ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA

DEBATE IN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLYON PART XIII — ARTICLE 289

(Existing Part XV — Elections)

NIRVACHAN SADAN

ASHOKA ROAD

NEWDELHI-110 001

15th June, 1949 (Wednesday)

Article 289

Mr. President: We shall now take up Part XIII—article289.

Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: May I suggest thatamendment No. 99 may be taken up as it substantiallyreplaces the whole article? All the other amendments maybe discussed thereafter.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Mr President,Sir, I move:

'That for article 289, the following article be substitut-ed:—

289. (1) The superintendence, direction and control ofsuperintendence, direc- t h e Preparation of the electoraltions and control of elec- rolls for, and the conduct of, alltions to be vested in an elections to Parliament and toelection commission ±, , • , * « «* *

the Legislature of every Stateand of elections to the offices of President and Vice-President held under this Constitution, including theappointment of election tribunals for the decision of doubtsand disputes arising out of or in connection with electionsto Parliament and to the Legislatures of States shall bevested in a Commission (referred to in his Constitution asthe Election Commission) to be appointed by the Presi-dent.

(2) The Election Commission shall consist of the ChiefElection Commissioner and such number of other ElectionCommissioners, if any, as the President may, from time totime appoint, and when any other Election Commissioneris so appointed, the Chief Election Commissioner shall actas the Chairman of the Commission.

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(3) Before each general election to the House of thePeople and to the Legislative Assembly of each State andbefore the first general election and thereafter before eachbiennial election to the Legislative Council of each Statehaving such Council, the President shall also appoint afterconsultation with the Election Commission such RegionalCommissioners as he may consider necessary to assistthe Election Commission in the performance of thefunctions conferred on it by clause (1) of this article.

(4) The conditions of service and tenure of office ofthe Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis-sioners shall be such as the President may by ruledetermine:

Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shallnot be removed from office except in like manner and onthe like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court and theconditions of the service of the Chief Election Commis-sioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after hisappointment:

Provided further that any other Election Commission-er or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed fromoffice except on the recommendation of the Chief ElectionCommissioner.

(5) The President or the Governor or Ruler of a Stateshall, when so requested by the Election Commission,make available to the Election Commission or to aRegional Commissioner such staff as may be necessaryfor the discharge of the functions conferred on the ElectionCommission by clause (1) of this article."

Mr. President: I have notice of a number ofamendments, some in substitution of the articles 289, 290and 291 and some amendments to the amendments which

are going to be moved. I think I had better take theamendments which are in the nature of substitution ofthese articles. Dr. Ambedkar has moved one. There isanother amendment in the name of Pandit Thakur DasBhargava.

Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (United Provinces:General): May I ask, Sir, whether Dr. Ambedkar is notgoing to say anything in support of the proposition that hehas moved? It concerns a very important matter. Is it notdesirable that Dr. Ambedkar who has put forward anamendment to article 289 should say something in supportof his amendment. I think he would be proceeding onsound lines if he took the trouble of explaining to the Housethe reasons for asking it to replace the old article 289 t>ya new article. The matter is of the greatest importance andit is a great pity that Dr. Ambedkar has not considered itworth his while to make a few remarks on this proposition.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Mr. President,Sir, I did not make any observation in support of the motionfor two reasons. One reason was that if a debate tookplace on this article,— it is quite likely that a debate wouldundoubtedly take place—there would be certain points thatwill be raised in the debate, which it would be profitablefor me to reply to at the close so as to avoid a duplicationof any speech on my part. That is one reason.

The second reason was that I thought that everybodymust have read my amendment; it is so simple that theymust have understood what it meant. Evidently, myhonourable Friend Pandit Kunzru in a hurry has not readmy new Draft.

Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru: I have read every lineof it; I only want that the honourable Member should treatthe House with some respect.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: The House willremember that in a very early stage in the proceedings ofthe Constituent Assembly, a Committee was appointed todeal with what are called Fundamental Rights. ThatCommittee made a report that it should be recognised thatthe independence of the elections and the avoidance ofany interference by the executive in the elections to theLegislature should be regarded as a fundamental right andprovided for in the chapter dealing with FundamentalRights. When the matter came up before the House, it wasthe wish of the House that while there was no objectionto regard this matter as of fundamental importance, itshould be provided for in some other part of theConstitution and not in the Chapter dealing with Funda-mental Rights. But the House affirmed without any kind ofdissent that in the interests of purity and freedom ofelections to the legislative bodies, it was of the utmostimportance that they should be freed from any kind ofinterference from the executive of the day. In pursuanceof the decision of the House, the Drafting Committeeremoved this question from the category of FundamentalRights and put it in a separate part containing articles 289,290 and so on. Therefore, so far as the fundamentalquestion is concerned that the election machinery shouldbe outside the control of the executive Government, therehas been no dispute. What article'289 does is to carry outthat part of the decision of the Constituent Assembly. Ittransfers the superintendence, direction and control of thepreparation of the electoral rolls and of all elections toParliament and the Legislatures of States to a body outsidethe executive to be called the Election Commission. Thatis the provision contained in sub-clause (1).

Sub-clause (2) says that there shall be a Chief

Election Commissioner and such other Election Commis-sioners as the President may, from time to time appoint.There were two alternatives before the Drafting Commit-tee, namely, either to have a permanent body consistingof four or five members of the Election Commission whowould continue in office throughout without any break, orto permit the President to have an ad hoc body appointedat the time when there is an election on the anvil. TheCommittee has steered a middle course. What the DraftingCommittee proposes by sub-clause (2) is to have perma-nently in office one man called the Chief ElectionCommissioner, so that the skeleton machinery wouldalways be available. Elections no doubt will generally takeplace at the end of five years; but there is this question,namely that a bye-election may take place at any time. TheAssembly may be dissolved before its period of five yearshas expired. Consequently, the electoral rolls will have tobe kept up to date all the time so that the new election maytake place without any difficulty. It was therefore felt thathaving regard to these exigencies, it would be sufficient ifthere was permanently in session one officer to be calledthe Chief Election Commissioner, while when the electionsare coming up, the President may further add to themachinery by appointing other members to the ElectionCommission.

Now, Sir, the original proposal under article 289 wasthat there should be one Commission to deal with theelections to the Central Legislature, both the Upper and theLower House, and that there should be a separate ElectionCommission for each province and each State, to beappointed by the Governor or the Ruler of the State.Comparing that with the present article 289, there isundoubtedly, a radical change. This article proposes to

centralise the election machinery in the hands of a singlecommission to be assisted by regional Commissioners, notworking under the provincial Government, but workingunder the superintendence and control of the the CentralElection Commission. As I said, this is undoubtedly aradical change. But, this change has become necessarybecause today we find that in some of the provinces ofIndia, the population is a mixture. There are what may becalled original inhabitants, so to say, the native people ofa particular province. Along with them, there are otherpeople residing there, who are either racially, linguisticallyor culturally different from the dominant people who are theoccupants of that particular Province. It has been broughtto the notice both of the Drafting Committee as well as ofthe Central Government that in these provinces theexecutive Government is instructing or managing things insuch a manner that those people who do not belong tothem either racially, culturally or linguistically, are beingexcluded from being brought on the electoral rolls. TheHouse will realise that franchise is a most fundamentalthing in a democracy. No person who is entitled to bebrought into the electoral rolls on the grounds which wehave already mentioned in our Constitution, namely, anadult of 21 years of age, should be excluded merely as a

\ result of the prejudice of a local Government, or the whimof an officer. That would cut at the very root of democraticGovernment. In order, therefore, to prevent injustice beingdone by provincial Governments to people other thanthose who belong to the province racially, linguistically andculturally, it is felt desirable to depart from the originalproposal of having a separate Election Commission foreach province under the guidance of the Governor and thelocal Government. Therefore, this new change has beenbrought about, namely, that the whole of the election

machinery should be in the hands of a Central ElectionCommission which alone would be entitled to issuedirectives to returning officers, polling officers and othersengaged in the preparation and revision of electoral rollsso that no injustice may be done to any citizen in India,who under this Constitution is entitled to be brought on theelectoral rolls. That alone is, if I may say so, a radical andfundamental departure from the existing provisions of theDraft Constitution.

So far as clause (4) is concerned, we have left thematter to the President to determine the conditions ofservice and the tenure of office of the members of theElection Commission, subject to one or two conditions, thatthe Chief Election Commissioner shall not be liable to beremoved except in the same manner as a Judge of theSupreme Court. If the object of this House is that allmatters relating to Elections should be outside the controlof the Executive Government of the day, it is absolutelynecessary that the new machinery which we are setting up,namely, the Election Commission should be irremovableby the executive by a mere fiat. We have therefore giventhe Chief Election Commissioner the same status so far asremovabiHty is concerned as we have given to the Judgesof the Supreme Court. We, of course, do not propose togive the same status to the other members of the

.Commission. We have left the matter to the President asto the circumstances under which he would deem fit toremove any other member of the Election Commission;subject to one condition that-the Chief Election Commis-sioner must recommend that the removal is just andproper.

Then the question was whether the Electoral Com-

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mission should have authority to have an independent staffof its own to carry on the work which has been entrustedto it. It was felt that to allow the Election Commission tohave an independent machinery to carry on all the workof the preparation of the electoral roll, the revision of theroll, the conduct of the elections and so on would be reallyduplicating the machinery and creating unnecessaryadministrative expense which could be easily avoided forthe simple reason, as I have stated, that the work of theElectoral Commission may be at times heavy and at othertimes it may have no work. Therefore we have providedin clause (5) that it should be open for the Commissionto borrow from the provincial Governments such clericaland ministerial agency as may be necessary for thepurposes of carrying out the functions with which theCommission has been entrusted. When the work is over,that ministerial staff will return to the provincial Govern-ment. During the time that it is working under the ElectoralCommission no doubt administratively it would be respon-sible to the Commission and not to the ExecutiveGovernment. These are the provisions of this article andI hope the House will now realise what it means and inwhat respects it constitutes a departure from the originalarticles of the Draft Constitution.

Mr. President: Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava—do youwish to move your three amendments?

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: No. Sir.

Mr. President: Mr. Kapoor is not moving hisamendment. The article is open for discussion.

Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: Sir, I have given noticeof an amendment to an amendment to article 289.

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Sir, I beg to move:

"That in Amendment No. 99 of List I (Fifth Week), thefollowing amendments be incorporated:—

(1) At the end of clause (1) add the following words:—

'Subject to confirmation by 2/3rd majority in a jointsession of both the Houses of Parliament.'

(2) After the word appoint in clause (2), the followingwords be inserted:—

'Subject to confirmation by 2/3rd majority in a jointsession of both the Houses of Parliament.'

(3) In clause (3), for the words 'after consultation with'the words 'in concurrence with' be substituted.

(4) In clause (4) for the words 'President may by ruledetermine' the words 'Parliament may by law determine' besubstituted.

(5) In proviso (1) to clause (4) substitute 'ElectionCommissioners' for the words 'Chief Election Commission-er' in both places.

(6) In proviso (2) to clause (4) omit 'any other ElectionCommissioner or.'"

Mr. President, Sir, I must congratulate Dr. Ambedkaron moving his amendment. As he has said, his amendmentreally carries out the recommendations of the FundamentalRights Committee and in fact the matter was so importantthat it was thought at one time that it should be includedin the Fundamental Rights. The real purpose is that thefundamental right of adult franchise should not only be

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guaranteed by the Constitution but its proper exerciseshould also be guaranteed in practice. He has explainedto us that he has tried to make the Election Commissionwholly independent of the Executive and he thereforehopes that by this method the fundamental right tofranchise of all the individuals shall not only be guaranteedbut that it shall also be practiced in a proper manner sothat the elected people will represent the true wishes of thepeople of the country. After a careful study of hisamendment I have suggested my above amendments tocarry out the real purpose of Dr. Ambedkar's amendmentin full.

What is desired by my amendment is that the ElectionCommission shall be completely independent of theExecutive. Of course it shall be completely independent ofthe provincial Executives but if the President is to appointthis Commission, naturally it means that the Prime Ministerappoints this Commission. He will appoint the otherElection Commissioners on his recommendations. Nowthis does not ensure their independence. Of course oncehe is appointed, he shall not be removable except by 2/3rd majority of both the Houses. That is certainlysomething which can instil independence in him, but it isquite possible that some party in power who wants to winthe next election may appoint a staunch party-man as theChief Election Commissioner. He is removable only by 2/3rd majority of both Houses on grave charges, whichmeans he is almost irremovable. So what I want is this thateven the person who is appointed originally should be suchthat he should be enjoying the confidence of all parties_hisappointment should be confirmed not only by majority butby two-thirds majority of both the Houses. If it is only a baremajority, then the party in power could vote confidence in

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him but when I want 2/3rd majority it means that the otherparties must also concur in the appointment so that inorder that real independence of the Commission may beguaranteed, in order that everyone even in Opposition maynot have anything to say against the Commission, theappointments of the Commissioners and the Chief ElectionCommissioner must be by the President but the namesproposed by him should be such as command confidenceof a two-thirds majority of both the Houses of Legislatures.Then no person can come in who is a staunch party-man.He will necessarily have to be a man who will enjoy theconfidence of not only one party but also of the majorityof members of the Legislature. Then alone he can get a2/3rd majority in support of his appointments. I therefore,think that if the real paragraph of the recommendations ofthe Fundamental Rights Committee is to be carried out, asDr. Ambedkar proposes to do by this amendment, then hemust provide that the appointment shall not only be by thePresident but it shall be by the President subject toconfirmation by a two-thirds majority of both Houses ofParliament sitting and voting in a joint session.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: Don't you think that the party willissue whips to elect a certain man? He will be a party-man.

Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: What I have said is this.He will not be a Member of Parliament. He can be anybodyelse, but whosover is chosen must be a person who enjoysthe confidence of at least two-thirds majority of both theHouse of Parliament so that one single party in powercannot impose its own man on the country.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: The majority party will put up itsown candidate for the job and issue whips that all shouldvote for that candidate. Whether he is a Member oroutsider he will be a party nominee.

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Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: Majority means only 51per cent, but I want a two-thirds majority.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: You are having more than two-thirds majority already.

Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: At this time nothing willhelp in this matter. Whosoever you put forward will beelected. But we are making a Constitution for ever and notonly for today. Today of course whosover is appointed bythe President on the recommendation of the Cabinet willbe approved. We are lucky in having as our Prime Ministera man of independence and impartiality and he will seethat a proper person is appointed. But we cannot be surethat the Prime Minister will always be such a personality.I want that in the future, no Prime Minister may abuse thisright, and for this I want to provide that there should betwo-thirds majority which should approve the nominationby the President. Of course there is danger where oneparty is in a huge majority. As I said just now it is quitepossible that if our Prime Minister wants, he can have aman of his own party, but I am sure he will not do it. Still,if he does appoint a party-man, and the appointmentcomes up for confirmation in a joint session, even a smallopposition or even a few independent members can downthe Prime Minister before the bar of public opinion in theworld. Because we are in a majority we can have anythingpassed only theoretically. So the need for confirmation willinvariably ensure a proper choice. Therefore, I hope thismajority will not be used in a manner which is against theinterests of the nation or which goes against the impartialityand independence of the Election Commission. I want thatthere should be this provision in the Constitution so thateven in the future if some Prime Minister tends to bepartial, he should not be able to be so. Therefore, I want

13to provide that whenever such an appointment is made,the person appointed should not only be a nominee of thePresident but should enjoy the confidence of two-thirdsmajority of both the Houses of Parliament.

The second point made by Dr. Ambedkar was thatthis Commission may not have permanent work andtherefore only the Chief Election Commissioner should beappointed permanently and others should be appointedwhen necessary on his recommendations. Our Constitu-tion does not provide for a fixed four years election cyclelike the one in the United States of America. The electionswill probably be almost always going on in some provinceor the other. We shall have about thirty provinces after theStates have been integrated. Our Constitution provides forthe dissolution of the Legislature when a vote of no-confidence is passed. So it is quite possible that theelections to the various Legislatures in the provinces andthe Centre will not be all concurrent. Every time someelection or other will be taking place somewhere. It maynot be so in the very beginning or in the very first five orten years. But after ten or twelve years, at every momentsome election in some province will be going on.Therefore, it will be far more economical and useful if apermanent Election Commission is appointed_not only theChief Election Commissioner but three or five Members of-the Commission who should be permanent and whoshould conduct the elections. I do not think that there willbe lack of work because as I said in our Constitution allthe elections will not synchronize but they will be at varyingtimes in accordance with the vote of no-confidence passedin various Legislatures and the consequent dissolution ofthe Legislatures. Therefore, I think that there will be nodearth of work. This Commission should be a permanent

14Commission and all the Commissioners should be appoint-ed in the same manner as the Chief Election Commission-er. They should all be appointed by a two-thirds majorityof the Legislature and be removable in the same manner.

In clause (3) it has been said that the President mayappoint Regional Commissioners after consultation withthe Election Commission, that means the Chief ElectionCommissioner. Mere consultation means the Presidentcan have his way even disregarding the views of the ChiefElection Commissioner. Therefore, I want "in concurrencewith" so that if anyone disagrees,_if the Election Commis-sion or the President disagree about a person_then hecannot be appointed.

Clause (4) says that "the conditions of service andtenure of office of the Election Commissioners shall besuch as the President may by rule determine." This I thinkis not proper. The conditions of service and tenure of officeetc., of the Election Commissioners should not be in thepower of the President to determine. Otherwise he can usehis influence in a manner prejudicial to their independence.Therefore, I want that these things should be determinedby Parliament by law and they should be permanent sothat nobody will be able to change them and no ElectionCommissioner will then look to the President for favours.

These are my suggestions so that the ElectionCommission may be really an independent Commissionand the real fundamental right, the right of adult franchise,may be exercised in a proper manner. I agree with all thatDr. Ambedkar has said and I only want to suggest thatwhat he has suggested will not be sufficient to carry outwhat he wishes.

Shri H. V. Pataskar (Bombay: General): Mr. Presi-

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dent, Sir, I have carefully gone through the new amend-ment No. 99 moved by my respected Friend Dr. Ambedkarand I have also very carefully listened to the argumentsthat he advanced. While I agree with him entirely, that theelections in any democratic form of Government must befree from any sort of executive interference I still do notunderstand and realise the necessity of making it whollycentralised always. That is the only point. I am going todiscuss the difference between the original article 289 asit stood in the Draft Constitution and the new article whichhas been suggested in its place by amendment No. 99,and particularly clause (3) of the same. I would now liketo give a brief history of this article. There was first thereport of the Union Constitution Committee daied the 4thJuly 1947 and on page 55 there was this paragraph:

"The superintendence, direction and control of allelections, whether federal or provincial held under thisConstitution, including the appointment of election tribu-nals for decision of doubts and disputes arising out of orin connection with such elections shall be vested in aCommission to be appointed by the President."

This clause (24) therefore laid it down that whether itis federal or provincial, the superintendence, direction andcontrol of elections should vest in one single Commission.Then the matter came before this House on 29th June1947 and I brought forward an amendment confining it tofederal elections only. The idea was that there should besimilarly constituted independent tribunals for provincesalso. The underlying reason even then was that electionsshould be free; the only question was that there should beseparate independent Commissions for the provinces orStates. The idea was that it would be difficult for oneCommission sitting here in Delhi or somewhere else to

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supervise elections all over India. That amendment wasaccepted by the then mover of the clause, Honourable Mr.Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. The idea of every one, includingDr. Ambedkar, then was that elections would be kept freefrom executive interference. The only point was that thereshould be different Commissions as one Commissioncould not carry out the functions entrusted to it. Then on29th August the Drafting Committee was appointed whichconsidered the decision of the House in framing article 289(1) and (2). The Draft Report says:

"The Committee has not thought it necessary toincorporate in the Constitution electoral details includingdelimitation of constituencies, etc."

