Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan - … operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. •

Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously:

• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition.

• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition.

• Retain supportive individuals.These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents

• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams

Support forInsurgency

NeutralPopulace

Support for HNGovernment

PotentialFractiousness

of Society

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Start with taking a ternary view of the population: Gov’t supporters, Ins supporters and neutrals. Each is a reservoir containing a percentage of the population. Four possible flows of people: Gov to Neu, Neu to Ins, Ins to Neu, Neu to Gov. Flow rates between reservoirs are based on numerous external influences. Fractiousness of society is an exogenous variable.

• An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development.

• A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.


NeutralPopulace


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

CoalitionFunding


of Society

Presenter

Presentation Notes

One effect of coalition funding will be to promote economic investment. This in turn leads to economic development. Economic development can shift people from Ins to Neu and Neu to Gov. What else does coalition funding affect?


NeutralPopulace


Satisfaction withEssential Services

Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential

Services

Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and

Restoring EssentialServices

Time to DevelopEssential Services

EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

CoalitionFunding


of Society

• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services.

• Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

-Coalition funding can also help to develop essential services. This development also takes time. -Actual essential services is based on a competition between their development and their breakdown. (Funnel analogy, or a leak.) -What are essential services? We have to ask the population to find out, because ultimately it’s based on what they want, not what we think that they want. -The provision of essential services, combined with the population’s expectations of them, leads to a level of satisfaction with essential services. -It is this level of satisfaction that shifts people between the reservoirs of support. -But expectations for essential services are not an exogenous variable. It’s endogenous; but what affects it?


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance

Time to DevelopGovernance

EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity

Insurgent Actsof Violence

PsychologicalOperations

Effectiveness


of Society

External MaterialSupportA government that is established,

recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to

• Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace.

• Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce.

• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

- Psychological operations! Specifically, effective psychological operations effectiveness. - PysOps can influence the populations expectations. - What improves PysOps? A good government, which can provide a credible message. Good government also shifts people’s allegiances and promotes economic investment. - People can be shifted by their perception of security. Perceived Security is affected by PsyOps and Insurgent violence. - So what’s the rest of the model?


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity


Total ForceDensity

Host NationForce Density

Coalition ForceDensity

Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force


Effectiveness

Information

Host NationSecurity Forces

Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces

Impact ofIllegitimate Actions

Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability

to Execute

AppropriateStrategic Emphasis

Understanding andKnowledge of Social

Structures

Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio


of Society

External MaterialSupport

An appropriate force mix, and correct operational tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very significant impacts on

• The restoration of essential services.

• The populace’s perception of security.

• The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Note understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures. This is a direct result of ASCOPE. This leads directly to two things: An appropriate strategic emphasis, and increased competency and ability to execute. Both of these lead directly to a better mix of effort and more appropriate use of force. Don’t go too deep into the details here.


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity


Total ForceDensity





Effectiveness

Information





to Execute



Structures



of Society

The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24


Presenter

Presentation Notes

Here it is. A graphical representation of the causes and effects identified in FM 3-24. In red are the LOOs. Let’s take a look at one example, the information loop.


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity


Total ForceDensity





Effectiveness

Information





to Execute



Structures



of Society


The Basic Information Ops Loop

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Start with improved information. Better information allows for a better targeting of force, which leads to the direct elimination of insurgents. We can use these successes in our PsyOps campaign, which leads to a perceived increase in security. An increase in perceived security can convince neutrals to openly support the government. This feedback loop concludes with people providing more information.

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9

Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively

SupportingGov’t & SF

Sympathizingw/ Gov’t

the FencePopulation

Sympathizingw/ Insurgents

PopulationActively

SupportingInsurgency

PotentialAttractiveness

of Gov vs.Insurgent Path

RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs

Insurgents

POPULAR SUPPORT t

Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters

Presenter

Presentation Notes

We add our target, the population, to the model.


Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF

Strength of Religious

Ideology & Tribal Structures

Cultural Erosion/Displacement

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents

Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Average Connectedness

of Population

Perceived Security

Fear of Ins. Attack,

Repercussions

Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services &

Employment

Visible Gains In Security, Services &

Employment

Expectations for Security, Services &

Employment

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology,

Tribal Structures w/

Gov’t Path

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Fear of insurgent attack is based on three things: the population’s perception of the insurgents strength and intent, and the population’s perception of Gov’t and Coalition strength and intent. What matters here is relative strength. The Counterinsurgents need to be perceived as stronger than the insurgents to reduce the populations fear of attack. Fear of insurgent attack relates directly to changing sympathizers to supporters. So how does this fit into our population model?



