting literature has become over-focused on metaphysical ideas and on conflict and that what is required is a refocus and reorientation around the notionof love. A focus on love would overcome the limits of existing theoretical approaches, engage more appropriately with theworld by shifting from the focus on outward change and towards inward change, and bypass our tendency towards academicconflict and point scoring.

Molisa (2011) is an enjoyable and challenging paper. It has forced me beyond my academic comfort-zone in style andin content and yet has provided an opportunity to synthesise different streams from my academic and personal readingsand reflections. I must admit that I found the tendency to use the work of some authors uncritically and to dismiss oth-ers unreflectively annoying. However, while objecting to some arguments I also found myself agreeing with many of hisconclusions.

I challenge Molisa’s (2011) uncritical use of Tolle (1997, 2005) as the theological literature used by Tolle needs to beunderstood within the context of the traditions in which it arose. However, Tolle (1997, 2005) grasps the point presentedby these religious traditions that our notions (particularly notions of God) get in the way of our experiences (of God). Tolle(1997, 2005) contribution is to extend this idea by challenging his personal processes of obsessive thinking and therebyrecognising that his sense of self and therefore his ‘thoughts’ were socially constructed. The position adopted by Tolle canalso be presented from the perspective of psychology and sociology. Transactional Analysis psychology would suggest that

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what we regard as ‘the self’ is a collection of scripts or programming primarily derived from our upbringing. Therefore thesescripts and programming can be changed and modified even though they are normally subconscious. Pierre Bourdieu extendsthe psychological notion of script or programming to argue that taken-for-granted attitudes and practices can serve to benefitthe powerful and elite and disadvantage the weak in processes of symbolic violence. As a consequence emancipation mustinvolve both a change to physical conditions or resource arrangements and also changes to fundamental taken-for grantedattitudes or values.

However, the paradox is that in recognising that values or attitudes are socially constructed, the values of those wishingto ‘emancipate’ others are also subject to suspicion. An offer to ‘emancipate’ raises the question of who will actually benefitfrom the ‘act of emancipation’. Even the response of asking those who are to be emancipated ‘what they want’ does notresolve this issue as the answer will be clouded by symbolic violence. While this does have the danger of lapsing intoa postmodern funk, Molisa’s (2011) suggestion of moving beyond metaphysical values (which must also be treated withsuspicion) to an active ethic of love has value. While arguing for an active questioning of our own values and assumptions(and incidentally the stated values of those we wish to emancipate), I argue that a process ethic of compassion is moregrounded in the religious tradition Molisa (2011) presents, is more comprehensible to modern society and is reflected incontemporary moral and ethical challenges by thinkers such as Karen Armstrong. In effect compassion provides a basis foran emancipatory praxis which calls the powerful to release power and to place themselves in the shoes of the weaker party.Without someone letting go of positions of influence, power, status and resources emancipation is impossible. However, thedanger is that our own disciplinary frameworks may be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In the end, ratherthan calling for an emancipatory accounting, emancipation may have little or nothing to do with our notions of accounting.

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