Enhancing transparency or issuing special passes? A comparative … · 2017. 4. 6. · for veterans, lobbying regulation faced the institutional problem of dealing with strong interest

Enhancing transparency or issuing specialpasses? A comparative analysis of the

adoption of lobbyist registers

Fabrizio De Francesco∗Philipp Trein†

April 6, 2017

– Second Draft –

Abstract

In recent years, the regulation of lobbying by organized interests hasbecome an increasingly popular issue around the world. After a longperiod of rare adoption, the new century has witnessed the choice of12 EU and OECD countries to adopt lobbyist registers. This adminis-trative innovation has a dual function. On the one hand, it can increasethe transparency and the accountability of policymaking and reducecorruption. On the other hand, it can simply strengthen the preferredchannel of communication between dominant interest groups and elec-ted officials. Testing this dual purpose, we disentangle the determi-nants of adoption of lobbyist register. An event history analysis demon-strates that the structure of the interest group landscape affects theadoption of lobbying registers.

Keywords: accountability; corruption; interest groups; lobby register; transparency

∗University of Strathclyde†University of Lausanne

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1 Introduction

During the time period of more than a quarter of a century, Anglo-Saxoncountries were almost alone in regulating lobbying activities. Notably, theU.S. (1946), Australia (1983), and Canada (1989) are amongst the early adopt-ers of lobbying regulation. Germany (1951) is the only non-English-speakingcountry where lobby-registers were adopted in the last century. Nowadays,lobbying regulation is not anymore an almost exclusively Anglo-Saxon phe-nomenon (Holman & Luneburg 2012). In the new century, policy mak-ers adopted lobbyist registers in Lithuania (2001), Poland (2005), Hungary(2006), Israel (2008), France (2009), Mexico (2010), Slovenia (2010), Austria(2012), Italy (2012), the Netherlands (2012), Chile (2014), and the UnitedKingdom (2014). During the post-2000 period of adoption, the spread oflobbying regulation is at its initial stage not yet forming the traditional S-Shaped cumulative adoption curve, which is typical of the policy innova-tion literature (Gray 1973) (Figure 1).

In recent years international organizations such as the OECD and the EUhave promoted lobbyist register as a way to increase transparency. TheOECD members agreed on “Principles for Transparency and Integrity inLobbying” (OECD 2013). At the EU level, an Interinstitutional Agreementbetween the European Parliament and the European Commission sets outthe principles and rules for governing a common Transparency Register(European Parliament and European Commission 2014). Prior to this com-mon principles, both institutions established their own lobbying register.

The emerging comparative analysis of lobbying regulation emphasized twomain functions of lobbyist registers. Lobbyist registers can be a response topublic demands for increasing the transparency of the policymaking pro-cess. However, the same innovation can provide business interests withaccess to lawmakers (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 75). In a nutshell, lobbyistregisters can be either a “hall pass” for lobbyists or an instrument for level-ling the playing field among interest groups that aim to participate in thepolitical process (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77).

This paper aims to shed a light to this dual but alternative function of lobby-ist registers by testing the explanatory power of two domestic determinants

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Figure 1: Annual and cumulative frequencies of adoption after 2000

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of adoption: the interaction effect of GDP and corruption, and the institu-tional structure of interest groups and civil society organizations respec-tively. Which functional explanation increases the probability of adoptinga lobbyist register in a given country and a specific year? We do answerthis question focusing on the recent wave of adoptions of lobbyist registersamong 40 EU member states and OECD members and partners.

Besides the contribution to the emerging comparative literature on lobby-ing regulation, we aim to enhance the comparative public policy literatureby analyzing the adoption of a policy innovation prior the saturation point,when most of countries have passed a legislation. This is a novel method-ological strategy in policy diffusion literature, since the vast majority ofstudies occur when the spread of innovations is completed. Therefore, thismethodological strategy allows us also to make policy recommendations tointernational organizations who are promoting transparency of policymak-ing through lobbyist registers. Empirical findings show that at this initial

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stage of diffusion lobbying register is mainly an instruments for issuing spe-cial passes in countries with mid-level of corporatism.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides anoverview of the state of the art of the comparative literature on lobbyingregulation and identifies the main determinants of adoption. Section 3 il-lustrates our main expectations associated with the likelihood of adoptinglobbyist registers. Section 4 presents the data and the event history model.Section 5 presents the statistical results and Section 6 concludes.

2 Enhancing transparency or issuing hall passes? Lob-bying regulation in the literature

The adoption of lobbying registers is not a new phenomenon. However, fewcountries followed the example of the early adopters. The U.S. were the firstcountry to regulate lobbying activities through the 1946 Federal Regulationof Lobbying Act. This legislation was a reaction of the Federal government tothe adoption of lobbying registers in the (U.S.) States. Furthermore, in thecontext of postwar social policy challenges such as the provision of housingfor veterans, lobbying regulation faced the institutional problem of dealingwith strong interest groups, notably in the real estate market (Zeller 1948,239-243).1 Another early adopter was the Federal Republic of Germanythat regulated lobbying activities in 1951 (OECD 2016). Nowadays, inter-est groups are required to present the name of the organization, the placewhere the organization is registered, the name of the board members, theorganization’s area of interest, the number of members, and the name of therepresentatives, in order to be admitted to a hearing in parliament (BT 2014,Appendix 2). It took until the early 1980s for another country to adopt lobbyregisters, precisely the Australian government created the Lobbyist Registra-tion Scheme in 1983. After the abolishing the act in 1996, in 2008, the Aus-tralian government re-established a lobbyist registry.2 In Canada, the Lob-

1The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 replaced the act (OECD 2016).2In the empirical analysis of this paper, we exclude Australia from our sample of coun-

tries because the abandonment of a policy innovation is against the general assumption ofpolicy diffusion studies that consider the institutionalization of a reform as a granted step.

