Economic History Association

The Mechanization of Reaping and Mowing in American Agriculture, 1833-1870Author(s): Alan L. OlmsteadSource: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1975), pp. 327-352Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2119411 .Accessed: 09/05/2011 13:37

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The Mechanization of Reaping and Mowing in American Agriculture, 1833-1870

INRTODUCTION

T HE successful demonstration of reaping machines by Obed Hussey and Cyrus McCormick in 1833 and 1834 inaugurated

a long series of events that eventually revolutionized the harvesting of small grains and grasses, drastically altering the lives and pro- ductivity of grain farmers. Given the ultimate success and wide- spread impact of the reaping machine, historians have long pon- dered why almost twenty years elapsed between the date when Obed Hussey sold his first machine in 1833 and the first wave of popular acceptance in the mid-1850's. Why did it take twenty years for a significant number of farmers to begin to exchange their cradles and scythes for reapers and mowers? What important eco- nomic and technological factors governed the initial diffusion of this invention? These are important historical questions, the answers to which can significantly influence our broader perceptions of the problem of technological diffusion.

Of the numerous attempts to answer these questions, none has been so systematic or rigorous as that of Paul David in his widely read and acclaimed article, "The Mechanization of Reaping in The Ante-Bellum Midwest."' David first postulates that there were no productivity-increasing technological changes, that reapers could

I have benefited from the comments of Wayne Rasmussen, Morton Rothstein, Morgan Sherwood, James Shideler, Hiromitsu Kaneda, Victor Goldberg, William Moss, C. Daniel Vencill, Robert Ankli, Robert Higgs, Rondo Cameron, Richard Rosenberg, and Philip Coelho. Brian Burwell, Richard Bryant, Rory Phillips, Robert Enholm, and James Yerkes assisted in the research. I would aso like to thank Donald Kunitz and his staff at the Higgins Library of Agricultural Technology for their assistance.

1 Paul A. David, "The Mechanization of Reaping in the Ante-Bellum Midwest," in Henry Rosovsky (ed.), Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 3-39. (Here- after cited as David, "Midwest.") Recently David has applied a similar, albeit far more sophisticated, model to explain the diffusion of reapers in Britain. Paul A. David, "The Landscape and the Machine: Technical Interrelatedness, Land Tenure and the Mechanization of the Corn Harvest in Victorian Britain," in Donald N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), Ap 145-205, and "Discussion 5," pp. 206-214. (Hereafter cited as David, "Britain.)

327

328 Olmstead

not be shared or rented and thus represented an indivisible fixed capital investment to individual farmers, and that farmers behaved as if they were profit maximizers. He also implicitly assumes that each farmer's decision as to how many acres to plant in small grains was made independent of the reaper. Given these assumptions and given knowledge of costs, David calculates a break-even point or threshold size farm at which adoption will take place. He found that in the period 1849-53 the gap between the required threshold and the actual average acreage in small grains was over twenty-one acres, but that the gap fell to only five acres by the period 1854-57. It was this precipitous closing of the gap between the actual and threshold acreage that accounts for the sudden diffusion of reapers in the mid-1850's. This explanation is appealing in part because of its simplicity. David has cut through the fog of confusion by explaining the timing and pace of diffusion within the context of a simple com- parative static model which focuses on relative factor costs.

This article argues that we need to reconsider both the factors governing diffusion of this invention and the general lessons that have found their way from the reaper literature into the broader discussions of technological change and diffusion. There are two major themes. First, sharing and contracting were economically feasible and widely practiced. Second, a myriad of improvements in reaper design profoundly affected machine productivity and dif- fusion.

If farmers could share or rent reapers and mowers, then the threshold argument, as presently constituted, is rendered inoperative. There would still be a break-even point at which it would pay to adopt a reaper, but this threshold would only apply to the total acreage cut by the machine. A reduction in the threshold resulting from changes in relative factor prices or in the technical param- eters of the model would still facilitate adoption, but one could no longer explain diffusion by comparing the threshold with the actual acreage in small grains on each farm.

An alternative argument to explain the diffusion of reapers re- quires that we fuse the essential elements of David's model with the emphasis that Hutchinson, Rogin, Ardrey, and others placed on technological change.2 If we combine David's American and British

2 William T. Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick: Seed-Time, 1809-1856 (New York & London: The Century Co., 1930), (hereafter cited as Hutchinson, Seed);

Reaping and Mowing 329

studies, we must conclude that there were no significant techno- logical advances in what he calls the "basic reaper" between 1833 and the 1870's. This assumption probably has been the single most important conclusion to find its way from the reaper literature to more general discussions of technological diffusion. The example of the reaper has become the economic historians' best paradigm of de- layed diffusion: the machine was born fully developed, only to wait in the wings for twenty years before changing factor costs led to its diffusion. Rosenberg, who perhaps more than any other economic historian has perceived the importance of changing supply con- ditions and in particular technical refinements in explaining diffu- sion, actually singles out the reaper as a counter example of the general trend. "[David's] study derives much interest from the his- torical fact that the mechanical reaper had been available for twenty years before the sudden beginning of its rapid adoption after 1853."3 What started as an unsupported assumption has grown into an "historical fact," even though it is in direct contradiction with the neglected opinion of the extremely knowledgeable historians who emphasized how a host of technical changes transformed an experi- mentally crude, heavy, unwieldy, and unreliable prototype of the 1830's into the relatively finely engineered machinery of the 1860's. To understand the delayed diffusion of the reaper requires that more emphasis be placed on improved reaper design, which increased machine longevity, versatility, and productivity and reduced the risks and uncertainty of breakdowns.

Before turning to these twin themes of sharing and technological change, it is worth considering a narrower question. Within the comparative static framework how sensitive are the threshold calcu- lations to changes in parameter values? If minor variations in key parameters have a substantial impact on threshold calculations, then

William T. Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick: Harvest, 1856-1884 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935), (hereafter cited as Hutchinson, Har- vest); Leo Rogin, The Introduction of Farm Machinery in Relation to the Produc- tivity of Labor in the Agriculture of the United States During the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1931); R. L. Ardrey, American Farm Implements: A Review of Invention and Development in the Agri- cultural Implement Industry of the United States (Chicago: by the author, 1894).

3 Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 132, fn. 26. Also see p. 169, fn. 74, and Robert William Fogel, "The New Economic History: Its Findings and Methods," The Economic History Review., XIX (December 1966), 649.

330 Olmstead it is necessary to critically evaluate these parameters in light of the extant historical evidence.

THRESHOLD SENSIVrrITY

Figure 1 offers an indication of the sensitivity of threshold values to changes in two parameters. Lines T1 and T2 illustrate how the threshold farm size varies with changes in the depreciation param- eter (d) for periods I (1849-53 and II (1854-57) respectively.

FIGURE 1 THRESHOLD SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN THE RATE OF INTEREST

AND THE DEPRECIATION PERIODa

WI W2 T, T,

1854-1857 T

g 015 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ // T

0.20 Y79

eT(5 yrs.)

