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Elisabet Puigdollers Mas WEST PAPUA: POWER SHARING IN INDONESIA

UPF - Soeren Keil

INTRODUCTION

Violence in West Papua between Indonesia and the “secessionist” OPM (Organisasi

Papua Merdeka/ Free Papua Movement) has brought serious social and political

consequences. Considerable numbers of civilians have lost their lives, property and

future. The violent conduct of both armed groups-- the state of Indonesia and the

OPM fighters in West Papua-- raises issues for international and national organizations

that are trying to protect human rights, working for peace and democracy or providing

humanitarian relief. Moreover, recent mobilizations in West Papua show the rising

popular support to the idea of running a referendum on the independence of West

Papua.

This essay tries to bring in some new arguments and present the existing ones

altogether in relation to how should Indonesia share its power with West Papua?

To answer to the main question I will first present Indonesia's recent history in order to

have a full understanding of the context. After that, I will analyze Indonesian policies

according to minorities as a pre-stage before getting into the concrete case study.

Hence, it will follow a presentation of Papua’s history and an explanation of the

conflict derived from their national demands. Last but not least, I will analyze which

power-sharing system would be best or at least applicable in the region of West Papua

according to the political and cultural framework explained above.

INDONESIA’S MODERN HISTORY

It is widely accepted that we must study the past events to understand the present.

The potential peace process between Indonesia and Papua has to start from the

knowledge of the historical conditions, especially in this particular case, in which the

current demands are a consequence of the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969 and the open

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conflict is a consequence of the process of decolonization. Thus, any analysis of the

present must take into account the previous context in order to make realistic and

consistent proposals.

Prior to the independence

For most of the colonial period, the Dutch control over the islands was tenuous except

of some islands and coastal areas. It was until the early twentieth century that the

Dutch domination was extended to what later would be the current limits of

Indonesia. The Dutch troops were constantly engaged in quelling the uprisings inside

and outside the island of Java. The influence of local leaders such as Prince Diponegoro

in Central Java, Imam Bonjol in central Sumatra and Pattimura in the Moluccas, besides

a bloody war in Aceh, which lasted thirty years, weakened and reduced the Dutch

colonial military forces. Despite the deep political and social divisions during the

Indonesian war of independence they were all united in their struggle for freedom,

circumstance that would have strong effects in the power-sharing system with regions

like West Papua and Aceh. Finally, the Japanese invasion and occupation during World

War II ended Dutch rule, and encouraged the Indonesian independence movement

previously suppressed by the Japanese. Two days after Japan's surrender in August

1945, Sukarno, an influential nationalist leader, declared the independence and was

appointed president. The Netherlands tried to reestablish control over the country,

leading to an armed and diplomatic struggle that ended in December 1949, when

under international pressure, the Dutch formally recognized the independence of

Indonesia; with the exception of the Dutch territory of West New Guinea, who joined

after the New York Agreement of 1962 and after the controversial ‘Act of Free Choice

of the UN’ in 1969, which effects will be explained later.

Sukarno Era 1945-1966

The 17th of August 1945, Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia and led

the war against the Netherlands, until they recognized the independence in 1949. He

was also the one who conceived the philosophy and ideology of the Pancasila State

which is still very present in the Indonesian politics. Moreover, Sukarno became the

first president of the Republic of Indonesia and the father of the nation. However, in

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his years of government he moved from democracy to authoritarianism. The early

years of parliamentary democracy included a period of high volatility due to conflicts

between nationalists who wanted a secular state, Muslims, Communists, discrepancies

between the various law enforcement and territorial conflicts. Claiming that Western-

style democracy was unsuitable for Indonesia, he abolished in 1956 all parties and

called for a system of "guided democracy" in 1959. He defended that the Indonesian

way of deciding important questions should be through deliberative processes as a

way to reach consensus. This system was applied at the village level and Sukarno

claimed that it should be the entire nation’s model. He created a government based on

"functional groups" in which all the nation's basic elements would be represented and

that would together conform a National Council. This Council would express the

national consensus and could express itself under presidential guidance. However, this

consensus system called “guided democracy” derived into an autocracy governed by

decrees.

The 30th of September 1965, a coup attempt was countered by the army, who led a

violent anti-communist campaign, between 500,000 and one million people were killed

during these clashes; the PKI was attributed to the coup attempt and the party was

dissolved.

Suharto Era 1967-1998

The army chief, General Suharto, replaced in 1967 the already weak Sukarno and by

March 1968 he was formally appointed president. The administration of the "new

order" was supported by the U.S. government during the Cold War due to Suharto’s

anti-communist militancy and purges of communists made during the years 1965-66.