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byists Registration Act was put into place in 1989, and has been repeatedlyamended since then (OECD 2016).

Whereas most of the early adopters of lobbyist registers are Anglo-Saxoncountries, Germany has a different institutional context of interest group in-clusion, namely corporatism. In research on comparative politics, researche-rs distinguish broadly between corporatist and pluralist systems of interestgroup inclusion in the political process. Therein, corporatism refers to aninstitutional arrangement, in which the state “grant[s] a deliberate repre-sentational monopoly” (Schmitter 1974, 94) to interest groups. Accordingto Lehmbruch (1977, 94), this form of interest intermediation has developedinto an “institutionalized pattern of policy-formulation in which large inter-est organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities”.To the contrary, pluralism refers to competitive and non-coordinated inter-est intermediation. It entails a form of interest group inclusion that rests onbilateral relations between the state and interest groups, as well as a low de-gree of coordination across different economic sectors (Siaroff 1999, Lijphart2012).

Besides the institutional arrangements for participation, policymakers facethe challenge of having to deal with the dark side of interest groups poli-tics, namely corruption and other forms of illegal relations between policy-makers and organized interests. Therefore, the question of when and whypolicymakers actually adopt lobbyist registers is highly relevant. Althoughrecent reviews of the interest group literature have demanded a greater fo-cus on the connection of interest groups to the institutional environment(Hojnacki, Kimball, Baumgartner, Berry & Leech 2012, 393) and to specificpolicy issues (Hacker & Pierson 2014, 656), there are no empirical analysison the influence of the extent of interest intermediation and coordinationon the adoption of institutional innovation ruling the political participa-tion of interest groups themselves. Indeed, the main research focus of theinterest group literature is twofold. On the one hand, it examines inter-est group strategies of coalition formation in the policy process (Heaney &Lorenz 2013), including how different interest groups interact within largernetworks (Beyers & Braun 2014). On the other hand, the effect of interestgroups is analyzed only with regard to policy decisions (Box-Steffensmeier,Christenson & Hitt 2013) rather than the decisions on institutional control

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over their political participation.

Lobbying register is the main instruments for regulating interest groups in-fluence. Regarding adoption, researchers have traced lobbying regulationthrough qualitative analyses. Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010) conductedthe first systematic comparative analysis of the institutionalization of lob-byist registers. They identified several theoretical justifications for regulat-ing lobbyists. Deliberative democratic theory revolves around the idea that“reasons for, and details behind, policy decisions should be publicly avail-able” (Chari, Hogan & Murphy 2010, 5). Accordingly, regulating lobbyistsvia the establishment of a register has the potential to increase the trans-parency and accountability of policymaking and ultimately to enhance thepublic trust towards political institutions. Ideally, lobbyist registers wouldallow citizens to observe and monitor the interactions between policymak-ers and private interest groups at the stage of policy formulation. Throughthis function, lobbying regulations have the potential to hold policymakersand economic interest groups accountable. Chari, Hogan, and Murphy fo-cused also on the theoretical justifications for not regulating lobbyists, suchas barriers to entry and the “dangers” of shedding light on the policy pro-cess. The idea of barriers to entry is based on the concept that lobbyingregulation would limit the participation to the policy process exclusively toregistered lobbyists. Increasing transparency on lobby activities can bringthe danger of limiting the effectiveness of policy decisions based on negoti-ations and technical expertise (Chari, Hogan & Murphy 2010). By measur-ing the extent of regulation, Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010) classified theadopters in three regulatory environments of low, medium and high regu-lation. Germany, Poland and the EU are in the category with the lowestregulation, Lithuania, Hungary, Taiwan and Australia are in the categorywith medium regulations, and, finally, the U.S. is in the highest category.

Holman and Luneburg (2012) develop an analysis of the adoption of lob-bying registers along the logic of access. Rather than barriers to entry forthe “not registered”, these authors highlighted lobbyists’ easiness of accessto policymaking through the establishment of “special entry to the hallsof government” (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). Consequently, “many ofthe European lobbying laws were designed to facilitate the interaction be-tween business leaders and lawmakers in an effort to boost economic devel-

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opment, not to strengthen transparency and reduce corruption” (Holman &Luneburg 2012, 77). Thus, the purpose of lobbying registers is to formalizeand legalize access to policymakers for those groups that provided politi-cally valuable access goods (Bouwen 2004).

Similarly to Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010), Holman and Lunenburgcompare the North American experience with strong lobbying regulationvis-a-vis regulatory regimes of European countries composed of France,Germany, Lithuania and Poland with weak regulation and Austria and Slove-nia with more stringent requirements for lobbyists. They conclude by not-ing that weak lobbyist register regimes provide business interests with aspecial access that is widely ignored when private interest groups have ac-cess anyway. The focus on the extent of regulation related to lobbyist reg-isters had been analyzed also by American scholars. While Opheim (1991)explains the variation in the stringency of legal requirement and adminis-trative procedure among the US states, Gray and Lowery (1994, 1997, 1998)use the same variable for discerning the influence of lobbying registers onthe composition of interest groups.

