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International regimes and alliance

behavior: explaining NATO

conventional force levels

John S. Duffield

The military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has

entered a period of profound change. For the first time in more than two

decades, the alliance has revised its formal military strategy of fiexible

response. More visibly, NAT O conventional force levels are declining sharply

as a result of 1) the limits accepted by Germany on the size of its armed forces,

(2) the implementation of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE),

and (3) further troop reductions by alliance members.^

Against this backdrop of change, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that prior to

the recent dramatic political developments in Europe, NATO's military

posture had been remarkably stable for some three decades. The size of the

alliance's conventional forces in particular had fluctuated very little, especially

in the critical Central Region of Europe. Stability had largely characterized

both the overall level of conventional forces and the relative contributions of

NATO countries with forces in the region. The primary departure from this

otherwise highly static picture occurred as a consequence of the completion of

West German rearmament in the mid-1960s. Even that development, however,

conformed to plans that had been drawn up m ore than ten years earlier.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the meeting of the Am erican Political Science

Association, San Francisco, 30 August—2 September 1990. For helpful comments on previous

drafts, I would like to thank Robert Beck, Mark Brawley, Cheryl Eschbach, Sandra Gubin, David

Hendrickson, Lisa Martin, Herman Schwartz, Nina Tannenwald, Steve Weber, and, especially,

Stephen Krasner and two anonomyous reviewers for International Organization. Steven Finkel

provided valuable assistance with the statistical analysis. For research support, I am grateful to the

Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.

1. "The A lliance's New Strategic Concept," NATO Review 39 (December 1991), pp. 25-32. The

new NATO strategy document is the first ever to be m ade public.



820 Interna tional Organization

This record of marked stability in NATO conventional force levels in the

Central Region cannot be adequately explained by the leading structural

theories of international relations. Balance-of-power theory and its refinement,

balance-of-threat theory, suggest that overall alliance force levels should have

varied somewhat more than actually was the case in response to changes in

Soviet conventional capabilities. Western perceptions of Soviet intentions, and

the nuclear arsenals of both sides. There has been little positive association,

moreover, between variations in the relative contributions of NATO countries

with forces in the Central Region and their respective military potentials, as

public goods theory would predict.

This article seeks to demonstrate that a satisfactory account of the history of

NATO conventional force levels must include institutional as well as structural

factors. Specifically, it argues that an international regime has strongly

influenced the provision of conventional forces in Central Europe by the

countries in the region as well as by the United States, Britain, and Canada.

This regime, which has existed within the broader, institutional framework of

the Atlantic alliance, has consisted primarily of highly stable norms and rules

concerning the number of forces that each country should contribu te. Although

the regime is now being transformed after more than three decades of

existence, this metamorphosis is occurring only as a result of fundamental

changes in the political-military environment of Europe, which have under-

mined the foundation of shared beliefs and assumptions about the Soviet

threa t upon which the regime was based.

The present analysis of the history of NATO conventional force levels seeks

to contribute to the literature on international regimes in three ways. First, it

attem pts to show tha t regimes do matter by providing a convincing dem onstra-

tion of their importance for explaining state behavior and international

outcomes. Second, it extends regime theory to relations among allies, suggest-

ing that the application of this approach in the security field has greater

potential than the traditional focus on relations between adversaries would

imply. Third, it elaborates a comprehensive model for understanding why

states actually comply with regime injunctions. The model stresses both the

ways in which regimes efi^ectively modify the international environment within

which states operate, altering the costs and benefits associated with different

courses of action, and the ways in which participating states may internalize

regime norms and rules, thereby making compliance increasingly autom atic.

The article first describes the historical evolution of NATO conventional



NA TO force levels 821

The stability of NATO conventional force levels

This study addresses only one aspect of NATO's overall military posture: the

size of the alliance's conventional forces in the Central Region of Europe.^ It

does not consider the details of NATO strategy. It also excludes consideration

of those conventional forces stationed on NATO's northern and southern

flanks and reinforcements for the Central Region tha t are based outside the

area in peacetime. Finally, the study pays little atten tion to qualitative aspects

of NATO's conventional forces, such as equipment modernization, readiness,

and sustainability. Instead, it is primarily concerned with basic, quantitative

measures of force structure, namely, numbers of major combat units and

military personnel, especially in the ground forces.''

Notwithstanding these limitations, the subject of this study, NATO's

conventional forces in the Central Region, has comprised one of the most

important components of the alliance's overall military posture.^ These forces

have formed the first line of defense in a region (Western Europe) that has

been regarded as both vital to the security of the alliance as a whole and highly

vulnerable to a direct Soviet invasion. Their capabilities have determined

whether or not a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact conventional attack could be defeated

without resort to nuclear weapons and, if not, at what point the alliance would

have to cross the nuclear threshold. Finally, and not least important, these

forces have accounted for a large percentage of the resources alliance mem bers

have devoted to defense. Each of the four leading NATO powers—the United

States, Britain, France, and West Germany—has made its primary conven-

tional force contribution to the alliance in the Central Region.

3. Before German unification, the NATO Central Region was defined to include Belgium, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FR G), less its territory north of

the Weser river. Although the FRG traditionally stationed a small fraction of its forces outside of

the Central Region in Schleswig-Holstein, the figures in this article include all West German

forces.

4. This study focuses on three variables: military personnel, divisions, and brigades. Of these, the

number of military personnel is, perhaps, the best indicator of actual combat capability. Standard

combat units vary in size from one country to another. The number of divisions or brigades fielded

by a particular nation, m oreover, may increase or decrease simply as a result of reorganizations that

produce little or no change in fighting power. It may be argued that such simple, quantitative

measures provide an inadequate guide to actual combat capability. Oualitative improvements

alone may result in significant increases in the strength of NATO's conventional forces. To be sure,

incremental qualitative improvements are inevitable because of advances in military technology. In

the case of NATO, however, such improvements tended to be canceled out over time by

comparable, if not greater, qualitative improvements in Warsaw Pact forces. Moreover, the overall

effect of qualitative changes on combat capability is extremely difficult to measure in the absence of



822 Internationa l Organization

For all these reasons, the size of NAT O's conventional forces in the Central

Region has been an abiding concern of alliance policy. Many alliance force

planning initiatives have concentrated on strengthening precisely those forces.

At the same time, the question of the relative contributions of forces by NA TO

coun tries in the Central Region, like that of relative levels of military spending,

has often been at the center of heated debates over burden sharing within the

alliance.

This study begins with the observation that NATO conventional force levels

in the Central Region were strikingly stable for over three decades, especially

when the completion of the West German rearmament program in the early

1960s is taken into account. This stability characterized both the overall level of

forces and the relative contributions provided by each of the countries with

forces in the region (see Table 1). From the mid-1960s onward, NATO fielded

between twenty-six and twenty-eight nominal divisions and between seventy-

one and seventy-eight active brigades in West Germany and the low countries

in all but a few years. During the same period, the number of active NATO

military personnel in the region remained between 1.0 and 1.1 million. Thus,

these key indices of conventional strength varied for the most part within a

range of less than

10

percent.

The contributions of individual countries were almost as stable. After the

basic size of the U.S. contribution was established in 1951 with the decision to

station four additional divisions in Europe, the number of major U.S. combat

units remained virtually constant for some sixteen years at six division-

equivalents. During the same period, U.S. manpower levels in Germany

fluctuated only slightly more.*" The most significant overall adjustment in the

size of the U.S. military presence in Europe took place in 1968, when the

United States withdrew the equivalent of three brigades, four squadrons of

tactical aircraft, and approximately 35,000 military personnel as a result of the

trilateral negotiations with Britain and West Germany. These reductions were

subsequently offset, however, by a gradual increase in the number of U.S.

military personnel in the Central Region from 210,000 to 245,000 and a net gain

of one brigade over the following two decades.

British forces in Germany also increased rapidly, from two to four divisions

and approximately 80,000 troops, following the outbreak of the Korean War.

The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) remained at that size until the late

1950s, when it was reduced to some three divisions and 55,000 effectives.

Subsequently, and despite substantial reorganization, the number of troops in





824

Interna tional Organization

the BAOR remained virtually constant. The one brigade organization that was

withdrawn in 1968 as a result of the trilateral negotiations, moreover, was

returned within several years. Most of the variation in the number of British

military personnel on the continent since the late 1960s was due to changes in

the size of the Royal Air Force contingent.

The size of the French military presence in the Central Region fluctuated

considerably during the 1950s. Following a rapid buildup in the early years of

the decade, it was reduced to the equivalent of two weak divisions by the

dispatch of units to North Africa in the mid-1950s. During the following three

decades, however, the French army in Germany remained at between approxi-

mately 50,000 and 60,000 troops, notwithstanding France's withdrawal from

the NATO integrated military structure in 1966 and the reorganization of that

force from two to three divisions in the la te 1970s.

