EDITORIAL BOARD MIGRATION · in 2016 Aderanti Adepoju1 Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Africa in 2015, what are the three most important migration

MIGRATIONPOLICY PRACTICEISSN 2223-5248

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• FrankLaczko(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• KarolinePopp(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Coordinator:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Assistants:• MyleneBuensuceso(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)• AnnaLynConstantino(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Committee:

• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopmentCentre,Lagos,Nigeria)

• RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)

• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentofMexico)

• DavidCostello(Commissioner,OfficeoftheRefugeeApplications,fromtheGovernmentofIreland)

• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)

• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)

• AraceliAzuaraFerreiro(OrganizationofAmericanStates–OAS,Washington,D.C.)

• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,Florence)

• LukasGehrke(InternationalCentreforMigrationPolicyDevelopment–ICMPD,Vienna)

• ShahidulHaque(MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh)

• MichelleLeighton(InternationalLabourOffice–ILO,Geneva)

• PietroMona(SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation,FederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Berne)

• WilliamMcClure(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)

• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopmentInitiative,Brussels)

• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,NewDelhi)

• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg)

• AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeonMigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)

• MaiaWelbourne(CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

• KlausF.Zimmermann(InstitutefortheStudyofLabor–IZA,Bonn)

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

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Afghanistan-refugeesandmigrantswhohavetragicallylosttheirlivesthisyearareremembered.©IOM2015

OUTLOOK FOR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN 2016Introduction: Outlook for Migration in the Global South in 2016Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Outlook on migration in Africa in 2016Aderanti Adepoju

Outlook on migration in Asia in 2016Manolo Abella

Outlook on migration in the Caribbean in 2016Joanne van Selm

Outlook on migration in the Gulf in 2016Nasra M. Shah

Outlook on migration in Latin America in 2016William Mejía

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SPECIAL ISSUE

Vol. V, Number 5, December 2015–January 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE2Introduction: Outlook for Migration in the Global South in 2016Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

Welcome to the new issue of Migration Policy Practice,whichfocusesonexpectedmigrationtrendsintheGlobalSouth.Much

mediaandpolicyattentioniscurrentlyfocusedontheriseinmigrationflowstoEurope.Buthowismigrationchanging in the rest of the world? What are theexpected keymigration challenges for policymakersindevelopingcountries in2016?Weaskedsomeoftheworld´sleadingexpertsonmigrationtotrytolookaheadandassesshowmigrationandmigrationpolicyare likely tochange in “their” regions in2016.Eachauthorwasaskedtoconsiderthreequestions:

1. What are the three most important migrationpolicychallengesfor2016inyourregion?

2. Howaremigrationflowslikelytoevolvein2016?

3. What are likely to be the key migration policydebates?

InthecaseofAfrica,muchofthepolicyattentioniscurrently focusedon theflowsof irregularmigrantsfrom Africa to Europe. Africans constituted about14percentofarrivalsinEuropein2015.Althoughtheseflows are relatively modest in size – approximately150,000persons,fromapopulationinAfricaofoverabillionpersons–theincreaseinmigrationfromAfricatoEuropeattractedhugemediaattention.Numerousarticles portrayed Africa as a continent plagued bypovertyandconflict,oftengivingtheimpressionthatmostpeoplewouldwishtomigrateiftheycould.Littlementionismadeinthemediaofthegrowingmiddleclass and increase in economic growth in manyAfrica countries. In response to the increased flowsof migrants from Africa, the European Union hascreatedtheEmergencyTrustFund,withabudgetofEUR1.8billiontoaddress“therootcausesofirregularmigrationanddisplacementinAfrica”.The1.8billionbudgetmayseemhigh,butitissmallcomparedwiththe USD 60 billion remittances sent bymigrants toAfricalastyear.

1 Solon Ardittis isManaging Director of Eurasylum Ltd. FrankLaczko isHeadoftheGlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre(GMDAC) at the International Organization for Migration(IOM) in Berlin. They are the co-editors ofMigration Policy Practice.

Since 2015, the price of oil has fallen by75percent.The fall in thepriceofoiland its likelyimpact on migration trends is a common themementionedbyseveralauthors.FormostofAsia,thefall in oil prices could be a huge gain and facilitaterecovery or spur faster growth within the region.A major policy development in Asia in 2016 is thebeginning of theAsian Economic Community (AEC).Thiswillfacilitatethefulleconomicintegrationof10South-EastAsiancountries.Thisinturnmayfacilitatethe mobility of migrant labour within the region.However,migration from Asia to other regionsmaybebadlyaffectedbythefallinthepriceofoil.

AstheGulfregionhasbecomethelargestdestinationareaforAsianmigrantworkers,thefallinthepriceofoilcouldseriouslyreducethedemandformigrantsfromAsia.Thereareover16millionmigrantworkersfromAsiaworkingintheGulfcountries.Migrantsaccountforapproximatelyhalfof thepopulationof theGulfcountries.Despiteeffortsbygovernmentsintheregiontoreducetheirdependenceonmigrantworkers,thenumberofnon-nationalshasgrownsignificantlyoverthelasttwodecades.OneofthereasonswhytheGulfcountrieswishtoreducemigrationisbecauseofrisingunemploymentamongtheirownnationals.Inrecentyears, theunemployment rateamongSaudiwomenhasrisento35percent.

On the other side of the world, migration patternsare also likely to change in 2016. Thawing relationsbetween Cuba and the United States has led to anincrease in the number of Cubans seeking to entertheUnited States.Asmanyof thesemigrantsmaketheirway to the United States via Central America,problems arose when Nicaragua tried to seal itsborders, leaving many migrants stranded in CostaRica. The United States is the main destination formigrantsintheCaribbeanregion.TherecentupturnintheUSeconomyhasledtoanincreaseinthenumberof persons from the Caribbean seeking tomove totheUnitedStates.Forexample,a recordnumberofvisa applications to the United States were madeby Jamaicans in 2015. However, there are growingconcerns in Jamaicaabout thehighcostofapplyingforsuchvisasandthelossofincometoJamaicawhenapplications are rejected. Recent migration trends

3Vol. V, Number 5, December 2015–January 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

in theCaribbeanhighlight thatmigration is aglobalphenomenon.Althoughthenumbersaresmall,severalCaribbeanislandshaveseenasignificant increaseinthenumberof asylum claims fromSyriansover thelastyearandthistrendisexpectedtocontinue.

Thefinalarticle inthis issuefocusesontheregionaloutlookformigrationin2016inLatinAmerica.Herethemajor challenges are similar to those in 2015 –theprotectionof the rightsofmigrants, the lackofcoherence between migration and other policies,and the need to improve cooperation and dialoguebetween States. Within South America, it is likelythat Chile will become an increasingly important

destinationformigrants,withmorethan100,000newimmigrantsexpectedin2016.Mostofthesemigrantswill come from other countries in South America,highlightingthegrowingimportanceofSouth–Southmigration.

WethankallthecontributorstothisissueofMigration Policy Practice andinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinasurveywhichaimstohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimary interests inour journal.Shouldyouwishtoparticipate inthissurvey,pleaseclick here.n

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/J3M7PS5

Vol. V, Number 5, December 2015–January 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE4

1 Aderanti Adepoju is the Coordinator of the Network ofMigrationResearchonAfrica(NOMRA).

Outlook on migration in Africa in 2016Aderanti Adepoju1

Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Africa in 2015, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2016, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

2015wasayearofso-calledmigrationcrisis,withovera million asylum-seekers and migrants from Africa,andalso fromtheSyrianArabRepublic,Afghanistanand Iraq, crossing over to Europe and creating ahuge humanitarian challenge. It, however, took thetragic death of 800 migrants in the MediterraneanSea inApril togalvanizepublicandpoliticalopinionthatpromptedthesummitbetweenEuropeanUnion(EU)andAfricanHeadsofStateinValletta,Greece,inNovember2015,todiscussthechallengesofirregularmigrationflowsintoEurope.

For Africa, the big migration story of 2015 andremarkably throughout 2016 hovers around theValletta Political Declaration, the Valletta SummitAction Plan, and the EU Emergency Trust Fund ofEUR 1.8 billion for stability and addressing the rootcauses of irregularmigration and displaced personsin Africa. This is a collective response by the EU tothecurrentchallengesandcomplementstheexistingdevelopmentaid toAfrica toassist theSahel regionandLakeChadarea,theHornofAfricaandNorthernAfrica – the major migration hubs and migrationroutestoEurope.Inaddition,neighbouringcountriesto these target countriesmayalsobenefit from theFund’s projects to address regional migration flowsandthechallengesrelatedtobordercrossing.

TheActionPlan is built around5priority areas and16 priority initiatives to be launched before theend of 2016. The priority areas,which are also keypolicy challenges in the migration–developmentarchitecture,are:(i)developmentbenefitsofmigrationandaddressingtherootcausesofirregularmigrationand forced displacement; (ii) legal migration andmobility; (iii) protection and asylum; (iv) prevention

of and fight against irregular migration, migrantsmuggling and trafficking in human beings; and(v)return,readmissionandreintegration.

TheAfricanUnion (AU) has raised the discourse onmigration to the height of its policy agenda. This isreflected in a series of proclamations with the keyobjective to promote the benefits of migration,improve capacity for migration management andenhancemobilityonthecontinent,aswellasaddressthechallengesofirregularmigration.

The Africa Union Consultation in Nairobi, on 14–15December 2015, provided a forum for all 54 AUMemberStatesandRegionalEconomicCommunities(RECs)(forthe20AUMemberStatesand6RECsnotinvited to Valletta) to discuss themigration agendaandidentifykeypriorityareasforimmediateactionintheshortandmediumtermwithintheframeworkofAUpoliciesandprogrammes.

Atthepoliticallevel,atthe25thAUSummiton7–15June2015, inJohannesburg,acomprehensiverangeofissueswereflaggedtobeachievedby2018,notablyspeedinguptheimplementationofregionwidevisa-freeregimesincludingissuanceofvisasatallportsofentryforallAfricans,theprojecttofast-trackissuanceofanAfricanpassportbyMemberStates,whichwouldinitiatefreemovementofAfricans,asiscurrentlythecase of the Economic Community of West AfricanStates(ECOWAS).Othersareimprovingintraregionallabour mobility by establishing harmonizedmechanisms to ensure that higher education inAfrica will enable recognition of credentials thatwill facilitate transferability of knowledge, skills andexpertise. Existing action plans to combat humantraffickingandsmugglingofmigrantsarealsoputintoeffect, especially theAUHornofAfrica InitiativeonhumantraffickingandsmugglingofmigrantsindirectresponsetotheirregularmigrationflowswithinandfromtheHornofAfrica.

OtherinitiativesincludetheAUAssemblyDeclarationonMigrationatthe25thAUSummitinJohannesburgin June 2015, with the theme of “Year of WomenEmpowerment and Development towards Africa’sAgenda 2063”; Declaration of the 1st Diaspora


Conference on African Migration to Europe inSeptember 2015; and importantly the UN GeneralAssemblydeclarationoftheInternationalDecadeforPeopleofAfricanDescent(2015–2024).

The 24th Assembly adopted the Labour MigrationGovernance for Integration and Development(the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP)) inAfrica to facilitate the implementation of relevantpolicy frameworks on labour migration and thetransformational agenda for 2063 towards Africanintegration.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Africa likely to evolve in the course of 2016, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

TheVallettaSummitclearlystressestheneedtoassistAfrica to stem irregularmigration, ease visa regimefor students and professionals, and enjoin Africancountriestobereadytoreadmitfailedasylum-seekersandrepatriatedirregularmigrants.Sixteenprojectsaretobeimplementedin2016toimpacttherootcausesofmigration. Thesemay set the structure and levelofmigrationflowsfromAfricain2016andbeyond.Itshouldbenoted,however,thattheforeseenimpactmayalsobe limited in viewof the limitedallocatedfundandtimeframeforimplementingtheinitiatives,andespeciallywith respect toaddressing thedeep-rootedcausesofmigrationwithinandfromAfrica.

