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Electoral Reform in the UnitedKingdom: Lessons from New ZealandMargaret Wilson DCNZM aa University of Waikato , Hamilton, New ZealandPublished online: 05 Oct 2011.

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Electoral Reform in the United Kingdom:Lessons from New Zealand

MARGARET WILSON, DCNZMUniversity of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

ABSTRACT Proposals by the UK Coalition government, which came into power in May 2010, toalter the electoral system for the Westminster Parliament have generated much debate and somecontroversy. The central plank of the campaigners for reform, viz. the introduction of a form ofproportional representation, has been tried in New Zealand for some years now in the form of amixed member proportional system. This article explains how that system came into being andhow it has fared in the nearly two decades for which it has been in existence.

KEY WORDS: United Kingdom, New Zealand, electoral reform, Alternative Vote Plus,Alternative Member System, Jenkins Commission, proportional representation, MixedMember Proportional System

Introduction

Electoral reform has become a matter of public policy again in the United Kingdomand New Zealand, with referendums being held in both countries in 2011. In theUnited Kingdom there is a long history of attempts to change the electoral system,with the Jenkins Commission being the last full review and consideration of theissue. The Commission recommended the Alternative Vote Plus (AVþ), but therewas also a dissenting report recommending the Alternative Member System (AMS).1

This form of proportional electoral system is similar to that in place in the ScottishParliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Greater London Assembly as well as inGermany and New Zealand. In New Zealand, the AMS system is named the mixedmember proportional (MMP) system, and it is this system that is the subject of thisarticle.

MMP a Radical Decision

The decision to support a MMP electoral system was a radical one so it is importantto understand the factors that resulted in this change. The conjunction of severalevents created what has been described as a ‘perfect storm’. The process combined a

Correspondence Address: Margaret Wilson, DCNZM, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of

Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand. Email: mwilson@waikato.ac.nz

The Round TableVol. 100, No. 416, 509–517, October 2011

ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/11/050509-09 � 2011 The Round Table Ltd

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2011.609691

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careful consultative political education campaign with political accident andmiscalculation. The road to MMP has also been described as ‘a long and windingone’. To understand the twists and turns in that road it is necessary to understandthe political framework.

Two main political parties, namely, the Labour Party and the National Party, hadmanaged New Zealand’s political system since the mid-1930s. Elections werecontested by both parties, with one of the parties emerging with a majority of seats toform the government. Who won the election was dependent not only on politicalorganisation and policy manifestos, but also on the determination of electoralboundaries. It was, in other words, a classic ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPP) politicalenvironment.

Although there had been advocates for proportional representation in the 1920s, itwas not until the 1970s that new trends began to emerge on the political landscapethat ignited the campaign for electoral reform.2 Third parties started to gain electoralsupport but few seats in Parliament; election campaigns focused on marginal seats;governments were elected with fewer votes than the opposition party; and theNational government of the time exercised executive power in an arbitrary way thatprovoked public opposition. These developments raised questions of legitimacy ofthe government. The debate was also renewed on the whole nature of the electoralsystem.

Support for reform came from third parties, community groups and theopposition Labour Party, which included in its election manifestos at the 1981and 1984 elections a promise to ‘establish a Royal Commission . . . to inquire intoand report on [amongst other things] whether proportional representation or someother variant from the existing, first-past-the-post system should be introduced’.3

Much of the activism of this period was driven by a post-war generation thatchallenged the traditional social and political institutions, which no longer reflectedtheir needs and interests.

When the Labour Party was elected in 1984 there was a general expectation thatthere would be substantial change to social and economic policies. The Labourgovernment delivered economic changes that were not foreshadowed when itimplemented a neo-liberal economic policy framework that begun a fundamentalshift in social, economic and political institutions. A Royal Commission on theElectoral System was delivered as promised with comprehensive terms of reference toreview all aspects of the electoral system.4 When the Commission reported in 1986 itfound that the electoral system was unfair in many respects, in particular to minorparties and Maori. Among its many recommendations was the adoption of a mixedmember proportional electoral system similar to that in Germany.5 The Commissionconcluded:

. . . throughout our Report we have tried to adopt an approach which recognisesboth principle and practical reality . . . we have endeavoured to strike a balancebetween rules for the passing hour, which may require regular review, andprinciples for an expanding future, which may be of a more enduring nature. Indoing so our recommendations reflect an assessment of the ways in which oursociety may best put into practice the ideals of fairness, equality, representationand democracy and an awareness of the ever-changing contexts in which it does

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so. We have tried to make proposals for good government and for a betterdemocracy.6

Although the recommendation encouraged the electoral reform movement, therewas resistance in the Labour Cabinet to change so little happened until the 1987election when David Lange misread his notes for a television interview during theelection campaign and promised a referendum on electoral reform. Although thissurprised most Labour supporters it was quickly endorsed by the Labour Party.After the election, which Labour won, it started to have second thoughts on areferendum and was encouraged to back away from the commitment by a SelectCommittee Report on the Royal Commission recommendations. The Committee didnot support MMP but proposed a Supplementary Member (SM) electoral system.The introduction of a Private Members’ Bill kept the debate alive but support waswaning from the Labour government. The prospect of sharing power was notappealing to many and it was difficult to envisage how any arrangements could workwith political opponents.

Electoral Reform Surprise

The 1990 election campaign, however, provided another of those electoral reformsurprises when Jim Bolger, the then leader of the National Party, committed hisparty to a referendum on electoral reform before the end of 1992. Although theNational Party president at the time subsequently stated this announcement was ‘oneof the enduring mysteries of modern New Zealand politics’, Jim Bolger kept hispromise when his party won the 1990 election.7 There was little support in theNational Party for electoral reform but, bound by the election promise, the decisionwas made for an indicative referendum on whether a change was supported, and ifthe majority voted yes then the referendum offered a choice of four different electoralsystems, including MMP. The expectation was there would be little support forchange. The National Party in government, however, much the same as the previousLabour government, undertook economic and social policy U-turns that alienated alarge section of the electorate. Public confidence in politicians and Parliament hadfallen to 4% in public opinion polls by 1992 when the referendum was held.8

An indicative referendum was held before the end of 1992, which presented NewZealand voters with two questions to answer—first to choose between FPP or achange to another system, and a second question that asked voters to indicate whichof the following electoral systems were preferred if the majority had voted for changein the first question. Those electoral systems were MMP, single transferable vote(STV), preferential vote (PV) and SM.9 Although only 55.2% of voters voted, 84.7%supported a change in the first question and 84% voted for MMP in the secondquestion. The government was then committed politically to hold a bindingreferendum, which was held in conjunction with the 1993 election and asked onequestion—a choice between FPP or MMP.

A Bill was prepared to put in place the legislative framework for a MMP electoralsystem if the referendum delivered that result. The Bill also included a provision inthe referendum for a second chamber. The select committee that considered the Billreceived over 600 submissions, and while there was considerable support for the

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referendum on electoral reform, there was little support for the idea of a secondchamber, so it was dropped from the legislation. The campaign around thereferendum then held was vigorous, with several politicians and the businesscommunity providing an opposing argument for reform. The referendum attractedvotes from 82.2% of the voters, of whom 53.9% voted for MMP. The provisions ofthe new Electoral Act 1993 then came into force, including the RepresentationCommission promulgating new electoral boundaries, with the 95 general electoratesbeing reduced to 60, including five Maori seats. New Zealand had radically changedits electoral system in a way that could not have been envisaged by politicians orcommentators at the time.10

The preparations for a change of electoral system meant the transition wasrelatively smooth. Once the electoral boundaries were finalised the preparations forexplaining the voting system were undertaken by the independent ElectoralCommission. The elector had two votes, one for the constituency Member ofParliament and one for the Party. The Party determines the individuals who standboth in the constituency seats and on the list and the order of the names on the list.When the elector exercises the party vote, the Members elected are in the order theyappear on the list. The composition of Parliament reflects the number ofconstituency seats plus a top-up of seats in proportion to the number of partyvotes. It is interesting to note that the constituency seats are determined every fiveyears after the census, and the formula at the last election produced 70 electorateseats that left 50 list seats to be allocated. A party must get 5% of the party vote orone constituency seat to be represented in Parliament in proportion to their votes.The number of seats therefore reflects the number of votes a party receives at theelection.

