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I
Breaking the ImpasseForging an EU Leadership Initiativeon Climate Change
A policy paper by
Hermann E. Ott and Sebastian Oberthür
I HEINRICH BULL FOUNDATIONWORLD SUMMIT 2002 JOHANNESBURG
Papers No. 3
BR
EA
KIN
GT
HE
IMP
AS
SE
forg
ing
anE
UL
eadersh
ipIn
itiative
onC
limate
Change
4’A
policypap
erby
,;
Herm
ann
E.
Ott
andS
ebastianO
berth
ür
1
Pu
blish
edby
theH
einrichB
ollF
ou
nd
ation
Thanks
CO
NT
EN
TS
The
authorsw
ouldlike
tothank
Bill
Hare,
Reinhard
Loske,
$aschaM
üller-Kraenner
andT
homas
Gehring
forcom
menting
onan
earlierversion
ofthe
paper.R
esponsibilityfor
thecontent
andany
errorsrem
ains,of
course,solely
with
theauthors.
Many
thanksgo
furthermore
toH
aukevon
SehtE
xecutiveS
umm
ary5
andB
erndB
rounsfor
theirassistance
andto
JohannahB
ernsteinfor
herinvaluable
editingw
ork.
We
alsogratefully
acknowledge
thesupport
ofthe
Heinrich
Boll
Foundationin
theproduction
ofP
reface7
thispaper.
Break
ing
the
Impasse:
Forg
ing
anE
UL
eadersh
ipIn
itiative
on
Clim
ateC
han
ge
-
1.Introduction
10
2.T
heL
andscapeof
InternationalC
limate
Politics
atthe
Turn
ofthe
Century
11
2. 1T
heD
omestic
Clim
ateP
olicyof
theM
ajorP
layersafter
Kyoto
12
2.2T
heP
ost-Kyoto
InternationalA
rena16
2.3C
onclusion:T
heS
tateof
Clim
ateP
olicyand
some
Underlying
Factors
1$
.
3.T
heE
uropeanU
nionm
ustlead
onC
limate
Change
19
3. 1T
heR
ationaleof
aL
eadershipInitiative
onC
limate
Change
20
3.2T
heF
irstE
lement
ofa
Leadership
Initiative22
3.3T
heS
econdE
lement
ofa
Leadership
Initiative24
3.4T
heT
hirdE
lement
ofa
Leadership
Initiative26
4.C
onclusion28
The
Authors
30
World
Summ
it Papersof
theH
einrichB
ollFoundation,
No.
3:B
reakingthe
Impasse:
Forgingan
EU
Leadership
Initiativeon
Clim
ateC
hange.A
policypaper
byL
iterature31
Herm
annE.
Ott
andSebastian
OberthU
r.Published
bythe
Heinrich
Boll
Foundation
Notes
33Printed
inG
ermany
©H
einrich-Boll-Stiftung,
Berlin,
June2001
All
rightsreserved
Production:trigger,
Berlin
The
following
publicationdoes
notnecessarily
representthe
views
ofthe
Heinrich
Boll
Foun
dation.T
hepublication
may
bereproduced
inparts
providedthat
thesource
istm
entioned.
This
policypaper
ispreviously
releasedin
1999.
To
orderthis
publication:H
einrich-Boll-Stiftung,
Rosenthaler
Str.40/41,
10178B
erlin,
Tel.
0049-30-285340, Fax:0049-30-28534
109, E-m
ail:info
@boell.de
Internet:w
ww
.boell.de
2
EX
EC
UT
IVE
SU
MM
AR
Y
The
Kyoto
Protocol
hasthe
potentialto
providean
important
basisfor
thefurther
develop-
ment
ofinternational
climate
policyin
thenext
millennium
.F
ullim
plementation
byin-
dustrialisedcountries
oftheir
differentiatedtargets
would
notonly
leadto
astahilisation
of
emissions
at1995
levels,but
itw
ouldalso
ensurea
reversalof
currentem
issiontrends.
How
ever,tw
oyears
afterits
adoptionthere
continuesto
bem
uchuncertainty
aboutthe
potentialeffectiveness
ofthe
Protocol.
Concerns
regardingeffectiveness
arein
largepart
relatedto
thehigh
thresholdfor
itsentry
intoforce.
The
more
progressiveindustrialised
countries(prim
arilyE
UM
ember
States)
arenow
waiting
forthe
US
toexercise
responsibilityand
joinforces
with
themin
fulfillingtheir
obligations.H
owever,
theU
Sand
otherlaggard
countriessuch
asA
ustraliaare
attempting
tostall
actionin
theinternational
arenain
orderto
extractm
oreconcessions
within
the
ongoingnegotiation
process.F
romtheir
perspective,the
longerthe
delayin
reaching
agreement
andcom
mencing
action,the
easierit
will
befor
themto
arguefor
weaker
obligationson
thebasis
thatexisting
onesare
nolonger
realisticnor
viable.
Ithas
become
patentlyclear
thatinternational
climate
policyat
theturn
ofthe
millennium
lacksboth
mom
entumand
leadership.It
istherefore
criticalat
thisjuncture
fora
strong
playerto
takethe
lead.A
tthis
point,the
EU
isthe
onlycandidate
who
couldreasonably
forgea
Leadership
Initiativeon
climate
change.L
edby
theU
nion,a
coalitioncould
be
formed
among
thosecountries
who
areactively
comm
ittedto
strongclim
ateprotection
policy.M
oreover,the
EU
couldsuccessfully
buildsupport
aroundspecific
issuesfrom
countriesw
itheconom
iesin
transition(including
Russia),
fromseveral
comm
ittedde
velopingcountries,
andas
well,
fromJapan
(asthe
hostof
theK
yotoconference).
This
approachw
ouldlead
tothe
creationof
anew
criticalm
assof
supportthat
isabsolutely
necessaryfor
breathingnew
lifeinto
theinternational
climate
policyprocess.
The
EU
Leadership
Initiativecould
focuson
thefollow
ingcore
elements.
First,
theearly
andp
rom
pt
ratfIcation
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol
shouldbe
atop
priorityto
ensureits
timely
entryinto
force.G
iventhe
currentS
enate-drivenresistance
ofthe
US
towards
ratification,
itis
absolutelyessential
thatthe
EU
,Japan
andR
ussiaratify
theP
rotocol.T
heircom
bined
ratificationis
requiredin
orderto
meet
them
inimum
thresholdof
55%of
thetotal
CO
2
emissions
ofA
nnexI
Parties
(at1990
levels).T
heU
nionm
usttherefore
initiatea
process
toitself
ratifythe
agreement
assoon
aspossible,
without
waiting
forother
countries,in
particular,the
US.
Itm
ustalso
startexploring
possiblew
aysin
which
agreement
couldbe
reachedw
ithR
ussiaand
Japanto
engagetheir
comm
itment
toratify
theP
rotocolas
well.
This
will
requirea
carefullydesigned
diplomatic
effortinvolving
comprom
iseon
allsides.
As
partof
thisbargaining
process,the
EU
might
haveto
demonstrate
increasedflexibility
with
regardto
theK
yotoM
echanisms.
As
aresult,
itshould
bepossible
toagree
ona
fee
onall
tradingtransactions,
asw
ellas
strictm
onitoring,reporting
andverification
pro
ce
dures,w
hichensure
theenvironm
entallyeffective
useof
theinstrum
ents.If
aco
mp
rehen
siveplan
canbe
established,the
EU
shouldalso
beable
toprevent
afurther
dilutionof
the
sinkcategories
underthe
Protocol.
5
Second,
anE
UL
eadershipInitiative
shouldintroduce
measures
fordom
esticim
plemen
tationof
theK
yotoobligations
andshould
encouragethe
internationalco-ordination
of
suchm
easures.N
umerous
studieshave
providedevidence
ofthe
vastpotential
oflow
-cost
andno-cost
optionsfor
reducinggreenhouse
gasem
issionsin
theE
Uand
elsewhere.
Concerns
aboutreduced
economic
competitiveness
couldbe
minim
isedby
aco-ordination
ofpolicies,
most
importantly
with
Japan.T
heE
Uand
itsM
ember
States
havea
wealth
of
experiencein
policyco-ordination
which
couldprovide
asound
basisfor
pursuing
internationalco-operation.
The
co-ordinationshould
notconsist
ofcom
mon,
bindingm
easuresbut
shouldfocus
ona
transparentand
accountableprocess
ofco-ordination,
which
couldstand
upto
ahigh
standardof
publicscrutiny.
thorder
tobe
successful,the
initiativeshould
concentrateon
a
limited
setof
measures
uponw
hichagreem
entis
most
likely.A
leadershipgroup
of
comm
ittedcountries
couldthus
demonstrate
thatecological
protectionand
sustained
economic
growth
arenot
onlycom
patible,but
alsom
utuallyreinforcing
targets.P
otential
areasof
fruitfulco-ordination
couldinclude
‘greentaxation”,
alarge-scale
R&
Deffort
for
renewables
andthe
efficientuse
ofenergy,
dismantling
climate
adversesubsidies,
energy
efficiencystandards
and,finally,
climate
friendlypublic
procurement.
Third,
theinvolvem
entof
developingcountries
inthe
climate
processis
ofutm
ostim
portancefor
them
ediumand
longterm
effectivenessof
climate
protectionand
forthe
futuredevelopm
entof
theinternational
climate
regime.
Developing
countries’needs
and
interestsm
ustbe
addressedfirst.
Imm
ediateem
phasism
ightfocus
onan
adaptationstrategy.
This
shouldinclude
them
obilisingof
additionalresources
foradaptation,
e.g.
throughthe
establishment
ofan
adaptationfund
financedby
atransaction
feeon
allK
yoto
Mechanism
s.F
urtherefforts
shouldbe
directedat
theco-operative
elaborationof
the
Clean
Developm
entM
echanism(C
DM
)under
Article
12of
theK
yotoP
rotocol.T
hisw
ill
ensurethat
theneeds
ofdeveloping
countriesare
dulyrecognised
without
comprom
ising
onthe
ecologicaleffectiveness.
And
finally,the
European
Union
andits
alliesshould
enter
intoa
constructivem
edium-term
dialoguew
ithdeveloping
countrieson
thefair
and
equitableallocation
ofem
issionrights.
Ifthis
proposedE
UL
eadershipJiiitiative
canbe
successfullyestablished,
itw
illcatalyse
numerous
opportunities.It
will
reinvigoratethe
Kyoto
Protocol
andw
illcreate
further
incentivesto
governments
toim
plement
effectivepolicies
andm
easuresto
mitigate
climate
change.It
will
alsogenerate
much
neededpublic
awareness
todem
onstratethat
economic
well-being
canbe
improved
without
havingto
bumincreasing
amounts
offossil
fuels.A
nE
UL
eadershipInitiative
within
theclim
ateregim
ew
ouldthus
ensurethe
pro-
gressneeded
toprotect
theE
arth’sclim
atefor
thebenefit
ofhum
ankind.
PR
EF
AC
E
Ratify
ing
the
Kyoto
Pro
toco
lfo
rE
arthS
um
mit
2002
InD
ecember
1990,the
United
Nations
General
Assem
blyasked
anInternational
Neg
otia
tingC
omm
itteeto
developa
newinternational
climate
treaty.T
heU
NF
ramew
orkC
on-vention
onC
limate
Change
was
signedat
the1992
Earth
Sum
mit
inR
io,but
lackedsp
ecifics
ongreenhouse
gasreduction
numbers
andtim
eframes.
More
thanfive
yearslater,
inD
ecember
1997,the
firstlegally
bindinginstrum
entto
reducegreenhouse
gasem
issionsw
orldwide
was
agreedupon
inK
yoto,Japan.
The
Kyoto
Protocol,
despiteits
apparentflaw
sand
modest
targets,is
am
ilestonein
thehistory
ofenvironm
entalpolicy.
Now
theP
rotocolhas
tobe
ratifiedand
implem
ented.In
consecutivebudget
periods,its
targetsshould
bestrengthened
stepby
step,new
countriesshould
joinits
comm
itments
tolim
itand
consequentlyreduce
theirem
issions,and
com
mon
andcoordinated
measures
shouldbe
approved.T
heK
yotoP
rotocolis
aw
orkin
progress,but
itis
theonly
game
intow
n.T
hosew
horeject
theK
yotoP
rotocolreject
theachievem
entsof
tenyears
ofinternational
cooperationto
combat
climate
change.
Ten
yearsafter
Rio,
atthe
JohannesburgW
orldS
umm
itfor
Sustainable
Developm
entin
Septem
ber2002,
theK
yotoP
rotocolshould
finallyenter
intoforce.
Until
then,55
coun
triesw
illhave
toratify
theP
rotocolcovering
atleast
55percent
ofem
issionsof
industria
usedcountries
basedon
1990levels.
How
ever,one
countrythat
will
notbe
aparty
when
theK
yotoP
rotocolenters
intoforce,
isthe
United
States
ofA
merica.
The
U.S.
were
oneof
severalcountries
thathave
contin
uously
slowed
down
thenegotiating
process.T
heU
.S.S
enatew
hichhas
toratify
inter-national
treatiesbefore
theycan
become
law,
haddem
onstrateda
stronghostility
toward
theK
yotoP
rotocoleven
beforeits
contentw
asknow
n.R
atificationby
theU
.S.
Senate
ofany
internationalagreem
entthat
setslegally
bindingreduction
comm
itments
forgreen-
housegases
remains
highlyunlikely
forthe
coming
years.
At
the6
thC
onferenceof
theP
artiesto
theC
limate
Convention
inT
heH
ague,N
etherlandsin
Novem
ber2000,
theoutgoing
Clinton-G
oreadm
inistrationw
asunw
illingto
agreeon
aprecise
definitionof
theK
yotoP
rotocol’sso-called
flexibilitym
echanisms,
likeem
issionstrading,
carbonsinks
andthe
Clean
Developm
entM
echanism.
The
European
Union
didnot
rejectthe
notionof
flexibilityand
cost-effectiveim
plementation,
butrightfully
dem
anded
aprecise
quantificationof
which
amount
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol’s
reductioncom
mit-
ment
couldbe
offsetby
theflexibility
mechanism
s.T
heoutgoing
U.S.
administration
didnot
demonstrate
thenecessary
politicalstrength
toagree
onany
quantitativerestriction
onthe
useof
them
echanisms.
Now
,that
theB
ush-Cheney
administration
hasdeclared
theK
yotoP
rotocoldead,
theE
uropeanU
nion,R
ussia,Japan,
developingcountries
andothers
havethe
taskof
ratifyingand
implem
entingthe
Kyoto
Protocol
alone.
67
The
reasonfor
theU
nitedS
tates’sfailure
toprovide
leadershipin
internationalclim
atepolicy
isthe
lackof
anyserious
domestic
climate
policyprogram
.B
oththe
Clinton-G
oreand
theB
ush-Cheney
administrations
havebeen
slowin
implem
enting
climate
policym
easuresdom
estically.T
henew
administration
hascut
fundingfor
energyefficiency
andrenew
ableenergies,
challengedexisting
andproposed
Federal
standardsfor
carsand
householdappliances
andhas
broughtforw
arda
nationalenergy
planthat
focusseson
thesupply
ofcoal,
oiland
gas,not
onefficiency,
demand
sidem
anagement
andrenew
ables.