E //o \ 0.15

o / 1849-1853

Source: /ee /A 0.10

(1 0 yrs.)/

0.05/

// 30 50 70 90

Threshold (Acres)

a T. and T2 assume a rate of interest of 6 percent. T.3 and T4 assume a rate of interest of 10 percent. Points A and B denote David's threshold calculations. WI. and W2 show the average acreage in small grains on farms in selected Illinois coun- ties at the beginning and end of the 1850's respectively. Source: See text and David, "Midwest," pp. 28-37.

Reaping and Mowing 331 Lines T3 and T4 also show the relationship between the threshold and the depreciation parameter but assume an interest rate (r) of ten percent instead of the six percent rate used by David. Points A and B denote David's calculations (using d = .10 and r =6 per- cent). Points Y and Z denote what appear to be at least as plausible calculations (using d .20 and r = 10 percent). It can readily be seen that with these adjustments the thresholds more than double in both periods. Even more noteworthy, the revised period II cal- culation pertaining to a period when reapers were being adopted results in a gap between the actual acreage and the threshold of almost forty acres. This gap is more than twice as large as David found in period I, and about eight times that found in period II.

Given the magnitude of these discrepancies and their adverse im- plications for the accepted explanation of reaper diffusion, it would be useful to investigate more thoroughly the questions of what the usual life of a reaper was, and what the relevant discount rate was. The estimate that the useful life of a reaper was ten years rests upon two sources-Hutchinson and Rogin.4 Hutchinson notes that "With good care the reaper would harvest one hundred acres per year for ten years," but elsewhere he claims that reapers had "a life of from five to ten years. . . ." More important, Hutchinson is explicit in noting that reapers often did not receive the "good care" required for a life of ten years.5 Rogin states "that a machine even at that time lasted very close to ten years. . . ."6 But his remark refers to the decades of the 1870's and 1880's, a period when the machinery, the farmer's knowledge of its use, and the condition of the terrain upon which it was run bore little resemblance to the conditions that pre- vailed during the period in question-the 1830's, 1840's and 1850's.

A study of contemporary accounts and documents uncovers nu- merous citations suggesting that the useful life of a reaper or mower was typically closer to five years or less. The lowest estimate is re- ported by Danhof who, citing contemporary farm journals, claims that the average useful life of machines sold before 1850 was about two years.7 In 1856 the executive committee of the Illinois State Agricultural Society assumed that the better reapers were "good for

4 David, "Midwest," p. 33. 5 Hutchinson, Seed, pp. 73, 311, 471, and 365. 6 Rogin, Farm Machinery, p. 95 and fn. 145. 7 Clarence H. Danhof, Changes in Agriculture: the Northern United States, 1820-

1870 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 235. Danhof cites the Rural New Yorker, XII (1861), p. 382; XIII (1862), p. 390.

332 Olmstead five years' wear."8 The judges presiding over the Auburn mower and reaper trials held in 1866, after investigating the issue, noted that "we have ascertained that the average life or duration of a mowing machine is five years."9 The Auburn report's estimate was widely quoted by knowledgeable agricultural observers as repre- senting the average life of both mowers and reapers. In 1866 the editors of The Journal of the New-York State Agricultural Society referring to both reapers and mowers asserted that ". . . it is known . . . that the average life of a machine is four years."'0 Perhaps the most compelling testimony concerning the expected average life of reapers and mowers is offered by Walter A. Wood who regularly estimated that his machines lasted four years."

A reevaluation of the questions surrounding the interest rate re- quires much less archival digging. At first glance the issue appears straightforward. Relying on Hutchinson, David reports that the "Selection of an appropriate rate of interest proves to be simple. It ap- pears that the McCormick Company charged farmers a standard rate of 6 percent on the unpaid balance of their reaper notes throughout the 1850's."12 This is indeed a reasonable interpretation of Hutchin- son, and it has been universally subscribed to by historians of the period. But a reading of the sources used by Hutchinson reveals that farmers typically paid a marginal interest rate far in excess of six percent.'3 McCormick advertisements in the early 1850's generally listed the price as "$115 if cash is paid on delivery . . . or $120 when $30 is paid on delivery as above and the balance on the 1st December next, with six per cent interest after 1st July next."'4 When the extra $5 "service charge" is subtracted from the price and added to the interest, where it properly belongs, the actual rate of interest be-

8 Illinois State Agricultural Society, Transactions for 1856-57, II (Springfield: Lanphier and Walker, 1857), p. 120. On pages 21 and 22 the committee again assumes a five-year lifespan.

9 "Trial of Mowers and Reapers [at Auburn]," in New York State Agricultural Society, Transactions for 1866, XXVI (Albany: Van Benthuysen & Sons, 1867), p. 342. (Hereafter cited as: "Auburn.")

10 The Journal of the New-York State Agricultural Society, XVI, August 1866, p. 67.

11 For example see Walter A. Wood Mowing and Reaping Machinery Co., Cir- cular For the Year 1870 (New York City: Benjamin D. Brown, 1870), p. 53. Similar estimates are found in earlier circulars.

12 David, "Midwest," p. 33. 13 See Hutchinson, Seed, pp. 362-63, p. 337, fn. 31, and p. 369; Harvest, pp.

71-75. 14 An 1849 advertisement similar to others found in the early 1850's is repro-

duced in Hutchinson, Seed, opposite p. 330.

Reaping and Mowing 333 comes nineteen percent A brief look at the practices of two other manufacturers shows that they charged even higher rates. In 1860 the interest rate implied in Manny advertisements was twenty-nine percent, and in the period between 1855 and 1857 the rate implied in Atkin's advertisements ranged between thirty-six and forty-eight percent5 Since McCormick often offered extra discounts on cash sales, it is possible that the true interest rate he charged on occasions approached those demanded by his competitors.

The selection of an appropriate discount rate is further compli- cated because Hutchinson informs us that if the original loans were not repaid when due at the end of five or six months (and many were not), McCormick generally renewed the loan at an interest rate of ten percent.'6 Assuming Hutchinson's calculations are accu- rate, the appropriate discount rate would become ten percent. A final point of considerable importance is that for many farmers the purchase of a reaper necessitated complementary capital invest- ments-an extra horse, land clearing, fencing, and so on. In such cases one must consider the total investment package. The marginal interest rate on the complementary capital most likely exceeded ten percent and this higher rate, whatever it may have been, would be- come the appropriate discount rate for the entire package.

In light of this reevaluation the credit practices of early reaper manufacturers appear much less novel than has hitherto been sup- posed. The accepted view, that McCormick and other producers supplied loans at or below their own opportunity cost of funds and substantially below prevailing rural interest rates rests upon a mis- calculation of the true interest rate and must be discarded. The find- ings presented above also suggest that precise threshold calculations are fraught with uncertainty. Reservations similar to those raised in this section could be stated of every variable and parameter in the threshold equation except one (the price of the reaper is fairly well agreed upon). The net impact of changes in these other variables

15 For example, in 1860 Manny listed the f.o.b. cash price as $135 or terms of $50 cash (which is assumed to be paid on July 1), $50 on November 1 and $45 on January 1. These terms imply an interest rate of 29 percent. The Northwestern Farmer, V (June 1860), p. 238.

