Ecofeminist Citizenship

Ecofeminis t Citizens hip

KATHERINE PETTUS

In this article I discuss how some women activists experience their citizenship locally and around the world through their work for the environment and resistance to systems which threaten world existence. By looking at the oikos-polis distinction in Aristotle as the genesis of environmental pathologies which give rise to newly complementary categories of citizenship and ecofeminism, I consider moral pluralism and agonistic liberalism as non-hierarchical theoretical frameworks for thinking about citizenship.

All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, “Silence is a woman’s glory” but this

is not equally the glory of man. (Aristotle, The Politics)

The women are speaking. Those who were identified as having nothing to say, as sweet silence or monkey chatterers,

those who were identified with Nature, which listens, as against Man, who speaks, those people are speaking. They

speak for themselves and for the other people, the others who have been silent, or silenced, or unheard, the animals, the

trees, the rivers, the rocks. And what they say is: We are sacred. (Ursula Le Guinn, “Women/Wildness” in Plant 1989)

It is not enough for a political theorist just to say that obviously Aristotle was wrong about women; that after twenty-four centuries of gender hierarchy, “modern” people have realized that sexual equality is the way to go; that the task of contemporary political theory is to get on with constructing societies free of race, class, and gender domination. Just to say that Aristotle was wrong does not explain why the women are speaking now, what is the subject of their discourse, or whether it behooves sensible people to listen to them. A twenty- four-century history of oppression (and it isn’t over yet) is an awfully long time

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for political theorists to come and go, speaking of many things that simply take for granted the original hierarchies posited by Aristotle.

Such a long time span, during which some supposedly very smart men did not not ice-or did not think to mention-gender hierarchy, begs more than a few questions. Is gender hierarchy one of the few common threads that stretch across all those centuries and cultures? Empirically speaking, what have been its cumulative effects? Do the explanations for hushing women and excluding them from citizenship themselves explain why women find themselves forced to act so aberrantly today? Put differently, what is it about the original justifications for gender hierarchy that explains why women’s actions are defining citizenship in new ways at the close of the twentieth-century ?

Almost two-and-a-half millennia after Aristotle wrote the Politics and the Nichomacheun Ethics, the (albeit different) configuration of potis (the city, or the place of politics) and oikos (household) still defines the status, quality, and virtues of citizenship. The key difference is that the oikos function of “wealth- getting” as Aristotle called it in the Politics, dominates the polis. Individual liberal citizenship is generally understood to be about the representation, through the vote, of private oikos interests-preferences-rather than promotion of the common good. More precisely, “free-market liberalism” holds that active pursuit of individual interests will bring about the common good. The result, as Hannah Arendt points out, is that the political sphere now appears as an administrative order for nationwide “housekeeping,” interestingly enough done mostly, and rather poorly, by men (Arendt 1959,27).’

Although the “natural” hierarchy (between oikos and polis, men and women, rationality and corporeality) theorized by Aristotle is a fiction, the material consequences of its institutionalization into segregated spheres are all too real: technoscientific development has flattened “natural” hierarchy into the “equality” of our shared “risk fate” (Beck 1992); the oikos has erupted into the polis with a vengeance. Ulrich Beck‘s concept of the “risk society” views the globalization of risk-from nuclear power plants, nuclear war, toxic waste, global warming, industrial agriculture, and so on-as one that gives heretofore distinct cultural identities “common community.” The developmental dynam- ics of risk destroy boundaries, forcing people together into “the uniform position of civilization’s self-endangering.’’ In this concept, class and gender distinctions are superseded (although far from obliterated) by the common risk fate brought on by the overdevelopment of scientific rationality.

Not only has the function of wealth-getting (in Beck‘s terms “techno-economic development”) colonized what was formerly “the political,” it has also endangered the household.* The oikos is no longer a safe haven for women and families whose soil, air, and drinking water are contaminated with toxic wastes, who live daily with the threat of nuclear meltdown, whose breast milk and rivers are polluted with pesticide runoff, whose subsistence farms are displaced

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by commercial agriculture. Moreover, the highly differentiated division of labor in high modernity, the interdependencies of law, science, business, agriculture, and politics-the various specializations of the agents of modem- ization-point to the difficulty of isolating single causes and responsibilities for shared risk fate. The agents of modernity are generally complicit and not individually responsible, making it difficult, if not impossible, for individual voters-citizens of the oikos-contaminated polis-to hold their representatives accountable through the political system. This state of affairs has forced women, whose traditional oikos roles as mothers, nurses, midwives, subsistence farmers, teachers, and caretakers place them on the receiving end of the pathologies of the risk society, to utilize their (newly won) citizenship to confront directly the corporate and bureaucratic entities that threaten their safety and survival. For the first time in twenty-four centuries, women are streaming into the public sphere (not necessarily institutional politics, but most definitely the public sphere) to act (rather than simply just to vote), and are making themselves heard. They are “chattering” in the corridors of power.

This paper discusses the genesis of the newly complementary categories of ecofeminism and citizenship in order to discover where and how the explicitly “high modem” identity of “ecofeminist citizenship” fits into contemporary debates about membership and purposes. I believe that ecofeminist citizenship transcends, or bursts the boundaries of, the categories of “rights” and “identity,” what Yasemin Soysal calls “the two elements of modem citizenship” (Soysal1994,159). Lofeminist citizens are acting not to protect their rights- the classical liberal rights of freedom of speech, property, and so on-“against” the state, or to safeguard national, ethnic, sexual, racial, or gender identities for their own sake. While ecofeminist citizenship stands on the modem ground of these rights and identities, there is nothing abstract about its demand^.^ First and foremost it is about survival, about fighting tooth and nail for the primary material priorities of the oikos in the polis. Some brief definitions will be offered for the purposes of orientation.