Suharto carried out economic policies that encouraged foreign direct investment in the

country, which was an important factor for economic growth during three decades.

Western countries considered authoritarianism to be the payback for development,

however, the ongoing economic liberalization was incompatible with the strict social

and political control; thus, left NGOs and Indonesian intellectuals appeared in defense

of democracy, such as the "Petition of 50". With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and

the end of communism, foreign powers could no longer support the authoritarian rule

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of Suharto while defending political liberalism. Therefore, the authoritarian "new

order" was widely accused of corruption and violent repression of political opposition.

Suharto had then to lead to a process of nation opening; market liberalization led to

think that Indonesia was a new economic power. The new consumer culture increased

the middle class but in turn increased the gap between rich and poor people. Islam

ceased to be repressed and received institutional support; it was created the ICMI

(Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) and NU (Muslim Traditionals). The media was also

liberalized and critical voices against the government of Suharto increased. All this

changes were coupled with corrupt elections, the Bre-X scandal and the Asian financial

crisis that hit Indonesia between 1997 and 1998 and derived into a pernicious

situation. Poverty doubled in part because of IMF policies and increased popular

discontent with the "new order". Suharto created a new government in 1997 including

some politicians who had popular support but they joined students’ and popular

protests; thus Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998 and briefly passed power to his right

hand Habibie.

Habibie governed until the first democratic elections on October 20, 1999. Habibies

controversial policies are very well summarized by Adrian Vickers; “Habibie lifted

legislation that discriminated against Chinese, took power away from the military,

decentralized government and provided the East Timorese people with a democratic

vote over their future”. (Adrian Vickers, 2005, 210)

Gus Dur Abdurrahman Wahid, a member of the UN and leader of Partai Kebangkitan

Bangsa, won the elections and ruled between 1999 and 2001. However, his policies

were too democratic (he defended neutrality, interreligious dialogue and a national

reconciliation process) for a country still anchored in the Communist dictatorship,

which led him to be deposed by a coup by Muslim politics and the military. A nostalgic

reflection of the no longer existing past regime was the reason to declare Sukarno’s

daughter, Megawati, leader of the PDI-P the new president. She reflected a safer and

more conservative alternative and also represented certain continuity with the

previous regime. She ruled until 2004 and was replaced by the current President Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono on October 20, 2004 from the Democratic Party.

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Indonesia’s modern political History can be summarized with Adrian Vickers’ quote;

“The good intentions of genuine reformers have been drowned by a political culture in

which access to power is synonymous with access to economy. This culture is Suharto’s

strongest legacy.” (Adrian Vickers, 2005, 213). This situation has taught Indonesians to

consider the State a distant institution; moreover the corrupted police became very

powerful in local regions were they encouraged ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts

instead of bringing peace that has had terrible effects in West Papua. Besides the

regional autonomy process after Suharto’s fall and many reforms, all gubernators

haven’t replaced Sukarno’s promise of revolution or Suharto’s promise of

development by any other feasible process of modernization, democratization and

national stability. The political and economic instability, social unrest, corruption and

terrorism have slowed progress since then. Although relations among different

religious and ethnic groups are largely harmonious, the number of minority discontent

and violence remain the main problems in regions like West Papua and Aceh.

However, there have been processes of accommodation of the minority groups and of

reconciliation such as the secession of East Timor in 1999 after 25 years of violent and

forced occupation. The provinces of Aceh, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Papua and West Papua

have now greater legislative privileges and a greater degree of autonomy from central

government. The government of Aceh, for example, has the right to create an

independent judiciary, as an example, in 2003 it instituted Sharia. Yogyakarta was

given the status of "semi-autonomous region", Papua was granted the status of "semi-

autonomous region" in 2001, while Jakarta became a "special region" as it is the

nation's capital.

MINORTIY POLICIES IN INDONESIA

From what has been detailed until now, it can be inferred that the Indonesian nation-

state is the result of the Dutch colonial rule and the consequent anti-colonial

nationalist revolution in the mid twentieth century. Its national territory was further

extended with the incorporation of Papua in the 1960s and the invasion of East Timor

in 1975, a former Portuguese colony. The Indonesian government had to control its

extended territory through centralized military rule; thus, its control was delineated by

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the presence of Army troops and was determined by the constant use of violence and

coercive threats. However, once Indonesia began the process of liberalization,

democratization, and decentralization after 1998, its authority over the occupied

territories- East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua - entered a period of uncertainty. These

three territories weren’t only excluded from Habibie’s process of democratization but

also were nor demilitarized neither decentralized. This situation rose nationalist

feelings and demands throughout theses territories that were externalized through

peaceful protests and mobilizations. The protesters’ aims were on one hand the

removal of Indonesian military forces over their territories and on the other hand, the

recognition of the special status of their territories. However, these contests were

used by the Indonesian government to justify a further military presence. The

continuing military dominance over the three territories besides the democratization

process in Indonesia, inevitably brought further protests and led to a period of violent

conflict, and hence, hundreds of people had to displace to safer territories. This entire

situation has left many enduring problems.

