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Janusz 1
Electoral Consequences: The Importance of Political Parties in Brazil
Andrew Janusz
Seminar Paper
Date
Janusz 2
Voter participation in deciding electoral contests demonstrates voter beliefs that the type
of person who governs has consequences on outcomes. In majoritarian democracies, political
parties are considered to offer real choices to voters by nominating candidates for public office
(Lijphart 1984). By choosing among the slate of candidates put forth by political parties, voters
elect officials who then implement their preferred partisan policies (Lijphart 1984). At the
national and state levels, evidence shows that partisanship is a significant determinant of
economic, political, and social outcomes (Aldrich 1995; Bartels 2008; Besley and Case 2003;
Gerring 1998; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004; McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Although local elections are by far the most
common type of election, significantly less research exists on the impact of partisanship on local
outcomes. In this paper I answer the following question: "what is the impact of mayoral
partisanship on local outcomes?"
I use non-parametric regression discontinuity designs to investigate how mayoral
partisanship impacts policy outcomes at the municipal level in Brazil's over 5,500 municipalities.
Brazil's federal structure grants party-affiliated mayors sole authority in primary education,
health care, and to some extent economic development, which thus makes it an excellent case to
explore the impact of partisanship on local outcomes. I find that municipalities that elect a
mayor of the center-left Workers' Party (PT), arguably Brazil's most cohesive and programmatic
political party, do not display better or worse education, health care or economic outcomes than
otherwise similar municipalities governed by a mayor of a different party. Moreover, when
political parties are grouped into ideological blocs using a variety of classifications, differences
in policy outcomes remain unforthcoming. These findings suggest that mayoral partisanship is
of little value in explaining local policy outcomes in Brazil.
Janusz 3
Literature Review
A rich literature exists on the relationship between ideology, partisanship and outcomes.
For both elected officials and voters, partisanship has emerged as an important determinate of
policy preferences. At the individual level, partisanship is a strong predictor of vote choice and
is used as a heuristic device for making voting decisions (Campbell et al. 1960; Goren 2005;
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Popkin 1994; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001).
Partisan differences between elected officials are thought to manifest themselves in
differences in policy outcomes, but this relationship has not been sufficiently explored at
different levels of federal systems. In the United States the distinct governing philosophies of
the Republican and Democratic parties explain differential policy outcomes well at the national
and state levels (Aldrich 1995; Bartels 2008; Gerring 1998; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Lee et al
2004; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Significantly less
research has explored the impact of partisanship at the local level in the American context. Of
that body of work, findings have been mixed (Ferraz and Finan 2007; Ferreira and Gyorko 2009;
Gerber and Hopkins 2011). Gerber and Hopkins (2011) assert that these mixed findings are an
artifact of the outcomes studied. They contend that differential policy outcomes attributable to
partisanship are likely only to be found in those policy areas in which mayors exercise
significant political control. In the comparative context, a survey of the studies done on the
impact of partisanship on policy outcomes at the local level in federal systems yields mixed
findings (Furdas and Kis-Katos 2010; Pettersson-Lidbom 2008). This paper contributes to this
literature by identifying the causal impact of partisanship on local policy outcomes in Brazil.
The Brazilian Case
Janusz 4
Brazil's strong federal constitution, large number of municipalities and large number of
political parties make it an attractive case to explore the partisanship policy outcome puzzle. In
the majority of federal systems, most public policies are affected by politicians at multiple levels
of government. Brazil's federal constitution, in contrast, provides municipal level mayors most
legal, budgetary and administrative authority (Wampler 2004). Compared to politicians elected
to serve in the national legislature, sub-national government executives wield significantly more
power to hire, fire and to implement public works projects (Samuels 1998). In Brazil, mayors
are solely responsible for health care services, pre-school and primary education and even the
economy to some extent. In order to meet their responsibilities, Brazil’s democratic constitution
grants mayors the discretion to tailor programs to meet local constituent needs (Sugiyama 2008).
Brazil also has a large number of municipalities in which to identify the effects of
partisan on local policy outcomes. Politically, Brazil is composed of 26 states and a federal
district, with each state being composed of municipalities, akin to counties in the United States.