Since the late 1950s, the greatest change in absolute as well as in relative

terms occurred in the size of the West German contribution. Most of this

variation, however, is explained by the fact that the Federal Republic was only

permitted to rearm in 1955, having been dem ilitarized after World W ar II. The

subsequent military buildup, moreover, took much longer than the three to

four years that had originally been anticipated and was not completed until the

mid-1960s. Nevertheless, the resulting force of twelve divisions, thirty-two

aircraft squadrons, and approximately 450,000 military personnel under arms

corresponded closely in size to the plans that had been drawn up more than ten

years earlier. Although the Bundeswehr was fleshed out by the addition of

another 50,000 troops and three brigades during the following decade, the size

of West Germany's active force structure subsequently remained virtually

constant until the mid-1980s, when the number of military personnel began a

gradual decline.

The largest relative declines in the last three decades took place in the

contributions of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada. The impact of these

reductions was mitigated, however, by the fact that these countries generally

maintained the smallest numbers of active combat units in the Central Region.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Belgian armed forces shrank by about

one-quarter, from 120,000 to some 90,000 military personnel, while the num ber

of active brigades fell from six to four in the late 1960s. Subsequently, however,

these levels did not change. The number of Dutch troops under arms also

gradually declined by about one-quarter, from 140,000 in the early 1960s tojus t

over 100,000 in the mid-1980s, although the number of active Dutch ground



NATO force levels 825

The inadequacy of structural ex planations

How might we account for the high degree of stability that characterized both

overall NATO conventional force levels and national contributions in the

Central Region? An obvious place to begin is with the theoretical approaches

that have been used most often to explain alliance behavior: balance-of-power

theory and public goods theory.^ These two structural theories are potentially

quite complementary, moreover, since each best addresses a different aspect of

the question. Balance-of-power theory would seem to be especially useful for

generating hypotheses about overall alliance conventional force levels, while

the promise of public goods theory lies in its ability to predict relative national

contributions. Taken together, they offer to provide a comprehensive explana-

tion of the history of

NATO

conventional force levels in the C entral Region. As

argued below, however, these structural approaches are inadequate by them-

selves and need to be supplemented by regime theory.̂

Balance-of-power theory

Balance-of-power theory is concerned primarily with the effects of the

distribution of power in the international system." In its simplest form, this

theory predicts that states will seek to balance the power of potential

adversaries. Individual states may make internal efforts to increase their power

and to use it more effectively, or they may form alliances with o ther states. By

extension, the members of an alliance will increase their collective power in

response to an increase in the power of the state or coalition against which the

alliance was formed.

Although power may be measured in a number of ways, most applications of

this approach have emphasized military power, or the ability of states to do

harm to one ano ther.'" In a non-nuclear world, balance-of-power theory would

predict that N ATO conventional force levels in the Cen tral Region would vary

with the size of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces opposing them. As

Warsaw Pact forces increased or decreased, so would those of NATO . In fact,

this direct relationship has been greatly complicated by the existence of nuclear

7. For an insightful application of these theories to a related set of issues, see Charles A.

Kupchan, "NATO and the Pers ian Gulf: Examining Intra-all iance Behavior,"

Intemationai

Organization

42 (Spring 1988), pp . 317-46.

8. It should be emphasized that this study does not purport to offer a comprehensive evaluation

of the validity of the theories discussed. Rather, it has the much more limited aim of determining






Public goods theory

In contrast to balance-of-power theory, public goods theory has been used

primarily to explain the relative military contributions of alliance mem bers. In

brief, this approach predicts that those states that would benefit the most from

the availability of a public good and that have the greatest means to provide it

will bear a disproportionate share of the costs of doing so.'̂ In other words, the

ratio of costs to benefits and/or means will correlate positively with benefits

and/or means. Conversely, the theory suggests that states with relatively few

resources will do little or nothing to provide the public good, a phenomenon

popularly known as "free-riding."

Public goods theory has been extensively applied to military alliances and to

NATO in particular, where the public good may be regarded as collective

security through deterrence.''' Traditionally, member country contributions to

the public good have been measured in terms of relative defense burden,

defined as military expenditures divided by gross domestic product (GDP).

There is no inherent reason, however, why NA TO conventional force levels in

the Central Region cannot also be treated as a public good. Indeed, the

contribution of these forces to collective security through deterrence is more

direct than that of military spending. Much military spending is used to provide

purely private benefits, such as employment and forces intended for use outside

the alliance area. In fact, most of the literature on the application of public

goods theory to NATO has sought to account for a secular decline in the

association between relative defense burden and GDP by differentiating the

public and private components of allied military spending.'^

One problem is the difiiculty of measuring perceptions of adversary intentions and the probability

of war. Moreover, even in situations where adversary capabilities and intentions seem clear-cut, it

may be difiScult to ascertain just what the appropriate response, in terms of conventional force

levels, would b e. Nev ertheles s, it should be po ssible to overco me these difiiculties to som e extent by

focusing on the effects of changes in the independent variables rather than on their absolute values.

For further discussion of the problem s of threat p erception, see Klaus Kno rr, "Thr eat Perc eptio n,"

in Knorr, ed..

Historical Dimensions of National Security

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas

1976), pp. 78-119 .

13.

See Mancur Olson,

The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Croups

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). This formulation of the basic hypothesis is

borrowed from John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO,"

Intemational Organization

44 (Summ er 1990), p. 380.

14. Th e literatu re on the subject is vast and con tinue s to grow; the first such attem pt rem ains

the seminal article. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of

Alliances,"

Review of Economics and Statistics

48 (August 1966), pp. 266-79. For a valuable recent

analysis , see John R. Oneal, "Testing the Theory of Collective Action: NATO Defense Burdens,




In contrast, NATO-committed conventional forces have contributed directly

to the deterrence of Warsaw Pact aggression in several ways. They have played

the leading role in deterring small conventional attacks (against which nuclear

retaliation might not be credible) by ensuring that such actions would not

succeed. Thus, their presence has meant that in order to avoid certain defeat,

the Soviet Union and its allies would have had to employ a force of substantial

size.

By raising the stakes, however, such an attack would have greatly

increased the likelihood that NATO would make a nuclear response. Finally,

even in the event that the alliance's conventional forces were eventually

overrun, they would have enhanced deterrence by preventing a fait accompli,

thereby providing time for NATO leaders to take and to implement the

momentous decision to use nuclear weapons.^*

Of course, not all NATO conventional forces have had the characteristics of

public goods. For example, because of

geography,

those forces stationed on the

northern and southern flanks have not contributed directly to the security of

the countries in the Central Region. In terms of the theory, they have not

satisfied the condition of nonexeludability. NATO forces in the Central

Region, on the other hand, have contributed much more equally to the security

of all the countries that provide them. A Warsaw Pact attack on West G ermany

would almost certainly have been viewed as threatening the vital interests of its

immediate neighbors as well as those of the United States.'̂

In terms of the concerns of this study, therefore, public goods theory

hypothesizes that those countries that benefit the most from the presence of

conventional forces in the Central Region and that have the greatest means to

provide them will contribute a disproportionately large share relative to their

means and to the benefits they receive. This approach quickly runs into troub le,

however, when one begins to look for evidence of disproportionality. What

constitutes a proportionate national force contribution is highly contextual,

depending on a country's location, its technological endowments, its other

contributions to collective security, and, perhaps, additional factors. For

16. For an early analysis of the contributions of NATO's conventional forces to deterrence, see

Glenn H. Snyder,

Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security

(Princeton, N.J . :

Princeton University Press, 1962).

17. It may be argued that conventional force levels, although superior to military spending, are

still an inadequate operationalization of collective security, since NATO nuclear weapons have

also helped to deter Soviet aggression. In addition, it is impossible to establish the respective

contributions of conventional and nuclear forces to deterrence with any degree of certainty. For

obvious reasons, however, it is unlikely that there has been a close relationship between the




example, because the United States has necessarily provided the vast majority

of the alliance's nuclear capabilities, even a disproportionately large U.S.

conventional contribution in the Central Region is likely to have been smaller

than what consideration of overall national military resources alone would

suggest. Indeed, for much of the postwar era, the United States has provided

far fewer conventional forces than has West Germ any, a country approximately

one-quarter as large.

This limitation on attempts to apply public goods theory can be partially

overcome by using time-series analysis. Although it may be difficult, if not

impossible, to specify the rank order of national force contributions in absolute

terms, public goods theory nevertheless suggests that relative contributions

should vary with changes in the relative means of countries to provide forces.