Africans constituted about 14 per cent of arrivalsin Europe in 2015.Mixedmigration flows from andwithin Africa is a growing phenomenon that wouldpersistwithinandoutsideAfricain2016.Onelessontobe learned from themigration crisis in2015andtheresponsebyEUcountriesisthepossibilityofmoremigrantsusingthefamilyreunificationroutetoenterEurope.This isespecially the caseof the thousandsof unaccompanied minors that have already beengranted asylum, about 30,000 by Sweden forexample.Besides,manyof thepotential immigrantsfromAfrica’shotspots–Eritrea,EthiopiaandSomalia–willalsoexploitthenetworkofestablishedmigrantsto gain entry into some “soft” countries of asylum,notably Germany and Sweden, unless their currentpoliciesaredrasticallyreviewed.

Irregular migration and human trafficking in theHorn of Africa, particularly from Eritrea, Ethiopiaand Somalia, will intensify, for the root causes ofthis dynamic (i.e. conflicts, governance and climatechange)arefarfrombeingresolved.

The challenge of insurgency still persists in Mali,Nigeria, Somalia, and neighbouring countries inWesternAfricaandEasternAfrica.ThepromisetorootoutBokoHaramfromNigeriabyDecember2015wasnotachieved.Thoughweakened,thesectcontinuestokill,maimanddisplacepopulationsnotonlyinNigeriabut also in Cameroon and Chad. One consequenceis the likely increase in the number of internallydisplaced persons and strain on infrastructure toprovidefortheneedsofvulnerablegroups,especiallywomenandchildren.

The incidence of expulsion ofmigrantswill becomewidespread, as major destination countriesexperience economic difficulties well into 2016. Atthe same time, the triggers for emigration – youngpopulation,excruciatingpoverty,highunemploymentand insecurity – will worsen in 2016. In almost allAfrican countries, youth unemployment remainsa major development challenge and a trigger foremigration.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Africa in 2016, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

The key policy debates aroundmigration would, atthepan-Africanlevel,andalsointhetargetcountriesoftheSahel,theHornofAfrica,NorthernAfricaandLakeChadregion,revolvearoundtheimplementationframework, mechanisms and follow-up of the 16activities under the Valletta Plan of Action. WhileEuropeplanstoprovidetheEUR1.8billionEmergencyFund(yettobefullyrealized),Africancountrieswouldneed to enhance their institutional capacity andgovernance deficit, while ensuring sustainability ofefforts,notablycapacitytoraisetheirowndomesticrevenuestoprovidegoodgovernance,andmaintainandenhancedevelopmentinfrastructure.

6 Vol. V, Number 5, December 2015–January 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

In view of the declining economic fortunes andrevenue base of many African countries, includingoil-producing African countries, led by Nigeria,remittance-dependent and aid-dependent countrieswillhavetocreativelyexploreremittancesaspotentialsource of development and as poverty-reductionstrategy.This is themore so since remittanceshaveovershadowed official development assistance anddirectforeigninvestment.WithaboutUSD60 billionin remittance flowing into Africa through formalchannels,andmuchmoreifaddedtoinformalchannelsof remittances, governments will need to partnerwithstakeholderstoachievelowertransactioncosts,thereby also increasing the volume of remittancesand exploring the use of diaspora bonds andAfricaDevelopmentBank’sSendMoneyAfricaproject.

The African Institute for Remittances (AIR) hasrecently established works towards reducingtransaction costs of remittances while encouragingcountries and migrants to leverage remittances forthe socioeconomic development of the continent.TheAIRisafocalpointforallstakeholdersinAfricanremittances, a centre of excellence on Africanremittances for research, advocacy and privatesector engagement. It is also a hub through whichtechnical assistance and capacity-building regardingremittanceswouldbeprovidedtoAfricancountries’banks and non-bank financial institutions. The AIR’sobjectiveistodevelopthecapacityofMemberStatesof the AU, remittance senders and recipients, andotherstakeholderstoimplementconcretestrategiesandoperational instrumentstouseremittancesasadevelopmenttoolforpovertyreduction.Theclamourfor lower costs of money transfers, presently at9.7percenttosendUSD200tosub-SaharanAfricancountries, the highest in the world with a globalaverage of 7.7 per cent, would resonate louder in2016.

WithinAfrica, thedramaticerosionofgovernments’major source of income – that is, oil in major oil-producing countries, which are alsomajormigrant-receivingcountries–isforcinggovernmentstopursuestringent economic policy. The impact of inflationanddiminishedwelfareoftheworkingpoorissettointensify in 2016, leading to discontent among thelocalpopulationthatmayturntoxenophobicviolentreactionsagainst foreignerswhomaybeblamedfortheircountries’economicwoes.Asnationaleconomiesinmajoroil-producingcountries(e.g.Algeria,GabonandNigeria)continuetoshrink,politiciansmayoncemore turn the search light on immigrants as easy

scapegoatsforallfailingsofgovernmentstoprovidejobs fornationals. Towards theendof 2015,Gabonexpelled about 700 so-called irregular immigrants,atrendthatmaypersistalbeit lessdramatically into2016,evenbeyond.

Many observers in Africa view with scepticism theimportoftheVallettaPlanofAction,arguingthatitisaveiledpolicyfordeportationofAfricanimmigrantsandaformalengagementwithAfricancountriestobereadytoreadmitandreintegratedeportees.TheJointDeclarations between the EU and the five Africancountries – Cabo Verde,Morocco, Tunisia (MobilityPartnerships),EthiopiaandNigeria(CommonAgendaon Migration and Mobility) – is also inadvertentlyseeninthiscontext.

In Africa, 2015 can indeed be tagged season ofexpulsion of asylum-seekers and irregular migrantswithinandoutsidetheregion.Withinthecontinent,South Africa arrested 1,600 irregular immigrantsin May 2015, in the wake of the anti-immigrantxenophobic violence in April that resulted in sevendeaths when mobs hunted down migrants fromZimbabwe,MozambiqueandotherAfricancountries.Rampantyouthunemploymentofover50percent,poverty and a slowing economy are the triggersfor the expulsion of over 800 immigrants, mostlyMozambicansandZimbabweans.

Gabon also made the news headline when frommiddle toendof2015, thecountryexpelledalmost800 irregular migrants from Burkina Faso, Côted’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, who were alldumped in Calabar, south-east Nigeria. These anddeportations of immigrants from Equatorial Guineaand Congo to the Democratic Republic of Congoare set to continuedeep into2016, evenasoil-richAlgeria 3,700 deported irregular migrants to Niger.Cameroon, Chad and Niger deported thousands,as theBokoHaramterroristattacks spread to thesecountries. All over the region, the slogan “AfricansdeportingAfricans”resonateslouder.

Outside the continent, Saudi Arabia’s campaign todetain and deport thousands of undocumentedworkers culminated in mass expulsion of irregularmigrantsfromEthiopia,SomaliaandYemenin2015.InMay2015,Israelplannedtocontroversiallyresettle–aeuphemismfor“deport”–SudaneseandEritreanasylum-seekers and irregular migrants to refugeecamps in other African countries, possibly UgandaandRwanda.


In Europe, Sweden plans to expel 80,000 failedasylum-seekers;Finlandalso followedsuit.Germanyis reportedlyproposing thatAlgerianandMoroccanasylum-seekersnolongerbeputinsheltersthroughoutthecountrybutratherinexistingexpulsionfacilities.

ThefeelingiswidespreadamongAfricanofficialsthatthistrendwillintensifyin2016asoneofthepriorityareas of the Valletta Action Plan relates to return,readmission and reintegration of irregular migrantsand failed asylum-seekers, both from EU MemberStates and associated countries and from Africancountriesoftransitanddestination.n

In view of the declining economic fortunes and revenue base of many African countries,

including oil-producing African countries, led by Nigeria,

remittance-dependent and aid-dependent countries will

have to creatively explore remittances as potential source

of development and as poverty-reduction strategy.


Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Asia in 2015, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2016, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Three developments are most likely to determinetheshapeofmigrationinAsiain2016.Thefirstandmost important is how theMiddle East destinationcountries will react and adjust their spending totheir lower revenues following the sharp decline inoilprices.Thesecondishowthewindfallgainsfromlow-oil prices will translate into faster growth forthe oil-importing economies of the region, notablyIndia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and themember countries of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN). The third is how migrationpressureswill be absorbedwithin countries suchasIndia,VietNam,thePhilippinesandIndonesia,whichareexperiencingacceleratingeconomicgrowth,andinMyanmar,wheretheopeningoftheeconomymayspurreturnflowsfromThailandandMalaysia.Theoil-richStatesofthePersianGulf,namely,SaudiArabia,Kuwait, theUnitedArabEmirates,Qatar,OmanandBahrain together constitute the most importantdestinations of Asian migration, hosting today over16 million Asian nationals, almost all of them ontemporarycontractsasguestworkers.Inrecentyearstheyhavebeen importing some2.4millionworkersannuallyfromsevenAsiancountries–India,Pakistan,Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines andIndonesia (Shah,2012).2Thismigrationsystemowesits existence largely to the fortunes made from oil

2 Shah reported that there were 14.4 million workers fromfive Asian countries, namely, India, Indonesia, Pakistan,the Philippines and Sri Lanka. In 2006–2010, the estimatedstockofAsianworkers in themembercountriesof theGulfCooperationCouncil (GCC) is as follows:4.5million Indians,2.7 million Indonesians, 2.1 million Pakistanis, 2.4 millionFilipinos and 2.7million Sri Lankans. See: N. Shah, “LabourmigrationfromAsiantoGCCcountries:Trends,patternsandpolicies”,paperpresentedatthespecialsymposiumonlabourandmigrationintheMiddleEast,UniversityofToronto,16–17March2012.BangladeshisandNepaleseintheGCCprobablynumberanother2million.

1 ManoloAbella is a SeniorResearchAssociate at theCentreonMigration,PolicyandSociety(COMPAS),OxfordUniversity,andformerDirectoroftheInternationalMigrationProgrammeattheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)inGeneva.

Outlook on migration in Asia in 2016Manolo Abella1

andhowsuchfortuneshavebeenspenttotransformwhat in thepastweresmallvillagesettlements intotoday’s modern metropolises. A large reduction inspendingon constructiondue todeclining revenuesfromoilwillnodoubthavean important impactonAsianmigrationflowstoandfromtheregion.