Each of Brazil's over 5,500 municipalities is governed by an elected mayor, who serves a four
year term with the option to run for one additional term.
Lastly, Brazil has a large number of active parties. Thirty-one parties are registered to
compete in elections. They do so with varying frequencies at the local, state and national levels.
While a candidate from each political party does not compete in every mayoral election, rarely
are mayoral races uncontested.
In order for differences in mayoral partisanship to affect municipal outcomes there must
be a strong association between party labels and policy positions. Although there is some doubt
that political parties in Brazil have ideological meaning (Lucas and Samuels 2010) conflict at the
national level between catch-all parties suggests otherwise (Coppedge 1997; Leoni 2002; Power
Janusz 5
and Zucco 2009; Saiegh 2009). Levels of party commitment in the Brazilian case are also
contested. Known for its weakly institutionalized party system, political parties in Brazil have
historically been volatile and uncohesive, with parties frequently breaking up, disappearing and
reemerging (Ames 2001; Power 2000). At the national level, in the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies the open-list proportional representation format of elections is thought to candidates to
focus on their personal opinions and qualities as opposed to emphasizing their party affiliation or
the official party platform, leading to individualistic behavior (Ames 2001, 2002; Desposato
2006; Graeff 2000; Mainwaring 1991, 1997, 1999; Pinheiro Filho 1998). Faced with the
dilemma of whether to pursue their individual interests or to devote resources to maintaining
their party's collective reputation, Brazilian politicians have historically done the latter (Shugart
and Carey 1992). Because party has not been a strong indicator of the policies politicians will
support, Brazilians are thought to vote for personalities rather than parties or policies.
While other Brazilian political parties may lack ideological meaning, sanctioning
mechanisms within the PT have discouraged individualistic behavior and produced a nationally
recognizable party (Ames 2002; Hunter 2008; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 1997; Samuels
2006). This has led some scholars to suggest that the PT is Brazil's most cohesive party
(Mainwaring 1999; Samuels 2006). In addition to being the most cohesive party, the PT party
platform prioritizes the poor and disadvantaged, resulting in a reputation of being an ally of the
underprivileged sectors of Brazilian society (Abers 1996; Pribble, Huber and Stephans 2009).
As a result of its cohesiveness and reputation, the PT has the strongest base of partisan identifiers
in the electorate (Samuels 2006).
At the national level, the PT gained acclaim in 2003 after its candidate, Luiz Inacio Lula
da Silva, won the presidency. Targeting social assistance funds to improve the lives of the
Janusz 6
poorest sectors of Brazilian society, under Lula's leadership, Bolsa Familia, the largest
conditional cash transfer program in Latin America, has directly benefitted over forty-four
million people (Hall 2008). Lula's legacy has been upheld by his successor, President Dilma
Rousseff, who has actively pursued a social policy agenda. Locally, the PT has also been
successful. Baiocchi (2003) writes that the cornerstone of the PT's success is due to
redistributive administrative schemes at the local level. Many PT administrations have decreased
or eliminated traditional forms of clientelism and corruption, ensuring that municipal funds are
appropriately spent on projects that improve the quality of life for municipal residents, such as
through construction of new schools or health clinics. In addition to education and health
projects, most PT administrations have incorporated greater citizen involvement and control in
small-scale municipal economic development projects (Abers 1996).
Though the PT may be Brazil's most cohesive political party, there is a disagreement in
the literature as to the relative cohesiveness of Brazilian political parties and thus the value of
partisanship. At the national level, some scholars suggest that levels of party discipline are
rising in other parties and they find that partisanship is an important determinant of legislative
behavior (Amorim Neto and Santos 2003; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Lyne 2005; Pereira and
Muller 2002). Increasing numbers of party oriented legislators may be leading Brazilian political
parties in the direction of developing credible, programmatically coherent platforms (Hagopian,
Gervasoni and Moraes 2009; Lyne 2005; Tafel 2011). Other scholars (Lucas and Samuels 2010)
reject the notion that Brazil's party system is becoming consolidated. Lucas and Samuels (2010),
for example, claim that few voters cast partisan votes due to their ignorance of party positions on
the issues. Lucas and Samuel's (2010) findings suggest that in the Brazilian context not only is
partisanship of little value but so is political ideology. They contend that while the PT is distinct,
Janusz 7
that no clear ideological differences exist between Brazil's other main political parties (Lucas and
Samuels 2010). Further, they suggest that the spatial distance between the PT and other parties is
diminishing (Lucas and Samuels 2010).