However, a measure of resolution appeared in 2005. First of all, East Timor’s

independence after 24 years of Indonesian occupation in 1975 was finally achieved in

1999 through a referendum. Nevertheless, the following Indonesian repression raised

the number of refugees and increased the following problem of repatriation and

double nationalities. Secondly, after many years of armed separatist fights and of

violent Indonesian military repression in Aceh, it was signed an agreement in Helsinki

between representatives of the Indonesian government and the representatives of the

Free Aceh Movement (known as GAM, created in 1976). The agreement facilitated the

cessation of hostilities between both parts, it was accepted the demanded

implementation of special autonomy for the province, and GAM fighters and

supporters were successfully reintegrated into local political life. Moreover, the

widespread violence and the forced displacements that took place in Aceh during 2003

and 2004 were replaced by the return, repatriation, and reintegration of those who

had to leave their homes due to the conflict and because of the tsunami. However, in

both cases, the conflict that seems to have ended but is still open due to the problems

derived from the displacement of many citizens and the Indonesian military abuses of

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the human rights. Finally, West Papua remains a territory where the national

sovereignty problem is still unresolved and the conflict has not improved at all. Despite

the political liberalization initiated by Habibie in 1998 and the peaceful popular

mobilization, Papua’s history is one of occupation and violence. In conclusion, while

the democratic Indonesia has made huge efforts to solve ethnic violent wars and

separatism conflicts in provinces like Aceh, Papua has remained outside this process

and that’s why it is essential to find a solution.

WEST PAPUA

History

After the Indonesian independence in 1949, the people of West Papua, then the Dutch

New Guinea1, were promised self-determination and eventual independence by their

colonial masters in the 1950’s. The successive Dutch governments delayed the process

of decolonization in attempt to prevent Indonesia taking control of the region and to

prepare the region for self-rule. The Dutch invested in education and also encouraged

the appearance of a Papuan nationalism. As a result it appeared a small elite

sympathetic to an approach to New Guinea.

In 1961, it was elected a national parliament; The New Guinea Council (Nieuw-Guinea

Raad) was a body created to be the basis for an independent West Papuan parliament.

However, the nascent nationalism had a week support across the region and was also

fragmented.

Sukarno took West Papua as the focus where to continue the struggle against Dutch

colonialism and started a fight. However, the Dutch were unwilling to repeat a futile

armed struggle as the one previously lost against Indonesia in the 1940’s; hence, they

accepted America as a mediator. It wasn’t until 1961 when West Papuan

independence was proclaimed; the ‘Morning Star’ flag rose for the first time and the

national anthem was sung. The result of the negotiations was the UN-ratified New

1 During the Dutch occupation it was called ‘Dutch New Guinea’, after that it was called ‘West Irian’ until

1973, during Suharto’s regime it was called ‘Irian Jaya’ and finally ‘Papua’ was adopted as the official name in 2002. ‘West Papua has been used as a self-identifying’ term by the Papuans since 1963, when it was transferred to the Indonesians. I am going to use this term to refer to the union of Papua and West Papua.

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York Agreement in September 1962, by which the authority over Papua had to be

transferred to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). After that,

the 1st of May in 1963 full administrative control over West Papua was transferred to

the Indonesians with the blessing of the USA, the UN and Australia. During that time,

Indonesia let the Papuans determine whether they wanted to be independent or

integrated to Indonesia. In 1969, the United Nations supervised the "Act of Free

Choice" in which the Indonesian government used the procedure of musyawarah,

based on a consensus of 'elders'. Without a significant Papuan nationalist movement,

the 1,054 elders (officials appointed by the Indonesian government) agreed to be a

part of Indonesia. Nevertheless, Peter King (Comprehending West Papua, 2011) argues

that the consultation didn’t raise any evidence about the consent of the Papuans, and

claims that the Papuans tend to call it the ‘Act of No Choice’. Besides that, soon after

the region became the 26th province of Indonesia with full United Nations and

international recognition. Since then, most Papuans have refused the inevitability of

the occupation and have organized through violent and non-violent groups to achieve

their independence.