They left it to be provided by auxiliary legislation. Sothey considered the decision of this House of the 29th Julyand the original article 289 is in conformity with that. Andthe House will consider whether clauses (1) and (2) ofarticle 289 are not enough for the purpose. Granting thatelections are the basis of democracy and should be freefrom executive interference, let us see whether article 289(1) and (2) are or are not enough. So far as federalelections are concerned the provisions of the presentamendment or substituted article and clause (1) of article-289 are the same. Supposing we have to provide for theappointment of a federal Commission, it cannot be doneby the Central Government which is an ExecutiveAuthority. It has to be done by the President. Then withregard to clause (2) the Drafting Committee thought thatwith respect tQ the appointment of a Commission for theprovince it will be equally independent if that appointmentwas made not by the Government of the day but by theGovernor of this State. At the time of the Draft the idea wasthat there should be an elected Governor. Now at present

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we have no elected Governor but now we have providedfor a Governor who will be nominated by the President. Sovirtually the appointment of the Commission to be madeby the nominated Governor will be in the hands of thePresident himself. The Commission appointed by thePresident for the purpose of elections to the federallegislature can be independent. But I do not see why inthe provinces the Commission appointed by the Governorshould not be equally independent. His official existencedepends entirely on the President. In that respect, if it wasthought necessary, the power could be given to thePresident himself to make the appointment of a ProvincialCommissioner. But is it necessary that we should go backand have one Central Commission only with all theinconveniences that it is likely to cause? Then clause (3)removes the Regional Commission altogether. There isonly one Central Commission and the Regional Commis-sioners are to assist that Election Commission. Is itdesirable that one Commission sitting in one corner ofIndia should be entrusted to do this work, and the RegionalCommissioners are merely to assist? I see absolutely noreason why this should be done. Then I find that, after theConstitution was presented to us, a note was given to ustowards the middle of May 1949 which indicates to us thereasons for changing what we decided on 29th July 1947.Let us analyse the reasons given. The first reason is thatthis is a matter which requires careful consideration andthat it has been hinted in a section of the press that insome provinces the Governments are helping the registra-tion of their own supporters. This is a point which wasadverted to by Dr. Ambedkar also. Sir, there will be no onein this House who will not condemn such practices aimedat denying the people the franchise which this Constitutiongives them. But then what is the remedy for it? The proper

18remedy would be to take action against people who resortto such practices. The Central Government has full powerand authority to see that nothing of the kind is done. Thisis in the interests of democracy. Then we are told that itis hinted in a certain section of the press that certainprovincial Governments are taking certain irregular actions.Sir, if it is merely a hint why should we be upset? PerhapsDr. Ambedkar knows better how things are happening inthe provinces. He may have information in the Cabinet. Ifthis is so, it is better to take action against people who triflewith democracy on linguistic, racial or other considerations.

Another reason given is that in the bye-elections tothe provincial assemblies it has been alleged by membersof the losing party that provincial Governments take undueadvantage of their position. That is bad. But I fail tounderstand how a change in the procedure as contemplat-ed is going to bring about better state of affairs. If here aresuch people in Government they are unfit to be there inany democratic Government. If one or two instances of thiskind have come to the notice the remedy is not to put downsomething in the Constitution which is not found anywhereelse. These two reasons given in the report do not appealto me.

Then it is said that the idea occurred to the DraftingCommittee to change their draft of article 289 by areference to what has been done in the Canadian ElectionAct of 1920. Sir, I find that that Act refers only to theappointment of a Chief Commissioner for the purpose ofelection to the Dominion Parliament. At page 380 of hislatest book on the Canadian Government, Dr. Dawsonsays that the appointment of a Chief Commissioner orChief Electoral Officer was made to provide for anindependent official to supervise the Dominion Elections.

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It is only for the Federal election that the Chief Officerfunctions. For that there is no objection here also. Thereis already article 289(a). It is rather strange that even forprovincial elections such an appointment should beconsidered necessary by the Central Authority.

To my mind the reason for all these changes is to befound in the fact that we are now trying gradually to moveaway from the idea of federation. On account of certainhappenings in the provinces, on account of certain internalsituations and external factors which are threatening us weare trying more and more to reverse the process of havinga federation with which we started our business here. Thefirst resolution of this Assembly known as the famousObjectives Resolution which we passed was to form aUnion of autonomous units together with residuary powers.We" are moving away from that position. We started withthe idea of a Union or Federation of autonomous units. Itmay or may not' be • necessary now, to have suchautonomous units. We have changed the name ofprovinces into States. Then came the great tragedy ofpartition which gave a swing in favour of the unitary typeof Government. It is due to this sort of thing that we arenow trying to make everything, as we think, safe. We areclinging to the form of federation but we are changing itfrom within in substance. It is this process which hasresulted in the amendment now under consideration. Theland-marks in this process are that we changed from theelected Governors into nominated Governors and we arewanting to have for the Centre power to legislate in respectof subjects given to the provinces. Now we have thisproposal that in matters of election, even to provinciallegislatures, the Centre alone should have power. In fact,this amendment No. 99 means that we are abolishing all

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provincial commissioners for elections, for what reason I donot know. If a Commission is appointed by the Presidentfor the Centre, why should not the same President appointalso Election Commissioners for the different provinces?Always why should we interfere with the. provincialelections and thwart the process of democracy? I submitthat this means that we are creating more and more pointsof difference between the Provinces and the Centre. Afterall, is this necessary? If you do not trust your Governor ashe is likely to be influenced by the provincial Government,let the President appoint provincial commissioners orregional commissioners for elections. Why do you supposethat in the provinces there will be no purity of administrationand that democratic practices will not be followed? It is notproper. I think a provision like this will only mean that weare getting away from the principles of federation and ourdistrust of even the nominated Governors is there. We aregoing to have adult franchise and for the transition periodcertain exceptional provisions may be necessary. But thatneed not lead us into framing a provision of this nature.After all in elections on the basis of adult franchise,whether for the Centre or for the province, the same typeof people are likely to be returned and so I do notunderstand why there should be this distinction betweenthe two. This can only result in creating a spirit of hostilitywhich cannot and should not exist. Sir, I admit that thepresent conditions justify that there shall be a strongCentral Government, but what is the idea of the CentralGovernment being strong? Is it the idea that the CentralGovernment should be so strong that the provinces will bedeprived of their legitimate powers? It has become thefashion these days to say that if anybody talks of theprovinces, it is something anti-national. This is entirelywrong.

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Mr. President: Are you likely to take much time?

Shri H. V. Pataskar: Yes, Sir.

Mr. President: Then you can continue tomorrow.

Mr. Tajamul Husain (Bihar: Muslim): Before youadjourn the Assembly, since we have been reading in thepapers that the Assembly

Mr. President: If the honourable Member had waited,I was myself going to make a statement before adjourning.

We shall continue the discussion of this articletomorrow. Before we adjourn today, I desire to make onestatement with regard to the programme of work. We havealready dealt with nearly three-fourth of the Constitution.There are certain articles and certain Parts which have notyet been dealt with, but with regard to which we are notin a position today to take up the discussion. For example,the position of the Indian States in some cases is not quiteclear yet. Then, there is the question of the distribution ofrevenues between the Union and the Units. This requiresconsultation between the Central Government and theprovincial Governments. We are not in a position to havethat Conference immediately for various reasons, one ofwhich is that the Finance Minister has to be away fromIndia for some time in connection with urgent nationalwork. It has therefore become necessary to adjourndiscussion of the remaining articles of the Constitution forsome time so that within the time available theseconsultations may be held and the articles may be takenup for consideration at a time when everybody is ready todeal with them finally. It has therefore been proposed thatwe adjourn discussion of the other articles of theConstitution after tomorrow and we meet again, say, about

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five weeks later, and then we pass the remaining articlesof the Constitution in the second reading. When that willbe finished, some time will be taken up in putting thevarious articles in their proper places, looking into thevarious articles from the drafting point of view and alsoconsidering whether any lacuna has been left or whetherany changes are required when the whole picture is beforethe Drafting Committee. That will take some time and whenthat has been done, we shall meet for the third readingwhich, I hope, will be a short session because the wholething will have been thrashed out in the second readingstage and we shall be able to get through the third readingpretty rapidly. That is the programme as I envisage it, andtherefore I desire Members to note that we shall beadjourning after tomorrow for about five weeks. I shallannounce the exact date of the meeting later on.

Shri R. K. Sidhva: Any idea of the date?

Mr. President: As I said, I shall announce the exactdate later on.

Mr. Tajamul Husain: Under the rules, the Presidenthas no power to adjourn the House for more than threedays.

Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi (Madras: General):A formal resolution can be moved tomorrow before weadjourn.

Mr. President: When we adjourn, we shall adjourn inaccordance with the rules.

We adjourn now till Eight O'clock tomorrow morning.

The Assembly then adjourned till Eight of the Clockon Thursday, the 16th June 1949.

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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA

Thursday the 16th June 1949

The Constituent Assembly of India met in theConstitution Hall, New Delhi, at Eight of the Clock, Mr.President (The Honourable Dr. Rajendra Prasad) in theChair

TAKING THE PLEDGE AND SIGNING THE REGISTER

The following Members took the pledge and signedthe Register:—

(1) Sheikh Mohd. Ahdullah.

(2) Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg.[Kashmir]

(3) Maulana Mohd. Syeed Masoodi.

(4) Shri Moti Ram Bagda.

Mr. President: I am sure the House will join me inextending a cordial welcome to Sheikh Mohd. Abdullahand the three other Members, who have joined theAssembly today and are going to take their seats for thefirst time. This brings to the Assembly now the fullcomplement of representatives from all the States thathave acceded to India.

Shri H.V. Kamnath(C.P. & Berar: General): Bhopaland Hyderabad?

Mr President: Their presence, I am sure is going tobe of great help in framing the Constitution which isintended to cover the whole country and which, I am sure,

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will receive full support from all its constituent members.They have been somewhat late in coming but it is not theirfault, nor do I think it is our fault. Circumstances have beensuch that they have been delayed, but I am sure they havecome in time to make very useful contributions to ourConstitution.

DRAFT CONSTITUTION—contd.

Article 289

Mr. President: We shall now proceed with thediscussion of article 289. Mr. Pataskar.

Shri H.V. Pataskar (Bombay. General): Sir, I am newgoing to look at this question from a constitutional point ofview. So far as I am aware there is no other Constitutionwhere such elaborate provisions with respect to theelections and its details are made. Even the CanadianElection Act on the basis of which the present amendmentand the subsequent amendments which are to follow aredrafted, is an Act of the Canadian Legislature, and that too,as I said yesterday, as far as I can find out from the recordsavailable to me, applicable only to the Dominion Parlia-ment in Canada. In spite of all efforts, I could not get a copyof it either in the Legislative Library or this library. All thesame, from the documents available, I am convinced. Mypoint is whether really it is necessary or desirable that allthese elaborate details about the method of election, aboutthe Election Commission, etc., are necessary to beincluded in the Constitution. While, as we could find, thereis some justification probably from what must have cometo the notice of the Drafting Committee and in view of thework which is now proceeding for the preparation for the

25

elections, that they want some provision of this kind to bemade, the best remedy would be not to include them in theConstitution here, but to get an Act passed by thelegislative section of the Constituent Assembly. I am toldit is likely to meet in September next and it would not havemattered if an Act on the lines of the Canadian ElectionAct was passed by the Central Legislature. It is notdesirable that it should be provided for in the Constitutionwhich is for all time to come. We do not know whatconditions may prevail after ten or twenty years. From whatis happening in some parts of the country, it is notdesirable that our Constitution should be burdened with allthese details. I would therefore still appeal—probably itmay be without much effect—that all these things and thesubsequent provisions which are to follow could have moreappropriately found a place in the Act to be passed by theCentral Legislature. We have our own legislature even nowand that could have been used.

Sir, I do not think it is desirable in matters of suchconsequence we should try to depart from time to timefrom what we decided earlier, unless there were some verycogent reasons as to why that decision should be reversedafter a few months' time. As I said, so far as I can see,article 289(2) is quite enough for the purpose. Even underarticle 289(2) we can appoint not merely some officials ofthe Government as Election Commissioners, but people ofthe position of High Court Judges; we can make thempermanent; we can make them as Independent as we aretrying to make them in the case of the Central Commission.Even under the Government of India Act, 1935, whichcertainly did not contemplate so much of a FederalGovernment as a type of Government which was to someextent more unitary than otherwise, provision for election

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was contained in section 291. It says: "In so far asprovision with respect to the matters hereinafter mentionedis not made by this Act, His Majesty in Council may fromtime to time make provision with respect to those mattersor any of them the conduct of elections under this Actand the methods of voting thereat etc." Even then,practically it was left to the provincial Governments. I donot see any reason why we should make provision for allthese things in the Constitution itself and as far as I havebeen able to ascertain, no other Constitution contains aprovision of this nature.

I have therefore to make one or two concretesuggestions. We may keep, article 289 as it is. We maysupplement it by an Act of the Central Legislature formaking provision with respect to all other matters which arenow tried to be put in this Constitution, as to what shouldbe the status of these Regional and other Commissionerswhen they are appointed, whether they should beindependent men of the position of High Court Judges,how they should be removed and all these things. I agreethat they should be free from influence of the executive.All that we can easily entrust at least to the present CentralLegislature."

Finally, I have to make an appeal that it is not yet toolate in the day when we should really seriously considerwhether article 289(2) is not enough. As I have alreadystated, the amendment takes away to my mind not only thelast vestige of provincial autonomy, but actually displays adistrust of our people of the provinces, down from theGovernor nominated by the President to the smallest localauthority. I do not think there is any justification for anattitude of this type. Therefore, I suggest that we should

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not try to incorporate all these things in the Constitutionitself.

Shri R.K. Sidhva (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr.President, Sir, I consider this article in the Constitution asone of the important articles as far as elections areconcerned. I do not think that there are two opinions eitherin this House or outside the House that elections shouldbe fair, pure, honest and impartial. If that is the view, I amsure it could be achieved only by an impartial agency ashas been contemplated in this article. We want theelections to be above-board. Any machinery that is to beset up should be quite independent, free from anyinfluence from any agency, executive or anybody. There-fore, Sir, I whole-heartedly welcome the article that hasbeen proposed by my honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar.

Sir, I do feel that even this article does not go as faras is necessary in the matter of perfection of elections isconcerned. I will show you presently that there is some-defect in this article also. With all that, I feel that everyeffort has been made in this article to achieve the objectwhich we all are anxious to achieve.

It has been stated, why do you encroach upon therights of the provinces by entrusting this work to a SpecialCommission. Now, Sir, I fail to understand how thequestion of encroaching upon the right of the provincesarises at all. This Commission will not run the elections forthe provincial legislatures only, but it will run the electionsfor the Central Legislature also. If, it encroaches on therights of the provinces, it encroaches on the rights of theCentre also, and therefore it is unfair to say that itencroaches upon the rights of the provinces.

Under this article, a machinery has been set up for

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election purposes. While it has been made independent ofthe executive for purposes of administration, clause (5)says that the staff required for election work may beborrowed from the provinces. Herein lies the defect, whichI said makes the scheme imperfect. If you want to makethe scheme perfect, you should not borrow any staff fromthe provinces. Though during the period of election, thestaff would be under the control of the Commission, it willbe only for a temporary period. They will be permanentpeople responsible to the executive and if the executivewants to play mischief, it can issue secret instructions tothat staff to act according to their behests. The staff mayfeel that their permanent duty lay with the executive, thatthe work with the Commission was for a short period andthey would thus carry out the fiat or behest of thepermanent officials. Therefore, Sir, I would have preferredall the staff to be also recruited from outside but Iconsidered myself as to what will be the effect of it. It willrequire an army of men. Those persons who have seenthe elections being run and those who are interested in itknow that to run the elections of the whole country theywill have to recruit a number of men, a large army of men.It will be very expensive; therefore, although to that extentit is imperfect, I accept it for the reason that it is nearerto perfection. If we have to recruit a new staff it will beprohibitive as far as expenditure is concerned and it will bea new untrained staff and probably it will not beadministratively as effective as we would expect it to be.Another provision is as regards the permanency of theCommission. It has been suggested why you incur somuch expenditure in providing for a permanent Commis-sion. I have some experience of election of the KarachiMunicipal Corporation both as the Mayor and Chairman ofthe Standing Committee. There is a provision in the

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Karachi Municipal Act that there shall be a permanentelection staff and in accordance with that since ten yearswe have introduced this permanently and the electionshave been fair and perfect, although compared withKarachi the number of voters there being negligible but theimpersonation and the false votes have been completelyremoved by that method which we have introduced. I ampositive that with the permanent Commission that we aregoing to establish, we are going to remove all thesedefects and it is incorrect to state that this Commission willnot have any work after the general election is over. Weshall have now about 4,000 members in all the provincesand there will be bye-elections. Surely every month therewill be two or three elections-some will die, some will bepromoted to high offices-some will go here and there. Inthis Constituent Assembly during the short period we havehad a number of bye-elections although we had nothingto do with them, but in the places from which they havecome there have been a number of elections. Therefore,apart from the necessity and fairness, this Commission willhave ample work. Apart from that if the Commission ispermanent, what will it do? Periodically it will examine theelectoral rolls and from the statistics of those provincesthose who are dead they will remove those names and willbring the electoral rolls up to date as far as possible. Anelectoral roll is to provide pure election and I know atpresent as the electoral rolls are prepared, 50 per cent ofthem are defective. Some are dead and their names areintentionally put in by a particular party who wants to runthe election and wants to put in names of their own choice;I have heard people living in the cities trying to influenceby mixing up with the executive. I can tell you that frommy own personal experience and i feel that if we were tohave a perfect electoral roll-and electoral roll is the

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principal thing in an election—I am sure we must have anindependent Commission and if we establish a PermanentCommission we shall certainly have a permanent roll anda very good electoral roll. I have no doubt in my mind aboutthat and therefore, though you say that it will be anexpensive thing and it is not a necessity, I strongly sayfrom my experience that this Commission is very neces-sary under the circumstances that I have mentioned.

