1

RSA – Genesis, operation &security

ECE 646 - Lecture 9

Public Key (Asymmetric) Cryptosystems

Public key of Bob - KBPrivate key of Bob - kB

Alice Bob

Network

Encryption Decryption

2

Trap-door one-way function

X f(X) Y

f-1(Y)

Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman“New directions in cryptography,” 1976

PUBLIC KEY

PRIVATE KEY

Professional (NSA) vs. amateur (academic)approach to designing ciphers

1. Know how to break Russian

ciphers

2. Use only well-established

proven methods

3. Hire 50,000 mathematicians

4. Cooperate with an industry

giant

5. Keep as much as possible

secret

1. Know nothing about

cryptology

2. Think of revolutionary

ideas

3. Go for skiing

4. Publish in “Scientific

American”

5. Offer a $100 award for

breaking the cipher

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4

Challenge published in Scientific American

9686 9613 7546 2206 1477 1409 2225 43558829 0575 9991 1245 7431 9874 6951 20930816 2982 2514 5708 3569 3147 6622 88398962 8013 3919 9055 1829 9451 5781 5145

Ciphertext:

Public key:

N = 114381625757 888867669235779976146612010218296721242362562561842935706935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541

(129 decimal digits)e = 9007

Award $100

1977

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RSA as a trap-door one-way function

M C = f(M) = Me mod N C

M = f-1(C) = Cd mod N

PUBLIC KEY

PRIVATE KEY

N = P Q P, Q - large prime numbers

e d 1 mod ((P-1)(Q-1))

RSA keys

PUBLIC KEY PRIVATE KEY

{ e, N } { d, P, Q }

N = P Q

e d 1 mod ((P-1)(Q-1))

P, Q - large prime numbers

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Why does RSA work? (1)

M’ = Cd mod N = (Me mod N)d mod N = M

decryptedmessage

originalmessage

?

e d 1 mod ((P-1)(Q-1))

e d 1 mod (N)

Euler’s totientfunction

Euler’s totient (phi) function (1)

(N) - number of integers in the range from 1 to N-1that are relatively prime with N

Special cases:

1. P is prime

Relatively prime with P: 1, 2, 3, …, P-1

2. N = P Q P, Q are prime

(N) = (P-1) (Q-1)

Relatively prime with N: {1, 2, 3, …, PQ-1} – {P, 2P, 3P, …, (Q-1)P}– {Q, 2Q, 3Q, …, (P-1)Q}

(P) = P-1

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Euler’s totient (phi) function (2)

Special cases:

3. N = P2 P is prime

(N) = P (P-1)

Relatively prime with N: {1, 2, 3, …, P2-1} – {P, 2P, 3P, …, (P-1)P}

In general

If N = P1e1 P2

e2 P3e3 … Pt

et

(N) = Piei-1 (Pi-1)

i=1

t

Euler’s TheoremLeonard Euler, 1707-1783

a: gcd(a, N) = 1

a(N) 1 (mod N)

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Euler’s Theorem - Justification (1)

For N=10 For arbitrary N

R = {1, 3, 7, 9} R = {x1, x2, …, x (N)}

Let a=3 Let us choose arbitrary a, such thatgcd(a, N) = 1

S = {ax1 mod N, ax2 mod N, …,ax (N)mod N}

S = { 31 mod 10,33 mod 10, 37 mod 10,

39 mod 10 }= {3, 9, 1, 7} = rearranged set R

Euler’s Theorem - Justification (2)

For N=10 For arbitrary N

R = S R = S

x1x2 x3 x4(ax1) (ax2)(ax3 )(ax4) mod N

x1x2 x3 x4a4 x1x2 x3 x4 mod N

a4 1 (mod N)

i=1

(N)

xi

i=1

(N)

a xi (mod N)

i=1

(N)

xi a(N)

i=1

(N)

xi (mod N)

a (N) 1 (mod N)

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Why does RSA work? (2)

M’ = Cd mod N = (Me mod N)d mod N =

= Me d mod N =

= M1+k(N) mod N = M (M(N))k mod N =

= M (M(N) mod N)k mod N =

= M 1k mod N = M

e d 1 mod (N)e d = 1 + k(N)

=

Rivest estimation - 1977

The best known algorithm for factoring a129-digit number requires:

40 000 trilion years= 40 · 1015 years

assuming the use of a supercomputerbeing able to perform

1 multiplication of 129 decimal digit numbers in 1 ns

Rivest’s assumption translates to the delay of a single logic gate 10 ps

Estimated age of the universe: 100 bln years = 1011 years

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Lehmer SieveBicycle chain sieve [D. H. Lehmer, 1928]

Computer Museum, Mountain View, CA

Machine à Congruences [E. O. Carissan, 1919]Machine à Congruences [E. O. Carissan, 1919]

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Supercomputer Cray

Computer Museum, Mountain View, CA

Early records in factoring large numbers

YearsNumber of

decimaldigits

Numberof bits

Requiredcomputational

power(in MIPS-years)

1974

1984

1991

1992

1993

45

71

100

110

120

149

235

332

365

398

0.001

0.1

7

75

830

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How to factor for free?A. Lenstra & M. Manasse, 1989

• Using the spare time of computers,(otherwise unused)

• Program and results sent by e-mail(later using WWW)

Practical implementations of attacks

Factorization, RSA

Year

Numberof bitsof N

Number ofdecimal digits

of N

Estimated amountof computations

1994

1996

1998

129

130

140

430

433

467 2000 MIPS-years

5000 MIPS-years

750 MIPS-years

Method

QS

GNFS

GNFS

1999 140467 8000 MIPS-yearsGNFS

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Breaking RSA-129

When: August 1993 - 1 April 1994, 8 months

Who: D. Atkins, M. Graff, A. K. Lenstra, P. Leyland+ 600 volunteers from the entire world

How: 1600 computersfrom Cray C90, through 16 MHz PC,

to fax machines

Only 0.03% computational power of the Internet

Results of cryptanalysis:

“The magic words are squeamish ossifrage”

An award of $100 donated to Free Software Foundation

Elements affecting the progressin factoring large numbers

computational power

computer networks

better algorithms

1977-1993 increase of about 1500 times

Internet

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Factoring methods

General purpose Special purpose

QS - Quadratic Sieve

GNFS - General NumberField Sieve

ECM - Elliptic Curve Method

Time of factoring dependsonly on the size of N

Time of factoring is muchshorter if N or factors of N

are of the special form

Pollard’s p-1 method

Cyclotomic polynomial method

SNFS - Special Number FieldSieve

Continued Fraction Method(historical)

Running time of factoring algorithms

Lq[, c] = exp ((c+o(1))·(ln q)·(ln ln q)1- )

For =0

Lq[0, c] = (ln q)(c+o(1))

Algorithm polynomialas a function of the numberof bits of q

For =1

Lq[1, c] = exp((c+o(1))·(ln q))

Algorithm exponentialas a function of the numberof bits of q

For 0 < < 1 Algorithm subexponentialas a function of the number

of bits of q

f(n) = o(1) if for any positive constant c>0 there exist a constantn0>0, such that 0 f(n) < c, for all n n0

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General purpose factoring methods

size of the factored numberN in decimal digits (D)

100D 130D

QS moreefficient

NFS moreefficient

Expected running time

QS NFS

LN[1/2, 1] = exp((1 + o(1))·(ln N)1/2 ))·(ln ln N)1/2)

LN[1/3, 1.92] = exp((1.92 + o(1))·(ln N)1/3 ))·(ln ln N)2/3)

110D 120D

First RSA Challenge

RSA-100RSA-110RSA-120RSA-130RSA-140RSA-150RSA-160RSA-170RSA-180RSA-190RSA-200RSA-210..............RSA-450RSA-460RSA-470RSA-480RSA-490RSA-500

Largest number factored to date

RSA-200 May 2005

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Second RSA Challange

Lentgh of Nin bits

Length of Nin decimal digits

Award forfactorization

576

640

704

768

896

1024

1536

2048

174

193

212

232

270

309

463

617

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$50,000

$75,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

Number of bits vs. number of decimal digits

10#digits = 2#bits

#digits = (log10 2) · #bits 0.30 · #bits

256 bits = 77 D384 bits = 116 D512 bits = 154 D768 bits = 231 D1024 bits = 308 D2048 bits = 616 D

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Factoring 512-bit number

512 bits = 155 decimal digitsold standard for key sizes in RSA

17 March - 22 August 1999

168 workstations SGI and Sun, 175-400 MHz

First stage

Second stage

Cray C916 - 10 days, 2.3 GB RAM

Group of Herman te RieleCentre for Mathematics and Computer Science(CWI), Amsterdam

