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Electoral Intimidation & Violence Electoral Intimidation & Violence in Ghana and Newark:in Ghana and Newark:
Can we define, measure, and explain Can we define, measure, and explain patterns across different systems?patterns across different systems?
Megan ReifMegan Reif
Charles & Kathleen Manatt Democracy Studies Fellow, IFESCharles & Kathleen Manatt Democracy Studies Fellow, IFESPh.D. Candidate, University of MichiganPh.D. Candidate, University of Michigan
Thursday, September 29Thursday, September 29
AcknowledgementsAcknowledgements
For rich resources, ideas, information, institutional and individual expertise, support, conversation, networking, advice, collaboration,… friendship…
THANK YOU!
With special thanks to
Charles & Kathleen Manatt
(All errors are mine and in no way reflect on the excellent work of IFES. To ensure accuracy and protect respondents in Newark, please cite only with permission.)
• Test a critical assumption of the proposed long-term dissertation research with available data
• Identify practical issues of definition and measurement necessary to refine theory and implement research design
• Solicit feedback on the validity of cross-cultural/contextual, cross-level comparison (local versus national election) and what we might learn from it
• Compare legal contexts to begin to explore possible effects of institutional environment on violence
Presentation ObjectivesPresentation Objectives
Methodology and LimitationsMethodology and Limitations
Methodology– Developed tentative propositions and assumptions from (limited)
secondary and case study literatures and election observation in Indonesia (03-04)
– Coded incidents from Newark interviews and media; coding of media incidents in Ghana; entry of IFES monitor incidents in Ghana (interpreting and seeing how other interpreted events) (IFES)
– Informal interviews with victims and perpetrators of electoral intimidation in Newark, NJ
– Exploration of Newark, Ghana, and Iraq incidents Limitations
- Case selection not designed to test theory- Deductive inferences - Incident data limited in time and space; cannot test potential explanations
involving institutional change- Data not recoded for intensity scale and index creation
Critical AssumptionCritical Assumption
Election Violence is STRATEGIC, aimed at:(1) Winning (gaining or retaining power and/or
resources) (2) Protesting or signaling unfairness / seeking
reform of unfair systems“It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive, or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives” (Fischer 2002, 2).
(3) Discrediting or ending democracy as a system of government (insurgency)
(4) Reciprocal / Escalatory (tit-for-tat or defensive response to coercive tactics by opponent)
Non-Strategic Conceptions of Non-Strategic Conceptions of Election ViolenceElection Violence
Possible Explanation Empirical Expectation Implied Intervention
Symptomatic: Manifestation of ‘primordial’ or personal conflicts, played out during critical events like elections
Occurs where there is regular conflict around social cleavages
Actors involved same as those in underlying conflict
Elections foment conflict
Resolve ethnic, cleavage conflict Law enforcement Create a political, economic, and
electoral system that addresses underlying grievances
Expressive: Spontaneous, epiphenomenal manifestation of passionately held attachments
Violence random with respect location in space and time
Civic education Law Enforcement Public service announcements Party control of supporters/
codes of conduct
Criminality/Greed: Criminal acts taking advantage of chaos of an election and diversion of security resources
Actors are criminals Occurs in high crime areas or
areas of wealth, irrespective of electoral competitiveness
Law enforcement
Epiphenomenal: Violence in queues, frustration associated with crowds, celebrations, drunkenness (e.g. Ghana crowds, insufficient police)
Violence random with respect location in space and time
Violence in poor or high population areas
Law enforcement Restrictions on alcohol
Assumption of Strategic MotivesAssumption of Strategic Motives
Politicians...
• Seek to obtain or retain power and resources
• Have a menu of electoral strategies at their disposal
• View coercion as a costly substitute for non-violent electoral strategies because it risks:
- Reputational costs/loss of legitimate supporters (even dictators seek legitimacy)- Prosecution and punishment- Higher probability of detection than fraud (DOJ)
- Lower certainty of achieving desired outcomes
• Yet Fischer (2002) and IFES experience demonstrates that electoral violence is important, even when rare.