The
Am
ericanlove
affairw
itheven
biggercars
standsem
blematically
fora
development
paththat
leadsthe
U.S.
continuouslyaw
ayfrom
fulfillingits
comm
itments
underthe
Rio
Clim
ateC
onvention.O
nthe
questionw
hetherP
residentB
ushw
ouldcall
ondrivers
tosharply
reducetheir
fuelconsum
ption.W
hiteH
ousepress
secretaryA
nF
leischerrecently,
onM
ay7,
2001,answ
ered:“T
hat’sa
bigno.
The
presidentbelieves
thatit’s
anA
merican
way
oflife,
andthat
itshould
bethe
goalof
policymakers
toprotect
theA
merican
way
oflife.
The
Am
ericanw
ayof
lifeis
ablessed
one.”
But
thereason
why
internationalclim
atepolicy
hasbeen
moving
ata
snail’space
isnot
som
uchthe
laggards,but
theabsenceof
leaders.
In1999,
theH
einrichB
ollF
oundationhad
thereforeasked
two
expertsto
developa
newleadership
initiativeto
getinternational
climate
policym
ovingagain.
Herm
annO
tt,scientist
atthe
Wuppertal
Institutefor
Clim
ate,E
nergy,E
nvironment,
andcurrently
working
forthe
Planning
Departm
entof
Germ
any’sF
oreignM
inistry,and
Sebastian
Oberthür,
Senior
Fellow
ofthe
Ecologic
Institute,a
Berlin
basedthink-tank
forE
uropeanand
internationalenvironm
entalresearch,
proposethe
following
threeelem
entsfor
suchan
initiative:
.A
combined
effortof
theE
uropeanU
nion,together
with
Eastern
European
countries
includingR
ussiaand
otherC
ISstates
pluskey
developingcountries
toachieve
earlyratification
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol,
ifnecessary
without
initialU
.S.
participation..
Acoordinated
effortto
jumpstart
nationalclim
atepolicy
programs.
Credible
nationalim
plementation
iskey
toconvince
othersthat
theK
yotoP
rotocolw
orks.International
coordinationof
policiesand
measures,
likeeconom
icinstrum
ents,technical
standards
ortrade
rules,w
illhelp
tofacilitate
nationalim
plementation
andsm
oothconflicts
with
othereconom
icdevelopm
entgoals.
.N
ewincentives
toinvolve
Southern
countriesinto
theC
onventionprocess:
The
Kyoto
Protocol
foreseesa
number
ofnew
fundingm
echanisms
andeconom
icinstrum
entsfor
North-S
outhcooperation.
Those
instruments
must
becreated
ina
way
thatallow
s
broadand
equalparticipation,
transparencyand
am
aximum
ecologicalbenefit.
Even
ifthe
Kyoto
Protocol
will
enterinto
forcew
ithoutU
.S.
participation,the
doorfor
the
U.S.
andothers
hasto
remain
open.A
nycountry
shouldbe
legallyand
technicallyable
to
joinduring
laterbudget
periods,provided
theenvironm
entalintegrity
ofthe
Protocol
is
preserved.T
heU
.S.
hasa
lotto
contributescientifically,
technically,financially
andpolitically
tosolve
theglobal
environmental
crisis.In
otherphases
ofits
history,the
U.S.
hasbeen
aleader
oninternational
environmental
cooperation,the
Montreal
Protocol
toprotect
theozone
layerbeing
aprim
eexam
plethat
would
nothave
beenpossible
without
strongU
.S.initiative.
Last
butnot
least,U
.S.
emissions
continueto
contributesignificantly
tothe
problem.
U.S.
policiesshould
thereforealso
contributeto
thesolution.
At
theeve
ofE
arthS
umm
it2002,
thew
orldhas
totake
stockof
what
hasbeen
achievedsince
Rio.
The
Fram
ework
Convention
onC
limate
Change
thatprom
isesto
“achieve...
stabilisationof
greenhousegas
concentrationsin
theatm
osphereat
alevel
thatw
ouldprevent
dangerousinterference
with
theclim
atesystem
”w
assigned
inR
io,am
ongstothers
bythen
U.S.
President
George
Bush
Senior.
Ten
yearslater,
itis
time
tofulfil
itscom
mitm
ents.T
heK
yotoP
rotocolis
afirst
butnecessary
stepto
coordinatethe
globaleffort
tom
eetthis
globalchallenge.
When
headsof
statem
eetin
Johannesburg,they
shouldcelebrate
theK
yotoP
rotocol’sentering
intoforce,
butalso
lookahead
anddo
more.
Sascha
Mütler-K
raennerH
einrichB
oll fou
ndatio
nW
ashingtonO
ffice
June,200]
89
This
will,
however,
dependon
thedom
esticim
plementation
ofthe
treatyand
onthe
ratificationby
atleast
55P
artiesto
theC
limate
Convention
representingat
least55%
of
industrialisedcountry
emissions
in1990
(seeC
hapter3.1).
As
well,
thedesign
ofthe
so-called
Kyoto
Mechanism
sthat
formpart
ofthe
Protocol
(Em
issionsT
rading,Joint
Imple
000CD
2.T
he
Lan
dscap
eof
Intern
ational
Clim
ateP
oliticsat
the
Tu
rnof
the
Cen
tury
The
futureprospects
forinternational
co-operationon
climate
changedepend
onw
hetherand
when
theK
yotoP
rotocolw
illbe
ratifiedand
implem
entedby
them
ajorplayers.
The
following
sectiondescribes
theinternational
landscapeof
climate
politicsthrough
an
BR
EA
KIN
GT
HE
IMP
AS
SE
:F
OR
GIN
GA
NE
UL
EA
DE
RS
HIP
INIT
IAT
IVE
ON
CL
IMA
TE
CH
AN
GE
By
Herm
ann
E.
Oft
and
Seb
astianO
berth
ür
1.In
troductio
n1
The
Kyoto
Protocol
tothe
United
Nations
Fram
ework
Convention
onC
limate
Change
(FCC
C)
was
-and
stillis
-a
remarkable
achievement
forinternational
climate
policy.2N
egotiatedin
littlem
orethan
two
yearsand
concludedin
1997,this
extremely
complex
treatyhas
thepotential
toconstitute
thefoundation
ofthe
climate
regime
forthe
nextcentury.
Itsm
ostim
portantcornerstone
isundoubtedly
thequantitative
obligationfor
industrialisedcountries
toreduce
emissions
ofa
setof
greenhousegases
(GH
G5)
bya
specifiedpercentage
inthe
periodof
2008—2012
(Article
3and
Annex
Bof
theP
rotocol).3T
heim
plementation
ofthese
differentiatedtargets,
rangingfrom
minus
8%for
theE
Uand
some
Eastern
European
countriesto
plus10%
forIceland
(seeT
able1)
would
leadto
astabilisation
ofem
issionsat
1995levels
andthus
constitutea
deviationfrom
presentem
issiontrends
(seeF
igure1
).
Table
1:T
heD
ifferentiatedQ
uantitativeO
bligationsofA
nnexB
Parties
mentation
andthe
Clean
Developm
entM
echanism)
andthe
futuretreatm
entof
sinksw
illno
doubthave
adecisive
impact.
How
ever,the
Kyoto
Mechanism
sare
inherentlycontra-
dictory.W
hilethey
providefor
thecost-effective
implem
entationof
thereduction
targets,they
canalso
beused
byP
artiesto
evadeeffective
actionat
thenational
level.5A
con
struc
tivedialogue
onthe
environmentally
andeconom
icallyeffective
designof
thesein
strum
entsis
thereforeof
utmost
importance.
At
present,the
paceof
theclim
atenegotiations
isfar
tooslow
andthe
prospectsfor
itsentering
intoforce
remain
ratheruncertain.
The
negotiatingprocess
hasbeen
marked
bya
lackof
meaningful
discussionon
thestrategies
neededfor
effectiveclim
ateprotection,
notto
mention
theabsence
ofm
uch-neededconstructive
co-operationin
thedevelopm
entof
policiesand
measures
toim
plement
theK
yotoP
rotocol.Instead,
post-Kyoto
negotiationshave
concentratedon
theK
yotoM
echanisms
andhave
generallybeen
characterisedby
battlesof
retreat.B
ecausem
omentum
isso
clearlylacking,
aL
eadershipInitiative
isurgently
needednow
more
thanever.
This
paperaim
sto
developthe
designfor
suchan
initiative.T
hefirst
substantivepart
analysesthe
stateof
affairsof
internationalclim
atepolicy
atthe
turnof
thecentury
(Chapter
2).S
ubsequently,a
concreteresponse
tothe
ongoingproblem
sin
thenegotiating
processis
presentedin
theform
ofa
Leadership
Initiativeon
climate
changeto
revitaliseinternational
climate
policyand
re-energisethe
Kyoto
Protocol
process(C
hapter3).
Fig
ure
1:Projected
Impacts
oftheK
yotoProtocol
onE
missions
ofGreenhouse
Gases
fromA
nnexI
Parties
6.5-
Target
(percentageP
artyreduction
frombase
yearor
period)
-8%
Austria,
Belgium
,B
ulgariaa,C
zechR
epublica,D
enmark,
Estonia’,
European
Com
munity,
Finland,
France,
Germ
any,Ireland,
Italy,L
atvia’,L
iechtenstein,L
ithuaniaa,L
uxembourg,
Monaco,
Netherlands,
Portugal,
Rom
aniaa,S
lovakiaa,S
loveniaa,S
pain,S
weden,
Sw
itzerland,U
nitedK
ingdomof
Great
Britain
andN
orthernIreland
-
7%U
nitedS
tatesof
Am
erica-
6%C
anada,H
ungary
a,Jap
an,
Po
land
a
-
5%C
roatiaa
Stabilisation
New
Zealand,
Russian
Federationa,
Ukrainea
+1%
Norw
ay
+8%
Australia
+10%
Iceland
6.0-
OEC
DG
reenM
odel
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
aC
ountriesthat
areundergoing
theprocess
oftransition
toa
market
economy
Source:A
nnexofD
ecision1/C
P.1in
FCC
C/C
P/1997/7/Add.1.
EIAH
ighG
rowth
Scenario
2n
dN
ationalC
omm
unications
3.0
2.5
19901995
20002005
20102015years
Source:
OE
CD
1993;E
IA1999;
2”
National
Com
munications
ofAnnex
IParties,fC
CC
ICP/199811
1/Add.2.
1011
analysisof
thecurrent
stateof
implem
entationand
ratificationof
theP
rotocolby
them
ajorplayers.
And
inlight
ofthe
ever-growing
influenceof
civilsociety,
newdevelopm
entsin
theclim
ateN
GO
arenaare
alsoexam
ined.T
hisis
followed
byan
analysisof
thestate-of-
playof
theinternational
negotiatingprocess.6
2.1T
heD
omestic
Clim
ateP
olicyof
theM
ajor
Players
afterK
yoto
Dom
esticclim
atepolicy
isthe
basisof
anational
government’s
internationalposition
with
progressat
theinternational
levelthus
requiringeffective
domestic
measures.
Unfortunately,
effortsto
implem
entthe
Kyoto
obligationsand
toprepare
forthe
entryinto
forceof
theP
rotocolhave
beeninsufficient
inthe
two
yearsfollow
ingits
adoptionin
Decem
ber1997.
Em
issiontrends
underbusiness
asusual
scenariostherefore
continueto
risew
ithcontinued
uncertainratification
prospects.
Low
Expectations
for
theE
Uan
dthe
Ap
plican
tC
ountries
As
regardsthe
internationalprocess,
theE
Uhas
continuedto
strivefor
internationalleadership
inthe
post-Kyoto
phase.In
particular,it
hasattem
ptedto
maintain
pressureon
theU
Sand
otherlaggard
countriesto
adoptan
environmentally
effectivedesign
forthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
s.F
urthermore,
theE
Uhas
made
some
effortto
respondto
criticismof
itsinw
ard-lookingfocus
duringthe
Kyoto
negotiations.A
spart
ofthis
effort,it
hassucceeded
instrengthening
itsties
with
countriesw
itheconom
iesin
transition(C
ET
Ts)
anddeveloping
countries.7
InJune
1998,the
EU
reachedan
agreement
onan
internalburden-sharing
arrangement.
This
will
formthe
basisof
itsdeclaration
onjoint
fulfilment
underA
rticle4
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol
(i.e.the
redistributionof
itsoverall
comm
itment
among
EU
Mem
berS
tates)upon
itsratification.8
Despite
thisagreem
ent,how
ever,the
EU
hasnot
yettaken
thenecessary
stepsfor
earlyratification
ofthe
Kyoto
ProtocoL9
This
appearsto
bedue
primarily
tostrategic
considerations(see
alsoC
hapter3.2).
Until
theE
Uratifies
theK
yotoP
rotocol,how
ever,it
will
hardlybe
ableto
achieveany
realprogress
indeveloping
itspolicies
forlim
itingG
HG
emissions.’°
The
main
post-Kyoto
achievement
hasbeen
anagreem
entw
ithE
uropeancar
manufacturers
in199$
tolim
itaverage
CO
2em
issionsof
newcars
to140
mg
perkilom
etreby
200$.T
hisrepresents
a25%
reductionfrom
currentlevels
andcould
contributeabout
one-sixthof
thereductions
neededto
achievethe
Kyoto
targetfor
theE
U.’
‘Nevertheless,
anddespite
strengthenedefforts
bysom
eM
ember
States
likeG
erm
any,according
tothe
European
Com
mission’s
estimates
ofM
ay1999,
EU
totalG
HG
emissions
arestill
expectedto
increaseby
some
6%from
the1990
levelby
2010if
furtherm
easuresare
not12
There
hasalso
beena
notablelack
ofprogress
ona
number
ofinternal
policyinitiatives.
By
mid- 1999,
along-aw
aitedproposal
forlegislation
supportingthe
feed-inof
electricityproduced
byrenew
ableenergy
sources,had
stillnot
evenbeen
tabledby
theE
uropeanC
omm
ission.N
egotiationson
aproposal
forthe
taxationof
energyproducts
appearedto
bedeadlocked
asw
ell.’3In
addition,the
EU
hasbeen
slowto
developpolicies
and
measures
forthe
non-C02
GH
Gs.
Regarding
thefluorinated
gases(H
FC
s,P
FC
s,SF6),
theU
nionhad
notelaborated
astrategy
untilm
id-1999.’4F
urthermore,
internaldivergence
with
respectto
theK
yotoM
echanisms
hasbecom
eincreasingly
obviousas
some
Mem
berS
tatescontinue
toexplore
thefull
potentialof
them
echanisms.
For
example,
theN
ether-lands
areplanning
torealise
50%(com
paredto
abusiness
asusual
scenario)of
theirtarget
underthe
burden-sharingagreem
entof
1999by
drawing
onE
missions
Trading,
JointIm
plementation
(II)and
theC
leanD
evelopment
Mechanism
Close
tieshave
developedbetw
eenthe
EU
andC
entralE
asternE
uropeanC
Effs,
partlyas
aconsequence
ofthe
EU
enlargement
process.T
hisis
expectedto
leadto
theaccession
ofthe
Czech
Republic,
Estonia,
Hungary,
Poland,
andS
loveniaearly
inthe
2y
Stcentury.