Lobbying regulation and registers have been also the focus of reviews ofcountries’ experience conducted by international organizations. In two re-ports, the OECD’s Public Government Committee compared the regulatoryregimes of its members (OECD 2009) as well as self-regulated by lobbyistsand alternative measures to government regulation (OECD 2012). The re-ports review standards that are exclusively founded on “building blocks”for providing a “Framework... that is designed to support decision makerswhen lobbying reaches the political agenda” (OECD 2009, 19). At the Euro-pean level, in 2014 the Commission has started collecting data on the lobby-ing regulation as well as institutional measure to fight corruption throughnational anti-corruption reports.3 The year later, the same Commission hadlaunched a program for sharing experience on anti-corruption policies.4

3http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/

organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/

index_en.htm4ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/

organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/experience-sharing-programme/

index_en.htm

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http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm



ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/experience-sharing-programme/index_en.htm



This paper assesses whether the adoption of lobbyist registers has beenmore likely as a potential solution in countries with low public trust onpolitical institutions or as a potential solution in countries in which largeencompassing civil society organizations to influence policymaking. By aquantitative analysis of the likelihood of adoption and going beyond the ex-tent of regulatory stringency, we aim to shed a light on the main drivers ofthis initial wave of cumulative adoption of lobbyist registers.

3 Determinants of lobbying regulation adoption

Why does a government adopt lobbying registers? While controlling foradministrative features and policy interdependence, we put forward threeinternal determinants hypotheses of why policymakers put into place regu-lations of lobbying activities. Firstly, functional problems pressures, namelythe level of corruption conditional upon the level of economic developmentin the country, make adopting lobbying regulations more likely. Secondly,the structure of the interest groups influence can impact on the adoptionof interest groups registers. Thirdly, we point out whether the variation ofpolitical parties in government affects the adoption of lobby registers. Theremainder of this section explains our hypotheses in detail and discussesthese competing explanations.

3.1 Corruption, transparency and economic development

Lobbyist registers are considered as an institutional innovation that havethe potential to enhance the citizens’ knowledge of who is influencing poli-cymakers. Through the register, citizens should be able to observe, monitor,and hold accountable the incumbent that in their opinion is not pursing thepublic interest. In other words, the adoption of lobbying regulation is anact of the government in order to meet the public demand that more lightshould be shed on the interaction between politicians and interest groups,and thus make the policy process more transparent (OECD 2009). Accord-ing to the deliberative democracy theory, one would expect that the demandfrom the citizens for establishing a transparency mechanism of policymak-

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ing is more pressing in those countries where the level of corruption is rel-evant. This expectation however is based on the assumption of citizens’ ca-pacity to monitor and sanction the behavior of elected officials and interestgroups (Elster 1998, 1). Put differently, in the ideal-typical world of deliber-ative democracy, higher corruption should make the adoption of lobbyingregisters more likely.

We argue that such an explanation would, however, be simplistic. Highlevels of corruption alone should not make the adoption of lobby registersmore likely since corrupt policymakers would rather obstruct than supportthe regulation of lobbying. Nevertheless, in certain condition policymakersare not able to resist the public demand to enhance transparency. For exam-ple, “especially among the wealthier European economies that have beenracked by government scandal and public cynicism in recent years, thereis a concerted effort by governmental authorities to win back the public’sconfidence through renewed transparency in the policymaking process”(Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). We hold that policymakers are particularlyresponsive to citizens’ demands to reduce corruption if the country is or hasbeen an emerging market economy where economic development has cre-ated a positive mood amongst citizens due to new jobs, better education andimproved public services, for example in Eastern Europe or Latin Amer-ica. In these countries, governments want to reduce corruption – at leastsymbolically – because a comparatively high-level of corruption would stifleeconomic growth (Mauro 1997) and would cause resistance by citizens whowould not want to see the democratic transition being jeopardized (Holman& Luneburg 2012, 77). In this case, lobby registers would strengthen the ac-countability of the lobbying process and signal to citizens and investors thatthey take the potential threat of corruption seriously. Therefore, we put for-ward the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: High levels of corruption makes the adoption of lobbyingregisters more likely, only in the case of economically developed countries.

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3.2 Interest groups, civil society structure and governments’ po-litical position

The second part of our argument concerns the supply side of lobbying reg-ulations and the reasons for policymakers to institutionalize their relation-ships with interest groups that are highly influential in the policymakingprocess. Intuitively, countries that have either rather corporatist or ratherpluralist institutions of interest intermediation (Siaroff 1999, Lijphart 2012,184) could both adopt lobbying registers, but for very different reasons. Onthe one hand, according to the corporatist logic, lobbyist registers may en-hance the coordination of large and organized interest groups in the parlia-mentary process that are prevalent in corporatist systems. Indeed, lobby-ing regulation among European countries tend to strengthen the interactionamong business and political elites (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). On theother hand, according to the pluralist logic of interest intermediation, a gov-ernment might decide to adopt registers for lobbying activities in order tolevel the playing field for all groups that (potentially) seek access to govern-ment officials. The register has the purpose to institutionalize the process ofinterest representation, enhancing transparency and allowing competitionamongst interest groups through a reduction of the competitive advantageof large and organized interest groups. The fact that the two pioneer coun-tries that were first to adopt lobby registers comprise of were either one thatis rather pluralist (U.S.) or rather corporatist (Germany) indicates that bothfunctional logics are plausible.