For most countries in Asia, the drop in oil pricesrepresentsahugewindfallthatcanfacilitaterecoveryor spur faster growth. With the value of their oilimportsnowjustathirdofwhattheywereonlyayearago,mostcountriesinAsiashouldenjoymuchlowerenergy costs, which should boost growth across allsectors,withoutcausinginflationarypressures.China,whichinrecentyearshasseenarapiddecelerationofitsgrowthrate,isnowthelargestimporterofoilintheworld, averaging some7millionbarrelsof crudeoiladay.Indiaisthefourthlargestconsumerofenergyin the world, spending over USD 300million a dayfor imported fuels in 2014. Evenbefore thedeclineinoilprices, India’sgrowthratehashoveredatover7per cent so thewindfall is likely to allowanevenfasterrateofeconomicgrowth.TheASEANcountriesarenow importingclose to4millionbarrelsofoiladay so their savings will also be substantial. Whiletheoverall global impactof the75per centdeclinein oil prices since 2015 is still being debated, thereis littledoubtthattheoil-importingcountries intheregion stand to gain significantly. Itwillmakemoreviable a wide range of manufacturing activitieswithout requiring government subsidies to energyconsumption,reducethecostsofagricultural inputsandraise real incomesacross largesectionsof theirpopulations.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Asia likely to evolve in the course of 2016, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

There is of course a downside to the decline in oilpricessincemostoftheGulfStatesarelikelytostartreducing their spending and thus their demand forlabour. How this will affect the size of the foreignworkforce already in their countries remains to beseen,but it iscertain thatnewadmissionswill starttodeclinein2016comparedwiththepreviousyears.Saudi Arabia revenues are estimated to fall from


USD164billion in 2015 toUSD137billion in 2016.With forecast deficit of SRI 326.2 billion, the Saudiauthoritiesarereportedtobeconsideringnewtaxesand curbing increases in public sector wages andsalaries. The Middle East Economic Digest recentlyreportedthatthevalueofcontractstobesignedbySaudiArabiathisyearwilllikelyfalltoUSD140billioncompared with USD 165 billion in 2015, a drop of15percent.Sincemanyprojectsarestillonstream,actualspendingin2016isexpectedtodroptoUSD223billioncomparedwithUSD259billionin2015.Similardeficitsareforecastelsewhere.KuwaitauthoritiesareforecastingadeficitofUSD27billionfor2015/2016,while their counterparts in Qatar anticipate a fiscaldeficitofQR46.5billionfor2016.

TheGulf has become the largest destination regionforAsianmigrantworkers.Trendssuggestthattodaytherearesome16millionAsiannationalsintheGulfStates. Theseworkers are brought in on short-termcontractsof anywhere from6months to2 years towork in almost every conceivable occupation, frombuilding skyscrapers to serving as house helpers,driving public buses or cleaning streets, serving inhotelsandrestaurantsorsellinginstores,aswellasmore skilled jobs in hospitals, banking, petroleumrefining and teaching in universities. In almost allof the member countries of the Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC), Asians today make up the largestcomponentof the foreignworkforce,outnumberingby a largemargin workers from other regions. It isclear that whatever happens in that region will bethe dominant factor shaping futuremigration flowsfromAsia.Shahreportedthatin2012aloneabout2.4millionworkersfromsixAsiancountriesmigratedtotheGCCcountriesforemployment.Giventhecurrentsituation, it is highly unlikely that such volume ofmigrationtotheGulfStateswilltakeplacein2016.

Givenapossibledeclineinspendingonconstructionofanywherefrom12percentto15percentin2016,the volume of contract renewals plus new hires ofAsian workers may drop by as much as 300,000 in2016. The decline is unlikely to be spread evenlyacrossorigincountries,withthebruntbeingfeltmostbycountriesthatsupplyconstructionlaboursuchastheSouthAsian sourcesnotably IndiaandPakistan,andperhapsalsoNepal.Lesslikelytobeaffected,atleastintheforeseeablefuture,arecountriessupplyingdomestic helpers notably Sri Lanka, Indonesia andthe Philippines. Migrant workers in more skilledoccupations, such as those employed in hospitalsandthehealthservicessector,bankingandfinance,telecommunications and professional services, willnot be touched. Asian governments are already

anticipatingsomereturnflowsandareunderpressuretocomeupwithprogrammesforreintegration.Ifonegoesbyexperience,fewsuchprogrammeswillmakeadifferencetothereturnees,mostofwhomwillfindtheirownwaybacktojobsathomeortoanotheroneabroad.

How a possible decline in the migrant workerpopulation in theGulf Stateswill affect the volumeof remittances sent home by migrant workers ismore difficult to predict. Long-term trends showremittances rising with numbers of migrants butshort-term fluctuations depend on other factorssuchaswhenmigrantsrespondtocatastrophes(e.g.largeincreaseofflowstoNepalaftertheearthquake)or when expectation of exchange rate changesprompt holding back. In 2015, overall remittancesfrom theGulf Statesareestimated tohave reachedUSD 100 billion. India alone received aboutUSD 37 billion. The 2.8 million Indian nationals inSaudi Arabia,most of themworkers, are estimatedtohavesenthomesomeUSD10.3billion;Pakistanis,USD 4.49 billion; Bangladeshis, USD 3.8 billion;Indonesians, USD 3.3 billion; and Filipinos,USD 3.2 billion. What makes prediction difficult isthat experience has been counter-intuitive. In theaftermathoftheIraqiinvasionofKuwaitin1990,mostobservers expected a large decline in remittancesas hundreds of thousands of migrant workers losttheir jobs aswell as their hard-earned savings keptinbanks,butitdidnothappen.Therewasinsteadasmallriseingrossremittances.Somestudiessuggestthatmigrantstendtosendmoremoneyhomewhentheir foreigncurrenciesexchangeatahigherrateathome(i.e.whendevaluationoccurs).Thiswasnoted,for example, in India when a surge in remittancesfollowed the rupeedevaluationofabout6per centin2015.

A consequence of the oil price decline that is notdifficult to predict is an increase in the numberof business establishments in the Gulf States thatwill no longer be viable as the economies contract.Migrantworkerswhoare thefirst tobe laidoffwillstrive to find other employment to recoup theirinvestments but will be competing in a crowdedlabour market. Authorities in these countries aswellasintheircountriesoforiginwillthenbefacedwith growingnumbers ofmigrantswhowill requirefinancial assistance to return orwhowill risk beingconsidered “illegal” by violating the conditions oftheirworkvisas.ArecentsurveybytheInternationalLabour Organization and the World Bank revealedthatPakistaniworkerspaidonaverageUSD3,500fortheirvisastoSaudiArabia,whichisoverseventimes


theaverageofUSD480monthlywagetheyreceive,andthisdoesnotincludeotherexpensessuchasfortravel and for servicesof recruiters.Given thehugeinvestmentsmigrantsincurtogettheirjobs,onecanonly imagine thefinancialdistress facing thosewholosethem.

Is the region likely to see a repeat of the Koreanexperience?TheRepublicofKoreausedtobeamajorsupplierofcontract labour intheMiddleEast inthe1970sanduptothelate1980s.MostwereconstructionworkersbroughttotheGulfStatesbysometwodozenKorean companies, notably Hyundai, which wonlargecontracts tobuildairports,oilpipelines,ports,highwaysandotherinfrastructurealloverthePersianGulf regionandall thewaytoLibya inNorthAfrica.Some 122,000 Korean workers left their countryeachyearintheearly1980stoworkinSaudiArabia,and others found their way to Kuwait and Libya.3

Thecollapseofoilprices in themid-1980s followedbyIraq’sinvasionofKuwaitledtoasharpdeclineinconstructionactivitiesintheMiddleEast,forcingthereturnofthecontractorsandtheirworkers.However,thisprovedtobeaboontoKoreancontractorswhichneededthoseworkersathomewheretheeconomywas booming. A similar situation is emerging inmanypartsofAsiawhereconstructionactivitiesarebooming,spurredbylowinterestratesandambitiousgovernment-funded infrastructure projects. Aninternational consultancy firm, Building Radar,forecasts fast growth of construction activities until2020ledbyIndiaandChina,aswellasbyIndonesia,the Philippines, and Viet Nam.4 All these countrieshavemigrantworkersemployedinconstructionjobsin theMiddle East,many by contractors from theirowncountries.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Asia in 2016, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

This year signals the beginning of ASEAN EconomicCommunity (AEC), the ambitious programme forthefulleconomic integrationof10South-EastAsiancountrieswithacombinedpopulationof622million

3 It was reported that over 64,000 Korean workers wereemployedinKuwaitbetween1975and1985.

4 See https://buildingradar.com/construction-blog/asian-construction-market-forecast-from-2015-2020/

andGDPofUSD2.6trillionin2014.5Thisdevelopmentisexpectedto leadtoevengreater inflowsofdirectforeigninvestmentsintotheregion,asmultinationalsseektofindabaseinahugeandfast-growingmarketwithamplesuppliesof relativelycheap labour.Over4 million ASEAN nationals are estimated to beengaged in intra-ASEAN migration, sending aboutUSD 12 billion in remittances each year.6 Somemovementsaregovernedbyformalagreements,butmuch of it is still informal. The removal of barriersto tradeshould lead tomovementofgoods insteadof workers. More employment opportunities willbe created at home as the economies restructureto take advantage of their respective comparativeadvantages.However,intheimmediateshortterm,itismorelikelytoleadtomoremovementsofworkersacrossbordersduetothesuperiorpositionofsomecountrieswith respect to infrastructure,governanceand track record inattracting foreign capital. So far,the AEC does not provide for the free movementof workers, and given the wide differences in percapitaincomesamongthemembercountries,thisisunlikelytohappenforsometime.Thereissofaronlyagreementformutualrecognitionofqualificationsinsevenprofessionaloccupations.7

In sum, 2016 is likely to see some redirection ofmigration flows in Asia, as countries of destinationandoriginadjust to the redirection in incomeflowswithdecliningoilprices.Exactlyhowmacroeconomicconditions shaping migration will change over thecourse of the year is extremely difficult to predict,as there are numerous imponderables in the globaleconomythatwillaffectAsiaincludingspilloversfromcrises in other parts of the world. The foregoing isourattempttoseizeonalreadyknownlinkbetweenmigrationandoilprices,andtoreflecttheexperienceof past responses of Asian migration to changingeconomic environment. We have not included anyprediction of how the migration crisis in Europewill affect Asian migration since that region has sofar not featured as a major destination except for

5 Seewww.asean.org/asean-economic-community/andwww.asean.org/storage/2015/12/AEC-at-a-Glance-2015.pdf

6 G. Pasadilla, and M. Abella, “Social protection for migrantworkers in ASEAN”, CESifoWorking Paper Social ProtectionNo. 3914, Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for EconomicResearchattheUniversityofMunich.

7 Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) have been agreedbyASEANcountriesforeightprofessions,namely,physicians,dentists,nurses,architects,engineers,accountants,surveyorsand tourismprofessionals, tobe free towork inanyASEANnationafterthestartoftheAEC,31December2015.

https://buildingradar.com/construction-blog/asian-construction-market-forecast-from-2015-2020/

https://buildingradar.com/construction-blog/asian-construction-market-forecast-from-2015-2020/

http://www.asean.org/asean-economic-community/

http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/12/AEC-at-a-Glance-2015.pdf

http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/12/AEC-at-a-Glance-2015.pdf


relativelysmallflowsofhighlyskilledworkersontheone hand and refugees on another. On the widerscale,theWorldBankpredictsglobalGDPtogrowby2.9 per cent in 2016, slightly higher than the2.4percentachievedin2015.Ifthisforecastisborneout, the decline inmigration in some corridors arelikelytobecompensatedbyarise inothers,sothatoverallwemaynotseeasignificantchangefrompasttrends.n

A large reduction in spending on construction due to declining

revenues from oil will no doubt have an important impact

on Asian migration flows to and from the region.


1 Joanne van Selm is Eurasylum’s Associate Director ofResearch,andEditorialAdvisorof Migration Policy Practice.Shealsoworksasanindependentconsultantoninternationalmigration,asylumandrefugeepolicies,andiscurrentlybasedinKingston,Jamaica.

Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in the Caribbean in 2015, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2016, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?Joanne van Selm: The challenges facing countriesin the Caribbean on the migration policy front willcontinuetobepartlynationalandregional,andpartlygroundedinexogenousfactors.