Thus, as one country grows relatively more or less prosperous than its allies, its

relative conventional force contribution should increase or decrease accord-

ingly.'^

Evaluating the structural explanations

Taking these obstacles into account, how well do balance-of-power theory

and public goods theory explain the evolution of NATO conventional force

levels in the Central Region over time? Balance-of-power theory would seem to

provide a convincing explanation of several important developments, especially

during the first decade or so of the alliance. Most significantly, it accounts for

the rapid buildup of NATO forces following the outbreak of the Korean War,

which was widely regarded as signaling a greater willingness on the part of the

Soviet Union to use force in pursuit of its political objectives. Similarly, the

failure of the alliance to achieve the ambitious goals set for this buildup may be

interpreted as stemming from the subsequent relaxation of tensions and

decline in fears of Soviet aggression, as well as the increasing availability of

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s. Finally, balance-of-power

theory explains the m odest, but nevertheless sudden, increases that took place

in the num ber of

U.S.

and Germ an military personnel in the region during the

1961-62 Berlin crisis—a time when the risk of war seemed heigh tened .

On other occasions, however, NATO conventional force levels failed to

respond to external developments as balance-of-power theory might predict.

For example, there was no immediate increase in the late 1950s in the w ake of

either (1) the Soviet invasion of Hungary, which stirred Western fears of




aggression, or (2) the demonstration of a Soviet intercontinental nuclear

capability, which clearly called into question the willingness of the United

States to respond to lesser forms of aggression with strategic nuclear retalia-

tion. In fact, the pace of the West German military buildup actually slowed

during that period, while the British and, to a lesser extent, the United States

reduced their forces in the region. Although arrangements for making tactical

nuclear weapons available to the European allies were approved in the late

1950s and the number of such weapons on the continent m ore than doubled in

the 1960s, these responses were largely offset by the growth of the Soviet

theater nuclear arsenal.

Similarly, there was no significant upward movement of NATO force levels

in response to substantial increases in Warsaw Pact conventional and theater

nuclear capabilities in the late 1960s and 1970s; the Soviet Union's achieve-

ment of parity first, in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the early 1970s and

subsequently, in nuclear warheads; or events such as the invasions of Czecho-

slovakia and Afghanistan, which, like Korea and Berlin before, could have been

viewed as signaling more aggressive Soviet intentions or at least a heightened

risk of war.'^ Although NATO's 1979 dual-track decision may have been

expected to neutralize the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, it did nothing to rectify

what was widely perceived as a growing conventional imbalance. The modest

increase in the num ber of U.S., British, and French combat units that did occur

during this period, moreover, was largely the result of force restructuring and

had little direct impact on personnel strengths. At the same time, apart from

the reductions agreed to in the trilateral talks, which can largely be attributed

to the demands placed by the Vietnam War on U.S. military resources, the

sharp downward revision of U.S. estimates of Warsaw Pact conventional

capabilities in the early to mid-1960s and the more benign NATO assessment

of Soviet intentions that prevailed in the late 1960s and early 1970s produced

no significant decline in alliance conventional force levels.^"

Public goods theory would seem to be even less successful than balance-of-

power theory in accounting for the evolution of NATO conventional force

levels in the Central Region during the period from 1965 (when the West

19. As a consequence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which resulted in the stationing of five

Soviet divisions in that country, the number of Soviet combat units and military personnel located

across West Germany's eastern borders increased by approximately one-fifth in the late 1960s.

Between 1965 and 1980, moreover, the total number of Warsaw Pact military personnel in Central

Eu rop e rose by 150,000, or some 20 perc ent. Du ring the sam e period, the W arsaw Pact extended its

advantage over NA TO in the num ber of major weapons systems deployed with active comb at u nits




TABLE 2.

Chan ges in national shares of gross domestic product (GD P),

military personnel, and major combat units, 1965-19 90

Change in GDP as a per-

centage of total

Change in mihtary personnel

Absolute"

As a percentage of total

Change in units'*

Absolute

As a percentage of total

U.S.

- 1 . 2 9

- 1 8 . 0 0

- 0 . 2 3

- 2 . 0 0

- 2 . 9 0

Britain

- 1 . 4 0

+4.00

+0.74

+2.00

+2.50

France

+ 1.13

- 9 . 0 0

- 1 . 4 3

0.00

- 0 . 1 0

Germany

+0.62

+20.00

+4.52

+3.00

+3.33

Belgium

- 0 . 0 9

-1 5 . 0 0

- 0 . 8 5

- 2 . 0 0

- 2 . 7 0

Netherlands

+0.05

- 3 2 . 0 0

- 2 . 3 4

0.00

- 0 . 1 0

Canada

+0.87

- 5 . 0 0

- 0 . 4 2

0.00

- 0 . 0 2

"In thousands.

' 'Brigades. /

Sources.

GDP figures are from Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "A New Set of International

Com parisons of Real Prod uct and Price Level Estimates for 130 Cou ntries , 1950-19 85,"

Review of

Income and Wealth

34 (Ma rch 1988), pp . 1-26; and Int ern atio nal Institu te for Strategic Studies,

Th e

Military

Balance, 1990-91

(London: IISS, 1990). Figures for military personnel and brigades

are from Table 1.

German buildup was completed) to 1990. A comparison of the figures in each

column of Table 2 shows little positive relationship between changes in the

relative ability to contribute forces, as measured by GDP, of the countries with

forces in the Central Region and changes in their relative force contributions,

in terms of military personnel and numbers of active brigades. Only in the case

of the United States, and possibly that of West Germany, is there clearly a

positive association; in three cases (Britain, France, and Canada), the associa-

tion is negative; and in the remaining two cases, changes in relative force

contributions were accompanied by virtually no change in relative GDP,

suggesting no relationship whatsoever.

The results are no more convincing if one considers the correlation between

changes in the variables over five-year intervals between 1965 and 1990 as

shown in Table 3.2' In neither case is it possible to disconfirm the null

hypothesis that no relationship exists between changes in relative GDP and

changes in relative force levels. In the case of GDP and military personnel, the



832 International Organization

TABLE 3 .

Correlations between changes in national shares of total gross domestic

product (GD P), military personnel, and major combat units, 1965-90^*'

Correlation Coefficient Probability

Change in share of GD P

versus change in share of

military personnel -0.2 612 .130

Change in share of G DP

versus change in share of

brigades -0.10 98 .530

"A pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis was used. The change in each relative m ea-

sure during each time interval was divided by the average value of the relative m easure itself dur-

ing the time interval in order to control for constant country-specific factors.

^N = 35 for both correlations.

Sources. See Table 1 and sources for Table 2.

correlation actually appears to be negative, although the coefficient is not

significant at even the .10 leveL^^

In sum, these two structural approaches, even when taken together, fail to

provide an adequate basis for understanding the history of NATO conventional

force levels. While balance-of-power theory scores some successes, especially

in the early years of the alliance, it is unable to account for the high degree of

stability characteristic of NATO's force structure over the past three decades,

since it would predict greater and more frequent variation than actually

occurred. Public goods theory is even less helpful. Thus we must search further

for an adequate explanation.

Applying regime theory to intra-alliance relations

The remainder of this article seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to provide

a more satisfactory account of the evolution of NATO conventional force levels

in the Central R egion, especially their remarkable stability over the past three

decades, if we supplement balance-of-power theory with international regime

theory. Regime theory seeks to account for the establishment and persistence

of patterns of cooperation under the condition of international anarchy.^^ Of

course, cooperation should not necessarily be equated with stasis. In the




absence of an agreement to alter a particular pattern of cooperation, however,

cooperative behavior is likely to be regarded as continued adherence to the

status quo. Thus, in contrast to balance-of-power theory and public goods

theory, which suggest that force levels will vary in response to changes in the

distribution of power and resources, regime theory emphasizes the constrain-

ing effects of enduring institutional factors. As will be discussed below, this

approach is particularly useful for explaining why alliance members have not

decreased their NATO contributions at times when domestic pressures or

international conditions militated for force reductions.

The behavior of the members of military alliances with respect to one

another on security issues has not previously been considered as regime-

governed. Regime theory has been developed primarily in the area of

international political economy (IPE).^'* In the security field, it has been

applied almost exclusively to relations among potential adversaries,^^ and in

this context regimes have generally been regarded as enjoying substantially less

influence over state

behavior.̂ **

This is because adversarial relations difl'er from

international interactions in nonsecurity areas in several important ways that

make cooperation more difficult to achieve.̂ '' First, the stakes are much higher.

Variations in outcomes may mean the difference between national survival and

annihilation. Second, adversarial security relations tend to be more competi-

tive.

For many purposes, military power is still relative rather than absolute.