The term “ecofeminisme” was coined by the French writer Francoise d’Eaubonne in 1974 to represent the women’s potential to bring about an ecological revolution to ensure human survival on the planet (Merchant 1990). “Ecofeminism” designates the marriage of radical cultural (as opposed to radical rational) feminist and ecological theory! While both identify the centrality of the woman-nature nexus, rational feminists repudiate it as oppres- sive and a core mechanism of subordination, while cultural feminists appropriate its potential for the emancipation of women and nature. Ecofeminism acknowledges the woman-nature connection as a core mechanism of subordination and domination while seeking, through praxis, to redeem-to reassert the value of-both, in order to ensure the safety and sustainable flourishing of all life forms.


The word “ecology,” like “economy,” is derived from the Greek oikos, signifying the realm of the household. The science of ecology was invented in the nineteenth-century by a female scientist, Ellen Swallow Richards, who was the first woman to enter the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She called her science of environmental quality “oekology,” which became “home ecology” and then “home economics” (Merchant 1996, 139). Ecology “per- ceives relationships between different elements of an ecosystem. . . . Ecologi- cal ways of knowing are necessarily participatory” (Shiva 1994, 41). A paradigmatic ecological model is the biotic community, which

displays a tremendous capacity for self-regulation, adaptation, and a shared metabolism that preserves the health and stability of the whole. Unity-in-diversity, the sharing of abundance and the elaboration of complexity is the rule; scarcity and competi- tion among species for the control of individual niches are the myths of a competitive society anxious to justify itself. (Tokar 1992,4)

The classical definition of “citizen,” from the Greek polites or Latin civis, is he who is “a member of the Athenian polis or Roman res publica” (Pocock 1995, 29). What distinguished the citizen who participated in the polis from the same man who was a householder, the master of the oikos, was that in the polis he was “free” from the realm of necessity. The polis was the place where equals met, spoke, and acted (Brown 1988): As Aristotle pointed out, there are many different kinds of citizens, but specifically, “the citizen is a member of a community. . . . One citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all” (The Politics, Bk.111, ch.4 1276b). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “man is born for citizenship” (Bk.1, ch.7,1097b), and he does mean males; citizenship was not for women, whose deliberative faculty he considered inferior (Politics, 1260a). Aristotle’s brilliance, though flawed, can still be mined for modem use, and this paper will paraphrase his description of citizens as “members of a community, whose common business is the salvation of that community.”6

“THE POLITICAL” AS THE REALM OF CITIZENSHIP

Aristotle’s conflation, in the Politics, of fact and value-that “the hus- band. . . rules over wife and children [because] the male is by nature fitter for command than the female” has dominated Western sociopolitical arrange- ments either implicitly or explicitly for well over two thousand years. The place where the male rules the female is the oikos, the prepolitical realm of necessity, as Hannah Arendt characterizes it (Arendt 1959). This is the proper (natural) place for women and slaves, the place where economy, or household management, is practiced. Both beyond and “prior” (in Aristotle’s peculiar

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inversion) to the oikos is the polis, the realm of freedom, freedom being the highest value. O n l y when the householder leaves behind the concerns of the oikos, the realm of “unfreedom,” and steps out into public life of the polis, does he act as a citizen.

It is the argument of this paper that the failure of the contemporary institutional political realm-and hence, ordinary citizenship-to tend, and manage, the negative externalities of the “wealth-getting” function of the oikos, or what is now called “the market,” is rooted in the fictitious series of hierarchic dualisms: politeialoikos, man/woman, equality/inequality, and free- domlnecessity, which survived the Industrial Revolution and is reproduced with globalization to this very day. The purpose of relegating corporeality (women, slaves, and children), irrationality, and economy to the private, hidden, unequal world of the household is to take these activities out of the realm of the political, the only place where males are free. Unworthy of being the objects of political discourse, oikos issues become “management” issues; by its very definition, “the political” lacks the necessary “rationality” with which to address issues that arise from the (ma1)hnctioning of the o i k o ~ . ~ When, with the rise of market society and reductionist science in the seventeenth-century, the still profoundly gendered oikos took over the polis, citizenship was con- verted into an instrument for the exploitation of nature (identified as female) for profit. Negative externalities that constitute the massive ecological crisis the world is experiencing today-manifesting as pollution, disease, famine, deforestation, global warming, and so on-are therefore the objects of ecofeminist activism (read “citizenship”).

Modern welfare states assign these “housekeeping” issues to the technical “expertise” of bureaucracies, which are profoundly incapable of managing dimensions of risk, coordinating information to communities, and so on (Offe 1984; Beck 1992; Hager 1993). The March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant demonstrated, for example, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had failed to ensure that the plant (or any nuclear power plant for that matter) was able to contain radiation in the event of a meltdown. The responsible agency was manifestly incapable of protecting the surrounding community, the dairy farms, the nearby Hershey chocolate fac- tory, from radionucleides that had escaped into the atmosphere. To this day, communities around the country, particularly those targeted for nuclear waste storage, are debating how best to “seal off from the ecosystem a material known to be lethal for tens of thousands of years.

Jiirgen Habermas, among others, has theorized the differences between bureaucratic, technoscientific, and communicative or social rationality, delin- eating their disjunctions and pathologies. Anyone who lives in a community that has had to deal with a bureaucratic agency’s proposal, for instance, to site a waste dump in the immediate vicinity, and has had to enter the labyrinths of the permit and review process, and read the “literature” (reports, impact


statements, and so on) knows firsthand the meaning of these disjunctions. Ulrich Beck describes them as the “fissures and gaps between scientific and social rationality in dealing with the hazardous potential of civilization” (Beck 1992,29).

These very same “fissures and gaps” are the site of ecofeminist citizenship, including local, national, and international women’s meetings and conferences, the majority of which are sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, and are unaffiliated with any state institutions. Moreover, few of the women who participate in these conferences are “technocrats” but women from many different walks of life and professions. Many are housewives (managers of the oikos) who have no prior political experience.