Instead of differentiating countries according to the corporatism/pluralismcontinuum, we propose a different argument based on the structure of civilsocieties composed of a larger and smaller (interest group) organizations.This assumption relies on the literature on the civil society structure (Bernhard1993, Anheier 2004), which takes a more holistic approach to the study ofcivil society (Anheier 2004, 16), i.e. non-state and non-partisan actors. Specif-ically, we focus on large and encompassing civil society organizations (CSOs),rather than smaller, more local, or narrowly construed organizations. Weexpect a direct causal relationship between the presence and the political in-fluence of large mass constituency civil society organizations and the prob-ability of adoption of lobbyist registers. However, this relationship is not

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linear.

We hold that the impact of civil society structure on the probability of lob-byist register adoption follows the form of an inverse u-curve. This impliesthat countries that are characterized by either low or high political influ-ence of large and organized CSOs are less likely to adopt lobbyist registers.In countries with no or low levels of political influence of large CSOs, pol-icymakers would have little incentive to supply an institutional innovationfor overseeing lobbying activities. In other words, the additional benefit forpolicymakers in supplying the register in a political system where there isalready a level playing field among interest group organizations would bemarginal. The incentive for policymakers to supply lobbyist registers is alsolow in countries where large CSOs dominate the policymaking process alsothanks to preexisting institutions for interest intermediation and coordina-tion. In other words, the additional benefit for policymakers in adopting anadditional institution for coordinating with large CSOs would be marginal.According to the supply-side logic, policymakers have higher incentive toadopt lobbyist registers in countries where large CSOs are influential with-out dominating the political system.

Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between the political influence of largeCSOs and the probability of lobbyist register adoption is not linear. Higherthe political influence of large CSOs, less likely the adoption; lower the po-litical influence of large CSOs, less likely the adoption by means of otherinstitutional mechanism of civil society representation and participation.

By focusing on policymakers’ incentive structure, the supply-side argumentcan be associated with the ideological position of governments. Policymak-ers, who are driven by ideological preference of consideration of economicgrowth vis-a-vis consideration of distribution and equality, for example byattracting investments (foreign or domestic), should be more inclined to cre-ate a context of legal security for companies. Accordingly, policymakershave higher incentives to adopt an innovation regulating the lobbying ac-tivities. In this case, the register would strengthen the accountability of thelobbying process and signal to investors and business community a crediblecommitment towards a transparent intermediation between policymakersand interest groups and business. The expectation here is that right-wing

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governments should be more interested than left-wing government to im-prove the chances of each single business interest to be represented andinfluence their policymaking, by reforming the modes of interest groupsintermediation.

Hypothesis 2b: Right-wing governments are more likely to adopt lobbyistregisters.

3.3 Controlling for other explanations

Next to the two discussed hypotheses, there are a number of other expla-nations to take into consideration in the empirical analysis. Precisely, theseare the following factors:

• Other macroeconomic factors: Administrative innovations such as a lob-byist register may be associated to administrative and economic com-plexity. The increasing complexity of modern policymaking requiresa rational administrative system so as to enhance capacity and effi-ciency (Bennett 1997). Policymaking needs to be based on supervi-sion and control and the standardization of procedures. The greaterthe complexity and size of economy and government, the greater thenecessity to enhance the flows of information and strengthen the citi-zens’ control over lawmakers and business interests. Economic glob-alization is one of the main explanation of diffusion of political insti-tutions (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, Garrett 1995, Garrett 1998).The adoption of administrative reform is a way that governments sig-nal to international investors that they pursue modern forms of gov-ernance (De Francesco 2012). Furthermore, according to the politicaleconomy perceptive the register can facilitate the establishment of anew channel of communication between interest groups and lobbies“that are either international in structure, or co-operate through in-ternational coalitions” (OECD 2009, 46) and lawmakers. Accordingly,a given country with high levels of trade openness is more likely toadopt a lobbyist register.

• Administrative ecology and administrative tradition: The adoption and

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implementation of administrative innovations may follow specific evo-lution patterns. Lobbyist register cannot be considered in isolationfrom other administrative mechanisms for enhancing the transparencyof policymaking. Accordingly, we control for the adoption of otheradministrative requirements for enhancing transparency such as ad-ministrative procedure act and freedom of information act. Lobbyistregister as a new control mechanisms of the interaction between in-terest groups and elected official is necessarily embedded in a coun-try’s democratic and constitutional setting (OECD 2009, 18). Indeed,administrative culture and state tradition “play a role in defining theway in which administration is conducted, and the receptivity of theadministrative system to change” (Peters 1997, 78). Legal origins areproxy variables for identifying difference also in administrative law(De Francesco 2012).

• EU and OECD influence and other diffusion hypotheses: Being a memberof the OECD and the EU could have a relevant impact on the like-liness of adoption of lobbyist register – similar to other policy fields(Trein forthcoming). Both international organizations have increas-ingly active in promoting the control of lobbying activity through theestablishment of a register. Another expression of countries’ intercon-nectedness to the international environment is the extent of a coun-try’s participation to international networks for tackling political cor-ruption. Furthermore, spatial proximity (Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2016)and a the extent of a country’s trade openness could lead to higherprobability to adopt lobbyist register.

4 Data and models

Differently from previous comparative analyses of lobbying regulation, wefocus on the probability of a given countries to implement lobbyist registerin a specific year, as a dependent variable for our analysis. This methodolog-ical choice allows us to treat lobbying regulation as an administrative inno-vation and refer to the vast literature on policy diffusion and administrativereform. We rely on the OECD’s data in order to determine the year of im-

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plementation for the sample of 40 countries. The data is based on the OECDinformation regarding the adoption of lobbying registers (OECD 2016).