SupportingGov’ t & SF


the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t POPULAR SUPPORT

PerceivedDamages &Use of Force

by Ins.

Perception ofInsurgentStrength &

Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

PerceivedDamages/Use

of Force byGov t & Coalition

Relative WOMMessage

AmplificationGov vs Ins’t

Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception

Of GovtStrength& Intent

Expectations

Services, &Employment

Visible Gains

Services &Employment

Satisfactionw/ Gains in

Security, Services& Employment

for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity

AverageConnectednessof Population

Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,

Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath

StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry

Strength ofReligious

Ideology &Tribal

Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement

POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures


Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and ability to operate

2Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population

Insurgent Capacity,

Priorities & Effectiveness

Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/

Support for Gov’t

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

Territory Not Under Gov’t

ControlIns Provision

of Gov’t & Services

Insurgent Offensives &

Presence (Clear & Hold)

Insurgent Damages & Casualties 1

Funding & Material

Support to Insurgents

Insurgent Terrain

Advantage

Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Illegit Agric Production

Trade & Employment

Narcotics & Criminal

Activity Levels

Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/

Ins Support for Payment

Criminal/ Trafficking

Capability & Coercion

Havens / Ability to Operate

Insurgent Leadership

Training, Skill & Exper

Coordination Among Ins Factions

Outside Support /

Enablement of Ins.

Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower,

& ISR

Fear of Gov’t / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions

Presenter

Presentation Notes

What about the insurgents? Start with territory not under the government control. This provides the insurgents with havens to recuperate and train, and an area from which to conduct operations. This increases their capacity to conduct effective operations. They clear and hold, just like we do. The more clear and hold operations they are able to execute, the more territory there will be not under the control of the government. Let’s add this into the overall model.


Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Ins. StrategicCommun/IO

& Affiliation w/Population

Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services

Ins.Offensives &

Presence(Clear & Hold)

Ins. TargetedAttacks on

Supportfor Gov

Territory NotUnder Gov’t

Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,

Priorities &Effectiveness

Fear ofGov t/ANSF/

CoalitionRepercussions

Ins. Damages& Casualties ’

Ins.Leadership,

Training, Skill& Experience

CoordinationAmong Ins.

Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &

Other CriminalFunding Funding &

Support to InsurgentsMaterial

InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower

& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment

Crime/Violence /Ins. Support

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels

Criminal/TraffickingCapability &

Coercion

TerrainHarshness& Breadth

InsurgentTerrain

Advantage

IllegitAgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTSPerceived

Damages &Use of Force

by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage



Of Gov tStrength& Intent

Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal


POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS


by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal






the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t


POPULAR SUPPORT

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS


Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

1

2

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)

Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment &

Spending

Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People &

Goods Rapidly

Legit Economic Activity, Trade &

Employment

Legit vs Illegit Relative

Economic Opportunity

Fraction of Workforce and Agric.

Legit vs Illegit

Civilian Services (SWET,

Healthcare, Education)

Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric

Population Basic Needs

Service Levels & Employment

Private Sector Workforce

Skill & Avail

Legit Agric Production

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Investment can increase legitimate agricultural production. This increase leads an increase in legitimate economic activity, which leads to an increase in investment.



by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal



Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit

PopulationBasic Needs

Service Levels& Employment

Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector

WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure

Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment

Legit vs. IllegitRelative

EconomicOpportunity

CivilianServices(SWET,

Healthcare,Education)

Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric

Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &

Spending

Ability toMove

People& GoodsRapidly

-

Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &

EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY




the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage

Illegit AgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT

FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS


POPULAR SUPPORT



Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts

Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)

’

’Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments

Gov’t Funding

Adequacy

Gov’t/Contractor Corruption &

Tribal Favoritism

Tax Revenues

Central Gov’t Institutional & Execution

Capacity

Gov’t Training, Mentoring,

Vetting, and Hiring

Gov’t Professionalism, Policy Quality &

Fairness

Overall Gov’t Reach,

Execution, Capacity & Investment

Gov’t Workforce

Skill & Avail

Gov’t Security Policy Quality & Investment

Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal

Structures & Beliefs

Gov’t Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Gov’t / ANSF StratCom/IO