Papuans consider that Indonesia is making huge efforts to exploit the rich natural

resources and assimilate the indigenous Papuans into the Indonesian administration

and culture. That’s why it has met armed resistance from the Free Papua Movement

called OPM and has also raised international concerns. However, the fact of the

existence of the OPM, although it is a marginal actor that is better known as an

international symbol, justified the intimidating presence of the Indonesian military and

led to abuses of the human rights. In 2005 it was published a two-year study made by a

team of Australian and local researchers that affirmed that,

a campaign of ethnic cleansing has left thousands of internally displaced

civilians and Papuans face becoming a minority in their own land. More than

100,000 Papuans are estimated to have died since Indonesia took control of

West Papua from the Dutch Government in 19632.

2 Virginia Gawler, 19/8/2005, Report claims secret genocide in Indonesia, viewed 14/04/2012

<http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=651>

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In the Post-Suharto era since 1998, the national government began a process of

decentralization and in December 2001, Papua was given a "Special Autonomy" status

which devolved some power to Papuans and local governments were created.

Simultaneously there was a pumping of huge sums of money back into the region,

however, the Indonesia government controversially split Papua into two separate

provinces, Papua and West Papua3.

Political conflict

In comparison with East Timor and Aceh, the West Papuan conflict is far from reaching

its end. It is a long-running conflict that is poorly understood even by those involved.

For almost fifty years, and after the end of the Dutch colony, the Indonesian military

and police have been fighting in the West Papuan territory. Recent violence exposes

the complexity of the conflict, moreover, Papua is thousands of kilometers from

Jakarta, is also sealed from foreign journalists and many human rights observers and

hence, it is nearly impossible to solve most of the attacks, which remain mysterious.

The conflict has many actors involved and this makes difficult the achievement of an

agreement. The root of the problem is the conflict between Indonesia and West

Papua, where the former claims Papuan territory to be Indonesian, and the later

claims the opposite. However, this conflict is multiple. On one level, the Indonesian

security forces fight against West Papuan violent groups of indigenous and separatists

like the OPM. The existence of violent groups is used to justify the presence of

Indonesian forces in the West Papuan territory. However, what is being disputed is the

exploitation of the rich mines and natural resources. On another level, there are two

conflicts within the West Papuans. One is between the partisans of the two leading

organizations of the West Papuan resistance, the West Papua National Coalition for

Liberation (WPNCL) and the West Papua National Authority (WPNA). The other conflict

is between those (Indonesians and Papuans) who defend the collaboration between

Jakarta and Papua and the Papuan independentists organized throughout the

Coalition, the Authority and some other less known groups.

3 As it has already been said, in this essay it is used the term West Papua to make reference to both split

regions.

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Moreover, the conflict has important ramifications around many countries in Asia and

Oceania. Thus, the conflict also involves the governments in Australia, New Zealand

and Melanesia. Australia continues to advocate the territorial integrity of the

Indonesian republic and the necessity of Special Autonomy for West Papua but is at

the same time the place where conferences and peace interviews are being held. This

can suggest that the conflict might be receding; however, some authors consider that

“it is rather intensifying and complexifying, generating opportunities for conflict

resolution and peacemaking which need to be urgently acted upon”4.

Current situation of the conflict

Cultural differences between Indonesians and the indigenous population and

complaints about the Javanization of West Papua have exacerbated the existing

tensions. This cultural conflict is worsened by the perception of the indigenous people

that they are economically left behind by a sponsored flood of Indonesian immigrants

who are dominating most of the urban economies.

After the continuous outbursts of violence during these last years, that have killed

many Western Papuans, Indonesia is being called to solve the conflict if it wants to stay

an emerging democratic giant, which is incompatible with the raising economic misery

and human rights abuses in West Papua.

These few last years there have been numerous protests in favor of a referendum. It

emerged a new wave in June and July 2010, when civil demonstrations, led by an NGO

called FORDEM (Democratic Forum of the United Papuan People), amassed up to

20,000 protesters on the streets of Jayapura. On February 8, 2012 thousands of people

protested in Papua in towns and cities to demand a referendum on independence due

to the ongoing violence resulting from the years of Indonesian presence in West

Papua. However, the response from the Indonesian government was loud and clear:

4Peter King; Jim Elmsie; Camellia Webb-Ganonn, 2011, Comprehending West Papua. University of

Sydney. Australia. p15

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“Papua is a part of the unitary republic of Indonesia [and] that is what we must

maintain.”5

International groups, independent research organizations and civil society groups are

claiming for a renewed dialogue between Papuans, who consider themselves

ethnically different and demand the independence, and officials in Jakarta, who

consider West Papua part of their territory.