Data on our main independent variables stem from the V-dem data set(Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish,Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Staton, Zimmermann,Sigman, Andersson, Mechkova & Miri 2016). To analyze the first hypoth-esis, we use the “v2x corr” variable for the citizens’ perception of corrup-tion. This index provides averages values of the following four sub-indexes:i) public sector corruption index; ii) executive corruption index; iii) the in-dicator for legislative corruption; and iv) the indicator for judicial corrup-tion. In addition, we use the World Bank’s data to measure GDP per capita(that we divided it by 100000 in order for the scale to be convenient for ouranalysis), and interacted it with the corruption variable. We centered theinteraction effect around the mean in order to make the interpretation ofthe results more straightforward. From the V-dem data set, we also use the“v2csstruc 1” variable which measures the extent to which large encom-passing CSOs are highly influential in the policymaking. Specifically, thisvariable is constructed around an expert surveys that attempts “to charac-terize the relative influence of large mass constituency CSOs versus smaller,more local, or narrowly construed CSOs” (?, 237). Varying between 0 and1, this variable is the mean of the respondent frequencies and the associ-ation of a given countries to the fact that large CSOs are influential. Thesurvey specifies that corporatist systems or large CSO that are highly influ-ential belongs to this category of civil society structure. Accordingly, “[t]hevoice of such organization is recognized by the government and is accordedspecial weight by policymakers” (?, 237-8). For all variables from the V-dem data set, we lagged the observation for three years in order to avoid anendogeneity issue and to have as many observations as possible since formost countries in the sample the last available observation is in 2012. Table1 summarised the descriptive statistics of the main independent variablesand control variables. To model the inverse-u impact of the interest groupstructure on the adoption of lobbying registers, we square the variable thatmeasures interest group structure.5

5Plumper and Martin use a similar strategy to demonstrate the effect of democracy oneconomic performance (Plumper & Martin 2003).

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Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable Mean Std. Dev. NAdoption 0.02 0.14 605Corruption 0.252 0.217 573GDPp.c.\100000 0.296 0.232 603Corruption*GDPp.c. 0.038 0.030 573Interest group structure 0.368 0.275 573Interest group structure2 0.211 0.237 573Left in Gov. 1.561538 1.122702 650Trade\10000 0.009 0.005 598Foreign Direct Inv. 8.307487 31.36755 661Size of government 18.413 4.145 596Administrative Procedure Act 0.689 0.463 605Freedom of Information Act 0.856 0.351 605Freedom of Information Act (time) 12.901 13.541 605English Legal Origin 0.198 0.399 605Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.132 0.339 605German Legal Origin 0.101 0.301 605French Legal Origin 0.34 0.474 605Socialist Legal Origin 0.228 0.42 605EU Member 0.517 0.5 605OECD Member 0.641 0.48 605Dem. Duration 55.329 43.626 605Spatial lag 0.0419275 0.0455238 630t 8.061 4.535 605t2 8.551 7.767 605t3 10.306 12.081 605

To operationalize the control variables, we use a variety of different mea-sures. Regarding the additional macroeconomic controls, namely the open-ness of the economy, we use information on the trade volume based onWorld Bank Data. Higher trade volumes should make adoption more likely.Concerning administrative ecology and administrative tradition, we controlfor several measures. Firstly, we take into consideration whether a countryadopted an administrative procedures act and the freedom of informationact. If a country implemented these two administrative innovations, theadoption of lobbying registers becomes more likely (De Francesco 2013).Secondly, we take into consideration the legal origin of the administration.Therefore, we created a number of binary variables that measure differenttypes of legal origins. Notably, these are English legal origin, Scandinavianlegal origin, German legal origin, French, legal origin, and Socialist legalorigin countries (La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1999). Thereby, wehave a clear expectation only for English legal origin countries. They shouldbe amongst the early adopters since three of the first adopting countries –

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the U.S., Australia, and Canada – are all countries with an English legal ori-gin. Thirdly, we control for the overall size of government – hypothesizingthat a larger size of government should make adoption more likely. In ad-dition, we control for EU and OECD membership using binary variables, aswell as for the duration of democracy harkening again back to the V-demdata set (Coppedge et al. 2016). The data for the regarding political partiesare taken from the “Database of Political Institutions” (Beck, Clarke, Groff,Keefer & Walsh 2001) (Table 1).

4.1 Event history model

Event history analysis is the established methodology among policy inno-vation studies. The data set covers 40 countries and starts in 2000, 3 yearsbefore the start of the OECD engagement with lobbying regulation. There-fore, we exclude the four early adopting countries – the U.S., Germany, Aus-tralia, and Canada – from the analysis. Among the possible EHA models,we have chosen the logit model that allows for flexibility in the analysis(Langner, Bender, Lenz-Tonjes, Kuchenhoff & Blettner 2003, 1). In time-series cross-sectional analysis, logit models however come with two spec-ification issues (Buckley & Westerland 2004). The first one is related tothe likelihood that the observations are temporally dependent (Buckley &Westerland 2004, Mooney 2001). To consider “time seriously” (Beck, Katz& Tucker 1998), we have inserted three time variables, t, t2/10, t3/100, inthe discrete EHA (Carter & Signorino 2009). The second issue concerns theselection of an appropriate functional form in the analysis of “rare events”(King & Zeng 2001) that should be guided by appropriate substantive andstatistical theory (Buckley & Westerland 2004). The issue here has to dowith the underlying distributional assumption within a logit model that themaximum marginal effect occurs at the value π = .5.