REDEFINING “THE POLITICAL”

Even though, if my argument is correct, oikos concerns dominate the polis such that the latter is unable effectively to mediate the social and environmental pathologies generated by the market, the issues raised by these pathologies are still referred to colloquially as “political.”* It is the very slippage between common usage of the term, contemporary praxis, and the cumulative genealogical failure of “the political” to cope that reveals the space wherein ecofeminist citizenship, of necessity, is practiced. The failure of political rationality, which lays bare the urgency for new, direct, non- abstract, non-(simply ) rights-based, participatory ways to practice citizenship, can be ascribed to a particular geneology of “the political” and its inherent practice of citizenship.’

To define what is “public, common and general” (in Wolin’s phrase) as “the political” and therefore as ontologically exclusive of the “realm of necessity” that obtains in the private sphere is to create an artificial, theoretical separa- tion where none exists at the natural, material level. The material consequences of institutionalizing this fiction of the political are pathological, however, and necessarily result in the modem struggles for survival (that is, for clean drinking water, sustainable forestry, “no nukes,” and so on).”

In her discussion of the origins of the word “political,” Hannah Fenichel Pitkin describes how theorists such as Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin employ the term.

Wolin and Arendt are talking about what is political, about the meaning of ‘political’; and they are trying to tell us that an important part of the meaning applies less and less well to the reality of the practice and institutions we still call, from habit, ‘political.’ They are trying to recall us from the habitual forms to the substance of the political. (Pitkin 1972,213)

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Is “the substance of the political” an ontological fact, then; something to which people can actually gain access, such that it effects the sort of transub- stantiation of private persons into citizens envisioned by Aristotle? If so, must modem citizens end up in the same catastrophic cul-de-sac to which Aristotle’s theory has led? J. G. A. Pocock calls the question.

If one wants to make citizenship available to those to whom it has been denied on the grounds that they are too much involved in the world of things-in material, productive, domestic, or reproductive relationships-one has to choose between emancipating them from these relationships and denying that these relationships are negative components in the definition of citizenship. If one chooses the latter course, one is in search ofa new definition of citizenship, differing radically from the Greek definition articulated by Aristotle, a definition in which public and private are not rigorously separated and the barriers between them have become permeable or have disappeared altogether. In the latter case, one will have to decide whether the concept of the “public” has survived at all. (Pocock 1995, 33, emphasis added)

Ecofeminist praxis reveals that “the latter course” has been chosen; that citizenship, and therefore “public,” are being redefined. Refusing the classical concept of “public” (and therefore, logically, its inverse, “private”) because both are fatally gendered, ecofeminism demonstrates that both public and private must be theoretically reconceived in pluralistic, inclusive terms. By endangering the natural resources on which human survival is based, profit- seeking corporations or government agencies themselves have blurred the boundary between “private” and “public,” indicating the “new definition of citizenship” to which Pocock refers. The health and well-being of fetuses, babies, children, and the most intimate bodily functions of adults (affected by toxic emissions, for instance) are now the subject of publicly funded technoscientific discourse. Shared “risk fate” obviates the oikos-polis distinction, which is still maintained in terms of women’s unequal participation in the institutional public sphere, and thereby engenders unprecedented “political” action by women on behalf of their communities all over the world. Risk society brings public and private, past (what has been done) and future (what will be its effects on unborn generations) onto the same political stage.

Pitkin muses on a more abstract, and to ecofeminism more accessible, idea:

Perhaps what characterizes political life is precisely the problem of creating unity, a public, in a context of diversity, rival claims, unequal power, and conflicting interests. In the absence of rival claims and conflicting interests, a topic never enters the polit-


ical realm; no political decision needs to be made. But for the political collectivity, the “we’) to act, those conflicting claims and interests must be resolved in a way that continues to preserve the collectivity. (Pitkin 1972,215)

This passage is rich in implications for a fruitful analysis of the intersections between the categories of ecofeminism and citizenship. The central concept is the “we,” the “unity . . . in a context of diversity,” the so-called thorny problem of “moral pluralism” that is at the heart of contemporary liberal controversies. ’’ Ecofeminism and moral pluralism have a natural affinity. However, ecofeminism challenges the ontological and epistemological categories that have traditionally defined citizenship in a pluralist society. These categories must be “unpacked)’ because different approaches to them set up different tensions between equality and freedom.

THE ONTOLCGY OF CLASSICAL CITIZENSHIP

Aristotle believed in the existence of certain “facts about the soul,” which “clearly the student of politics must know somehow” (Nichomacheun Ethics, 1102a). The exposition of these “facts” is the subject of most of the Nichomacheun Ethics, and forms the basis of the Politics. Aristotle’s concept of justice, which he considers the highest end of political science, is proper ordering: the rule of the soul over the body, the intellect over the passions, men over women, superior over inferior. In his tautological way of thinking, which starts from the final cause and reasons backwards, nature’s purposive design, which includes social practices and can be known through observation, is intrinsically good.

Because the highest element of the living being is the mind, which is “more essentially a part . . . than the body; parts of a similar order to the mind must equally be reckoned as more essentially parts of the state than those which serve its bodily needs” (Politics, IV, iv, 14). The ontologically posited inequality distinguishing householder from slave guaranteed the freedom of the former, guaranteed his access to Citizenship. This is precisely the point of Judith N. Shklar’s discussion of US. citizenship. She says “The value of citizenship was derived primarily from its denial to slaves, to some white men, and to all women” (Shklar 1991, 16, emphasis added). Inequality is, in this reading, a necessary condition of political freedom. That Aristotle “spies the political- ness of these relations and then proclaims them natural” is an exercise of power, not of science (Brown 1988, 43). It reflects the power of free men to name and to categorize, a power denied to women. “The ontology of dichoto- mization generates an ontology of domination, over nature and people” (Shiva 1994,44). Wendy Brown traces the Greek “obsession with immortality” to this “severe denigration of existence-related or mortal things,’’ which “pose a

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persistent threat to man’s desire for freedom. . . . Freedom, ethical goodness, and excellence of action lie precisely in this alienation, this wielding of the body [in games, competitions, and sports] as an instrument of the mind” (Brown 1988,58).