Now coming to the tribunal, it will be necessary for theelection petitions or those who have to make anyapplication for the election, to have a Tribunal. I have alsocertain experience of tribunals. Tribunals have beenappointed by the Governors in the past and they haveappointed tribunals, at the instance of the Executive, of thefavourites and they have never acted impartially. Itherefore suggest that the tribunal should consist of judgesof superior courts to whom the election petitions of theelection should go. I am, opposed to such cases beingentrusted to any kind of tribunals. It will mar the verypurpose and the very object for which we are striving—tohave our elections pure and fair—it will frustrate that veryobject, if in the tribunal that will be appointed, some kindof mischief is made. In England also-l might state-theConstitutional law of the British Commonwealth providesfor entrusting this work to superior courts. I thereforesuggest that although nothing could be provided in thisConstitution, I do not desire that the Constitution should beburdened with all this-but in the Act that will be made-theElection Act-wherein many things are required to be put in,e.g., the secret ballot boxes etc.-l suggest to Dr. Ambedkarto bear that in mind that when the Parliament Act is madeit must be made clear that the tribunal's appointmentshould not be left to the President or anybody-l do not want

31hereafter any kind of trickery that was played in the pastshould be played hereafter. With all that, I feel that thepermanent superior judiciary alone can fairly and impartial-ly adjudicate in such disputes and they will command theconfidence of the public. Those who will be appointed frompublic men or some lawyers may be best lawyers but theywill be temporary men and would be liable to influence. Ifthe tribunal does not consist of responsible permanentmen I am sure these tribunals will be of no effect. MyFriend Mr. Pataskar desired that why burden the Consti-tution with election scheme, the rules may be made; butI can surely and safely tell him that if we have not suchan article in our Constitution our very purpose of makingour elections pure will be frustrated; it is, therefore,necessary that it should be provided here. I do not wantthis to go into the Election Act. I really wish even some ofthe other provisions e.g., the secret ballot-box could alsobe provided in the Constitution which is very essential foran election. The whole thing depends upon the election forthe future constituencies and if we do not make thisprovision in the Constitution and leave it to Parliament tobe made, it will be running a great risk. Under thesecircumstances I whole-heartedly welcome this article andstrongly support it.

Shri Kuladhar Chaliha (Assam: General): Mr. Pres-ident, I have heard with great attention the argumentsadvanced by Dr. Ambedkar who is the Constitutionalmanoeuvrer and whose industry and diligence is a wonderto all of us. Yet, his arguments have not brought thatconviction which ordinarily they bring. His main objectionis-he first argued that he wanted it to be inserted in theFundamental Rights but as it was said that he wanted aseparate provision for this, so this article has been added

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in order to safeguard the interest of the electorate-hethought that a body outside the Executive should be thereto conduct the elections; but what is that body outside theExecutive? It is the President who will select the ChiefElection Commissioner and he is a party-man whatever itmay be and will have the same prejudices and same biastowards his own party-man as anyone else and thereforethat argument does not hold very good. Secondly, he saysand he admits that it is a radical change and I do not seeany reason why this radical change is brought forward. Hashe been able to give us examples of corruption andnepotism in case of election tribunals in the provinces? Noinstance has been given of abuse of power by the electiontribunals appointed by the Governors in the provinces. Inspite of that he wants a radical change. Of course radicalillness requires a radical remedy, but Dr. Ambedkar has notbeen able to give one single instance of corruption orabuse of powers by these election tribunals. On thecontrary we know that, as a result of the findings of anelection tribunal in Sind, Pir llahi Bux was removed by hisown party-men, which shows that our people have thecapacity to be impartial. I see no reason why this radicalchange should be necessary.

Then it is said that there are minorities in theprovinces who require protection. But should we keepthem in haughty isolation and not pave the way forharmonious relations with the general population? Bydoing this you will be. creating big problems for theseprovinces. It is said that they are racially and linguisticallydifferent. But will you perpetuate these differences orshould you try to remove them? I submit that nojustification has been offered for this radical change. Dr.Ambedkar has brought this forward on the analogy of the

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Canadian Act of 1920. But there they have a smallpopulation as against our 340 millions, and one ElectionCommission would hardly do for this country. In spite ofthere being Regional Commissioners this Election Com-mission would not be able to realise the feelings of thepeople of different parts of the country. They would notknow what a man in Madras would do and what a man inAssam would do. I submit that this thing should not betaken out of the provinces. If you suspect the provincesand take greater powers for the Centre it will only lead toundesirable results. If you cannot trust men like Messrs.Pant, Kher and Shukla and the men working under themyou will hardly make a success of democracy. You aredoing something which will have a disintegrating effect andwill accentuate differences instead of solving them. If youlake too much power for the Centre the provinces will tryto break away from you. How can a man in Madrasunderstand the feelings and sentiments of a man in Assamor Bengal? You seem to think that all the best qualities arepossessed by people here in the Centre. But the provincescharge you with taking too much power and reducing themto a municipal body without any initiative left in them. Youthink you possess better qualities than the men in theprovinces, but I know there are people there who are muchbetter than you are. If you cannot trust the honesty of yourown individuals you can never make a success ofdemocracy. You are always suspicious and think that theprovince will be unjust to the minorities. But if they are keptaloof and always under the protection of the President orthe central executive, they will never be able to developtheir own virtues, and you will only be encouragingdisturbances and rebellions. It has been suggested thatthe Scheduled class people are suspicious about theimpartiality of the provinces. But they are our own people

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and they can be just as fair and impartial as men in theCentre. Why should you think that you have developed thevirtue of impartiality which no one else possesses? Sir, Ifail to see why this provision should be sought to beembodies in the Constitution.

Sir, the Governor is appointed by the Centre and hewill form election tribunals, as has been done in the past.In spite of Mr. Sidhva's assertion I must say that no caseof partiality has been proved against any of these tribunals.In a case in which I was interested I know that even whenthe Congress was in the bad books of Government, thetribunal decided in favour of the Congress, although thecandidate was opposed by Rai Bahadurs and other bigmen. That shows that they can be impartial. Why shouldyou condemn your own men as partial, unjust andincapable of being honest? If we cannot trust our ownpeople we are not worthy of our independence, Sir, aninjustice is sought to be done to the provinces and theyare needlessly suspected, and I therefore oppose thisproposal.

Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (United Provinces:Genera!): Sir, my honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar moveda new article yesterday in place of article 289 as containedin the Draft Constitution. The article deals with a veryimportant matter and departs radically from the corre-sponding article in the Draft Constitution. Nevertheless hecontented himself with moving this amendment withoutexplaining in the smallest measure the reasons why thenew Draft had been proposed. When I pointed out that itwas not fair to the House that an article dealing with a veryimportant matters should be placed before the Housewithout a full explanation of its provisions he felt the need

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for defending himself. But finding that he was in a verydifficult position he became reckless and said I had askedfor an explanation only because I had not read theamendment. It was obvious that this irresponsible state-ment of his did not satisfy the House and he was thereforecompelled to explain the differences between the newDraft and the old Draft.

Sir, several points arise in connection with thisquestion. The most important question is one of principle.It is right that in a matter of this kind the provincialGovernments which are being given full responsiblegovernment should be deprived of all power? I shall notdilate on this subject because it has been dealt with veryably and fully by our honourable Friend Mr. Pataskar. DrAmbedkar defended the new procedure which makes theCentral Government responsible for superintendence,control and guidance in all matters relating to thepreparation of the electoral rolls and the conduct of theelections on the ground that complaints had been receivedfrom some provinces that members belonging to racial,linguistic or cultural minorities were being excluded, underministerial instructions, from the lists of voters. I do notknow to what extent the complaints received by him or bythe Government of India have been investigated and foundto be correct. Supposing that they have been found to becorrect, one has to ask oneself why this elaborateConstitution is being framed. If we cannot expect commonhonesty from persons occupying the highest positions inthe discharge of their duties, the foundation for responsiblegovernment is wanting, and the outlook for the future isindeed gloomy. I do not know of any federal Constitutionin which the Centre is charged with the duty of getting theelectoral rolls prepared and the elections held fairly and

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without prejudice to any minority—there may be someconstitution in which such a provision exists, but I am notaware of it. In all probability ours will be the only federalor quasi-federal Constitution in which the Provinces will beexcluded from all share in the preparation of the electoralrolls and other ancillary matters except in so far as theirhelp is needed by the Election Commissioners appointedby the President.

Even granting however, Sir, that there is need fortaking the control of elections out of the hands of theprovincial Governments we have to see whether the newDraft contains the necessary safeguards. It may be rightto curtail the political power of the provinces; but is thereno danger, if the article is left as it is that the politicalprejudices of the Central Government may prevail whereotherwise the political prejudices of the provincial Govern-ments might have prevailed? Everything in the new Draftis left to the President; the appointment of the ElectionCommission will be made by the President; he will appointthe Chief Election Commissioner and decide how manyElection Commissioners should be appointed; he willdecide the conditions of service and tenure of office of theElection Commissioners and the Regional Commissionersthat might have to be appointed. Again, while it is providedthat the Chief Election Commissioner should not beremoved except in the same manner as a Judge of theSupreme Court, the removal of the other Election Commis-sioners is left in the hands of the President. He can removeany Commissioner he likes in consultation with the ChiefElection Commissioner. Clause (4) of the article whichdeals with this matter is so important that I think it isdesirable that I should read it put to the House. Itsays:

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"The conditions of service and tenure of office of theElection Commissioners and the Regional Commissionersshall be such as the President may by rule determine:

Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shallnot be removed from office except in like mannerand on the like grounds as a judge of theSupreme Court and the conditions of service ofthe Chief Election Commissioner shall not bevaried to his disadvantage after his appointment;

Provided further that any other Election Commission-er or a Regional Commissioner shall not beremoved from office except on the recommenda-tion of the Chief Election Commissioner."

I find, Sir, that I made a mistake when I said that theother Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis-sioners could be removed in consultation with the ChiefElection Commissioner. They can be removed only on therecommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. Heretwo things are noticeable: the first is that it is only the ChiefElection Commissioner that can feel that he can dischargehis duties without the slightest fear of incurring thedispleasure of the executive, and the second is that theremoval of the other Election Commissioners will dependon the recommendations of one man only, namely theChief Election Commissioner. However responsible hemay be it seems to me very undesirable that the removalof his colleagues who will occupy positions as.responsibleas those of judges of the Supreme Court should dependon the opinion of one man. We are anxious, Sir, that thepreparation of the electoral rolls and the conduct ofelections should be entrusted to people who are free frompolitical bias and whose impartiality can be relied upon in

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all circumstances. But, by leaving a great deal of power inthe hands of the President we have given room for theexercise of political influence in the appointment of theChief Election Commissioner and the other ElectionCommissioners and officers by the Central Government.The Chief Election Commissioner will have to be appointedon the advice of the Prime Minister, and, if the PrimeMinister suggests the appointment of a party-man, thePresident will have no option but to accept the PrimeMinster's nominee, however unsuitable he may be onpublic grounds. (Interruption). Somebody asked me why itshould be so. As full responsible Government will prevailat the Centre, the President cannot be expected to acl inany matter at his discretion. He can only act on the adviceof the Ministry and, when, in matters of patronage, hereceives the recommendations of the Prime Minister, hecannot, if he wants to act as a constitutional Head of theRepublic, refuse to accept them. I think, Sir, therefore, thatthe Draft placed before us by Dr. Ambedkar has to bemodified in several respects, so that the Election Commis-sion may, in reality, consist of impartial persons and theElection Commissioners may be able to discharge theirresponsible duties fearlessly.

My remedy for the defects that I have pointed out isthat Parliament should be authorised to make provision forthese matters by law. Again, Sir, this article does not laydown the qualifications of persons who are chosen asChief Election Commissioners or as Election Commission-ers. And, as I have already pointed out, in the matter ofremoval, the Election Commissioners are not on the samefooting as the Chief Election Commissioner. I feel, Sir, thatthe opinion that I have placed before the House, was atone time or other the opinion of Dr. Ambedkar too. We

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have in the List of Amendments, amendment No. 103which has not been moved by Dr. Ambedkar, but has beengiven notice of by him. Honourable Members who haveread this amendment will have noticed that clause (2)provides that a 'member of the Commission shall only beremoved from office in like manner and on the like groundsas a judge of the Supreme Court, and the conditions ofservice of a member of the Commission shall not be variedto his disadvantage after his appointment.' It will be cleartherefore that the suggestion that I have made is in accordwith' the better judgement of Dr. Ambedkar which,unfortunately, has not been allowed to prevail.

I know, Sir, that Dr. Ambedkar told us yesterday thatit might be unnecessary to have permanent ElectionCommissioners and that all that might be required mightbe to appoint Election Commissions when there is workenough for them to do. In such a case obviously theprocedure relating to the removal of judges of the SupremeCourt cannot be applied in the case of Election Commis-sioners. This is true, but then there is no reason why thewhole matter should be left in the hands of the President,and why the conditions and tenure of service of theElection Commissioners should be determined by rule byhim. These, too, should be determined by law made byParliament.

Again, Sir, we have to consider the position ofRegional Commissioners who may have to be appointedin. the provinces in order to help the Election Commissionin carrying out its duties honestly and efficiently. It isobvious that so long as these officers are holding theiroffices they will be carrying out highly responsible duties.It will depend on them primarily whether the preparation of

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the electoral rolls and all matters connected with theconduct of the elections gives satisfaction to the public ornot. Now, in the Draft which was not placed by him beforethe House Dr. Ambedkar provided with regard to theRegional Commissioners and the Returning Officers, etc.,that no such authority or officer would be removed exceptby order of the President. As I have already pointed outa change has been made now and their removal has beenmade to depend on the recommendation of the ChiefElection Commissioner. This has been done presumablybecause the Election Commissioners would be permanentofficers and if there is only one permanent officer, the lawcannot obviously require that the removal of the RegionalCommissioners and the Returning Officers should dependon the decision of the Commissioners, as a whole. But forthis very reason, Sir, the matter ought not to be left to thesweet will of the President, in reality the Prime Minister ofthe day, but should be determined by law.

My honourable Friend, Professor Shibban Lai Saksena,moved a number of amendments yesterday, Sir, withregard to the new Draft placed before the House by Dr.Ambedkar. It may not be practicable to accept some ofthem, but I think that he has done a public service bydrawing the attention of the House to the glaring defectsin the Draft that we are considering. I think it is the dutyof my honourable Friend, Dr. Ambedkar, to consider thematter carefully and to provide such safeguards as will givegeneral satisfaction by ensuring that our electoral machin-ery will be free not merely from provincial politicalinfluences but also from Central politicalinfluences. We aregoing in for democarcy based on adult franchise. It isnecessary therefore that every possible step should betaken to ensure the fair working of the electoral machinery.

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If the electoral machinery is defective or is not efficient oris worked by people whose integrity cannot be dependedupon, democracy will be poisoned at the source; nay,people, instead of learning from elections how they shouldexercise their vote, how by a judicious use of thier votethey can bring about changes in the Constitution andreforms in the administration, will learn only how partiesbased on intrigues can be formed and what unfair methodsthey can adopt to secure what they want.

Mr. President: I think that Members understand thatwe will have to finish the agenda today. Otherwise we mayhave to sit tomorrow.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad (West Bengal: Muslim): Mr.President, Sir, I have come here to support this article. Atthe beginning when I came to this Assembly for the firsttime, I thought that the Provinces should be made strongand the Centre to that extent must yield. But after aconsiderable amount of experience and on prolongedconsideration of what is happening in the Provinces andin the States, I am now of the opinion that for many yearsto come the Centre must take charge of all importantmatters affecting the general well-being of the country andencroach on the Provincial field. Election is a mostimportant item in a democratic set-up and it is verynecessary that it should be controlled and supervised bya very competent, independent and impartial body. Theway in which some of the Provinces are proceeding shoWsthat the Provinces are rent by party factions arid it willalways be the desire of the party, or the faction in powerfor the time being, to appoint election tribunals and officersof their own choice with a view to control or manipulate theelections. The result will be that election tribunals and

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officers will not be free from corruption and partiality. It isfor this reason that I welcome the move by the Centre tocontrol elections, so that thereby the impartiality andefficiency of the election machine cound be ensured. Wehave had the experience of West Bengal and otherProvinces. West Bengal is rent by party factions. Even inthe Congress ranks in Calcutta and in the districts thereare several groups and factions accusing one another ofhabitual corruption and the like. They are fighting againstone another in a most unseemly fashion to the detrimentof the general well-being of the country. This is alsohappening in some of the States. We have the unseemlyquarrel in the Greater Rajasthan State and also in someother States. If we do not want the Provinces and theStates to descend into chaos and disorder, the first thingthat we should do is to control the elections, not to interferewith the policies and activities of the different parties, butjust to ensure impartiality and efficiency in the conduct ofelections. The most important duty of the Commissionwould be to appoint Election officers upon whose efficien-cy, integrity and independence much will depend, and Ibelieve that the Central control of these elections will bewelcome in serious quarters. The secrecy of the ballot box,as has been pointed out by one of the speakers and asis well-known, is a very important matter in an election asfostering freedom of the vote, and this secrecy must bethoroughly and effectively guarded. We hear allegationsand counter allegations that in the recent South-Calcuttaelection, the secrecy of the ballot box and the integrity ofthe ballot papers were violated. I do not know what truththere may be in these allegations, but they have a badodour in themselves. I believe that if these matters arecontrolled by the Centre, these tendencies to makeallegations and counter-allegations of this type would be

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removed. The officers who are to be appointed to conductthese elections sould be above all suspicion and shouldbe selected just to avoid provincial cliques and parties. Sir,I do not wish to take up further time of the House. I accordmy humble and whole-hearted support to this article.

Shri K. M. Munshi (Bombay: General): Mr. President,Sir, I rise to support the amendment No. 99 moved by myhonourable Friend, Dr. Ambedkar. This amendment hasbeen subjected to two files, one by my honourable Friend,Pandit Kunzru, on the ground that the amendment doesnot go far enough, that it does not make the ElectionCommission sufficiently independent, that the CentralGovernment could influence it in a manner prejudicial tofair elections. That is one ground. The other ground, ofwhich the exponents have been my honourable FriendsMr. Pataskar and Kuladhar Chaliha from Assam, putforward, is that this is a trespass on provincial autonomy,to put it shortly. I will deal with these two points separately.

Sir, the amendment which has finally emerged fromthe Drafting Committee makes it clear that neither theCentral Government nor the provincial Governments willhave anything to do with the elections. The Chief ElectionCommissioners, as the House will find, is practicallyindependent. No doubt he is appointed by the President,that is, the Central Government. There can be no otherauthority, no higher authority in India than the President forappointing this Tribunal. You cannot omit this importantthing.

The next argument against the amendment is that thisamendment departs from the old amendment No. 103which was to be moved on behalf of the DraftingCommittee, under which the Commissioners other than the

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Chief Election Commissioners were not removal except inthe manner in which a High Court Judge can be removed.Perfectly right. But the change has been made for a verygood reason. Between two elections, normally there wouldbe a period of five years. We cannot have an ElectionCommission sitting all the time during those five yearsdoing nothing. The Chief Election Commissioner willcontinue to be a whole-time officer performing the dutiesof his office and looking after the work from day to day,but when major elections take place in the country, eitherProvincial or Central, the Commission must be enlarged tocope with the work. More members therefore have to beadded to the Commission. They are no doubt to beappointed by the President, but as the House will find, theyare to be appointed from time to time. Once they areappointed for a particular period they are not removable atthe will of the President. Therefore, to that extent theirindependence is ensured. So there is no reason to believethat these temporary Election Commissioners will not havethe necessary measure of independenc}. Any way theChief Election Commissioner an independent officer, willbe the Chairman and being a permanent officer will havenaturally directing and supervising power over the wholeCommission. Therefore, it is not correct to say thatindependence of the Commission is taken away to anyextent.

We must remember one thing, that after all anelection department is not like a judiciary, a quasi-independent organ of Government. It is the duty and thefunction of the Government of the day to hold the elections.The huge electorates which we are putting up now, thevoting list which will run into several crores_all these mustnecessarily require a large army of election officers, of

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clerks, of persons to control the booths and all the rest ofthem. Now all this army cannot be set up as a machineryindependent of Government. It can only be provided by theCentral Government, by the Provincial Government or bythe local authorities as now. It is not possible nor advisableto have a kingdom within a kingdom, so that the electionmatters could be left to an entirely independent organ ofthe Government. A machinery, so independent, cannot beallowed to sit as a kind of Super-Government to decidewhich Government shall come into power. There will begreat political danger if the Election Tribunal becomes sucha political power in the country. Not only it should preserveits independence, but it must retain impartiality. Therefore,the Election Commission must remain to a large extent anally of the Government; not only that, but it must, aconsiderable extent, be subsidiary to Government exceptin regard to the discharge of the functions allotted to it by'law.