“People don’t think they sit around a conference room table and plan these things [electoral intimidation and violence]. They
do. They know exactly what they are doing.”
- 2004 Candidate for Newark Board of Elections
Motivating QuestionsMotivating Questions
Given the costs of coercion, under what circumstances do politicians choose coercive electoral strategies when and where they do?
Different answers imply different strategies for measurement and interpretation of violence, as well as intervention, and conflict resolution.
Are the answers the same across contexts?
Tentative Empirical Expectations of Strategic Conception of ViolenceTentative Empirical Expectations of Strategic Conception of Violence
Variables Illustrative Expectation Implied Intervention
High Stakes: (a) “Office that Matters”; (b) Resources/levers of power; (c) Probability of Win/Loss (Competitiveness), (d) Sudden appearance of viable challengers (e) Partisan public goods provision/patronage
Election violence likely where office control of policy and resources high (legal & illegal)
Violence likely in close districts/races
Violence increases with viable challengers
Impose reputational costs Reduce personal stakes of
office Term limits Reduce patronage, limit
state/city employment
Institutions:(a) Means:
Administrative/enforcement quality (opportunity for fraud & nonviolence);
(b) Selection: Location of SELECTION vs.
ELECTION (suggests time in process to monitor)
(c) Information & Uncertainty (1) Pr(violence)=desired outcome
(2) Party ideology offers clear choice to voters
Change in fraud, suffrage, or ballot secrecy enforcement may increase violence
Election day violence occurs in FPTP systems
Pre-Election violence occurs in PR systems
PR, Party List, Coalition systems more prone to candidate-on-candidate violence than voter violence
SNTV, non-partisan, weak party systems more likely to be personalistic, vindictive
Electoral system change Enforce institutional laws
against violence Monitor entire process Improve clarity of complaint
procedure Assess how intimidation
affects outcomes and create electoral remedies for intimidation
Exclusion/Fairness: Parties excluded or wronged by unfair practices use violence
Banned parties victims or perpetrators of violence
Improve inclusion, suffrage, voter registration
Challenge of Defining and Mitigating Challenge of Defining and Mitigating Election Violence: Coercion and Election Violence: Coercion and
Fraud involve Creative InnovationFraud involve Creative Innovation
• If politicians substitute and combine tactics, will addressing one type of electoral manipulation or changing aspects of the electoral process lead to substitution with another tactic?
[Examples: Costa Rica, Indonesia, Newark]
“Having been thwarted by increasingly sophisticated and better organized election machinery, they could turn to violence to achieve their ends.”
- Danville Walker, Director of Elections, Jamaica, November 10, 2002 (quoted in Jamaica
Observer)
Substituting Means of Electoral Manipulation in Costa Rica Substituting Means of Electoral Manipulation in Costa Rica (1901 – 46)(1901 – 46)
Molina, Iván and Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq. 1999. "Political Competition and Electoral Fraud: A Latin American Case Study." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 30: 228.
Secret Ballot
Modern Electoral Code
Mandatory Turnout Laws
Nonviolent methods
Coercive methods
Similar patterns in Egypt, 19th-century Kentucky, Kansas City, U.S. South
United StatesUnited States
• Anonymous welfare and debt mailings to voters; newly covered under mail fraud laws
• Fake police officers in Hispanic areas in the Southwest
NewarkNewark
Even violence that appear spontaneous may be orchestrated:
• Newark Booker Campaign Incident Log:“District 48: Sharpe had 15-20 people
outside; -- Send Visibility”• Incitement / Provocation and Response
[2005 Incident at Pennington Court designed to show candidate’s toughness]
Defining Coercion, continuedDefining Coercion, continued
• Where does nonviolence end and violence begin?
[Newark code enforcers (film clip)]
• How proximate to the election does an event have to be to “count” as election-related?