Relative Message Quality

Gov’t vs Ins

Relative Message Impact

Gov’t vs Ins

Presenter

Presentation Notes

If we can increase GIRoA’s reach and capacity, that will lead to increased tax revenues. More revenues lead to a better funding capacity, which can lead to more institutional capacity. This both leads back into overall reach, and into GIRoA integrating local tribal structures, which also increases gov’t reach. Notice the internal loop based on training, mentoring and professionalism. Also, better gov’t leads to a better IO message.


Recognition/Engagement to

IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage

Impact Gov’tvs Ins

RelativeMessageQuality

Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,

ExecutionCapacity &Investment

Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures

TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor

Corruption &Tribal Favoritism

Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality

& Fairness

Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and

Hiring

Gov'tFunding

Transparencyof Gov’t

Processes &Investments

Adequacy

Central Gov'tInstitutional &

CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

TRIBAL GOVERNANCE








EconomicOpportunity




Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,

Investment &Spending

Ability toMove


-



INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY








EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-





by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal






the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t

Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




POPULAR SUPPORT


Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

US Domestic Perceived

Cost/Benefit & Support

US Domestic/ Int’l StratComm

& Diplomacy

US Gov’t Support for Operation

Media Sensationalism

Bias

Breadth of Coalition

& Support

Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels)

Coalition StratComm/IO

Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill

Duration of Operation

Coalition Knowledge &

Understanding of Social

Structures

Coalition Appropriate Balance of

Effort & Force

Coalition COIN Support

Strategy & Unity

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory &

Aid

Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Advisory &

Aid

Coalition Dev. Ops- Infrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid Provide

Humanitarian Relief

Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of

Afghan Methods

Coalition Visibility to Population

Western Affiliation Backlash

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Let’s start by looking at the ability of the coalition to execute its mission and to have the correct priorities. Four things go into that: Knowledge and understanding of Social Structures (ASCOPE) Average COIN experience and skill Level of resources (money and manpower) And the proper balance of effort Our ability to execute our mission directly leads to three key capabilities: Developing and advising of ANSF, GIRoA, Economic aid. It also leads to a better IO message.


WesternAffiliationBacklash

Durationof

Operation

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

CoalitionDev.Ops-

Infrastructure,Services,

Econ.Advisory

& Aid

US DomesticPerceived

Cost/Benefit& Support

MediaSensationalism

Bias

US Domestic/Int'l Strategic

Commun.& Diplomacy

US Gov'tSupport forOperation

Breadth ofCoalition &

Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO

Duration ofOperation

CoalitionAvg COINExperience

& Skill

CoalitionKnowledge

of SocialStructures

& Underst CoalitionCOIN

SupportStrategy &

Unity

Coalition

Balance ofEffort &Force

Appropriate

CoalitionExecution

PrioritiesCapacity &

Coalition

GovAdvisory

& Aid

Dev. Ops-’t

CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan

CoalitionDev. Ops-

Advisory& Aid

ANSF

CoalitionVisibility toPopulation

Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of

Afghan Methods


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE








EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-











EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-





by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal






the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t

Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES

COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS


POPULAR SUPPORT


TRIBAL GOVERNANCE




ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to

tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention.

2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time.

2

1 1

ANSF & Coalition

Damages/ Casualties

ANSF & Manpower

Recruiting & Retention

ANSF Institutional & Execution

Capacity

ANSF Funding

Adequacy

ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security

Force Capacity & focus

ANSF Training & Mentoring

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity

Targeted Strikes

Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops

Sweep Ops (Clear)

Policing & Security

Ops (Hold)

ANSF Unit Capacity,


ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline

& Morale

ANSF Corruption

& Tribal Favoritism

\

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

ANSF Appropriate

Use of Force



Durationof

Operation

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid



MediaSensationalism

Bias


Commun.& Diplomacy



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO



& Skill

CoalitionKnowledge

of SocialStructures


SupportStrategy &

Unity

Coalition


Appropriate

CoalitionExecution


Coalition

GovAdvisory

& Aid

Dev. Ops-’t


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Advisory& Aid

ANSF



Afghan Methods


Durationof

Operation

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid



MediaSensationalism

Bias


Commun.& Diplomacy



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO



& Skill

CoalitionKnowledge

of SocialStructures


SupportStrategy &

Unity

Coalition


Appropriate

CoalitionExecution


Coalition

GovAdvisory

& Aid

Dev. Ops-’t


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Advisory& Aid

ANSF



Afghan Methods


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE


by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal










EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-











EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-







the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t

ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional


Counter Narcotics/Crime OpsTargeted

StrikesSweep Ops

(Clear)Policing &

Security Ops(Hold)