Some reference has been made that the powers ofthe Parliament have not been preserved. I may point outthat amendment No. 123 which is also going to be movedby Dr. Ambedkar gives to the Parliament power to makeprovisions with respect to etections to legislatures, subject,of course to the provisions of this Constitution. Similarly Sir,you find amendment No. 128 which gives to a StateLegislature the power to make provisions with respect toelections to such Legislatures. Therefore, the Parliamentas well as the State Legislatures are free to make allprovisions with regard to elections, subject, of course, tothis particular amendment, namely, the superintendence,direction and control of the Election Tribunal. Today, forinstance, the elections are controlled by officers appointedeither by the Centre or the Provinces as the case may be.

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What is now intended is that they should not be subjectedto the day-to-day influence of the Government nor shouldthey be completely independent of Government, andtherefore a sort of compromise has been made betweenthe two positions; but I agree with my honourable Friend,Pandit Kunzru that for the sake of clarity, at any rate, toallay and doubts clause (2) requries a little amendment. Atthe beginning of clause (2) the following words may beadded; "subject to the provisions of law made in this behalfby Parliament." Similarly in clause (4) also where theconditions of service and tenure of office of the ElectionCommissioners and Regional Commissioners are pre-scribed, it will be proper to have words to this effect:"subject to the provisions made by Parliament in thatbehalf." That, of course, would follow from amendment No.123, but we do not want any doubt to be on this point, andtherefore, it would be better if these words are added togive parliamentary control over the terms of service andthe tenure.

Shri H. V. Kamath: How will you insert those wordsin the amendment?

Shri K. M. Munshi: I have no doubt in my mind thatDr. Ambedkar will accept my suggestion and move theseamendments.

The question was raised with regard to the qualifica-tions of the Regional Commissioners. The same couldeasily be provided by parliamentary legislation either underarticle 123 or under the new phrase which I submit shouldbe added to clauses (2) and (4). So in this way theParliament's power over these details would be secured.This amendment, therefore, maintains impartiality andindependence of the Election Commission so far as it is

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necessary in the circumstances and also the supremacyof the Parliament over the details.

Now I come to the other part of criticism. And, thatis the argument that this provision whittles down or takesaway what is called provincial autonomy. This argumenthas the knack or appearing again and again in respect ofalmost every article, and I think it is high time that thosehonourable Members of the House who put it forwardreconcile themselves to the position that the House hastaken the line more suited to the country rather than thedoctrinaire views of theoretical writers on federalism. Dr.Ambedkar in the opening speech has made it clear that theidea of an Election Commission was accepted as far backas January or February 1947, when even the question ofthe partition of the country had not become a settled fact.The Fundamental Rights Committee put forward thissuggestion. It was unanimously accepted by the AdvisoryCommittee and again it was accepted unanimously by theHouse. Therefore, it must be treated as the opinion of theHouse, and the country as a whole that matters of electionmust be taken out of the purview of the Centre and theprovinces with a view to meet the realities of the situation.That being so, the only other question is as to how thisshould be done.

With regard to the precedent, reference has alreadybeen made to section 19 of the Dominion Elections Act ofCanada. This Act lays down that for the whole of Canada,a Chief Electoral Officer, not a Commission as we haveenvisaged, will superintend, control and direct all elections.His tenure of office is exactly the same as we haveadopted here for the Chief Election Commissioner.

Another argument put forward in the course of this

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debate was that this is undemocratic: I fail to understandhow democracy is affected by this provision. Let usanalyse the position. This Constituent Assembly, if it laysdown a Constitution for the country, is nothing else but aninstrument of the sovereign people of India, not thedifferent people of the provinces meeting together in aconfederation for the purpose of evolving a Constitution.Let us not forget this main fact. It is open to the House tolook at the conditions in the country, to look at the realitiesof the situation and to give some power to the Centre, togive other power to the provinces, to transfer power fromone to the other. That does not take away from either therepresentative character of the Costituent Assembly or thedemocratic power of the sovereign Indian people. TheHouse cannot be tied down by any theoretical consider-ations in this matter. In the debate on article 226 also, Ifound the same kind of argument advanced. But we mustrealise once for all that it is the Constituent Assembly asthe instrument of the sovereign people of India which isone unit that is going to decide what are going to be thefunctions of the Centre and the provinces in view of theactual conditions that exist in this country. Now, Sir, if thatis so the sovereign people, and the Constituent Assemblyas their agent, is bound to maintain the purity of electionsin a practical manner. That can only be done by theestablishment of the machinery envisaged in this amend-ment. To say that it is undemocratic is entirely baseless.If there is going to be democracy, the sovereign people ofIndia must be in a position to elect their own representa-tives in a manner which is above suspicious," abovepartiality. Corrupt practices do not necessarily apply to thecandidates. There may be corrupt practices by a govern-ment of the day. Therefore, it is necessary that we shouldnot consider this question from the point of view of any

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theoretical provincial autonomy, a point which is beingtrotted out again in this House.

My honourable Friend Mr. Kuladhar Chaliha comingfrom Assam said that this affects the power of theprovincial Governments. He further put forward the pointof view that in point of efficiency and integrity the Centreis no better than the provinces. He said if I heard arightthat the provinces were better in this respect than theCentre. If that be so, I wish the sooner we wound up ourdemocratic business the better. My friend coming fromAssam ought to know that complaints after complaintshave been received from Assam that ingenious devicesare found to shut out people who have settled in Assamfrom the electoral rolls. The complaints may be wrong; Iam not here judging them. But the complaints arethere

Shri Kuladhar Chaliha: I question that.

Shri K. M. Munshi: The complaints are known to.every department that is concerned with them. The factthat such complaints come is the reason why provincialGovernments cannot be trusted, in the condition in whichwe are, to be as impartial in the elections as they shouldbe.

Shri Kuladhar Chaliha: I seriously protest againstthis remark.

Mr. President: There is no need to introduce heat inthe discussion. We are only discussing a purely constitu-tional question.

Shri K.M. Munshi: I am not introducing heat. Myhonourable Friend said that the provinces are muchsuperior to the Centre or this Constituent Assembly.

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reminded him that coming as a leader from Assam, it wasa surprising remark. It may come from some otherprovince; that is a different matter.

As my honourable Friend Mr. Sidhva said, in the pastseveral Election Tribunals were appointed by Govern-ments of the provinces. They were not Congress Govern-ments; they were appointed by other Governments. Theywere appointed to secure a particular object. As honourableMembers know, one leading Member of this House, whowas the head of the Congress organisation of his province,was victimised in the past regime and debarred from beinga Member of the legislature. It is very easy for a Premierto manipulate an Election Tribunal and thus remove astrong rival for five or seven years from the scene. It istherefore necessary that these matters should be placedbeyond the reach of temporary passions in the provinces.

Sir, one thing more : We must realise—and this is thegeneral answer that I propose to give to my honourableFriends Mr. Pataskar and Mr. Chaliha—we can onlyconsider the problems before us from the conditions asthey exist today. We cannot forget the fact that some tenor eleven of the Indian States which are not accustomedeven to the little measure of democratic life which isenjoyed by the provinces are coming into the Union onequal terms. We cannot ignore the fact there are cornersin India where provincial autonomy requires to be placedon a better footing. In these conditions, it is but natural,apart from world conditions, that the Centre should havea larger measure of control over the affairs which affect thenational existence as a whole. Even in America in whichit was not a question of the Centre decentralising itself, butthirteen, independent States coming together first in a sortof confederacy, and then in a federation what do we find?

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After the depression of 1929, agriculture, education,industry, unemployment, insecurity, all passed graudally byvarious means under the control or influence of the Centre.There, the Constitution is water-tight and they had to goround and round in order to achieve this result. Therecannot'be smaller units than a nation today; even a nationis small unit in the light of the international situation. Thisidea that provincial autonomy is the inherent right of theprovinces, is illusory. Charles Merriam one of the leadingpolitical thinkers in America to his book called "The Needfor Constitutional Reform", with reference to the States ofU.S.A., says, "Most States do not now correspond toeconomic and social unities and their position as units oforganisation and representation may be and has beenseriously challenged." In our country the situation isdifferent. From the Councils Act of 1833 till the Govern-ment of India Act of 1935, there has been central controlover the provinces and it has proved wholesome. Thestrength, the power and the unity of public life which Indiahas developed during the last one hundred years is mainlydue to centralised administration of the country. I wouldwarn the Members who are still harping on the samesubject to remember one supreme fact in Indian historythat the glorious days of India were only the days, whetherunder the Mauryas or the Moghuls, when there was astrong central authority in the country, and the most tragicdays were those when the central authority was dismem-bered by the provinces trying to resist it. We do not wantto repeat that fatal mistake. We want that the provincialsphere should be kept intact that they should enjoy a largemeasure of autonomy but only subject to national power.When national danger comes, we must realise that theCentre alone can step in and safeguard against the chaoswhich would otherwise follow. I therefore submit that this

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argument about Provincial Autonomy has no a prioritheoretical validity. We have to judge every subject ormatter from the point of view of what the existing conditionsare and how best we can adjust the controls, either Centralor Provincial to secure maximum national efficiency. Fromthat point of view I submit the amendment moved by myFriend Dr. Ambedkar is a good one, a very good one anda very wholesome one for the whole country.

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha (Bihar:General): Sir, the question be now put.

Mr. President: There is a closure motion. I would liketo take the sense of the House.

The question is:

"That the question may now be put."

The motion was adopted.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Bombay:General): Mr. President, Sir, this amendment of mine hasbeen subjected to criticism from various points of view. Butin my reply I do not propose to spread myself over all thepoints that have been raised in the course of the debate.I propose to confine myself to the points raised by myFriend Professor Shibban Lai Saksena and emphasized bymy Friend Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru. According to theamendment moved by my Friend Professor Saksena thereare really two points which require our consideration. Theone point is with regard to the appointment of theCommissioner to this Election Commission and the secondrelates to the removal of the Election Commissioner. So faras the question of removal is concerned, I personally donot think that any change is necessary in the amendmentwhich I have proposed, as the House will see that so far

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as the removal of the members of the Election Commissionis concerned the Chief Commissioner is placed on thesame footing as the Judges of the Supreme Court. And Ido not know that there exists any measure of greatersecurity in any other constitution which is better than theone we have provided for in the proviso to clause (4).

With regard to the other Commissioners the provisionis that, while the power is left with the President to removethem, that power is subjected to a very important limitation,viz., that in the matter of removal of the. other Commission-ers, the President can only act on the recommendation ofthe Chief Election Commissioner. My contention thereforeis, so far as the question of removal is concerned, theprovisions which are incorporated in my amendment are-adequate and nothing more is necessary for that purpose.

Now with regard to the question of appointment I mustconfess that there is a great deal of force in what my FriendProfessor Saksena said that there is no use making thetenure of the Election Commissioner a fixed and securetenure if there is no provision in the Constitution to preventeither a fool or a knave or a person who is likely to beunder the thumb of the Executive. My provision—I mustadmit—does not contain anything to provide againstnomination of an unfit person to the post of the ChiefElection Commissioner or the other Election Commission-ers. I do want to confess that this is a very importantquestion and it has given me a great deal of headache andI have no doubt about it that it is going to give this Housea great deal of headache. In the U.S.A. they have solvedthis question by the provision contained in article 2 Section(2) of their Constitution whereby certain appointmentswhich are specified in Section (2) of article 2 cannot bemade by President without the concurrence of the Senate;

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so that so far as the power of appointment is concerned,although it is vested in the President it is subject to a checkby the Senate so that the Senate may, at the time whenany particular name is proposed, make enquiries andsatisfy itself that the person proposed is a proper person.But it must also be realised that is a very dilatory process,a very difficult process. Parliament may not be meeting atthe time when the appointment is made and the appoint-ment must be made at once without waiting. Secondly, theAmerican practice is likely and in fact does introducepolitical considerations in the making of appointments.Consequently, while I think that the provisions containedin the American Constitution is a very salutary check uponthe extravagance of the President in making his appoint-ments, it is likely to create administrative difficulties and Iam therefore hesitating whether I should at a later stagerecommend the adoption of the American provisions in ourConstitution. The Drafting Committee had paid consider-able attention to this question because as I said it is going,to be one of our greatest headaches and as a via mediait was thought that if this Assembly would give or enactwhat is called an Instrument of Instructions to the Presidentand provide therein some machinery which it would beobligatory on the President to consult before making anyappointment, I think the difficulties which are felt asresulting from the American Constitution may be obviatedand the advantage which is contained therein may besecured. At this stage it is impossible for me to see oranticipate what attitude this House will take when theparticular draft Instructions come before the House. If theHouse rejects the proposal of the Drafting Committee thatthere should be an Instrument of Instructions to thePresident which might include, among other things, aprovision with regard to the making of appointments, this

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problem would then be solved by that method. But, as Isaid, it is quite difficult for me to anticipate what mayhappen. Therefore in order to meet the criticism of myhonourable Friend Prof. Saksena, supported by thecriticism of my honourable Friend Pandit Kunzru, I amprepared to make certain amendments in amendment No.99. I am sorry I did not have time to circulate theseamendments, but when I read them the House will knowwhat I am proposing.

My first amendment is:

"That the words 'to be appointed by the President' atthe end of clause (1) be deleted."

"In clause (2) in line 4, for the word 'appoint' substitutethe word 'fix' after which insert the following :—

"The appointment of the Chief Election Commissionerand other Election Commissioners shall, subjectto the provisions of any law made in this behalfby Parliament, be made by the President."

"The rest of the clause from the words 'when anyother Election Commissioner is so appointed' etc., shouldbe numbered clause (2a)."

Shri M. Ananthawayanam Ayyangar (Madras: Gen-eral): Sir, on a point of order, new matter is beingintroduced which ought not to be allowed at this stage.Otherwise there will have to be another debate.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: I hope theChair will allow other Members to offer their views.

Mr. President: In that case I think the best coursewould be to postpone consideration of this article.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: These amend-

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ments are quite inoffensive; they merely say that anythingdone should be subject to laws made by Parliament.

Shri T.T. Krishnamachari (Madras: General): Isuggest that these amendments may be cyclostyled andcirculated, and they may be taken up latter on.

The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam (Madras:General): I suggest that these may be considered by theDrafting Committee. Even it they are merely technical wemust have an opportunity of considering them.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: These amend-ments have been brought after consultation with theDrafting Committee.

Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: The amendments merelysay that the President's powers are subject to parliamen-tary legislation. They do not detract from the contents ofthe article and we need not be too finicky about theprocedure at this stage.

Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru: Even if there is to befurther discussion, I think we should know how Dr.Ambedkar proposes to meet the difficulties that have beenpointed out. He should therefore be allowed to put forwardhis suggestions. .

Mr. President: That is why I allowed him to movethese amendments. After they are.moved we shall decidewhether to discuss them now or at a later date.

Shri K.M. Munshi: The amendments only say thatacts done should be subject to the laws of Parliament. Thatis already covered by amendment 123.

Mr. President: Let the amendments be moved.

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The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: My nextamendment is:

"That in the beginning of clause (4) the followingwords should be inserted:— 'subject .to the provisions ofany law made in this behalf by Parliament'."

The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam: Sir, this is amaterial amendment because the President's discretionmay be fettered by parlimentary law.

Mr. President: I do not think any further discussionis necessary; let these be moved.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: You cannotdeal with a constitution on technical points. Too manytechnicalities will destroy constitution-making.

Shri H.V. Kamath: Sir, you ruled some days ago thatsubstantial amendments would be postponed.

Mr. President: If these are considered to besubstantial amendments they will be held over. As thereseems to be a large body of opinion in the House in favourof postponement, the discussion will be held over.

New Article 289-A

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That with reference to amendment No. 110 of List I(Fifth Week), for the proposed new article 289-A, thefollowing article be substituted:—

289-A. There shall be one general electoral roll forNo person to be ineligible every territorial constituency for

^LSSSZSi^Z etection to either House of Par-the electoral roll on liament or to the-House or eitherground of religion, race, H o u s e o f t n e Legislature of acaste or sex.

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State and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in, orclaim to be excluded from, any such roll on grounds onlyof religion, race, caste, sex or any of them."

Sir, the object of this is merely to give effect to thedecision of the House that there shall hereafter be noseperate electorates at all. As a matter of fact this clauseis unnecessary because by later amendments we shall bedeleting the provisions contained in the Draft Constitutionwhich make provision for representations of Muslims,Sikhs, Anglo-Indians and so on. Consequently this is un-necessary. But it is the feeling that since we have takena very important decision which practically nullifies the pastit is better that the Constitution should in express termsstate it. That is the reason why I have brought forward thisamendment.

Mr. President: Do I take it that only for the purposeof discussion you have brought it up and that you do notwant it to be passed?

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: No, Sir, not likethat. I have moved the amendment. I was only giving thereasons why I have brought it up.

I shall move the other amendment also for insertingnew article 289-B, I move:

"That for amendment No. 3087 of the List ofAmendments, the following be substituted:—

"That after article 289-A, the following new article beinserted:—

289-B. The elections to the House of the People andElections to the House of to the Legislative Assembly ofthe People and to the e S { a t e s n a | ) b e o n t h e b a s j sLegislative Assemblies of 3

states to be on the basis of adult suffrage; that is to say,of adult suffrage.

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every citizen, who is not less than twentyrone years of ageon such date as may be fixed in this behalf by or underany law made by the appropriate Legislature and is nototherwise disqualified under this Constitution or any lawmade by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegalpractice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at anysuch election."

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad (Bihar: General): Mr.President, Sir, I rise to oppose article 289-B. I am opposedto adult franchise on grounds both theoretical andpractical. I am opposed to adult franchise because it is agross violation of the tenets of democracy. Adult franchisepresupposes that the electorate is enlightened. Where theelectorate is not enlightened there cannot be parlimentarydemocracy.

Mr. President: Is that open to objection now? Wehave already passed article 149 in which it is expresslystated that the election shall be on the basis of adultsuffrage. It was passed in the winter session.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: Sir, I will submit to yourruling. I was not present when that article was passed.

Mr. President: Then you cannot oppose it at thisstage.

Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: This new article isactually redundant. It may be that the Drafting Committeewill subsequently have to take it away.

Mr. President: That is what has has also said. Whenthe time comes for rearranging the sections it may not benecessary to have this section in this form. But it has beenmoved.

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Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: The principle is one whichhas been accepted by the House.

Mr. President: That is what I say. The principle hasalready been accepted.