As can be seen, the road to electoral reform was long and tortuous but ultimatelysuccessful. As has been apparent the reform of the electoral system was achievedthrough a combination of political action from within and outside Parliament, andpolitical accident in the form of two political leaders unexpectedly committing theirparties to electoral reform. The grass-roots community campaigns combined withpolitical advocacy from parliamentarians such as Sir Geoffrey Palmer enabled thecampaign to be sustained and take advantage of the opportunities presented byDavid Lange and Jim Bolger. The lesson from this experience may be—always beprepared for the unexpected in politics.

There are two arguments used by opponents of MMP that will now be discussed,namely, that it results in uncertainty and that it creates political instability. Anydiscussion of MMP, however, must take account of New Zealand’s constitutionalarrangements. New Zealand has general elections every three years, no compulsoryvoting but compulsory registration to vote, detailed election laws, but no writtenconstitution or second chamber. These constitutional arrangements produce a verydirect form of democracy, with around 75–80% of registered voters voting at generalelections.

In the New Zealand context the outcome is certain in the sense that who has themost seats is known after the election, but what is not certain is which parties willform the government. An essential element of MMP then is the notion of a coalitionor minority government, both of which require the party with the most seats tonegotiate with another normally smaller party to form the government. This is a

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political process in which the Governor-General plays no part beyond receiving theassurance of the party leader who achieves a majority of support from other partiesthat a government can be formed. The Cabinet Manual 2008 describes the con-stitutional conventions relating to the role of the Governor-General as follows:

6.37 The process of forming a government is political, and the decision to forma government must be arrived at by politicians.

6.39 By convention the task of the Governor-General in the governmentformation process is to ascertain where the confidence of the House lies, basedon the parties’ public statements, so that a government can be appointed. It isnot the Governor-General’s role to form the government or to participate in anynegotiations (although it is possible that the Governor-General might wish totalk to party leaders if the talks were to have no clear outcome from the talks).

The Cabinet Manual makes this clear. Parliament ultimately determines thegovernment’s legitimacy through the vote of confidence. The formation ofgovernment can take up to four weeks. As elections are normally held in November,there is an expectation that there will a government before Christmas so Parliamentcan be called and MPs and Ministers sworn in.

Uncertainty

It is argued that the period of government formation creates uncertainty. In NewZealand the Cabinet Manual lays down the role of the caretaker government. Beforean election there is a three-month period during which the government is expectednot to make major policy commitments or appointments. After the election theprevious government continues until a new government is formed. The caretakergovernment undertakes the normal tasks of government but if a major issue arisesthen consultation with other parties will take place. The public service continues toadvise the caretaker government but is aware new initiatives are not part of thatadvice. The Cabinet Manual states during caretaker periods ‘. . . the incumbentgovernment is still the lawful executive authority, with all the powers andresponsibilities that go with executive office. However, governments in this situationhave traditionally constrained their actions until the political situation is resolved, inaccordance with what is known as the convention on caretaker government’ (6.16Cabinet Manual).

The Cabinet Manual sets out the rules and procedures to be followed by allparties. It therefore provides the certainty that is essential during this period. It isimportant that the parties be given time to reach their agreements because they willbe expected to be bound by them for the next three years. New Zealand has three-year elections. The Cabinet Manual has no legal force and is amended in the light ofexperience with advice from Cabinet officials and approval by the Cabinet. It is notjust the executive’s best practice manual; it also enables the opposition and the publicwith knowledge of the procedures that are expected from the executive.

The coalition agreements are publicly notified so the public are aware of thecommitments undertaken by the parties. There are dangers for minor parties in any

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coalition arrangement. They can lose their ‘brand’ and are constrained fromestablishing a distinctive policy position. In New Zealand the introduction of the‘agree to disagree’ clause after the 1999 election has given the minor parties freedomto disagree with the government. The Cabinet Manual also clarifies the notion ofcollective responsibility when such a clause applies. The provisions also recognise thedifferent responsibilities of Ministers inside and outside Cabinet.

The Cabinet Manual provisions read as follows:

5.22 The principle of collective responsibility underpins the system of Cabinetgovernment. It reflects democratic principle: the House expresses confidence inthe collective whole of government, rather than in individual Ministers . . .

5.24 In a coalition government, Ministers are expected to show careful judgmentwhen referring to party policy that differs from government policy. Subject toparagraphs 5.25–5.27, a Minister’s support and responsibility for the collectivegovernment position must always be clear.