Paradoxically, it is the very “valorization of immortality” as the foundation of freedom, a valorization that has marked history for more than two millennia, that has brought the present generation to look species death-mass mortal- ity-in the face. The source of this pathology is the distorted concept of freedom developed by Aristotle: the ‘(natural” (now traditional) place for women is the household, the site of “unfreedom,” with the result that women are denied significant participation in public life, the site of “freedom,” the place for men. The cumulative effect of the political and economic decisionmaking that has taken place in this gendered site of “freedom” now threatens the survival of humankind, both locally and globally. This being the case, survival and sustainability demand a definition of freedom, and therefore of “politics” and citizenship that is not founded on inequality. In his essay, “The Changing Quality of Citizenship,” Ralph Dahrendorf asks,

As we move on to a liveable environment and thus to sustainable growth, an even more difficult question arises. It is that of how we can curb unfettered expansion without violating other entitlements of citizenship. Can we survive in freedom? This may well be the most significant question before us, and I am not at all sure about the answer. For those who share my own belief that freedom matters above all-even above survival- the alternative is literally vital. (Dahrendorf 1994, 18)

What freedom does he mean? Traces of the exclusivity of the polis are still visible twenty-four centuries after its demise. While for a liberal, the posited opposition between freedom (meaning the possession of rights) and survival (a ‘(good”) is theoretically coherent, in an ecofeminist context it is not; it is a false dichotomy. Such casual allusions to freedom, which abound in the literature, strike feminist theorists as profoundly gendered, most obviously because only a very tiny class of human beings has ever had the kind of freedom to which Dahrendorf is alluding; the survival of whole populations (of indigenous people, for example) is at stake because the “free” people in industrialized societies have used liberal rights to “develop” beyond their means, to use the natural resources of the planet in ways that are fatal to less “fortunate” populations.

An ontology that constructs domination as the inverse, rather than the foundation, of political freedom yields an entirely different type of politics and citizenship.


Both feminism and ecology embody the revolt of nature against human domination. They demand that we rethink the rela- tionship between humanity and the rest of nature, including our natural embodied selves. In ecofeminism, nature is the central category of analysis. An analysis of the interrelated dominations of nature-psyche and sexuality, human oppression, and nonhuman nature-and the historic position of women in relation to those forms of domination is the starting point of ecofeminist theory. (King 1990, I 17)

An ecological response to social, political, and economic domination con- ceives of freedom as praxis, as participation, as inclusion in the paradigmatic, life-sustaining, healthy biotic system.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF CITIZENSHIP

The continuum between the classical and modem discourses on politics and citizenship is constituted by gender hierarchy and ways of knowing that are “rational,” scientific, and therefore exclusive. The intellectual mentor of Thomas Hobbes, considered the first modern Western political theorist, was Francis Bacon, in turn considered the “father” of modern science. In Tempores Partus Musculus, or The Masculine Birth of Time, Bacon promised to create “a blessed race of heroes and supermen” who would dominate both nature and society (Keller 1985, 38-39). Bacon’s New Atlantis kept women in the oikos in exactly the same state of submission and silence that Aristotle had ordained.

What then, is the epistemological connection between early modem science and modem citizenship? (Early) science, just like (early) political theory, was profoundly gendered. For Bacon, nature was no longer Mother Nature but a female nature, an object to be conquered by an aggressive masculine mind. As Carolyn Merchant points out, this transformation of nature from a living, nurturing mother to inert, dead, and manipulable matter was eminently suited to the exploitation imperative to growing capitalism. The mastery and domination images created by the Baconian program and the scientific revolution, also associated with the mass burnings of women as “witches,” traumatized positive premodern relationships to nature and functioned as cultural sanc- tions for the denudation of nature.

The removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos constituted the death of nature-the most far-reach- ing effect of the scientific revolution. Because nature was viewed as a system of dead, inert particles moved by external, rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature. Moreover, as

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conceptual framework, the mechanical order had associated with it a framework of values based on power, fully compatible with the directions taken by commercial capitalism. (Merchant 1990, 182)

The twentieth-century global market economy functions on these same epistemic assumptions, devastating ecosystems and traditional communities in the name of progress and economic imperatives. According to the Indian nuclear physicist and ecofeminist activist Vandana Shiva,

The ontological and epistemological assumptions of reductionism are based on uniformity, perceiving all systems as compris- ing the same basic constituents, discrete and atomistic, and assuming all basic processes to be mechanical. The mechanistic metaphors of reductionism have socially reconstituted nature and society. In contrast to the organic metaphors, in which concepts of order and power were based on interdependence and reciprocity, the metaphor of nature as machine was based on the assumption of divisibility and manipulability. (Shiva 1993,23)

Reductionist science is based on homogeneity; it sees all systems as made up of the same constituents, discrete, unrelated, and atomistic. Because commercial capitalism is based on specialized commodity production, it values uniformity in production and the unifunctional use of natural resources.

Reductionism reduces complex ecosystems to a single component, and a single component to a single function, to maximize exploitation. . . . In this way, reductionist science is at the root of the growing ecological crisis, because it entails a transformation of nature such that its organic processes and regularities and regenerative capacities are destroyed.” (Shiva 1993,24)

DEONTIC CITIZENSHIP IN THE LIBERAL POLIS

In the Nichmchean Ethics, Aristotle said that virtue is not natural.

Neither by nature, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by the habit. . . . We become just by doing just acts. This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, those who do not effect it miss the mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. (Nichomachean Ethics, 1103b)


This could almost be John Stuart Mill talking, and it shows clearly the central difference between liberals of the Lockean tradition, such as James Madison, and classical theorists, such as Aristotle. John Locke, as a religious man, did not believe that the state had any business shaping its citizens’ virtues (Creppell 1996). The founders of the American republic explicitly r e h e d to count on “men” being virtuous; they intended the institutions to function as “sedimented virtue, which thus made the actual practice of these virtues, such as truthfulness, wisdom, reason, virtue, justice, and all kinds of moral qualities, to some extent dispensable, on the part of both the rulers and the ruled” (Offe and Preuss 1991, 149). Not quite dispensable, virtue was supposed to be the province of the private sphere; in terms of the framework of this paper, it was relegated to the oikos, where man was master. The problem is, of course, that immoral or unvirtuous acts and lives generated in the oikos have public effects, produce public “bads”; and if there is insufficient “virtue” or political where- withal within the public sphere or the institutions to address those effects, they will reproduce and mutate in pathological ways.

