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RESERVE FORCES OF THE NATO ARMIES

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Tripp, INSenior Service College Fellow

NATO Defense College

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Approved for publicrelease; distribution is unlimited.

March 1991

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARUISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

91-03152

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

RESERVE FORCES OF THE NATO ARMIES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Tripp, INArmy National Guard of the United States

Colonel Richard W. WallProject Advisor

U.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

*91 rep

wi"" aasunr.?Avalablit *oo

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert E. Tripp, LTC, IN

TITLE: Reserve Forces of the NATO Armies

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 5 March 1991 PAGES: 120 CLASS: Unclassified

Reserve forces comprise over half of the wartime strengthof the armies of NATO member nations. With so much of thisstrength in a mobilizable status, it is important thatcommanders and staffs of NATO organizations know andunderstand the reserve systems on which they would depend inwartime. This study seeks to provide an overview of thesesystems in an unclassified format which can be used as areference document.

With the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty, budget cuts,and manpower shortfalls, some NATO countries have proposedchanges which will impact on their reserve systems. To theextent information was available, these proposals have beenoutlined in the applicable chapters. Descriptions of NATOaffiliated associations are also incorporated, as are somebasic conclusions and recommendations. Source materials forthis research project include current publications, personalinterviews, as well as official NATO and national documents.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ................................................... ii

INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1

CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND .................................... 3

II. BELGIUM ....................................... 6

III. CANADA ........................................ 15

IV. DENMARK ....................................... 22

V. FRANCE ........................................ 29

VI. GERMANY ....................................... 33

VII. GREECE ........................................ 41

VIII. ITALY ......................................... 45

IX. NETHERLANDS ................................... 49

X. NORWAY ........................................ 56

XI. PORTUGAL ...................................... 65

XII. SPAIN ......................................... 72

XIII. TURKEY ........................................ 76

XIV. UNITED KINGDOM ................................ 79

XV. UNITED STATES ................................. 87

XVI. NATO RESERVE ASSOCIATIONS ..................... 106

XVII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............... 109

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................... 114

iii

INTRODUCTION

There are large numbers of reserve forces within the

member armies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). Indeed, many of these armies would not be effective

in wartime without the mobilization of their reserves. If the

commanders and staffs of NATO headquarters are to understand

the armies that are to be assigned to the them, they should

know and understand the reserve systems of those armies.

It has been my experience that NATO officers usually

think of reserves within the context of their own countries.

In fact, the composition, organization, training levels of

reserve forces vary widely across the Alliance. For example,

some countries, like the Netherlands and Germany, have

standing cadre units which would have to be brought up to

wartime strength by mobilizing reservists. Other countries,

such as the United States, have a number of whole combat

formations made up entirely of reserve component soldiers.

The purpose of this study is to provide an unclassified

reference document that summarizes the army reserve systems of

each NATO country. It is my hope it will be used by NATO

ground component staffs to help them understand the reserve

forces of the Alliance.

In order to compile the information contained in this

paper, : tocused my research on the following questions:

o What icserve systems are found in NATO armies?

o What changes are being made to these systems?

For the purposes of this study, a "reserve system" pertains to

the command and control, mission, organization, personnel,

training, and logistics of a nation's army reserve, militia or

army affiliated home guard.

Answering the first question involved collecting and

sorting through data on each country's reserve folces.

Answering the second question was more difficult. The

occupation of Kuwait and uncertainty of the Soviet threat are

slowing down the impetus to make changes to the reserve forces

in some countries. As an example, long term decicions on

changes to reserve systems in the United States will probably

have to wait until units and individuals called up for

Operation Desert Storm have been demobilized.

The paper begins with a background chapter, followed by

chapters on the army reserve component systems in each NATO

nation. Each of these chapters start with general information

relating to a country's individual defense environment and its

army. Following a discussion of the reserve system concerned,

a description of any changes being considered will be

provided. I have also incorporated a short chapter on the

international reserve associations affiliated with NATO,

followed by my conclusions and recommendations.

Admittedly, some chapters are more comprehensive than

others. Where this occurs, it is normally the result of

limited availability of information.

Two nations have been omitted altogether: Iceland,

because it does not have an army; and Luxembourg, because it

has no reserve.

2

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUi

Most of the armies of the North Atlantic Alliance are

organized with a mix of active and reserve forces. The size,

%.ompcsition, and tho dearee of mix is usually the result of a

nation's perception of the Soviet threat, "out of area"

commitments, and budgetary constraints.

Three NATO nations have volunteer reserve forces:

Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The

remainder rely on conscripts to fill their ranks. Regardless

of the source of personnel, NATO considers all reserve

elements to be essential partners in the defense of the

Alliance.