16 This is the figure cited in Hutchinson, Harvest, p. 74. We do not know how it was calculated, and the true rate may have been substantially higher.

17 Robert Ankli has convincingly raised such reservations about the wage rate and the labor saving (or productivity) or the machine. See Robert Ankli, "The Coming of the Reaper," unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Guelph. Ankli has independently developed many of the ideas explored in this paper.

334 Olmstead is at best uncertain, but the fact that apparently reasonable revisions in just two parameters (a life of five years, and an interest rate of nineteen percent) generate thresholds of approximately 100 and 80 acres in periods I and II respectively has ominous implications for the future usefulness of the threshold model.'8 To be sure, there is a closing of the gap (from about seventy-five acres to about fifty acres), but we are still left with a vast schism almost ten times as large as that which emerged from David's period II calculations. Given these reservations it behooves us to examine more closely the assumptions underlying the model and search for an alternative ex- planation for the belated adoption of reapers.

REAPER SHARING AND CONTRACTING

One method by which farmers could have drastically narrowed the gap between their actual acreage and the threshold (however wide this gap might have been) was to participate in sharing and contracting arrangements. A substantial body of evidence indicates that a great many farmers took advantage of this method, but before examining this evidence, it would be useful to raise two related issues that are crucial to the threshold argument but which have gone un- analyzed. First, the argument requires that the actual acreage in small grains be an independent variable, the increase of which partly explains the diffusion of reapers and mowers. To date, neither evidence nor logical argument has been offered to support this particular line of causality instead of the alternative possibility that the advent of better reapers induced farmers to increase their acreage."9 The actual resolution of this issue is complicated by the strong possibility that farmers increased their acreage in anticipa- tion of purchasing a reaper. In such instances the arrival of the

18 It is difficult to make precise statements of these revised thresholds since using the higher interest rate requires a reduction in the initial price. Since the prices used by David included an unknown proportion of both cash and credit sales, it is impossible to determine how much of an adjustment is needed. In any case the threshold calculations are not very sensitive to small changes in machine prices.

19 There are numerous accounts suggesting this latter line of causality. For example, "They [mowers and reapers] have placed the farmer above the contin- gency of finding extra hands for securing his crops at a critical juncture, and on this account can extend his breadth of sowing with the confidence of being able to secure what he raises." J. J. Thomas, "Farm Implements and Machinery," in Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 1862 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1863), p. 421; see also Hutchinson, Harvest, p. 76.

Reaping and Mowing 335 reaper would follow the acreage increase but still be a cause of the increase.

Assuming that the above caveat proves unfounded-that is, the acreage in small grains was in fact determined independently of reapers, a second imposing issue must be raised. What were the dis- tributions around the two means reported for farms in selected Illi- nois counties? Without ancillary assumptions about the distribution function of the acreage around these means (assuming these samples are representative of other grain-producing areas), David's model leaves open the possibility that no farmer could have benefited from the introduction of the hand-rake reaper from 1833 to 1860. This would be the case with distributions tightly skewed around the means. Alternatively, with other distributions there could have been several times as many farms exceeding the threshold acreage (in grains) as there were reapers in use. In either case one would want to search beyond the accepted explanation.20

These issues, although of conceptual interest, take a back seat to the more important question of whether or not there was widespread sharing and renting. David argues that "In the apparent absence of feasible cooperative arrangements for sharing the use of harvesting machinery among farms at this time the reaping machine itself constituted an indivisible input for the farmer."'21 This argument is particularly interesting because it runs counter to the economist's usual proclivity to assume that side markets will arise unless faced by well-specified institutional or technological constraints which cause market failure. It is thus necessary to show that such barriers did in fact exist.

There is little evidence of commercial renting of reaping and mowing machines, or commercial grain harvesting by horsepower, such as developed in connec- tion with the use of the large breaking-plows on the prairies during the 1850's. Neighbors may well have shared the use of a reaping machine owned by one farmer, compensating the owner on an informal basis, but, some inquiry into contemporary accounts, farm newspapers, and such sources does not suggest that this was common practise.... The fact that the maximum cutting capacity of the early machines was not very large, especially when the time constraint

20 For an excellent discussion of the importance of the size distribution of farms in telling the story of reaper adoption in Canada see Richard Pomfret, "The Intro- duction of the Mechanical Reaper in Ontario, 1850-70," mimeographed paper de- livered at the Cliometrics Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, April 1974.

21 David, "Midwest," p. 16.

336 Olmstead on harvesting in any given locale is taken into consideration, coupled with the high costs of overland transport for a bulky machine weighing upwards of a half a ton, would appear to have militated against operating a profitable itinerant commercial reaping enterprise during the ante-bellum era. The time constraint seems the crucial factor, since it was not present to the same degree either in prairie breaking operations or in post-harvest tasks such as threshing and corn shelling; the former became established on a commercial basis, while sharing of equipment among neighbors was not unusual in the latter cases. Furthermore, as a consequence of the time constraint, the prob- lems of deciding who was to have priority of use of a jointly owned reaper would have required the owners (users) to form some compensation arrange- ment, equivalent to an output pool or a profit pool. The economic, not to mention the political and sociological consequences of a reorganization of inde- pendent small farms into such pooling arrangements would have profoundly altered the course of agrarian history in the United States.22

A number of scholars have recognized that if machines could be shared, thereby making their services divisible, the threshold model would lose much of its appeal. Lance Davis and Alan Bogue have made this point quite forcefully, but they only offered hints of actual evidence. Davis cites Bogue: "I gave this problem to a graduate student one morning at eight o'clock and he was back in my office by ten with a long list of cooperative purchases."23 The student's list came from McCormick sales records. Admittedly, a quotation of a colleague citing an anonymous graduate student referring to the McCormick collection is not a standard form of scholarly reference, and one would like to ask several questions concerning the represen- tative nature of the student's list. Notwithstanding these minor objec- tions, one reasonably could expect the proponents of the threshold model to investigate this evidence, but such has not been the case, for subsequently the threshold model has been widely reproduced and extended to explain diffusion in other countries. In a discussion dealing with the diffusion of reapers in Britain, a number of noted scholars recognized the potential importance of cooperative use, but David repeatedly asserted that reapers were not shared or rented because of "high transactions costs," the "cost of negotiations and of forming a market," and the cost of moving the reaper from one farm to another.24 He also noted that "The broader question of why

22 Ibid., pp. 16-17, fn. 27. 23 Lance E. Davis, "'And It Will Never Be Literature': The New Economic His-

tory: A Critique," Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 2nd series, VI (Fall 1968), 87-88.