The ability to understand the relationship between partisanship and local outcomes is
essential to evaluating the value of political parties. Although a number of scholars have
examined political party behavior at the national level in a number of countries, including Brazil,
much less research has been done on the impact of political parties on local outcomes. In federal
systems, such as Brazil, a large portion of governance takes place at the state and local levels. As
a result, a comprehensive evaluation of Brazilian political parties requires an analysis of the
impact of partisanship on local outcomes. This paper will test whether the Brazilian political
parties do in fact exhibit cohesiveness at the local governance level.
Hypotheses
The debate explored above with respect to partisanship leads to the development of two
hypotheses. I contribute to the political partisanship and political ideology literatures by
empirically testing them.
Hypothesis 1: Municipalities governed by PT mayors display superior outcomes in the
areas of education, health care and the economy compared to similar municipalities
governed by mayors from another party.
Like PT representatives at the national level, I expect PT mayors to display programmatic
behavior. Because education, health care and the economy are of the utmost interest to the PT's
partisan voters, typically poor individuals who likely rely on public education for their children,
Janusz 8
and public health care for their families, PT mayors should display higher levels of commitment
to improving outcomes in these areas than mayors of other parties. The precarious economic
position of PT partisan voters should lead PT mayors to take steps to encourage economic
growth in the municipalities in which they govern.
Hypothesis 2: Municipal measures of education, health care and the economy should not
vary depending on the position of a mayor's political party on the left-right political
ideology spectrum.
If the assertions of Lucas and Samuels (2011) are correct differential outcomes between
otherwise similar municipalities on the basis of mayoral ideology will not be forthcoming.
Because they suggest that the spatial differences between the PT and other parties are shrinking
this includes municipalities governed by PT mayors.
To test these hypotheses, I estimate the causal effect of mayoral partisanship and political
ideology on measures of primary education, health care and the economy.
Methods
Estimating the causal effect of mayoral partisanship and political ideology on municipal
outcomes without bias presents a challenging identification problem. Mayoral partisanship and
by extension political ideology are not randomly assigned to municipalities, introducing the
possibility of endogeneity. Municipalities in which PT mayors tend to be elected are likely
different from municipalities governed by mayors from other parties both in observable and
unobservable ways. For example, a municipalities history of reelecting incumbent mayors may
be controlled for. Municipalities in which the top two rightist mayoral candidates coordinate and
Janusz 9
one of them exits the mayoral race to ensure that a leftist mayoral candidate does not win
however are different in unobservable ways from municipalities in which the top two rightist
candidates do not coordinate and split the rightist vote. Controls for observable differences can
be included in statistical models, but by definition unobservable differences cannot be controlled
for, leading to the possibility of biased estimates (Imbens and Lemieux 2008).
In light of these concerns, I test both of the previously states hypotheses using regression
discontinuity designs. A regression discontinuity design allows for comparison of municipalities
that are quite similar in their probability of receiving treatment, but differ in whether or not they
receive treatment. With regards to hypothesis 1, which concerns the causal effect of a PT mayor
on municipal outcomes, I rely on the intuition that municipalities in which PT mayoral
candidates were elected by narrow margins are a good counterfactuals for those municipalities in
which PT candidates lost their respective mayoral elections by narrow margins. I carry out a
similar process in order to attain the causal effect of political ideology on municipal outcomes. I
compare municipalities in which mayoral elections were decided by a small margin between
candidates of parties that have different ideologies. The regression discontinuities examine
elections of right versus candidates of left political parties, candidates of right versus candidates
of center political parties, and finally candidates of center versus candidates of left political
parties.