According to the international groups and researchers, the situation in West Papua can

be defined as follows in terms of Karon Snowdon:

Indonesia has faced strong resistance to its rule in Papua,

or West Papua, as it’s also known. The complaints include the appalling human

rights record of the security forces, lack of development, resource stripping,

cultural insensitivity and unwelcome migrants. Often these complaints have

been ignored or dealt with inadequately, but perhaps this is changing.6

From what it has been said and in order to clarify the complex situation, it follows an

enumeration of the main characteristics of the conflict:

West Papuans have the sensation that Indonesian security forces are immune

to the law and are killing and torturing with near total impunity. Hence, they

relate Indonesian rule with violence.

West Papuans mistrust both, the government in Jakarta and their own regional

governments.

West Papuans consider that the Indonesian government is sponsoring the

arrival of non-Papuan immigrants to dominate their economy.

Violent groups like OPM are used to justify the military presence and the use of

violence.

5Aubrey Belford. 26/8/2012, An Indonesian War of Unknown Persons, The New York Times, Viewed

14/04/2012<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/asia/27iht-papua27.html?pagewanted=all> 6 Karon Snowdon, 25/2/2011, West Papuans Call For Dialogue With Indonesia West Papua Media Alerts,

ABC News/Radio Australia, viewed 15/04/2012 in <http://westpapuamedia.info/tag/jacob-rumbiak/>

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Papuan civilians are democratically protesting for an independence

referendum.

Due to the open conflict, human rights are continuously infringed.

The conflict extends to other countries, such as Australia, because of the many

West Papuan displaced.

Integration, autonomy or independence?

Many voices are rising to claim the necessity to end this violent conflict; however, the

solutions proposed are multiple, complex and conflicting with each other. According to

Peter King (West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or

Chaos?, 2004) they can be organized in three groups called softliners, soft hardliners

and hardliners. The firsts are the ones who advocate for “the limited, or even

extensive, break-up of the unitary republic declared first by Sukarno in 1945”7. They

take as a precedent East Timor’s independence and even claim that Indonesia would

be better off if West Papua became independent. Secondly, he calls the soft hardliners

those who are “strongly determined to preserve Indonesian unity, but not at any price

and not necessarily the unitary state”.8 Hence, this perspective includes proposals such

as regional autonomy or federalism. Finally, the hardliners are against autonomy,

federalism and more fiercely against secession. They are represented by Golkar Party,

Megawati’s party (PDI) and the military; their view is derived from a spiritual

perception of the unitary constitution approved in 1945 that must be defended by any

means.

The first assumption that any pacifist would make is the urgency to find a middle

option in order to end with violence and human rights assumptions. However, many

authors have claimed that special autonomy has already failed in West Papua and the

solution will have to be more radical.

Bringing in some historical facts, under Habibie’s administration it was expected an

institution of substantive provincial autonomy and was supposed to be fully launched

7 Peter King, 2004, West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?

University of New South Wales Press Ltd. Sydney. Chapter 3, pg 70. 8 Ibid. pg 72

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by 2001 under the reformasi process; however, Papua was split into two provinces in

1999, two governors were appointed and moreover, under Gus Dur’s presidency

regional autonomy was delayed. Simultaneously, provincial elites in West Papua took

seriously the question of autonomy and gathered a team of intellectuals to draft a bill

on special autonomy. The final version accepted by the Indonesian government was

the most restrictive implementation. Hence, only a few articles were accepted such as

the name change to Papua, the symbols (considered with only cultural significance),

the tripartite composition of the upper house, and finally that the governor should be

native Papuan. Nevertheless, in practice, the implementation of this special autonomy

required many regulations that were late or never promulgated. Moreover, critics

prediction were accomplished within a year, they suggested that “some combination

of existing corrupt networks and structures, popular Papuan hostility and indifference,

administrative incompetence on the part of government and subversion by […] army

leadership would bring special autonomy down”.9

In the same direction, some intellectuals argue that special autonomy has so far failed

to solve the roots of the conflict because deep poverty persists, as well as chronic

corruption. “The government of President Yudhoyono, on Papua as on everything else,

has been glacially slow to develop a policy that would be different from the default

response of throwing cash at the problem and hoping it will go away.”10 Besides that,

President Yudhoyono, has realized of the disadvantages of special autonomy and is

committed to developing a temporary body to look for solutions to poverty, corruption

and rights abuses in West Papua, called the Unit for the Acceleration of Development

in Papua and West Papua; however, as it happened under Gus Dur’s government, its

formation has been delayed.