Newark Mayor vetoed committed funds for social service group as punishment for support of opposition 1 month after election;birthday party fundraising occurs annually. Wilkinson (2004) argues that parties are always campaigning in India and use ethnic violence to play on fears.
Exploratory Assessment of Exploratory Assessment of Preliminary Hunches:Preliminary Hunches:
Data, Qualitative Interviews, Glance at Data, Qualitative Interviews, Glance at Legal FrameworksLegal Frameworks
Exploratory Research: NewarkExploratory Research: Newark
• Identified incidents from any Star Ledger article pertaining to elections from date of Booker’s candidacy to inauguration date
• Identified 50+ potential respondents
• Interviewed ~25 people, including former James employees and “intimidators” who have defected to the other side
• Identified 38 incidents of coercion, combining media reports and campaign legal notes
Exploratory Research: NewarkExploratory Research: Newark
• High Stakes for Incumbent Sharpe James
- “Resource Curse” of Port Authority revenue and opportunities for patronage (Newark collects only 83% of taxes; most city residents are employed by City Hall)
- Highest paid official in New Jersey, paid more than any Governor and the VP
- “Double Dipping” and shaping rules of the game as State Senator
- Highest murder rate, one of poorest cities in the most affluent U.S. State
• Faced first viable challenger in 2002
• Employees/dependents faced job loss, campaign reform under Booker
Sharpe’s Bundle of Strategies Prior Sharpe’s Bundle of Strategies Prior to 2002to 2002
• City employees compelled to finance incumbent campaign (b-day tix)
• Transfer or termination of anyone who supports opposition council members or mayoral challengers (Dana Rone family members)
• Delivers votes to county, state, and national Democrats in return for favorable laws, lax enforcement in return (sign ordinances)
• Reputation for having “eyes and ears everywhere” deters criticism and competition (Healey Invitation)
• Coopts enemies with lucrative contracts or city jobs• Pendergast-style largess (Turkeys and Patronage) cultivates
loyalty (voters like Sharpe’s goodies better)
Sharpe’s Nonviolent LeversSharpe’s Nonviolent Levers
• City Code enforcement• Union contract negotiation• Developer contracts• City employees (police, etc.)• Housing Authority• Authorization of Federal Block Grants• Large sums of unregulated revenue• Year-round campaigning & fundraising getting or
delivering votes up the chain (“Campaigning is a year-round job around here”)
Sharpe’s Desperation in 2002: Sharpe’s Desperation in 2002: Employing Election Violence can be Employing Election Violence can be
a a POSITIVEPOSITIVE Sign of Increasing Sign of Increasing Electoral CompetitionElectoral Competition
• Presence of viable, well-funded opponent leads to more open criticism and opposition, whereas 1998 Challenger Mildred Crump told reporters people were “terrified” to support her.
• Polls show James losing support in South Ward• James hires consultants, conducts polls, and uses media
advertising for the first time• Using uniformed and off-duty police to intimidate, vandalize,
and restrict opponents’ movement• Hiring out-of-town street power• Alleged employment of gangs• Race-baiting, incitement and hate speech• Escalation of economic coercion
Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Data Exploration of Non-Strategic ExplanationsExplanations
H: Violence is Merely Symptomatic of Ethnic Cleavages:• Booker Lawyers emphasized civil rights threat
against Hispanics to invite Federal oversight, but the data pattern suggests James conceded Hispanic areas and intimidated in his stronghold.
• Interviews suggest people believe it is easy for leaders to abuse their own and get away with it
• A hotly-contested election turned a non-partisan, all-African American race into a racial conflict, not the other way around (See also Wilkinson 2004 on India).
Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Explanations, continuedExplanations, continued
H: Intimidation/Violence is Expressive of Passionate Supporters
• Strategic presence of mobs/crowds hired from Philadelphia• Interviews suggesting crowd presence deters voting
because race has been won; compels voting because voters assume their choice will be found out; or convinces voters to vote for the side that will win
• Cluster of incidents is non-random• Incidents cluster around GOTV operations & high turnout
“Newark is Gangs of New York…Tammany Hall” -- leader of Union punished for backing Booker
Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Data Exploration of Non-Strategic Explanations, continuedExplanations, continued
H: Violence is Associated with Crime• Some evidence to support gang involvement on election
day, but strategic not criminal involvement (“When you have the same drug dealers & criminals who instill fear in the housing projects suddenly wearing James shirts at the polls, you can imagine what people will do” – Booker lawyer)
• Interviewees suggest that low education and income level makes people vulnerable to manipulation and willing to commit or ignore crime
• DOJ: Election crimes as indicators of other corrupt activity – Corrupt leaders’ fear of losing office
Data Exploration of Strategic Data Exploration of Strategic ExplorationExploration
• Timing of Intimidation Seems Strategic1. Shift from pre-election deterrence of financial and volunteer support to opponent to…2. GOTV operations on Election Day (seem to be associated with increasing support for James from 1998-2002)3. Retribution against opponents’ supporters when levers of punishment become available.
(NCC; Major McGreevey Donor)
Pre-Election Directed to DeterringOpposing Candidate & Supporters
Election Day: Directed toward VOTERS
Post-Election: Directed toward INSTITUTIONS/Donors
Data Exploration of Strategic Data Exploration of Strategic ExplorationExploration
• Location Seems Strategic
1. Clusters
2. East Ward was considered up for grabs, but any new turnout would go to Booker
3. Polls showed James weakest in South and East in 9/2001, yet he won them
Practical Considerations for Practical Considerations for Definition, Measurement, InferenceDefinition, Measurement, Inference
• Number and location of incidents do not reflect level of intimidation because of combination of polling stations in key locations (higher number of districts affected than map indicates);
• How would we know if intimidation influences the outcome? (Booker interviewees mixed on whether election was stolen or not; unprecedented 4,000 votes in S. Ward)
• How do we characterize:- electricity outages in polling stations- rumors of Election Board machine tampering, - Union contract negotiation delays- Arena threat, - Strip club incident- legal harassment (parking tickets, 22 sign injunctions ($1000 ea)
• Rumored verses verifiable incidents? (researcher versus practitioner)
Methodological ConsiderationsMethodological Considerations
• Choice of Sources:– Allegations (Lehoucq and Molina 2002)– Legal investigation (DOJ reported receiving over 100 incidents, with
other organizations receiving more calls) (motives?)– Media Reports (Media & Culture in U.S. versus Ghana)
* Acceptability of “rough and tumble” politics“Politics is war and I’m ready to fight….I’ve got a Ph.D. too, a Ph.D. in street politics....I rule the street operations.”
-- Newark ward operations strongman* American complacency about what does and does not happen in U.S.* American tendency to report same incident with every new story and to summarize general trends (not conducive to the “who did what to whom where” data collection format typical of political science
- Different legality for incidents (lack of a sense of outrage)
““The factual truth of the allegations The factual truth of the allegations [of intimidation and violence] is not [of intimidation and violence] is not what matters, but the perception what matters, but the perception
that they are widespread and could that they are widespread and could happen to you.”happen to you.”
