Upload
others
View
6
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Antitrust/Competition Commercial Damages Environmental Litigation and Regulation Forensic Economics Intellectual Property International Arbitration
International Trade Product Liability Regulatory Finance and Accounting Risk Management Securities Tax Utility Regulatory Policy and Ratemaking Valuation
Electric Power Financial Institutions Natural Gas Petroleum Pharmaceuticals, Medical Devices, and Biotechnology Telecommunications and Media Transportation
Copyright © 2011 The Brattle Group, Inc. www.brattle.com
Dynamic Pricing: Past, Present, and Future
Presented to:
Canadian Association of Members of Public Utility Tribunals
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Presented by:
Sanem Sergici, Ph.D.
Ahmad Faruqui, Ph.D.
06/14/2011
22011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Agenda
1. Background in dynamic pricing
2. What have we learned from dynamic pricing pilots?
3. Accommodating objections to dynamic pricing
4. Potential of dynamic pricing
5. References
32011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Dynamic pricing (DP) comes in a wide variety of forms
Charges a higher price during all weekday peak hours and a discounted price
during off-peak and weekend hoursTime-of-Use (TOU)
A rate with hourly variation based on LMPs and with a capacity cost adder
focused only during event hours, creating a strong price signal at these timesCritical Peak RTP
A rate with hourly variation that follows LMPs, but with capacity costs
allocated equally across all hours of the yearFlat Real Time Pricing (RTP)
The existing flat rate combined with a rebate for each unit of reduced demand
below a pre-determined baseline estimate during peak times of event daysPeak Time Rebate (PTR)
A TOU rate in which a moderate peak price applies during most peak hours of
the year, but a higher peak price applies on limited event daysCPP-TOU Combination
Customers are charged a higher price during the peak period on a limited
number of event days (often 15 or less); the rate is discounted during the
remaining hours
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP)
Similar to the TOU with the exception that the peak window is shorter in
duration (often four hours), leading to a stronger price signalSuper Peak TOU
DescriptionRate
Summary of Time-based Pricing Products
Note: TOU rates are not considered dynamic, yet included in this slide to give a complete picture of time-based pricing products
42011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
What is the current state of DP deployment?
TOU is the most commonly implemented time-based rate option for all customer classes and is largely deployed as a full-scale offering
CPP is more commonly tested through pricing pilots at this stage-although there are full-scale implementations
RTP is most typically deployed as a full-scale offering for C&I customers
PTR has only been tested through pilots as of yet – but this is likely to change
C&I customers are offered time-based rates much more frequently than the residential class and are more likely to be exposed to dynamic rates like RTP and CPP
52011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Agenda
1. Background in dynamic pricing
2. What have we learned from dynamic pricing pilots?
3. Accommodating the objections
4. Potential of dynamic pricing
5. References
62011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
1. Customers do respond to DP
Impacts from Residential Pricing Pilots
Pricing Pilot
Pe
ak
Re
du
cti
on
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
72011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Rate, technology, and pilot design are only part of the puzzle
Other factors include
♦ Price signal
♦ Central-air conditioning (CAC) saturation
♦ Other appliance saturation
♦ Type of enabling technology
♦ Weather
♦ Sociodemographic factors
♦ Marketing/incentives/education
Why the variation in impacts?
82011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
2. Enabling technologies boosts the impacts
Peak Reductions by Rate and Technology
Pricing Pilot
Pe
ak
Re
du
cti
on
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%T
OU
TO
U w
/ T
ech
PT
R
PT
R w
/ T
ech
CP
P
CP
P w
/ T
ech
RT
P
RT
P w
/ T
ech
92011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
3. Customer response is not a novelty and persists over time
Several recent DP pilots have specifically tested the persistence of customer response when events are called across two or three days in a row and found persistence
At least two pilots that have run for multiple years have testedpersistence across years and found persistence
Two utilities in Arizona have observed persistence in customer response to time-of-use rates across decades
102011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
4. Pilots are good indicators of the impacts in full-scale deployments when they are carefully designed
In the best pilots, treatments and control customers are randomly selected to be representative of the population at large
Pre-treatment measurements were taken to net out any pre-existing differences between the treatment and control groups
Pilot design and roll-out approach must mimic utility’s full deployment approach as much as possible
112011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
5. Low income customers do respond to DP
Low Income Customer Responsiveness
Relative to Average Customer Response
22%
50%
66% 66%
85%
100% 100%
84%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
California SPP:
CARE vs.
Average
PG&E
SmartRate
2009: CARE vs.
Average
PG&E
SmartRate
2008: CARE vs.
Average
CL&P's PWEP
Program (PTP
high):
Hardship vs.
Average
California SPP:
Low Income vs.
Average
Pepco DC
(price only):
Low Income vs.
Average
Residential
BGE 2008:
Known Low
Income vs.
Known
Average
Customer
CL&P's PWEP
Program:
Known Low
Income vs.