According to Peter King (Comprehending West Papua, 2011), Indonesia’s effort of

appeasing Papuans demands has failed as well as special autonomy. Moreover, the

9 Ibid. Pg 90

10 Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua 22/8/2011, Asia Briefing N°126, Jakarta-Brussels, viewed

15/04/2012 in <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B126-indonesia-hope-and-hard-reality-in-papua.aspx>

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government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been embarrassed by the worldwide

release of images and videos showing how Indonesian security forces torture Papuan

men. Therefore, the political situation in Jakarta is now being driven by events in

Papua and also by the international reaction to what’s happening in Papua.

So, critics of Special Autonomy consider that it has become a tool for the process of

ethnic cleansing in Papua as it doesn’t raise any suspicions in the international

community. Moreover, they believe that Special Autonomy prolongs violence and

marginalizes Indigenous Papuans. That’s why they strongly affirm that Special

Autonomy has already failed and become a new problem.

All in all, the plausibility and credibility of either the ordinary autonomy or the special

autonomy are in doubt, and neither of them have gained any significant support in

Aceh or Papua with the passage of time.

The other middle option remaining is federalism. To some, it is the solution that best

solves the dissatisfaction of both regions because it maintains the unity of the nation

and at the same time allows the existence of multiple nations with their own

government. However, the federal option, despite being the least bad option, isn’t well

seen either by Indonesians or by Papuans because they still associate this concept with

the Dutch imperium. Actually, Indonesia became independent in 1949 under the name

‘The Republic of the United States of Indonesia’ which later brought to Sukarno’s

initiative to restore unity along the country and to the promulgation of 1945 unitary

Constitution. Nevertheless, it remains one of the options to be considered.

So, having presented the limits of the middle options, there are still left the softliners

and hardliners’ approaches.

On one hand, the amounts of Papuans who remain committed to independence grow

every day and it has been proved that investing in the region doesn’t appease their

demands. On the other hand, Indonesia is similarly inflexible and is strongly committed

to the pancasila11 principle ‘Unity in Diversity’ created during Sukarno’s era as a way to

unify the whole nation; with the same objective it was taken West Papua as the focus 11

Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state comprised by five principles.

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where to continue the struggle against Dutch colonialism. The minority nationalism is

therefore challenging the meaning of the majority nationalism. That’s why symbols

and minority expressions of Papuan nationalism are considered an attack and are

prohibited; an example can be the prohibition of unfurling the Morning Star

independence flag which is considered subversion and is penalized with imprisonment.

So, it is clear that the conflict is polarized, having on one side the independence option

and on the other side the integrationists.

However, international actors are claiming the urgency of stopping the infringement of

human rights and the end of torture to political prisoners. That’s an urgent and

essential condition for initiating the peace process and is also a way to urge the

solution of power-sharing in West Papua.

After that, the discussion between the actors involved in the conflict will also have to

address the new democratic youth mass mobilization around independence, the

demanded referendum on self-determination and the popular rejection of Special

Autonomy in Papua since mid-2010. Jacob Rumbiak (Comprehending West Papua,

2004), the coordinator of the foreign office of the West Papua National Authority,

which he calls the transitional government of an independent West Papua, affirms that

the principle aim must be based on democracy, which means letting the Papuans

choose in a real referendum if they want to integrate with Indonesia or if they want to

be independent.

Finally, the other conflict to be solved in order to achieve peace and to facilitate the

peace discussions is the one within the Papuans; the lack of unity in the past has set

back the resistance movement. John Otto Ondawame, the vice president of the West

Papuan National Coalition for Liberation defends a united call for dialogue for the

peaceful resolution of issues with Indonesia. According to him, “all groups are now

working together both inside West Papua in the guerilla camp, in the jungle and also in

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the outside world to raise the voices of the West Papuans to the international

community that we are united”12.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

From the different voices implicated in the conflict who want the end of violence,

there is a common agreement in the idea that there must be a reconciliation process in

West Papua simultaneous to the redefinition of power sharing.

Reconciliation in Papua

Reconciliation within the Papuan civil society (horizontal level) and with Indonesia

(vertical level) is a prerequisite for the existence of a peace building process and for

the establishment of a single representative or interlocutor. The achievement of a

durable and successful settlement of differences between contesting parties in West

Papua can take different forms according to John T. Sidel (Indonesia: Minorities, Migrant

workers, Refugees, and the new Citizenship law, 2007). In the vertical level, hostilities must

cease, violence must transform into a political dialogue, Indonesian military forces

must withdraw with the essential intervention of International Peacekeeping Forces

and finally it is necessary a public apology for past grievances. In the horizontal level,

there must be a negotiation between the leaders of the independence movement,

trust within the citizens must be built in order to weaken the support to violent

extremists, armed groups must be disarmed and finally the government must

encourage equal distribution of resources, labour power and education among men

and women.