The question is:

"That with reference to amendment No. 110 of List I(Fifth Week), for the proposed new article 289-A, thefollowing article be substituted:—

289-A. There shall be one general electoral roll forNo person to be ineligible every territorial constituency forfor inclusion in, or to election to either House of Par-claim to be excluded ,. xlfrom, the electoral roll on '"ament or to the House or eithergrounds of religion, race, House of the Legislature of acaste or sex. S t a t e a n d n o p e r s o n s n a , | b e

ineligible for inclusion in, or claim to be excluded from, anysuch roll on grounds only on religion, race, caste, sex orany of them."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 289-A, as amended, stand part of theConstitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 289-A, as amended, was added to theConstitution.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That for amendment No. 3087 of the List ofAmendments the following be substituted:—

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"The after article 289-A, the following new article beinserted:—

289-B. The elections of the House of the People andElections to the House to the Legislative Assembly ofof the People and to the e QtatQ s h a | | b e Q n t n e b a s j sLegislative Assembliesof states to be on the of adult suffrage; that is to say,basis of adult suffrage. every citizen, who is not lessthan twenty-one years of age on such date as may be fixedin this behalf by or under any law made by the appropriateLegislature and is not otherwise disqualified under thisConstitution or any law made by the appropriate Legisla-ture on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness ofmind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitledto be registered as a voter at any such election."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 289-B stand part of the Constitution.:

The motion was adopted.

Article 289-B, was added to the Constitution.(New article 289-C was not moved.)

Article 290

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That for article 290, the following article be substitut-ed:—

290. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,Power of Parliament to Parliament may from time to timemake provisions with .respect to elections to by law make provisions withLegislatures. respect to al matters relating to,or in connection with, elections to either House ofParliament or to the House or either House of the

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Legislature of a State including matters necessary forsecuring the due constitution of such Houses and thedelimitation of constituencies."

Sir, with your permission I would also like to move theother amendment which amends this. I move:

"That with reference to amendment No. 123 of List I(Fifth Week), in the new article 290, after the word'including' the words 'the preparation of electoral rolls andall other' be inserted."

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava (East Punjab: Gen-eral): Sir, I gave notice of amendment No. 100 andamendments 127 and 129 with the idea that the entireresponsibility and jurisdiction for making laws in regard toelections should be left to the Central Legislature and thatthe Central Legislature alone should have been given thispower to enact laws in regard to matters pertaining toelections. Even now when amendment No. 99 was beingdiscussed I felt that it would not be necessary to havethese new amendments if my amedments Nos. 100, 127and 129 were accepted, because according to me, it is notfair to give the power to the executive to appoint suchhighly placed officers in whom all the rights and powers inregard to elections are concentrated. Parliament shouldhave the ultimate power. Similarly with regard to myamendment No. 127 which I did not move when I foundthat the wording of amendment No. 123 was "Subject tothe provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may fromtime to time by law make provisions with respect to all

matters relating to, or in connection with, election "When Parliament has been given this power, I do not knowwhat power is left to be exercised under this article by theprovinces. If we want uniformity in the conduct of electionswe should see that Parliament alone has this power.

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Under article 289 many arguments were advanced forgiving these powers to the Central Government instead ofto the provinces. If those arguments are valid, it does notbehove us to say that any power which is left may beexercised by the provincial legislatures. Amendment No.123 is all embracing and therefore there is no need foramendment No. 128.

Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: Sir, I supportthe retention of amendment No. 128 moved to article 291.I do not agree with my Friend Mr. Bhargava. We havetaken away the elections from the provincial legislaturesand the Governors. Practically we have centralised theappointment of the Election Commission. This is adeviation with respect to which there have been complaintsthat the provincial governments have been made ciphers.To avoid corrupt practices we wanted the entire power tobe vested in Parliament. Amendment 128 only says thatfor matters for which the Parliament does not make aprovision the provincial legislatures shall have power. MyFriend Mr. Bhargava does not want even this. Accordingto him, either Parliament makes the law or there should beno authority to make law. There may be certain matterswhere for the sake of uniformity Parliament may make lawand the State legislature may make the rest of the laws.That is what is provided in amendment No. 128. I do notknow why even to this limited extent power should not begiven to the State legislatures. Why are we so suspiciousof the State legislatures that we want to take awayeverything from them? I support amendment No. 128.

Mr. President: I find that there is notice of anamendment by Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena to article 290.He was not here at the time the amendments were moved.Anyhow it is not an amendment of substantial character.

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If Dr. Ambedkar does not want to say anything in replyI shall put the amendment to vote.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. AMBEDKAR: I havenothing to say, Sir.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That for article 290, the following article be substitut-ed:-

290. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,Power of Parliament to make Parliament may from time to timeprovisions with respect to by law make provisions withelections to Legislatures. . . „ .. . .. .

a respect to all matters relating to,or in connection with, elections to either House ofParliament or to the House or either House of theLegislature of a State including the preparation of electoralrolls and all other matters necessary for securing the dueconstitution of such House or Houses and the delimitationof constituencies."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:"That article 290, as amended, stand part of the

Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 290, as amended, was added to theConstitution.

Article 291

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I move:

"That for article 291, the following article be substitut-ed:-

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291. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and

Power of Legislature of a i n S 0 f a r a S Provision in thatstate to make provisions behalf is not made by Parliamentwith respect to election t h e Legislature of a State mayto such Legislature. , . . ,

from time to time by law makeprovisions with respect to all matters relating to or inconnection with, the elections to the House or either Houseof the Legislature of the State including matters necessaryfor securing the due constitution of. such House or•Houses."

Sir, with your permission I move also amendment No.211 of List VI. Fifth week.

The amendment runs thus:

"That with reference to amendment No. 128 of List I(Fifth Week) in the new article 291, after theword 'including' the words 'the preparation ofelectoral rolls and all other' be inserted."

Mr. President: There are also other amendments.Amendment No. 129 is a negative one and so cannot bemoved. Amendments Nos. 130 and 131 are not moved.

Does any Member wish to say anything on theamendment or the article?

Shri H. V. Kamath: Mr. President, this article 291,following as it does article 290 already adopted, is acorollary to it. Article 291 follows very closely article 290except with regard to the last matter contained in article290 relating to the delimitation of constituencies. Thequestion here arises as to the powers which will be vestedin Parliament and in the State Legislature. In article 290it is stated that Parliament may from time to time by lawmake provisions with respect to all matters-the phrase

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used is "with respect to all matters'-relating to or inconnection with elections, etc. Here again the same wordsare used, that is to say, article 291 lays down that the StateLegislature may from time to time by law make provisionswith respect to all matters relating to or in connection withelections, etc. That is to say, all matters relating toelections to either House of the State Legislature comewithin the purview of Parliament as well as the StateLegislature. Are we going to define the limits of ordemarcate the powers to be conferred on the Parliamentand on the State Legislature? Are we going to haveanother Schedule? That is my question. Are we going tohave a new Schedule to this Draft Constitution wherein wewill define the powers of Parliament and the powers of theState Legislature to legislate with regard to matters relatingto elections in the States? If we do not define, definitelyallocate the functions, I am afraid it might lead to some sortof friction or tension between the Parliament and the StateLegislature at some time or other. No doubt the savingclause is there in 291 "in so far as provision in that behalfis not made by Parliament". Sir, if the Parliament exhaustsall matters relating to elections in the States-the power todo is there under 290; the Central Parliament has fullpower to make laws with respect to all matters relating toelections in the State including delimitation of constituen-cies which is taken away from the State-I do not quarrelwith that-what will be left for the States? In regard tovarious other matters relating to elections, I do not thinkit wise to deprive the State Legislature of any jurisdictionin this regard. To my mind, it will be better and wiser toleave them some powers so as to promote greaterharmony. We are here, I am afraid, aiming at over-centralisation of functions. Over centralisation to my mindis not conducive to harmony between the Union and the

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Units. We certainly want strength, but strength along withharmony. Strength without harmony, without good-willbetween the Union and the Units, is no strength at all. Itis mere rigidity. Therefore, Sir, I would personally preferthat certain matters relating to elections in the States mustbe allowed to be dealt with by the State Legislature itselfand Parliament should not be given entire authority tomake, laws with respect to all matters relating to electionsto either House of the State Legislature. Some definitepowers to my mind should be given to the Legislature ofthe State also.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I think Mr.Kamath has not properly read or has not properlyunderstood the two article 290 and 291. While 290 givespower to Parliament, 291 says that if there is any matterwhich is not provided for by Parliament, then it shall beopen to the State Legislature to provide for it. This is a sortof residue which Parliament may leave to the StateLegislature. This is a residuary article. Beyond that, thereis nothing.

Shri A. Thanu Pillai (Travancore State): When stepshave to be taken according to the time schedule, is thelocal Legislature to wait and see what the CentralParliament does?

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Primarily itshall be the duty of the Parliament to make provision under290. The obligation is squarely placed upon Parliament. Itshall be the duty and the obligation of the Parliament tomake provision by law for matters that are included in 290.In making provisions for matters which are specified in 290,if any matter has not been specifically and expresslyprovided for by Parliament, then 291 says that the State

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Legislature shall not be excluded from making anyprovision which Parliament has failed to make with regardto any matter included in 290.

Shri A. Thanu Pillai: May I know from Dr. Ambedkarwhether it would not be better for either the CentralLegislature or the Local Legislature to be charged with fullresponsibility in this matter so that elections may go onaccording to the time schedule?

The Honourable Or. B. R. Ambedkar: I do not agree.There are matters which are essential and which Parlia-ment might think should be provided for by itself. There areother matters which Parliament may think are of such localcharacter and liable to variations from province to provincethat it would be better for Parliament to leave them to theLocal Legislature. That is the reason for the distinctionbetween 290 and 291.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That with reference to amendment No. 128 of List I(Fifth Week), in the new article 291, after the word'including' the words 'the preparation of electoral rolls andall other' be inserted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That for article 291, the following article be substitut-ed:-

291. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution andin so far as provision in that behalf is not. made byParliament, the Legislature of a State may from time totime by law make provisions with respect to all mattersrelating to, or in connection with, the elections to the House

69or either House of the Legislature of the State including thepreparation of electoral rolls and all other matters neces-sary for securing the due constitution of such House orHouses."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 291, as amended, stand part of theConstitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 291, as amended, was added to theConstitution.

Article 291-A

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That after article 291, the following new article beinserted:-

291-A. Notwithstanding anything contained inBar to jurisdiction of this Constitution—courts in electoral mat-ters.

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitationof constituencies or the allotment of seats tosuch constituencies, made or purporting to bemade under article 290 or article 291 of thisConstitution shall not be called in question inany court;

(b) no election to either House of Parliament or tothe House or either House of the Legislature ofa State shall be called in question except by an

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election petition presented to such authority andin such manner as may be provided for by orunder any law made by the appropriate Legis-lature;

(c) provision may be made by or under any lawmade by the appropriate Legislature for thefinality of proceedings relating to or in connec-tion with any such election at any stage of suchelection."

Sir, I also move:

"That with reference to amendment No. 132 of List I(Fifth Week) in the new article 291-A, clause (c) beomitted."

Mr. President: The question is:

"That with reference to amendment No. 132 of List I(Fifth Week) in the new article 291-A, clause (c) beomitted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That after article 291, the following new article beinserted:-

291-A. Notwithstanding anything containedBar to jurisdiction of in this Constitution-courts in electoral mat-ters.

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitationof constituencies or the allotment of seats tosuch constituences, made or purporting to bemade under article 290 or article 291 of thisConstitution shall not be called in question inany court;

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(b) no election to either House of Parliament or tothe House or either House of the Legislature ofa State shall be called in question except by anelection petition presented to such authority andin such manner as may be provided for by orunder any law made by the appropriate Legis-lature;"

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 291-A, as amended stand part of theConstitution."

The motion was adopted.

"That article 291-A, as amended, was added to theConstitution.

Mr. President: Then we go to the other article 296.

Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: As article 292 to form partof a whole scheme and article 296 also goes along withthem, we might take up article 297 and leave 296 over forthe present.

Mr, President: Is that the idea that we shouldpostpone discussion of article 296 also? Then we shalltake up article 297.

Article 297

(Amendment No. 3169 was not moved.)

Shri H.V. Kamath: Mr. President, Sir, I move:

"That in clause (2) of article 297, for the words 'if suchmembers are found qualified for appointment on merit as

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compared with the members of other communities', thewords 'provided that such appointment is made on groundonly of merit as compared with the members of othercommunities' be substituted."

I think, Sir, that this is an amendment more or lessof a drafting nature and I leave it to the cumulative wisdomof the Drafting Committee to consider it at the appropriatestage.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: I do not seethat it is of a drafting nature. However, we shall considerit later on.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 297 stand part of the Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 297 was added to the Constitution.

Article 298

(Amendment No. 3172 was not moved.)

Mr. President: There is no amendment to this articleNo. 298 also.

Mr. Frank Anthony (C.P. & Berar: General): Sir, I donot intend to make a speech. I had given notice of anamendment to article 298 seeking to make it applicable tothe Mysore State, but after I had discussed my amendmentwith Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Munshi, it was pointed out tome that even if they were prepared to accept myamendment, they were unable to do it at this stagebecause it has not yet fc/een decided as to whether this

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Constituent Assembly is going to legislate for the MysoreState and because of that, Sir, I do not propose to ask foradmission of this amendment at this stage. If and when theAssembly does legislate with regard to Mysore, then I feelthat I may be given permission at that stage to reiteratethis amendment. In this connection, I only wish to say afew words and to thank all those Members, who in spiteof the fact that they have given notice of severalamendments, have once more shown their generosity bywithdrawing those amendments en masse.

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: Sir, when I gavenotice of certain amendments to articles 297 and 298,1 didnot do so in any spirit of niggardliness or disregard forhonouring the words of our leaders who had given somesort of assurance to the Anglo-Indian community, but Imust state in fairness to myself that, as a matter of fact,it was a different standpoint from which I gave thesenotices of amendments. When these concessions weregiven to the Anglo-Indian community, it was in 1947 andten years' time was regarded as sufficient. Ordinarily theseten years would have been finished by 1957. Now theConstitution will commence in 1950. So I thought that theconcessions should have been given only for ten years. Ido not grudge any sort of concessions to this communityor that community but we must realise that the basis ofconcessions given to suppressed classes and depressedclasses is of a different nature. We want that theseconcessions may be implemented. Apart from reservationof seats which is only for ten years, other concessions likeeducational facilities etc., to be provided under article 301may have to be given for more than ten years. But herein this case this community is not a suppressed community.This community has to a certain extent been given this

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concession because its standard of life was different fromthe rest of the Indian community and it was higher. So Igave amendments in the view that when Mr. Anthony saidon the last occasion when he spoke on the question ofminorities that the Committee had shown unique generos-ity I thought that his community would respond by showingunique fairness in saying that they would only want theseconcessions for ten years because I know that for everyboy of the Anglo-Indian community to whom this conces-sion is granted, we have to grant these very concessionsto the upper classes also because in these schools towhich these grants are made, 40 per cent or so are Anglo-Indian boys and the remaining 60 per cent, belong to theupper classes. So if we grant these concessions, weshould grant them not only to the Anglo-Indians but alsoto the upper classes. After all our means are limited, andwe cannot make one rupee into seventeen annas and ifyou grant these concessions for very long periods topeople whose standard of life is better and who are moreaffluent, you would have to deny even ordinary rights tothe rest of the people. So that, for educating thesepersons, you starve the boys of other communities. I thinkmy honourable Friend Mr. Anthony will not misunderstandme for giving notice of this amendment. I gave notice ofthese amendments in the hope that in his patriotism, in hisrecognition of the principle of fair treatment to all, he willagree that only ten years will be availed of and not more.

Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: Mr. President, Sir, thesetwo articles 297 and 298, one of which we have alreadypassed, give certain concessions to the Anglo-Indiancommunity. I may say at the very outset that I am notopposed to any concession which these people may want.I may also say that I would wish them to make the best

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use of the concessions. But, I would like to utter a wordof warning. I feel that these concessions are based on aprinciple which has not been followed anywhere else in theconstitutions. We have given separate representation topeople who are backward. But, in this case the position isdifferent. The Anglo-Indian community has up till now liveda different kind of life from the rest of the people. Theyprobably feel some difficulty in accommodating themselvesto the new change and therefore they want theseconcessions. I only want the representatives of thecommunity who are present here, who are very distin-guished members and who are my very good friends, toconsider coolly whether these concessions will reallybenefit the community. My feeling is that during the last somany years, this community has been kept aloof from therest of the population and the British people who kept usunder subjection tried to make them also completelyisolated. They gave them a different kind of education,different habits etc. I am only surprised that they still wantto keep to their old methods of education. I only hope thatalthough these concessions are given, the boys of thatcommunity will try to take advantage of the commoneducation given to all Indian boys, and that they shall notcontinue any further their separation which was imposedby the British people for their own purposes. I have knownthese friends through my contacts with labour on railwaysand in the posts and telegraphs and in other places. Theyare very active people; they form a virile element in thenation and I know they do not need any crutches. Like theParis, they will get more than their due even in the generalelectorate and in the normal course of general competition.I therefore think that these two articles are based on theapprehension that they may not get their legitimate sharein the circumstances. I wish to give this friendly advice, if

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it is of any worth. I do wish this community to become onewith the rest of the people and to remove all those barriersof separation which the British Rulers had raised betweenthis community and the rest of the people, so that whenthe time comes, at least after ten years, there is no needfor them to demand all these concessions,—I hope theywill realise that it is better that they merge themselves inthe general population. We all wish to feel that they areone with us. I also know that they realise that the Britishhad made them pawns in their game. I hope that they willvery soon give up those old habits and traditions. I hopethat these articles which we all approve unanimously willnot be supposed to be something intended to perpetuatethe old separation, but intended to help them to assimilatethemselves with the rest of the population.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: (United Provinces: General): Mr.President, Sir, I rise to oppose the article as it is. I knowI will incur the displeasure of my very great Friend Mr.Anthony. He is so charming that nobody in the Housewould like to annoy him; but then, I want to give him anadvice.

He has seen many minorities claiming special rightsin India; he has also seen their fate. Suppose we agreeto this article. I do not know whether Mr. Anthony agreesto it. If he is a party to this article, I am afraid he is doinga disservice to his community. As it is mentioned in thisarticle, we cannot give more grants than we are givingthem today I do not know how we can agree to this. Afterall, it is a progressive community; it is a privilegedcommunity. It has the affection of both Indian and England.They are a bright community; wherever they are, they farevery well; they are the least communal. They are a veryintelligent and bright people. In India they need have no

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fear; they have to thrive. I ask why should they not deservemore grants or more help from the State if they reallydeserve it. The article says during the first three years afterthe commencement of this Constitution, the same grantsif any, shall be made by the Union and by each State. Iask, why not more grants? If their students deserve moregrants, why should we make the same grants? I do notknow whether you call it sympathy; it is a wrong-placedsympathy. I do not know my honourable and intelligentFriend Mr. Anthony would agree to the same grants. Theprices may go on rising, but the boys in the school will getthe same grants. Why not more? This is neither help norany protection. I do not want to waste the time of the•House by reading the article further which says that everythird year there will be a reduction of ten per cent. Whyshould we envisage a reduction at all? My view is this.Such a small community if you go on identifying it as acommunity, as a minority, I assure you that that communitywill ultimately lose. Let them merge their identity into thewhole nation and belong to the nation without anydistinction whatsoever. Their distinction of beauty andcolour is enough to distinguish them from us; that is a gooddistinction. Let them stand on their own colour and on theirbeauty and on their intelligence. Why should they take tothe adjective 'minorities' and all that. That is a slur on thatcommunity. That is a community which can stand on itsown legs and stand boldly. From the friendly manner inwhich the members of this community are behaving. I thinkit is an insult to their attitude to say that these people atall need any protection.