Known
Average
Customer
Pea
k R
edu
ctio
n
Average customer response
122011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
6. Most low income customers will be better of under DP due to their flat load profiles
Distribution of Dynamic Pricing Bill Impacts
- Low Income Customers on CPP Rate -
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ch
an
ge in
Mo
nth
ly B
ill
Before Customer Response
After Customer Response
"Losers""Winners"
Notes: Bill Simulation results for a large urban utility.
Assumes an average of 10% load response for low income customers
132011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
7. Customers are satisfied with DP once they experience it
Customers are already familiar with the idea of dynamic pricing
♦ Cell phone minutes
♦ Airline tickets and hotel rooms
♦ Toll roads and bridges
♦ Sporting events and shows
In the case of electricity, they tend to associate it with high prices and price volatility
♦ When they are asked if they want it, in focus group settings or telephone interviews, the majority say no
♦ When they have lived through it, either in full-scale programs or in pilot settings, the vast majority report high satisfaction and want to continue with the rates
142011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
8. Direct load control programs are not substitutes but complements to DP programs
Direct load control (DLC) only applies to customers who have airconditioning or water heating; other end-uses in the home are not incentivized to respond during critical events
Payments are made whether or not events are called and without smart meters, it is hard to verify that the controlled load has actually responded
Traditionally, direct load control is only triggered by reliability events
In general, DP can yield higher load responsiveness when combined with enabling technology than DLC and it can be triggered by either economic or reliability events
152011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
9. We also know more about potential pilot implementation “landmines”
♦ Test rates with significant price differentials
♦ Set or program enabling technologies during installation
♦ Carefully recruit via multiple channels
♦ Manage customer expectations
♦ Be prepared to explain bill increases
♦ Provide feedback about savings quickly and frequently
♦ Communicate with external and internal stakeholders
♦ Document reasons for unenrollment
♦ Beware of unrepresentative meter footprint
♦ Track “walk-ins”
More detail in a forthcoming Brattle paper…
162011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
10. After all the experimenting, there are still things we know poorly
Conservation impact of dynamic pricing needs more research♦ Several recent pilots suggest 0% to 1% savings
♦ Other studies have suggested 2% to 4%
Customers respond equally to peak time rebates and critical peak pricing in some tests and unequally in other tests
Customers respond to informational feedback about energy usage, prices and utility bills
♦ By how much they respond remains uncertain
♦ The impact on peak demand is uncertain
♦ Whether either energy or peak demand response would persist over time is also uncertain
The specific impact of web portals, in-home displays and energy orbs needs more research
Impact of socio-demographic variables (e.g., income, education) on customers’price responsiveness also need more research
172011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Several new concepts will be tested in the DOE-funded consumer behavior studies
♦ Variable peak pricing
♦ PTR as a transition tool
♦ Technology acceptance
♦ Pre-payment billing
♦ Sample selection methods
♦ Pricing period duration
♦ Bill protection
♦ Information access patterns
♦ Enhanced education
♦ Test-and-learn
182011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Agenda
1. Background in dynamic pricing
2. What have we learned from dynamic pricing pilots?
3. Accommodating objections to dynamic pricing
4. Potential of dynamic pricing
5. References
192011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Accommodating objections to dynamic pricing
Creating customer buy-in♦ Changing a century-old ratemaking practice will require significant
customer education and management of expectations
Offering tools♦ Improved billing information♦ In-home information displays♦ Enabling/automating technologies
Two-part rate design♦ Allows customers to manage the amount of usage exposed to the
dynamic rate
Peak-time rebates♦ Creates a “no lose” situation for all customers, while still providing the
incentive to reduce peak usage
202011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Accommodating the objections (cont’d)
Bill protection
♦ A “no losers” proposition for the first few years
♦ Phase out over time as part of educational initiative
Crediting customers for the hedging premium
♦ Flat rates sometimes include a premium to account for the price and volume risk associated with wholesale power purchases
♦ If price fluctuations are passed through to the retail rate, this risk is transferred to the customer and the premium is eliminated or reduced
Creating a menu of tariffs anchored around dynamic pricing
♦ Give customers the option of migrating to other time-varying rates or even hedged flat rates
212011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Current risk-reward frontier for electric rates
Risk
(Variance in
Price)
Reward
(Discount
from Flat
Rate)
10%
5%
10.5Flat Rate
RTP
CPP
VPP
Inclining Block Rate
Seasonal Rate
TOU
Less Risk, Lower
Reward
More Risk, Higher Reward
Super Peak TOU
PTR
Potential Reward
(Discount from Flat
Rate)