Nevertheless, the achievement of these requisites is impossible without the

establishment of a process that creates a new way to articulate power in both regions.

So, the double process is complex and will need International support and

intervention.

12

John Otto Ondawame, 25/2/2011 West Papuans Call For Dialogue With Indonesia, West Papua Media Alerts, ABC News/Radio Australia, viewed 15/04/2012 in <http://westpapuamedia.info/tag/jacob-rumbiak/>

17

Power sharing: how?

The integrationist approach has been proved to be useless to the means of providing

peace in West Papua. Moreover, the legitimacy of the process of integration through

the ‘Act of Free Choice’ has still to be proved according to Papuans. It is derived the

claim of the vast majority of Papuans and researchers of promulgating a legal and just

referendum where Papuans can express their desire of whether staying in Indonesia or

seceding. Moreover, it will represent the legitimization of the democratic protests and

will encourage the peaceful unity of Papuans and the rejection of extremist violent

groups.

Therefore, my first option to solve the problem is the same as Dr George Junus

Aditjondro;

The problems in Papua have been very difficult to resolve. Therefore, there is

no other option but to follow the passionate demands of the people of Papua

who want a referendum. And the Indonesian Government must immediately

withdraw from Papua. Only a referendum can determine whether the Papuans

still want to be part of Indonesia or not.13

Indonesia not accepting a new referendum will make obvious that the Free Act of

Choice was not an exercise of real democracy but a military made up procedure to get

international approval and support to occupy a region. Nevertheless, the UN

supervised the Free Act of Choice and approved the transfer to Indonesia. Therefore,

those who claim that secession is the only option left, will have to find a legal crack in

the International law.

13

Socratez Sofyan Yoman, 3/4/2012, The Indonesian Government Occupies, Colonises and Marginalises Indigenous Papuans, West Papua Media, viewed 20/04/2012 in <http://westpapuamedia.info/2012/04/06/the-indonesian-government-occupies-colonises-and-marginalises-indigenous-papuans/>

18

Some new interpretations of self-determination have appeared such as the one

presented by Akihisa Matsuno14, who focuses on the concept of legitimate

sovereignty, rather than decolonization, because it guided the independence successes

of East Timor and Kosovo. However, the International law is very restrictive according

to secession; it gives priority to territorial integrity and stipulates the obligation of

mutual agreement. Moreover, it gives special attention to secession as a result o

decolonization. Therefore, West Papua might need to justify their right to secede by

defending that their incorporation to Indonesia was part of a non-ended process of

decolonization and to do so, they will need to revise the New York Agreement and

legally prove the invalidity of the ‘Free Act of Choice’; hence, they will need

international support from the UN and the International Court of Justice as it

happened with the Timorese case.

According to the extreme situation it seems that the first and essential step to take is a

referendum supervised by international actors in order to provide a real and legal

framework in which it has to be taken. Because of the turbulent circumstances in

which it was conducted the Free Act of Choice, I consider that the results of the

referendum, the real will of the Papuans, must be accepted and further applied as it

was the Indonesians intention in 1962. If the result happens to be negative, it must be

debated beforehand what this is the best way to articulate the peaceful coexistence of

the two regions. In this case, I will claim that the better system of power-sharing is an

asymmetric federalism. Although there are other types of power-sharing I consider

them not to be appropriate for the case studied.

The power dividing approach and the NCA are impossible to apply because Indonesia is

an archipelago shaped by little islands. On one hand, the power dividing approach has

its roots in the conception that instead of dividing societies according to the most

powerful cleavages, what it should be created is a system of cross-cutting majorities so

that there is no dominant issue. However, islands in Indonesia are quite isolated and it

14

Comprehending West Papua: A report on the CPACS conference in Sydney and surrounding events, 22-23/2/ 2011, Comprehending Papua Conference, University of Sydney Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Viewed 23/4/2012 in <http://westpapuamedia.info/tag/akihisa-matsuno/>

19

is impossible to cross cut national claims that are united within an island. On the other

hand, the NCA defends non-territorially based autonomy under the ‘personality

principle’ and demands societies affected by deep ethnic conflicts where territorial

separation is impossible or where there is a territorial dispersion or dilution of the

national/ethnic group. Thus, it is also impossible to apply it because the minority

studied is concentrated in Papua and already isolated.