ANSFAppropriateUse of Force

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &

FairnessPerceived

ANSFPriorities & Effectiveness

Capacity,

TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFFunding

Adequacy

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity

ANSFTraining &Mentoring

ANSF Avg.Professionalism

& MoraleSkill, Discipline,

ISR / OpenSource Ops

ANSFManpower

RetentionRecruiting &

ANSF UnitLeadership

Capacity& Tactical

ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties

ANSF INSTITUTIONAL

ANSF TACTICAL




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES POPULATION

CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

POPULAR SUPPORT


TRIBAL GOVERNANCE






WORKING DRAFT – V3

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment

Neutral/OnPopulation



Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage

AmplificationGov’t vs Ins


& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO

Private SectorWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &

Other CriminalFunding

InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)


CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.

of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN

Support’Strategy &

Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness

InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment


Employment




Spending

Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment


Intent

WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of

Coalition Intent& Commitment

RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity




IllegitAgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR

Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &


Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/


Ins. Damages& Casualties

Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/

IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of

Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF

FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,

& Morale

ANSFManpower

Recruiting &Retention

ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity

TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity,



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively


Ethnic/TribalRivalry

CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities







Commun.& Diplomacy


CoalitionAppropriateBalance of

Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Policing &Security Ops

(Hold)

TargetedStrikes


FactionsInsurgentTerrain

Advantage


of Force byGov’ t & Coalition

PerceivedSecurity



of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path

Visible GainsIn Security,Services &

Employment



PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent


TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t

Path

Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t


Coercion

Legit AgricProduction

Ability toMove


Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric



MediaSensationalism

BiasCultural Erosion/

Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)

RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs

Insurgents

Funding &Material





Significant Delay=

Significant Delay=


POPULAR SUPPORT

INSURGENTS


NARCOTICS



ANSF TACTICAL

TRIBAL GOVERNANCE


ANSF INSTITUTIONAL



CENTRAL GOV’T

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Here it is, a complete model of the current situation in Afghanistan. Let’s look through a couple of cause and effect loops.


1




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage



& Fairness Private Workf

Skill &

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



InfrastructureDev Adequacy


Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurity

ForceCapacity &

Focus


alitionOps-

ov’tvisoryAid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity,



PopulationActively



the Fence Sw


tngacy


ExecutionCapacity

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes


Factions






Security Services


Ability toReconcile


sparencyGov’t

cesses &stments


Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents




2

Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population

Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and actively supporting the Government. Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce insurgent ability to target and intimidate the population such that Gov’t sympathizers are willing to be active supporters. •

HUMINT: The population will be more willing to provide intel if they do not fear insurgent repercussions.•

ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development is facilitated by the expansion of secure regions. (ANA and ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or overrun.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Start with Clear and Hold Ops: Reduces the territory not under the control of the Afghan government. This eliminates their havens and training areas, degrading their ability to carry out successful attacks. This reduces the population’s fear of attacks, and leads to a direct increase in the population willing to openly support the Gov’t. This is nothing more complicated than protecting the population! This does to things: leads to better information which increases the effectiveness of operations; and increases the ability of the ANSF to recruit and retain personnel, expanding their capacity and effectiveness. This ultimately increases their ability to carry out successful operations, leading to follow-on clear and hold Ops.