More
CE
llsw
illfollow
insubsequent
years.A
spart
ofthe
enlargement
process,the
accessioncountries
will
berequired
toadapt
theirnational
legislationand
administrative
structuresto
theE
Ustandards
andrequirem
ents.A
sa
result,these
countriescan
beex
pec
tedto
largelyfollow
theexam
pleof
theE
Uand
itscurrent
Mem
berS
tates.T
hereis
littledoubt
that,once
theE
Uand
itsM
ember
States
ratifythe
Kyoto
Protocol,
thesecountries
will
followsuit.
The
“Um
brellaG
roup”:
Flig
ht
intothe
Mechanism
s
Inthe
post-Kyoto
period,the
“umbrella
group”has
beenthe
main
counterpartto
theE
Uin
internationalclim
atepolitics.
The
mem
bersof
thegroup
areA
ustralia,C
anada,Iceland,
Japan,N
ewZ
ealand,N
orway,
theR
ussianF
ederation,U
kraine,and
theU
S.T
heum
brellagroup
encompasses
allm
ajorG
HG
emitters
among
theindustrialised
countriesexcept
theE
U.
Itincludes
thetw
oC
Ells
with
thehighest
GH
Gem
issionsand
thegreatest
interestin
trading“hot
air”,i.e.
thesurplus
emission
allowances
thatare
availableas
aresult
ofthe
steepfall
inem
issionsthat
hastaken
placein
thesecountries
since1990
(butw
hichrem
ainedunaccounted
forin
thedeterm
inationof
theK
yoto16
Little
haschanged
inU
Sclim
atepolitics
sinceK
yoto.T
heU
SG
overnment
hascontinued
tom
akethe
“meaningful
participationof
keydeveloping
countries”a
preconditionfor
consideringthe
ratificationof
theK
yotoP
rotocol.F
urthermore,
ithas
worked
forcefullyduring
internationalnegotiations
toprevent
anyquantitative
restrictionson
theuse
ofthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
s.D
omestically,
littleprogress
hasbeen
achieved.T
othe
contrary,the
Senate
Budget
Com
mittee
deletedclim
ate-friendlytax
incentivesand
researchgrants
in199$,
anda
number
ofR
epublicanspledged
toblock
anyadm
inistrationbudgetary
orregulatory
moves
towards
implem
entingthe
US
‘sK
yotoU
SG
HG
emissions
areprojected
toincrease
by23%
from1990
lQvels
by2010.18
The
longerthe
internalU
Sclim
atepolicies
remain
instalem
ateand
thelonger
legislativeaction
ispostponed,
them
oredependent
theU
Sw
illbecom
eon
theK
yotoM
echanisms
forreaching
itstarget
ofm
inus7%
.It
may
alreadybe
toolate
forthe
US
toexecute
itscom
mitm
entby
domestic
actionalone,
althougha
number
ofdevelopm
entspoint
ina
more
positivei’9
Overall,
however,
US
ratificationprospects
arevery
uncertain.
Japan
hasa
strongdiplom
aticinterest
inthe
successof
theK
yotoP
rotocol,since
theagreem
entw
asreached
inK
yoto.R
egardingdom
esticim
plementation,
Japanhas
seriously
1213
investigatedits
optionsfor
reachingthe
Kyoto
targetof
minus
6%and
hasdeveloped
anoverall
strategyfor
meetings
thattarget.
This
strategyaim
s,am
ongother
things,at
astabilisation
ofC
O2
emissions
andincreased
useof
J120and
Em
issionsT
radingto
con
tribute
1.8%tow
ardsits
total6%
GH
Gem
issionreduction
target.2’A
ssuming
thatthe
finaldesign
ofthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
sw
illallow
Japanto
make
useof
JIand
Em
issionsT
rading
tosom
eextent,
Japancan
beexpected
tojoin
theP
rotocolearly
inthe
nextcentury
(ifthe
EU
doesso
asw
ell).
The
prospectsfor
Russian
climate
policyare
most
uncertain,reflecting
itscurrent
econom
icand
politicalsituation.
Since
climate
protectioninterests
arebarely
representedin
Russian
politics,ratification
ofthe
Protocol
will
mainly
dependon
thedesign
ofE
mis
sionsT
rading,since
thisw
illbe
decisivefor
Russia’s
abilityto
sellits
excessem
issionallow
ances(otherw
isereferred
toas
‘hotair).
The
ratificationof
othernon-E
Uindustrialised
OE
CD
countriesis
notas
decisivefor
theentry
intoforce
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol,
sincetheir
shareof
thetotal
Annex
IC
O2
emis
sionsis
relativelysm
all.T
hesm
allerem
itterscould,
however,
tipthe
scalesfor
reachingthe
necessary55%
ofthe
totalA
nnexI
CO
2em
issionsin
1990for
theP
rotocolto
enterinto
force.N
ouniform
development
isvisible
inthat
respect.N
orway
andS
witzerland,
bothhaving
ahistory
ofconstructive
participationin
internationalefforts,
succeededin
reachingtheir
objectivesin
Kyoto
toa
largeextent.
They
may
thusbe
expectedto
become
mem
bersof
theaccord
eventually.O
thers(A
ustralia,C
anada,N
ewZ
ealand)m
ayratify
soas
to“join
theclub”,
butare
likelyto
allowothers
tolaunch
theP
rotocol.O
verall,these
countrieshave
takenlittle
domestic
actionto
revertG
HG
emission
trends.
Developing
Countries:
Wait
andSee
Because
am
inimum
of55
ratificationsare
requiredfor
theP
rotocolto
enterinto
force,developing
countriesm
ustbe
includedin
thegam
e.T
heirinvolvem
entin
severalaspects
isdecisive
forthe
futuresuccess
ofthe
internationalco-operation
requiredby
thefram
ework
ofthe
Protocol.
ththe
shortand
medium
term,
theirconstructive
inputw
illbe
neededto
reachagreem
enton
theK
yotoM
echanisms,
inparticular
Em
issionsT
radingand
theC
DM
.ln
thelong
term,
thedeveloping
countriesw
illthem
selveshave
tolim
itand
reducetheir
own
GH
Gem
issions.
1nthe
post-Kyoto
phase,AO
SIS
hasbeen
tornbetw
eentw
opartially
competing
objectives.O
nthe
onehand,
theyhave
strivento
maxim
isesupport
forthose
countriesw
hichare
particularlyvulnerable
toclim
atechange,
which
couldim
plythe
possibleextensive
useof
theC
DM
.O
nthe
otherhand,
thishas
partiallyconflicted
with
AO
SIS
’intention
toensure
thatindustrialised
countries’obligations
arefulfilled
bytaking
domestic
action.O
verall,A
OS
ISw
illrem
ainthe
moral
conscienceof
theinternational
climate
negotiations.Indeed,
asof
16June
1999,7
AO
SIS
mem
bersw
eream
ongthe
first10
countriesto
haveratified
theP
rotocol.O
therA
OS
ISm
embers
canbe
expectedto
followin
orderto
contributeto
the55
ratificationsneeded
forthe
entryinto
forceof
theP
rotocol.
OP
EC
countriesstill
havethe
potentialand
capabilityto
slowdow
nthe
process,although
theK
yotoprocess
hasshow
nthat
theirinfluence
islim
itedw
henthe
otherbig
playersare
determined
tocontinue.
Ifthe
Kyoto
Protocol
entersinto
force,they
canbe
expectedto
jointhe
club,if
onlyto
beable
toinfluence
thefuture
game.
After
all,these
countrieshad
thepolitical
insightto
joinw
ithall
othercountries
inadopting
theP
rotocol.
Overall,
littleeffort
hasbeen
made
byother
developingcountries
toratify
theP
rotocol.H
owever,
interestto
doso
isexpected
toincrease
onceentry
intoforce
becomes
likely.A
tthis
pointhow
ever,the
0-7
7and
China
havebecom
eincreasingly
dividedinternally.
One
ofthe
most
controversialissues
concernsthe
matter
ofvoluntary
comm
itments
ofdevelop-
ingcountries.
This
issuew
ascatalysed
byA
rgentina’sdeclaration
toannounce
sucha
comm
itment
atthe
fifthC
onferenceof
theP
arties(C
OP
5).T
hisdoes
notnecessarily
mean
thetotal
breakdown
ofG
-77solidarity
(which
hasbeen
declaredm
anytim
esin
thepast).
But
otherlarge
andpow
erfuldeveloping
countries,India
andC
hinain
particular,have
voicedprincipal
concernsabout
theallocation
anddistribution
ofem
issionrights
underthe
Protocol.22
“Grey
”B
usinessN
GO
s:B
eginningto
Rise
tothe
Challenge
At
firstglance,
businesshas
continuedin
thepost-K
yotophase
much
inthe
same
way
asit
haddone
before.In
theU
nitedS
tates,the
“Carbon
Club”
launcheda
campaign
toobstruct
theK
yotoProtocol.23
The
fossilfuel
lobbycontinued
itsw
orkboth
internationallyand
domestically
toprevent
effectiveaction
andratification
ofthe
Protocol.
How
ever,a
num
herof
developments
reinforcethe
expectationthat
thebalance
ofpow
erin
thebusiness
comm
unitym
ayw
ellshift
towards
them
orem
oderateand
progressiveforces.
InA
pril1998,
theoil
giantS
hellfollow
edthe
example
ofB
Pand
severedits
tiesw
iththe
Global
Clim
ateC
oalition.24
Inaddition
totheir
strategicre-positioning
in1997
byinvesting
heavilyin
solarenergy,
Shell
andB
Phave
declaredplans
toreduce
theirow
nG
HG
emissions
by10%
from1990
levelsby
2002(S
hell)and
by2005
(BP).
As
anotherexam
ple,D
uP
ontannounced
ata
conferenceorganised
bythe
Pew
Centre
onG
lobalC
limate
Change
inlate
1999that
itw
ouldreduce
GH
Gem
issionsby
65%from
1990levels
by2010,
would
holdtotal
energyuse
flatand
userenew
ableenergy
sourcesfor
10%of
itsoverall
energyuse.25
Furtherm
ore,a
number
oftransatlantic
mergers
exposedtheir
newU
Sbranches
topressure
fromtheir
more
moderate
European
partners.F
orexam
ple,B
PA
moco,
hassince
adoptedthe
more
progressivestance
ofB
P.26A
tthe
same
time,
theprogressive
lobbygroups
within
busi
ness,like
Cogen,
theB
usinessC
ouncilfor
aS
ustainableE
nergyF
utureand
itsE
uropeancounterpart
(e5),have
sinceconsolidated
andstrengthened
theirow
ninfluence.
“Green
”E
nviro
nm
ental
NG
Os:
InD
ang
erof
Losing
their
Message
Environm
entalN
GO
shave
continuedto
work
onthe
internationalprocess
andthe
do-m
esticim
plementation
inindustrialised
countries.U
Sgroups
inparticular
haveshifted
theirfocus
fromthe
internationalto
thedom
esticlevel,
inlight
ofthe
importance
ofcongressional
supportto
thepotential
ratificationof
theP
rotocol.E
nvironmental
NG
Os,
15
14
co-operatingw
ithinthe
framew
orkof
theC
limate
Action
Netw
ork(C
AN
),have
worked
forearly
ratificationof
theP
rotocoland
anenvironm
entallyeffective
designof
theK
yotoM
echanisms.
How
ever,green
NG
Os
havefaced
two
particularproblem
sin
thepost-K
yotoperiod.
First,
theim
portanceof
climate
changehas
generallydeclined
onthe
politicaland
publicagendas
ofindustrialised
countries.S
econd,N
GO
shave
haddifficulties
conveyingclear
messages
tothe
publicbecause
ofthe
increasingtechnical
complexity
ofthe
issues.W
iththe
adoptionof
theK
yotoP
rotocol,the
environmental
lobbyhas
appearedto
havelost
itsrallying
point,w
hichin
turnhas
reinforcedthese
problems.
2.2T
heP
ost-Kyoto
Intern
ational
Aren
a
Inthe
imm
ediateperiod
following
Kyoto,
exhaustionprevailed
andinternational
climate
policyw
ascharacterised
bya
lowlevel
ofactivity,
thusreflecting
theslow
implem
entationof
domestic-level
obligations.G
overnedby
am
andateadopted
byC
OP
3,and
reinforcedby
CO
P4
inB
uenosA
ires,the
Kyoto
Mechanism
sand
theissue
ofsinks
havesince
be-com
ethe
currentfocus
ofclim
atediplom
acy.F
urthermore,
theparticipation
ofdeveloping
countrieshas
remained
highon
theinternational
agenda.
Focus
onthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
s
The
Kyoto
Mechanism
s(Joint
Implem
entation,C
DM
,E
missions
Trading)
havebeen
theprim
aryfocus
ofattention
inthe
post-Kyoto
process.M
anydesign
featuresw
ereleft
un
resolvedin
theP
rotocol,including
theinstitutional
set-up,m
onitoringand
verification,responses
tonon-com
pliance,eligibility
criteriafor
projectsam
ongothers.27
Inaddition
tothe
many
technicalissues
concerningthe
concreteterm
sof
them
echanisms,
onehighly
politicallycharged
questionthat
remains
relatesto
whether
upperlim
its(“caps”)
shouldbe
seton
theuse
ofthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
sin
orderto
ensurethat
thepurchase
ofem
issionallow
ancesabroad
remains
‘supplementaF’
todom
esticaction.
The
political‘cam
ps’confronting
eachother
onthe
designof
theK
yotoM
echanisms
haverem
ainedvery
much
unchangedsince
Kyoto.
On
theone
hand,the
US
andother
mem
bersof
the‘um
brellagroup”
preferas
littleregulation
aspossible
soas
notto
constrainthe
availabilityof
them
echanisms
and,above
all,E
missions
Trading.
On
theother
hand,the
EU
proposeda
rathercom
plicatedform
ulafor
aquantitative
“ceiling”on
theuse
ofthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
sin
1999.2
8
The
work
programm
eon
theK
yotoM
echanisms,29
which
forms
partof
theB
uenosA
iresP
lanof
Action
adoptedat
CO
P4,
specifiesthat
detailedrules
forall
mechanism
sshould
beadopted
inone
packageat
CO
P6,
scheduledto
takeplace
inlate
2000or
early2001
(probablyin
theN
etherlands).B
yconsolidating
therules
ofall
threeK
yotoM
echanisms,
industrialisedcountries
successfullypressured
developingcountries
toagree
notonly
onthe
rulesof
theC
DM
,for
which
many
hadshow
na
particularinterest,
butalso
onE
mis
sionsT
radingand
JI.T
hereis,
however,
thedanger
thatconcerns
regardingthe
environ-m
entaleffectiveness
ofthe
instruments
will
receiveinadequate
attention.30
Another
potentialthreat
tothe
effectivenessof
theregim
ew
ouldbe
ahasty
expansionof
thesink
categoriesunder
theK
yotoProtocol.3’
After
lengthydiscussions
in1998,
Parties
atC
OP
4linked
boththe
treatment
offorest
sinksand
theinclusion
offurther
categoriesof
sinksto
aspecial
reportby
theW
CC
tobe
adoptedafter
theyear
2000.32A
lthoughthe
issuew
asthus
effectivelypostponed,
theU
Sand
othernon-E
Uindustrialised
countries,tried
topush
thedebate
atthe
politicallevel
duringthe
Subsidiary
Body
meetings
inB
onnin
Junel9
99
.T
hisbehaviour
was
feltto
bequestionable,
sincethe
US
was
ineffect
tryingto
expandsink
categoriesin
advanceof
thepublication
ofthe
WC
Cspecial
report.U
nfortunately,the
EU
seemingly
demonstrated
limited
interestnor
effortin
resistingthese
attempts.