5.25 Coalition governments may also decide to establish ‘agree to disagree’processes, which may allow Ministers within the coalition to maintain, in public,different party positions on particular issues or policies. Once the final outcomeof any ‘agree to disagree’ issue or policy has been determined (either at theCabinet level or through some other agreed process), Ministers must implementthe resulting decision or legislation, regardless of their position throughout thedecision-making process.

5.26 ‘Agree to disagree’ processes may be used in relation to different partypositions within a coalition. Any public disassociation from Cabinet decisionsby individual Ministers outside the agreed processes is unacceptable.

5.27 Ministers outside Cabinet from parliamentary parties supporting thegovernment may be bound by collective responsibility only in relation to theirparticular portfolios. Under these arrangements, when such Ministers speakabout issues within their portfolios, they speak for the government and as partof the government. When they speak about matters outside their portfolios,however, they may speak as political party leaders or members of Parliamentrather than Ministers, and do not necessarily represent the government position.When such Ministers represent the government internationally, they speak forthe government on all issues that foreign governments may raise with them intheir capacity as Ministers.

The collective responsibility provisions contribute to refuting the second criticism ofMMP, that it produces political instability. The emphasis of the Cabinet Manualprovisions is for the parties to be clear of their positions from the outset and then toabide by that agreement. This is what provides the certainty and stability. Theevidence in New Zealand would not support the contention of instability, though thecloser the election the more tested becomes the commitment to coalitiongovernment.

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Learning Experience

New Zealand has had five MMP elections. The first MMP election in 1996 and thesubsequent Parliament was not a good example of MMP government, but it provedto be a learning exercise, and subsequent Parliaments have functioned in an orderlyfashion. The 1999–2002 Parliament also produced a learning experience. The minorparty in the coalition split internally and caused an election to be called three monthsearlier than normal. The Alliance Party suffered badly in the following election.Also, when the NZ First Party, a populist party, split and caused problems for the1996–99 government, it did badly in the subsequent election. Parties soon learn thatstability is expected by the electorate and if the party is perceived as putting it at riskthen it is likely to suffer a loss of support at the next election.

The most potentially disruptive influence to political stability in the early years ofMMP was the practice of ‘party jumping’. As Members of various parties becamedisaffected with their party they left to join other parties, or sit as independents. Inthe period 1993–96 (prior to MMP) 14 party defections occurred and between 1996and 1999 a further 11 members left their parties.11 These practices disturbed the basisof the MMP system, namely, proportionality. The initial political response to thissituation was the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001, which attempted toprevent ‘party-hopping’ by requiring the defecting Member to resign if theproportionality of the Parliament had been altered as a result of the defection.This Act had a sunset clause and has expired.

It was very controversial legislation because it interfered with the fundamentalnotion of the right of the electorate to determine who was elected to and removedfrom Parliament. Under MMP, however, it was argued that the party in effect electsthe List Members of Parliament who are not directly subject to election in the sameway as a constituency Member of Parliament. Since the Act expired there has beenno attempt to revive it and there have been fewer defections or expulsions.

Lessons to be Drawn

What then has been the effect of the New Zealand experience of MMP? First,supporters of electoral reform and in particular proportional representation had twoprimary objectives, namely, to ensure the Parliament was more representative of thepeople and to enable Parliament better to check the power of the executive.

In terms of representation, the 2008 election resulted in: seven parties representedin Parliament; 41 women elected (34% of total MPs, women comprise 51% of thepopulation); 18 Members who identify as being of Maori descent (15% of the totalMPs, Maori comprise 18% of the population); five Members of Pacific descent (4%of the total MPs, 7% of the population identify as being of Pacific descent); and sixof Asian descent (5% of total MPs, 9% of the population identify as being of Asiandescent).