Thus those measures that one side takes to enhance its security often reduce

the security of others, regardless of the first side's intentions, a phenomenon

known as the security dilemma.^^ Third, adversarial security relations are

generally characterized by a lower degree of transparency. Thus it is more

24. See especially Steph en D . Krasne r, ed.,

Intemational Regimes

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 1983); Robert O. Keohane,

After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the

World Political Economy (Prin ceton , N.J.: Princ eton University Press, 1984); Vino d Agga rwal,

Liberal Protectionism: The Intemational Politics of Organized Textile Trade

(Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1985); and Andrew M. Moravcsik, "Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD

Export Credi t Arrangement ," Intemational Organization 43 (Winter 1989), pp. 173-205. An

impo rtant exception is Or an R. Young,

Intemational Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural

Resources and the Environment

(Ithac a, N.Y.: Corn ell University Press, 1989).

25. Examples include the following: Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Krasner, ed.,

Intemational Regimes,

pp. 173-94; Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security

'Regimes ' and the Management of International Conflict ," Intemational Joumal 40 (Aug ust 1985),

pp . 599-627; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. , "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,"

Intemational Organization

41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402; and Alexander L. George, Philip J .

Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds. , U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, failures.



834 Internationa l Organization

difficult to detect what others are doing and to measure one's own security,

which increases uncertainty and mistrust.

International security affairs, however, are not limited to strictly adversarial

relations. To the degree that other security phenomena are characterized by

lower stakes, less competition, and greater transparency, they would seem to be

more amenable to regime-based explanations. A case in point is the nuclear

nonproliferation regime.^'

The application of regime theory to the interactions of the members of

military alliances would appear to be especially promising. In the NA TO case

in particular, intra-alliance relations have had more in common with economic

relations among the Western countries than they have had with relations

between potential military adversaries. Except for the remote possibility that a

NA TO country might drag its allies into a war with the Soviet Union or that the

United States might suddenly abandon its allies in a crisis, the issues at stake in

intra-alliance relations have rarely been matters of national life or death. In

addition, absent the complete withdrawal of the United States from its security

commitments to Europe, an increase or decrease in one country's military

efforts would not have significantly affected the security of its allies. Finally,

NATO affairs generally have been characterized by a considerable amount of

openness.^"

How regimes influence state behavior

How would regime theory account for the stability that has characterized

NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region? Before answering this

question, it is first necessary to indicate precisely how regimes are supposed to

influence state behavior.^' At the core of every regime is a cluster of norms and

rules, or what Oran Young has called "well-defined guides to state action or

standards setting forth actions that mem bers are expected to perform (or not to

perform) under appropriate circumstances."^^ Such injunctions provide bench-

29.

Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime; Anomalies for Contemporary

International Relations Theory," Intemational Organization 41 (Spring 1987), pp. 253-81.

30.

One should be careful not to push the analogy between intra-alliance security relations and

international economic relations too far, however. Differences of

a

fundamental nature distinguish

the roles of regimes in those two spheres of activity. In the economic realm, regimes typically serve

to restrain states from interfering in the operation of markets, allowing transactions among private

entities to go forward. In the case of intra-alliance relations, the emphasis is primarily on the

actions of the states themselves as prescribed or proscribed by regimes. For discussions of the




marks against which the behavior of states can be assessed. In the context of the

present study, relevant rules would concern the provision of conventional

forces in the Central Region. The overall hypothesis generated by regime

theory is that states will generally act in accordance with those behavioral

guides, even when other international and domestic factors might tempt them

to do otherwise.

Why do participating states comply with a regime's norms and rules?^^

Regime theorists have offered two general explanations, each of which is based

on a different set of assumptions about the nature of state actors. The first

approach regards states as rational, self-interested, utility maximizers. Such

states act in accordance with regime injunctions on the basis of straightforward

calculations of a utilitarian nature. The second explanation treats states as

habit-driven actors, which, for a variety of internal reasons, are conditioned to

comply with regime injunctions even when the external benefits do not exceed

the costs.̂ "

Despite their differing assumptions, these alternative explanations may be

viewed as mutually reinforcing and can be combined to provide a more

comprehensive model of how regimes influence state behavior that has both

external and internal components. The external component emphasizes how

regimes may modify the incentives and constraints that even rational, self-

interested states encounter in the international environment. The existence of

a regime may alter the costs and benefits to the state associated with different

possible courses of action in ways that increase the likelihood of behavior in

accordance with regime injunctions. The internal component seeks to capture

the ways in which the tendency to comply with regime injunctions may become

behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations." An early consensual definition of

regimes is described by Krasner as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and

decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of

international relations." See Robert O. Keohane "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,"

IntemationalJoumal 45 (Autumn 1990), p. 732; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and

Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening V ariables," in K rasner, ed., Intemationai

Re^mes,

p. 2. Norms and rules are also central in the sense that in their absence, other regime elements,

such as those creating incentives to comply, would serve no meaningful purpose. Throughout the

rest of this article, the terms "norms," "rules," "conventions," "injunctions," "standards," and

"guides to behavior" are used interchangeably.

33.

The best general treatments of this question are to be found in Young, Intemationai

Cooperation, pp. 70-80; and

Ke,oh&nt, After

H egemony, pp. 98-106 and 237-40. Also instructive are

analyses of compliance with international law. See, especially, Roger Fisher, "Constructing Rules

that Affect Governments," in Donald G. Brennan,

e.A.,Arms Control, Disarmament,

and National

Security

(New York: George Braziller, 1961); Louis Henkin,

How Nations

Behave:

Law and Foreign

Policy (New York: Praeger, 1968), especially chapter 4; and Abram Chayes, "An Inquiry into the




embedded in domestic structures and even in the belief systems of individuals.

As a result of such internalization, compliance may become increasingly

automatic.

External incentives for compliance

Rational, egoistic states have a number of incentives to comply with the

norms and rules of a regime, even when other factors might suggest that their

interests would be better served by acting otherwise. Such behavior benefits

participating states by contributing directly to the achievement of the common

purpose served by the regime. In addition, by providing evidence of a state's

willingness to compromise and to exercise self-restraint, it may reinforce the

tendency—or overcome the reluctance—on the part of other states to comply

as well, resulting in even greater benefits both immediately and in the future.

Finally, compliance can help establish a repu tation for trustworthiness, which

may increase the willingness of other states to enter into further, mutually

beneficial arrangements.^^

Regime rules are invariably accompanied by expectations of future behavior

in conformity with them. Such expectations may spring from a variety of

sources, such as states' formal commitments to abide by agreed institutional

provisions or their observation of certain behavioral norms in practice.

Whatever their origins, it is these expectations that endow regimes with much

of their influence. Because participating states expect each other to behave in

accordance with established norms and rules, they will feel aggrieved and may

seek redress whenever another state fails to comply. In this way, the very

existence of regime ru les, by raising expectations about the prop er conduct of

states, may result in stronger reactions when d iscrepant behavior occurs than if

the same action had been taken in their absence.^*-

Consequently, noncompliance may redound to a state's disadvantage in a

number of ways. At a minimum, it is likely to damage the state's reputation,

causing its partners to be more skeptical of its promises and commitments in

the future. In addition, a disregard of accepted standards of behavior may

prompt other participants to exclude the state from some of the benefits

provided by the regime or to take various other forms of punitive action. M ore

profoundly, noncompliance may cause other states to question the merits of

their own continued compliance, resulting in a weakening of the regime. In the

worst case, such behavior may culminate in the com plete disintegration of the

regime and the consequent loss of all associated benefits. The collapse of one




regime, moreover, may inadvertently undermine others involving the same

partic ipants, further raising the potential costs of breaking the rules.^^

These incentives for compliance derive from the very existence of regime

rules as valued instruments for the pursuit of common interests and the

expectations associated with them. Other elements of a regime may further

foster behavior in accordance with its conventions by simultaneously reducing

the risks of compliance and increasing those associated with noncompliance.

For example, although the enforcement process is usually highly decentralized

in international relations, regimes may include a number of institutional

arrangements intended to ensure the punishment of rule-breakers. These may

simply be higher-order norms establishing an obligation on the part of

participants to impose sanctions, or they may consist of more detailed

procedures for coordinating punitive actions in order to reduce the transaction

costs of organizing such responses, which otherwise m ight be quite high.

In addition, regimes may include arrangements for making the behavior of

member states more transparent to one another, such as measures for

providing states with detailed information about each other's activities.

Transparency measures enable states to detect noncompliance more quickly

and more easily. Timely and accurate detection, in turn, allows states to limit

the am ount of damage that can be inflicted upon them by rule-breakers. At the

same time, it limits the benefits that can be derived from noncompliance while

increasing the likelihood of punishment. As a result, in the presence of efl'ective

transparency measures, the members of a regime will have less reason to be

concerned about each other's activities and thus

will

experience less pressure to

disregard its injunctions themselves.