They need nothing. Their attitude is their ownprotection. I think it is better we leave them to their naturalprotection God has given them. Then again when we have

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once decided that we do not encourage any minorities orcommunities, then, in the face of that, should only onesmall community be recognised? Well, they will becomethe target of jealousy from all the rest of the communities.It is only a little money that is being guaranteed, but forthis little privilege why should they become the target ofhatred, jealousy and envy of all other small communities?I think they will not fare well if they get this too small aprivilege, the losses entailed with it being much greater.And if communities are to be considered I would suggestconsideration of that community which is only newlycreated—it is the community of displaced persons. Why doyou not protect these refugees who are homeless? Let usguarantee that for 10 years they will get such and suchprivileges and they are the real minority communitydeserving help. In the provinces today nobody has everthought of giving them special privileges or help becausethey are Hindus but in spite of their being Hindus orbelonging to a religious majority community, they are adeplorable small minority today in India. It is a pity that itis now a year gone and little has been done for them; andnow the time has come when their protection should havebeen our first thought and we should have protected theirrights of education, their accommodation and other things.If communities are to be considered here in this Constitu-tion, the most miserable community that should beconsidered first is that of the refugees, but the refugeesare not considered ever as a community. And why shouldwe always take communities by religious distinctions or bydistinctions of their blood? Communities are a group ofpeople being affected in one common manner eitheradversely or in better circumstances. Whatever theconditions, those who are affected together similarly insimilar circumstances become a community; and as such,

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if there is any community which requires safeguards andprotection, it is that of the refugees. But they have nevercome forward for any special grant before us. I wouldsuggest that we do not allow this article to remain in thisConstitution. It will contain the germs of communalism.Why not purge the whole Constitution of this diseasealtogether and why keep germs? They might develop andagain we might have to face another big problem ofcommunalism and the same old history of the MuslimLeague days might repeat itself. I would suggest withemphasis that either the consideration of this article bealso postponed or, if the House or you are not pleased topostpone it for further consideration, I would appeal to theHouse to reject the article here and now, and not care foryour private decisions of groups. Let us take liberty of ourgroups and say that it being a dangerous article, if we allowit to remain, we shall allow this body politic to remaindiseased for ever. With these words I oppose the article.

Shri K.M. Munshi: Mr. President, Sir, I am sure thaton a matter of this importance we should appreciate all thathappened in the past and not reopen the discussion whichhas passed through several stages. The two sectionswhich are under discussion are the result of very longdiscussions and suggested by a Special Committeeappointed for this purpose, accepted by the AdvisoryCommittee and ultimately accepted by the House. Nowafter all that has been said and done, it serves no usefulpurpose to repeat the arguments that were advanced bycertain sections of the House at different stages. TheHouse has always accepted that the Minorities Commis-sion's decisions as more or less conclusive. We mustrealise the importance of the two points dealt with by myfriend Mr. Tyagi. When this decision was arrived at by the

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House, the one point which it had to consider was that thissmall community had been under the protecting wings ofthe old Government in such a manner that it wasimpossible for it to stand on its legs unless it were spoon-few by some kind of concession for a small period of time.Over 60 per cent of its adults are in certain services. Weneed not go into the various causes of this situation, buta sudden change would throw this community immediatelyon the streets. The second point was that certain specialgrants were given to their educationanl institutions. Thoseeducational institutions as now being attested to by burown educational authorities in various provinces haveattained a high standard of educational school and nowthat the schools take students from other communities thepolicy of some provincial Governments is that thatstandard should be maintained for all schools. In Bombay,for instance in that Anglo-Indian schools, 70 per cent of thestudents are not Anglo-Indians but members belonging toother communities. Therefore these articles have beenconsidered from every point of view. They are only for alimited period of time. My appeal therefore to the Houseis that a decision which has been come to afterconsiderable deliberation should not be disturbed, apartfrom a vote, even by a discussion, which may not createa right impression in the country. I hope Members willrealise that any discussion or criticism would perhaps takeaway from the generous gesture which the majoritycommunity made to this small minority community.

Shri Krishna Chandra Sharma (United Provinces:General): Mr. President, I very much appreicate the spiritof compromise and reconciliation and would not grudgeany help to any section of the people whatsoever, but myonly trouble is that article 9 in the Fundamental Rights says

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that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen ongrounds only of religion, race, caste or sex, etc. Now theState Funds are meant for education for all citizens.Because A belongs to Muslim Community, B belongs toHindu community and C belongs to Parsee or Anglo-Indiancommunity, therefore per capita they will have differentsums of money for their education and training, onediffering from the other simply because their religion orcommunity differs. I beg to submit, is against the spirit ofthis article. My second point is that the grant is meant tobe given to the institution. This money can be given on theground that the institution has a better standard ofeducation, it is more expensive or situated at a placewhere ordinary grants would not suffice, etc. That may bethe basis for greater grants to an institution like the MuslimUniversity at Aligarh or an Anglo-Indian institution ofNainital. I do not grudge the grant but there should be arational basis.

A further objection is that these are minute detailswhich should be left to the Education Department and theUniversity, and not laid down by Parliament in theConstitution. I do not find this in any other constitution inthe world and I do think it would be advisable to do it here.

Honourable Members: The question may now beput.

Mr. President: I may point out that these articleshave been brought in pursuance of decisions arrived at bythe Advisory Committee on Minorities and by some sort ofagreement between the parties. So I do not think there isany occasion or reopen what was then decided. It was alsoplaced before a previous session of the Assembly andaccepted. So I do not think the question need bereopened.

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The question is:

"That the question be now put."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 298 stand part of the Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 298 was added to the Constitution.

Mr. President: Article 299 is held over.

Article 300

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That with reference to amendment No. 3186 of theList of Amendments in clause (1) of article 300 after theword and figure 'Part I' the words and figures 'and Part III'be inserted."

Shri A.V. Thakkar (Saurashtra): Sir, I am very gladthat this amendment extends the benefits of welfare workfor the tribal people of all the States where they live atpresent. These tribal people come into the picture for thefirst time* now in this Constitution. It would have been a halfmeasure • if it had been confined to tribal people inprovinces only but not extended to those in Indian States.But as now amended it is in the interest of all backwardtribal people. The same benefit to all backward peopleapplies to article 301 and therefore there is greater reasonthat the same extension is given in article 300.

Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: Sir, I support this articlewhole-heartedly. I shall draw attention to the problem

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confronting us in the tribal areas. They are some of themost backward people in the country. The British Govern-ment tried to keep them secluded and attempts weresometimes made by missionaries to convert them. I havevisited many of these people and can say that they havea kind of sub-human and miserable existence. This articleis intended to devise ways and means for bringing themto the normal level. But we should not rest on our oars bymerely passing this provision but should do our utmost tobring them up to the normal level. The consciousnessabout them came first in 1931 when the British Govern-ment tried to give them separate representation. Reform-ing bodies and people like our revered Shri Thakkar Bapahave worked among them but much still remains to bedone and we should see that these people are made totake their rightful place in society.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: Sir, this article is very haltingfrom the point of view of helping the scheduled areas. Itonly says that a Commission may be appointed from timeto time or whenever the President so likes to enquire intoand report on the conditions of these areas, and "theexecutive power of the Union shall extend to the giving ofdirections to such a State as to the drawing up andexecution of schemes specified in the direction to beessential for the welfare of the scheduled tribes in theState." I wonder whether there is anything constitutionalabout it. Why should we encumber a Constitution with themention of scheduled areas? They are backward areas.The State has so far been keeping them deliberatelybackward and not much of improvement has been effectedin those areas. Half of my constituency is partially excludedarea, known as the Jaunsar Bawer. I know the conditionsthat obtain in that area. Years ago when Committees had

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been appointed they looked into the conditions. Butlooking into the conditions is not much of a job. Real jobis to improve the conditions. This article does not go farin improving their conditions. It does not even give a rayof hope as to what will be done. To know what theconditions are a Commission will be appointed. That is notenough. It would be better if the article had been takenaway from the Constitution because it does not help thescheduled areas at all. There is nothing positive about thearticle. Commissions can be appointed even without theUnion being authorised to appoint the Commisssions.What is there to prevent it from appointing Commissionsor Committees or from making enquiries? So I think thearticle is not at all positive. If there be anything importantor if any hope is hidden within these words or lines, I wouldlike the Chairman of the Drafting Committee to expose itto air so that the people residing in those areas might alsoknow what good future lies for them in between these lines.I do not see any hope for them. It is with this view, justto provoke Dr. Ambedkar or anyone on his behalf to giveus an idea as to what is the meaning of bringing in thescheduled areas here and what hope it offers, that I haveraised this point. If there is nothing and if only their mentionis meant, then I would rather prefer that the article is takenaway.

Mr. President: Dr. Ambedkar, do you wish to sayanything?

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: No, Sir.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That with reference to amendment No. 3186 of theList of Amendments, in clause (1) of article 300, after the

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word and figure 'Part I' the words and figures 'and Part III'be inserted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 300, as amended, stand part of theConstitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 300, as amended, was added to theConstitution.

Article 301

(Amendments Nos. 3189 and 3190 were notmoved.)

Shri H.V. Kamath: Mr. President, Sir, I moveamendments Nos. 3191, 3195, 3196, 3197, 3198 and3200 standing in my name.

I move:

"That in clause (1) of article 301, the words 'consistingof such persons as he thinks fit' be deleted."

In my judgement these words are wholly superfluous.I may even go to the length of saying that they cast areflection upon the wisdom of the President. The Presidentwhen he appoints certain persons, certainly appoints suchpersons as he thinks fit for the job with the commission ofwhich those persons are charged. It is absolutely pointlessand purposeless to say here that he may "appoint aCommission consisting of such persons as he thinks fft".It may stop after "appoint a Commission". This adequately

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and sufficiently conveys the meaning intended in thisportion of the article.

Then I move;

"That in clause (1) of article 301 for the word'difficulties' the word 'disabilities' be substituted."

Bearing in mind what we have already adopted in thisHouse I think the word 'disabilities' conveys the idea farbetter then the word 'difficulties'. If we turn to the Chapteron Fundamental Rights we find that the second part ofarticle 9 refers to "any disability, liability, restriction,condition" etc. The word 'difficulty' nowhere occurs in thatvery important article which seeks to abolish discriminationon grounds of religion, race, caste or sex. We have passedthat article. The word "difficulty" is to my mind hardly aconstitutional term. I have read several constitutions of theworld but I find that it finds no place in constitutionalterminology or parlance. The word "disability" is a far moreappropriate word than the word "difficulty". I am sure Dr.Ambedkar, steeped as he is in constitutional lore andconstitutional learning will have no difficulty in acceptingthis amendment.

I move my next amendment.

"That in clause (1) of article 301, for the words 'grantsshould be given' the words 'grants should be made' besubstituted."

This is a purely verbal amendment. I do not wish topress it home, but I leave it to the collective wisdom of theDrafting Committee which I am sure will come into play atthe appropriate time.

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Then I move:

"That in clause (1) of article 301, for the word 'and'(in line 10) the words 'as well as' be substituted."

That portion of the article reads thus as it has beenmoved before the House:

"The President may by order appoint a Commis-sion to remove such difficulties and to improve theircondition and as to the grants that should be given for thepurpose by the Union or any State and the conditionssubject to which such grants should be given "

I think the meaning would be more exactly expressedby the phrase "as well as" than by the single word 'and'here. That also I leave to the wisdom of the team ofwisemen which this House has appointed to draft theConstitution.

I next move amendment No. 3198—

"That in clause (2) of article 301, for the word 'a reportsetting out the facts as found by them and' the words 'areport thereon' be substituted."

The clause as it stands reads thus:

"A Commission so appointed shall investigate thematters referred to them and present to the President areport setting out the facts as found by them and makingsuch recommendations as they think proper."

If my amendment is accepted by the House theclause will read as follows:

A Commission so appointed shall investigate thematters referred to them and present to the President a

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report there on making such recommendations as theythink proper."

This is only with a view to avoid cumbersomelanguage and style and secure brevity and precision, butnot at the sacrifice of any substantial meaning.

Lastly, I move my amendment No. 3200 which runsthus:

"That in clause (3) of article 301, the words 'togetherwith a memorandum explaining the action taken thereon'be deleted and the following words be added at the end:—

'for such further action as may be necessary'."

This clause of the article as it now stands runs thus:

"The President shall cause a copy of the report sopresented, together with a memorandum explaining theaction taken thereon to be laid before Parliament."

My amendment seeks to modify it in this regard andif it is accepted by the House, the clause will read asfollows:

"The President shall cause a copy of the report sopresented to be laid before Parliament for such furtheraction as may be necessary."

This is a drafting amendment, plus an amendment ofsubstance. There are two parts to it. The first relates to themanner in which the President shall cause a copy of thisreport to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament. Theclause, as it is now, makes it incumbent upon the Presidentto affix a memorandum to the copy of the report to be laidbefore Parliament. It does not seem to be wise to lay downthe manner in which the report should be presented to

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Parliament by the President. If the President deems itnecessary to submit a memorandum along with the reporthe will certainly do so. The President will be a wise man.I am sure we will not have as President a man who is notwise or who is incompetent to do his duties in the interestsof the nation. If the President thinks it necessary to affixa memorandum to the report he will do so. Why should welay down in the Constitution things in such minute detail?It is just a tremendous trifle to say that he must add amemorandum to the report. That is the first aspect of myamerjdment.

The second part of my amendment relates to thesequel to the submission to Parliament by the Presidentof this report by the Commission. I think, Sir, that theHouse is agreed on this point that Parliament, oursovereign Parliament of Free India, shall have a definitesay, a substantial voice inwhatever policy is going to beadopted or action taken with regard to the welfare of thesocially and educationally backward classes in our country.This article has relation to the conditions of socially andeducationally backward classes in- the Indian Union.Parliament, I am sure, will be entitled to ask that any actiontaken with regard to the welfare of its backward peoplemust be in conformity with the policy that will be formulatedby it. Therefore I. am anxious that with a view to having thisimplemented, when the report comes before Parliament,further action should be taken by Parliament and not bythe President. The President will if need be, communicateto parliament his own reactions to the report, but shouldnof be final authority to take action thereon. Parliamentmust have the last word on the action to be taken on thatreport. Therefore, this last amendment of mine seeks tomake that quite clear, absolutely fool-proof and knave-

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proof, as Dr. Ambedkar might say, and make it impossiblefor the President to divest Parliament of this inherent rightto take action on the report of the Commission submittedby the President to Parliament. Therefore I have suggest-ed the addition of the words "for such further action as maybe necessary". It may be that within the next ten yearsthere may be no socially or educationally backwardsclasses in our country. I look forward to that day evenbefore the expiry of ten years. We have the example ofSoviet Russia before us. Russia abolished illiteracy andbrought even the lowest strata of the population to a fairlydecent level in ten or fifteen years. Can we not, with ourancient heritage and our background of cultural andspiritual genius aspire to something better and to bring allthese backward classes within less than ten years tosocially and educationally higher level? 1 hope, Sir, thatwithin ten years we will have advanced a good dealtowards redeeming these fallen and so-called backwardpeople and we shall have no occasion to appoint aCommission for the submission of a report. I shall be veryhappy if that day comes in less than ten years. But as itis, the Constitution provides for the appointment of aCommission. Then let Parliament consider and deliberateon the report submitted by the Commission to thePresident and let Parliament take such action as it deemsfit or necessary in this matter, so that within the ten-yearperiod, when a Commission has been appointed and itsreport comes before Parliament, Parliament may chalk outa programme for the uplift and redemption of theseeducationally backward classes, and carry it out. I trust thatafter the first ten-year period has expired, there will be noneed for the President again to appoint a Commission ofthis nature to enquire into the conditions of the backwardclasses in our country. Sir, I move these various

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amendments and commend them for the acceptance ofthe House.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move:

"That in cluase (3) of article 301 for the word'Parliament' the words 'each House of Parliament' besubstituted."

Mr. President: There are two amendments of whichnotice has been given by Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava,Nos. 180 and 181 of the First List.

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: I do not wish to movethe amendments but I wish to speak on the article.

(Amendments Nos. 3192, 3193, 3194, 3199 and No.181 of the First List were not moved.)

Mr. President: The article and the amendments arenow open to discussion.

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: Sir, I consider thatarticle 301 is one of the most important articles of thisConstitution. Left to myself, I would call it the soul of theConstitution. So far as the Depressed Classes areconcerned, we have only reserved some seats for them.The rest we have not done and this article 301 seeks tocomplete the process of bringing them up to normalstandards. This article places upon the entire nation theobligation of seeing that all the disabilities and difficultiesof the Depressed Classes are removed and therefore it isreally a charter of the liberties of the backward classes andin a sense this is an oath taken by the House, an oath tosee that within the coming years we will provide all thefacilities which can be provided by the nation for expiatingour past sins. Now, Sir, in this country there are backward

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classes some of whom have had reservation given to themso far as representation is concerned, but the otherclasses have not been given such reservations but theyare equally backward. I would therefore have liked aregister to be made of all the backward classes includingthe present Depressed Classes, and after the Commissionhad found out what their difficulties and disabilities wereand a programme chalked out for providing facilities toevery member of these backward classes. If a particularclass was economically very backward, provision could bemade that with regard to their houses in the villages, theywere given not only the residential rights but rights ofdisposal of their properties. If we chalk out a programmeafter the Commission has investigated their disabilities, wewill be taking a great step towards the removal of thosedisabilities. There are many disabilities pertaining to themwhich the House fully knows and I need not go into themat this stage. What I want to say is that.so far as theseclasses are concerned, we should see to it that theseclasses do not continue in the category of backwardclasses after they have come up to normal standards sothat their backwardness is not crystalized or perpetuated.After they have reached normal standards, they should betaken away from this category. If any community continuesin backwardness, socially culturally or educationally, thenit should not be a question of ten years or fifteen years butup to the time they are brought up to normal standards,facilities should be given and continued for them.

My next submission is that the article says "ThePresident may by order appoint, etc." I have given noticeof an amendment in this regard for substituting the word'shall' for 'may' and even if the word 'may' is used in thearticle, I think it should be the obligation of the President

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to appoint such a Commission. Even though the word'may' has been used, it must be construed as ^ shall'.Therefore I have no doubt that the President shall appointsuch a Commission and the Commission after makinginvestigation into the conditions of these classes, shallhave to suggest in what particular manner the stepssuggested should be implemented. The article here simplysays that he shall cause a copy of the Report to be placedbefore Parliament. The obligations of the Parliament arenot given in article 301. I understand there is provision forthem in 299 which has been held over. I do not want tospeak now on that article, but what I want to submit is this:Now the safeguards for minorities have been taken away,for instance for the Muslims and the Sikhs. The onlyresponsibility of the Parliament are the Scheduled Castesand the backward classes. In regard to these classes,special officers are to be appointed to see whether thefundamental rights which have been given to them underthis Constitution and the special facilities which are soughtto be provided for them after the investigation of theCommission are enjoyed by these people or not. Theseclasses are not only the responsibility of the CentralParliament but of the State Legislature as well. But I submitthey are the special obligation of the Central Legislature.This article 301 is only the material form of the ObjectivesResolution. This article only gives the mechanism by whichthe Objectives Resolution is carried out. We should providein this article that it shall apply not only to the communitiesfor whom reservation has been made but also to those forwhom no reservation has been made but who are all thesame backward.

Sir, I feel great happiness in supporting article 301.

Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena: Mr. President, Sir, I

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whole-heartedly support this article. I only wish to point Quttwo things in this regard. The first thing is according to thescheme of the Constitution, this Commission will beappointed at the very outset of the commencement of theConstitution. That means that as soon as our Constitutioncomes into existence, the President shall appoint theCommission to investigate into the conditions of thesocially, educationally and culturally backward classes andthen make its report on how to remove their backwardness.We are using the expression 'the backward classes' inseveral places in the Constitution, but we have not definedthem anywhere in the whole Constitution. I hope thisCommission which will specially investigate the conditionsof the backward classes all over the country will be ableto tell us what is meant by the term "backward classes".When the Commission reports to the Parliament, I hopethey will define the terms "backward classes" and "de-pressed classes" in their report.

I also support the amendment of Mr. Kamath for theaddition of the words "for such further action as may benecessary". That means that when the report is made, theHouse must consider the ways and means of removing thebackwardness of these people. I think therefore that thisamendment is necessary.

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Sir, thequestion be now put.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That the question be now put."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. President: I have to put the various amendmentsto vote now.

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The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: If thereis no other work then the House should be adjourned.

Mr. President: The question is:

'That in clause (1) of article, 301, the words'consisting of such persons as he thinks fit' be deleted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (1) of article 301, for the word'difficulties' the word 'disabilities' be substituted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: Amendments Nos. 3196 and 3197, Ithink are of a drafting nature. We had better leave them.The question is:

"That in clause (2) of article 301, for the word 'a reportsetting out the facts as found by them and' the words 'areport thereon' be substituted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (3) of article 301, the words 'togetherwith a memorandum explaining the action taken thereon'be deleted and the following words be added at the end:-

'for such further action as may be necessary'."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (3) of article 301, for the word'Parliament' the words 'each House of Parliament' besubstituted."

The amendment was adopted.

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Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 301, as amended, stand part of theConstitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 301, as amended,was added to theConstitution.

Mr. President: This brings us to the end of thesearticles which we have set down for consideration today.One article which we passed over, article 289, remains tobe considered. There were certain amendments andcertain Members said that they were taken by surprise andthat they would like to have time to consider it. If the Houseso desires, we might have an afternoon session, so thatwe may not have to sit tomorrow.

An Honourable Member: We are prepared todiscuss it now.

Mr. President: At 6 o'clock.

Shri K. M. Munshi: The sittings should not be fixedfor tomorrow as many Members, I know, have booked theiraccommodation.

Mr. President: It is therefore why I am suggesting sixO'clock.

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Eitherwe can hold it over or you have a meeting in the eveningand finish it.

Mr. President: I think some Members feel that theywould like to have time to consider the amendments andtherefore it is much better to give them time and if you allagree, I would like to have an afternoon session in theevening, say at six O'clock.

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Honourable Members: 6 p.m.

Mr. President: So the House stands adjourned till sixO'clock this evening. The Assembly then adjourned till sixof the Clock in the afternoon.

The Constituent Assembly re-assembled at Six of theClock in the afternoon, Mr. President (The Honourable Dr.Rajendra Prasad) in the Chair.

DRAFT CONSTITUTION—(Contd.)

Article 289—(Contd.)

Mr. President:'We shall take up the amendmentmoved by Dr. Ambedkar in the morning I think that is theonly amendment now to the original article which wasmoved by Dr. Ambedkar.

I have just received notice of amendments from twoMembers Shri Mahavir Tyagi and Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor.1 do not know how these amendments come in at thisstage. They cannot be amendments to amendments; theycan only be amendments to amendments to amendments.I am not inclined to allow any amendments to amendmentsto amendments.

Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor (United Provinces: Gener-al): May I then be permitted, Sir, to put forth my viewpointcontained in this amendment, of course during generaldiscussion?

Mr. President: The article and the amendment will beopen to discussion. Any Member may say whatever helikes. It is for him to vote according to what he says orotherwise.

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Shri Mahavir Tyagi: May I submit, Sir, if at any stagesome serious discrepancy is found and it is pointed out.I hope it must be taken notice of.

Mr. President: I do not think your amendment comesunder that. In your case, the amendment of which youhave given notice does not deal with the matter which hasjust been discovered.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: I could not follow, Sir.

Mr. President: Your amendment is this: that in clause(1) of the proposed article 289, the words "and Vice-President" be deleted. That is to say, you want to keep theelection of the Vice-President out of the purview of theElection Commission.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: Yes, Sir.

Mr. President: It is not a case in which something hasbeen discovered as a result of discussion which createsdifficulty and this amendment becomes necessary. Thisshould have been foreseen and if you wanted to givenotice of an amendment, you should have given it before.I cannot allow this now.

Shri H.V. Kamath: May I request, Sir

Mr. President: I have given a ruling on Mr. Tyagi'samendment, I am now dealing wifh the other amendment.

Shri H.V. Kamath: For the ftiture at least, may Iknow, Sir, what is the position with regard to amendmentsto amendments to amendments?

Mr. President: I am not going to make any promiseabout the future. I will deal with every case as it comes up.

Shri H.V. Kamath: I want to know what -is the rule,Sir.

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Mr. President: The Member may rest assured, I willfollow the rules.

Shri H.V. Kamath: I am not questioning that. As therules are silent on the point, I want to know what theposition is with regard to amendments to amendments toamendments.

Mr. President: As I have said, I shall decide eachcase as it comes up.

As regards the amendment of Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor,he may speak on it. The article and the amendment areopen to discussion.

Shri R.K. Sidhva (C.P. & Berar: General): May Iknow, Sir, whether the discussion will be only on theamendment or on the article also?

Mr. President: The whole thing.

Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: Mr. President, Sir, if I riseto speak on amendment No. 99 relating to article 289, itis not because I am fond of speaking too often. Whilecoming to the rostrum, Sir, it was suggested to me by myhonourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar that the galleries todaywere empty and that I need not be very particular aboutspeaking on this article. I may assure my honourableFriend Dr. Ambedkar that I never speak to the galleries orwith the object of finding any prominent place in the Press.I speak only when I feel it is absolutely necessary to speakand on this occasion, Sir, such is my feeling and henceI have come before you to address on article 289.

I must confess, Sir, that on the last day of thissession, article 289 has proved to be rather an inconve-nient one. It has been debated at length yesterday and

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today and I find that the more it is being debated the moredefective it appears to be and I find that the more wescrutinise it the more defects of it come to light. On a closerscrutiny of this article I find that it is necessary to recastit altogether. A few amendments here and there, a fewalterations or changes here and there in this article wouldnot do: it needs being recast altogether. I do not suggestthat it needs being recast in order to meet the viewpointof those who question the propriety of the Centre beinginvested with the authority to conduct all elections. I takeit that everyone of us, or at least the overwhelming majorityof us, is inclined to the view, is definitely of the view thatelections must be run under the control, direction andsupervision of an authority appointed by the CentralGovernment, the President I mean of course, subject toany law which may be enacted by the Parliament. But, Sir,I think it is necessary to recast this in order to make theprocedure laid down in this article 289 as a really effectiveand workable one so that there may be no conflict betweenthe authority which is to be appointed by the President—Imean the Election Commission—and the other bodies inthe Centre or in the provinces. As it is, however, I think thatarticle 289 if allowed to remain in its present form wouldlead to conflict between the Election Commission and thepresiding officers of the various legislatures. Let us seehow it stands.

"The superintendence, direction and control of thepreparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of,all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature etc. bythe President."

Now these are the various functions that are going tobe entrusted to this Election Commission. Superintendence,direction and control of what things, firstly, of the

101preparation of the electoral rolls for all elections toParliament, to State Legislatures and for all elections to theoffices of President and the Vice-President. The electoralrolls for these elections are to be under the supervision,direction and control of this Election Commission. Second-ly, its function is the conduct of all these elections. Theseare the two functions that are going to be entrusted to theElection Commission. Now let us see how the election ofthe President is going to be, how the election of the Vice-President is going to be, how the election of members ofthe Council of States is going to be and lastly how theelection of members to the Legislative Councils of theStates is going to be. Under article 43 which we havealready passed the President will be elected by the electedmembers of both Houses of Parliament and by the electedmembers of the Legislative Assemblies of the variousStates. Now the question is what will be the electoral rollof all these members? Is it the intention of Dr. Ambedkarthat the question as to who are to be the electors who willfrom these electoral colleges is to be decided by thisCommission? Now the electors will be members who willhave been already duly elected to the House of thePeople, Council of States and the various LegislativeAssemblies. They will be already duly elected members.So the question of preparing an electoral roll of thesemembers simply does not arise at all. It should not beopen—I think it will be readily admitted—to the ElectionCommission to decide as to which of those particularmembers are unqualified. A person once having been dulyelected can of course become disqualified from remainingas a member; and so far as the Legislative Assembly ofthe various States are concerned, we have only the otherday enacted article 167-A which lays down that if any suchquestion arises, it will be decided by the Governor and the

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order of decision of the Governor shall be final. Now thatdecision and order of the Governor being final whatfunction remains for the Election Commission to performin the matter of determining the question as to whichparticular members are entitled or not entitled to participatein the election of the President? So far as the preparationof electoral roll is concerned, the Election Commission hasno function to perform. The second is the stage ofconducting the election itself. Now the question arises thatthe members of the House of the People will be calledupon to elect the President and also members of theCouncil of States, and so also elected members of theLegislative Assemblies of the various States. Thesepersons will cast their votes as members of the variousLegislatures and as such they must perform that functionof casting their votes under the supervision, direction andcontrol of the presiding officers of the respective legisla-tures. Is it the intention to divest the presiding officers ofthese various legislatures of their ordinary and inherentright of conducting these elections? I suppose not. So thatso far as the election of the President is concerned, bothin the matter of the preparation of the electoral roll as alsoin the matter of the conduct of election, the ElectionCommission shall have absolutely no function to perform,or if it has, obviously it will come in conflict with thepresiding officers of these various legislative bodies. Nowlet us come to the question of the election of the Vice-President. There the matter is more complicated still. Theelection of a Vice-President it was pointed out to us—thecredit of which must go to my honourable Friend Mr.Tyagi—it was pointed out by him outside the House thatunder article 55 we have it "That the Vice-President shallbe elected by members of both Houses of Parliamentassembled at a joint meeting in accordance with the

103system etc." Here also we find that the question as to whoshall vote for the election of Vice-President is alreadydefinitely determined by article 55, and the ElectionCommission will have nothing to do about this. The mannerof conducting the election is also laid down in article 55.All the members will sit together in a joint meeting whichwill be presided over, as has been provided, by theSpeaker of the House of the People. Where does theElection Commission come in as regards the election ofVice-President? Thirdly comes the question of election ofmembers of the Council-of States. Under article 67 theyare to be elected by the elected members of the legislativeassemblies of the various States. There too the memberswho will participate in the election are well-known; there isno question of preparation of electoral roll there. Then asto the conduct of elections and casting of votes, that willbe done, as in the past, under the direction and control ofthe Speakers of the various legislatures; and interferenceby the Election Commission will lead to conflict with theSpeakers. The same objection will apply in the case ofelections of these members to the legislative Councils ofthe States who are to be elected by the members of thelegislative assemblies in the various States. Therefore,while the underlying intention of article 289 is a laudableone and while we must provide for elections to beconducted under the supervision and control of a centralauthority appointed by the Central Government, we mustso frame the article as to obviate any chances of conflict

.between the Election Commissions and the presidingofficers of the various States by taking away those thingswhich may give rise to such conflicts. We should also takenote of article 55 in which we have provided for the electionof Vice-President. Therefore I submit that it is necessaryto recast this article so as to make to applicable to direct

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elections only to House of People and legislative assem-blies. Today we can commit ourselves definitely to theprinciple that all elections shall be conducted under thesupervision, direction and control of a central authority,subject of course to such variations as appear obviouslynecessary in the light of article 55 and in the light of whatI have already submitted. That is what I have to submit andthe amendment of which I had given notice was only inregard to these points that I have raised. If the difficultiesand apprrehensions that I have raised are in any wayremovable by some interpretation of article 289 that Dr.Ambedkar may give, that is another thing.

Mr. President: I may point out that no explanationneed be given. You are assuming that in all these electionsmembers will give votes while sitting in Parliament. Butthey will not be sitting in Parliament; they will vote as votersof that particular constituency.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: What will happen as regardsdisputes, and the filing of nomination papers before theSpeaker?

Mr. President: It will be for the Election Commissionto decide who the returning officer for this election will be.The whole argument is based on the assumption that whenmembers of the legislatures who are entitled to vote for theelection of the President sit, they sit in a session of theAssembly. They are not going to do that. They will bemembers of an electoral college and they will vote in thatcapacity.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: In the case of the election ofVice-President, the names are to be proposed in theHouse by honourable Members, then it will be secondedand nomination papers are to be filed, etc.

105Mr. President: You are again assuming that it will a

session of the House.

Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: My submissions werebased on that assumption surely, but I do not know if therecan be any other assumption. We find everywhere thatmembers shall be electing the President, Vice-Presidentand members of the Council of States as members of thelegislature and in no other capacity. For instance, we findin article 55 that the Vice-President will be elected bymembers of both Houses of Parliament in a meeting.

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: The working is"at a joint meeting" and not "sitting".

Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor: It will be all right if thatpoint is authoritatively stated on the Floor of the House soas to avoid the possibility of this article being interpreteddifferently, for in articles 80(3) and 164(3) the word'meeting' has obviously been used in the sense of a sittingof the legislature and not in the sense of merely acongregation of the members. The same word cannot beinterpreted differently in different articles unless definitelyspecified therein. That is all I have to submit.

Sardar Hukam Singh (East Punjab: Sikh): Sir, article289 as has been lately amended is surely a very importantprovision for the safegaurding of—as the Mover said,cultural, racial or linguistic minorities. It is conceived withthe very laudable idea that it will give .protection to themagainst any provincial prejudices or whims of officials. Butthere is one thing that I am afraid of. Whereas sufficientprotection has been given against injustice to racial,cultural or linguistic minorities so far as provincial prejudic-es are concerned, it has been assumed that the Centre willnot be liable to corruption at any time. We are perhaps

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obsessed with the feeling that our present leaders, who arenoble and responsible people and are at the helm of affairsnow, will continue for ever or that their successors will beas responsible as they are. My fear is that in future thatmay not be so and with a little prejudice or unsympatheticattitude at that time the minorities may be in great danger.I am certainly against centralisation of powers and I feelthat in this Constitution we are reducing the provincialGovernments to the position of District Boards by centralisingall power here. But I am not opposing the presentamendment because we have been assured that it is tosafegaurd the interest of these minorities. I rather welcomeit. But I want to make one observation about that and thatis that this Commission will have very important functionsto perform and one of them would be delimitation ofconstituencies. Of course this business would be the soulof all elections. If delimitation of constituencies is madewith full sympathy to the minorities it might restore theirconfidence and they might never feel sorry for what theyhave done—I mean this voluntary giving up of allsafeguards of reservation of seats. So far as the majorityis concerned it has nothing to fear. So far as the ScheduledCastes are concerned they are quite safe because theyhave got the reservation of seats. So far as the Anglo-Indians are concerned they will be nominated if they arenot adequately represented. But for other minorities suchas Muslims and Sikhs I feel that if they are not properlyrepresented they might lose confidence in that majority.This Commission shall have a very responsible task toperform in that respect when it is carving out thoseconstituencies. If the Commission, as our object is, feelsthat responsybility and does its job with full responsibilitythen I am sure the minorities shall have nothing to fear.But with a little apathy and some ill-adjustment in the

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delimitation this Commission can certainly work muchhavoc and those minorities may not even get what theyordinarily would have got according to their population. Somy object in making this observation is that in thebeginning at least the Government should take care thatthis Commission is so constituted that every interest isrepresented on that Commission, and this the Governmentcan do very easily. By this they would restore allconfidence in the minorities. This would go a long way inachieving the object which we have in view, namely, thatwe should have one nation, all people welded together. Ifthe Government were simply to give an assurance that itwould give sympathetic consideration to this request ofmine, that for the beginning at least this Commission shallbe representing all interests, my object would be achievedand the minorities also would not feel apprehensive of theirfuture fate. With these remarks I welcome this article asnow proposed in this House.

Shrimati Annie Mascarene (Travancore State): Mr.President, Sir, after hearing Dr. Ambedkar's explanationtwo days back I thought I would abide by this article. Butafter listening to Mr. Munshi's speech this morning I amprovoked to speak again on the subject and resume myold position. Sir, I am a believer in the right of the peopleof the province to elect their representatives independentof any control, supervision and direction of any power onearth. I believe that to be democracy. If the Centre is tothink that expediency demands that they should superviseand control the elections, as one sitting in the ProvincialLegislature I can see in the Centre as many deliquenciesas they see in us. From this article it looks as if the Centreis assuming to be the custodian of justice. Well, justice isnot in the custody of anybody but of those who are lovers

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of truth. Mr. Munshi this morning spoke that article 289 iscalculated to defend the rights of the people in theprovinces in view of expediency and reality. May I remindhim of the expediency and reality of nations in days longgone by—of the Parliament of Rome, of the LongParliament of England? Cromwell thought that it wasexpedient to run the administration by a unicamerallegislature. The Nepoleonic heroes thought that it wasexpedient to run the administration by a unicamerallegislature. But time has proved the effect of thoseexpediencies. What is reality and expediency today is notreality and expediency tomorrow. We are here laying downprinciples—rudimentary principles—of democracy, not forthe coming election but for days to come, for generations,for the nation. Therefore principles of ethics are moresuitable to be considered now than principles of expedien-cy. I am a believer in politics as nothing but ethics writlarge. I am not a believer in politics as a computativeprinciple of addition, subtraction and multiplication. If thissection is to be accepted we are to believe that hereafterthe provincial elections will be under the prepetual tutelageof the Centre. That means, Sir, that the integrity of theprovincial people is questioned. I wish to turn the tableson the Centre itself. Sir, should we, at this psychologicalmoment when the people of India are demanding theirrudimentary right of electing their representatives withoutbeing interfered with by authority on earth, impose anyrestriction? If democratic principles are to be accepted, thisarticle should be deleted from the Constitution.

Then I come to the latest amendment, giving thelegality of Parliament to a section which was hithertoblooming as autocratic. Well, Sir, whatever may be theamendment added on to it, it cannot lose its old shade or

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colour and it stands there as the ancient Roman tutelageunder the patriarchal system. If the provincial or the Statespeople are to be guided, let them be guided by experience.If we have erred, we will err only for a time or a period.They say that this is a deviation from the democraticprinciple. Well, I ask where is the necessity to deviate fromthe experience of nations and ages? Have you any primafacie case to show that we have erred in our democraticprinciples? In that case I am willing to accept this clause.But, as it is, we have not tried the experiment. We are onlyin the making of it. If in the experimental stage we fail, well,there is provision in the Constitutions to amend it whentime and circumstances demand. But let us not sully thefair name of the nation by believing in the first instance thatthe provincial people will not be guided by principles oftruth and justice and will not keep up the democraticprinciples of fairness by electing by fair means.Centralisation of power is good enough for stable admin-istration, but centralisation of power should be a develop-ment at later stages and not from the very inception ofdemocracy. At the very inception of democracy,centralisation would look more autocratic than democratic.We are living in an age when democratic experiments arebeing tried by many a nation. Dr. Ambedkar quoted fromthe Canadian Act of 1920. How is it that he did not traveldown to the United States from Canada? Why would henot look at the Australian Commonwealth? If Canada hasadopted a measure, is it necessary that India, with twenty-five times the population of Canada and half the size ofEurope, should adopt those very principles in her Consti-tution and take it as a salutary example for experiment indemocracy? If democracy could succeed in the UnitedStates, if it can succeed in England, why should it notsucceed in India without this clause? Well, Sir, I hope this

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House will give consideration to this article and be guidedby principles of democracy rather than by principles ofexpediency.