ThawingUnitedStates–Cuba relationsand concernsamong Cubans for what that might mean for theirspecial immigrationandasylumstatus in theUnitedStates(intermsofthe“wetfeet,dryfeet”distinction,and the access to parole status) make the Cubanexodus a potentially high regional policy priorityfor 2016. Meanwhile, mixed migration patternsare posing policy challenges to various Caribbeanislands, involving labourmigration, forcedmigrationand trafficking. Finally, changes in the internationalbankingregimecouldhavemajorimpactontheflowofremittancestotheregion,whichcouldinturnhaveimportantimpactsondevelopment.

CubanémigrésareaveryspecificgroupthatisgoingtocausepolicychallengesforCuba,theUnitedStates,and other countries in the Caribbean and CentralAmerican region as the relationship between theUnited States and Cuba develops over the comingyears.CubansareseekingtoentertheUnitedStatesinever greaternumbers, taking riskyboat crossingsandmaking their way over land after first reachingcountries in Central America. Tensions have arisenbetween Costa Rica andNicaragua, in particular, asseveralthousandCubansbecameeffectivelytrappedin Costa Rica on their way to the United States.Cuba’s ally, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua,was detaining and threatening the Cubans, andclaiming,forexample,thatCostaRicawasviolatingitssovereigntyby“throwing”theCubansintoNicaragua.

At the veryendof 2015, anairliftwasorganized tomovethe6,000CubanstrappedinCostaRicatotheUnitedStates,therebybypassingNicaragua.However,officialsexpressedconcernthatwhereassome40,000Cubans had arrived in Ecuador (which had offeredvisa-free entry to Cubans), only 7,000 were knowntohaveenteredCostaRica.Themigrantsare takingroutesviaColombiaandPanama,andsmugglersandtraffickersareknowntobeexploitingthesituation.

In terms of mixed flows, some of the wealthierLeewardAntilleanislandssuchasArubaandCuraçaohavebeen seeing increasing arrivals ofVenezuelansas tourists, transit migrants or asylum-seekers. Insomecases,theseVenezuelansjustwanttousetheirATMcards,as cash isnot so readilyavailable in theBolivarianRepublicofVenezuela,ortobuygoodsthatare now scarce there (including basic commoditiessuch as toilet paper and sugar, and also beer) andthenreturntotheircountry.Othersseektosellgoodsor consumables such as fish or frequently illegallyimportedwhiskey,andtheninsomecasesattempttoremainon the islands illegallyor to requestasylum.These islands, which are constituent countries ofthe Kingdom of the Netherlands, have visa policiesthat are largely based on a supple approach totouristarrivals,anddonotcurrentlyrequirevisasforVenezuelancitizens(althoughtheydoforcitizensofmostCaribbeanislands).However,bothemploymentand staying beyond the short term approved fortourismrequireauthorization.PriortotheDecemberparliamentary elections in the Bolivarian Republicof Venezuela, warnings had been voiced on bothislands aboutwhat theCuraçao Chronicle termed a“ticking timebomb” on the borders of the KingdomoftheNetherlands.Asthoseelectionswereheldon6December2015, it is toosoontotellwhetherthesuccessofthecentristcoalitionagainstthesocialistswillhaveasignificantcalmingimpactonthesecurityfears and political climate; however, the economicturmoil in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelaremains,not least thanks to themassivedrop inoilprices, and therefore the chances that Venezuelanswill seek opportunities through migration are stillhigh.While Aruba’s PrimeMinisterMike Eman hasbeen clear that his island will respect the rights ofand accept refugees, both Aruba and Curaçao have

Outlook on migration in the Caribbean in 2016Joanne van Selm1


seenrisingoppositionamongthepopulationstotheirregular arrivals and stays of Venezuelans. Arubahas imposed cash amounts that Venezuelans musthave in handon arrival to cover the lengthof theiranticipated stay. A petition has been running inCuraçaodemandingchangesinimmigrationrulesforVenezuelans.This isasituationthat is likelytoposesomepolicychallengesintheyearahead.

With theUSeconomy improving, remittances couldpotentially increase. Remittances are an importantsource of revenue for individuals and families, aswell as a channel for investments and a significantcomponent of GDP, particularly for poor islands.Remittancestotheregionin2014wereestimatedatwelloverUSD10billion.Touristdollarswillalsobeanimportantsourceofrevenue,andfromthesepointsofview,emigration,diaspora relationsand theeaseoftouristtravelwillcontinuetobekeyissuesfortheregion.However,changesintheinternationalbankingregimecouldputtheimportantremittanceandotherpayment flows in jeopardy. Regulations on anti-money laundering and on combating the financingofterrorismarehavingtheunintendedconsequenceof shutting down correspondent bank channels,andare,accordingtoaNovember2015WorldBankreport, havingaparticular impacton theCaribbeanregion.Clearingbanksarebeingextremely cautiousnot to get into difficulties with these regulations,whichrequire thoroughsurveillanceof transactions,due diligence procedures on new customers,maintenance of transaction records and reportingofsuspiciousactivitiestonationalauthorities.Whenmajorinternationalbanksarenotsurewhethersmallfinancialinstitutionsareadheringfullytotheserules,colloquiallyreferredtoas“Knowyourcustomer”,theyhavebeenclosingdowncorrespondentbankfacilities,oftenwithout notice. This is having amajor impactonthetransferof remittances,aswellas theabilityof small businesses to make payments or receivethemforexports,forexample,andwillrequiresomeattentionintheyeartocome.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in the Caribbean likely to evolve in the course of 2016, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

Joanne van Selm:Thetwomainpredictable“hotpots”in termsofnumerical growth inmigrationare likelytobeCubaandtheBolivarianRepublicofVenezuela,

withCubansmovingoverseaorviaCentralAmericatotheUnitedStates,andVenezuelanstakingtheboatjourneyfromtheNorthCoasttotheLeewardAntilles.Inaddition,as theUSeconomystrengthens relativetobothitsownrecentperformanceandthesituationin the Caribbean region,more andmore Caribbeannationals are seeking business visas for multipleentries to the United States. The unpredictableelement in the Caribbean migration picture is, ofcourse,whatmighthappenintheeventofanaturaldisastersuchasanearthquakeaffectingoneormoreislands,orpoliticalupheaval,whichcontinuestobeascenariomostlikelytoimpactCubaand/orHaiti.

Inthe12monthstoOctober2015,therewere4,300Cubans intercepted and repatriated while seekingto enter theUnited States. Thatwas an increaseof600overthepreviousyear.Therewasa118percentspikeinthenumberofCubansseekingasylumatlandborders (Miami and crossings with Mexico). Some40,000CubansenteredEcuador in2015, seeking tomaketheoverlandjourneytoentertheUnitedStatesviaMexico.Meanwhile,fromJanuarytoOctober2015,41,000Cubansentered theUnited Stateswithout avisa–31,000overlandattheMexicoborder,andtheremaining10,000eitherbyboatorbyairtoFloridaorotherstates.

The United States serves as a magnet in migrationterms for theCaribbeanregion.As theUSeconomystrengthens,relativebothto itsownpositionduringthefinancialcrisisstartingin2008andtothepaceofgrowthintheCaribbeanregion,nationalsofCaribbeanislandsareseekinglegalchannelstoentertheUnitedStates for business or short-term employmentopportunities in particular. Visas for CaribbeannationalstoentertheUnitedStatesforbusinessandshort-term,work-relatedopportunitieshaverecentlybeen a cause for concern in Jamaica, for example.Around159,000visaapplicationsweresubmittedtotheEmbassyoftheUnitedStatesinKingstonin2015,thehighestnumberin20years.Eachapplicationfora 10-year, multiple-entry visa is accompanied by aUSD 160 fee, meaning that Jamaicans paid a totalof USD 25 million in 2015 for US visas. Of theseapplications,35percentwererejected.Theconcernin Jamaicawas focusedon the fact that themoneypaid to theUnitedStates for visaprocessing (whichthe United States channels into both the costs ofproceduresandgreaterbordersecurity)islosstotheJamaicaneconomy,andequatestotwicetheamountthatparentshavebeenaskedtopayinauxiliaryfeesforpubliceducation(acontroversialnewfeesystem).


Overthe14-yearruleofHugoChavez,aboutamillionVenezuelansleftthecountry(3.5%ofitspopulation),mostlytowardsColombiaandotherCentralAmericancountriesaswellastheUnitedStates.Verylittleofthismigration has been towards the Caribbean nations,although thepotential for transitmigration throughthemexists.

Therearethreeothertrendstowhichattentionwillbe paid in the coming year. One is the increasingfeminization of migration, with all its impacts oncountries of origin at the family and communitylevels,aswellasimpactsoncountriesofdestination.Caribbean emigration seems to be in line with thisglobal trend and worthy of attention. Deportationlevels from developed countries, particularly theUnitedStates,CanadaandtheUnitedKingdom,andalso other European States, could change over thecoming year, particularly as the focus on (irregular)immigration intensifies and as laws and policiescouldeitherbetightenedormore strictly enforced.Removalsofmigrantscovernotonlythosewhoareinviolationregarding their immigrationstatusbutalsothosewhohavebeenfoundguiltyofcrimestotheircountriesoforigin.Howtheseindividualsaretreatedontheirreturntothecountryoforigin,whethertheyareincludedintrainingandemploymentprogrammes(oftenfundedbythedeportingcountry)orservingouta jail sentence, for example, and their reintegration(orotherwise)willneedcloseattentionforitssocietalimpacts. Finally, diaspora relations, including thenature and impact of remittances, and potentiallythe returnofqualified investorsasemployers,or inretirement,couldbeonanupwardtrend,andagain,worthyofclosepolicyattention.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in the Caribbean in 2016, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

Joanne van Selm: Although several islands(prominently Jamaica2 and the Dominican Republic,andalsoTurksandCaicos,CuraçaoandPuertoRico)have elections in the coming year, none can beanticipated to have a major or immediate impactonmigrationpolicydebates in the region. Somedo

2 TheJamaicanelectionislikelytotakeplacein2016,butcouldbecalledlateintheyearandactuallyheldinearly2017.

suggest,however, thatPuertoRicanmigrants totheUnitedStates,whogaintherighttovoteinpresidentialelectionswhenregisteredtovoteinaUSstate(thoughnotwheninPuertoRico)couldhavesomeinfluenceontheUSelectionsinNovember2016.

However, several migration issues will be the basisof debate and possible new policies as well asdiscussion inpublic forums.These includemigrationissuesrelatedtoextremism;thereceptionofasylum-seekers and treatment of victims of trafficking inpersons; statelessness, particularly of people ofHaitian descent; health; investor citizenship; andclimatechange.

While geographically distant from the events in theMiddleEast,theCaribbeanisnotimmunetoIslamicextremism, and this subject is going to be part ofthe policy debates in the coming year. Trinidad andTobago inparticularhaveconcerns in thisdirection:reports suggest thatup to100nationalsofTrinidadandTobagohavealreadybeenfoundtohavetravelledtotheSyrianArabRepublictotrainandfightwiththeIslamicState(IS),andsomehavebeendiscoveredinTurkish refugee camps, too. There is concern in theregionthatsuch“homegrown”extremistscouldbringterrorismtothispartoftheworld,andalsoconcernabout the emigration and returnof thesewould-befighters. Such radicalization is not new among theMuslimpopulationofTrinidadandTobago.Overthelast10to15years,therehavebeenseveralinstancesofTrinidadandTobagonationalshavingbeenfoundtobeplottingattacks, including intheUnitedStates(e.g. at the JohnF.Kennedy InternationalAirport inNewYorkin2007).Therehavebeenconcernsthatafew extremists have emerged on other islands andtravelledtotheSyrianArabRepublic;however,thereissignificantdoubtcastonaccountsofanyotherthantheTrinidadandTobagonationals.