Internal sources of compliance

Thus far, this analysis has assumed that states are rational, self-interested,

unitary actors and that decisions to comply with regime norms and rules are the

result of careful cost-benefit analysis. As noted above, however, some theorists

argue that states often comply with established conventions without making

elaborate calculations on a case-by-case basis. To the contrary, behavior in

accordance with the injunctions of an international regime may become

internalized by participating states and take on a life of its own.^^ In effect, a

state's interests may become redefined in ways that reinforce compliance

through its participation in a regime.^'






Hypotheses regarding regime influence on state behavior

Several hypotheses can be derived from regime theory regarding NATO

conventional force levels in the Central Region. At the most general level, this

approach would predict that alliance members would tend to provide forces in

accordance with established conventions. Consequently, NATO force levels,

both national and overall, would remain constant as long as the relevant norms

and rules did not change. More important, this stability should even character-

ize situations in which shifts in Warsaw Pact military capabilities. Western

perceptions of Soviet intentions and the risk of war, or the distribution of

military potential among alliance members would lead one to expect some

variation in overall NATO force levels or relative national contributions,

situations that recurred in the 1960s and 1970s.

Of course, behavior in conformity with regime injunctions alone may not

constitute conclusive proof of regime influence. Under some circumstances,

other explanations may be equally plausible. Conversely, examples of discrep-

ant behavior do not necessarily invalidate the claim of regime influence. To

quote Young again, with domestic institutions, "we almost always regard a

certain level of non-compliance as normal.'"'^ What matters is whether or not

the existence of a regime increases the likelihood of behavior in conformity

with its norms and rules. Thus, the most compelling evidence of the influence of

regimes will be found in the calculations of decision makers."*^ Consequently, a

second hypothesis, which follows from the external component of the model

developed above, is that regime considerations will carry significant weight in

the policymaking process. The existence of the regime will alter decision

makers' evaluations of the costs and benefits of different courses of action in

ways that favor compliance.

Three more hypotheses can be derived from the internal component of the

model. First, the decision-making process is likely to be influenced further by

the emergence and strengthening of groups with a direct interest in the

maintenance of the regime. Second, the process itself may become structured

in ways that result in outcomes consistent with compliance. Third, the beliefs

and values of decision makers may evolve under the influence of the regime in

directions that cause them to favor adherence to established norms and rules.

These additional hypotheses suggest that we should expect to see few

proposals for change in a country's NATO force contribution, even when shifts

in the balance of power as well as perceptions of the threa t or of the fairness of

the distribution of the defense burden within the alliance suggest the need for

adjustment. Any proposals that do emerge, moreover, are likely to encounter




fierce resistance, notwithstanding their objective merits, and, as a result of such

opposition, few are likely to become national policy. Those proposals that

survive will be considerably diluted during their passage through the policymak-

ing process, and even then, plans for reductions are prone to be moderated in

the face of allied objections.

Evaluating the utility of regime theory

A careful evaluation of the utility of a regime-based explanation of the

evolution of NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region should

include the following steps: (1) identification of the norms and rules that have

governed the provision of conventional forces; (2) demonstration that the

actions of those countries with forces in the region indeed have been generally

consistent with those norms and rules'"; (3) where such behavior occurs,

indication of the general causes of compliance, both in terms of the incentives

and constraints created by the very existence of the regime and in terms of

reinforcing domestic and cognitive sources; and, most importantly, (4) documen-

tation of the infiuence of regime considerations in the calculations of decision

makers and of the internalization of behavior in accordance with regime

injunctions consistent with the hypotheses developed above. This four-step

analysis, which is undertaken in the next two sections, provides considerable

support for the claim that a regime has strongly influenced NATO force levels.

Norms and rules of the regime

A combination of general norms and more specific rules evolved during the

1950s that subsequently served as guidelines for the provision of conventional

forces in the Central Region. The highest norm was that, in the absence of an

agreement to the contrary, states should seek to provide previously agreed-

upon force levels or at least to preserve the status quo. If a state concluded that

it could no longer maintain its force contribution at the existing level, it was

nevertheless expected to refrain from altering its contribution unilaterally.

Rather, it was expected to consult with its allies before taking any significant

actions. The norm of consultation reinforced the regime by allowing allies to

express any objections to proposed force reductions that they may have had,

thereby underscor ing the potentia l costs of proceeding to implement h ' ^



NATO force levels

841

TABLE

4. NATO force goals and requirements (divisions)

United S tates

Britain

France

Germany

Belgium

Netherlands

Canada

Total

1952

6%"

4%

7'/3

12

a

1953

6

4%

7'/3

12

3

1

•/3

35>/3

1958

6

4

5

12

2

2

'/ 3

31'/3

1961

6

3

4

121/3

2

2

1/3

29%

7962

(Actual forces)

6

3

2'/3

8

2

2

'/ 3

23%

"Dashes = data not available.

''Each 13 represents one brigade.

Sources.

Walter S. Poole,

The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint C hiefs of Staff and Na-

tional Poiicy, 1950-1952, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 1976), p.

293;

National A rchives and Records Administration, Record Group 59,

"Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 April 1953," File 740.5/4-1553; U.S. Congress,

House Com mittee on Foreign Affairs, Selected Executive Session Hearings, 1957-60, vol. 19, Mu-

tual Security Program, Part 6 (Washington, D.C; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 28;

U.S.

Department of Defense, "Rem arks by Secretary MeNamara, NATO Ministerial M eeting, 5

May 1962, Restricted Session," Freedom

of

Information

Act.

NATO has also offered specific rules concerning the forces that member

countries should provide. These primarily took

the

form

of

national force goals

and force requirements for major ground force units and aircraft, which were

based, in turn, on NATO's formal military strategy, estimates of Soviet and

Warsaw Pact military capabilities,

and

assessments

of

alliance resources. Table

4 summarizes the formal force goals or requirements that were adopted on a

more or less annual basis between 1950 and

1953,

and again in 1958 and

1961.''̂

NATO force goals

and

requirements were never binding, however. Their

actual fulfillment, moreover, often lagged by several years and, in many cases,

was never achieved. This

was

especially true with regard

to the

requirements

for mobilizable reserve units. Nevertheless, most

of

the goals

for

ready forces

in

the Central Region were eventually realized. By the early 1960s, a close

correspondence existed between NATO requirements

and the

forces then

being provided.^"

NATO last formulated divisional force requirements in 1961. In principle,

the task of formally determining such requirements, although never again

49.

National goals for ready forces in the Central Region during this period, like actual force




attempted, was greatly complicated in 1967, when the alliance adopted the

concept of political warning in conjunction with the strategy of flexible

response.^' This concept, which assumed that any hostilities would probably be

preceeded by a prolonged period of tension during which NATO could

mobilize sufficient forces to deter or, if necessary, to defeat an attack, largely

decoupled the requirement for ready forces from Warsaw Pact capabilities.

This doctrinal development allowed countries to justify a much wider range of

possible contributions of standing forces in peacetime.

Nevertheless, force goals of a kind continued to exist in the form of the status

quo.

In institutional terminology, the maintenance of existing force levels

became a social convention. In the w ords of Thom as Schelling, the status quo

became a salient "focal point" on which it was natural for expectations of

future behavior to converge. In the absence of jointly agreed force goals, the

status quo was the one point at which a line could be drawn that would not

seem entirely arbitrary, of which one could ask, "If not here, where?"^^

After the late 1950s, several changes occurred in the status quo, but these

were invariably negotiated or at least received subsequent multilateral endorse-

ment. The British withdrawals in 1957 and 1958 were discussed and approved

by both the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, and the modest

U.S. and British reductions of the late 1960s took place only after lengthy

negotiations with the West Germans—and then only after they had received

the concurrence of the alliance as a whole. Thus, in each case, the status quo

was effectively renegotiated, and a new but only slightly different consensual

norm regarding force levels emerged to replace the old.

In addition to explicit and implicit force goals, the provision of conventional

forces in the Cen tral Region has been shaped by several other conventions. For

example, upper limits on national force contributions were developed in 1951

for the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). After the EDC was

scuttled in 1954, these restrictions were adopted by the parties to the Brussels

Treaty as one of the interlocking agreements that paved the way for West

German rearmament. In practice, however, only the West German military

contribution, which was capped at twelve divisions, was affected, since the

forces of the other W EU countries were never expected to exceed the ceilings

set for them.53

At the same time that West Germany was admitted to NATO, Britain stated

its intention to maintain the equivalent of four divisions and a tactical air force

on the continent in order to calm French anxieties about German rearmam ent.