Candidates from several political parties compete in Brazilian municipal elections, with
the winning candidate being elected by plurality. For this reason, instead of using a fixed cutoff
of 50% like Green and Hopkins (2011) the margin of victory separating the elected mayor and
the first runner-up is instead used (Brambor and Ceneviva 2011; Imbens and Lemieux 2008). In
Brazilian municipalities with more than 200,000 eligible voters, mayors are directly elected
Janusz 10
through (run-off) majority rule. Because different electoral rules lead to different data generating
processes, municipalities with over 200,000 eligible voters are removed. Elections in which the
winning candidate and runner-up were of the same party or ideological bloc are removed in
respective regression discontinuities.
I treat the margin of victory between the winning candidate and the first runner-up as a
continuous variable. I limit my sample to include only municipalities in which treatment was
determined by a margin of victory of 3%. Increasing the margin of victory results in a larger
sample size and thus greater external validity, but at the cost of internal validity. As the margin
of victory increases additional observations are included, but the partisanship of the mayor is no
longer determined by a quasi-random variable. Additional models with varied margins of victory
can be found in the appendix. These models show the stability and strength of the causal
estimates.
Data
In order to determine treatment I use electoral data from the 2008 municipal elections
obtained from Brazil's Supreme Electoral Court (TSE). The TSE is responsible for managing all
elections in Brazil. This data set contains information about the partisan affiliation of candidates,
the number of votes they received and whether or not they were elected. Using 2004 municipal
electoral data I also generate a dummy variable for incumbency. As previously stated I removed
from this data set any municipality that resulted in a second round, runoff election
(municipalities with over 200,000 registered voters) as well as those in which the top two vote
receivers shared PT affiliation in the first set of regressions or ideological affiliation in the
following sets of regressions. See appendix ideological bloc classifications.
Janusz 11
The outcome variables used are obtained from FIRJAN (Federação das Indústrias do
Estado do Rio de Janeiro). FIRJAN produces yearly measures ranging from 0 to 1, with one
being better, for each municipality using official government statistics. Each of the dependent
variables used reflect municipal issues that mayoral candidates cite in their campaigns and that
they can affect through policy and programs. These include the economy, education and health
care. I used the 2010 FIRJAN measures, but include the respective measure from 2007 to
increase precision.
For the economy variable I use the FIRJAN measure of income and employment, which
is constructed from data available from the Ministry of Labour and Employment. This variable
gives equal weight (50% each) to both the number of formal jobs created and the average
monthly income of formal sector workers. One potential concern is that this does not reflect
informal sector job creation or income. Informal sector growth is likely uncorrelated with
mayoral partisanship and will therefore not bias the resulting estimates.
The FIRJAN measure of education is created from statistics available from the ministry
of education. It is designed to reflect both the supply and quality of early childhood education,
both of which are the responsibility of the municipality and thus overseen by the elected mayor.
The education variable is composed of measures for the early childhood education enrollment
rate, drop-out rate, ratio of students at the appropriate grade level by age, percent of teachers
with higher education, average amount of classroom instruction. Together these measures
provide a good measure of education access and quality.
Lastly, the FIRJAN measure of health care is created using statistics on the number of
pre-natal visits, preventable infant deaths and deaths from poorly defined causes. The infant
mortality rate is considered to be one of the best indicators of a municipality's health and
Janusz 12
therefore Brazil's health. Together the FIRJAN development index variables provide a good
indication of the quality of life in Brazil's municipalities.
Models
Four sets of three models each are presented below. I use economic well-being (labeled
as economic health), education and health care as the dependent variable for one model in each
set. For the first set of models I test the PT partisanship hypothesis using each dependent
variable. I test the political ideology hypothesis by comparing mayors from left versus center
parties in models 4-6, mayors from right versus center parties in models 7-9 and mayors from
right versus left parties in models 10-12.