When Robert Solow of MIT won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1987, he stated, “the world can, in effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a catastrophe” (quoted in Singh 1987,218). Nature, the survival base of billions of people, is expendable. The citizen in this epistemic universe is the rights bearing elector whose private life and personal interests-the concerns of the oikos-disaggregate him (or her) from political concerns, unless they are threatened and require protection and promotion. Because the negative externalities of the economy are relegated to technocratic, bureaucratic expertise, the institutional political realm is not considered the appropriate place for their resolution (Hager 1993).

Instead, “extraparliamentary citizen initiative groups” challenge militarism, deforestation, pollution, and other problems by constructing a pluralist poolis founded on a non-hierarchical ontology that embraces epistemologies fundamentally different from those of reductionist science. The oikos reconceived by ecofeminism is non-hierarchical, does not privilege “rationality” over corporeality, and is not rigidly separated from the polis. Clearly, women’s new status as bearers of the political rights denied to them for twenty-four centuries has helped to shift the balance of power in the household and, therefore, in the public sphere. The oikos is no longer a place where the male citizen has unfettered power. While the reconfiguration of public and private rights and realms, worked out theoretically as well as legally, has blazed the trail for women’s political participation, such as it is, this primarily Western and academic effort cannot account for the grassroots organizations and leadership of women in ecofeminist movements in the “less developed” countries.

The political realms being created by the “we” constituted in ecofeminist struggles are spaces where citizens attend to the mundane concerns of the global and local oikos because they recognize that such attention is the

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condition not only of their survival but their freedom. This attention is not necessarily informed by theoretical, much less by feminist concerns, but springs from the instinctive, life-protecting, materialist function that classical citizens were so obsessed with avoiding in the polis. The differentiated, egali- tarian, reflexive polis created by ecofeminist action is not what Aristotle had in mind when he wrote the Politics. Yet if we apply his teleology to ecofeminist citizenship-hoist him with his own petard, as it were-he would have to admit its rightness: “each thing when it is fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of” [an ecofeminist philosophy] “the final cause and end of a thing is the best” (The Politics, 1253a). As noted earlier, Aristotle stated unequivocally that the business of the citizen was the salvation of the community.

SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS AND POLITICS

The Baconian-Newtonian scientific paradigm constituted the foundation of the scientific and industrial revolutions, which, superimposed on classical ontologies of gender hierarchy and citizenship, led to the relentless, politically sanctioned assault on nature, the consequences of which we are experiencing today. The ecofeminist theory of citizenship is based on a qualitatively different scientific paradigm, an eclectic combination of ecology, quantum physics, and the Gaia hypothesis. Each of these very paradigms creates different “coordinates” for new spaces of (often spontaneous) action, different configu- rations of “reality” and identity that coalesce as the local, untutored activisms that constitute ecofeminist citizenship.

As already noted, the ecological model assigns equal importance to all organic and inorganic components in the structure of an ecosystem. Healthy air, water, and soil-the abiotic components of the system-are as essential as the entire diverse range of biotic parts, plants, animals, bacteria, and fungi. Without each element in the structure, the system as a whole cannot function properly. Remove an element, reduce the number of individuals or species, and erratic oscillations may appear in the larger system (Merchant 1990, 146).

Quantum physics breaks down the subject-object duality presupposed by the Newtonian model, holding that

all properties . . . can be conceived as the classical secondary qualities were supposed to be, not dichotomous, existing actually either on the side of the object or on the side of the subject, but potential and dipolar, requiring for their realization the interaction between erstwhile subjects and erstwhile objects. (Callicott 1987, 271)

I am not making the simplistic argument that an “ecological politics” is contingent on adopting a nondualistic attitude toward the world based on an


understanding of quantum physics. Such a politics can clearly have humbler origins. What contemporary science does is provide the empirical and theoretical (as opposed to metaphysical or linguistic-a la Habermas) paradigm in which to ground an environmental ethics, and the ontology of that paradigm is interactional.

In the context of quantum theory and relativity, we can no longer concretely validate or define the properties of external reality as completely independent of the process of observation. Realism, upon which Western science rests, is a philosophical view in which external reality is assumed to exist, and have definite properties which are fundamentally independent of an observer and are also objectively identifiable. Yet the existence of consciousness may create an intrinsic subjective aspect to reality. It seems that the intervention of mind in the universe of matter leads the process of observation to one of participation. (Rauscher 1988,29)

The Gaia hypothesis, named for the Greek goddess of the earth, was developed by biologists James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis in the early 1970s. This hypothesis proposes that “the entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the earth’s atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond its constituent parts” (Lovelock 1979,6; 1988).

The noncoercive unity in diversity suggested by these alternative scientific theories has its political-philosophical analogue in an environmentally friendly moral pluralism. This differs both in form and in substance from any sort of totalizing, thick theory of the good, which would be an anathema to rights-based liberalism.

Any politically acceptable social arrangement for late modernity would most probably have to be based on the citizenship rights most modems take for granted (Marshall 1965). The question is, what is it about the deontic concept of citizenship that needs to be reconfigured to meet the challenges of the twenty -first-century ?