Consociationalism might be appealing and also applicable concerning that it is based

on the cooperation of the elites, which it has been lately happening in encounters in

Australia between Indonesian and Papuan representatives and foreign researchers.

However, consociationalism must be applied in the whole nation as a way to solve

problems in very much divided societies. Nevertheless, Indonesia is a unitary State that

keeps all the regions and cultures together through the political philosophy created by

Sukarno with the exception of the non-resolved West Papuan conflict. The Aceh and

East Timor conflicts are mainly solved; in Aceh it ended with the peace agreement in

2005 and the enforcement of special autonomy and the one in East Timor ended with

the independence in 1999.

Therefore, consociationalism would imply a new definition of the State that would

collide with the unitary philosophy that fundaments it, which might be necessary if we

truly want to end the conflict, but however, it might also bring up new ethnic problems

that are now tight due to the common belief of ‘unity in diversity’. Therefore, it might

be necessary to find ways to successfully apply a new type of autonomy as it is what

Indonesia has been trying to apply along these years with no success. Nevertheless,

the only option left is an expansion of the autonomy of Papua, but it is essential to

avoid older processes such as regional or special autonomy that are associated with

abuses and violence. Hence, what seems more applicable is a concrete asymmetric

multinational federal state in which the definition of the unitary state according to the

other regions of Indonesia is not strongly challenged, but Papua gets a special

recognition and a separate government but remains included in the central level.

Nevertheless, as it happens with the consociational option, the radical positions will be

fiercely against any redefinition of the unitary state but the one conceived by Sukarno

tightly associated with the declaration of independence.

20

So, the first reason to defend multinational federalism is that it is a malleable system

of power sharing as every federal country has its own conditions and structures.

Moreover, it is the middle option that has been considered and weighed in the

debates that have been taking place since Suharto’s fall. Intellectuals in Indonesia have

agreed that a greater degree of federalism is necessary. Therefore, the asymmetric

federalism proposed should be the result of a process of checks and balances between

both regions in conflict. So, federalism is the least bad option because it easily adapts

to the conditions of any country. In a federalist system, government activities are

divided between regional governments and the central government, so there are a

number of activities in which each type of government has full authority. So, there is a

territorial distribution of powers on the level of the Federation (currency, foreign

policy etc…) embodied in a Constitution and it leaves the rest of powers to the federal

entities, in this case West Papua. In this division of powers it is included the

distribution of the tax capacity according to the purchasing power of the region.

Moreover, to control the exercise of powers it is created a central federal court that

must resolve the conflicts confronting the federation with the federated entity. Finally,

and what might be appealing to the Indonesian government is that the federated

entity will also have its own constitution but it should not collide with the federation's

constitution.

In the case of Indonesia, federalism is more appealing than consociationalism because

it can be applied asymmetrically without completely challenging its unitary system and

is adaptable to the country needs without the complex system derived from the

consociational organization. All in all, the federal formula has the potential solution of

the conflict as it legitimizes the national unity and averts disintegration.

Nevertheless, according to its history of violence and the Papuans recent democratic

claims, what seems the best option is to call for a referendum and International

intervention to grant the legality of the process and the end of violence.

Moreover, secession is probably the best option for West Papua as the conflict is very

polarized, middle options are unsatisfactory for both regions and they derive into

abuses and violence.

21

CONCLUSION

Indonesia’s national constitution is the consequence of a process of decolonization and

the subsequent creation of a unitary state as a response to the years of occupation.

However, they have moved from being a minority under the Dutch imperium to a

majority that integrates other minorities, like the Papuans, as a result of a process of

decolonization that liberated Indonesia but colonized Papua with the blessing of the

international forces. However, if Indonesia considers its independence a legitimate

process and a natural right, why can’t it be the same for West Papua? This case shows

how being a minority can be a problem, but how being a minority within an ex-

minority is even worse.

REFERENCE LIST

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Adrian Vickers, 2005, A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge University Press. New York.

Comprehending West Papua: A report on the CPACS conference in Sydney and surrounding events, 22-23/2/ 2011, Comprehending Papua Conference, University of Sydney Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Viewed 23/4/2012 in <http://westpapuamedia.info/tag/akihisa-matsuno/>

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22

Socratez Sofyan Yoman, 3/4/2012, The Indonesian Government Occupies, Colonises

and Marginalises Indigenous Papuans, West Papua Media, viewed 20/04/2012 in

<http://westpapuamedia.info/2012/04/06/the-indonesian-government-occupies-

colonises-and-marginalises-indigenous-papuans/>

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14/04/2012 <http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=651>