5 Statistical results

The results of our analysis suggest that if we insert an interaction effect of thelevel of corruption and the degree of GDP into the analysis, the regression

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coefficient for the interaction effect demonstrates a positive and statisticallysignificant effect on the adoption of lobbying registers. This result suggeststhat the combined increase of corruption and the size of the economy makesregulating lobbying registers more likely overall. Thus, the separate effectof both – corruption and size of the economy – displays a negative effect onadoption if the other variable is fixed at the mean. Concerning the impactof the interest group structure, the models show that if we include the indi-cator measuring the effect of interest groups structure, the effect is positivebut not significant statistically. It is only when we add the squared term ofthe interest group structure variable to the model that the effect becomesstronger and statistically significant. Therefore, the results of our analysisreveal an inverse-u effect of interest group structure on the adoption of lob-bying registers, which is highly significant statistically. With respect to theeffect of color of political parties in government, our analyses do not reveal aclear result. Overall, these results indicate support for of the three hypothe-ses that we formulated before (Table 2). We will now discuss the findingsfor the control variables and the robustness of our findings.

Regarding the control variables, the results indicate that bigger govern-ment, a strong interest group lobby network, German legal origin, and moretrade make adoption more likely. On the other hand, the presence of an Ad-ministrative Procedure Act, a strong interest group lobby network, OECDmembership, and EU membership make adoption less likely – althoughnone of the variables are significant statistically (Table 2). Interestingly, thespatial lag variable has a strong negative – although not statistically sig-nificant – effect. This finding shows that the case of lobbying registers isnon-typical for a diffusion process because the presence of such an innova-tion in a neighboring country did not increase the probability of adoptionby countries close by. The previous adoption of a Freedom of InformationAct is dropped from the analysis and no coefficients can be obtained. Con-trary to our expectation, this implies that the presence of a Freedom of In-formation Act, i.e. a legal basis that grants citizens access to all governmentdocumentation, always comes along with the absence of a lobbying register(Table 4, Appendix). This can be explained by the fact that the presence ofan encompassing governance mechanism for transparency excludes the ne-cessity of a further administrative requirement concerning the interaction

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Table 2: Discrete Event History Analysis: Adoption of lobbying registers(regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by 40 countries)

(1) (2) (3) (4)adoption adoption adoption adoption

Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.Corruption -10.385∗ -8.477∗ -8.641 -4.693

(5.715) (4.983) (6.765) (6.821)GDPp.c. -9.286∗∗ -8.222∗∗ -10.382∗∗ -8.118

(4.147) (3.942) (4.150) (6.621)Corruption*GDPp.c. 33.951∗ 23.940 34.410 1.490

(19.770) (18.328) (28.199) (24.681)Int. Gr. Struct. 12.964∗∗∗ 22.138∗∗ 26.755∗ 25.240∗∗

(4.529) (10.384) (13.674) (10.641)Int. Gr. Struct.2 -12.473∗∗ -20.839∗ -24.283∗ -24.730∗∗

(5.517) (11.338) (14.445) (11.977)Left in Gov. -0.158 -0.123 0.077

(0.408) (0.500) (0.379)EU–Member -0.714

(1.197)OECD–Member 1.722

(1.532)Int. Gr. Lobby 0.225

(0.418)FDI t-3 -0.040 -0.043

(0.028) (0.029)Trade 138.914 141.648

(104.673) (125.143)Spatial lag -13.725 -11.852

(9.745) (9.566)Size of Gov. 0.293

(0.286)Dur. of Dem. -0.014

(0.026)Adm. Proc. Act -1.642

(1.355)Germ. Leg. Or. 2.542

(2.164)t -0.363 -0.323 -1.064 -1.181

(0.881) (1.023) (1.776) (1.530)t2/10 0.936 0.962 1.888 2.183

(1.080) (1.307) (2.151) (1.921)t3/100 -0.424 -0.479 -0.820 -0.940

(0.391) (0.498) (0.795) (0.720)Constant -3.986∗ -6.295∗∗ -8.044 -10.848∗

(2.301) (2.844) (6.556) (6.377)Pseudo R2 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.25Observations 573 553 506 504∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

18

between lawmakers and interest groups. This incompatible association be-tween FOIA and lobbyist registers is also represented when we look at legalorigin of countries. If the legal background of a country reclines to a Scandi-navian legal origin, traditionally associated with high level of transparencythrough FOIA, there will definitively be no lobbying register present. Putdifferently, any other legal origin than the Scandinavian is associated withthe adoption of a lobbyist register (Table 4, Appendix). Nevertheless, if weexamine the effect of the other legal origins in separate models without ac-counting for the Scandinavian model, the effects are not significant statisti-cally (not shown).

We inserted the control variables to test the robustness of our results con-cerning the main variables we are interested in, in terms of statistical signifi-cance. Two of the three main variables of interest – interaction of corruptionand size of the economy and interest group structure – pass at least sometests of robustness (Model 3). Nevertheless, a second set of robustness testsshows that the effects for corruption and the economy do not remain statis-tically significant whereas those for the variables regarding interest groupsdo (Model 4). This indicates that – overall – we can have some confidencein the robustness of our findings, but the results regarding interest groupstructure are a bit more statistically robust.