There can be no exogenous imperative to act in a free society, although many women, and men, probably join environmental groups and engage in community-based politics from a sense that they must take responsibility for the quality of the world their descendents will inherit. They participate, put in time, “incur costs,” because their survival and the survival of what they love (as St. Augustine so disingenuously put it) is at stake (Paolucci 1962, 42). Countless anecdotal reports reflect the sense of empowerment that women, especially, gain on emerging from the oikos into the polzs to stand up for what they believe in. Listen to the voices of two “ordinary housewives” who joined

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the Greenham Common Peace Camp to stop the placement of U.S. cruise missiles at military bases in Great Britain:

My whole life is taken up with this work now. . . . Every one of us has to be responsible for what happens in our own name, and our governments are behaving in this manner now because so many people are not standing up and protesting. Once you make that decision, make up your own mind that you will no longer cooperate with this insanity, you are then in the position to influence so many other people that the whole thing is slowly boiling and growing. These protests are growing because it’s a very enjoyable way of life-it’s choosing life as opposed to death, that’s the essential thing. (Helen John, quoted in Gar- land 1988)

Women have initiated this action because women are the ones excluded from the meaningless bureaucracy of peace groups. We’re the ones who can’t cope with it, who totally reject it, and want to walk away and leave the men to carry on with their utterly mundane and irrelevant discussions. That’s what is so beautiful about Greenham: you go there, and you experience it and you walk away feeling very strong-willed because you know that no matter what happens, women there are doing what they believe in. Someone is standing up for something good. (Susan Lamb, quoted in Garland 1988)

Thousands of women camped out at the Greenham Common military base for several years during the early 1980s, with some actions involving up to fifty thousand protesters. All over the world, women staged ancillary actions in support of the Greenham encampment. In late 1987, U.S. and Soviet leaders announced their agreement on a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons, including the cruise missiles based at Greenham Common. While clearly the encampments did not directly bring about the treaties, they did take place, and were significant actions by women in a particular time and place, and therefore deserve the attention of political theorists scrutinizing the “chatter” and actions of citizens.

The “direct action” of the Greenham women, the Seabrook and Nevada Test Site “affinity groups” who “occupied” plants during the early 1980s, and the “tree huggers” in California, Oregon, and India is participatory politics. “Tree huggers” place their bodies in front of chainsaws to stop loggers from cutting old growth forests. “Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory,” says Vandana Shiva (1994, 41). Consequently the politics of restoring value (not market value) and integrity to nature where it is destroyed or threatened, are participatory politics. The participants in the movements


are the occupants of the oikos, the women and “slaves” whose material base is under siege, those who are the traditional managers and caretakers of their specific and complex environments. Unlike deontic citizenship, which views political participation, and particularly activism, as a burden, ecofeminist citizenship sees it as essential to freedom.

This does not mean that ecofeminist theory purports to give content to an objective idea of human flourishing; it explicitly distances itself from “essentialism” (Quinby 1989, 124). The particular goals of ecofeminist action are specific to the particular local struggle it takes on, the micropolitics of the space in which the community is engaged.

Jkofeminism as a politics of resistance operates against power understood, as Foucault puts it, as a iimultiplicity of force relations” decentered and continually produced from one moment to the next.” Against such power, coherence in theory and centralization of practice make a social movement irrelevant or, worse, vulnerable, o r e v e n more dangerous-participatory with forces of domination. (Quinby 1989, 124)

As Indian activist Corinne Kumar DSouza puts it,

The movements for change in different societies will not be identical, each bringing its own emphasis, its own ethos; its own politics, its own praxis. What is significant is that changes in the microcosm can, in their totality, produce a larger change in the global macrocosm, creating new spaces. Hopefully then the armourers and the police will begin to lose their authority. The ideologists will lose their lines. A new space for politics will open up. (DSouza 1989,38)

MORAL (CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL) PLURALISM

Moral pluralism insists on the existence of a “permanent tension” between the ethnic, national, racial, religious, intellectual, and personal loyalties of groups and individuals in the nation-state (Katznelson 1996, 172-178; Gray 1996,38-75). It admits that there will be a “loss” when actors have to choose between values that are incommensurable.

By incommensurability is meant incomparability-the incomparability of valuable cultural objects, activities, reasons for action or forms of life. In ethics an implication of incornrnensura- bility is the reality of an ultimate diversity of incomparable fonns of human excellence OT flourishing (and of an equal diversity of incomparable evils). . . . Contrary to Aristotle, no hierarchy can be

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established by an rational procedure among such diverse forms of human flourishing. To think otherwise is to invoke an archaic metaphysical biology, itself grounded in an atavistic consmology of natural ends or a great chain of being. (Gray 1996,52, emphasis added)

The compatability between Sir Isaiah Berlin’s quasi-anthropological view, as Gray calls it, and the ecofeminist ontology described above, is self-evident. However, while Berlin’s thesis of the incommensurability of values obtaining in plural societies is perceptive and helpful from a nonuniversalist political viewpoint, he fails to recognize what all the so-called incommensurable cultures and subcultures have in common: the same old gender hierarchy that goes right back to Aristotle. While they might differ in many other respects, the majority of which Berlin recognizes, the moral pluralism he advocates- along with John Gray who calls it “agonistic liberalism”--does not dislodge its ancient cornerstone.

This same cornerstone is the common site of struggle for otherwise diverse communities around the world.I2 It is this very cornerstone that literally “engendered” the Beijing declaration of 1995.13 Ending violence against women, particularly sexual violence, was the one thing that women represent- ing every possible linguistic, national, religious, class, and professional degree of diversity available could agree on, because it is the one thing that all their cultures have in common. On this cornerstone is formed the site for the “we” on both of the micropolitical and the global levels, the “we” that is the precondition of “the political,” which up to the last few decades, has excluded women.