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

AppropriateUse of Force

Relative WOMMessage



& Fairness Private SectorWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


Trainingoring,g, and

ring

Overall Gov'tReach,


han


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness



Employment







Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Legit vsRela

EconoOpport




Illegit AProduc

TradEmploy

N&

Retention,Manpower

& ISR




IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.alition/HomelandAcceptance offghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

tionOps-SFsory

Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


Retention,Manpower

& ISR




IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.alition/HomelandAcceptance offghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

tionOps-SFsory

Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively




Coalitionsibility toopulation


ExecutionCapacity

v't/ractorption &avoritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity

AverageConnectedness

of Population



Visible GainsIn Security,Services &Employment






Path



Coercion


Ability toMove





Insurgents

Funding &Material


& Pakistan)


Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance

Critical for the Government to recognize and make the effort to engage existing tribal structures and Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Ties to local governance can gain popular support and rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability to engage the population.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

If the gov’t is able to integrate local tribal structures, it can expand its reach and capacity. This will allow it to further engage with local tribal structures and reconcile their beliefs with the central government. (Tribes will see that their local government and the central government are not mutually exclusive. This increases the gov’ts ability to integrate local tribal structures and religious ideology, leading to further support from the population. The more people support the gov’t, the more willing they will be to integrate their local tribal structures. Afghanistan has experienced strife when its religious and secular gov’ts have been at odds. It has been peaceful when they have been in harmony.


WORKING DRAFT

Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood ofActive Ins.Support forPayment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(MilitaryForces,CivilianForces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness



Employment



Private SectorCapital

Management,Investment &

Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity &Priorities


PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Criminal/Trafficking

Capability &Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)

RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs

Insurgents

Funding &Material





Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief




Employment




Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path



Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents

Funding &Material






Reconciliation Effectiveness

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE

WORKING DRAFT



Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT

WORKING DRAFT





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief




Employment




Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path



Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents

Funding &Material







WORKING DRAFTSignificant Delay=

Significant Delay=

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood ofActive Ins.Support forPayment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(MilitaryForces,CivilianForces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief




Employment





Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Criminal/Trafficking

Capability &Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents

Funding &Material





Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture



Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage




Skill & Avail

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


iningng,and

g

Overall Gov'tReach,


hn


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief



CiviliaServic(SWE

HealthcEducat



Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Leadership,Training, Skill& Experience



IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.on/Homelandceptance ofan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

ns-

y

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


& Morale

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopu

Sympaw/ Insu


THa&

alitionbility toulation


ExecutionCapacity

toron &oritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Ability toMove





Insurgents

FunMa

SupInsu





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage




Skill & Avail

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


iningng,and

g

Overall Gov'tReach,


hn


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief



CiviliaServic(SWE

HealthcEducat



Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions




IO


by Ins.



Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

ns-

y

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


& Morale

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopu

Sympaw/ Insu


THa&



ExecutionCapacity

toron &oritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Ability toMove





Insurgents

FunMa

SupInsu





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage




Skill & Avail

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


iningng,and

g

Overall Gov'tReach,


hn


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief



CiviliaServic(SWE

HealthcEducat



Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions




IO


by Ins.



Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

ns-

y

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


& Morale

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopu

Sympaw/ Insu


THa&



ExecutionCapacity

toron &oritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Ability toMove





Insurgents

FunMa

SupInsu


Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture


Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Population Security





Relative WOMMessage


PrivW

Ski

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures

Gov'ttegration ofocal Tribal

Structures

ecognition/gagement toIntegrate

Tribaltructures&Beliefs

I f S i E


Private SeCapita

ManagemInvestme



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &


p


IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

tyy

&ent

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairness


& Morale

pcalty

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism


PopulationActively



the Fence


OutsidSuppor

Enablemof Ins.

gSecurity Ops

(Hold)


Factions



PerceivedSecurity


PotentialAttractivenes

of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Pa


Employment






Path


Ability toMove

People




Insurgents








Relative WOMMessage


PrivW

Ski

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures

Gov'ttegration ofocal Tribal

Structures

ecognition/gagement toIntegrate

Tribaltructures&Beliefs

I f S i E


Private SeCapita

ManagemInvestme



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &


p


IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

tyy

&ent

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairness


& Morale

pcalty

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism


PopulationActively



the Fence


OutsidSuppor

Enablemof Ins.

gSecurity Ops

(Hold)


Factions



PerceivedSecurity


PotentialAttractivenes

of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Pa


Employment






Path


Ability toMove

People




Insurgents




Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions and also perception of ‘who will win’ over longer term: •

Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF / Coalition forces impact perceived security. •

Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress” to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the fear this generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum.•

In addition to near term security concerns, the population is assessing ‘who will win’ over the long term by comparing perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations.

Documents

Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan - … operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. •