The
Dem
andfo
rE
arlyD
evelopingC
oun
tryP
articipatio
n:
Stifling
Progress
Although
thequestion
ofdeveloping
countryparticipation
inthe
Kyoto
Protocol
isnot
currentlyon
theofficial
agenda,it
hasrem
ainedone
ofthe
most
prominent
issuesthrough-
outthe
post-Kyoto
discussions.34T
herehave
beencontinuing
callsfrom
theU
Sand
othernon-E
Uindustrialised
countriesfor
the“m
eaningfulparticipation”
ofdeveloping
countriesin
combating
climate
change.In
response,C
hinaand
Indiahave
made
theper
capitadistri
butionof
emission
rightsone
oftheir
centraldem
ands.T
heresult
hasbeen
deadlockin
thenegotiations.
The
eventthat
triggeredand
deepenedthe
debateat
CO
P4
inB
uenosA
iresw
asthe
an-nouncem
entby
Argentina’s
President
Menem
thathis
countryw
ouldadopt
avoluntary
quantitativecom
mitm
entby
CO
P5,
coupledw
itha
callfor
equalaccess
toE
missions
Trading.35
To
many
observers,these
typesof
voluntaryem
issionlim
itscould
threatento
furtherdilute
industrialisedcountries’
reductionobligations.
Inparticular,
ahigh
Arg
entinean
voluntarytarget,
basedupon
a(strategically
increased)business-as-usual
energyscenario,
couldintroduce
alarge
quantityof
excessem
issionallow
ancesinto
thetrading
system.
Som
eprogress
inthe
post-Kyoto
phasew
asachieved
with
respectto
thestrengthening
ofthe
provisionsrelated
tothe
transferof
financialresources,
technologyand
know-how
.D
ecisionson
thetransfer
oftechnology36
andthe
financialm
echanism37
were
approvedas
partof
theB
uenosA
iresP
lanof
Action.
The
GE
Fw
asentrusted
with
theoperation
ofthe
financialm
echanism,
which
will
bereview
edevery
fouryears.
The
GE
Fw
illalso
financem
easuresdesigned
toassist
vulnerabledeveloping
countriesin
adaptingto
climate
changeim
pacts,such
asrising
sealevels.
At
thesam
etim
e,com
pensationfor
potentiallynegative
effectsof
climate
protection,such
asa
reduceddem
andfor
fossilfuels
andraw
materials,
will
remain,
asa
resultof
therequest
byO
PE
Cm
embers,
onthe
agendaof
theC
onventionorgans
asw
ell.
Slow
Progress
onO
ther
Issues
The
number
ofother
topicson
theinternational
climate
policyagenda
hascertainly
notdecreased
inthe
post-Kyoto
phase.S
ome
activitiesfrom
thepre-K
yotoperiod
continueto
beaddressed,
suchas
theelaboration
ofa
non-compliance
procedureand
thedevelopm
ent
1617
ofpolicies
andm
easures(P
AM
s)for
them
itigationof
climate
change.38In
addition,cop
4endorsed
thew
orkprogram
me
onm
ethodologies,as
well
asthe
nationalco
mm
un
ications
andem
issioninventories,
which
hadbeen
elaboratedat
thesessions
ofthe
sub
sidiary
bodiesin
thesum
mer
of1998.
These
items
will
befurther
addressedduring
thepreparations
forthe
firstsession
ofthe
Conference
ofthe
Parties
servingas
them
eetingof
theP
arties(C
OP
/MO
P)
tothe
Protocol.
Inanother
field,the
laggardsclearly
gainedsom
epoints.
The
firstreview
ofthe
adequacyof
comm
itments”
ofindustrialised
countriesunder
theF
CC
Cat
CO
P1
inB
erlinresulted
inthe
Berlin
Mandate,
which
inturn
ledto
theK
yotoP
rotocol.In
viewof
theim
portanceof
suchprovisions,
Article
4.2(d)of
theC
onventionhad
mandated
asecond
reviewby
31D
ecember
1998at
thelatest.
This
review,
however,
didnot
takeplace
inB
uenosA
ires,in
partbecause
ofthe
deadlockbetw
eenindustrialised
anddeveloping
countries.O
fparti
cularnote
andconcern
inthis
contextis
thefact
thatthe
Parties
tothe
Convention
ap
parentlydo
notfind
ittroubling
todisregard
concretedeadlines
thatare
setout
inthe
treaty.E
quallyserious
was
theinability
ofthe
Parties
atC
OP
4to
agreeupon
adate
fora
thirdreview
.40
2.3C
onclusion:T
heS
tateof
Clim
ateP
olicyan
dsom
eU
nderlyingF
actors
Developm
entsin
civilsociety
regardingclim
atepolicy
havebeen
characterisedby
contra-dictory
trends.O
nthe
onehand,
theim
portanceof
climate
changehas
diminished
onthe
publicagenda
inm
anyindustrialised
countries,despite
ahigh
levelof
publicaw
areness.O
nthe
otherhand,
businessand
industryhave
increasinglyaccepted
theneed
toact.
How
ever,G
HG
emissions
havecontinued
toincrease
inalm
ostall
countries.
The
internationallandscape
ofclim
atepolitics
hasrem
ainedrelatively
stablein
thepost-
Kyoto
period.T
heB
uenosA
iresP
lanof
Action
setthe
stagefor
thefuture
internationalprocess.
How
ever,the
internationalprocess
haslost
considerablem
omentum
inthe
post-
Kyoto
period,w
ithprogress
havingbeen
seriouslythreatened.
Various
laggardsappear
to
graspevery
opportunityto
undermine
theK
yotoagreem
entand
toretreat
fromtheir
obligations.
Several
underlyingtrends
helpto
explainthis
situation.F
irst,dom
esticim
plementation
of
theP
rotocol,the
keyto
andbasis
forprogressive
positionson
theinternational
level,con-
tinuesto
besuperficial
atbest
(seeC
hapter2.1).
Second,
thedom
esticpolitical
conflictsof
theU
Shave
beenreplicated
atthe
internationallevel,
with
many
problems
createdby
the
US
inits
callfor
the“m
eaningfulparticipation”
ofdeveloping
countries.
Third,
theinstitutional
capacityof
theC
OP
andthe
CO
P/M
OP
ofthe
Protocol
todeal
with
theseproblem
sappears
tobe
woefully
inadequate.T
heC
onventionprocess
stilllacks
formally
agreedvoting
rulesand
thisshortcom
inghas
similarly
affectedthe
Kyoto
Pro-
tocol,threatening
tofurther
stifleprogress.
The
consensusrequirem
entw
illlead
toeven
more
decisionsbased
onthe
lowest
comm
ondenom
inator,since
itenables
individual
countriesand
small
groupsof
countriesrepresenting
specialinterests,
likeO
PE
Cor
Australia,
toexercise
undueinfluence.
Fourth,
thepost-K
yotonegotiations
havebeen
characterisedby
imm
ensecom
plexity.B
y
insistingon
dealingw
ithseveral
Kyoto
Mechanism
sat
once,and
byincluding
GH
Gsinks
inthe
Kyoto
Protocol,
thelaggards
managed
tooverload
theprocess
with
am
ultitudeof
technicalproblem
s.A
sa
result,it
hasbecom
eincreasingly
clearthat
noindividual
can
graspthe
overallpicture
inthe
post-Kyoto
phase.
As
aconsequence,
theN
GO
comm
unitynow
findsitself
caughtup
inthe
complexity
trap.
Not
onlyhave
theybecom
etrapped
inthe
minutiae
oftechnical
details,they
havealso
become
partlydeprived
oftheir
roleas
intermediaries
tothe
media.
Once
theK
yotoP
roto
colhad
beenagreed,
NG
Os
lostthe
centralcom
pellingm
essagethat
hadbeen
usedto
mobilise
publicpressure.
Under
thesecircum
stances,the
prospectsfor
theentry
intoforce
andim
plementation
of
theK
yotoP
rotocolrem
ainuncertain.
thtemational
climate
policyhas
arrivedat
acritical
junctureat
theturn
ofthe
millennium
.A
ftera
decadeof
internationaldiscussions,
thetim
e
isripe
fora
leadershipinitiative
basedon
strongdom
esticim
plementation
ofthe
Kyoto
targets.A
tpresent,
theE
uropeanU
nionis
theonly
industrialisedplayer
who
couldprovide
suchleadership.
3.T
he
Euro
pean
Unio
nM
ust
Lead
onC
limate
Chan
ge
Follow
ingthe
thirdC
onferenceof
theP
arties(C
OP
3)at
Kyoto
inN
ovember
1997,the
Kyoto
Protocol
was
regardedw
ithsom
edegree
ofaw
eand
characterisedas
a“koan”
inthe
Zen
tradition.41S
incethen,
theinternational
processhas
become
entrenchedin
battlesof
retreat,m
ostnotably
asregards
theconcrete
designof
thevarious
flexibilityinstrum
ents,
theso-called
“Kyoto
Mechanism
s”(see
Chapter
2.2).
Tim
e,how
ever,is
runningout
andw
itheach
yearthat
implem
entationof
theK
yototargets
isdelayed,
thepotential
fortheir
fullrealisation
becomes
thatm
uchm
oreunlikely.
Ifthe
entryinto
forceof
theK
yotoP
rotocolis
notachieved
by2003/2004,
thechallenge
ofsa
vingthe
Kyoto
Protocol
fromcom
pletefailure
will
bea
giant’stask,
ifnot
anunattainable
one.42this
case,it
will
beim
possibleto
reachthe
domestic
targetsestablished
bythe
Kyoto
Protocol
(inparticular
forthe
US
andJapan),
inlight
ofthe
considerabletim
eit
takesto
reverseem
issiontrends.
According
toprojections
made
bythe
InternationalE
nergyA
gency,C
O2
emissions
inall
major
industrialisedcountries
will
riseconsiderably
by2010
ifno
additionalm
easuresare
taken.D
rasticpolicy
changesare
thusrequired
soonin
allm
ajorindustrialised
countriesin
orderto
achievethe
Kyoto
targets.If
thesechanges
arenot
realised,the
much-needed
re
orientationof
industrialsocieties
towards
climate-friendly
economies
with
lowfossil
fuel
consumption
will
bedelayed.
Astagnant
climate
policyon
thepart
ofthe
Western
in-
dustrialisedcountries,
behindw
hichm
ostcountries
follow,
would
onlyserve
toreinforce
theconventional
economic
development
pathnow
followed
bythe
developingcountries.
This
inturn,
would
presentconsiderable
impacts
onfuture
globalem
issions.
1819
The
internationalprocess
thuslacks
freshm
omentum
,vision
andleadership
andsuffers
froma
dangerouslevel
ofinertia.
While
them
oreprogressive
industrialisedcountries
(essentiallya
number
ofE
UM
ember
States)
wait
forthe
US
toexercise
itsresponsibility
andjoin
forcesw
iththem
,the
US
andother
laggardcountries
likeA
ustraliaare
strivingto
delayaction
furtherin
orderto
extractm
oreconcessions.
The
longerit
takesto
reachagreem
entand
tostart
action,the
strongerthe
casefor
thelaggard
countriesto
attempt
todilute
existingobligations
onthe
spuriousgrounds
thatexisting
onesare
nolonger
realisticnor
viable.
3.1T
heR
ationale
ofa
Lead
ership
Initiativ
eon
Clim
ateC
han
ge
The
EU
hasrem
ainedcom
mitted
rhetoricallyto
leadershipon
climate
changein
thepost-
Kyoto
phase,but
itsactions
havenot
reflectedits
statedcom
mitm
ents.T
heE
U’s
post-K
yotostrategy
ofattem
ptingto
persuadethe
US
intoan
agreement
atall
costshas
provento
beineffective.
By
contrast,experience
with
otherregim
eshas
shown
thatleadership
canbe
bestm
obilisedthrough
acom
binationof
threecom
ponents.F
irst,the
leaderm
ustm
ake.use
ofgeneral
politicaland
economic
weight.
This
isreferred
toas
structuralleadership.
Second,
leadershipin
internationalnegotiations
requiresthe
skilfulbuilding
ofcoalitions,
otherwise
referredto
asinstrum
entalleadership.
Third,
andperhaps
most
importantly,
credibleleadership
ism
osteffectively
advancedby
demonstrating
solutionsto
others,i.e.
directionalleadership.
Dom
esticaction,
inthe
formof
leadershipby
example,
isa
decisiveelem
entof
thisthird
factor.43
The
emergence
ofthe
Montreal
Protocol
onS
ubstancesthat
Deplete
theO
zoneL
ayerin
them
id-1980sis
aprim
eexam
pleof
strongenvironm
entalleadership
onthe
partof
theU
S(an
unlikelypossibility
inthe
1990s).44S
imilar
leadershipstrategies
provedhighly
suc
cessfulin
thenegotiation
ofthe
Land
Mines
Treaty.
Apioneering
groupassum
ingleader-
shipon
climate
changew
ouldreceive
massive
supportfrom
non-governmental
org
ani
sations,as
couldbe
observedduring
theestablishm
entof
anInternational
Crim
inalC
ourtin
Rom
ein
June1998.
Given
thereluctance
demonstrated
bythe
US
andJapan,
theE
Uis
theonly
candidatethat
might
reasonablybe
expectedto
forgea
Leadership
Initiativeon
climate
change.L
edby
theU
nion,a
coalitioncould
beform
edon
theinternational
level,w
hichactively
andpublicly
pursuesclim
ateprotection.
With
some
potentialfor
success,the
EU
couldaim
atw
inningsupport
ondifferent
issuesfrom
anum
berof
CE
ll’countries,
fromcom
mitted
developingcountries
and,possibly,
fromJapan
asthe
hostof
CO
P3.
Inthis
manner,
thecritical
mass
ofcountries
necessaryto
breathnew
lifeinto
internationalclim
atepolicy
couldbe
achieved.
The
Initiativew
ouldhave
tobe
pursuedw
ithinthe
framew
orkof
theclim
ateregim
e,albeit
independentlyof
thelaggard
states.45A
sstated
before,independent
actionis
requiredat
thispoint,
sincew
aitingfor
thelaggards
would
ultimately
paralysethe
process.A
tthe
same
time,
however,
itis
important
thata
leadershipgroup
remains
firmly
comm
ittedto
theclim
ateregim
e,since
divergencefrom
theexisting
regime
couldseverely
jeopardisethe
climate
processas
such.A
sfragile
asthis
approachm
ayseem
,it
isthe
onlycredible
andviable
way
tosave
theintergovernm
entalnegotiating
processin
theshort
andlong-
term.
The
FC
CC
andthe
Kyoto
Protocol
haveconsiderable
potential,since
theyprovide
much
ofthe
structureneeded
tom
obilisethe
necessaryinternational
co-operation,w
hich
inturn
isneeded
foreffective
climate
protection.T
heclim
ateregim
efurtherm
oreenjoys
wide
publicattention
andapproval.