24 David, "Britain," pp. 214-15.

Reaping and Mowing 337 there were no reaping contractors is an intriguing one," and added that "the difficulty [with trying to measure the transactions cost] was that there were no reaping contracting firms in existence and there- fore no firms whose books can be examined to establish how high they were." At this juncture it is necessary to emphasize that all the arguments denying the possibility of cooperative arrangements are ex post rationalizations to explain the fact that no direct evidence exists. These rationalizations do not themselves constitute evidence, for no information whatsoever pertaining to transactions costs, and so on, has been presented. In the face of direct evidence showing cooperative use the rationalizations become vacuous. With this in mind it seems desirable to examine more thoroughly the available historical documents.

An indication of the pervasiveness of legal joint-ownership can be gleaned from the records of the McCormick Company.25 Random samples of all McCormick sales in 1854 and 1859 show that in both years approximately one out of every four reapers sold was pur- chased jointly by two or more individuals. In the overwhelming majority of cases the individuals did not have the same last name. An in-depth investigation indicates that the above figure under- estimates the importance of sharing in the Midwest because the frequency of joint purchases varied sharply between regions. In the more developed states (such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio) relatively few machines were purchased jointly. But in the newly settled states of the Midwest-including Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin-over thirty percent of all McCormick reapers were jointly purchased. In some areas joint ownership was very common. For example, in 1854 the McCormick agency in Cordova, Illinois (William Marshall & Son) sold 241 reapers in Iowa and Illinois; ninety-four of these, or thirty-nine percent, were purchased jointly. In 1858 this agency sold 536 machines-over forty percent were jointly purchased. In 1858 the Wisconsin agency of Isaac G. Porter & Company sold thirty-four machines-fifty-five percent were jointly purchased. Over forty-one percent of the 255 machines sold in 1859 by Fish & Elliot in Iowa were purchased jointly. The facts are un-

25 The following discussion is based on data found in McCormick Company ledgers entitled "Reaper Sales," for the years 1854, 1858, 1859, the McCormick Collection in the Wisconsin State Historical Society Library. A random sample shows that 24 percent in 1854 and 23 percent in 1859 of the reapers were jointly pur- chased. Cases where one of the individuals was identified as a financial backer secur- ing the note of the other were tabulated as single rather than joint purchases,

338 Olmstead deniable: not only was there widespread joint ownership, but this form of sharing was most common in the Midwest. The point to emphasize is that the McCormick samples deal with machines legally purchased by two or more farmers. A multitude of other sources indicate that this method of sharing may have been far less common than contracting and informal sharing among neighbors. An exami- nation of farmers' diaries, letters and memoirs, company advertise- ments, state agricultural reports, journals, and agricultural histories reveals hundreds of references to contracting and informal sharing but only a few references to formal joint ownership of the type re- flected in the McCormick samples.

A search of farmers' diaries, letters, and autobiographies un- covered twenty-three documents that mentioned reapers and/or mowers. In many instances the references were very brief, com- prising only one or two sentences. In thirteen there is explicit men- tion of sharing or contracting, in three cases it is uncertain whether or not the machines were shared, and in seven cases there was no mention of cooperative use. Only one mentioned formal joint owner- ship, and none explicitly denied that the machines were shared or rented. A few excerpts from these accounts will be most illuminating. The following segment from the diary of Benjamin F. Gue illustrates the apparent ease with which he moved his Atkins self-raker from one farm to another in Iowa during the harvest of 1855.26

July

Mon. Jy. 2, was warm. I went down to Davenport after our reaper. Got it, Atkins Self Raker paid $180.00 to Jackson the agent and $5.00 freight, 60 cents ferriage. Came out to the brick house and put up. Borrowed $90 from F.J. Parker for Jo.

* * *

Wed. Jy. 11, was hot. A little past noon a tremendous storm of wind and rain and hail came over us and did an immense amount of damage to wheat and corn and~all kinds of crops.

Thurs. Jy. 12, was hot. In the afternoon I took the Reaper up to Jerrys wheat. Fri. Jy. 13, was hot. We started the Reaper in Jerrys wheat. The Reaper

worked well. Sat. Jy. 14, we finished Jerrys wheat, got through about 6 o'clock. Sun. Jy. 15, was warm, went over to Jos. Mon.-Wed. Jy. 16-18, cut wheat for Jo. Thurs. Jy. 19, moved the Reaper down to Jackson Parkers and cut 1/2 day.

26 Earle D. Ross (ed.), Diary of Benjamin F. Gue in Rural New York and Pioneer Iowa; 1847-1856 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1962), p. 128.

Reaping and Mowing 339 Fri. Jy. 20, was rainy, cut part of day. Sat. Jy. 21, moved the Reaper down to my place and cut for me. Sun.-Mon. Jy. 22-23, cut for Jackson. Tues.-Wed. Jy. 24-25, was warm, cut wheat for myself. Thurs. Jy. 26, finished my wheat. Fri.-Sat. Jy. 27-28, Began Jos wheat. Sun. Jy. 29, cut for old Van.... Mon. Jy. 30, Jo cut wheat ?V2 day and for me ?2 day. Tues. Jy. 31, Finished my wheat at 9 oclock and moved up to Jacksons and

cut the rest of the day.

August

Wed. Aug. 1, was rainy all day. Thurs. Aug. 2, Finished cutting for Jackson. Fri. Aug. 3, cut for Tyler.

In all, Gue reaped on six different farms making at least eleven moves from one farm to another.

Similar accounts are found in the diary of Mitchell Y. Jackson who bought a Manny in 1856. Jackson regularly mowed and reaped for himself, for his brother-in-law Oliver Caldwell, and for his brother A. E. Jackson. In 1861 Mitchell Jackson bought a "New Yorker" self-raking reaper and agreed to harvest eighty acres for another neighbor on a contract basis.27 Given the concern about prohibitively high transport costs it is worth noting that these farms were not all contiguous. Charles Marsh, the inventor of the Marsh Harvester, matter-of-factly recalls that "In 1855 our grain was cut by an Atkins self-raker hired for that purpose . . . , and in '56, in connection with a neighbor, [we] purchased a Manny reaper. ... Next year we bought out our neighbor."28 Marsh's farm was in Illi- nois. Marion Drury notes that in Iowa in the mid-1850's his grand- father "bought the first reaper of this kind [a McCormick] introduced in our community, and for some years it was used to cut the grain on a number of neighboring farms."29

These accounts are buttressed by Rodney Loehr's observation that a Minnesota farmer "as late as 1865 . . . traveled about reaping

27 See Rodney C. Loehr (ed.), Minnesota Farmers' Diaries: William R. Brown 1845-46; Mitchell Y. Jackson, 185263 (St. Paul: The Minnesota Historical Society, 1939), pp. 183-84, 194, 203-205.