120 Pentium PC, 300-450 MHz, 64 MB RAM4 stations Digital/Compaq, 500 MHz

2 months

March 2002, Financial Cryptography Conference

Nicko van Someren, CTO nCipher Inc.announced that his company developed software

capable of breaking 512-bit RSA keywithin 6 weeks

using computers available in a single office

Practical progress in factorization

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Number of operations in the best known attack

512-bit RSADES(56-bit key)

1/50

NDES

NDES

RSA vs. DES: Resistance to attack

Factoring RSA-576512 bits = 155 decimal digits

When?

Who?

Announced: December 3, 2003

J. Franke and T. KleinjungBonn UniversityMax Planck Institute for Mathematics in BonnExperimental Mathematics Institute in Essen

P. Montgomery and H. te Riele - CWIF. Bahr, D. Leclair, P. Leyland and R. Wackerbarth

German Federal Agency for InformationTechnology Security (BIS)

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Factoring RSA-200200 decimal digits = 664 bits

When?

Who?

Dec 2003 - May 2005

CWI (Netherlands), Bonn University,Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in BonnExperimental Mathematics Institute in EssenGerman Federal Agency for InformationTechnology Security (BIS)

First stage

Second stage

Effort?

About 1 year on various machines, equivalent to55 years on Opteron 2.2 GHz CPU

3 months on a cluster of 80 2.2 GHz Opteronsconnected via a Gigabit network

Factoring RSA-640640 bits = 193 decimal digitsWhen?

Who?

June 2005 - Nov 2005

CWI (Netherlands), Bonn University,Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in BonnExperimental Mathematics Institute in EssenGerman Federal Agency for InformationTechnology Security (BIS)

First stage

Second stage

Effort?

3 months on 80 Opteron 2.2 GHz CPUs

1.5 months on a cluster of 80 2.2 GHz Opteronsconnected via a Gigabit network

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numberdecimaldigits

date time (phase 1) algorithm

C116 116 1990 275 MIPS years mpqs

RSA-120 120 VI. 1993 830 MIPS years mpqs

RSA-129 129 IV. 1994 5000 MIPS years mpqs

RSA-130 130 IV. 1996 1000 MIPS years gnfs

RSA-140 140 II. 1999 2000 MIPS years gnfs

RSA-155 155 VIII. 1999 8000 MIPS years gnfs

C158 158 I. 2002 3.4 Pentium 1GHz CPU years gnfs

RSA-160 160 III. 2003 2.7 Pentium 1GHz CPU years gnfs

RSA-576 174 XII. 2003 13.2 Pentium 1GHz CPU years gnfs

C176 176 V. 2005 48.6 Pentium 1GHz CPU years gnfs

RSA-200 200 V. 2005 121 Pentium 1GHz CPU years gnfs

Factorization records

Factorization records

He who has absolute confidence in linear regression willexpect a 1024-bit RSA number to be factored on

December 17, 2028

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For the most recent records see

Factorization Announcements at

http://www.crypto-world.com/FactorAnnouncements.html

Estimation of RSA Security Inc. regardingthe number and memory of PCs

necessary to break RSA-1024

Attack time: 1 year

Single machine: PC, 500 MHz, 170 GB RAM

Number of machines: 342,000,000

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Best Algorithm to Factor Large Numbers

NUMBER FIELD SIEVE

Complexity: Sub-exponential time and memory

N = Number to factor,k = Number of bits of N

Polynomialfunction, a·km

Exponential function, ek

Sub-exponential function,

e k1/3

(ln k)2/3

k = Number of bits of N

Executiontime

Factoring 1024-bit RSA keysusing Number Field Sieve (NFS)

Polynomial Selection

Linear Algebra

Square Root

Relation Collection

Sieving

Minifactoring (Cofactoring,Norm Factoring)200 bit

smooth numbers

& 350 bit

ECM, p-1 method, rho method

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TWINKLE“The Weizmann INstitute Key Locating Engine”

Adi Shamir, Eurocrypt, May 1999CHES, August 1999

Electrooptical device capable to speed-upthe first phase of factorization from 100 to 1000 times

If ever built it would increase the size of the keythat can be broken from 100 to 200 bits

Cost of the device (assuming that the prototype wasearlier built) - $5000

Bernstein’s Machine (1)