Weakening
theF
CC
Cand
theK
yotoP
rotocolcould
thusplay
intothe
handsof
thoseinim
icalto
theconcept
ofrestraints
onthe
useof
fossil
fuels.
AL
eadershipInitiative
shouldhelp
givem
omentum
tothe
internationalclim
ateprocess
throughconcurrent
actionon
theinternational
anddom
esticlevels.
Should
itadopt
this
role,E
uropem
ustliberate
itselffrom
theinfluence,
paceand
positionof
theU
S.M
any
considerU
Sparticipation
tobe
vital,a
resultof
fearsconcerning
competitive
economic
disadvantages.Y
et,by
exploitingthe
availablelow
-costpotentials
forreducing
GH
Gem
issionsand
byinvesting
instrong
ecologicalprotection
measures
thatw
illeventually
leadto
economic
benefits,there
ism
uchroom
foracting
without
theU
S(see
Chapter
3.3
below).
Itis
important
torecognise
thatthe
EU
andothers
havebeen
waiting
forthe
US
fornearly
adecade
now.
Rum
ourssuggest
thatC
OP
6m
ightbe
postponeduntil
early2001
inorder
tow
aitfor
theoutcom
eof
thenext
presidentialelections
inthe
US
inN
ovember
2000.C
limate
protectionw
aspostponed
ina
similar
way
bythe
US
presidentialelections
in1992
andin
1996.A
lthoughthe
candidatesupported
byenvironm
entalistsw
onboth
times,
theU
Shas
notaltered
itsposition
much.
The
time
hasdefinitely
come
forthe
EU
to
takethe
lead.
Inm
anyrespects,
theU
nionhas
aconsiderable
potentialfor
forginga
newL
eadershipInitiative.
Itis
without
doubtone
ofthe
most
influentialplayers
ininternational
affairs,clim
atepolicy
inparticular,
andhas
comm
andover
significantpolitical
andeconom
icresources
(structuralleadership).
Itcould
usethese
resourcesto
pressureits
negotiatingpartners
andto
buildeffective
coalitions.M
oreover,its
diversediplom
aticcapabilities
are
enhancedby
thecom
binedexperience
ofthe
Mem
berS
tatesin
foreignrelations
(instru
mental
leadership).T
heU
Kand
France,
butalso
Germ
anyand
otherE
Um
embers,
have
long-establishedclose
relationsw
ithm
anyparts
ofthe
world.46
Ifthese
advantagesw
ereto
becom
bined,the
EU
couldinitiate
astrong
andeffective
leadershipcoalition
onclim
ate
change.A
ndfinally,
boththe
diverseexperiences
with
implem
entationin
theM
ember
States
andthe
existingsystem
forco-ordinating
policieson
theE
uropeanlevel
givethe
Union
exceptionaltools
fortaking
domestic
action,and
thusfor
leadingby
example
and
increasingthe
pressureon
theU
Sand
others(directional
leadership).
The
envisionedL
eadershipInitiative
might
focuson
thefollow
ingcore
elements.
First,
it
shouldaim
forthe
earlyrat/Ication
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol.
This
shouldbe
toppriority.
Second,
theinitiative
shouldintroduce
measures
fordom
esticim
plementation
ofthe
Kyoto
obligationsand
make
aconcurrent
effortto
co-ordinatesuch
measures
internationally.T
hird,since
theinvolvem
entof
developingcountries
inthe
climate
processis
ofutm
ostim
portancefor
them
ediumand
longterm
effectivenessof
climate
protection,special
effortsneed
tobe
undertakento
integratethese
countriesinto
theform
ationof
inter-national
climate
policy.E
achof
theseelem
entsis
exploredin
thefollow
ingsections.
2021
3.2T
heF
irstE
lement
ofa
Lead
ership
Initiativ
e:E
arlyR
atification
Ratification
prospectsand
theentry
intoforce
ofthe
Protocol
arerather
bleakat
thispoint
(seeC
hapter2).
Since
almost
allof
thoseA
OS
IScountries
thatare
Parties
tothe
Co
nv
ention
willjoin,
the55
ratificationsrequired
forentry
intoforce
ofthe
Protocol
will
most
likelybe
met.
Aserious
obstacleis,
however,
presentedby
therequirem
entthat
thera
tifying
Annex
IP
artiesrepresent
atleast
55%of
thetotal
CO
2em
issionsof
1990allocated
toA
nnexI
Parties.
Therefore,
atleast
two
ofthe
threem
ainem
itters(the
US,
EU
andR
ussia)m
ustratify
(seeT
able
Tab
le2:
Em
issionP
ercentagesof
Parties
or
Gro
ups
ofP
arties
Party
IG
rou
pof
%ofA
nnex
Iem
issionsin
1990P
arties
EU
24.2C
EFFs
7.4(w
ithoutR
ussia)R
ussia17.4
JUS
SC
AN
NZ
50.8U
SA
36.1Japan
8.5C
anada3.3
57.5E
U+
Russia
+Japan
+C
EJT
s
Source:
FC
CC
/CP
/1997/7/Add.1,
Annex.
Note
thatsince
Ukraine
hadnot
submitted
afirst
comm
unication,its
emissions
in1990
ofro
ug
hly
5%o
fAn
nex
IP
artiesare
notconsidered
forratification
purposes.
First
andforem
ost,this
requiresan
internalstrategy
fora
synchronisedratification
ofthe
Union
andits
Mem
berS
tates,as
proposedby
theC
omm
issionin
mid-1999.48
To
date,the
EU
andits
Mem
berS
tateshave
donelittle
toaccelerate
ratification.O
fficially,the
EU
maintains
thatit
must
knoww
hatit
will
besubscribing
beforeit
actuallyratifies,
andthereby
continuesto
levelpressure
onthe
US
andthe
“umbrella
group”by
threateningw
ithnon-ratification.49
The
Union
shouldrealise
thattrying
toforce
reluctantparties
with
threatsof
inactionis
anineffective
strategy.T
akingthe
leadby
initiatingratification
would
alsoexpose
thelaggards
tothe
publicat
largeas
thetrue
forcesw
hichare
responsiblefor
preventingthe
Kyoto
Protocol
fromentering
intoforce.
Finally,
strongerE
Uleadership
would
inturn
generatem
uch-neededpressure
onM
ember
States
tofinally
implem
enteffective
policiesand
measures
toreduce
GH
Gem
issionson
thenational
andE
uropeanlevels.
Such
leadershipcould
provethat
effectiveclim
atepolicy
isa
realisablegoal
andthat
theK
yotoP
rotocolis
arobust
andeffective
instrument
forachieving
thatgoal.
Furtherm
ore,E
Uratification
must
beseen
asthe
firststep
ofa
strategyfor
ensuringthe
entryinto
forceof
theK
yotoP
rotocol.B
ecauseof
thefierce
oppositionto
thetreaty
inthe
US
Senate,
entryinto
forcew
illprobably
haveto
beachieved
without
theU
Sand
possiblyC
anada,A
ustraliaor
New
Zealand.5°
Thus,
theU
nionshould
attempt
toinduce
Russia
and
Japan(and
theU
kraine)out
ofthe
“Um
brellaG
roup”and
obtainthe
supportof
otherco
un
triesw
itheconom
iesin
transition.5’In
thecase
ofthose
CE
llcountries
thatare
planningto
accedeto
theE
Uin
them
ediumor
longterm
,joiningforces
with
theE
Uon
climate
changeshould
bean
obviouscom
ponentof
theaccession
process.M
anyof
theaccession
candidateshad
tendedto
alignthem
selvesw
iththe
EU
duringthe
1990s.T
herefore,for-
gingcontinued
andgreater
collaborationon
theclim
ateissue
with
theaccession
countriescould
bean
important
component
ofa
largerstrategy
ofbuilding
strongerE
ast/West
co
operationw
ithinE
urope.A
sregards
Russia,
aP
rotocol-focuseddiplom
aticinitiative
bythe
EU
couldlikew
iseunderlie
alarger
effortaim
edat
improving
co-operationw
iththat
country.
The
roleof
Russia
iscrucial
inthe
effortto
ensurethe
Protocol’sentry
intoforce
(seeT
able2).
Regarding
climate
change,R
ussia’sm
ajorinterest
isto
sellas
much
ofits
hotair
(i.e.its
excessem
issionallow
ances,w
hichresulted
fromthe
transitionprocess)
asp
os
sible.H
owever,
sinceR
ussia’sability
tosell
thishot
airdepends
onthe
entryinto
forceof
theP
rotocoland
ona
tradingsystem
,R
ussiahas
astrong
interestin
anoperational
climate
regime.
While
itw
ouldlike
tohave
theU
Sas
apossible
buyeron
board,it
would
bem
oreprofitable
forR
ussiato
sellat
leastsom
eof
itsem
issionallow
ancesto
interestedE
uropeancountries
(andJapan)
thanto
sellnone
atall,
asw
ouldbe
thecase
shouldthe
Protocol
notenter
intoforce.
Alignm
entw
iththe
US
asa
probableoutsider,
which
might
preventthe
entryinto
force,therefore
entailssom
edegree
ofrisk
forR
ussia.
The
Union
couldexploit
thissituation,
butthis
will
requirea
carefullydesigned
diplomatic
efforttow
ardsR
ussiaand
Japan.T
hiseffort
must
takeinto
accountthe
specialinterests
ofthese
countriesand
thefact
thatpast
conflictsw
erein
factm
ainlyrelated
tothe
designof
theK
yotoM
echanisms.52
Asustained
diplomatic
initiativetow
ardsR
ussiaand
Japanm
ightthus
requirea
more
proactivestance
onthese
Mechanism
s.53Just
asU
SV
iceP
resident
Gore
chargedhis
negotiatingteam
atC
OP
3to
“showincreased
negotiatingflexibility
ifa
comprehensive
plancan
beput
intoplace”,54
EU
negotiatorsshould
besim
ilarlyin-
structed.C
omprom
iseon
allsides
will
benecessary
ifagreem
entis
tobe
reached.
Without
suchan
effort,entry
intoforce
ofthe
Protocol
will
bedelayed
alongw
ithin
creasing
pressureto
widen
the“loopholes”.
Moreover,
itw
illbecom
eincreasingly
difficultfor
many
industrialisedgovernm
entsto
meet
theirtargets
inthe
absenceof
domestic
imple
mentation.
This
isalso
thecase
fora
number
ofE
UM
ember
States,
which
areintending
torely
heavilyon
Em
issionsT
rading,JI
andthe
CD
Mfor
thefulfilm
entof
theirobligations
(seeC
hapter2.1).
As
aresult
ofthis
potentialdiplom
aticinitiative,
itm
ightalso
bepossible
forthe
emerging
leadershipgroup
toagree
upona
feefor
allactivities
underthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
s(p
articularly
onE
missions
Trading),
asis
thecase
forthe
CD
M.
This
would
levelthe
playingfield
between
thedifferent
mechanism
s,thereby
increasingthe
chancesof
obtainingthe
approvalof
many
developingcountries
thatare
interestedin
theC
DM
.It
would
alsoraise
thetransaction
costsof
Em
issionsT
radingand
therebyprovide
domestic
measures
with
acom
parativeadvantage.
And
finally,this
might
providethe
necessaryfinancial
resourcesfor
theestablishm
entof
anadaptation
fundas
partof
thethird
pillarof
theL
eadershipInitiative
(seeC
hapter3.4).
2223
Furtherm
ore,the
Union
shouldcontinue
toinsist
onclear
definitions,strict
monitoring
andreporting
andthe
effectiveenforcem
entof
therules
ofthe
mechanism
s.T
hesem
easuresare
ofprim
eim
portancefor
theenvironm
entaland
economic
effectivenessof
theem
ergingclim
ateregim
e.F
inally,an
inflationaryaddition
ofnew
categoriesof
sinksunder
theP
ro-tocol,
which
areonly
quantifiablein
therarest
ofcases,
might
undermine
thebasis
ofthe
Kyoto
Protocol.
The
Union
would
standto
gainconsiderably,
andw
ouldput
itsopponents
onthe
defensive,if
itinsists
upona
sounddesign
forthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
sand
forthe
ruleson
sinks.A
greement
uponthese
issuescould
pavethe
way
forthe
formation
ofa
strategicalliance
with
Russia
andJapan.
This
inturn,
would
securethe
emission
percen
tagesrequired
toenable
theentry
intoforce
ofthe
Protocol.
Japanhas
aprofound
dip
lom
aticinterest
inthe
successof
theK
yotoP
rotocoland
thisw
illprovide
itw
itha
furtherincentive
tojoin
thisnew
alliance.T
hisalliance
would
endthe
stiflingconfrontation
between
theblocks
(i.e.the
EU
versusthe
Um
brellaG
roup)by
forgingnew
coalitions.It
would
havesubstantial
influencein
theelaboration
ofthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
sand
couldachieve
anearly
entryinto
forceof
theP
rotocolafter
CO
P6,
duringthe
firstyear
ofthe
newcentury.
This
would
increasethe
pressureon
othersto
joinso
asto
beable
toin-
fluencefuture
decisions.It
might
evenfacilitate
theratification
processin
theU
Sas
itw
ouldprove
thatthe
Kyoto
Protocol
is,despite
assertionsto
thecontrary,
alive.In
anyevent,
itw
ouldend
thede-facto
vetopow
erof
theU
Sin
theinternational
processand
itw
oulddem
onstrateagain
thatthe
world
canact
independentlyof
thelast
remaining
superpower,
asit
hasdone
inother
cases.
3.3T
heS
econdE
lement
ofa
Lead
ership
Initiativ
e:M
easuresfo
rD
omestic
Imp
lemen
tation
andth
eirC
o-o
rdin
ation
Dom
esticim
plementation
ispossibly
them
ostfundam
entalbasis
forexercising
leadershipon
climate
change.D
espiteall
itsw
eaknessesduring
thenegotiations
ofthe
Kyoto
Pro-tocol,
EU
leadershipw
asm
ostcredible
when
itstarted
tolay
theground
fordom
esticim
plementation.
How
ever,in
thepost-K
yotophase,
thepace
ofdom
esticim
plementation
hasslow
edconsiderably.
This
isdue
toseveral
factors,including:
lackofpolitical
will;
thefear
ofcom
parativedisadvantages
within
globalm
arkets;serious
resistanceon
thepart
ofsom
eindustrial
sectors;and
anoverall
lackof
publicpressure.
Asecond
pillarof
aL
eadershipInitiative
couldtherefore
bethe
implem
entationof
policiesand
measures
among
alarger
groupof
countriesin
orderto
beginthe
longprocess
ofstm
ctural
decarbonisationof
theeconom
y.E
venbefore
Kyoto,
anum
berof
studieshad
pro
vi
dedevidence
ofthe
vastpotential
oflow
-and
no-costoptions
forreducing
GH
Gem
issionsin
theE
Uand
elsewhere.