28 Charles W. Marsh, Recollections 1837-1910 (Chicago: Farm Implement News Company, 1910), p. 80.

29 Marion R. Drury, Reminiscences of Early Days in Iowa (Toledo, Iowa: Toledo Chronicle Press, 1931), p. 21.

340 Olmstead

his neighbors' grain for a dollar an acre without horses for a dollar and a quarter an acre if he furnished both horses and reaper."30 Loehr, who has probably studied most of the known diaries of Minnesota farmers has made the general observation that "since few settlers could afford them, the fortunate few cut grain by the acre for their neighbors."'31

Company advertisements offer substantial support for Loehr's conclusion that reapers and mowers were frequently shared and rented. McCormick, Manny, Wood, Ketchum, Atkins, Hussey, Brown, Easterly, Miller and numerous other manufacturers dis- tributed literature referring to the cooperative use of their ma- chines.32 A statement found in an 1856 pamphlet published by the Illinois Central Railroad is particularly significant because of its apparent generality:

Reaping machines are almost altogether used at the West. They cost $125. They will cut fourteen acres of wheat per day. Contracts for reaping are made at 621/2 cents per acre. The contractor furnishes a driver, raker and horses, and the farmer finds binders and shockers.33

Finally, there are actually published records describing in con- siderable detail the activities of several mowing contractors in Massachusetts in 1855. For example, between July 3 and September 20, 1855 William F. Porter mowed on twelve different farms spread

30 Rodney C. Loehr, "Some Sources for Northwest History; Minnesota Farmers' Diaries," Minnesota History, XVIII (September 1937), 290.

31 Loehr, Brown and Jackson, p. 17. Earle Ross makes a similar observation refer- ing to Iowa in the 1850's. See Earle D. Ross, Iowa Agriculture: An Historical Sur- vey (Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1951), p. 44.

32 The following examples represent only a small sampling of the statements found in advertisements and catalogues. An 1849 McCormick advertisement states: "Many farmers who have purchased one have earned its cost in one year in harvest- ing for their neighbors . .. ," The Wisconsin Farmer and Northwestern Cultivator, I (June 1, 1849), 144b. A similar claim is found in an advertisement reproduced-in Hutchinson, Seed, opposite p. 330. An 1853 Ketchum advertisement quotes D. W. Schoonmaker of Seneca, New York: "I go round mowing; there has not been a day since I commenced mowing but I have from five to ten persons after me to mow. I have mowed in four towns . . . ," Ruggles, Nourse, Mason, & Co.: Catalog for 1853 (Worcester, Mass., 1853), p. 80. In an 1861 Manny circular R. W. Whiting notes that "I had the pleasure of using one of your Manny Machines last year upon my own and on some fifteen other farms in this town . . . ," Alzirus Brown, Manny's Patent Combined Mower and Reaper (Worcester, Mass., catalog for 1861), p. 11.

33 The Illinois Central Railroad Company, Farming and Wood Lands . . . (New York: John W. Amerman, 1856), p. 16. Bidwell and Falconer cite 62 1/2 cents per acre as the cost of hiring a mower in 1858. See Percy W. Bidwell and John I. Fal- coner, History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860 (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1925), p. 296.

Reaping and Mowing 341

across four townships. Porter never spent more than parts of three days in sucession on any one farm. He often mowed on two farms the same day, and he frequently returned to farms on which he had previously worked-in some cases as many as three times. He mowed as little as one acre and as much as fifteen acres before moving on to another farm. His account shows that he moved his machine between farms at least twenty-one times.84

To this point, discussion of sharing and contracting has only dealt explicitly with a subset of the relevant cooperative arrangements. Assume Farmer Jones rents his reaper to Farmer Smith. For pur- poses of analysis we could view this transaction from a different perspective: Farmer Smith has rented his land to Farmer Jones. Land leasing and sharing arrangements offered another method for farmers to spread the fixed costs of a reaper and thereby capture the scale economies it afforded.

In all, we have detailed references to men whom we can reasonably describe as reaping and mowing contractors operating in Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Massachusetts during the 1850's and 1860's. Statements published in company brochures testify to the existence of contractors in most northern states. The evidence of widespread cooperative use of harvesting equipment raises a number of interesting questions pertaining to the combined impact of institu- tional organization, sociological relationships, and market develop- ment on technological diffusion. Was sharing more prevalent in some regions than in others and if so, why? What institutional and social arrangements arose to help farmers hedge on risks and lessen the transactions costs inherent in sharing arrangements? What were some of the procedures of contractors operating in an entirely new market, the extent of which was seriously restricted by the combined effects of the state of the arts, the length of the harvest, and the threat of bad weather? Did the potential for sharing increase over

34 "Farm Implements: Reports of the Committee on Mowing Machines," in Charles L. Flint (ed.), Abstracts of Returns of the Agricultural Societies of Massa- chusetts, 1855 (Boston: William White, 1856), pp. 125-176, esp. pp. 156-157. Within these pages are also several related county society reports on mowers.

Although this paper only touches on British sources there is at least some evi- dence of similar sharing behavior there. "A considerable number of these machines [reapers] have been worked on large farms, their price and bulk rendering them comparatively inapplicable to smaller farms. This objection is, however, obviated . . . by persons letting them out to hire, the farmer supplying the horses to work the machines, and the owner sending a man to attend to it whilst working. On some estates the landlords have purchased them, to afford their tenantry an opportunity of hiring." Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society, XX (1861), 127.

342 Olmstead time thus contributing to diffusion? Resolution of these questions may have a critical bearing on our understanding of the diffusion process, but without more research only tentative statements are in order.

From the McCormick sales records it appears that cooperative purchases, although common to all regions, were most prevalent in developing areas where reapers were first being introduced. As the area matured, and as farmers began replacing their machines, the importance of joint purchases declined. This hypothesis conforms both with literary descriptions found in farmer accounts and with the limited samples already drawn from the McCormick ledgers. Such a hypothesis has conceptual appeal, for the relative benefits from mechanization and sharing would have been greater in develop- ing regions. Nineteenth-century rural labor markets were notoriously balkanized, but it is safe to generalize that labor was much scarcer in new agricultural regions than in established communities. The assumption underlying the comparative static analysis that indi- vidual farmers faced a perfectly elastic supply curve for labor might be reasonable for eastern states, but it is seriously at odds with the stark realities confronted by many western farmers. The numerous accounts of farmers in the weeks before the harvest or even at its peak (when the opportunity cost of their own time was exceptionally high) roaming the countryside and nearby hamlets in search of labor lends credence to the practical implications, if not the theoret- ical preciseness, of the often-heard cliche that labor could not be found at any price."35 Higher wage rates and greater uncertainty would have stimulated the adoption of reapers. But capital was also scarcer in new areas, and would not higher interest rates at least in part offset the effect of higher wages? In answering this question the significance of McCormick credit policies on regional diffusion patterns and sharing becomes apparent. Although manufacturers charged much higher interest rates than has previously been thought, the rates were apparently uniform between regions, which means that the financial costs of a reaper were not correspondingly higher in capital-scarce areas. Relative factor prices thus created a tremen- dous incentive for mechanization, but other problems restricted individual adoption. Complementary capital needed for adoption

35 If individual farmers in fact faced an upward sloping supply curve for labor then we must abandon the assumption that there were no diseconomies of scale to harvesting by cradle.