So “we” have come full circle: the hierarchical polis that excluded the oikos contained the seeds of its own destruction; a revolution in scientific “rationality” gave precedence to the art of wealth-getting such that citizenship became at best instrumental to oikos functions and at worst a fiction. Likewise, the dominance of oikos at the expense of politics, at the expense of virtue, at the expense of the natural environment and the communities that depend on it contains the seeds of its own-material-destruction. Freedom from necessity has not been realized; all we have done is to equalize our risk fate. “The notion that Man’s freedom and happiness depend on an ongoing process of emancipation from nature,” says Stephen Toulmin (whether through the classical polis or through modern science and the market), is under attack on multiple fronts, an attack that falls under the rubric of the “Lilliputian” strategy:

Lilliputian organizations cannot compel immoral rulers to apol- ogize on their knees, as Henry I1 had to do; but they do subject rulers who refuse to mend their ways to damaging embarrass- ment in the eyes of the world. If the political image of Moder-


nity was Leviathan, the moral standing of “national” powers and superpowers will, for the future, be captured in the picture of Lemuel Gulliver, waking from an unthinking sleep, to find himself tethered by innumerable tiny bonds. (Toulmin 1990, 198)

If it is difficult to imagine what the Lilliputians will actually do with Gulliver once he awakens, it is because no “totalizing” theory provides a ready answer. There are models in the “new science,” such as the “morphogenetic model of change,’’ which

can encompass and help us see the planetary transformation now occurring in so many dimensions simultaneously. This change model, familiar to biologists as that by which a chrysalis turns into a butterfly, states that it is characterized by accelera- tion, and by the inability to infer from any of the existing states of the system its future state. Both ecophilosophy and ecofeminism have shown the capacity to deal with such dimensions of breakdown and breakthrough. (Henderson 1988,16; emphasis in original)

CONCLUSION

If contemporary political theory is to be relevant to its local and global contexts, it must take as its central reference point the empirical fact of the twin crises of social and environmental devastation riddling the “developed,” the “developing,” and the “underdeveloped” w0r1ds.l~ These crises have been brought about by the imperatives of reductionism and homogeneity built into an economic system enshrined in an objectivist scientific paradigm.15 The classical genesis of this particular paradigm was a deeply gendered, hierarchical ontology theorized by Aristotle in the Athenian polis.

In response to the twin environmental and social crises worldwide, women ostensibly separated by class, race, geography, education, “degrees of development,” and language are practicing citizenship in a very new, special, and common way.I6 They gather by the thousands in Cairo, Copenhagen, Mexico City, Nairobi, and Beijing (among many other locations), hash out their differences in a “common language,” (Rich, 1978) and present platforms, declarations, and demands to corporate executives, bureaucrats, politicians, and world organizations. They return to their families and communities to nourish, organize, protest, work, and implement policy against all the odds; they are called silly, uninformed, “hysterical,” and “irrati~nal.”’~

This form of citizenship as action, as opposed to standing,’8 is a direct response to the material conditions wrought by twenty-four centuries of hierarchy.” Its object is the survival of people and the ecosystems on which human society

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depends. Because it is infused with such a strong sense of place-the particular “home” that is threatened-ecofeminist action is highly diverse. Broad participation and equality are its hallmarks because it relies on the numbers, the power of the disempowered, rather than on the electoral system with “representatives” selected by voters with “preferences.”

To be a politically acceptable solution to the empirical fact of difference celebrated in ecofeminist action around the world, moral pluralism must provide some sort of plausible answer to the political question, “whence unity?” What will constitute the common ground (the koinonia of the polis) wherein diverse identities can generate sufficient consensus on national policies, redistributive justice, and environmental regulation? “Thin” conceptions of the constructivist liberal variety seem to be proving too fragile to withstand “illiberalism” (Katznelson 1996; Strong 1996). Examples of illiberalism would be the Christian Coalition, the villification of “welfare mothers” and their children, or the anti-immigrant movements taking root all over the West- mutations of overmobilized identities that attack difference. They find support from those whose privilege is “on the wane” for a variety of reasons. Reasons sufficiently diffuse and abstract that the immediate political scapegoats are poor women, or “aliens” with darker complexions.

What binds us is what all separate identities have in common: the prospect of losing the biological foundations of our life and well-being on this planet. It is interesting that this issue is being addressed most vociferously and persis- tently by the one “group” whose subordination all groups across the spectrum of identity have in common. Women have made the connections between their historical subordination and prevailing social and environmental injus- tice. Women have articulated the claim, at both the theoretical and political levels, that it is only the process and praxis of rectifying that subordination that will open the way to the necessary participation of all sectors of society in the institutions that plan for and oversee sustainable development.

This is not simply an extension of the “moral voice” argument of nineteenth-century feminism; it is an argument for the (meta)physics of balance, as it were. Implicit in this argument is the claim that true democracy, true equality, true justice, have never been tried; have never even been seriously theorized until extremely recently because women have always been socially, economically, intellectually, and politically subordinate. Only now, astonish- ingly, are international institutions taking women’s role in “development” and subsistence economies seriously. Now, at the end of the twentieth-century, women gather from every comer of the earth and denounce the commonality of their condition, and offer strategies to overcome it. It has taken until the end of the twentieth-century for national and international institutions to recognize and support those strategies, albeit only nominally and sotto woce.

The overarching framework that gives coherence and a common frame of reference to multiple identities must, by definition, be greater, more encom-


passing, than the sum of those identities. In addition, it must address what those identities have in common if it is to create effective institutional channels of communication. The totally material commonalities in this case are shared risk and the subordination of women. Many theorists have argued that the latter is the foundation of the former; that it is only by dismantling the one, bringing about true partnership rather than hierarchy between the sexes, that the dimension of risk can be addressed politically, and perhaps, if furtunu smiles on us, can begin to abate.

In this context, the institution of equal citizenship, in the active rather than the status sense, becomes the full measure of freedom. As ecofeminist theorists Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies write,

To find freedom does not involve subjugating the realm of necessity, but rather focusing on developing a vision of freedom, happiness, the good life, within the limits of necessity, of nature. We call this vision the subsistence perspective, because to transcend nature can no longer be justified, instead, nature’s subsistence potential in all its dimensions and manifestations must be nurtured and conserved. Freedom within the realm of necessity can be universalized to all; freedomfiom necessity can be available only to a few. (Shiva and Mies 1993,8)

I believe that Aristotle, despite himself, were he alive today, would agree. Such freedom is based on a vision of nature as abundant and balanced rather than terroristic and the source of scarcity, a vision that became commonplace in political and economic theory after the publication of Leviathan. The task of restoring balance and abundance to a profoundly wounded nature has called forth, in those deemed unworthy of it, the ultimate virtues of classical citizenship: friendship, commitment, skill ( t e c h ) , patience, passion, and excellence (mete).