The British agreed not to reduce those forces without the approval of a

majority of Brussels Treaty countries.^'* As discussed below, this declaration

became an important constraint on subsequent British behavior.

Rational incentives for compliance

The provision of conventional forces in the Central Region (described in the

first section) has been highly consistent with the norm s and rules of the regime.

Until recently, NATO force levels had fluctuated very little during more than

three decades, notwithstanding occasional strong pressures for change. This

behavior, moreover, can be understood largely in term s of both the incentives

for compliance created by the very existence of the regime and internal factors

that have reinforced the status quo.

Several aspects of the regime helped to foster compliance. Most obviously,

the existence of concrete force goals at times provided a yardstick for assessing

national contributions. In addition, the N ATO force planning process required

mem ber countries to provide one another with detailed information about their

existing and planned force structures. As a result, intra-alliance security

relations were characterized by a high degree of transparency.

More important, by maintaining their forces at the indicated levels, NATO

countries theoretically improved the prospects for deterrence and, in the event

that dete rrence failed, a successful defense of the region. In this way, observing

established force goals contributed directly to the security of individual

countries. At the same time, it resulted in a num ber of subsidiary benefits, such

as enhanced domestic and international prestige and the appreciation of

grateful allies, which yielded greater influence with them on other issues.

Finally, states regarded steadfast adherence to the status quo as necessary to

foster a continued military contribution by other countries. They feared that a

sustained failure to provide the forces expected of them could result in similar

behavior by their allies, leading to a weakening of NATO and the consequent

loss of some, if not all, of the benefits associated with alliance membership.

It is worth examining these incentives in greater detail from the perspectives

of both sides of the Atlantic. To the European members of NATO, the

presence of U.S. troops in Europe served as a potent symbol of the U.S.

commitment to European security. The European members viewed the

continuation of that presence at approximately the same level as necessary to

sustain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee.'^ As a result, the

54. "Protocols to the Brussels Treaty."




European allies tended to maintain their forces at established levels largely in

order to ensure that no U.S. forces were withdrawn from the con tinent. For the

most part, European leaders calculated that the benefits to be derived from

unilateral reductions would not outweigh the resulting costs in terms of

diminished security if U.S. force levels were adversely affected.^^

On a number of occasions, the United States also refrained from deviating

from alliance norms

by

reducing its forces in the C entral Region ou t of concern

for the possible negative repercussions that such a move might have on the

behavior of its allies. U.S. leaders feared that troop withdrawals would

precipitate, corresponding allied force reductions, rather than compensatory

allied increases, further weakening deterrence and making Western Europe

even more vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation or aggression. As a result,

in the event of hostilities, the tJnited States would have faced the decision to

use nuclear weapons tha t much earlier. In the worst case, allies would have lost

confidence in the U.S. security guarantee and would have sought an accommo-

dation with the Soviet Union.

Internalization of the regime

While it might be tempting to view compliance with regime rules simply as a

rational response to the external opportunities and constraints created by the

regime, the outcomes of cost-benefit calculations are ultimately profoundly

influenced by the values that decision makers hold and their beliefs about the

likely consequences of difi'erent actions." In this sense, cognitive factors also

have played an important role in shaping decisions concerning the provision of

conventional forces in Central Region in ways that reinforced the regime.

In particular, support for maintaining the status quo has followed logically

from a set of mutually reinforcing attitudes and assumptions.'^ They are: (1)

the preservation of the political independence of Western Europe was a vital

interest not only of countries in the region but also of the United States; (2) the

Soviet Union sought to limit the political independence of Western Europe

and, through the maintenance of substantial, offensively postured military

capabilities, possessed the means to influence the politics of—if not to

intimidate—the countries of the region; (3) in order to neutralize the potential

political influence afforded by these military capabilities, the NATO countries

had to maintain substantial conventional and nuclear forces in Western

56. For example, see Alistair Francis Buchan, "The U nited S tates and the Security of Eu ro pe ,"

in David Landes, ed.,

Westem E urope: Th e Trials of Partnership

(Lexington, Mass.: D C He ath



NAT O force levels 845

Europe, including a large U.S. component^^; (4) up to a certain point, the

details of NATO 's force structure were less important than the preservation of

alliance cohesion, especially if disagreement threatened the U.S . comm itment

to defend the political independence of Western Europe as represented by the

U.S. military presence on the continent; and (5) by undermining alliance

cohesion, which presumed a high degree of cooperation and self-restraint,

unilateral force reductions would vitiate the effectiveness of the alliance in

countering Soviet political pressure and should therefore be strongly resisted.

Such general beliefs may nevertheless place only loose constraints on state

behavior. Careful adherence to regime norms and rules, however, also has been

reinforced by a number of more specific ideas and assumptions that were

broadly shared.^" At many times, for example, existing NA TO force levels were

widely regarded as the minimum necessary to preserve deterrence, given

Warsaw Pact capabilities and the state of military technology, or, in the case of

the U.S. contribution, to reassure nervous allies. Also important was the

common view, noted above, that if one country reduced its forces, its allies

would follow suit rather than increase their contributions.*'

Another important aspect of the internalization of the regime was the

redefinition of organizational interests around its rules. Most national military

organizations developed strong interests in maintaining NA TO force contribu-

tions at their existing levels. In many cases, the defense of the Central Region

became a central, if not the primary, organizational mission. Similarly, those

national forces stationed in the region came to constitute a large share, if not

all,

of the assets of many military organizations. Consequently, attempts to

reduce a country's NATO force contribution were seen as attacks on the

"essence" of the threatened military organizations, prompting fierce resis-

tance.*^ This regime-reinforcing behavior stands in marked contrast to the

initial reluctance of some military organizations, notably in the United States,

to station additional forces in the Central Region.

Other organizations with less direct stakes in NATO force levels also became

staunch advocates of compliance with regime rules. Foreign ministry budgets

were little affected by changes in force levels, but diplomats in regular contact

59 . Many U.S. policymakers, in particular, subscribed to the questionable belief that in the

absence of a firm U.S. commitment, the European countries would readily bandwagon with the

Soviet Union. See Joseph Lepgold,

The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European

Defense, 1960-1990

(New York: Greenw ood Press, 1990), pp . 86-92 . For evidence that ban dwago n-

ing behavior in international relations is the exception rather than the rule, see Walt,

Origins of

Alliances.




with their allied counterparts had an interest in maintaining good working

relations. Consequently, their positions often strongly reflected allied views,

which were likely to be opposed to any reductions.

Explaining the lack of upward movement in NATO

force levels

Thus far, the analysis presented here has emphasized the role of the regime

in preventing force reductions. Although regime theory also suggests, in

contrast to the predictions of balance-of-power theory, that N ATO force levels

would have been unlikely to rise during periods of growing adversary capabili-

ties or heightened international tension, consideration of a number of dom estic

factors would point to the same conclusion.'*^ jjjg provision of conventional

forces entails government outlays and, when forces are stationed abroad,

expenditures of foreign exchange. Since national resources are finite, increases

in a country's alliance contribution are likely to have substantial opportunity

costs. Consequently, they are likely to be highly contested. Domestic interest

groups that stand to lose from greater military spending will oppose the

necessary additional defense outlays. Even those interests that are not

adversely affected in a direct way may very well resist such changes because of

their uncertain impact on carefully crafted national budget agreements.

Additionally, national budgets may be so inflexible that increases in force

structure require years to implement.''''

As a result of such factors, states will delay raising their force levels for as

long as possible, in many cases until the pressure to do so has subsided.

Consequently, it may be unnecessary to invoke regime theory to explain the

absence of such increases. Many of the same domestic factors that militate

against increases in force levels, however, would cause force levels to decline

whenever international conditions permit. In short, force levels should be

sticky upwards but not downwards. Thus, dom estic factors, in addition to being

difficult to generalize across countries, can provide only a partial explanation of

the stability of N ATO force levels and m ust be supplem ented by regime theory.

Detailed evidence of regime influence

While the foregoing analysis is strongly suggestive of regime influence, a

thorough evaluation of the utility of regime theory requires a careful examina-




tion of the process by which national policy has been formulated.*^ What

detailed evidence is there to indicate that the postulated regime has actually

shaped decisions concerning the provision of conventional forces in the Central

Region? This section reviews five cases involving proposals and actual attempts

to reduce national force contributions to NATO.'^'' These episodes represent

the most serious challenges to the status quo—both successful and unsuccess-

ful—of the three and one-half decades preceding the dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact.fi''

This examination yields considerable evidence of regime influence on

national policymaking consistent with the hypotheses presented above. In some

cases, regime considerations carried signiflcant weight in decision makers'

calculations. In other instances, beliefs, organizational interests, and aspects of

the policymaking process evinced internalization of the regime's behavioral

injunctions. Thus, proposals for reducing NATO force levels were progres-

sively diluted or eventually rejected as a result of strong resistance by key

individuals and government agencies and the availability of powerful argu-

ments for not tampering with the status quo. While the evidence that can be

presented here is not conclusive (a much more detailed examination of each

case would be necessary to establish the precise impact of the regime on the

decision-making process), it does, nevertheless, appear to conflrm the utility of

a regime-based explanation.