TheCaribbeanhasseenafewarrivalsofSyrianasylum-seekers over the last few years. Thesenumbers areunlikelytorisesignificantlyinglobalterms;however,fortheislands intheregion,anincreasefromjustahandfulor twodozenasylum-seekers tooneor twohundred isquitesignificant.Thissituationhas facedTrinidad and Tobago in the past year, and otherislands could also face such increases. The islandsgenerally have limited refugee or asylum legislationinplace,andwork ratheronacase-by-casebasis inconjunctionwiththeOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)withassistancefrom localnon-governmentalorganizations. Insome


cases,forexample,intheBahamas,detentionisoftenusedalthoughnotnecessarilyappropriately.UNHCRisworkingwiththeCaribbeannationstodeveloptheirasylumsystemsandtoincreaseaccesstoprotectionandmechanismsforresettlement.TherecouldindeedbediscussionastowhethercountriesintheCaribbeanregioncouldplaya(veryminor)roleinresettlementasacontributiontomeetingtheprotectionneedsofthoseimpactedbyconflictintheregion.

Trafficking in persons has both domestic andinternational facets in the Caribbean region, whichis a source, transit point anddestinationof victims.It remains an underresearched area, and there isa persistent lack of focus on addressing the issue,resultinginlowscoringontheUSStateDepartmentTrafficking inPersons report,which couldultimatelyhave consequences in the financial and otherdevelopment aid sectors for some island nations.Children are particularly vulnerable in the region,including,butnotlimitedto,Haitians.TheCaribbeanhasmanyaspectsthatlendthemselvestohighlevelsof trafficking, including wide income disparities,the ease of boat departures and arrivals, and theprominenceof thedrugs tradeandotherorganizedcrime.Thethree-prongedprevention,prosecutionofperpetrators,andprotectionofvictimsapproachhasthus farprimarily resulted in informationcampaignsaimedatraisingawarenessandpreventingtrafficking,but little has been done either to prosecute or toprotectthemostvulnerable.

Policyandlegaldecisions intheDominicanRepublichave rendered statelessabout150,000peoplebornto non-national (the vast majority Haitian) parentsover several decades. Although 2015 saw requestsfromUNHCRandtheMemberStatesoftheCaribbeanCommunityandCommonMarket(CARICOM)thattheDominicanRepublicregularizethesituationofthesepeopleandrestoretheirrights,whatisdescribedbymanyasacrisisofstatelessnessremainsasweenter2016.SomepeoplehavemigratedvoluntarilytoHaiti,othershavebeendeported;butremovaltoHaitiwillnotresolvethesituationformanyofthem,astheyarealsoexcludedbyHaiti’snationalitylaws,havingbeenbornintheDominicanRepublicandoftenwithmixedparentage.CARICOMhasissuedappealsandwarningsto the Government of the Dominican Republic,particularly about their concerns over deportation,buttheorganizationhaslargelylettheUnitedNationstaketheleadintryingtofindresolution.Thissituationforms perhaps the most important current policychallengeinthemigrationfieldintheCaribbean.

Globalandmoreregionalhealthissueswillcontinuetobeafocusofsomemigration-relateddebates.Earlyin 2016, some Caribbean islands, such as Jamaica,have lifted the travel restrictions on visitors fromthecountriespreviouslyaffectedbyEbola.However,concern for infections travelling with visitors andmigrantsisnotgone.Whereasin2014–2015attentionwas on the mosquito-borne Chikungunya virus, in2016alleyeswillbeonthespreadoftheZikavirus(alsomosquito-borne),anditsimpactonpopulations,tourism and the economy. The virus has so fartaken its strongesthold inBrazil,where ithasbeenlinked to a rise in infants born with microcephaly,and is spreading to some other South Americancountries.MostCaribbean islandshaveatthispointreported confirmed Zika cases and autochthonoustransmission. As regional and internationalmobilitywillbethetoolforstartingupinfectionsonanyisland,therewillbeattentiontoarrivalsandonwardtravelsforitsimpactonthespreadofthediseasewithinthezone inwhich theAedis egyptaebreedofmosquitois active. However, efforts to combat the spread oftheviruswillneedtofocusonvectoreliminationandpopularawareness,notonmigrationcontrol.Beyondthelocalhealthimpact,thebiggesteffectislikelytobeontourism.

Interest in investor citizenship has increased acrosstheregioninrecentyears,withmoreandmoreislandslooking into the modalities for offering passportsand residency in return for significant financialand business investments. Antigua and Barbuda,Dominica,Grenada,andSaintKittsandNevisalreadyoffer programmes by which second passports and,in some cases, residency, are available in return forvaryinglevelsofinvestmentordonation.SaintLuciaissettorolloutaprogrammeinearly2016,andJamaicahasbeenstudyingthemodelforsometime.Whiletheeconomicbenefitstotheseislandsareclear,Jamaicaisbeingcautiousforfearoflargecountries–suchastheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdomandCanada–imposingtoughervisaregimesonJamaicancitizensiftheystarttoofferpassports“forsale”.ThishasbeenanegativeoutcomeforislandssuchasSaintKittsandNevis.

Among those apparently interested in receivingresidencyand/orapassportinreturnforinvestmentin Jamaica are reportedly the proposed Chineseinvestors in the Goat Island logistics hub. Althoughplans for this hub have not yet been made public,it is a much talked-about project coming on theback of Chinese construction of a major highway


linking the tourist centres of the north coast withthecapitalKingstononthesouthcoastoftheisland.ChineseinvestmentintheCaribbean,foundonmanyislands, most notoriously the Baha-Mar project inthe Bahamas, remains controversial.While likely tocontinuein2016andbeyond,itwillremainasubjectof heated public debate, particularly for the highlevels of Chinese workforce – effectively short- ormedium-term immigrant workers in countries withveryhighlevelsofunemployment.InJamaica,roughlyhalftheworkforceontheroadprojectwasChinese;intheBahamasalloftheworkersonmajorprojectshavebeenChinese.TheGoatIslandhubplanningwillbe accompanied primarily by public debate on theenvironmentalimpactontheseundevelopedwetlandhabitats,butimmigrationandemploymentissueswillnotbefarfromview.

TheCaribbeannations,particularlythosegroupedinCARICOM,enteredtheCOP21negotiationsonclimatechange with a unified agenda, and worked hardfor targets such as a limit of 1.5C of warming. TheCaribbeanregionisawarethatmigration(particularlyemigration) would be a likely outcome of climatechange and rising sea levels in the region, whichfrequently cause major weather events includinghurricanes.While2013and2014sawquiethurricaneseasons,October2015broughtmajordestructiontotheBahamas,throughhurricaneJoaquin.Fortunately,the Bahamas could manage the disaster, but lessaffluent islands might find that difficult. Any majortropicalstormwouldbothcausedamagetopropertyandsomelevelof(primarilyinternal)displacementintheshort-term,aswellaspotentiallossoflife.n

Whereas in 2014–2015 attention was on the

mosquito-borne Chikungunya virus, in 2016 all eyes will be

on the spread of the Zika virus (also mosquito-borne),

and its impact on populations, tourism and the economy.


Outlook on migration in the Gulf in 2016Nasra M. Shah1

Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in the Gulf in 2015, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2016, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Temporary migrant workers and their familiesconstitute about half of the total population of theGulf2countries,numberingabout24.2millionofthe50.4 million inhabitants of this region (Gulf LabourMarketsandMigration(GLMM),http://gulfmigration.eu/glmm-database/demographic-and-economic-module/).Duringthe lasttwotothreedecades,thenumber of non-nationals has expanded, despitethe host countries’ policies to reverse this trend(Table 1). In terms of origin, migrants from Asiancountries exceed those from Arab countries, in alltheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)countries.Indiaisthelargestsender,followedbyPakistan,Bangladesh,Egypt, Indonesia and the Philippines. A majorityofmigrantworkers in theGulf are employed in theprivate sector, primarily in relatively low-skilledoccupations such as construction, domestic andservicework such as cleaners, porters and helpers.Males are predominant in migration from severalcountries,whilefemalesarepredominantincountriesthatmainlysenddomesticworkers.

Inordertofullycomprehendthekeymigrationpolicychallenges in the Gulf, perspectives of themigrant-sendingcountriesandthedestinationcountriesintheGulfmustbeaddressed.Inmanycases,mechanismsand processes in the sending country may in factdetermine the success and welfare of a migrantworkerintheGulf.

2 GulfcountriesinthispaperincludethesixGulfCooperationCouncil (GCC) countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,Qatar,SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE).

Whiletherearepeculiaritiesanddifferencesbetweenspecificissuespertainingtosendingcountries,somegeneral policy challenges common tomost of themmaybeidentified.Sendingcountriesaregenerallypro-emigration and rely on foreign-worker remittancesas an important source of earnings. Their generalpoliciesaretomaintainorincreasethelevelofannualoutflows(Shah,2013a).Ageneraldesireto improvethe skill levels of migrants also exists, with somecountriestakingactivestepstoenhanceskillsthroughtrainingprogrammes.Ensuringprotectionandwelfareofthemigrantworkersinthehostcountryisanothercommongoal.Issuesofprotectionbecomeespeciallysignificant in case of female domesticworkers whoare employed inprivatehomes, arenot coveredbythelabourlawsoftheGCCcountriesandarelikelytobemorevulnerabletoabusethanotherworkers.

In addition to these common challenges, the abilityto continue competing in the Gulf labour marketremains a challenge for all sending countries.Withthe opening up of newer countries of origin (e.g.Nepal and Ethiopia), whoseworkersmay bewillingtoacceptlowerwagesforthesameworkperformedearlierbynationalsofanother country, competitionforlimitedjobsislikelytogettougher.ThiswouldbeespeciallyproblematicifoilpricesremainlowandtheGulfcountriesbegin todownsize theirdevelopmentand other projects. A major consequence of suchdownsizingmaybe the returnof anunprecedentednumberofworkerswhoarestillinworkingages.Suchreturnswouldnotonlyputanunexpectedstrainonthe labourmarket in the country of origin but alsowouldbeaccompaniedbyareductionofremittancesneeded for supporting the migrants’ families andboosting the economy in general. If the return oftemporary migrants occurs too suddenly and invery largenumbers,consequences formostsendingcountrieswouldbedisastrous,presentinghugepolicychallenges.

Another challenge for sending countries pertains tothecostofmigrationbornebythemigrantworkers.Intheireffortstofacilitateandregulatetheprocessoflabourmigration,sendingcountrieshaveformulatedlaws,rulesandpolicies,andhavesetuporganizationalstructures to implement these regulations. Licensed

1 NasraM.ShahisProfessorofDemographyattheDepartmentof Community Medicine and Behavioral Sciences at theFaculty of Medicine, Kuwait University. She received herdoctor’s degree in Population Dynamics from the JohnsHopkinsUniversity,SchoolofPublicHealth,Baltimore,UnitedStates.

http://gulfmigration.eu/glmm-database/demographic-and-economic-module/




recruitment agents perform an important role inthese structures, by providing information aboutjobsandassistingtheprospectivemigrantsatvariousstages until the process is completed. It has beenreported frommany Asian and Arab countries thatmigrantspayamuchhigher recruitment fee than islegally allowedby the sending countrygovernment.This occurs because intermediaries (agent in thehome country and/or in the host country, and thehost country employer who provides a work visa)oftenchargeanexorbitantlyhighamountforthevisa.Prospectivemigrantsoftenborrowthemoneyneededformigrationandmay repayamuch larger amountthantheborrowedamountbecauseofhigh interestrates.Thus,thenetbenefitofthemoveislargerforthoseworkerswhodidnotpayany recruitment feeotherthantheamountapprovedbythegovernment.Reducingtherecruitmentcosttothemigrantworkerremainsachallengeformostsendingcountries.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in the Gulf likely to evolve in the course of 2016, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and numbers and profiles of migrants?