Reaping and Mowing 343

was scarce and often beyond the reach of individual farmers. There was a serious power constraint, for antebellum harvesters required a minimum of two, and in many cases four, horses. Many small farmers could not afford this many animals, but when acting in combination with their neighbors this constraint vanished. Several accounts of reaper sharing explicitly note the joint use of horses. Land was abundant but cleared, fenced, plowed, and planted land was not. All of these operations required capital, labor, and time, and thus, while relative factor prices favored mechanization, con- straints in the supply of complementary capital and acreage limita- tions militated against individual ownership. The logical solution was cooperative use of reapers. Gradually farmers accumulated the needed complementary capital and increased their acreage in small grains, partly because they had access to a harvester. These changes reduced the need for sharing, and thus the incidence-or average sharing rate-decreased. But on the margin, that is among new farmers or those converting from hand to machine harvesting, shar- ing remained important. This is a crucial point because it is the behavior at the margin-of first users-that is of most interest in analyzing problems of technological diffusion. Thus our fixation on average sharing rates, of which the McCormick data suggest a lower bound of about twenty-five percent, underestimates the im- portance of joint use on initial adoption.

The general impression conveyed in literary sources, testimonials, and state reports is that sharing and contracting were also more frequent in the New England states. Again there is ample cause to accept this hypothesis, for the reasons offered in contemporary sources are quite convincing. Sharing and contracting arrangements proliferated because the farms were too small to warrant individual ownership. Furthermore, a far greater proportion of the work in this region was mowing grasses as opposed to reaping wheat. The argu- ment that harvesting equipment could not be contracted has been applied to both reapers and mowers, but it is clear that technological constraints did not so seriously restrict the mobility of mowers, for they lacked the cumbersome reel found on most reapers. Finally, depending on the local conditions, the length of the harvest season could be substantially longer in mowing operations, and grasses were not as seriously threatened as grains by bad weather.

What of the institutional and sociological characteristics of sharing and contracting agreements? The discovery of cooperative use ob-

344 Olmstead

viously has not ". . . profoundly altered the course of agrarian his- tory. . . ," but nevertheless it is worth asking how the participants pooled risks, determined priorities of use, and so on. An understand- ing of these issues requires us to realize that we are not dealing with negotiations between impersonal corporations or total strangers. Bargaining costs were greatly reduced by the strong bonds of mutual trust that united the participants. Neighbors, perhaps united by blood, but in any case welded to one another by their common ex- perience of the loneliness and hardships of rural life, did not bicker over the details of "profit pools." In most cases if tragedy struck one partner, it would have been unthinkable for the others not to have volunteered compensation. But the participants did not rely entirely upon the potential benevolence of their neighbors, for they devised a rather obvious method to pool risks-all detailed accounts of sharing and contracting show that the machine was frequently moved back and forth between farms. Thus if bad weather struck in the middle of the harvest, each of two sharers would have about one-half of his grain shocked. Smaller farmers recognized that half a loaf is better than none and that immediately sharing a reaper or mower is preferable to waiting years until they had amassed the necessary acreage and resources to permit profitable individual ownership. The risks and costs of sharing have always been juxta- posed with those of individual ownership. A more accurate reflection of the options small farmers faced is revealed if the question is rephrased and we cast the risks and costs of sharing against those inherent in the continued use of cradles. From this latter perspective the reaper, even if shared, afforded insurance against disaster, for it allowed small farmers to cut as much wheat in one day as they could cradle with their limited labor supply in several days.

A final point of considerable interest is that technical change in machine design introduced in the late 1840's and throughout the 1850's had a profound effect on machine productivity and maneuver- ability, thereby increasing the potential for sharing and facilitating diffusion. These technical changes were of such great importance in determining the timing and pace of diffusion that they warrant special consideration.

SECONDARY INVENTIONS, MACHINE PRODUCTIVITY, AND DIFFUSION

The comparative-static threshold model provides an explanation for the more than twenty-year lag in reaper acceptance which em- phasizes the short run changes in market forces. The model and the

Reaping and Mowing 345 accompanying argument assume that the technical proficiency of what David calls the "basic reaper" was constant over time. No allowance is made for changes in supply conditions (including technical refinements, better marketing procedures, improved repair facilities, and so on) except insofar as such changes might be re- flected in the nominal price of the machinery. We have already seen above that revisions in two parameters somewhat diminish the "predictive" powers of the threshold model. The question at issue here is, given its apparent variance with historical conditions and with the hypotheses of previous scholars, does the model even pro- vide an interesting explanation of the diffusion process. We have a readily available competing explanation. A number of historians have argued that the lag between invention and popular acceptance was largely due to the simple fact that the early machines were crude, unwieldy, and unreliable-in short, they did not work well. But in the late 1840's and the early 1850's a number of important design modifications and complementary inventions-what Usher has termed "secondary inventions"-were introduced which vastly increased machine productivity. These changes reduced the risks of disastrous breakdowns in the midst of the harvest, lessened the horsepower and auxiliary manpower requirements, and increased machine versatility and mobility. All of these changes would act to reduce the required threshold acreage in small grains needed for profitable adoption.

To assess the relative merits of the competing explanations it would be useful to establish with some precision what has been said by the proponents on each side and to assess the documentary bases for these divergent views. This historiographical inquiry is especially called for given the widespread acceptance by economic historians of the view that "the reaper" was, for practical purposes, available in the 1830's.

In summarizing the basic problem David notes:

Despite the fact that the history of commercial production of mechanical reap- ing machines in the United States stretched back without interruption to the early 1830's, this industry was one that only began to flourish in the 1850's. . . . Thus the intriguing question to which an answer must be given is why only at that time [the mid-1850's] were large numbers of farmers suddenly led to abandon an old, labor-intensive method of cutting their grain, and to switch to the use of a machine that had been available since its invention two decades earlier?36

36 David, "Midwest," pp. 8, 9.

346 Olmstead Elsewhere David discusses the "basic reaper" and the "pioneering hand-rake model," implying a constant product over a span of a decade or more.87 In his study of diffusion of reapers in Britain he extends this assumption to an even longer time period. "Progress in the design of machinery could increase its versatility in coping with a variety of terrain conditions." But a few lines later he notes that "within the period with which the present analysis deals, however, there were no radical design advances of this sort in reaping equip- ment."88 In this case the relevant period is 1851 to 1871.

In all this discussion there is little reference to specific technical obstacles or to the accounts of traditional historians except an occa- sional remark terming their arguments unconvincing and vague. For example: "One would have to find more convincing technical ob- stacles than are discussed in the authoritative works on the reaper to account for the lag betwen the first sale of Hussey's machine in 1833 ... and the eventual adoption of the innovation in the 1850's."39 It is time to exhume some of the traditional accounts.