This
evidencehas
sincebeen
confirmed
andreinforced
inthe
post-Kyoto
period.A
nanalysis
ofthe
European
Com
mission
in1999
concludedthat
theE
Ucan
indeedachieve
two-thirds
ofits
targetof
minus
8%for
thefirst
comm
itment
pe
nodby
implem
entinglow
-costm
easuresof
upto
5E
uroper
tonneof
CO
2equivalent.55
Another
studyconcluded
thatthe
averagenet
annualsavings
dueto
measures
toreduce
CO
2em
issionsin
theU
Sby
7%below
1990levels
by2010
amount
toU
S$
46billion
orU
S$
393per
household.56
Given
thiscost-saving
potential,it
isvery
clearthat
itis
notthe
economic
costsper
Se,but
ratherthe
politicalopposition,
which
preventsim
plementation
ofthe
Kyoto
targets.W
ithin
thefram
ework
ofan
EU
Leadership
Initiative,such
impedim
entscould
beaddressed
throughthe
exertionof
comm
onpolitical
will
ofthe
EU
Mem
berS
tatesand
otherallies.
Rem
ainingconcerns
aboutcom
petitivenesscould
bem
inimised
throughthe
co-ordination
ofpolicies,
forexam
plew
ithJapan.
The
EU
andits
Mem
berS
tateshave
aw
ealthof
ex
periencein
policyco-ordination
which
theycan
easilyem
ployfor
thispurpose,
inlight
of
thepreparatory
work,
which
hasbeen
doneby
theE
uropeanC
omm
issionand
othersin
pastyears.
Experience
with
therather
unsuccessfulattem
ptsof
theE
Uto
establishbinding
policies
andm
easuresin
theProtocol57
suggeststhat,
first,em
phasisshould
notbe
placedon
bindingm
easuresbut
ona
transparentand
accountableprocess
ofco-ordination.
Second,
dueto
thebenefits
thatcan
beexpected
fromco-ordination,
theL
eadershipInitiative
shouldconcentrate
ona
limited
setof
measures
uponw
hichagreem
entcan
most
likelybe
reached.A
leadershipgroup
ofcom
mitted
countriescould
thusbe
formed
todem
onstratethat
ecologicalprotection
andan
efficientand
strongeconom
yare
notonly
compatible,
but
alsom
utuallyreinforcing
targets.
Fiscal
policyis
oneof
them
ostim
portanttools
ofclim
atepolicy.
Even
minor
taxdifferen
tiationscan
bevery
effective,as
theexperience
with
thephasing
outof
leadedpetrol
inE
uropeshow
s.58A
number
ofcountries
(especiallyin
Europe)
havealready
successfullyim
plemented
energy/carbontaxes
andthere
issufficient
experiencein
successfuldesign
anddevelopm
ent.59T
hiseconom
icinstrum
entdoes
havea
directim
pacton
theco
mpeti
tivesituation
ofvarious
businesses,and
many
ofthe
relevantcountries
havetherefore
grantedtax
exemptions
ofvarious
degreesto
relevantindustries.
Because
ofthis
com
peti
tivenessaspect,
thecase
fora
European
andinternational
co-ordinationof
relatedefforts
is
compelling.
Taxation
ona
globallevel,
however,
appearsto
bepolitically
unfeasible,in
largepart
dueto
fierceU
Sopposition.6°
Japanis
generallym
oresupportive
ofthe
useof
sucheconom
icinstrum
entsand
assuch,
itcould
bean
allyfor
theco-ordinated
national
implem
entationof
carbon/energytaxes.6’
Furtherm
ore,structural
decarbonisationin
thenext
centuryw
illrequire
therapid
develop-
ment
oflow
-or
no-carbonenergy
sources.62A
secondfocus
ofthe
leadershipgroup
could
bedirected
towards
alarge-scale
co-ordinatedeffort
inresearch
anddevelopm
ent(R
&D
)
forrenew
ableenergy
sourcesand
forthe
promotion
ofenergy
efficiency.63T
heco
ord
i
nationof
suchefforts
certainlyhas
asignificant
potentialfor
producingm
uch-neededsynergies.
And
byrelying
partlyon
existinginternational
institutionsand
researchnet-
works,
sucha
co-ordinatedR
&D
strategycould
bringabout
substantialprogress
within
the
next10
years,if
fundedappropriately.
Athird
focusshould
beon
forginginternational
agreement
onguidelines
fordism
antling
climate
adversesubsidies
inorder
tom
obilisenew
resources.N
umerous
studieshave
shown
thatvast
amounts
offinancial
resourcesare
flowing
intocarbon
intensiveand
un
sustainableindustries
andactivities.
For
example,
subsidiesfor
fossilfuels
andnuclear
energyin
OE
CD
countriesam
ountto
some
US
$65
billionannually
(US
$145
billion
2425
world-w
ide).64T
herationale
forsuch
subsidiesis
frequentlythe
protectionof
relevantindustries
frominternational
competition.
Internationallyco-ordinated
actioncould
thushelp
addressthis
concern.S
uchan
initiativecould
belinked
toefforts
within
theW
orldT
radeO
rganization.A
tleast
partof
thosesubsidies
couldthen
bediverted
intoR
&D
andinto
temporary
supportfor
thedevelopm
entand
introductionof
renewable
energysources
intothe
market.
fourth,there
isa
needto
co-ordinateefforts
tostrengthen
theenergy
efficiencystandards
existingin
allm
ajorindustrialised
countries.Im
provingthe
efficiencyof
energyuse
isnot
onlyof
major
strategicim
portancefor
asignificant
reductionof
globalG
HG
emissions.
Co-ordination
ofefficiency
standards(for
householdappliances,
etc.)should
alsobe
ofinterest
tom
ostindustrialised
countriessince
itw
ouldultim
atelyfacilitate
internationaltrade
byrem
ovingor
avoidingpotential
tradebarriers
(e.g.w
hereefficiency
requirements
area
preconditionfor
entryinto
foreignm
arkets).F
inally,reaching
agreement
onclim
ate-friendly
publicprocurem
entand
emission
reductionm
easuresfor
thepublic
sector65should
bepolitically
feasibleas
well.
The
publicsector
accountsfor
alarge
shareof
do-m
esticdem
andand
canthus
exerciseform
idableinfluence
onthe
market.66
These
proposedE
UL
eadershipInitiative
activitiesdirected
towards
theco-ordination
ofdom
esticm
easurescould
bothdecisively
assistthe
mem
bersin
implem
entingtheir
ob
ligations
underthe
Kyoto
Protocol
andcould
catalyseof
publicaw
arenessand
education.It
shouldbe
complem
entedby
strongpublic
statements
forratification
andim
plementation
bythe
groupof
Parties.
Such
astrategy
was
highlysuccessful
inthe
ozonenegotiations,
where
variousleading
countries,in
theabsence
ofa
consensualagreem
enton
furtherm
easures,
annexedresolutions
anddeclarations
ofsupport
tothe
reportson
theM
eetingsof
theP
arties.It
isinteresting
tonote
thatthe
majority
ofthese
demands
were
actuallym
etin
thenext
roundof
negotiations.67
There
arenum
erousadvantages
toproceeding
ina
co-ordinatedm
annerin
theafo
rem
entionedareas.
Inaddition,
andirrespective
ofbroader
internationalco-ordination,
thereis
ample
roomfor
unilateralaction
toim
plement
theK
yotocom
mitm
entsboth
within
theE
Uand
elsewhere.
Such
unilateralefforts
will
beessential
forensuring
thesuccessful
implem
entationof
theP
rotocoland
forthe
mobilising
ofleadership
onclim
atechange.
3.4T
heT
hird
Elem
entof
aL
eadersh
ipIn
itiative:
En
han
cedInvolvem
entof
Developing
Countries
For
along
time,
indeedsince
thehistorical
alliancethat
was
forgedbetw
eenthe
EU
andm
anydeveloping
countriesat
CO
P1
inB
erlin,68the
EU
hasneglected
itstraditionally
closerelations
with
thesecountries.
Increasedparticipation
ofdeveloping
countriesin
theclim
ateregim
eshould
thereforebe
athird
goalof
theL
eadershipInitiative.
Although
thedem
andof
theU
Sfor
“meaningful
participation”is
inappropriateat
thispoint
andcould
well
undermine
thepresent
stageof
development
ofthe
internationalclim
ateregim
e,there
canbe
nodoubt
thatthe
longterm
sustainabilityof
ourplanet
will
requirethe
substantialinvolvem
entof
thosecountries
inthe
not-too-distantfuture.69
Because
theforceful
demands
ofthe
US
andothers
beforeand
afterK
yotohave
increasedthe
sensitivityof
developingcountries,
anysuch
diplomatic
effortm
ust beconducted
with
greatcare
ifit
isto
succeed.
The
needsand
interestsof
developingcountries
must
beaddressed
first.A
primary
interestof
many
developingcountries
liesw
ithadaptation,
sincethey
areparticularly
vulnerableto
changesin
theglobal
andregional
climate.
For
thisreason,
anadaptation
component
was
includedas
partof
theC
leanD
evelopment
Fund
proposedby
Brazil
inthe
mn-up
toK
yoto.7°A
fterK
yoto,the
participantsat
theA
fricanM
inisterialC
onferenceon
Environ-
ment
(AM
CE
N)
inO
ctober1998
recomm
endedthe
establishment
ofan
“adaptationfund”
anda
“seedfund’.7’
At
present,lim
itedfunds
areavailable
throughthe
GE
Ffor
adap
tation.
Article
12.8of
theK
yotoP
rotocolfurtherm
orerequires
that“a
shareof
theproceeds”
fromC
DM
activitiesis
tobe
usedto
assistdeveloping
countriesto
meet
thecosts
ofad
aptation.
How
ever,these
resourcesare
ratherlim
ited,and
will
continueto
beso
evenafter
theC
DM
becomes
operational.72
Afirst
emphasis
ofthe
Leadership
Initiativem
ighttherefore
beon
theelaboration
andim
plementation
ofan
adaptationstrategy
ledby
theE
Uand
some
keydeveloping
coun
tries.T
hisshould
includeboth
thefinancing
ofstudies
relatedto
impacts
andadaptation
andthe
mobilising
ofadditional
resourcesfor
adaptation,e.g.
throughthe
establishment
ofan
adaptationfund.73
The
resourcesneeded
tofinance
anadaptation
strategycould
begenerated
bya
fee(sim
ilarto
theone
alreadyapplicable
underthe
CD
M)
onactivities
underall
threem
echanisms
(seeabove),
which
couldbe
used,at
leastpartly,
forsuch
afund.
As
abeneficial
side-effectof
thisinitiative,
thetrue
costsof
adaptingto
climate
changecould
well
become
visible.A
ndthis
inturn
would
putcost
estimates
form
itigatingclim
atechange
intoperspective.
Such
aninitiative
onadaptation
would
generatem
uchsupport
within
andoutside
ofthe
climate
regime.
Itw
oulddem
onstratethat
thespecial
situationof
developingcountries
isbeing
takeninto
account,w
ithoutraising
fearsof
ahidden
agenda.A
ndit
would
freeA
OS
IScountries
fromtheir
dilemm
aas
regardsthe
CD
M(see
Chapter
2.1).
Asecond
short-termcom
ponentof
theL
eadershipInitiative
couldconsist
ofa
diplomatic
collaborativeeffort
todesign
theC
DM
inan
environmentally
effectiveand
economically
efficientm
anner.T
heissues
tobe
addressedinclude
theproper
functioningof
thisin
stmm
ent,for
example
throughthe
definitionof
verifiableand
strictbaselines,
comparable
methodologies
forverification
etc.,but
alsothose
thatare
primarily
emphasised
bydev
eloping
countries,such
asthe
“financialadditionality”
with
regardto
othersources
offunding
(Official
Developm
entA
ssistance)and
theintegration
ofsustainable
development
objec
tives.74A
trulycollaborative
effortto
designthe
CD
Min
am
utuallybeneficial
manner
couldserve
asa
confidence-buildingexercise.
Third,
theL
eadershipInitiative
couldbegin
adialogue
with
developingcountries
onthe
fairand
equitableallocation
of“em
issionrights”.
The
allocationof
“assignedam
ountsof
emissions”
onthe
basisof
1990em
issions(“grandfathering”)
inthe
Kyoto
Protocol
was
perceivedby
many
tobe
inequitable.A
number
ofalternative
proposalshave
beenm
ade
2627
forthe
distributionof
emission
rights,including
thepre-K
yotoB
razilianproposal
toallo
cateem
issionrights
onthe
basisof
historicem
issions(
i.e.“effective
emissions”).
The
most
prominent
proposalis
theone
which
aims
atconvergence
towards
equalper-capita
emissions,
asadvocated
byIndia
atC
OP
1in
Berlin.
Others
haveproposed
totake
GD
Pper
capitaand
otherfactors
intoaccount
toallocate
emissions
allowances.75
This
isan
extremely
sensitiveissue.
Em
phasisshould
thereforebe
placedon
buildingconfidence
andcom
mon
understandingthrough
adiscussion
processseparate
andapart
fromthe
officialnegotiations.
Such
adiscrete
processm
ightalso
remove
some
tensionfrom
theinternational
negotiatingprocess
ifthe
EU
(andits
allies)carefully
avoidplacing
pressureon
theirpartners.76
Apart
fromaddressing
thedifficult
issueof
allocationof
emission
allowances
between
industrialisedand
developingcountries,
thesediscussions
might
alsopave
thew
ayfor
am
oreconstructive
approachtow
ardsdifferentiation
between
developingcountries.
The
problemis
partlyrooted
inthe
binaryclassification
ofP
artiesas
Annex
I/non-Annex
Icountries
inthe
Convention.
Annex
Bof
theK
yotoP
rotocolperpetuates
thisartificial
division.T
hedividing
linein
economic
andecological
terms,
incontrast,
runsthrough
thesecategories.
Som
eof
thosecountries
labelledas
developingcountries
arem
oreafflu
entthan
theircounterparts.
For
example,
theG
DP
percapita
ofS
ingapore,S
outhK
orea77and
Israelis
equalor
higherthan
thatof
some
mem
bersof
theE
uropeanU
nion,such
asG
reece,S
painand
Portugal.78
Aprocess
fordifferentiating
comm
itments
fordeveloping
countriesappears
thereforeto
bea
reasonablegoal.
The
Kyoto
Protocol
itselfrecognises
theneed
fordifferentiation
throughthe
specifictargets
listedin
Annex
Band
throughthe
join
tfulfilm
ent”m
echanismunder
Article
4,w
hichallow
sthe
EU
Mem
berS
tatesto
reachtheir
reductiontarget
byw
ayof
internalburden-sharing.
During
the1990s,
anum
berof
countriessought
toestablish
dif
ferentiatedtargets
basedon
avariety
ofpossible
criteria.79A
considerablenum
berof
Latin
Am
ericanand
AO
SIS
countriesare
amenable
tosom
eform
ofspecific
comm
itments
fordeveloping
countries.80
The
failureof
industrialisedcountries
torespond
adequatelyto
thechallenge
ofclim
atechange
sofar
hasnot
enhancedthe
willingness
ofdeveloping
countriesto
contributeto
mitigation
effortsin
thenear
future.8’N
evertheless,m
ajordeveloping
countrieshave
effectivelyde-coupled
economic
growth
andem
issionsof
GH
Gs
toa
largerextent
thanm
anyindustrialised
countries.82U
nderthese
circumstances,
athoughtfully
developedeffort
isneeded
tocom
mence
theprocess
forinvolving
developingcountries
ina
fairand
equitablem
anner.