Fall 2001

Daniel Bernstein, professor of mathematicsat University of Illinois in Chicagosubmits a grant application to NSF

and publishes fragments of this applicationas an article on the web

D. Bernstein, Circuits for Integer Factorization: A Proposal

http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nfscircuit

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March 2002

• Bernstein’s article “discovered” duringFinancial Cryptography Conference

• Informal panel devoted to analysis of consequencesof the Bernstein’s discovery

• Nicko Van Someren (nCipher) estimates that machinecosting $ 1 bilion is able to break 1024-bit RSAwithin several minuts

Bernstein’s Machine (2)

March 2002

• alarming voices on e-mailing discussion listscalling for revocation of all currently used

1024-bit keys

• sensational articles in newspapers aboutBernstein’s discovery

Bernstein’s Machine (3)

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April 2002

Response of the RSA Security Inc.:

Error in the estimation presented at the conference;according to formulas from the Bernstein’s article

machine costing$ 1 billion is able to break

1024-bit RSA within10 billion x several minuts = tens of years

According to estimations of Lenstra i Verheul, machinebreaking 1024-bit RSA within one day

would cost $ 160 billion in 2002

Bernstein’s Machine (4)

Arjen Lenstra, Citibank & U. Eindhoven:

„…I have no idea what is this all fuss about...”

Bruce Schneier, Counterpane:

Carl Pomerance, Bell Labs:

„…fresh and fascinating idea...”

„ ... enormous improvements claimed are more a resultof redefining efficiency than anything else...”

Bernstein’s Machine (5)

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RSA keylength that can be brokenusing Bernstein’s machine

Computational cost = time [days] * memory [$]

RSA key lengths that can be brokenusing classical computers

3

2

1?

? ?

infinity

?

$ 1 bln*1 day $ 1000 bln*1 day

Bernstein’s Machine (6)

TWIRLFebruary 2003

Adi Shamir & Eran Tromer, Weizmann Institute of Science

Hardware implementation of the sieving phase ofNumber Field Sieve (NFS)

Assumed technology:

CMOS, 0.13 mclock 1 GHz

30 cm semiconductor wafers at the cost of $5,000 each

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TWIRL

Tentative estimations(no experimental data):

512-bit RSA:

1024-bit RSA:

< 10 minutes$ 10 k

< 1 year$ 10 million

A. Shamir, E. TromerCrypto 2003

Theoretical Designs for Sieving (1)

1999-2000

TWINKLE ( Shamir, CHES 1999;

Shamir & Lenstra, Eurocrypt 2000)

- based on optoelectronic devices (fast LEDs)

- not even a small prototype built in practice

- not suitable for 1024 bit numbers

2003

TWIRL (Shamir & Tromer, Crypto 2003)

- semiconductor wafer design

- requires fast communication between chips located

on the same 30 cm diameter wafer

- difficult to realize using current fabrication technology

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Theoretical Designs for Sieving (2)

2003-2004

Mesh Based Sieving / YASD

(Geiselmann & Steinwandt, PKC 2003

Geiselmann & Steinwandt, CT-RSA 2004)

- not suitable for 1024 bit numbers

2005

SHARK (Franke et al., SHARCS & CHES 2005)

- relies on an elaborate butterfly switch

connecting large number of chips

- difficult to realize using current technology

Theoretical Designs for Sieving (3)

2007

Non-Wafer-Scale Sieving Hardware(Geiselmann & Steinwandt, Eurocrypt 2007)

- based on moderate size chips (2.2 x 2.2 cm)

- communication among chips seems to be realistic

- 2 to 3.5 times slower than TWIRL

- supports only linear sieving, and not more optimal

lattice sieving

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Estimated recurring costs withcurrent technology (US$year)

768-bit 1024-bit

TraditionalPC-based

1.3107 1012

TWINKLE 8106

TWIRL 5103 10106

Mesh-based 3104

SHARK 230106

But: non-recurring costs, chip size, chip transport networks…

by Eran Tromer, May 2005

However…

Just analytical estimations, no realimplementations, no concrete numbers

None of the theoretical designs ever built.