Incr
easi
ng R
eward
Increasing Risk
222011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Agenda
1. Background in dynamic pricing
2. What have we learned from dynamic pricing pilots?
3. Accommodating the objections
4. Potential of dynamic pricing
5. References
232011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Aggressive pursuit of dynamic pricing can lead to substantial reductions in peak demand
0
50
100
150
200
Business-as-
Usual
Expanded
BAU
Achievable
Participation
Full
Participation
Peak R
ed
ucti
on
(G
W)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
% o
f P
eak D
em
an
d
Other DR
Interruptible Tariffs
DLC
Pricing w/o Tech
Pricing w/Tech
38 GW,
4% of peak
82 GW,
9% of peak
138 GW,
14% of peak
188 GW,
20% of peak
Source: FERC DR Potential Study (2009)
242011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Much of the untapped potential for dynamic pricing resides in the residential class
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Business-as-
Usual
Expanded
BAU
Achievable
Participation
Full
Participation
Peak R
ed
ucti
on
(G
W)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
% o
f P
eak D
em
an
d
Large
Medium
Small
Residential
Source: FERC DR Potential Study (2009)
252011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Dynamic pricing would improve the economics of new smart grid technologies
Provides price signal to encourage peak savings
Grid-friendly appliances
Improves intrinsic value of the device to the owner
In-home information displays
Encourages more efficient charging patterns
Plug-in electric vehicles
Provides price differential to encourage load shifting
Distributed storage
Rewards self-generation during peak (sunny) hours
Rooftop solar applications
Effect of Dynamic PricingSmart Grid Element
262011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Agenda
1. Background in dynamic pricing
2. What have we learned from dynamic pricing pilots?
3. Accommodating the objections
4. Potential of dynamic pricing
5. References
272011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
References
♦ Faruqui, Ahmad, “The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing,” The Electricity
Journal, July 2010.
♦ Faruqui, Ahmad, Peter Fox-Penner, and Ryan Hledik. “Smart
Grid Strategy: Quantifying Benefits.” Public Utilities Fortnightly,
July 2009.
♦ Faruqui, Ahmad, Ryan Hledik and Sanem Sergici, “Rethinking
pricing: the changing architecture of demand response,” The
Public Utilities Fortnightly, January 2010.
♦ Faruqui, Ahmad, Ryan Hledik, and Sanem Sergici, “Piloting the smart grid,” The Electricity Journal, August/September, 2009.
♦ Faruqui, Ahmad and Sanem Sergici, “Household response to
dynamic pricing of electricity–a survey of 15 experiments,”
Journal of Regulatory Economics, October 2010.
282011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
References (cont’d)
♦ Faruqui, Ahmad, Sanem Sergici and Ahmed Sharif, “The Impact
of Informational Feedback: A Survey of the Experimental
Evidence,” Energy: The International Journal, 2009.
♦ Institute for Electric Efficiency, The Impact of Dynamic Pricing
on Low Income Customers, September 2010.
♦ Institute for Electric Efficiency, Moving Toward Utility-Scale
Deployment of Dynamic Pricing in Mass Markets, June 2009.
♦ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Assessment of
Demand Response & Advanced Metering: Staff Report, September 2009.
♦ Peter Fox-Penner, Smart Power- Climate Change, the Smart
Grid, and the Future of Electric Utilities, Island Press, 2010.
292011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Speaker Bio and Contact Information
Sanem Sergici, Ph.D.
Senior Associate
Cambridge, MA
(617) 864 7900
Sanem Sergici is a Senior Associate of The Brattle Group with expertise electricity markets, industrial
organization and applied econometrics. At Brattle, the focus of Dr. Sergici’s work has been on assisting electric
utilities, regulators, research organizations and wholesale market operators in the development of innovative
demand response and energy efficiency portfolios and strategies. Dr. Sergici has expertise in the design and
evaluation of dynamic pricing pilot programs, development of load forecasting models, and design of innovative
rates for electric utilities. Her recent engagements include assisting the utilities in Michigan, Connecticut, Illinois
and Maryland in the design and impact evaluation of their pricing and technology pilots. Dr. Sergici is a member
of a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) for Smart Grid Investment Grant projects that was formed by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). She has spoken at several
industry conferences and published in several industry journals.
Dr. Sergici received her Ph.D. in Applied Economics from Northeastern University in the fields of applied
econometrics and industrial organization. She also holds an M.A. in Economics from Northeastern University,
and B.S. in Economics from Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey.
The views expressed in this presentation are strictly those of the presenter(s) and do not necessarily state or reflect the views of The Brattle Group, Inc.
Insert corporate headshot
here.
302011 Energy Regulation CourseQueen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
About The Brattle Group
Climate Change Policy and Planning
Cost of Capital
Demand Forecasting and Weather Normalization
Demand Response and Energy Efficiency
Electricity Market Modeling
Energy Asset Valuation
Energy Contract Litigation
Environmental Compliance
Fuel and Power Procurement
Incentive Regulation
Rate Design, Cost Allocation, and Rate
Structure
Regulatory Strategy and Litigation Support
Renewables
Resource Planning
Retail Access and Restructuring
Risk Management
Market-Based Rates
Market Design and Competitive Analysis
Mergers and Acquisitions
Transmission
The Brattle Group provides consulting and expert testimony in economics, finance,and regulation to corporations, law firms, and governments around the world.
We combine in-depth industry experience, rigorous analyses, and principled techniques to help clients answer complex economic and financial questions in
litigation and regulation, develop strategies for changing markets, and make critical business decisions.
44 Brattle Street
Cambridge, MA 02138