The historians who seriously studied reapers had a thorough understanding of the refinements in reaper design; if they were "vague" it was because they did not want to belabor an issue which they knew to be obvious. In one of several allusions to the importance of design changes Hutchinson notes:

.[. (A] complete story of the mechanical evolution of the reaper between 1848 and 1855 would involve technicalities beyond the purpose of this narrative, but several changes of considerable importance were introduced which require mention. Scarcely a single element [of the McCormick reaper] was left un- touched.40

Hutchinson itemizes eleven major changes introduced within a few years that encompassed the precise time when the first boom in reaper sales occurred.

Rogin's account agrees with that offered by Hutchinson.

The inventor himself [McCormick] furnishes the explanation for his reaper's failure to gain earlier popularity, for he tells us that his machines "were not of much practical value until the improvement of my second patent in 1845." . .Thus we are told that of one hundred reapers sold in 1847 without

dividers, eighty were returned. Upon the addition of "improved" dividers, the

87 Ibid., p. 22. 88 David, "Britain," p. 186. 89 David, "Midwest," p. 13; also see p. 11. 40 Hutchinson, Seed, p. 325; also see p. 324.

Reaping and Mowiing 347 reapers were accepted and used during the subsequent harvest. Nevertheless, the McCormick reaper was not a truly practicable machine so long as its capacity was limited by the ability of a man walking on the ground to rake the grain off the platform as it was cut.41

Rogin describes the tedious process of trial and error spanning four or five years (1845 to 1849) before McCormick succeeded in per- fecting a raker's seat. Rogin (and McCormick) considered this im- provement an essential prerequisite to widespread adoption.42 Next, Rogin traces out the improvements in the cutting bar between 1850 and 1854 which allowed McCormick's machine to serve as a mower and improved its performance as a reaper: [T]hese valuable improvements ... were instrumental in increasing the use of horse-drawn harvesting machinery in reaping grain. When we turn to the figures for the production of McCormick machines we are struck by the notable increase which took place during 1855 and 1856. This increase does not represent merely the natural acceleration in the adoption of a new inven- tion, for, as the bookkeeper in McCormick's employ since 1849 pointed out, the machines for 1855, 1856, and 1857, were the first ones to give general satisfaction.43

This brief anthology is intended to illustrate the importance that the leading researchers placed on technical refinements in determin- ing the eventual diffusion of reapers. A look at the rapidly changing composition of reaper sales offers an idea of the market significance of the more important changes. Between 1849 and 1857 the tradi- tional hand-rake reaper's share of the total market declined from almost one hundred percent to below twenty-five percent. By the mid-1850's about seventy-five percent of the "reapers" sold were mowers, combines, and self-rakers-machines that did not exist in the mid-1840's.

Probably the single most important change accounting for the jump in total reaper sales was the improvement in cutting bar and knife design that led to the development of specialized mowing machines (as well as combines, and improved reapers). One must remember that the aggregate data do not distinguish between

41 The early attempts threw the machines off balance and the seats had to be removed. Rogin, Farm Machinery, pp. 88-89. Also see John F. Steward, The Reaper: A History of the Efforts of Those Who Justly May Be Said To Have Made Bread Cheap (New York: Greenberg, Inc., 1931), p. 198.

42 Rogin, Farm Machinery, pp. 87-90; Steward, The Reaper, p. 201. 43 Rogin, Farm Machinery, p. 91. Ardrey presents arguments similar to those

offered by Hutchinson and Rogin; see Ardrey, Farm Implements, pp. 47, 153, 229.

348 Olmstead mowers and reapers, so the widely cited figure of 70,000 "reapers" sold between 1850 and 1858 includes mowers, hand-rake reapers, combines and self-rakers. Most accounts agree that even crude mowers did not exist until about 1847 at the earliest, yet as a rough estimate it appears that specialized mowers accounted for at least twenty-five percent of the total increase in "reaper" sales.44

Cutting bar improvements were also responsible for the explosion in the popularity of combines. Combines permitted a farmer to spread the fixed cost of a machine over a larger acreage, thereby lowering the threshold acreage required in grains alone. In the early 1850's McCormick experienced serious problems in developing his combine, and he did not consider it perfected until 1855. Notwith- standing these problems, by 1854, at the very start of the boom in reaper sales, "most of the machines which were sold [by McCormick] were combined reapers and mowers... Since McCormick fol- lowed other major producers in perfecting his combine, it is reason- able to presume that by 1854 a majority of industry sales were com- bines. This observation is particularly significant because smaller farmers-those near the threshold margin, and thus the only ones of interest insofar as the threshold model is concerned-evidently showed a distinct preference for combines.

The shift to self-rakers also began in the mid-1850's. Between 1853 and 1856, Atkins sold approximately 4,000 self-rakers and claimed to be producing 5,000 in 1857.46 Other firms were producing self-rakers in the mid-1850's, and it is possible that their output exceeded Atkins'.47 By 1860 Hutchinson estimates that there were about 20,000 self-rakers, which would have accounted for twenty-five percent of all the reapers in use.48

There is no doubt that there were significant and rapid shifts in

44 Ketchum, the first producer to specialize in mowers, sold nine machines in 1849. The estimate of mower sales is based on figures found in Hutchinson and in company circulars and advertisements. These data indicate about 20,000 mowers were sold between 1850 and 1858.

45 Hutchinson, Seed, p. 323. 46 This would have exceeded McCormick's sales by about 1,000 machines. The

Northwestern Farmer, II (February 1857), 84. Also see Hutchinson, Seed, p. 326 for 1854 sales.

47 Ardrey, Farm Implements, p. 229. 48 Hutchinson, Harvest, p. 393. David apparently errs in claiming that "McCor-

mick did not manufacture a self-rake model until the introduction of the 'Advance' in the post Civil War period," for Hutchinson notes that McCormick made his first self-rakers in 1861 and by 1864 two-thirds of his entire output were self-rakers. David, "Midwest," pp. 21-22; also see p. 34; Hutchinson, Harvest, p. 96.

Reaping and Mowing 349 the composition of sales away from the basic hand-rake reaper during the 1850's. Its rapidly dwindling market share indicates design changes and farmer preferences were fast making this style of harvester obsolete. But assume we disregard the diminishing ability of the basic hand-rake reaper to compete. If we want to hold technol- ogy constant in order to identify the importance of changing market forces, is it reasonable, especially in light of the emphasis of the traditional historians, to consider the hand-rake reaper to have been an homogeneous product during the period 1849-1857, let alone over two or three decades? Is there any evidence that the technical refinements which have so impressed some historians did in fact result in improved performance, thus increasing the reaper's eco- nomic worth?