At least three types of trend may be identified:(i) the perceived need to decrease migration ofworkersandtheirfamilies;(ii)identifyingthereasonsfor the continued high flows; and (iii) reducingirregularmigration.

(i) Perceived need to reverse the upward trend inmigration

As reported to theUnitedNations in 2013, all GCCcountries,exceptOman,viewedimmigrationtotheircountries tobe toohighandhadpolicies to reduceit (UN, 2013). However, data on the percentage ofnon-nationals in the Gulf indicates a clear upwardtrend, posing a direct contradiction to the hostcountry policies (Table 1). In addition to the hostcountries’ general desire to reduce foreign workerdependence,an importantreasonfor therestrictivepolicies is the rising level of unemployment inseveral Gulf countries. For example, unemploymentamong Saudi females age 15–64 increased from11.8percentin1992to35.3percentin2013,althoughitwasmuchloweramongSaudimales(Bel-Air,2015).Anobviousresponseinthefaceoftheabovesituationisaninferencebyhost-countrypolicymakersthatthehigh levelofunemployment is somehowa resultof

thelargenumberofforeignworkers. Inmanycases,however, amajor reason for unemployment amongnationals is their lack of willingness to work in theprivate sector and in jobs that may be consideredsociallyunattractiveanddefinedas“foreigner’swork”,especiallyifsuchworkislow-skilledandlow-paid.

Gulf countries have launched various policies tonationalize or indigenize the labour force andconsequently the population. A notable exampleincludes the “Nitaqat” campaign for Saudizationlaunched inmid-2011.Themaingoalof theNitaqatcampaign is to limit the number of foreignworkersthat firmsmayhirebyproviding incentives tofirmsforhiringSaudinationalsandimposingsanctionsonfirms that do not comply. Bel-Air (2015) identifiesvarious social and political challenges faced by theNitaqatcampaign,includingthecontinuedrelianceofnationalson thepublic sectorand the sociopoliticaldifficulties of regulating businessmen’s choices andpreferences.

(ii) Identifying the many reasons for failure ofrestrictivepolicies

Severalreasons,outlinedbelow,explainthefailureofrestrictivepolicies.However,thislistisnotcomplete.Other factors may provide further explanations fortheobservedtrends.

•Development projects, including construction ofbuildings, roads, bridges and residential units,continue to sustain a high demand for foreignworkersintheabsenceofindigenous(i.e.national)workerswholacktheskills forsuchworkand/orareunwillingtotakeupsuchoccupations.

•Thenumberofindigenousworkersbeingsmallerthanrequired.

•An increasingdemandforservicesectorworkers(especiallydomesticworkers)seemstoexist.Forexample, domestic workers constituted 628,406(26.3%)ofallforeignworkpermitholdersin2013inKuwait(GLMMdatabase,TableMOV2.2).

•Employers in the Gulf countries seem to bringin a larger number of workers than would bejustified in an efficiently performing labourmarket. These workers are often low-skilledand semi-skilled, and have been referred to bypolicymakers as “marginal”workerswho do notmakeanoptimalcontributiontothehostcountryeconomy. One of the reasons for the aboveapparent overconsumption of such “marginal”


labour relates to the profit-making possibilitiesafforded to the intermediaries who arrange theemploymentofsuchworkers.Itiswellknownthatafairly largeamountofvisatradingexists intheGulf, as follows. A migrant worker buys a workvisa sold through intermediaries by the sponsor(kafeel)whoisanationalofthehostcountryandisessentialforanymigranttobeemployedintheGulf. Each employee must have a sponsor thatmight consist of an individual, a company or anorganization.Forexample,akafeel mayprocureXnumberofworkvisasfromthegovernmentforacompanythathe/sheplanstoestablish.Thekafeel may sell these visas to prospective employeeswhothenworkforhim/her.Or,thekafeel maysellthesevisasonthemarketwithoutprovidingajobto the prospective employee. Sometimes “ghostcompanies” that exist only on paper may beestablishedwiththeintentofprocuringandsellingvisas.Sellingorchargingmoney(orpaying)foraworkvisaisillegal.Also,workingforanemployerotherthanthekafeel isillegal.Suchworkputsthemigrantworkerinanirregularsituationsubjecttoimprisonment or deportation if caught. Yet, thepracticeofvisa tradinghasbeenwidespread formanyyears.

• Inadditiontotheformalsectorthatmayarrangethe employment of most workers, an activeand vibrant informal sector consisting of familymembers,friendsandhome-countrycompatriotshave been acting as facilitators in the Gulflabourmarket. Social networks that successfullyarrange the employment are large and oftenwellestablished.Suchnetworksinitiate,support,sustain,andperpetuateadditionalinflowsoftheirkinandfriends.Membersofthenetworkareableto procure awork visa, either free of charge orthroughayearlypaymentfromanationalkafeel,and bring the friend or relative often withoutthe presence of a job. This generates a marketof“freelance”workerswhoarenottieddowntoa single employer. Such sponsorship, as well aswork,isunlawful,butitexistsinallGulfcountries.

•Although “temporary” in the sense that a non-nationalmayalmostneverbecomeaGulfcitizen,migration to the Gulf is often a fairly long-termphenomenon.Noneofthehostcountriesprovidesany information on the duration for whichmigrantworkers and their families reside in thehost country. Experience, observation and someresearch suggest, however, that an unknown

numberofnon-nationalshavelivedintheGulfforseveral decades, thus constituting a fairly stableand permanent part of the population. Data onplace of birth shows that in the case of Kuwait,for example, 18 per cent of all non-nationalswere actually born in the country (PACI, 2014).Arecentstudyonsecond-generationhighschoolstudents and employed persons born in Kuwaitshowed that themean duration for which theirfathershadbeenlivinginKuwaitwere30.4yearsand39.9years,respectively.Also,largenetworksof relatives were present among both groups;students reported an average of 14.8 relativesandworking persons reported an average of 18relativeswhowerelivinginKuwaitthoughnotinthesamehouse(Shah,2013b).

(iii)Reducing irregular migration and its possiblenegativeimpacts

Inadditiontoworkingforanemployerotherthanthesponsor, as outlined in the previously, other majorprocesses thatmay result in irregular status includeillegal entry into a country, overstaying one’s workvisa, being employed in occupations not permittedby the work visa or being born to parents with anirregular status. Like allmigrant-receiving countries,theGulfhasbeenhometoirregularmigrants,whosenumber is not known. Some data on overstayersfrom Kuwait indicates that at the end of 2014, thecountry had 103,154 persons who were residingthereonanexpiredvisa(ShahandKazi,2015).SaudiArabia publishes some routine data on the numberof apprehensions and deportation, recorded on theGLMMwebsite.However,littlepublishedinformationonirregularmigrantsofothertypesisavailable.

Irregularmigrationmatters forat least tworeasons.First, such migration evades effective regulation bythe concerned authorities; second, irregular statususually typifies a more vulnerable group that maysufferabuseasaresultofsuchstatus.Also,irregularmigration is likely to be higher among low-skilledmigrants, and probably among women, which mayadd further to their vulnerability. In Kuwait, forexample,femaledomesticworkersconstitutedabouthalf of all irregularworkers in 2014. Protection andwelfareofmigrantworkers is an important goal forcountriesoforiginaswellas theGulfcountriesandminimizingirregularmigrationshouldthereforebeasharedpolicygoal,andcontinuestoposeachallenge.


Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in the Gulf in 2016, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

ThisarticlehashighlightedsomeofthekeymigrationpolicychallengesintheGulf,focusingbothonsendingand receiving countries. In their efforts tominimizethe negative impacts and maximize the benefits ofmigration forall threeactors– thesendingcountry,the receiving country and the migrant – someprocessescomprisingregionaldialogue(e.g.theAbuDhabidialogue)andbilateralagreementshavebeenreachedbydifferentpairsofcountries.IndiahasmadesuchbilateralagreementswithallsixGCCcountries.

In the future, the most important challenges forsendingcountriesaretoachievehigherdevelopment

levels that can absorb their growing populationand workers are not impelled to seek overseasemployment in the faceofdesperationathome, toimprove the skill levels ofworkerswhodomigrate,andtocarefullymonitortheirwelfarewhileintheGulf.FortheGulfcountries,themostimportantchallengesaretoencourageindigenousworkerstodiversifytheirskilllevelsinordertoactuallyreplaceforeignworkers,andtodecreasetheirdependenceonworkersdefinedas“marginal”.

Inorder forthis tohappen,however,certaindeeplyimbedded structures, especially those surroundingvisa trading, would have to be uprooted andeliminated. Finally, decent work andwelfare of themigrantworkersshouldbeahighpriorityforsendingand Gulf countries, both because this is sociallyandmorally justandbecause ithasthepotential toheightenthegainsofmigrationforsendingaswellasGulfcountries.n

Table1:Percentagesofnationalsandnon-nationalsintheGCCcountries,1985–2010(orlater)

NationalityTotal population

Nationals (%) Non-nationals (%)

Bahrain1990 64.21 35.79 484,006

1995 63.14 36.86 558,879

2000 62.46 37.54 637,582

2005 54.54 45.46 888,829

2011 48.93 51.07 1,195,020

Kuwait1990 26.89 73.11 2,151,680

1995 36.15 63.85 1,958,794

2000 37.97 62.03 2,217,258

2005 33.17 66.83 2,991,189

2010 32.06 67.94 3,582,054

2013 31.34 68.66 3,965,144

Oman1990 81.29 18.71 1,625,000

1995 70.33 25.93 2,214,000

2000 74.02 25.98 2,402,000

2005 73.46 26.54 2,509,000

2013 56.34 43.66 3,855,000


NationalityTotal population

Nationals (%) Non-nationals (%)

Qatar1986 26.72 73.28 373,392

1997 28.27 71.73 536,474

2004 24.13 75.87 798,061

2010 14.30 85.70 1,699,435

Saudi Arabia1992 72.63 27.37 16,948,388

2004 72.88 27.12 22,678,262

2010 68.94 31.06 27,136,977

United Arab Emirates1985 28.72 71.28 1,379,303

1995 24.36 75.64 2,411,041

2005 20.10 79.90 4,106,427

2010 11.47 88.53 8,264,070 Source: GLMM database, various POP tables, available from http://gulfmigration.eu/glmm-database/demographic-and-economic-

module/

References

Bel-Air,F.D.2015 The Socio-Political Background and Stakes

of‘Saudizing’theWorkforceinSaudiArabia:TheNitaqatPolicy.Explanatory Note No.3,GulfLabourMakertsandMigration.

Kuwait,PublicAuthorityforCivilInformation(PACI)2014 Directory on Population and Labor Force.

StateofKuwait.PACI,KuwaitCity.

Shah,N.2013aLabour migration from Asian to GCC

Countries: Trends, patterns and policies.Middle East Law and Governance,5:36–70.

2013bSecond Generation Non-Nationals in Kuwait: Achievements, Aspirations and Plans. Research Paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States.TheLondonSchoolof Economics andPolitical Science,London.

Shah,N.andL.AlKazi2015 IrregularMigrationto,andwithin,Kuwait:

EnablingandSustainingFactors.Presentedat the 6th Gulf Research Meeting,CambridgeUniversity,August.

UnitedNationsDepartment of Economic and SocialAffairs(UNDESA)

2013 World Population Policies. UN DESA,PopulationDivision,ST/ESA/SER.A/341.

For the Gulf countries, the most important challenges are to

encourage indigenous workers to diversify their skill levels in

order to actually replace foreign workers, and to decrease their

dependence on workers defined as “marginal”.