The U.S. decision to forego m ajor force reductions in 1956

Soon after taking office in 1953, the Eisenhower administration sought to

reduce U.S. conventional forces, in part by placing greater reliance on nuclear

weapons to deter aggression, in order to trim the defense budget. Consistent

with this policy, the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons in

65. For further discussion of the method of "process-tracing," see George, "The Causal Nexus

Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making Behavior," and A ggarwal, Liberal Protectionism.

66. In principle, it would be most useful to study instances in which balance-of-power theory or

public goods theory would predict significant change in NATO force levels. This criterion presen ts

two sets of difficulties, however. First, it may be impossible to specify the precise point at which

variations in the factors emphasized by these theories would be expected to cause change in the

dependent variables. A second problem arises whenever change is not seriously considered by

national decision makers, notwithstanding structural pressures. Indeed, we may note that very few

proposals to alter national force contributions were made after the 1950s. Although such cases

would seem to conform to the expectations of

regime

theory, the empirical obstacles to establishing




Western Europe in increasing numbers between 1953 and 1955. During the

same period, however, the administration made no firm plans and took no

concrete actions to reduce the number of U.S. combat units or U.S. troop

strength in the Central Region. Although President Eisenhower had always

believed that the presence of U.S. forces in Europe was only a temporary

expedient, he reluctantly concluded that there should be no hint of a major

withdrawal until the allies had come to realize that such a move would make

military sense.*^

As time passed and U.S. defense spending failed to decline as much as the

administration had hoped, pressure to make such cuts mounted. In mid-1956,

the chairm an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, developed a

drastic force reduction plan including large withdrawals from Europe.^^ After

further consideration, however, the adm inistration decided in early October of

that year against redeploying any major units for the time being. At most,

Eisenhower concluded, the United States could eliminate unessential support

personnel through a process of "stream lining."

The decision not to reduce significantly the U.S. conventional force contribu-

tion in the Central Region, notwithstanding powerful strategic and budgetary

reasons for doing so, was strongly influenced by regime considerations and a

reinforcing set of beliefs held by many U.S. officials that militated against

reductions. Those opposed to withdrawals argued that the mere mention of

such a move would cause the Europeans to slacken their own defense efforts.

Indeed, they feared that any significant departure from the status quo could

begin a process that would culminate in the complete unraveling of the

alliance. These officials shared the conviction that the allies regarded the

existing level of U.S. forces in Europe as a barometer of the U.S. commitment

to their security; any U.S. withdrawals would have represented a diminution in

allied security far out of proportion to the actual contribution to deterrence

made by the forces in question. Consequently, they concluded that the

potential costs of reductions far outweighed the econotnic benefits that the

United States would derive.™

68. For Eisenhower's views, see the following documents in

FRUS

1952-1954, vol. 2 (Washing-

ton, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing

Office, 1984):

Memorandum

by

Cutler

to the

Secretary

of

State, 3 September 1953," pp. 455-57; Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, 8

September 1953," p. 460; and Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National

Security Council,

7

October

1953," pp. 527-29.

69. For

details

of the

Radford plan,

see

Catherine McArdle Kelleher,

Germany

and the

Politics

of Nuclear Weapons

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), p p. 43-44.




British efforts to achieve force reductions, 1956-1957

In the first half of 1956, Britain decided to seek a reduction in its

conventional forces stationed in the Central Region. Like many officials in the

Eisenhower administration, the British were anxious to reduce defense

spending, especially at a time when their burgeoning nuclear program was

consuming increasing resources. British officials were acutely aware of the

potential costs of reneging on the cotnmitment they had undertaken in 1954,

however, and initially concluded that they should not propose such a reduction

directly.^' Instead, they sought to revise NATO's formal military strategy in a

way that would result in lower conventional force requirements.'^

By the end of the year, however, the pressure to proceed with reductions

unilaterally had become virtually irresistable. The reformulation of NATO

strategy proposed by the British had been rejected, while the economic

situation in Britain had deteriorated tnarkedly, largely as a result of the Suez

crisis. Consequently, the government decided to pursue reductions directly,

invoking an escape clause that had been included in the 1954 declaration.'^

British officials nevertheless felt obligated to consult with their allies and the

NATO authorities before taking any action.''' The subsequent process of

consultation, moreover, provided the other countries and the NATO Supreme

Allied Com mander Europe with an opportunity to impress upon the British the

dangers of proceeding unilaterally and to press them to limit the size of the

proposed cuts. As a result, the British agreed to delay half of the proposed

reduction for one year and, eventually, to retain more troops on the continent

than had originally been planned. An important consideration in this decision

to compromise was their desire to avoid a unilateral breach of their 1954

comtnitment if at all possible.'^

71. See, for example, COS(97th)l, "Overall Strategic Concept," 9 October 1956, Ministry of

Defense Records (DEF E) 4/90, PRO .

72. See the following documents in FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 4: "Mem orandum of a Conversation

Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), 29 June 1956," pp. 84-86;

"Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador

(Makins),

13

July 1956," pp. 89-90; "Letter from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, 18

July

1956,"

pp. 90-92.

73.

Specifically, Britain was permitted to reduce the size of its forces on the continent as long

as it maintained the "equivalent fighting capacity" of four divisions and a tactical air force. The

British government could also petition the North Atlantic Council to review the situation if too

great a strain on Britain's external

finances

was imposed. See "Protocols to the Brussels Treaty," p.

1445.




The trilateral negotiations, 1966-67

The most significant one-time reduction in the number of conventional

forces stationed in the Central Region in the past three decades took place as a

result of the trilateral negotiations among the U nited States, Britain, and W est

Germany, which were conducted between October 1966 and May 1967.^^ The

accord reached by these three countries, and subsequently ratified by the

alliance as a whole, allowed the U nited States to redeploy up to 35,000 military

personnel from the continent and Britain to withdraw one brigade of 5,000

troops beginning in 1968, with the proviso that the departing forces would

remain committed to NATO.''' The cuts were justified in terms of both a

decline in the threat and the need to minimize the foreign exchange losses

incurred in stationing troops ab road.

Notwithstanding the fact that reductions did take place, this episode

illustrates (1) the impact of the alliance norm of consultation with respect to

proposed changes in force levels and (2) the infiuence of substate actors with a

stake in maintaining the status quo. Initially, the British government had

contemplated proceeding unilaterally with troop withdrawals as early as

October 1966 in order to reduce foreign exchange expenditures. At U.S.

urging, however, it eventually agreed to seek a negotiated solution and

postponed making a final roop cut decision until the following year.

Because of strong internal sources of resistance to the proposed reductions

and a U.S. predisposition to compromise in the face of allied criticism,

moreover, the U.S. withdrawals were much smaller than they might otherwise

have been. Those officials, especially in the U.S. Treasury Department and the

office of the Secretary of Defense, who wanted to reduce the number of forces

stationed in Europe in order to improve the U.S. balance-of-payments position

called for the withdrawal of up to four brigades, 72,000 army personnel, and

324 aircraft.'^ An equal if not greater number of influential individuals and

government organizations, however, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

special U.S. negotiator to the talks, John McCloy, who had long been involved

in alliance matters, opposed any significant reduction of U.S. forces in the

Central Region.