4.C
onclusion
After
adecade
oftalk,
itis
imperative
thatthe
internationalcom
munity
entersthe
newm
illenniumw
ithrenew
edm
omentum
andcom
mitm
entto
driveinternational
climate
policytow
ardsaction
toreduce
GH
Gem
issions.T
heE
Uis
theonly
industrialisedplayer
insight
with
theability
toundertake
aL
eadershipInitiative
aimed
at( 1)ratifying
theK
y-oto
Protocol
andbringing
itinto
force,(2)
initiatingbroad
domestic
implem
entationof
theK
yototargets
andinternational
co-ordinationof
measures
inthat
respectand
(3)starting
aninternational
processof
discussionw
iththe
longterm
goalof
involvingdeveloping
countriesm
oreclosely
andm
oreequitably
inthe
internationalefforts.
Ifthe
envisionedL
eadershipInitiative
canbe
establishedsuccessfully,
itw
illopen
upa
vastarray
offuture
opportunities.It
will
re-invigoratethe
Kyoto
Protocol
andw
illprovide
furtherincentives
togovernm
entsw
orld-wide
toim
plement
effectivepolicies
andm
easures
tom
itigateclim
atechange.
Itw
illalso
setinto
motion
aprocess
ofm
uch-neededpublic
awareness
raisingto
demonstrate
thatoverall
well-being
canindeed
beim
provedw
ithoutburning
everincreasing
amounts
offossil
fuels.T
hiscould
decisivelyfacilitate
thenext
stepsof
theinternational
process.In
thisrespect,
quantifiedtargets
forindustrialised
countriesfor
thesecond
comm
itment
periodfrom
2013—2017
will
beon
theinternational
agendain
them
iddleof
thenext
decade.A
substantialstrengthening
ofexisting
comm
it-m
entsw
illbe
requiredin
orderto
directindustrialised
countriestow
ardsthe
longterm
goalof
anem
issionreduction
inthe
orderof
80%.
Ifan
equitableschem
ecan
bedevised,
comm
itments
bythe
biggestem
ittersam
ongstdeveloping
countriescould
alsobecom
ea
realityin
thesecond
decadeof
the21st
century.A
fternearly
10years
ofdevelopm
entof
theclim
ateregim
e,the
Leadership
Initiativew
ouldthus
providethe
opportunityfor
dynamic
progresstow
ardsprotecting
theE
arth’sclim
atefor
thebenefit
ofhum
ankind.
2829
The
Auth
ors
Literatu
re
Dr.
Herm
ann
E.
Ott
was
trainedas
aprofessional
lawyer
andpolitical
scientistin
Munich,
London
andB
erlin.A
sA
ctingH
eadof
theC
limate
Policy
Division
ofthe
Wuppertal
Institute,he
works
extensivelyon
thelegal,
politicaland
economic
aspectsof
climate
changeas
well
ason
otherfields
ofenvironm
entalprotection.
E-M
ail:herm
ann.ott@w
upperinst.org
The
Wuppertal Institutefor
Clim
ate,E
nvironment and
Energy
was
establishedw
iththe
aimof
systematically
addressingboth
theglobal
environmental
challengesand
thecom
plextask
ofecological
structuralchange.
Itw
orkstow
ardsovercom
ingw
hatare
oftenperceived
asthe
conflictingdem
andsof
economy
andecology.
Increasedprosperity
with
areduction
inconsum
ptionof
naturalresources
isthe
paradigmfor
eco-efficientinnovation
andfor
anew
generationof
technology.T
ohelp
achievethose
aims,
theW
uppertalInstitute
draws
upconcrete
conceptsin
almost
allfields
ofthe
environment
andprovides
tangiblevisions
fornew
models
ofprosperity.
Dr.
Sebastian
Ob
erthü
rw
astrained
asa
politicalscientist
inM
arburgand
Berlin.
He
isa
Senior
Fellow
atE
cologic,bstitu
tefor
Internationaland
European
Environm
entalP
olicy.H
isw
orkfocuses
onissues
ofinternational
environmental
andclim
atepolicy
with
specialem
phasison
internationalenvironm
entalagreem
entsand
institutions.E
-Mail:
Ecologic
isa
not-for-profitinstitution
forapplied
environmental
researchand
policyconsultancy,
seatedin
Berlin.
Itsparticular
areasof
expertiseinclude
newapproaches
inenvironm
entalpolicy,
ecologicallysustainable
resourcepolicy,
internationalenviron-
mental
agreements
andinstitutions,
environmental
planningand
theintegration
ofenvironm
entalconcerns
intoother
policyrealm
s.E
cologic’sw
orkfocuses
inparticular
onanalyzing
theenvironm
entalpolicy
ofthe
European
Union
andits
mem
berstates
andenhancing
theeffectiveness
ofinternational
environmental
regimes.
Literatu
reS
ebastianO
berthürand
Herm
annE
.O
tt:T
heK
yotoP
rotocol,International
Clim
ateP
olicyfor
the21st
Century.
1999.X
X,
359pp.
14figs.,
15tabs.,
3-540-66470-X,
DM
9$,-(R
ecomm
endedR
etailP
rice)
Bail,
Ch
ristop
h1998:
Das
Klim
aschutzregime
nachK
yoto.E
uropäischeZ
eitschrzfl für
Wirtschaflsrecht,
Vol.
9,N
o.15,
457—464.
Bau
mert,
Kevin
A.,
Ruch
iB
liand
arian
dN
ancyK
ete1999:
Whatm
ightaD
evelopingC
ountryC
limate
Com
mitm
ent Look
Like?
Washington,
D.C
. : World
Resources
Institute.B
enedick,R
ichard
Elliot
1998a:O
zoneD
iplomacy.
New
Directions
inS
afeguardingthe
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Second
edition,C
ambridge
(Massachusetts):
Harvard
University
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Bernow
,S.,
K.
Cory,
W.
Dougherty,
M.
Du
ckw
orth
,S.
Karth
aan
dM
.R
uth
1999:A
merica’c
Global
Warm
ingSolutions.
Washington,
D.C
.:W
WF
/Energy
Foundation.
Breidenich,
Clare,
Daniel
Mag
raw,
Anne
Row
leyand
James
W.
Rub
in1998:
TheK
yotoP
rotocolofthe
United
Nations
framew
orkC
onventionon
Clim
ateC
hange.A
merican
JournalofIntem
ationalL
aw,
1998,3
15-331.C
entre
for
Science
andE
nviro
nm
ent
1998:The
Kyoto
Protocol.W
hat itsays?N
ewD
elhi(India):
CS
E.
Coenen,
Rein
hard
andG
erhard
Sard
eman
n199$:
Das
Kyoto-Protokoll zum
Schutzdes
Klim
as—
Erfolg
oderM
ijierfoig?K
arlsmhe:
Forschungszentrum
Karisruhe/ifA
S.C
ooper,R
ichard
N.
1998:T
oward
aR
ealG
lobalW
arming
Treaty.
Foreign
Affairs,
Vol.
77,N
o.2,
66—79.
Davies,
Peter
G.G
.199$:
Global
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ingand
theK
yotoP
rotocol.T
heInternational
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omparative
Law
Quarterly,
Vol.
47,A
pril1998,
446-461.
EIA
1999:International E
nergyO
utlook.W
ashington,D
.C. : E
nergyInform
ationA
dm
inistration.E
uro
pean
Com
mission
199$b:C
limate
Change
—T
owards
anE
UP
ost-Kyoto
Strategy.C
omm
issionC
omm
unicationto
theC
ouncilandthe
European
Parliam
ent(C
OM
(9$)353final),
Brussels.
Euro
pean
Com
mission
1999:P
reparingforIm
plementation
oftheK
yotoProtocol.
Com
mission
Com
munication
tothe
Council and
theP
arliament
(CO
M(99)230
final),B
russels.F
eenstra,
J.,I.
Burto
n,
J.S
mith
and
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Tol
(eds.)1998:
Handbook
onM
ethodsfor
Clim
ateC
hangeIm
pact Assessm
entandA
daptationStrategies.
version2.0.,
Nairobi!
Am
sterdam:
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EP
NriJe
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Fisch
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Weltalm
anach1999.
Frankfurt
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ain:F
ischer.F
lavin,C
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ph
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inB
uenosA
ires.W
orldW
atch,N
ovember!
Decem
ber199$,
11—18.
friend
sof
theE
arthIn
ternatio
nal
199$:C
arbonJustice!
Developing
anE
quitableG
lobal Solutionto
StabilizeG
reenhouseG
asC
oncentrationsat
aSafe
Level
inA
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dancew
iththe
Clim
ateC
onvention(C
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1998).A
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:O
ptionsforthe
European
Union.
Dordrecht:
Kiuw
er(forthcom
ing).lE
A(In
ternatio
nal
Energy
Agency)
199$:W
orldE
nergyO
utlook1998
Edition.
Paris:
IEA
/OE
CD
.IN
FR
AS
AG
/TE
ffi1997:
Long
termcarbon
emission
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ingtow
ardsconvergence.
New
Delhi.
3031
Notes
IThis
paperis
theresult
ofm
anyyears
ofparticipation
inthe
internationalclim
atenegotiations
bythe
two
authors.It
isfurtherm
orethe
quintessenceof
abook,
publishedin
earlyO
ctober1999,
onthe
historyand
contentof
theK
yotoP
rotocol;see
Oberthür/O
tt1999.
2F
oran
assessment
ofth
eP
rotocolsee
OberthU
r/Ott
1999;G
rubbet
al.1999;
Centre
forS
cienceand
Environm
ent1998;
Yam
in1998;
Ott
1998;S
meloff
1998;C
oenenlSardem
ann1998;
Bail
199$;S
imonis
1998;B
reidenichet
al.1998;
MU
ller-Kraenner
1998;D
avies1998.
3F
ora
detailedaccount
seeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
115et
seq.and
Grubb
etal.
1999,pp.
115et
seq.4
According
toprojections
ofthe
InternationalE
nergyA
gency,em
issionsof
CO
2from
thecom
bustionof
fossilfuels
will,
undera
business-as-usualscenario,
riseby
32%relative
to1990
until2010,
forO
EC
DE
uropethe
figureis
slightlylow
er,see
lEA
1998.5
This
problematique
isdiscussed
inm
oredetail
inO
berthür/Ott
1999and
Grubb
etal.
1999.6
Seein
more
detailO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
287et
seq.7
Seealso
European
Com
mission
1998b.A
sa
firstpositive
result,the
EU
andseveral
CE
ITs
(asw
ellas
Sw
itzerland)have
presenteda
number
ofcom
mon
positionson
relevanttopics
inthe
post-Kyoto
process;see
e.g.F
CC
C/C
P/1
9981M1SC
.7;F
CC
C/S
B/l998/M
ISC
.1/Add.3IR
ev.1and
Add.6.
8See
Oberthür/O
tt1999,
pp.147
etseq.
9See
therem
inderin
European
Com
mission
1999,p.
11.10
SeeW
WF
1998.II
EW
WE
,V
ol.7,
No.
15,7
August
1998,pp.
35.2
SeeE
uropeanC
omm
ission1999,
p.3.
‘3E
ND
SD
aily,26
May
1999.14
SeeE
uropeanC
omm
ission1999.
‘5E
ND
SD
aily,23
June1999;
seealso
thew
ebsiteof
theD
utchE
nvironment
Ministry
(VR
OM
)at
<http://w
ww
.minvrom
.nl/milieulbroeikaseffecU
f.htm?41901
.htm>
asof
24June
1999.16
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
197et
seq.17
“Global-W
arming
Debate
Gets
No
Consensus
inIndustry”,
Wall
Street
Journal,16
April
1998.g
FC
CC
/CP
R998/1
l/Add.l.
‘9First,
ithas
become
increasinglyevident
thatthe
climate
skepticsrepresent
aninfinitely
small
minority
among
scientiststhe
influenceof
which
isset
todecline.
Second,
growing
sectorsof
thebusiness
comm
unityappear
toaccept
theneed
foraction,
atrend
thatm
ightbe
reinforcedby
theentry
intoforce
ofthe
Protocol
(seeS
meloff
1998,p.
67).F
urthermore,
President
Clinton
hasordered
allfederal
government
agenciesto
improve
energyefficiency
ingovernm
entbuildings
by35%
from1985
levelsand
toreduce
GH
Gem
issionsfrom
energyuse
ingovernm
entbuildings
to30%
below1990
levelsby
theyear
2010(G
lobalE
nvironmental
Change
Report,
Vol.
XI,
No.
11,11
June1999,
p.3).
As
regardsratification
prospects,the
presidentialand
congressionalelections
inN
ovember
2000m
ayprovide
anopportunity
forchanging
theinternal
balancein
favourof
climate
policies.A
stypical
ofU
Spolitics,
publicopinion
will
havea
decisivesay
inthe
end.20
Already
in199$,
itstarted
exploringpossibilities
forii
projectsin
Russia;
see“Japan
andR
ussiaC
oncludeL
andmark
Greenhouse
Gas
Sw
ap”,R
eutersN
ews
Service,
19A
pril1998.
21Japan
haspassed
some
legislationto
thisend,
includinga
lawfor
theprom
otionof
measures
toprevent
globalw
arming
(October
1998),and
plansto
expandthe
useof
nuclearpow
ergreatly
inorder
toachieve
itstarget;
see“A
nalyseson
Japan’sP
ost-Kyoto
Policy
Measures
toA
chievethe
Kyoto
Target”,
31
May
1999,B
onn(on
filew
ithauthors);
seealso
“Law
Concerning
theP
romotion
ofM
easuresto
Cope
with
Global
Warm
ing”,in:
JapanE
nvironment
Quarterly,
Vol.
3,N
o.4,
Decem
ber1998.
22See
Oberthür/O
tt1999,
pp.233
etseq.
23“Industrial
Group
Plans
toB
attleC
limate
Treaty”,
The
New
York
Tim
es,26
April
1998.24
SeeD
owJones
New
swires,
21A
pril1998,
“Shelloil
withdraw
sfrom
powerful
U.S.
energylobby
group”;G
reenpeaceP
ressR
elease,“Shell
pullsout
ofU
.S.
Anti-C
limate
lobbygroup”,
21A
pril1998,
availableat
<http://w
ww
.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/1998apr21
.html>
.25
Washington
Post,
14S
eptember
1999.26
“BP
Clashes
with
Esso
overA
ctionon
Global
Warm
ing”,T
heG
uardian,15
April
1999.27
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,C
h.13-15.
28F
orthe
EU
capproposal
seeC
ouncilC
onclusionson
aC
omm
unityS
trategyon
Clim
ateC
hange,E
UD
oc.8346/99,
18M
ay1999.
How
ever,the
EU
hasbecom
eincreasingly
dividedinternally
onthese
issues.29
SeeD
ecision7/C
P.4
inF
CC
C/C
P/1998/16/A
dd.1.30
Cf.
Grubb
etal.
1999.31
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
130et
seq.32
Decision
9/CP
.4in
FC
CC
/CP
/1998/1
6/Add.I.
33O
nthese
meetings
seeE
arthN
egotiationsB
ulletin,V
ol.12,
No.
I10,14
June1999.
34T
heissue
attainedutm
ostprom
inencein
thecorridors
andbackroom
sof
CO
P4
inB
uenosA
iresand
was
partlyresponsible
forthe
sluggishprogress
atthe
conference.