NOTES

1. Arendt quotes Gunnar Myrdal in The Political Ekment in the Development of Ecaomic Theory (1953), p.x, saying that “the idea of social economy”, or “collective housekeeping” is one of the “three main foci” around which “the political speculation that has permeated economies from the beginning is found to be crystallized” (Arendt 1959).

2. As Aristotle points out in The Politics, “it is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with the art of wealth getting, for the one uses the material which the other provides” (1256a). Also, “There are two sorts of wealth getting: one is a part of household management, the other is the retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural,

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and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury” (1258b).

In late capitalism, an important source of “wealth” for a small class of people has been the “casino economy” where money and stock futures are traded: “During the post-war period, capitalist ‘growth‘ came from industrial expansion; today, wealth comes from unproductive and fictitious economic exchange. It is based not on exchange of industrial commodities, but on servicing a paper and electronic money system” (Shiva 1994, 221).

3. “Rights increasingly assume universality, legal uniformity, and abstracmess, and are defined at the global level” (Soysal 1994, 159).

4. For a detailed discussion of the distinction, see King (1990). 5. For a thorough feminist analysis of the oikos-poolis functions and relations, see

Brown (1988, chapters 1-4). 6. I am mindful of misappropriating Aristotle, and take seriously the cautions of

Wallach (1992). Nevertheless, this is too good a definition to pass up. 7. I am using “rationality” in the specific genealogy of Max Weber and Jurgen

Habermas. 8. For a linguistic analysis of the various usages and meanings of “political” as

opposed to “the political,” see Pitkin (1972, 213-215). 9. The literature on “the political” includes Wolin (1960); Arendt (1959); Mouffe

(1993); and Ranciere (1993). 10. In her essay, “Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin and the Liberal-Dem-

ocratic Conception of the Political” Carol Pateman (1988) discusses the fiction of “consent,” saying that “The social contract is a fiction about citizenship,” and arguing in “Women and Consent” that application of consent theory to women is incoherent and meaningless.

I believe that the fiction of consent theory is the natural sequel to the fiction of hierarchy; that the multiplication of fictions based on oppression, rather than creating order and stability, generates severe pathologies such as the environmental crisis we are in the throes of today. See Note 2 for the fiction of wealth in the casino economy.

11. The discussion about moral pluralism has recurred in the context of the “liberal- communitarian” debate, among others. Gertrude Himmelfarb characterizes the divi- sions among communitarians, most of whom remain committed to “liberalism rightly understood” as a “civil war within the liberal camp” (1996). Theorists such as Sir Isaiah Berlin, and more recently Ira Katznelson, see moral pluralism or what ]ohn Gray calls “agonistic liberalism” as the bridge between the liberal and communitarian camps, the attempt to call a truce, as it were. See Gray (1996), and Katznelson (1996).

12. It is interesting that the Greek word for “common,” which Aristotle used throughout The Politics to describe both the polis and the oikos is koinon, which Arlene Saxonhouse (1992) translates as “sharing:” “As Aristotle says at the beginning of Book 2 of The Politics, a plis must be koinonia, since it must share something, at the very least the land on which it is founded. A family is also a koinonia, sharing the goods of the household, the gods, and so forth. With regard to the city, though, the family is idion, distinct from its own property and gods.”

13. “They came from far away. Reservations, small villages, big cities, and small islands in the Pacific. All colors, sizes, religions, cultural beliefs, and income brackets. From the super rich, like Jane Fonda, to the women of Rwandaa, victims of war, genocide, and international policies. The U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women


in Beijing, China, brought together more than 30,000 women and 3,000 organizations in the largest U.N. conference ever” (Quoted in LaDuke 1995).

14. For a detailed description and analysis of these crises, see Brown (1996). 15. For the effects of the nascent market system on traditional communities in

Europe, see Polanyi (1957). 16. I am using the word “common” here differently than Aristotle did; it means both

“ordinary” and “together.” My intention is also to make a play on the word “common,” which when applied to women by patriarchal society signifies “of low morals’’ and is therefore used to denigrate and control. This meaning was given a new twist by the feminist slogan, “The common woman is like a loaf of bread: she will rise.”

17. “When women began protesting toxic wastes, male officials ignored them and criticized them for being overemotional. They labeled them “little old ladies in tennis shoes” and “hysterical housewives.” Blue-collar women appropriated the labels and turned them into empowerment. Said Cora Tucker, “When they first called me a hysterical housewife I used to get very upset and go home and cry. . . . I learned that’s a tactic men use to keep us in our place. When they started the stuff on toxic wastes. . . . a guy got up and said, ‘We have a whole room of hysterical housewives today, so men we need to get prepared.’ I said, ‘You’re exactly right. We’re hysterical and when it comes to matters of life and death, especially mine, I get hysterical. . . . If men don’t get hysterical, there’s something wrong with them.’ They stopped calling us hysterical” (Quoted in Krauss, 1993).

This is a mine of valuable discourse for my gendered oikos-polis thesis. The realm of necessity is speaking in the public sphere, from its essential “hysterical” “genderedness,” and its genderedness is being named as such. “Hysterical” comes from the Greek hustera, meaning “womb,” so syntactically speaking, men cannot get hysterical. That does not necessarily mean there is something wrong with them.

18. Judith N. Shklar (1991) distinguishes at least “four distinct though related meanings” in the word “citizenship,” one of which is “standing.” The other three are “ citizenship . , as nationality,” as “active participation,” or “good” citizenship; and finally “ideal republican citizenship.” Shklar’s book is about citizenship as standing. This paper is about citizenship as active participation.

19. I say “direct,” not only to signify “directly related” but also to signify the fact that in many cases women take “direct action.” For an inventory of women’s actions around the world, see Merchant (1990, 1996), Garland (1988), Shiva (1989, 1993), Diamond and Orenstein, eds. (1990), Plant (1989), and Mies and Shiva (1993).

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Documents

Ecofeminist Citizenship