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First Practical Implementation ofthe Relation Collection Step in Hardware

Tetsuya Izu and Jun Kogureand Takeshi Shimoyama (Fujitsu)

CHES 2007 - CAIRN 2 machine, September 2007SHARCS 2007 – CAIRN 3 machine, September 2007

2007

Japan

First large number factoredusing FPGA support

Factored number:

N = P · Q423-bits 205 bits 218 bits

Time of computations:

One month of computations using a PC supported by CAIRN 2for a 423-bit number

Problems:

- Speed up vs. one PC (AMD Opteron): only about 4 times- Limited scalability

CAIRN 3 about 40 times faster than CAIRN 2

Time of sieving with CAIRN 3 for a 768-bit keyestimated at 270 years

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SHARCS - Special-purpose Hardwarefor Attacking Cryptographic Systems

1st edition: Paris, Feb. 24-25, 20052nd edition: Cologne, Apr. 3-4, 20063rd edition: Vienna, Sep. 9-10, 2007

Workshop Series

Seehttp://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/itsc/tanja/SHARCS/

Keylengths in public key cryptosystemsthat provide the same level of security as AES

and other secret-key ciphers

Arjen K. Lenstra, Eric R. Verheul„Selecting Cryptographic Key Sizes”Journal of Cryptology

Arjen K. Lenstra„Unbelievable Security: Matching AES SecurityUsing Public Key Systems”ASIACRYPT’ 2001

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0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

Keylengths in RSA providing the same levelof security as selected secret-key cryptosystems

DES 3 DES(2 keys)

3 DES(3 keys)

AES-128 AES-192 AES-256

The same number of operations

The same cost

416620 1333

1723 19412426 2644

3224

68977918

13840

15387

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

2001 2010 2020 2030DES3 DES (2K)3 DES (3K)

AES-128

AES-192

AES-256

year

Keylengths in RSA providing the same levelof security as selected secret-key cryptosystems

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Recommended key sizes for RSARSA Laboratories, 1996

Old standard:

New standard:

Individual users

Individual users

Organizations (short term)

Organizations (long term)

512 bits(155 decimal digits)

768 bits(231 decimal digits)

1024 bits(308 decimal digits)

2048 bits(616 decimal digits)

Recommendations of RSA Security Inc.

May 6, 2003

2003-2010

2010-2030

2030-

Validity period

MinimalRSA key length

(bits)

Equivalent symmetrickey length

(bits)

80

112

128

1024

2048

3072

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Five security levelsallowed by American government

NIST SP 800-56

RSA / DH ECCSymmetric

ciphersLevel

I

II

III

IV

V

80

112

128

192

256

160

224

256

384

512

1024

2048

3072

8192

15360

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Discovery of public key cryptographyby British Intelligence

CESG - Communications-Electronics Security GroupBritish intelligence agency existing

for over 80 yers

Employees of CESG discovered the idea ofpublic key cryptography, the RSA cryptosystem and

the Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemeseveral years before their discovery in open research

Story disclosed only in December 1997

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General concept ofpublic key cryptography

Secret research Open research

James H. Ellis

“The possibility of SecureNon-Secret DigitalEncryption”

January 1970

Whit Diffie, Martin Hellman

November 1976

“New Directions inCryptography”

• proof of a possibility ofconstructing non-secret-keycryptography

• example of a public-keyagreement scheme

• concept of a digital signature

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RSA cryptosystem

Secret research Open research

Clifford Cocks Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir,Martin Hellman

November 1973 January 1978

C = MN mod N C = Me mod N

Decryption always based onthe Chinese RemainderTheorem

Decryption based onthe Chinese RemainderTheorem optional

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Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Scheme

Secret Research Open Research

Whit Diffie, Martin HellmanMalcolm Williamson

1974 June 1976

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Discovery of the public key cryptographyby British Intelligence

• Discovery in the secret research had onlyhistorical significance

• Discovery in the open research initiatedthe revolution in cryptography

• It is still unclear whether and if so whenpublic key cryptography was discovered by NSA.

• British Intelligence never considered applyingpublic key cryptography for digital signatures

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ACM A.M. Turing Award2002

R. RivestA. ShamirL. Adleman

“For Seminal Contributionsto the Theory and Practical Applications of

Public Key Cryptography”

Turing Award Lectures

Dr. Leonard M. AdlemanUniversity of Southern CaliforniaPre RSA Days

Dr. Ronald L. RivestMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyEarly RSA Days

Dr. Adi ShamirThe Weizmann InstituteCryptology: A Status Report

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