To better interpret the results of our analysis, we will proceed with a graphicpresentation of the main effects of interest, beginning with the interactionof corruption and the size of the economy. For cases of low economic de-velopment, an increase in the perceived corruption does not have a positiveeffect on the adoption of lobbying registers. Nevertheless, if the size of theeconomy increases, and corruption along with it, the probability to adoptlobbying registers augments as well (Figure 2). This relationship is espe-cially present in economies that aim at entering the club of the EU and/orthe OECD or have recently been admitted these circles, such as Baltic coun-tries or Mexico. The findings support the logic that we put forward in theelaboration of Hypothesis 1, namely that countries seeking to sustain theireconomic development and having problems with corruption tend to adoptlobbying registers. Against this background, regulating lobbying activitiesis beneficial as it signals to new investors that there is legal stability andsomewhat “fair” competition. What is more, adopting lobbying registers

19

Figure 2: Predictive Margins for corruption and size of economy0

.51

Prob

abilit

y to

ado

pt lo

bbyi

ng re

gist

ers

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Corruption

GDPpc=.007 GDPpc=.107 GDPpc=.207 GDPpc=.307

GDPpc=.407 GDPpc=.507 GDPpc=.607 GDPpc=.707

GDPpc=.807 GDPpc=.907 GDPpc=1.007 GDPpc(100k)

secures the access to the policy process for international companies that arealready in the country. Such institutional innovations are important on theroad to a highly developed economy that is integrated in international in-stitutions and organizations. Concerning countries that have already a veryhighly developed economy, the interaction of economic growth and corrup-tion does not increase the probability of regulating lobbying activities. Thereason for this is simply that the levels of corruption are relatively lowerthan in emerging economies and that the countries are already embeddedin the international economy as well as in international institutions and or-ganizations of economic governance (Figure 2).

Concerning the effect of the interest group structure on the adoption of lob-bying regulation, our regression analysis pointed to an inverse-u curve ef-fect of interest group structure on policy adoption. The data that we use tomeasure the structure of the interest groups in a country provides a scalethat ranges from no influence of large interest groups to the dominance of

20

0.0

2.0

4.0

6Pr

obab

ility

to a

dopt

lobb

ying

regi

ster

s

0.05

.1.15

.2.25

.3.35

.4.45

.5.55

.6.65

.7.75

.8.85

.9.95

1

Interest group structure

(a) Interest group structure

-.02

0.0

2.0

4.0

6Pr

obab

ility

to a

dopt

lobb

ying

regi

ster

s

0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3Left party in government

(b) Left parties in government

Figure 3: Predicted probabilities regarding interest groups and political par-ties

large interest groups. According to the regression analysis, the probabil-ity of adopting lobby registers increases in contexts with a mix of large andsmall groups. Contrariwise, if small or large interest associations dominateregulating lobbying activities is less probable (Figure 3a). The explanationfor these results are straightforward: in case large interest groups dominate,policymakers have the incentive to issue special passes; once there is a mixof large and small groups, regulations serve at leveling the playing fieldfor everyone. On the other hand, if there are mostly small interest groupsadopting lobbying registers is not necessary. In case the demand for gov-ernment attention comes from relatively small and similarly sized groups,competition should work well and policymakers would not need to adoptlobbying registers.

Contrary to our expectations, the results show no clear effect for the type ofparty in government. We hypothesized that right parties in government aremore likely to adopt lobbying registers since they closer to interest groupsand therefore more interested in issuing special passes. Nevertheless, ourempirical analysis did not support this finding. The results show that theeffects of the coefficients change. Under some configuration, of control vari-ables, the effect of right parties is positive (Models 1-3, Table 2) but thischanges with different controls (Model 4, Table 2). The graphical represen-tation underlines this finding.

The regression models support – at least to some extent – the hypotheses

21

that we developed based on the secondary literature. Nevertheless, thesizes of the effects differs considerably. Whereas the interaction of perceivedcorruption and size of the economy could increase the probability to adoptlobbying registers considerably, this is less the case for the interest groupstructure variable. Precisely, if the size of the GDP and the corruption areboth around the median value of the sample or above, the probability to reg-ulate lobbying increases almost by 50 percent (Figure 2). To the contrary,the effect size for interest group is much smaller. In case that the interestgroup structure is at the median value of the scale, i.e. there is a mix oflarge and small interest groups, the probability of adopting lobbying regis-ters increases by five percent relative to the overall sample of 40 countries(Figure 3). Overall, these results suggest the combination of a certain type ofproblem pressure and more importantly a specific structure of the interestgroups landscape affect the adoption of lobbying registers.

6 Conclusion

This paper analyzed the adoption of lobbying registers across 40 countries.We started from the question concerning why there are differences regard-ing the adoption of lobbying registers around the world. Based on a Dis-crete Event History Analysis, our analysis demonstrates that mainly twofactors explain policy adoption. Firstly, a specific combination of the sizeof the economy and corruption explain why governments put into placelobbying registers. For example, if the size of the economy increases andcorruption is high, policymakers tend to put into place lobbyist registers.Our explanation for this pattern is that politicians have an incentive to reg-ulate lobbying if they want to develop the economy. In this case, they wantto attract investors and cater companies that are already in the country. Le-galizing the lobbying process creates legal certainty for corporations andincreases therefore the attractiveness of a country for investors. Secondly,we demonstrate that specific conditions in the interest group structure of acountry make adoption more likely. Precisely, if large interest groups dom-inate, or there is a mixture of large and small interest groups that competefor government influence, policymakers put into place lobbying regulation.We argue that these two conditions create incentives for decisions makers

22

to adopt lobbying regulations because they either want to legalize the influ-ence of the dominating groups or aim at levelling the playing field in casethe size of interest groups varies. Other factors have less explanatory power.