Shri H.V. Kamath: Mr. President, article 289 of ourDraft Constitution dealing as it does with elections andelectoral matters has naturally evoked intense interest inthis House and I am sure it has evoked or is bound toevoke equally keen interest outside the House as well. Ifwe compare article 289 as it was originally drafted by theDrafting Committee and the article as it has come beforethe House today, we cannot fail to notice some salientdifferences, the main difference being that thesuperintendence, direction and control of all elections toState Legislatures have been radically modified in the draftarticle as it was moved by Dr. Ambedkar yesterday andamended by him today. The footnote to this article on page138 of the Draft Constitution reads thus:

"The Committee is of opinion that the ElectionCommission to superintend direct and control elections tothe Legislature of a State in Part I of the First Scheduleshould be appointed by the Governor of the State."

This was apparently the Drafting Committee's originalview. But later on that view underwent some transforma-tion and, in so far as the Election Commission for a Stateis concerned, the Governor has disappeared from thepicture. I fail to see why the Governor, now that he is goingto be nominated by the President, should not have anyvoice in the matter of the Election Commission tosuperintend, direct and control the elections of the StateLegislature. If honourable Members will turn to article193(1) they will find that even where appointments of HighCourt Judges in a State are concerned, the Governor of

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that particular State has been invested with some authorityin the matter. That relevant clause reads as follows:

"Every judge of a High Court shall be appointed bythe President by a warrant under his hand and seal afterconsultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governorof the State..."

I cannot understand why the Governor of the Stateshould have no voice whatsoever in the appointment of theRegional Election Commissioner or the Election Commis-sioners of that State. The article as it has been modifiedby Dr. Ambedkar confers power on the Governor of theState in so far as supplies are concerned, such as staff,furniture and I do not know what else. As far as these areconcerned, the Ruler of the State or the Governor of theState shall, when requested, by the Election Commission-ers make available to the Election Commission or RegionalCommissioner, such staff as may be necessary for thedischarge of the functions conferred on the ElectionCommission by clause (1) of this article. That, Sir, to mymind is a sort of anti-climax to the whole scheme of thearticle. In my humble judgement there is no valid reasonwhatsoever why the Governor should be deprived of theright of even exercising his voice or giving the benefit ofhis opinion in so far as the appointment of ElectionCommissioners for the State is concerned. The executivehead of the Union is the President and the executive headof the State is the Governor. May I ask the House why,if we seek to invest the President who is the constitutionalhead of the Union with such vast powers in theappointment of Election Commissioners for the whole ofIndia, we should not give the Governor the right to give hisopinion, his judgment in the appointment of ElectionCommissioners for his State? I fail to see any reason

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whatsoever for not giving the Governors any powersexcept in so far as providing the staff is concerned, howmany clerks, how may superintendents and how manyassistants are required for the Election Commissioners. Asort of Bada Babu the Governor has become so far as theElection Commission is concerned. You are making himnothing more. I submit that this is utterly derogratory to thedignity of the Governor of a State. I cannot understand whythe Governor is being asked to supply the staff when hehas no voice in the appointment of the Election Commis-sioners. I strongly object to this denudation of theGovernor's authority, so far as the office of the ElectionCommission is concerned. Again, I personally feel thatclause (5) is absolutely unnecessary. We are burdeningthe Constitution with redundant details, with purposelessand meaningless details. Certainly every office will have tohave necessary staff. But why put it down in theConstitution? The President of the Indian Union and theGovernors of the States will certainly require staff for theiroffices, but we have not mentioned that in the Constitution.Why mention then that the Election Commissioners at theCentre or the Regional Commissioners in the provincesshall be provided with necessary staff. What I ask is this.Is it conducive to the dignity of our Constitution if weburden it with such unnecessary details, such minutiae?

Next I pass on to the amendment which has beenmoved by Dr. Ambedkar today after listening to the debatein the House yesterday and today. I feel that theamendment which has been placed before the Housetoday is a sort of half-hearted concession to the viewpointsthat have been put forward in this House. We are dealingwith elections and electoral matters. Parliament is thesupreme elected body in the Indian Union and so

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Parliament must have greater voice in the matter ofsuperintendence, direction and control of election. With aview to serving this purpose, my Friend Prof. Shibban LaiSaksena moved certain amendments yesterday. Theamendment that has been moved by Dr. Ambedkar todaymeets some of those amendments, some of thoseviewpoints half way. I personally think-l may be wrong inthe assertion-but I believe that Dr. Ambedkar individuallyis inclined to go the whole hog. I shall not venture to makea statement on that point, and I have to take theamendment as it has been placed before the House.Clause (4) of the article moved by Dr. Ambedkar yesterdaysays that the conditions of service and tenure of office ofthe Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis-sioners shall be such as the President may by ruledetermine. Today the amendment placed before theHouse says, "subject to the provisions of any law made byParliament, the conditions of service and tenure of officeof the Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis-sioners shall be such as the President may by ruledetermine." There are two things, the Parliament's law andthe President's rule. Why, may I ask, in fairness to thisHouse and the future Parliament of the Indian Union,should we not say that the conditions of service and tenureof office shall be such as Parliament may by lawdetermine? Why also say "as the President may by ruledetermine"? The President is the executive head of theUnion, while Parliament is the supreme elected body. Whythen leave it to the President to frame rules in this regard?

The next point is, why the Chief Efection Commission-er's conditions of service and tenure of office are made sovery secure he is almost irremovable-except on a vote oftwo-thirds majority of both the Houses of Parliament. Why

114has he been made almost irremovable, while his col-leagues the Election Commissioners are, according to thisarticle, removable at the sweet will and pleasure of theChief Election Commissioner? Is this the way that thisHouse is going to treat the colleagues of the Chief ElectionCommissioner? Even a clerk in a District office or in theSecretariat has got far better conditions of service andsecurity of tenure than what is envisaged for the ElectionCommissioner in this article. I feel, Sir, that with the articleleft as it is, most of the time of the Election Commissionerswill be utilised in doing what I may call khushamat, to keepthe Chief Election Commissioner in good humour, becauseit will be only natural, human nature being what it is, lestthe Chief Election Commissioner should give a bad chit.So this is what we are trying to provide by means of thisarticle. I personally know that a superior officer often givesa bad chit, not because his subordinate is bad at his workbut because he is of independent views, is of strong mindor does not humour his boss. This sort of thing should notbe encouraged, but I am afraid that is what this articlemight do.

Pandit Lakshmi Kanta Maitra (West Bengal: Gener-al): How can Members be sacked by the ElectionCommissioner, I cannot understand.

Shri H. V. Kamath: Not members but ElectionCommissioners. You are not listening properly. I think myhonourable Friend is a hurry to go home.

Pandit Lakshmi Kanta Maitra: I am listening to you,but I am getting more and more confused as you proceed.

Shri H. V. Kamath: The second proviso to clause (4)to this article moved yesterday by Dr. Ambedkar is to theeffect that "provided further that any other Election

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Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not beremoved from office except on the recommendation of theChief Election Commissioner." Is it clear now? I want theElection Commissioners to be placed on a par with theChief Election Commissioner. We have adopted the articlewith regard to the removal of Supreme Court Judges andHigh Court Judges, placing them on a par with oneanother. There is no distinction between the Chief Justiceand his colleagues. I ask, therefore, Sir, why this distinctionbetween the Chief Election Commissioner and the ElectionCommissioners?

Pandit Lakshmi Kanta Maitra: That has beenprovided in the case of the Chief Commissioner. Theywould be done on the recommendation of the ChiefCommissioner.

Shri H. V. Kamath: Perhaps the language of thearticle is not clear. If, of course, the article means that theChief Commissioner and his colleagues the "ElectionCommissioners and the Regional Commissioners, all thesecan be removed only in a like manner and on like groundsas a Judge of the Supreme Court, then it is all right. Theremoval, the conditions of service and tenure of office ofthe Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis-sioners have been made so tenuous that with theseconditions before them, men of real merit, men of abilityand competence may not like to serve on the ElectionCommission (Interruption). There is the President to pullme up if necessary. I hope there is only one President inthe House. I will bow to his ruling and to none other's. ThePresident's command I will obey.

Then, Sir, there are one or two more points which Iwould like to stress before the House. I feel that so far asthe Regional Commissioners are concerned, that is, the

116Commissioners for a particular State are concerned, I havealready stated that Governor of the State should beconsulted by the President before he appoints ElectionCommissioners for that State. As it is, we are wateringdown provincial autonomy to a considerable extent in thisConstitution, but certainly there is no harm if in appointingthe Election Commissioners for the particular State theGovernor of the State is consulted. After all the Governoris not going to be elected now. He is going to be nominatedby the President; he is the President's nominee and moreor less a creature of the President. The President will havefull confidence in the Governor of the State; he is not goingto be an elected Governor at all, but a nominatedGovernor. If the President cannot trust even his ownnominee, I do not know whom else he can trust. So, Isuppose some sort of the suitable alteration will be madein this regard providing for consultation with the Governorby the President, especially in view of the fact that evenas regards the appointment of a High Court Judge in aState, we have provided that the President shall consultthe Governor of the State. I fail to see why the Governorshould not be invested with a similar power in regard tothe appointment of Regional Commissioner.

Next, so far as the removal of Regional Commission-ers is concerned, it should not be left so very delightfullyeasy as it is now in this article. I feel that there must bemore secure conditions of tenure and of service. IfParliament can have no voice-Parliament at the Centreand the Legislature in the State can have no voice-in theremoval of Regional Commissioners I at least feel that theyshould be removed only by the whole Election Commissionand not simply by the Chief Election Commissioner and theentire Commission will consist of the Chief Election

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Commissioner and his colleagues. The one-man showmust cease. It is all a one-man show at present. Now, ofcourse we are going to adopt an amendment to the effectthat "subject to any law made by Parliament", but so faras the removal is concerned, according to the article it isa one-man show,-the removal of the Election Commission-ers or Regional Commissioners. This should not be. Theremoval must be made more difficult; otherwise, I warn theHouse that no men of proved merit, ability or competencewill come to serve on the Election Commission when theconditions of service are so very insecure.

Then, Sir, there is one point made by my honourableFriend, Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena and that is that theRegional Commissioners must be appointed by thePresident not merely in consultation with, but in concur-rence with the Election Commission. I think that is a saferule to adopt, that the President should not have the onlyword, but he must be guided by the opinion of the ChiefCommissioner with whom he must concur in the matter ofappointment of his colleagues. After all when the Presidenthas appointed the Chief Commissioner, I see no reasonwhy the President cannot get suitable men about whomboth are in agreement. Certainly India is a vast country,and she can produce men for every place and for everyoffice that the future may have in store; and I am sure forthis job of Election Commissioner there will certainly bemen available about whom the President and the ElectionCommission can agree, and both in agreement with eachother can appoint the Regional Commissioners. These arethe lacunae and pitfalls in the article and the amendmentsthat have been moved by the Honourable Dr. Ambedkarbefore the House, I have serious misgivings about theworking of this article. I have doubts about the way in which

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it will work, unless it is further amended suitably. Unlessit is so amended, I am sure the Election Commission atthe Centre and in the States will not function as well aswe all want it should, and it is, I dare say, the unanimousdesire of the whole House that with elections looming onthe horizon, the first general elections should be conductedin an able, impartial, efficient manner. There can be no twoopinions on that point. I, however, fear that that object maynot be achieved by this article. That is a possibility whichI for one do not like to envisage. \ desire that a suitablemethod should be devised to have more competent, moreimpartial and more efficient Election Commissions in theStates as well as at the Centre to conduct elections. WhatI fear is that this article moved by Dr. Ambedkar may notserve that purpose. I hope that Dr. Ambedkar and his wisemen of the Drafting Committee will take into considerationthis matter, if not now, at a later stage perhaps, and tryto make further suitable amendments in this article. TheHouse, I am sure, will consider this matter more carefullybecause it is not a matter to be lightly treated, for membersto-laugh at and smile. They might live to weep another day.If-we are in a hurry to go home, I wish that this article maybe* held over. It is not a laughable matter at all and ifMembers are tempted to laugh, I wish them joy of it. Sir,I trust that the article will be suitably modified in the lightof my observations.

Some Honourable Members: The question be nowput,

Mr. President: Closure has been moved. Thequestion is:

'That the question be now put."

The motion was adopted.

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Mr. President: I will first put the amendment whch Dr.Ambedkar has moved last.

The question is:

"That in amendment No. 99 of List I in the proposedarticle 289-

(i) in clause (1) the words 'to be appointed by thePresident' occurring at the end be deleted.

(ii) for clause (2), the following clauses be substi-tuted:-

'(2) The Election Commission shall consist of theChief Election Commissioner and such num-ber of other Election Commissioners, if any,as the President may from time to time fixand the appointment of the Chief ElectionCommissioner and other Election Commis-sioners shall, subject to the provisions of anylaw made in this behalf by Parliament, bemade by the President.'

'(2a) When any other Election Commissioner is soappointed the Chief Election Commissionershall act as the Chairman of the Commis-sion.'

(iii) in clause (4), before the words 'The conditionsof service' the words 'subject to the provisionsof any law made by Parliament' be inserted."

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. President: I will put Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena'samendment. I think there will be a little change becauseof the new arrangement.

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Mr. President: The question is:

"That at the end of clause (1) the following words beadded:—

'Subject to confirmation by two-thirds majority in ajoint session of both the Houses of Parliament'."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That after the word 'appoint' in clause (2) thefollowing be inserted:—

'Subject to confirmation by two-thirds majority in ajoint session of both the Houses of Parliament'."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (3) for the words 'after consultationwith', the words 'in concurrence with' be substituted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in clause (4) for the words 'President may byrule determine', the word 'Parliament may by law deter-mine' be substituted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That in proviso (1) to clause (4) for the words 'ChiefElection Commissioner' the words 'Election Commission-ers' be substituted, in both places."

The amendment was negatived.

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Mr. President: The question is:

"That in proviso (2) to clause (4), the words 'any otherElection Commissioner or' be omitted."

The amendment was negatived.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That for article 289, the following article be substitut-ed:—

289. (1) The superintendence, direction and control of

Superintendence, direction t h e preparation of the electoraland control of elections to rolls for, and the conduct of, allbe vested in an Election e l e c t j o n s t o Parliament and toCommission.

the Legislature of every Stateand of elections to the offices of President and Vice-President held under this Constitution, including theappointment of election tribunals for the decision of doubtsand disputes arising out of or in connection with electionsto Parliament and to the Legislatures of States shall bevested in a Commission (referred to in this Constitution asthe Election Commission).

(2) The Election Commission shall consist of the ChiefElection Commissioner and such number of other ElectionCommissioners, if any as the President may from time totime fix and the appointment of the Chief ElectionCommissioner and other Election Commissioners shall,subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf byParliament, be made by the President.

(2a) When any other Election Commissioner is soappointed the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as theChairman of the Commission.

(3) Before each general election to the House of the

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People and to the Legislative Assembly of each State andbefore the first general election and thereafter before eachbiennial election to the Legislative Council of each Statehaving such Council, the President shall also appoint afterconsultation with the Election Commission such RegionalCommissioners as he may consider necessary to assistthe Election Commission in the performance of thefunctions conferred on it by clause (1) of this article.

(4) Subject to the provisions of any law made byParliament the conditions of service and tenure of office ofthe Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis-sioners shall be such as the President may by ruledetermine:

Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shallnot be removed from office except in like manner and onthe like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court and theconditions of service of the Chief Election Commissionershall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appoint-ment:

Provided further that any other Election Commission-er or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed fromoffice except on the recommendation of the Chief ElectionCommissioner.

(5) The President or the Governor or Ruler of a Stateshall, when so requested by the Election Commission,make available to the Election Commission or to aRegional Commissioner such staff as may be necessaryfor the discharge of the functions conferred on the ElectionCommission by clause (1) of this article."

The amendment was adopted.

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Mr. President: The question is:

"That article 289, as amended, stand part of theConstitution."

The motion was adopted.

Article 289, as amended, was added to theConstitution.

ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Mr.President, Sir, in the rules of procedure of this House, rule19, there is a proviso that the House cannot be adjournedfor more than three days by the President unless theHouse authorises him to do so. Therefore I move thisformal motion:

"Resolved that the House do adjourn until such datein July 1949 as the President may fix."

No date is specified; the President will fix the date.

An Honourable Member: Why put down the month?

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: themonth is fixed; the President shall fix the date.

The Honourable Shri Ghanshyam Singh Gupta:(C.P. & Berar: General): That means that the Presidentshall have no choice in regard to the month.

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Themotion is simply that the House do adjourn until such datein July 1949 as the President may fix. He cannot alter themonth; he can fix a date.

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Mr. President: Before I put this motion to the House,I desire to explain the situation and the programme as Ienvisage it. My own idea is that we should be able to finishthe second reading by the 15th of August. Thereafter, weshall have to adjourn for some time to enable the DraftingCommittee to prepare the Constitution in its final form forthe third reading. That might take some weeks. Therefore,we shall have to meet some time in September. Thatshould also be subject to this that we are able to pass thethird reading by the second of October. That is my wish.If the House generally agrees to this tentative programme,I shall fix the dates in consultation with the DraftingCommittee and perhaps with the members of Governmentwho are principally concerned in this.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: Could you also give an idea asto how long you may require us to sit in the month of July?

Mr. President: I could give you an idea. TheAssembly cannot meet before the 15th of July, because,as I said the other day, this adjournment has beennecessitated by the fact that there are certain provisionswhich have to be considered in consultation with theProvincial Ministries and the Finance Minister has also tobe present at these consultations. The Finance Minister isgoing to England in connection with the Sterling Balancenegotiations, and he will be coming back some time earlyin July. We cannot expect that this Conference ofProvincial Ministers may take place before the 15th of July.Therefore, the House cannot meet before the 15th of JulyThe question is as to on what exact date after the 15th ofJuly we should be able to meet. I shall try to adjust thatin consultation, as I have said, with the Drafting Committeeand with the Government.

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Shri Mahavir Tyagi: I want to know the length ofperiod for which we will have to sit.

Mr. President: As I have said, from the day we beginup to the 15th of August; that is as I envisage.

Shri Mahavir Tyagi: Fifteenth is the probable date onwhich you might summon the session. What I want to knowis how long will that session last.

Mr. President: I have answered that question. I havesaid, the session will last from the day it commences upto the 15th of August, if my provisional programme stands.

The Honourable Shri Ghanshyam Singh Gupta:May I also remind you, Sir, that it will be difficult for us tosay on what particular date we will finish. That will dependon the work and how much time we take.

Mr. President: As I have said, this is a provisionalsuggestion of mine. That is a good date and therefore Iwant to have it finished by that date. If the Members wantto prolong it, they can do it, of course.

Shri R.K. Sidhva: My point is, we have held over anumber of clauses and unless we meet a little earlier, viz.,by the 20th, we will not be able to finish the subject mattersheld over as contentious by the 15th August 1949.

Mr. President: I shall bear that in mind.

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Sir, letus adjourn now.

Mr. President: Do I take it that the House accepts themotion moved by Mr. Sinha?

Honourable Members: Yes.

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Mr. President: The question is:

"Resolved that the House do adjourn until such datein July 1949 as the President may fix."

The motion was adopted.

The Assembly then adjourned until a date in July1949 to be fixed by the President.