- Interview with professor forced to resign a major university position because of his criticism of Newark’s
City Hall economic policies
GhanaGhana
• Coded narratives and forms of IFES monitors in Ghana’s 2004 General Election (54 Incidents, ~6 of questionable relation to election and/or insufficient information)
• Supplemented with Daily Media Monitoring of paper known for lack of bias, Ghanaian Chronicle, from Registration Date to Inauguration Date (additional 16 incidents, though general reports of intimidation could not be included)
Methodological Issues Raised by Methodological Issues Raised by Ghana IncidentsGhana Incidents
• Rolling primaries• Accusations and statements
against violence• Coup Hoax• General Reports• Photography, surveillance
Rationale for ComparisonRationale for Comparison
• Approximately 20% unemployment in each case (leaving out Port Authority employment in Newark)
• Newark Poverty Rate of 26%• Incumbent with 20-36 Years in Power• Centralized control of state apparatus and
security forces• Although local, Electoral Systems are
uniform only at the city level for municipal and county for state/federal elections in New Jersey
Ghana Incident ExplorationGhana Incident Exploration
Cross Tabulation of Timing and Nature of Incidents of Election ViolenceGhana 2004 General Election
(Row Percentages)
Intraparty Interparty Other Total
Pre-Election Incidents
17 (47%) 20 (43%) 9 (20%) 46
Election Day 3 (15%) 7 (35%) 10 (50%) 20
Post-Election 1 (16%) 3 (50%) 2 (33%) 6
Total 21 30 21 72
Perpetrators and Victims of Electoral Coercion in Newark & Ghana
(Column Percentages: Multiple Perpetrator Categories Mean Total Exceeds Total Incidents, Column Percentage indicates Percentage of Incidents Involving Type of Actor or Event)
Newark Ghana
Perpetrators N Col % N Col %
Mutual Perpetrators 0 0.00 17 0.18
Leader Perpetrator 6 0.11 8 0.08
Party Agent Perpetrator 6 0.11 12 0.13
Party Supporter 20 0.36 48 0.51
Agent of State 14 0.25 3 0.03
Criminal Element 3 0.05 0 0.00
Indeterminant 6 0.11 7 0.07
55 95
Victims
Leader Victim 9 0.16 18 0.22
Party Agent Victim 4 0.07 7 0.09
Party Supporter 13 0.24 34 0.42
Voter 16 0.29 6 0.07
Election Persons/Material 13 0.24 16 0.20
55 81
Severity of TacticsSeverity of Tactics
Impact SeverityImpact Severity
What Future Comparative Analysis What Future Comparative Analysis Might Tell UsMight Tell Us
• Willingness of wrong persons to file complaints
• System effects on type of perpetrators and victims
• Social/cultural and legal/institutional explanations for severity of violence used
• What is election violence an indicator of? Do shifts in the nature of violence (from one-sided to mutual, or two-party, suggest an important change)?
• Motives of victims and perpetrators • Number and nature of parties (ideology, party
discipline)
Do Institutions and Laws Matter?Do Institutions and Laws Matter?
A deductive look at the legal framework
Legal Framework for CoercionLegal Framework for Coercion
1.Right to vote2.Legal definitions of election offences3.Penalties and remedies for election offences4.Enforcement (areas in need of further research)
• Clarity and transparency of election authority• Independence of election authority• Detection and prosecution of violations• Statute of Limitations
Ghana Current Electoral ProvisionsGhana Current Electoral Provisions
• 1992 Constitution, Ch. 7: Representation of the People
• Registration of Voters Regulations, 1968 (L.I. 587)
• Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) (“RPL”)
• Presidential Elections Laws, 1992 (PNDCL 285)
• Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act 451)
• Public Elections (District Assembly) Regulations, 1993 (C.I. 4) (repeals District Assembly Election Regulations, 1988 (L.I.1396) by applying to assemblies all provisions of the Public Elections Regulations (Parliamentary))
• Public Elections Regulations, 1996 (C.I. 15) (repeals Public Elections (Parliamentary) Regulations, 1992 (L.I.1537 and Amendment L.I.1544)
• Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574) (repeals Political Parties Law, 1992 PNDCL 281))
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: GhanaLaws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana
Right to Vote: Constitutionally guaranteed
Defining Physical Coercion: “Undue Influence” and “Interference in Electioneering” include threat or use of force, abusive language, disruption of public tranquility, creating fear of spiritual or temporal injury or loss, including fear of divine displeasure in order to induce a voter to vote or not vote or a candidate to withdrawal.