Jacob
y,
Hen
ryD
.,R
onaldG
.P
nn
nan
dR
ichard
Schm
alensee1998:
Kyoto’s
Un-
finishedB
usiness.F
oreignA
ffairs,V
ol.77,
No.
4,54—
66.K
inzig,A
nnP
.and
Daniel
M.
Kam
men
199$:N
ationalT
rajectoriesof
Carbon
Em
issions:A
nalysisof
Proposals
tofo
sterthe
Transition
toL
ow-carbon
Eonom
ies.G
lobalEnvironm
entalC
hange,V
ol.8,
No.
3,183—
208.K
oplow,
Douglas
andA
aron
Martin
1998:F
uelingG
lobalW
arming.
FederalSubsidies
toO
ilin
theU
nitedS
tates(a
reportfor
Greenpeace).
Loske,
Rein
hard
1996:K
limapolitik.
ImS
pannungsfeldvon
Kurzzeitinteressen
undL
angzeiterfordernissen.M
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eyers,N
.an
dJ.
Ken
t1998:
Perverse
Subsidies:
Tax
$sU
ndercuttingO
urE
conomies
andE
nvironment
Alike.
Winnipeg:
IISD.
Moor,
An
dré
deand
Peter
Calam
i1997:
SubsidizingU
nsustainableD
evelopment.
Underm
iningthe
Earth
with
Public
Funds
(comm
issionedby
theE
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urU
msetzung
undW
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Oberth
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ann
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Ott
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InternationalC
limate
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Berlin:
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Oberth
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tt1995:
UN
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onC
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The
First
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Environm
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dL
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OE
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theE
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Exploring
theL
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EC
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mw
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imV
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Eine
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überneue
Form
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institutionalisierterK
ooperationam
Beispielder
Vertrage
zumS
chutzder
Ozonschicht
undzur
Kontrolle
grenzuberschreitenderA
bfallverringerung.B
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Nom
os.R
eid,W
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JoséG
old
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reD
evelopingC
ountriesA
lreadyD
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Much
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lowC
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ateN
otes,July
1997.W
ashington,D
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orldR
esourcesInstitute.
Reid,
Walter
V.
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Gold
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1998:D
evelopingC
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Com
batingC
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Energy
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237.S
chlegelmilch,
Kai
1999:G
reenB
udgetReform
inE
urope—
Countries
atthe
forefront,B
erlin:S
pringer.S
chneider,S
tephenS.
1998:K
yotoP
rotocol:T
heU
nfinishedA
genda.C
limatic
Change,
No.
39(1998),
1—21.
Sm
eloff,E
dw
ardA
.199$:
Global
Warm
ing:T
heK
yotoP
rotocoland
Beyond.
Environ-
mentalPolicy
andLaw
,V
ol.28,
No.
2,63—
68.S
mith,
JoelS.,
Megan
M.
Law
sonan
dS
tephanieS.
Len
hart
1999:C
ompendium
of
Decision
Tools
toE
valuateS
trategiesforAdaptation
toC
limate
Change.
Bonn:
UN
FC
CC
Secretariat/S
tratusC
onsulting.W
WF
199$:A
Review
oftheS
tageoflm
plementation
ofE
uro
pean
Union
Policies
andM
easuresforC
O2
Em
issionR
eduction(edited
byD
ianP
hylipsen,K
omelis
Blok
andC
hrisH
endriks).U
trecht(N
etherlands):W
WF
.Y
amin,
Farh
ana
1998:T
heK
yotoP
rotocol:O
rigins,A
ssessment
andF
utureC
hallenges.R
eviewofE
uropeanC
omm
unity&
mt.E
nvironmental
Law
,V
ol.7,
No.
2,113—
127.
3233
35See
Annex
Iof
FC
CC
/CP
/1998/16.36
Decision
4/CP
.4in
FC
CC
/CP
/1998/16/Add.1.
37D
ecisions2
and3IC
P.4in
fCC
C/C
P/1998/16/A
dd.1.38
Regarding
theform
er,C
OP
4established
ajoin
tw
orkinggroup
oncom
pliance,w
hichis
toreport
toC
OP
5.T
hism
ightresult
inthe
elaborationof
anon-com
plianceprocedure
byC
OP
6.W
ithrespect
toP
AM
s,P
artiesat
CO
P4
mandated
theS
ecretariatto
reporton
relevant“best
practices”in
late1999
andto
organisea
workshop
onthe
matter
in2000.
39D
ecision8/C
P.4
inF
CC
C/C
P/1998/16/A
dd.l;on
thelatter
aspectsee
alsoF
CC
C/S
BS
TA
/1998/9and
FC
CC
/SB
I/l 998/7.40
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
253et
seq.41
Earth
Negotiations
Bulletin,
Vol.
12,N
o.76,
13D
ecember
1997,p.
14.42
Seealso
Grubb
etal.
1999,pp.
253et
seq.43
SeeG
uptalGrubb
1999.44
Benedick
1998a;F
lavin1998.
45T
hisis
differentfrom
theapproach
proposedby
Christopher
Flavin,
who
suggeststhe
formation
ofa
leadershipgroup
ofcom
mitted
countriesoutside
ofthe
climate
regime, joined
byregional
governments,
citiesand
companies;
seeflav
in1998.
46See
European
Com
mission
1998b.47
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
261et
seq.48
SeeE
uropeanC
omm
ission1999,
p.11.49
Furtherm
ore,the
Union
appearsto
bespeculating
internallyon
theaccession
ofthe
firstE
asternE
uropeancountries.
Ifthis
happensprior
toratification,
thisw
ouldenable
theE
Uto
incorporatesom
eof
the‘hot
air’available
fromthese
countriesinto
itsbubble
agreement.
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
141et
seq.50
Although
itshould
benoted
thatA
ustraliabecause
ofits
growth
targetprobably
hasa
stronginterest
to:O
flthe
Protocol
andsell
itsexcess
emission
allocations.IT
heU
mbrella
Group
was
formed
inK
yotoand
comprises
theU
S,Japan,
Canada,
Australia,
Norw
ay,N
ewZ
ealand,R
ussiaand
theU
kraine.U
nitedby
thecom
mon
goalto
designthe
Kyoto
Mechanism
sas
flexiblyas
ossible,this
grouphas
effectivelyplayed
thecounterpart
tothe
EU
inthe
post-Kyoto
negotiationsto
date.-2
Inthe
past,R
ussiaand
Japanw
ereable
topoint
outthat
theE
Uadvocated
strictlim
itationsfor
theK
yotoM
echanisms
while
atthe
same
time
securingfor
itselfthe
possibilityto
jointlyfulfil
itsobligations
underan
EU
bubbleunder
Article
4of
theP
rotocol.F
oran
analysisof
Article
4of
theP
rotocolsee
Oberthür/O
tt1999,
pp.141
etseq.
53T
heattem
ptby
theE
Uto
establisha
quantitativecap
onthe
useof
theK
yotoM
echanisms
was
unsuccessfulin
Kyoto
andthe
US
thereforeaccused
theE
Uof
tryingto
“rewrite
theK
yotoP
rotocol”; see
thequote
byJam
esF
oleyofth
eS
tateD
epartment
inG
lobalE
nvironmental
Change
Report,
Vol.
XI,
No.
10of
28M
ayI999,
p.1
; seealso
“Clinton
accusesE
Uof
Trying
toR
ewrite
Global
Warm
ingPact”
,Wall
Street
Journal,18
May
1999.54
SeeR
emarks
byV
iceP
residentA
lG
ore,T
heU
nitedN
ationsC
omm
itteeon
Clim
ateC
hange(m
istakein
theoriginal),
Conference
ofth
eP
arties,8
Decem
ber1997,
Kyoto,
Japan.55
European
Com
mission
1999,p.
10.56
Bernow
etal.
1999.57
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1999,pp.
103et
seq.5$
SeeE
uropeanC
omm
ission1999,
p.7.
59See
Schlegelm
ilch1999.
60See
forexam
plethe
callby
Cooper
1998and
Schneider
1998.61
According
toa
recentpoii
releasedby
theJapanese
Environm
entA
gency,the
majority
ofJapanese
firms
supporta
taxon
fossilfuels
tocurb
CO
2em
issions,<
http://biz.yahoo.com/ rf/990527/u.htm
l>as
of27
May
1999.62
SeeJacoby
etal.
1998,p.
61.63
Seealso
theB
attelleG
lobalE
nergyT
echnologyS
trategyP
rojectto
Address
Clim
ateC
hange,<
http://gtsp.pnl.gov/gelhome.nsf/w
ebpage/>for
atechnology-based
initiative.64
Meyers/K
ent1998,
pp.55-78;
seealso
OE
CD
1995;M
oor/Calam
i1997;
more
specificallyon
climate
seeK
oplow/M
artin1998.
65See
“Clinton
ordersgovernm
entto
reduceenergy
useand
emissions”
,Global
Environm
entalC
hangeR
eport,V
ol.X
I,N
o.I1,
1 1June
1999,p.
3.66
Benedick
I998a,p.
20;see
alsothe
Clim
ateT
echnologyInitiative
ofthe
TEA:
“Enhancing
Markets
forC
limate
Friendly
Technologies:
Leadership
Through
Governm
entP
urchasing”; June
1998,available
at<
http://ww
w.iea.org/clim
ate.htm>
.67
Seefor
example
Ott
1998a,pp.
200et
seq.68
SeeO
berthür/Ott
1995;L
oske1996,
p.250.
69See
Oberthür/O
tt1999,
pp.233
etseq.
70See
FC
CC
/AG
BM
/1997/M
ISC
. I/Add.3.
71See
UN
EP
pressrelease
1998/11.72
For
some
relevantsupport
material
thathas
beendeveloped
with
respectto
adaptationso
farsee
Feenstra
etal.
1998;Sm
ithet
al.1999
andS
outhP
acificR
egionalE
nvironmental
Program
me
(SP
RE
P),
The
Developm
entof
Adaptation
Guidelines
inthe
Pacific
at<
http://ww
w.sidsnet.org>
(asof
Septem
ber1999).
73See
alsoH
umphreys,
StephenlS
okona,Y
oubafl’homas,
Jean-Philippe:
“Equity
inthe
CD
M”,
EN
DA
TM
,D
akar,<
http://ww
w.enda.snlenergie/cdm
equity.htm>
asof
15O
ctober1998;
Mathur,
Ajay:
“Clim
ateC
hange:P
ost-Kyoto
Perspectives
fromthe
South”, T
ER
I,N
ewD
elhi,<
http://ww
w.teriin.org/clim
ate/cp4/contents.htm
l>as
of7
July1999.
74H
umphreys
etal.,
seefootnote
above.75
See“C
ontractionand
Convergence:
AG
lobalS
olutionto
aG
lobalP
roblem”
,Global
Com
mons
Institute,18/07/1997
<http://w
ww
.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html>
asof
9June
1999;see
alsoF
riendsofth
eE
arthInternational
1998;IN
FR
AS
AG
/TE
RI
1997;K
inzig/Kam
men
1998;B
aumert
etal.
1999.76
By
presentingits
“Annex
X”
beforeK
yoto,the
EU
didgive
theim
pressionthat
itw
asopen
fornon-O
EC
Ddeveloping
countries,w
hichseverely
strainedits
relationsw
iththese
countries.77
OE
CD
mem
bersince
1996.7$
Incom
parisonw
ithrecent
OE
CD
countrieslike
Mexico,
Turkey
andH
ungarytheir
figuresare
upto
ninetim
esas
high;see
Fischer
1998;C
IAW
orld-Factbook
199$<
http://ww
w.odci.
ov/ciaJpublications/factbook>as
of6
April
1999.9
Their
proposalsw
ereissued
asF
CC
C/A
GB
M/M
ISC
.3and
MIS
C.3/A
dd. Ito
3.80
For
example
Argentina,
Kazakhstan
andC
ostaR
icahave
alreadyannounced
theirw
illingnessto
takeon
bindingcom
mitm
ents.S
outhK
oreais
consideringthis
asw
ell,see
“Tow
ardsG
lobalP
articipation”,P
resentationby
Mr.
Raeckw
onC
hungon
behalfof
theK
oreanM
inistryof
Foreign
Affairs
andT
radeat
theO
EC
D/IE
AC
limate
Change
Forum
inP
aris,10
March
1999(on
filew
iththe
authors).$1
Inthe
United
States,
netem
issionso
fallG
HG
increasedby
21.54%from
1990to
1997(E
PA
draftU
SG
HG
inventories,3
February
99,<
http://ww
w.epa.gov/globalw
arming/
inventory/l999inv.html>
asof
9June
1999);ofth
e24
countrieslisted
inA
nnexII,
onlyseven
areexpected
toem
itC
O2
ator
below1990
levelsby
theend
ofth
em
illennium(F
CC
C/C
P/199$/1
1/Add.2).
82See
Reid/G
oldemberg
1997;1998
3435
The
Hein
richB
ollF
ou
nd
ation
The
Heinrich
Boll
Foundation,
affiliatedw
iththe
Green
Party
andheadquartered
inthe
Hackesche
Höfe
inthe
heartof
Berlin,
isa
legallyindependent
politicalfoundation
working
inthe
spiritof
intellectualopenness.
The
Foundation’s
primary
objectiveis
tosupport
politicaleducation
bothw
ithinG
ermany
andabroad,
thusprom
otingdem
ocraticinvolvem
ent,sociopolitical
activism,
andcross-
culturalunderstanding.
The
Foundation
alsoprovides
supportfor
artand
culture,science
andresearch,
anddevelopm
entalcooperation.
Itsactivities
areguided
bythe
fundamental
politicalvalues
ofecology,
democracy,
solidarity,and
non-violence.
By
way
ofits
internationalcollaboration
with
alarge
number
ofproject
partners—
cur-rently
numbering
about130
projectsin
60countries
—the
Foundation
aims
tostrengthen
ecologicaland
civilactivism
ona
globallevel,
tointensify
theexchange
ofideas
andexperiences,
andto
keepour
sensibilitiesalert
forchange.
The
Heinrich
Boll
Foundation’s
collaborationon
sociopoliticaleducation
programs
with
itsproject
partnersabroad
ison
along-term
basis.A
dditionalim
portantinstrum
entsof
internationalcooperation
includevisitor
programs,
which
enhancethe
exchangeof
experiencesand
ofpolitical
networking,
asw
ellas
basicand
advancedtraining
programs
forcom
mitted
activists.
The
Heinrich
Boll
Foundation
hasabout
160full-tim
eem
ployeesas
well
asapproxim
ately300
supportingm
embers
who
provideboth
financialand
non-material
assistance.
Ralf
Fücks,
Dr.
Claudia
Neusüf3,
andP
etraS
treitcom
prisethe
currentE
xecutiveB
oard.
Tw
oadditional
bodiesof
theF
oundation’seducational
work
are:the
“Green
Academ
y”and
the“F
eminist
Institute”.
The
Foundation
currentlym
aintainsforeign
andproject
officesin
theU
SA
,in
Cam
bodia,the
Czech
Republic,
El
Salvador,
Israel,the
Arab
Middle
East,
Kenya,
Pakistan,
South
Africa,
Turkey,
andan
EU
officein
Brussels.
New
foreignoffices
inB
osnia-Herzegovina,
Brazil,
andT
hailandare
currentlybeing
established.
For
2001,the
Foundation
hadalm
ost70
million
DM
publicfunds
atits
disposal.