Janusz 13
Table 1: PT Partisanship Regression ResultsVariable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable
Economic Health
Education Health Care
PT Mayor -0.0011 0.007 -0.0048
(0.0158) (0.007) (0.0076)
Incumbent 0.0293 -0.0193 0.0119
(0.0452) (0.0203) (0.0222)
2007 Economic Health
0.7157***
(0.0519)
2007 Education
0.9429***
(0.003)
2007 Health Care 0.7615***
(0.0313)
Constant 0.1057*** 0.0879*** 0.2151***(0.0231) (0.0208) (0.0239)
R-Squared 0.5519 0.8648 0.7983
N 160 160 160
Janusz 14
Table 2: Left vs Center Ideology Regression ResultsVariable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent Variable
Economic Health
Education Health Care
Leftist Party .0089 0.0105 0.0063
(0.0158) (0.0064) (0.0087)
Incumbent -0.0099 -0.0061 0.0230
(0.0513) (0.0218) (0.0296)
2007 Economic Health
0.7027***
(0.0517)
2007 Education
0.8574***
(0.0273)
2007 Health Care 0.7546***
(0.0386)
Constant 0.1173*** 0.1428*** 0.2167***(0.0226) (0.0193) (0.0299)
Janusz 15
R-Squared 0.5125 0.8494 0.6930
N 182 182 182
Table 3: Center vs Right Ideology Regression ResultsVariable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Dependent Variable
Economic Health
Education Health Care
Centrist Party 0.0302* 0.0060 0.0138*
(0.0156) (0.0063) (0.0079)
Incumbent -.0215 -0.0018 0.0438**
(0.0420) (0.0173) (0.0216)
2007 Economic Health
0.7116***
(0.0550)
2007 Educatio
0.8751***
Janusz 16
n(0.0262)
2007 Health Care 0.7239***
(0.0337)
Constant 0.1000*** 0.1366*** 0.2458***(0.0240) (0.0184) (0.0264)
R-Squared 0.4370 0.8360 0.6870
N 232 232 232
Table 4: Left vs Right Ideology Regression ResultsVariable Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Dependent Variable
Economic Health
Education Health Care
Leftist Mayor -0.0088 -0.001 0.0048
(0.0146) (0.0066) (0.0078)
Janusz 17
Incumbent 0.0494 -0.0045 0.0019
(0.0452) (0.0205) (0.0247)
2007 Economic Health
0.6449***
(0.0530)
2007 Education
0.9186***
(0.0294)
2007 Health Care 0.7403***
(0.0338)
Constant 0.1355*** 0.1063*** 0.2254***(0.0222) (0.0202) (0.0255)
R-Squared 0.4527 0.8432 0.7310
N 187 187 187
The results of models 1-3 are robust when the margin of victory is altered. Neither the
variable for PT mayoral partisanship nor incumbency is significant for elections decided by
margins of victory anywhere from one percent to ten percent. Graphs 1-6 in the appendix show
this visually. Similarly, in models 4-6 the results are robust for different margins of victory.
For model 7 when the margin of victory is altered to 4%, 5%, 9% and 10%, the Rightist
variable retains significance. This suggests that mayors from centrist parties are more successful
at increasing job growth and income, but because the relationship is not robust to all margins of
victory, this is not certain. Model 8 suggests that the presence of a rightist or centrist mayor does
Janusz 18
not result in significantly different education outcomes. When the same regression equation is
used but the margin of victory is 6%, 7%, and 10%, the rightist party variable does appear
significant. For model 9 the rightist party variable is only significant for the 3% margin of
victory suggesting electing a mayor of a centrist or rightist political party makes no difference.
Incumbency, however, is significant in all models suggesting that incumbents lead to better
health care outcomes if the incumbent mayors are from right or center political parties. Given
that incumbency is unimportant for the other dependent variables and in models that limit
elections to left and right parties or left and center parties incumbency is unconvincing. Lastly,
the results of models 10-12 are robust for different margins of victory.
The results of the above models support and extend the claims of Lucas and Samuels
(2010). While the PT is seen by many scholars as distinct from other political parties, at the
local level measures of the economy, education and health care suggest that PT affiliated mayors
are no better or worse than mayors from other political parties. One possible explanation is that
PT legislators are distinct at the national level but not at the municipal level. Another potential
explanation for this null finding is that the innovative municipal policies that PT mayors have
received credit for in the past decade have been adopted by mayors of other parties. A third
possibility is that PT mayors really are no better than mayors of other political parties at effecting
positive municipal change. Though the null is not rejected, mayoral partisanship in general and
PT partisanship specifically may still have causal effects. Policy outcomes are only one way to
explore potential effects of mayoral partisanship. Future studies should explore other
relationships, such as if mayoral partisanship affects clientelism and corruption.