Second, MMP has produced stable government, which must be a requirement ofany electoral system. During the time of negotiations the incumbent governmentcontinues as the caretaker government under conditions set out in the CabinetManual. The transitions have not given arise to any problems as everyone knows therules. It is important that the coalition agreements are carefully negotiated because

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the parties are bound by them for the period of the government. The agreementsinclude an ‘agree to disagree’ clause. The obligations on the minor parties to supportthe government are therefore clear in any particular policy. Each election produces adifferent set of challenges for government formation and it may be time to providegreater guidance on best practice, but political stability has been maintained todate.12

Third, the position of the Governor-General (the sovereign in the New Zealandcontext) is clear and set out in the Cabinet Manual. It has not created aconstitutional crisis through politicisation of the sovereign. It is recognised that theprocess of government formation is a political one and when the agreements arereached that give one party a majority, then the leader of the party goes to theGovernor-General who then calls the Parliament to meet and the government’slegitimacy is affirmed through a vote of confidence in the Parliament.

Fourth, the business of parliament is conducted proportionally. This affects theallocation of time for speaking, the number of questions, select committeememberships and the order of speaking. The Speaker, for example, does not havea casting vote because this would disturb the proportionality. Question Time in NewZealand takes place every sitting day unless there is an urgent matter. There are 12primary questions and the supplementary questions are distributed proportionallyamong the parties in the House, with a total of 175 asked over a weekly period.There is no time limit on asking or answering questions and the time for QuestionTime is not limited. Ministers are given between two and three hours’ notice of thequestions each day and there is no limit to how many of the 12 primary questions aredirected at a Minister, including the Prime Minister, who can be asked questions oneach sitting day. It is now acknowledged that Question Time is not a truth-seekingoccasion but a political contest where the credibility and integrity of the executive aretested.

Fifth, the jury is out on whether MMP has provided a check on the power of theexecutive. It has, however, enabled a broader range of views to be expressedin government decision-making. The select committee also now enables real input inthe shape of legislation through the contribution from submitters and oppositioncommittee members. There is also an expectation from the public that Parliamentfunctions in a transparent way, as the expenses controversy has demonstrated.

Finally, New Zealanders will get another opportunity to vote on their electoralsystem at the next election in 2011. The first referendum will be indicative and therewill be another binding referendum at the 2014 election. It is accepted that MMPdoes need some change in the light of experience. Whether the people are likely tovote for a change of electoral system is unclear at this stage.13

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to note that the choice of an electoral system is one ofthe most important constitutional issues in any country because it reflects the natureof the democracy within the country. Although both New Zealand and the UnitedKingdom share a commitment to a representative parliamentary form ofgovernance, both countries achieve that objective in different ways that reflect ourrespective constitutional histories and values.

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Notes

1. Dr Phil McCarvill, ‘Devising an Electoral System for the 21st Century: The Case for AMS’, May 2010,

Report prepared for the Institute of Public Policy.

2. See Colin James and Alan Robie (1993) Turning Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond (Wellington:

Bridget Williams Books), pp. 121–135; Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (1997) ‘MMP: the

decision’, in R. Miller (Ed.), New Zealand Politics in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press),

pp. 25–48.

3. See P. Harris and S. Levine (Eds) (1992) The New Zealand Politics Source Book (Palmerston North:

Dunmore Press); and Levine and Roberts (1997) for a discussion of the factors that contributed to the

MMP debate during this period.

4. Royal Commission on the Electoral System, ‘Towards a Better Democracy’: Report (1986) AJHR H

3.

5. ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy’, December

1986, H 3, pp. 295–302.

6. ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy’, December

1986, H 3, p. 293.

7. Geoff Thompson (2008) ‘Preparing the party for MMP’, in M. Clark (Ed.), The Bolger Years 1990–

1997 (Palmerston North: Dunmore Publishing), p. 15.

8. Alan McRobie, ‘A question of fairness’, in James and McRobie (1993, pp. 123–124).

9. Definitions of these systems were available before the referendum.

10. Levine and Roberts (1997, pp. 25–36). See also Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay

and Nigel S. Roberts (1996) New Zealand under MMP: A New Politics (Auckland: Auckland

University Press; Wellington: Bridget Williams Books) for an account of the introduction of MMP

between 1993 and 1996.

11. Ryan Malone (2008) Rebalancing the Constitution: The Challenge of Government Law-making under

MMP (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington), p. 51.

12. Jonathan Boston (2010) ‘Dynamics of government formation’, in R. Miller (Ed.), New Zealand

Government and Politics, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 206–225.

13. Raymond Miller and Pierce Lane (2010) ‘Future of the MMP electoral system’, in R. Miller (Ed.),

New Zealand Government and Politics, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 168–184.

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