Consistent with organizational interests and the deep-seated beliefs held by

many U.S. decision m akers, the opponents of withdrawals argued inter alia that

such a move would trigger corresponding allied cuts, cause the Europeans to

76. For details of the negotiations, see Gregory F. Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American



NATO force levels

85

question

the U.S.

commitment

to

their defense,

and

possibly precipitate

NATO's disintegration.™ Eventually, President Johnson decided to split the

difference

and

seek

a cut of

only two-thirds

of

one division

and

144 aircraft.^"

This compromise position

was

further diluted after being presented

to the

West Germans, who claimed to be "shocked" by the size of the proposed

reduction in aircraft.^^ Consequently, the United States ultimately agreed to

limit the redeployment to only ninety-six aircraft.^^

Senate challenges

to

U.S. force levels, 1966-73

The reductions resulting from the trilateral negotiations coincided with the

first of a series of efforts in the U.S. Senate to bring about even larger troop

withdrawals.^^ Subsequent

to the

deployment

of

ground troops

in

1951,

the

Congress had consistently deferred to the administration on the question of

U.S. force levels in Europe. In 1966,1967, and 1969, however. Senate Majority

Leader Mike Mansfield introduced resolutions declaring that the United States

could make substantial reductions without adversely affecting its "resolve or

ability" to meet its NATO commitment. In 1968, Senator Stuart Symington

proposed a measure prohibiting the use of funds after that year to support

more than 50,000

U.S.

troops

in

Eu rope. The most serious challenges occurred

in 1971 and 1973, when Mansfield introduced potentially binding legislative

amendments requiring that the U.S. military presence in Europe be cut by as

much as 50 percent.^

These initiatives were motivated by a number of considerations.^^ Perhaps

most important was the increasingly widespread perception that the United

States was shouldering a disproportionately large share of the burden of

defending W estern Europe, especially given the tremendous economic progress

that the allies had made since the inception of the alliance, f n addition , many

members

of

the Senate felt tha t the troops were m ore badly needed

in

Vietnam

79. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are presented in Memorandum for the Secretary of

Defense, 'Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Europe,' 27 October 1966, DDRS, no. 2570,1986. For

MeCloy's views, see Letter, McCloy to the President, 21 November 1966, and attachments, DDRS,

no. 1098,1986.

80 . Trilateral Negotiations and NATO.

81.

Telegram, Bonn 12730,24 April 1967, DDRS, no. 1021,1985.

82 . Telegram, State 183936,27 April 1967, DDRS, no. 191,1985.

83 . The most thorough account is provided by Phil Williams,

The Senate and U.S. Troops in

Europe

(New York: St. Martin's, 1985).

84 . The original 1971 amendment required a 50 percent reduction by the end of the year.




and, like elements of the adm inistration, viewed troop reductions as helping to

reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. As time went by, these arguments

were reinforced by the general discontent with military commitments abroad

engendered by the Vietnam War and the growing atmosphere of detente

between the United States and the Soviet Union, which seemed to undermine

the rationale for stationing forces in Europe.

In contrast to the previous case, which featured deep divisions within the

administration, the executive branch closed ranks and presented a solid front in

opposition to these Senate efforts. In response to Mansfield's 1971 proposal,

the Nixon administration staged a massive lobbying effort, while a parade of

top government officials testified before the Senate against the 1973 amend-

ment. On both occasions, Mansfield's opponents rather predictably, although

not without conviction, stressed the tremendous damage that would be caused

both to the alliance and to U.S. interests if unilateral reductions were

imposed.^^

It seems fitting that the greatest challenge to the U.S. conventional force

contribution to NATO would have originated in the legislative branch, where

one would expect to find less of an organizational interest in maintaining the

status quo. Yet even there , opinion was deeply divided. The Nixon administra-

tion's efforts to defeat the Mansfield amendments received crucial assistance

from elements in the Senate that opposed reductions. The outcome of the 1973

battle revealed that a majority of the senators questioned U.S. force levels in

Europe only insofar as they contributed to the balance-of-payments deficit. In

other words, they approved of the size of the existing U.S. contribution as long

as it did not prove too costly. Otherwise, most members of Congress believed

that such matters would best be decided by the executive branch and that any

adjustments should only be made in consultation with the allies, further

reinforcing the leading role of the administration.^^ As a result of such

regime-reinforcing attitudes, each of the Mansfield amendments was defeated.

The 1984 Nunn amendment

The last significant challenge to U.S. conventional force levels on the

continent prior to the events of the past few years occurred in 1984. That year.

Senator Sam Nunn introduced an amendment mandating the withdrawal of

90,000 troops over three years, unless the allies achieved real increases in

defense spending of 3 percent per year, a target established by NATO in the

late 1970s. Alternatively, U.S. reductions could be averted, or at least




Although the U.S. ambassador to NATO at the time subsequently described

this episode as "perhaps the most delicate time in NATO history since the

French withdrawal from the military command,"^^ there was little chance that

the United States would actually make unilateral withdrawals. In contrast to

the Mansfield amendments, the 1984 proposal provided the Europeans with

several ways to forestall the threatened reductions. Indeed, Nunn viewed the

amendm ent as entirely constructive. Its primary purpose was "to prod the allies

into doing more, and thereby establish conditions in which American troops

would contribute to a sustainable conventional defense ."'" In the end, even this

carefully hedged attempt to exert pressure on the allies failed by a Senate vote

of fifty-five to forty-one, while a much m ilder substitute lacking the controver-

sial troop cut clauses garnered almost unanimous Senate support.

Conclusion

This article has sought to demonstrate the utility of regime theory for

explaining the high degree of stability that characterized NATO conventional

force levels in the Central Region of Europe during the 1960s, 1970s, and

1980s. It has argued that balance-of-power theory and public goods theory

alone cannot provide a satisfactory account of this history. Rather, these

primarily structural approaches must be supplemented by a regime-based

explanation that emphasizes the persistence of established patterns of behav-

ior, even in the face of some structural change. In short, regimes do matter.

They can have a significant degree of influence on state behavior.^'

Nevertheless, there are limits to this influence, just as there are to regime

autonomy. Rarely, if ever, will regimes shape behavior in ways that are

fundamentally at odds with the dictates of structural factors, such as the

distribution of power. Ultimately, regime injunctions are conditioned by

international structure. Over time, incongruities may develop between a

regime and the underlying distribution of power, and when these incongruities

become severe enough, the regime will be transformed, replaced, or simply

abandoned.'^

Recent events have dramatically illustrated these limits. The regime that

governed the provision of conventional forces in the Central Region for more

than three decades has been swept away by the tremendous structural changes

that have taken place in Europe in the past few years. The decline in the Soviet

threat to Western Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact caused the




alliance's existing force levels, so often bemoaned as inadequate, suddenly to

seem excessively high. As a result, all of the countries with forces in the region

are now in the process of sharply reducing their N ATO contributions.

At the same time, however, these events also have demonstrated the

substantial degree to which structural factors may have to change before the

existence of a regime is seriously threatened. Modest shifts in the distribution

of power, for example, will not necessarily be reflected in regime change. Thus,

as this study has shown, the regime governing the provision of conventional

forces went largely unmodified for some thirty years, notwithstanding changes

in the explanatory variables emphasized

by

balance-of-power theory and public

goods theory.̂ 3

These observations suggest the usefulness of conceptualizing the relation-

ship between structural factors and regimes in the following manner.'"* We may

regard structural factors as setting only broad limits on in ternational outcomes,

including the possible forms that regimes may take.'^ A variety of regime rules

may be consistent with a given distribution of power. Once a regime arises,

however, it further shapes and contrains state behavior within the parameters

established by the structure of the system. Thus, balance-of-power theory and

public goods theory account for the range of NATO conventional force levels

that were possible, while regime theory explains why the allies adhered to a

particular set of force levels within that range. In this sense, structural and

institutional approaches to understanding international relations are highly

complementary.

A flnal conclusion is that the application of regime theory to security issues

has greater potential than studies of relations among military adversaries

would suggest. International regimes may arise whenever it is possible for

states to realize joint gains through collaboration.'^ We should expect to find

frequent opportunities for joint gains in relations among allies. Even adversar-

ial relations, however, need not always be characterized as zero-sum gam es. No

less a pair of antagonists than the United States and the Soviet Union during

much of the cold war shared important common interests, notably a mutual

desire to avoid nuclear war, that enabled them to engage in institutionalized

forms of cooperation on a number of issues.'^ In between these extremes of

93.

For furthe r discussion of the sourc es of regime au tono my , see ibid, pp . 359 -67.

94 .

For a similar conceptualization that is couched in terms of physical and behavioral laws on

the one hand, and rules on the other, see Elinor Ostrom, "An Agenda for the Study of

Insti tutions,"

Public Choice,

vol. 48, no.

1,1986,

pp. 3-25.

95 .

For discussions of the inde term inacy of structu ral factors, see, for exam ple. W altz,

Theory of




alliance and adversarial relations lies a wide range of mixed-motive situations,

such as collective security systems or arrangements for the control of exports

with potential military applications, in which the use of a regime perspective is

likely to bear at least some fruit.

With the end of the cold war, we may expect to see regimes assuming an even

more prominent role in security affairs, a phenomenon that should be

especially pronounced in Europe. The decline of the ideological antagonism

that previously divided the continent into two opposing blocs ensures that the

states of the region will enjoy an unprecedented, if still limited, degree of

common interests. At the same time, Euro pe already hosts a large and growing

number of well-developed security institutions. Thus regime theory may prove

to be particularly useful for analyzing, anticipating, and perhaps even guiding

the evolution of the post-cold war European security system.'^



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