Grouping political parties into ideological blocs also appears to be of little value. Quality
of life indicators are not statistically different when the mayoral candidate elected is affiliated
Janusz 19
with a party of the ideological left as opposed to right or center. Similarly electing a mayoral
candidate from a rightist party as opposed to a candidate from a centrist party does not result in
statistically significant quality of life outcomes.
Collectively these results suggest that mayoral partisanship and national ideology of
political parties at the local level are unimportant. Voters should vote for personalities, because
candidate partisanship does not appear to be of value. Even electing a member of the PT, which
is thought to be differentiable from other parties, does not differentially affect the quality of life
for municipal residents.
Appendix:
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of all MunicipalitiesVariable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Janusz 20
Municipal Population 2007 804 10900000 32662.4 195220Municipal Population 2010 805 11300000 33859.7 200394Total Votes Cast in Each Municipality 718 1183720 15009.3 39623Number of Votes Received by Runner-up 1 295921 5155.57 10908.1Number of Votes Received by Winner 448 778514 8231.59 24225.1Winner's Vote Share 0.5 0.9998065 0.58514 0.08506Runner up's Vote Share 0.0001935 0.5 0.41486 0.08506Vote share of the PT candidate 0.0131449 0.9690194 0.48615 0.12627Winning Candidate is the Incumbent 0 1 0.02696 0.16199Winning Party is the Incumbent Party 0 1 0.28307 0.45053Incumbent Party is the PT 0 1 0.03936 0.19447Percent of Residents Receiving Aid 2007 0.0007231 0.2551578 0.08769 0.04578Percent of Residents Receiving Aid 2010 0.0003745 0.2383144 0.09465 0.04948Economic Health 2007 0.0445617 0.9853157 0.39846 0.1524Economy Health 2010 0 1 0.40431 0.15589Education 2007 0.3337345 0.9930894 0.68772 0.11569Education 2010 0.3746 1 0.74135 0.11261Health Care 2007 0.3410417 1 0.76274 0.11641Health Care 2010 0.4421 1 0.79855 0.10047
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Municipalities in the 3% SampleVariable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.Municipal Population 2007 966 307284 18431.2 28232.9
Janusz 21
Municipal Population 2010 1020 300466 19370.4 29585.3Total Votes Cast in Each Municipality 878 151338 10896.1 14673.7Number of Votes Received by Runner-up 428 48601 4700.07 5728.16Number of Votes Received by Winner 448 50710 4847.53 5922.06Winner's Vote Share 0.5 0.5149878 0.50766 0.00438
Runner up's Vote Share0.485012
2 0.5 0.49234 0.00438
Vote share of the PT candidate0.485282
5 0.5149527 0.50006 0.00821Winning Candidate is the Incumbent 0 1 0.02514 0.15666Winning Party is the Incumbent Party 0 1 0.25698 0.43728Incumbent Party is the PT 0 1 0.03352 0.18011
Percent of Residents Receiving Aid 20070.002140
6 0.222907 0.08983 0.04553
Percent of Residents Receiving Aid 20100.004207
5 0.2383144 0.09778 0.05001
Economic Health 20070.052208
7 0.9706729 0.3888 0.14383Economy Health 2010 0 0.9438 0.39228 0.14521
Education 20070.362240
3 0.9888889 0.68068 0.1139Education 2010 0.437 1 0.73164 0.11118
Health Care 20070.403943
3 1 0.76023 0.11736Health Care 2010 0.4665 1 0.79304 0.10341
Table 3: Categorization of Political Parties by IdeologyIdeology Parties Left PDT, PC doB, PSB, PSDC, PT, PRTB, PTBCenter PMDB, PMN, PPS, PSDB, PHS, PSDB
RightDEM, PT do B, PP, PR, PRB, PV, PTN, PTC, PRP, PSC, PSL, PTB, PSDC
Table 4: Ideology ObservationsVariable Full Sample 3% SampleLeftist Defeated Centrist 1385 186Centrist Defeated Rightist 1698 237Leftist Defeated Rightist 1302 190
Janusz 22
Graph 1: Scatter Plot of Economic Health and PT Candidate's Vote Share
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the PT Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEconomic Health
Graph 2: RDD of Economic Health and PT Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 23
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the PT Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margion or LessEconomic Health
Graph 3: Scatter Plot of Education and PT Candidate's Vote Share
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the PT Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation
Janusz 24
Graph 4: RDD of Education and PT Candidate's Vote Share.4
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Edu
catio
n 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the PT Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation
Graph 5: Scatter Plot of Health Care and PT Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 25