Criminal Penalties: (a) Cedi 1 million ($833, or 87% of average household income); (b) up to two years in prison for coercion, destruction of election materials, bribery, vote buying, etc. (c) 5 years disqualification as voter or party
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: GhanaLaws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana
Remedies
(1) Immediate: (a) If violence or natural disaster interrupts polling, polling can be postponed to following day; (b) Disorderly persons or those committing offences defined above removed from polling stations and charged.
(2) Electoral: Petition and 20,000 Cedi (~$8.50) can be filed by voter or candidate within 21 days of the election to the High Court.
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: GhanaLaws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana
Electoral Remedy: If the High Court rules on the basis of a petition that election offences occurred, it can:
1. Call for count or rejection of specific votes affected by offences toward possible victory for a different candidate;
2. Disqualify candidates or punish offenders if guilty of offences but affirm election result;
3. Call for fresh election “general bribery, treating, intimidation or other misconduct…have so extensively prevailed that they may be reasonably supposed to have affected the result of an election”
Enforcement: Independent Election Commission
Ghana Electoral SystemGhana Electoral System
• First-Past-The-Post, Plurality system with single member constituencies
• Two-party dominant system• President must receive 50%
U.S. Current Federal Electoral U.S. Current Federal Electoral Provisions Related to CoercionProvisions Related to Coercion
• U.S. Constitution: 15th, 19th and 26th Amendments; States retain broad jurisdiction over the election process
• Federal Statutes: Apply to elections in which the ballot includes one or more candidates running for federal office if there is intimidation of voters (18 U.S.C. § 594 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1). 18 USC may apply in narrow circumstances to nonfederal elections involving physical threats or reprisals against candidates, voters, poll watchers, or election officials (§§ 245(b)(1)(A) ; §§); the presence of armed men at polls (592); coercion of military or federal employee voting (609-610). See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, Sixth ed., January 1995 for elaboration of complex statutes and jurisdiction. Federal authority warranted only to “redress long-standing patterns of election abuse.”
• State Election Law
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: U.S.Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: U.S.
Right to Vote: Constitution provides explicitly for non-discrimination in voting on the basis of race, sex, and age, but Bush v. Gore and other courts see no federally guaranteed right to vote in the constitution. (qualified citizens are eligible to vote)
Some Federal Definitions of Coercion: 18 U.S.C. §241 and 242: 241: State or federal authority cannot willfully deprive a person of any right, privilege, or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; 242: Ten-year penalty for conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate to deprive (…). Applied to cases in which voters prevented from reaching polls.
Voter intimidation: threats, duress, economic coercion, or some other aggravating factor which tends to improperly induce conduct on the part of the victim.
18 U.S.C. § 594: Requires proof that the actor intended to force voters to act against their will by placing them in fear of losing something of value…money or economic benefits…liberty or safety.
Speech: “Federal criminal laws are for the most part inapplicable to the tactics and rhetoric of the candidates and their agents…[to apply them] would tend to chill the free exercise of speech in the rough-and-tumble context of political campaigns.”