A study of the reports of the various mower and reaper trials offers an indication of the rapid improvement in performance. Prior to 1852 there are only the qualitative observations of the judges of the 1848 Buffalo trials sponsored by the New York State Agricultural Society. The judges found that all the machines clogged badly, were extremely heavy, and had excessive side drafts. The judges rated the machines' overall performance and the quality of their work below that done with a scythe or cradle.49 Only four years later at Geneva the results were quite different. The judges now were very favorably impressed with the economic worth of the better reapers and mowers although they still noted many flaws. For example, five out of the seven mowers tested "clogged frequently," and two of the seven "ceased to work." McCormick's knives had to be replaced twice, and his machine was judged "too fragile for useful purposes" as a mower, and as a reaper it lacked "firmness" and subjected the horses to a heavy side draft.50 Such criticisms seldom appeared in later reports.

One of the most important summary measures of reaper and mower performance, and one we can compare over time, was their draft while in operation. Table 1 records the average draft of the reapers and mowers competing in Geneva, New York in 1852; Hamilton, Ohio in 1857; and Auburn, New York in 1866. Over the

49 As reported in Danhof, Changes in Agriculture, p. 234; also see Fifth Annual Report of the Secretary of the State Board of Agriculture of the State of Michigan for the Year 1866, V (Lansing: John A. Kerr & Co., 1866), p. 261.

50 "Report of the Committee on Trial of Impliments at Geneva, July, 1852," in New York State Agricultural Society, Transactions for 1852, XII, 104-112. (Here- after cited as "Geneva.")

350 Olmstead TABLE 1

REAPER AND MOWER DRAFT 1852, 1857, 1866

Geneva Hamilton Auburn 1852 1857 1866

Reapers 410 258 247 Mowers 403 341 234

Sources: Calculated from data found in "Geneva," p. 111; O.A.R. for the Year 1857, XII, 101; and "Auburn," pp. 227-231, 349, 403.

span of fourteen years the average draft of both reapers and mowers declined about forty percent. This downward trend in draft dramat- ically reflects the cumulative impact of a host of technological re- finements on several aspects of reaper and mower performance bearing directly on their horsepower needs and on their maneuver- ability in rough terrain.5' These changes would have facilitated moving reapers between farms, thereby stimulating cooperative use. Underlying the decline in draft was a reduction in friction and wear on moving parts which resulted in greater durability. The judges at Auburn explicitly equated high draft with poor workmanship and faulty design.

The main causes, of this wide difference were, 1st. Bad workmanship, ill made gearings, rough bearings and imperfect adjustments of lines and parallelisms. 2d. Surface draft; wheels so narrow as to cut into the ground; castor wheels, greatly increased draft by their tendency to present their broad surfaces to the line of draft. So the great weight of some machines, by increasing their surface pressure, at the same time increased their draft.52

Similar observations linking draft with design were made at other trials. For example, the judges at the 1857 Syracuse trials concluded that a relatively simple but innovative change in the design of the

51 For a discussion of reapers requiring an increase in horses see Gould P. Col- man, "Innovation and Diffusion in Agriculture," Agricultural History, XLII (July 1968), 177-78. Danhof asserts that "The need for several teams militated against the machine in the eyes of countless farmers who possessed only one team, or perhaps a lone horse." See Danhof, Changes in Agriculture, p. 232. Numerous design changes increased reaper versatility. Besides the reduction in draft discussed above, the Kirby machines marketed in the last half of the 1850's introduced inde- pendently suspended finger-bars. "This independent action and flexibility of the finger-bar, lessens the liability to breakage when in contact with obstructions." The finger bar could also be easily set at any desired height. Ben[jamin] Perdey Poore (ed.), Field Trial of Reapers, Mowers, and Harvest Impliments, By the United States Agricultural Society at Syracuse, N.Y. July 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 20th, 1857 (Boston: Bazin & Chandler, 1858), p. 47. (Hereafter cited as: Syracuse.)

52 "Auburn," p. 349.

Reaping and Mowing 351 cutting bars on Wood's mower reduced its draft by more than fifty pounds.3 The lighter draft, insofar as it stemmed from improved cutting bar and knife design, resulted in less clogging and fewer breakdowns during peak load seasons. Whereas clogging was uni- versal at Buffalo in 1848, and generally the case at Geneva in 1852, it was a rare occurrence at Auburn in 1866. By then most of the better mowers could stop and start in heavy grass without backing the machine-a feat seldom accomplished in the early 1850's. Al- though improvements in the cutting apparatus were most important for mowing, they also improved reaper performance especially in wet, downed, or heavy grain.

CONCLUSION

A detailed examination of the historical evidence indicates that we must search beyond the explanation offered by the comparative static threshold model if we desire to understand the dynamics of reaper diffusion. By adjusting the depreciation parameter to con- form with a value commonly cited in contemporary sources, the threshold model provides a basis for concluding that few if any midwestern farmers would have rationally adopted a reaper in the 1850's. Even if we could obtain accurate estimates of this (and other) parameters, we still must ask whether the threshold model helps us understand the diffusion of the reaper given the assumptions of indivisibility and no technological change.

Machine services were in fact divisible-sharing and contracting were widely practiced. The fact that we have record of a reaper contractor (known to his neighbors as "a fanner") working on six farms in one season suggests that sharing was indeed feasible and that similar arrangements involving fewer farmers would have been correspondingly easier. The diffusion process was integrally linked to changing sharing-contracting patterns, for it appears that coopera- tive use of harvesting equipment was particularly important among first users, and that it was most common in newly developing regions. Furthermore, it appears that design changes markedly increased the potential for cooperative use and thus diffusion in the early 1850's.

An understanding of why reapers were suddenly accepted in the 1850's after a twenty-year hiatus requires that we recognize the

53 See the discussion of Walter A. Wood's mowers and reapers in Syracuse, pp. 40-41.

352 Olmstead economic significance of numerous technical refinements on machine productivity. Changes in relative factor prices as emphasized in the comparative static model undoubtedly contributed to diffusion. Traditional historians recognized this point, but they considered it of minor importance compared to the effect of changing technological factors on diffusion-to date not one iota of evidence has been offered that seriously challenges this judgment. From this latter perspective the story of the reaper, rather than contradicting, actually reinforces Rosenberg's argument emphasizing the importance of secondary inventions and design modifications on the diffusion process. "By concentrating our attention upon the sharp discon- tinuities associated with major inventions, we are misrepresenting the manner in which the gradual growth in the stock of useful knowl- edge is transformed into improvements in resource productivity.654 The proper parable for the reaper is not the story of Archimedes in the tub shouting "Eureka," but the tale of the ugly duckling.

Finally, we would be remiss not to raise some important method- ological issues. On this subject we can do no better than to heed Professor David's own warning "that the econometric historian- especially if he should keep regular company with theorists-lives in perpetual danger of never pausing to ask whether there is perhaps some direct evidence to suggest he should favor a different, and possibly less mathematically tractable set of priors."55

ALAN L. OLMSTEAD, University of California, Davis

54 Nathan Rosenberg, "Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology," Explora- tions in Economic History, X (Fall 1972), 8.

56 Paul A. David, "The Use and Abuse of Prior Information in Econometric History: A Rejoinder to Professor Williamson on the Antebellum Cotton Textile Industry," THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HIsToRY, XXXII (September 1972), 725.