Outlook on migration in Latin America in 2016 William Mejía1

Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Latin America in 2015, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2016, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Themainchallenges for2016arenotverydifferentfrom those announced for 2015. They still concernenforcement of the rights of migrants and otherpopulations that move within the region, linkingmigration policies with other social and economicpolicies, and progress in intraregional and South–Southcooperationingeneral(Mejía,2015).

Thefirstchallengeisthemaintenance,consolidationanddevelopmentofadvancesinfreedomofmobility,respect for human rights ofmigrants andprinciplesof common citizenship that has built the region inits integration bodies (e.g. Comunidad de EstadosLatinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC, Communityof Latin American and Caribbean States), Uniónde Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR, Union ofSouth American Nations), Mercado Común delSur (MERCOSUR, Common Market of the South),Andean Community, Sistema de la IntegraciónCentroamericana (SICA, Central AmericanIntegration System) and Caribbean Community andCommon Market (CARICOM)), under the followingcircumstances:

•Weakening of the populist governments in theregion and trend dominance of centrist politicalorientations;

•Economic slowdown,with low ratesofexpectedGDP growth inmajor receiving countries (-2.0%in Brazil; 0.8% in Argentina; 2.1% in Chile; 2.6%inMexico;and-7.0%intheBolivarianRepublicofVenezuela)2;

1 WilliamMejía isDirector of theResearchGrouponHumanMobility at Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira (UTP,TechnologicalUniversityofPereira),Colombia.

2 See:CEPAL,2015:63.

•Attempt of the United States to impose to itsneighbours its own safety criteria in managingmigration,seekingtotakecontrolofinflowsfromMexicoandCentralAmerica.3

Thesecondchallengehastodowiththedefinitionofjointcoursesforthetreatmentofmigrants’irregulartransit through the region, considering that in 2015thegovernmentstriedtorespondtothethreemainflows: the Haitians to Brazil; the relatively recentmigration of Asians, Africans and Cubans4 to theUnitedStates,drivenbytraffickers;andthetraditionalmovementoftheirownmigrants,especiallyAndeansand Central Americans. However, except the firstcase,wheretheBrazilianGovernmentproceededtotheissuanceofhumanitarianvisasinHaiti,theothertwo remainamajor challenge in2016,when surelytheywillnotberesolved.Solvingthemwouldrequireimplementingtheguidelinesonmigrationpolicythathave been agreed upon in the region, towhichwereferredinthepreviouspoint.

Theanswertothesecondflowgoesbeyondthefightagainst gangs of “coyotes”,5 sometimes traffickers,andshouldincludethedefinitionofastatustoprotectmigrants in transit and enable their safe passage,since any country has real skills to return them totheircountriesoforigin,ontheassumptionthatthecircumstances of migrants themselves permit. Theyearbeginswithbetween5,000and8,000migrants,mostly Cubans, dammed between the borders ofPanama and Costa Rica, after Nicaragua did not letthem continue their journey through its territory,amongotherthings,citingthreattoitssecurity.

3 Forexample,forthePlanoftheAllianceforProsperityintheNorthernTriangleofCentralAmerica(ElSalvador,Guatemalaand Honduras) for the fiscal year 2016, the US Congressapproved USD 750 million, with the application seeking toreduce emigration to the United States. Regarding the roleplayedbyMexico,see:Nazario,2015.

4 InflowofCubanmigrantstotheUnitedStates,estimatedat45,000peryear(Castillo,2015:10),coulddecreaseasaresultof the visa requirement for Cubans beginning 1 November2015, from Ecuador, a country where many Cubans andimmigrantsfromothercontinentsdeparttowardtheUnitedStates.

5 PersonswhosmugglemigrantsinLatinAmerica.


GiventhattheUnitedStatesisthefinaldestinationofthatflow,exceptforsomesmallpercentageofthosemigrants who go to Canada, and that the UnitedStates itself actively contributes to the movementof Cubans, with its “dry feet, wet feet” policy6 forthem,thecountryshouldbepartoftheagreementsandnot simplywait for theneighbours to takecareof their borders.However, it seemsunlikely that allinvolvedcountries, includingEcuadorandColombia,willengageinthesolution.

Regarding the traditional flow, interventions areneeded,especiallyforthemigrationofunaccompaniedminors from Central America, whose number grewagainduetofamilyreunificationpurposes.Inadditionto actions by countries of origin and transit, it isexpected that the United States, as the country ofdestination,willallowfamilyintegration.

Aprivilegedscenariointhisrespect,wheretheissuewas discussed in 2014, is the Regional ConferenceonMigration, inwhich theCentralAmericanStates,plus theDominicanRepublic, theUnited States andCanada,participated.InSouthAmerica,itisexpectedthatthefullMemberStatesandtheassociatenationsof MERCOSUR will fully implement the RegionalGuidelines on the Commitment to the PromotionandProtectionoftheHumanRightsofChildrenandAdolescentMigrants,whichwasrecentlyagreedupon(MERCOSUR,2015)

Thethirdchallengeisthecurrentrefugeecrisis,whichis likely to getworse in 2016, due to the escalatingconflicts in Syria. Latin America should face this asa regional challenge rather than one that entailsindividualeffortsfromStates,ashashappenedinsomecases. The region already has a specific instrumentfor this purpose, such as the “Brazil Declaration: AFramework for Cooperation and Regional Solidarityto Strengthen International Protection of Refugees,DisplacedandStatelessPersonsinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean”(Cartagena+30,2014).

InlinewiththisisthedeclarationoftheHeadsofStateofMERCOSURontheimportanceofvisafacilitation,quick fixes for recognition of refugee status,resettlementprogrammesanddirectsupporttocare

6 AUS policy inwhich Cubanswho are caught in thewatersbetweenCubaandtheUnitedStatesareconsideredtohave“wet feet” and are therefore sent back home, and CubanswhomakeittotheUSshorescanclaim“dryfeet”andqualifyforlegalpermanentresidentstatusandUScitizenship.

operations victims of displacement (MERCOSUR,2015).

Toadvancetheresponsetothechallengesdiscussed,theFifteenthSouthAmericanConferenceonMigrationXV(XVConferenciaSuramericanasobreMigraciones(XVCSM))hashighlightedthattheCSMiscommittedto initiating an assessment of the possible agendaitemsorissuesthatcanbetackledwithotherregionalconsultativeprocesses,particularlywiththeRegionalConference onMigration (XV CSM, 2015). Similarly,lines of action should be implemented regardingtheprioritymeasuresonthemigrantpopulation,asagreeduponattheSecondMeetingoftheRegionalConferenceonPopulationandDevelopmentinLatinAmericaand theCaribbean (CELADE,2015:111,116and117).

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Latin America likely to evolve in the course of 2016, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

AsthepaceofrecoveryoftheUSeconomycontinuestobeslow,migrationcontrolmeasuresremainrigid,particularly intheUnitedStates–Mexicoborder,andthe number of deportations continues to increase(and with the level of uncertainty caused by thefate of the migration policy reform proposed byUS President Barack Obama), it is expected that in2016 theflowofMexicans to theUnitedStateswillcontinue to decrease and return of Mexicans totheirhomecountrytoreunitewiththeirfamilieswillcontinue to grow,which have reached 174,000 and200,000,respectively,onaverageannuallyduringthelastfiveyears (Gonzalez-Barrera,2015:11).Asimilarsituation is likely, in lowervolumes, forNicaraguansand Ecuadorians, who have demonstrated similarbehaviourinrecentyears(LópezandPatten,2015:91).AlthoughemigrationtotheUnitedStatesofcitizensfrom other countries in the region is expected toremainhigherthanreturnin2016,thepacewillalsocontinuetobeslow.

Looking at the major European destinations, it ispredicted that, based on data from the NationalStatistical Institute of Spain, inflow to Spain ofnatural-bornLatinAmericanswill grow,whichcouldbebetween90,000and100,000.Venezuelanswouldrepresent the largest group in this migration andwomenwouldaccountfor60percent.


Theincreasewillbefavouredbythere-emigrationofLatin American nationalized Spanish (whomake upabout20%oftheflowfromLatinAmericatoSpain)andeventuallybytherecenteliminationoftheSchengenvisa requirement for Colombians and Peruvians forshortstays.GermanymaycontinuetobeanewmajordestinationforLatinAmericans,withinflowsin2016likelytobearound20,000,halfofwhomareBraziliansandColombiansbasedondatafromtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.

Greater dynamism is expected in intraregionalmigration, with Chile strongly remaining a majordestination for Latin Americans, South Americansinparticular. It isexpectedthat in2016Chilewouldreceivemore than100,000new immigrants,mostlyAndeans. Under these conditions, the country willovertaketheUnitedStatesandSpainasdestinationsfrom the subregion. On the other hand, the twocountries would bring some tens of thousands ofimmigrantstoChile.

Argentinawillmaintain its importanceas a regionaldestination,particularly forParaguayanandBolivianworkers. However, for economic reasons, somedeclineintheinflowstothecountryisexpected,butperhaps with the exception of the relatively smallgroupfromVenezuela,whichhasrecentlyshownanincrease.

InthecaseofMexico,it isexpectedthatinadditionto receiving its Central American neighbours, it willcontinuetoestablishitselfasadestinationofmediumimportance for South Americans (as will happen inEuropewithGermany),withthearrivaloffewerthan200,000ofthem.

Meanwhile, Brazil will continue to attract Haitians,now surelywith an important component of familyreunification, given the regularization processesconcerning them. To a lesser extent, despite itseconomic difficulties, Brazil will remain a growingdestinationforworkersfromtheregionandbeyond,forexamplefortheSpaniards.

Finally,thesigningofthepeaceagreementbetweenthe Government of Colombia and the rebel groupRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)),scheduledforthefirstquarteroftheyear,couldbeginin2016aprocessofmassreturnofColombianswhoemigrated toothercountriesdue toconflicts.Someresearchers estimate that about 400,000, located

especiallyintheBolivarianRepublicofVenezuelaandEcuador,wouldgobacktoColombia.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Latin America in 2016, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

Attention to the challenges of transit of migrantswill result in an important debate, which had itsformal beginning at the end of 2015 when CubansgotstrandedattheborderbetweenCostaRicawithNicaragua.Withthisincidence,argumentsofnationalsecurity and the rights of migrants, as well as thesharedresponsibilityofcountriesoforigin,transitanddestination,willbeaddressed.

InMexico, with greater involvement of civil societyand the academia, transit ofmigrants alsowill leadto discussions. A key issuewill be the contradictionbetween the Government’s frequent statements infavourof therightsofmigrantsandtheir repressiveactionsagainstthem.

Inthesouth,debateonimmigrationlawswillcontinue,withBrazilandChileseekingtoreplacetheircurrentlaws, which are based on national security criteria,correspondingtotheperiodofdictatorship.Thetwocountrieswantedtoend2015withthosenewlaws,but in Brazil the Parliament failed to pass the bill,whileinChiletheGovernmentisstillworkingonthebill that it intendstosubmit toCongressearlier thisyear,afteramajorconsultativeprocessin2015.