Our results provide an interesting explanation for the adoption of lobbyingregisters to the literature. Nevertheless, there are limitations to our analy-sis. The spread process regarding the lobbyist registers is in its course andwithin ten years’ time many more countries might have adopted lobby reg-isters, and potentially other factors than the ones we put forward might be-come more powerful in the explanation. However, an empirical analysis ofthe initial wave of adoption allows us to make practical recommendationsto international organizations engaged in the provision of international bestpractices for policy-making transparency. Although international organi-zations have correctly associated lobbyist registers with the issue of corrup-tion, it is important to note that the promotion of this institutional solutionin less developed countries may lead to symbolic adoption. Furthermore,the empirical findings partially support that the institutional structure of in-terest group representation is an important factor for explaining the adop-tion of lobbying regulation. Accordingly, international recommendationsshould take into account the structure of interest groups in an adoptingcountry. And it is necessary to properly distinguish regulation that levelsthe playing field for lobbyists from a mere issue of special passes to domi-nant interest groups.

23

7 Appendix



Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.Corruption -7.839∗∗ -9.127 -8.277

(3.771) (6.268) (5.630)GDPp.c. -5.947∗∗ -9.589 -9.869

(2.809) (6.848) (6.418)Corruption*GDPp.c. 27.101∗∗ 33.447 25.830

(12.798) (21.651) (20.860)Int. Gr. Struct. 20.011∗ 20.728∗∗

(10.554) (9.952)Int. Gr. Struct.2 -20.208 -20.039∗

(12.699) (11.370)Left in Gov. -0.044 -0.158

(0.361) (0.373)Size of Gov. 0.161 0.146 0.132

(0.174) (0.161) (0.215)Dur. of Dem. -0.017 0.004 0.001

(0.014) (0.012) (0.014)Constant -2.211 -11.021∗∗∗ -4.462∗ -8.332∗∗

(2.099) (3.875) (2.686) (3.966)t -0.482 -0.243 -0.377 -0.236

(0.834) (0.961) (0.867) (1.022)t2/10 1.024 0.752 0.867 0.827

(1.040) (1.229) (1.072) (1.316)t3/100 -0.439 -0.373 -0.373 -0.420


24



Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.Corruption -9.094∗ -9.062 -8.365∗ -8.188

(5.458) (5.744) (5.005) (5.105)GDPp.c. -9.796∗ -10.340 -8.072∗∗ -8.117∗∗

(5.131) (6.428) (3.972) (3.974)Corruption*GDPp.c. 34.018∗ 23.193 24.774 22.858

(20.341) (18.825) (18.355) (18.205)Int. Gr. Struct. 21.931∗∗ 21.231∗∗ 22.508∗∗ 24.484∗∗

(10.223) (10.444) (9.991) (10.025)Int. Gr. Struct.2 -20.216∗ -19.714∗ -21.261∗∗ -22.987∗∗

(11.095) (11.844) (10.822) (9.712)Left in Gov. 0.013 -0.079 -0.134 -0.149

(0.350) (0.334) (0.447) (0.418)Adm. Proc. Act -0.923 -0.898

(0.695) (0.876)Freed. Inf. Act dropped

–Freed. Inf. Act (t) 0.015

(0.032)Eng. Leg. Or. -0.243

(0.792)Germ. Leg. Or. 0.747

(1.324)t -0.538 -0.296 -0.310 -0.318

(1.019) (1.016) (1.024) (1.043)t2/10 1.228 0.962 0.945 0.961

(1.338) (1.324) (1.297) (1.335)t3/100 -0.559 -0.483 -0.472 -0.481

(0.510) (0.506) (0.491) (0.509)Constant -5.542∗ -5.407∗ -6.472∗∗ -7.000∗∗


25


(1) (2) (3)Model 10 Model 11 Model 12

Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.Corruption -9.415 -9.191 -12.010∗

(6.810) (6.592) (6.829)GDPp.c. -6.212 -8.222 -13.700∗

(6.769) (6.661) (7.699)Corruption*GDPp.c. 31.125 29.020 44.597∗

(25.996) (22.756) (23.566)Interest group structure 12.604∗∗∗ 13.258∗∗ 14.072∗∗

(4.552) (5.171) (5.485)Interest group structure2 -12.039∗∗ -13.340∗∗ -13.876∗

(5.724) (6.454) (7.100)German legal origin 14.531∗∗∗

(1.810)Socialist legal origin 15.494∗∗∗

(1.730)French legal origin 14.507∗∗∗

(1.243)English legal origin 13.507∗∗∗ -1.130 -1.437

(1.532) (0.772) (0.935)Scandinavian legal origin dropped

–Duration of democracy 0.009

(0.017)Administrative Procedure Act -0.799 -0.690 -0.975

(0.965) (0.875) (0.987)Size of government 0.075 0.103 0.070

(0.224) (0.176) (0.197)Trade -81.001 -33.910 -17.430

(99.981) (77.406) (93.562)t -0.375 -0.365 -0.251

(0.913) (0.909) (0.929)t2/10 0.969 0.945 0.821

(1.153) (1.144) (1.169)t3/100 -0.425 -0.421 -0.381

(0.422) (0.418) (0.428)Constant -19.762∗∗∗ -5.238 -4.208

(5.330) (3.568) (3.778)Pseudo R2 0.22 0.18 0.19Observations 568 488 568∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

26

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Enhancing transparency or issuing special passes? A comparative … · 2017. 4. 6. · for veterans, lobbying regulation faced the institutional problem of dealing with strong interest