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: New JerseyNew Jersey
Coercion (illlustrative):
N.J. Stat. § 19:34-27 / 34-30: Employers cannot threaten injury, damage, harm, or loss against any person in his or her employ to induce or compel him to vote or refrain from voting….(includes enclosing political information in pay envelopes or posting it at the workplace)
N.J. Stat. § 19:34-28: “No person shall, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person in his behalf, make use of, or threaten to make use of, any force, violence or restraint, inflict or threaten the infliction…of any injury, damage, harm or loss, or in any manner to practice intimidation upon or against any person, in order to induce or compel…”
N.J. Stat. § 19:34-29: “No person shall by abduction or duress or any forcible or fraudulent device or contrivance whatever, impede, prevent, or otherwise interfere with the free exercise of the elective franchise by any voter…”
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: New JerseyNew Jersey
Penalties: • A person is guilty of a misdemeanor and will be punished
by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, if on Election Day they do any of the following:(i) tamper, deface or interfere with any polling booth;(ii) obstruct the entrance to any polling place, or obstruct or interfere with any voter; or(iii) loiter, or do any electioneering within any polling place or within 100 feet thereof. § 19:34-6
• Disenfranchisement in some cases; harsher penalties for second offenses
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: New JerseyNew Jersey
Penalties:
Most violations (impeding voters on election day, interfering with canvassing, etc.) are punishable as “disorderly persons” offenses (misdemeanors)
An election official is guilty of a crime [felony] in the second degree for committing:
(i) knowingly and willfully intimidating, threatening or coercing or attempting to intimidate, threaten or coerce any person for registering to vote or attempting to vote
Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: New JerseyNew Jersey
Remedies:
Immediate: Any individual who believes there has been, or will be, a violation of any provisions of this title may file a complaint with the Division of Elections seeking relief or, as an alternative, file a complaint with the Superior Court. The complaint will be resolved expeditiously. [§§ 19:61-6(a); 19:61-6(g)] (Judges are available on election day)
Electoral: Irregularities Complaint Log Form: • Instructions of where to send it; what authority?• If acts were trivial or unimportant, accidental, or did not arise
from any want of good faith, the election of the candidate should not “by reason of such offense complained not be void” § 19:3-9
• Unclear statute of limitations
Electoral Authorities: Electoral Authorities: New JerseyNew Jersey
State Law divides election responsibilities among the Elected, Partisan: • The Board of Elections is responsible for staffing and managing the
polling locations. • The Superintendent of Elections/commissioner of Registration is
responsible for establishing a 100- foot barrier around polling places to prevent electioneering. The office also manages the voting machines until Election Day.
• The City Clerk's office is responsible for counting the votes and certifying them.
Dispute Resolution:• Four Superior Court judges assigned to hear election appeals on
election day pertaining to challenges, registration, etc.Prevention/Security: Routine deployment of 15 state troopers and
UNPRECEDENTED deployment of U.S. Attorneys Officer observers
Electoral System: New JerseyElectoral System: New Jersey
• Non-Partisan System: In 1953, discontent with the city's five-member commission form of government, led to a city Charter Commission and adoption of a strong nonpartisan mayor system with a nine-member council. Voters approved the measure on Nov. 3, 1953. • Mayoral and council candidates must obtain 50 percent of the votes cast - plus one vote - to win, or a runoff is held one month later. • Violence has marred Newark elections in the 19th century, 1930s-40s, and the 1970 election.
Institutional Reforms: Institutional Reforms: What Newark Could Learn from What Newark Could Learn from
Ghana and its Sister City, Kumasi:Ghana and its Sister City, Kumasi:
• Independent election authority• Bipartisan election authority• Clear instructions for filing complaints• Extending laws to include campaigning,
donations• Longer statute of limitations for complaints• Specific penalties and electoral remedies• Future research should address assessment
of when a finding can be made that intimidation and violence have affected the results
Future DirectionsFuture Directions
1. Large-N, Multiple Regression & Interaction Effects (substitutability across tactics, effects of electoral system when stakes are high vs. low, exclusion is high vs. low)
2. Additional Variables (resources, statute of limitations)3. Change over time (endogeneity between violence and institutional
change)
Election Violence
Evioltime 1= f(Institutions -> Means, Stakes, Exclusion; Quality of enforcement/admin; ΔInstitutionst, t-1; Control variables)
Endogeneity
Institutionstime 1 = f(Eviolt-1; Institutionst-1; Control variables)
Election Violence and Electoral Election Violence and Electoral ReformReform
Time (Election Years)
Major Reform 1(e.g. secret ballot)
Major Reform 2(e.g. suffrage)
Major Reform 3(e.g. system, registration, admin quality)
ComprehensiveReform
Pre-peak: reform demandsPost-peak: politician substitution + enforcement demands
Preliminary EvidencePreliminary Evidence
• Bipartisan municipal election authorities in the U.S. are in areas that experienced violence (Cook Co, MO; NYC; Chicago)
Thank you!Thank you!
Discussion