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are2
010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the PT Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care
Graph 6: RDD of Health Care and PT Candidate's Vote Share
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the PT Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care
Janusz 26
Graph 7: Scatter Plot of Economic Health and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEconomic Health: Left vs. Center
Graph 8: RDD of Economic Health and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 27
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margion or LessEconomic Health: Left vs. Center
Graph 9: Scatter Plot of Education and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation: Left vs. Center
Janusz 28
Graph 10: RDD of Education and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation: Left vs. Center
Graph 11: Scatter Plot of Economic Health and the Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are2
010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care: Left vs. Center
Janusz 29
Graph 12: RDD of Health Care and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share.5
.6.7
.8.9
1H
ealth
Car
e 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care: Left vs. Center
Graph 13: Scatter Plot of Economic Health and the Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 30
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEconomic Health: Left vs. Right
Graph 14: RDD of Economic Health and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margion or LessEconomic Health: Left vs. Right
Janusz 31
Graph 15: Scatter Plot of Education and the Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation: Left vs. Right
Graph 16: RDD of Education and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 32
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation: Left vs. Right
Graph 17: Scatter Plot of Health Score and the Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are2
010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care: Left vs. Right
Janusz 33
Graph 18: RDD of Health Care and Leftist Candidate's Vote Share
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Leftist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care: Left vs. Right
Graph 19: Scatter Plot of Economic Health and the Centrist Candidate's Vote Share
0.2
.4.6
.81
Eco
nom
y 20
10
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Centrist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEconomic Health: Center vs. Right
Janusz 34
Graph 20: RDD of Economic Health and Centrist Candidate's Vote Share0
.2.4
.6.8
1E
cono
my
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Centrist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margion or LessEconomic Health: Center vs. Right
Graph 21: Scatter Plot of Education and the Centrist Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 35
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by Centrist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation: Center vs. Right
Graph 22: RDD of Education and Centrist Candidate's Vote Share
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1E
duca
tion
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Centrist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessEducation: Center vs. Right
Janusz 36
Graph 23: Scatter Plot of Health Care and the Centrist Candidate's Vote Share
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are2
010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by Centrist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care: Center vs. Right
Graph 24: RDD of Health Care and Centrist Candidate's Vote Share
Janusz 37
.5.6
.7.8
.91
Hea
lth C
are
2010
.48 .49 .5 .51 .52Percent of the Vote Won by the Centrist Candidate
Elections Decided by a Three Percent Margin or LessHealth Care: Center vs. Right
Table 5: Full Sample Party StatisticsParty # Times Runner-up # Times ElectedDEM 437 473PC do B 70 39PCB 7 0PCO 1 0PDT 364 329PHS 26 13PMDB 898 1,127PMN 47 40PP 415 525PPS 221 129PR 305 372PRB 85 51PRP 33 16PRTB 33 11PSB 305 296PSC 87 58PSDB 597 758PSDC 41 8PSL 34 14
Janusz 38
PSOL 81 0PSTU 5 0PT 607 530PT do B 27 8PTB 347 382PTC 33 12PTN 36 15PV 139 75Total 5,281 5,281
Table 6: 3% Sample Party StatisticsParty # Times Runner-up # Times ElectedDEM 70 59PC do B 8 8PCO 1 0PDT 49 45PHS 5 0PMDB 110 158PMN 5 5PP 65 72PPS 25 13PR 41 42PRB 12 7PRP 5 3PRTB 2 2PSB 53 35PSC 13 7PSDB 74 116PSDC 6 3PSL 3 4PSOL 6 0PT 86 75
Janusz 39
PT do B 4 0PTB 53 51PTC 4 2PTN 4 1PV 12 8Total 716 716
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