ConsideringthestatementsofthemostrecentCSM,Regional Conference onMigration and Summit EU-CELACin2015,althoughitisnotlikelytooccur,thereshould be broader regional discussions on issuessuch as migration management, promotion andprotectionofthehumanrightsofmigrants,andthemigration–developmentnexustoprovideanin-depthunderstandingofthedeclarationsagreeduponatthesemeetingsandofthenewdirectionsforjointactionofdifferentstakeholders(inter-State,inter-agency,inter-non-governmental organization, interacademic, etc.)towardsrealizingthesedeclarations,particularlythechallengespreviouslymentioned.n


ReferencesCartagena+30

2014 Declaración de Brasil: Un Marco deCooperación y Solidaridad Regional paraFortalecer la Protección Internacional delas Personas Refugiadas, Desplazadas yApátridas en América Latina y el Caribe,Brasilia,3dediciembrede2014.Availablefrom www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2014/9867

Castillo,C.2015 Gran éxodo de Cubanos ha fomentado

una crisis fronteriza en Centro América.Acontecer Migratorio, 38(11):10–11.Available from http://twitdoc.com/view.asp?id=239047&sid=54G7&ext=PDF&lcl=A-M-noviembre-2015.pdf&usr=CepamCaracas&doc=293873619&key=key-QJhijUebmzYnooXD4JMb

Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía(CELADE)

2015 Guía Operacional para la Implementación y el Seguimiento del Consenso de Montevideo sobre Población y Desarrollo. SegundaReunión de la Conferencia Regional sobrePoblación y Desarrollo de América Latinay el Caribe, Ciudad de México, 6 a 9 deoctubre de 2015. Available from http://crpd.cepal.org/sites/default/files/go_c1500860_web1.pdf

ComisiónEconómicaparaAméricaLatinayelCaribe(CEPAL)

2015 Balance Preliminar de las Economías de América Latina y el Caribe 2015. Documento informativo. División deDesarrollo Económico de la ComisiónEconómicaparaAméricaLatinayelCaribe,NacionesUnidas, Santiago. Available fromwww.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/39558-balance-preliminar-economias-america-latina-caribe-2015-documento-informativo

Gonzalez-Barrera,A.2015 More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to

theU.S.PewResearchCenter,Washington,D.C. Available from www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/11/2015-11-19_mexican-immigration__FINAL.pdf

López,G.andE.Patten2015 The Impact of Slowing Immigration:

Foreign-born Share Falls among 14Largest U.S. Hispanic Groups. PewResearch Center, Washington, D.C.Available from www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-15_hispanic-origin-profiles-summary-report_FINAL.pdf

Mejía,W.2015 Outlook on migration in Latin America

2015. Migration Policy Practice, IV(5):26–30. Available from http://costarica.iom.int/public/pdf/Outlook_on_migration_in_Latin_America_in_2015.pdf

MercadoComúndelSur(MERCOSUR)2015 Comunicado Conjunto de las Presidentas

y losPresidentesdelosEstadosPartesdelMERCOSURyEstadosAsociados.Reunidosen la ciudad de Asunción, República delParaguay, 21 de diciembre de 2015, enocasión de la XLIX Reunión Ordinaria delConsejo del Mercado Común y Cumbrede Jefes de Estado. Available from www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/7359/1/comunicado-ep-ea_es.pdf

Nazario,S.2015 Therefugeesatourdoor.New York Times,

10 October. Available from www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/the-refugees-at-our-door.html?_r=0

XVConferenciaSuramericanasobreMigraciones2015 Declaración de Santiago: Con Justicia

e Igualdad Hacia una GobernanzaMigratoria. Santiago, 8, 9 y 10 deseptiembre. Available from http://csm-osumi.org/Archivos/ConfCSM/XV%20CSM_%20DECLARACI%C3%93N%20DE%20SANTIAGO%20(2015).pdf

Although emigration to the United States of citizens from

other countries in the region is expected to remain higher than

return in 2016, the pace will also continue to be slow.

http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2014/9867



http://twitdoc.com/view.asp?id=239047&sid=54G7&ext=PDF&lcl=A-M-noviembre-2015.pdf&usr=CepamCaracas&doc=293873619&key=key-QJhijUebmzYnooXD4JMb





http://crpd.cepal.org/sites/default/files/go_c1500860_web1.pdf



http://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/39558-balance-preliminar-economias-america-latina-caribe-2015-documento-informativo



http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/11/2015-11-19_mexican-immigration__FINAL.pdf



http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-15_hispanic-origin-profiles-summary-report_FINAL.pdf



http://costarica.iom.int/public/pdf/Outlook_on_migration_in_Latin_America_in_2015.pdf



http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/7359/1/comunicado-ep-ea_es.pdf



http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/the-refugees-at-our-door.html?_r=0



http://csm-osumi.org/Archivos/ConfCSM/XV CSM_ DECLARACI%C3%93N DE SANTIAGO (2015).pdf




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This is a pioneering initiative that will contribute potentially to reducing the effects of budget cuts and underfunding in major refugee, migration and human rights programmes around the

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MigFunder targets, primarily but not exclusively, members of the diaspora who are willing and able to support viable business projects from their compatriots, as well as development, humanitarian and research initiatives in the countries of immigration or origin.

Current campaigns on MigFunder originate from organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Doctors of the World, the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Business in the Community Ireland and Quist Solicitors, among others. Most are concerned with the current refugee crisis.

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mailto:dingham%40migfunder.com?subject=


PublicationsBuilding Better Futures: Canada and IOM2015/56pagesEnglish

CanadaandIOM’spartnershipisglobalinfocus,diverseinthematicfocus,andinclusiveagrowingnumberofCanadianstakeholders.Thispublicationoffersanoverviewofmajorareasofcooperation,andhighlightskeyachievementsandlandmarkstepsintheevolutionofourjointwork.FromfacilitatingtheorderlymigrationofrefugeesandmigrantstoCanadatohumanitariananddevelopmentprogramming, IOM and Canada have made significant strides since CanadajoinedasaMemberStatesin1951.

10 Years of IOM in Myanmar (2005–2014)2015/28pagesEnglish

ThispublicationprovidesanoverviewoftheactivitiesandachievementsoftheInternational Organization forMigration (IOM)Mission inMyanmar since itsestablishmentin2005.WorkingwiththeGovernmentofMyanmar,IOMprovidessupporttomigrantsandtheircommunitiesintheareasofhealth,disasterriskreduction, humanitarian response, migrant protection, labour migration andresearch. This publication also includes success stories in reducing risk andvulnerabilityandsupportingsafemigration.

The Middle East and North Africa: Annual Report 2014 (Arabic)

2015/72pagesArabic

In2014,significantflowsofmigrationto,throughandfromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricacontinuedunabated.Ongoingconflict,economicstagnation,andpoliticalturmoilweremaindriversofmigration,thoughmotivesformovementremain complex. Irregular migration – especially for vulnerable or under-protectedpeoplesuchasunaccompaniedminors,womenandsexualminorities–exposedmigrantstoanarrayofrisksastheyattemptedtoattainphysicalsafetyandeconomicstability.

The 2014 annual report on IOM’s work in theMiddle East and North Africais organized thematically, reflecting the areas of work carried out by theorganization: emergency and humanitarian operations, migrant assistance,bordermanagement,supportformigrationpolicy,labourmigrationandhumandevelopment. Migration health is a cross-cutting area of work reflected inmultiplesections.Thereportalsoincludesasectiononresearchandpublications,aswellasadataanalysissectionwhichpresentsacomprehensivebreakdownofpersonswhohavebefittedfromIOMactivitiesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricain2014.

http://publications.iom.int/books/building-better-futures-canada-and-iom

http://publications.iom.int/books/10-years-iom-myanmar-2005-2014

http://publications.iom.int/books/middle-east-and-north-africa-annual-report-2014-arabic-5


Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series Issue 1 | Vol. 2 | January 2016

2015/8pagesEnglish

Environmentalmigrationisinevitablylinkedtothequestionoflandforseveralreasons:(a)environmentalandclimatechangereducestheamountofhabitableland; (b)more land is needed to accommodate thosewho leave such areas;and (c) landpolicies aredecisive factors indeterminingpeople’s resilienceatplacesoforigin,aswellassuccessfulestablishmentatdestinations. InKenya,landtenureinsecurityisamajorfactorofvulnerabilitytoenvironmentalchange.

Based on a reviewof Kenyan land legislation for theMigration, Environmentand Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project, this policy briefanalyses the ongoing land reform process in Kenya, and its potentials andshortcomingsthatcontributetothemanagementofenvironmentalmigration,aswellasmitigatepressurestomigrate.This two-prongedapproach is in linewithKenya’sNationalClimateChangeActionPlanbutimpairedbycurrentdelaysinimplementingthepolicyobjectivesoftheKenyanConstitutionandtheNewLandPolicy.Theauthorrecommendsacceleratedeffortsinthisdirectionandtoincorporatemeasurestomitigatelandtenureinsecurityindisastermanagementframeworks.

MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) waslaunchedthreeyearsagoandtheeditorswouldnowliketoinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinashortreaders’satisfactionsurvey.

Thepurposeofthissurvey,whichcanbetakenanonymously,istohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Thesurvey’sresponseswillcontribute,inparticular,toadjustingandimproving,asappropriate,MPP’scontentandstyle,andthusthereader’sexperience.

Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,pleaseclick here.

Thankyou.

http://publications.iom.int/books/migration-environment-and-climate-change-policy-brief-series-issue-1-vol-2-january-2016

http://publications.iom.int/books/migration-environment-and-climate-change-policy-brief-series-issue-1-vol-2-january-2016

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/J3M7PS5


Call for authors/Submission guidelines

SinceitslaunchinOctober2011,Migration Policy Practice haspublishedover110articlesbyseniorpolicymakersanddistinguishedmigrationpolicyexpertsfromallovertheworld.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) andSpecial Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil societyactivities intheUnitedNationsHigh-levelDialogueonInternationalMigrationandDevelopmentandtheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment;Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje,ChairoftheGFMD2013-2014;Mark Cully,ChiefEconomistattheAustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;António Guterres,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees;Khalid Koser,ChairoftheWorldEconomicForumGlobalAgendaCouncilonMigration;Khalid Malik,DirectoroftheHumanDevelopmentReportOffice,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP);Cecilia Mamlström,EUCommissioner forHomeAffairs;Ali Mansoor,Chairof theGFMD2012;Andrew Middleton,DirectorofCulture,RecreationandMigrantStatistics,AustralianBureauofStatistics;Najat Maalla M’Jid,UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesaleofchildren,childprostitutionandchildpornography;Robert A. Mocny,DirectorofUS-VISIT,USDepartmentofHomelandSecurity;Imelda M. Nicolas,SecretaryoftheCommissiononFilipinosOverseas(CFO),OfficeofthePresidentof the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes InternationalFederation; Kelly Ryan (CoordinatoroftheIntergovernmentalConsultationsonMigration,AsylumandRefugees–IGC,Geneva);Martin Schulz,PresidentoftheEuropeanParliament;David Smith,DirectorofSurveysandReporting,AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;Sir Peter D. Sutherland,SpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-GeneralforMigration; Ambassador William Lacy Swing,DirectorGeneraloftheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM);Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, DeputyAssistantSecretaryofState,BureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigration,USDepartmentofState.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

•Notexceedfivepagesandbewritteninanon-academicandreader-friendlystyle.

•Coveranyareaofmigrationpolicybutdiscuss,asfaraspossible,particularsolutions,policyoptionsorbestpracticerelatingtothethemescovered.

•Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant publicadministrations,orcivilsociety,inothercountries.

Articlesgivingaccountofevaluationsofspecificmigrationpoliciesandinterventions,includingbothevaluationfindingsandinnovativeevaluationmethodologies,areparticularlywelcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

• Solon Ardittis([email protected]);and

• Frank Laczko([email protected])

mailto:sardittis%40eurasylum.org?subject=

mailto:flaczko%40iom.int?subject=

Documents

EDITORIAL BOARD MIGRATION · in 2016 Aderanti Adepoju1 Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Africa in 2015, what are the three most important migration