The NATO Handbook states: "Reserve forces ... play an

important role in the whole spectrum of NATO's defence

structure and in the event of crisis, would be required to

take up positions and carry out tasks alongside Regular

Forces."' In spite of their importance, some countries have

not provided adequate training or resources to their reserves.

The institution of Total Force concepts in Canada, the

United Kingdom, and the United States during the decades of

the '70s and '80s has gone a long way to improve the reserve

forces in those countries. The United States Army, for

example, has equipped a number of National Guard units with M-

1 "Abrams" tanks, M-2 "Bradley" fighting vehicles, as well as

"Black Hawk" and "Apache" helicopters. Also, some units of

3

the Regular Army could not go to war without their logistical

"tails" found in the Army Reserve (as witnessed by the

mobilization of such units for Operation Desert Storm).

Some countries are planning and implementing army

reorganizations which will affect their reserves. These are

based on the need to cut costs or to respond to a decrease in

the number of draft-age personnel.

With the unification of Germany and the signing of the

Conventional Forces Europe Treaty (CFE), more reorganizations

will probably follow in time. Some of these may include

reductions in both active and reserve strength; while other

nations may decide to reduce the size of their active armies

and move force structure into the reserves. Exactly when

these reorganizations may take place will probably depend on

how soon the situations in the Soviet republics and the

Persian Gulf stabilize.

44

NOTES - CHAPTER I

1.North Atlantic Treaty organization, NATO Handbook, p. 77.

5

CHAPTER II

BELGIUM

GENERAL

Belgium is a charter member of NATO. It has excellent

ports and transportation systems which constitute much of the

vital lines of communication for the Central Region. This

country is also host to both Headquarters, NATO and Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Belgian Army has two major commands, I (Belgian)

Corps and the Interior Forces.' Reservists may have

mobilization assignments to either.

First Corps is Belgium's land contribution to Allied

Command Europe. Most of the Corps is forward deployed in

Germany. It has two division headquarters, which have just

recently been transferred out of the active Army and into the

Reserve.2 Two of the Corps' six combat brigades are also in

the Reserve. "oth of these organizations are configured as

mechanized infantry.3

The Interior Forces include an active para-commando

regiment, two active infantry brigades, and eleven territorial

regiments made up almost entirely of reserves.4 The important

Army-wide functions of training, mobilization, and logistics

are also under the direction of the Interior Forces.

EOUIPMENT

This army is plagued with older equipment. Some items

6

date to World War II and the Korean Conflict. Most of the

oldest equipment is in the Reserve Force; however, some ray

still be found in active units.5 This is cause for concern.

Until the Reserve Force can be modernized, its effectiveness

after mobilization will be in question.

BELGIAN RESERVE SYSTEM

The Belgian Army Reserve has a strength of about 120,000

soldiers, which is 70 percent of the Army's wartime

composition.6 These reservists are conscripts who have

completed their active duty commitments.

The length of active service is dependent on rank.

Enlisted conscripts serve for ten months on active duty in

forward deployed units in Gerirany or twelve months in Belgium.

Conscripts who are trained as noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

are committed for twelve months. Reserve officers se2rve for

thirteen months.7

Enlisted soldiers remain in reserve status for eight to

fifteen years, depending on specialty. Officers and NCOs have

a reserve obligation to forty-five or sixty years of age,

depending on rank.

In the Belgian system, there are four classifications of

reserves: complements, recalled reservists, Reinforcing Line,

and Recruiting Rese.ve.8

When a conscript leaves active duty he is irn;-diately

placed in complement status for one year. If the soldier is

mobilized in this status, he would return to his former unit.9

After completion of the complement year, the soldier

becomes a recalled reservist. These individuals are assigned

7

to reserve units, and remain in those assianments for four

years.1° During ti-at period, the reservist may be calle(d up

for training or actual mobilization.

The Reinforcing Line is a pool of trained reservists who

are no longer assigned to units. Upon mobilization they would

serve as individual replacements.11 There are appro)-imately

60,000 personnel in this category.12 Each will remain in the

Reinforcing Line until the end of his reserve obligation.'3

The final classification is the Recruiting Reserve. '2hi -

category incluss all other untrained persons subject to

mobilization. Men awaiting the draft, and even some who have

been exempteu, are examples of those who are part of the

Recruiting Reserve. 1

TRAINING

By doctrine, training call-ups of whole reserve units

take place only once every four years. The d'ration of this

training varies from eight days, for Interior Force troops, to

twelve days, for I Corps units. Normally, these periods begin

with refresher training, and end with a field training

exercise (FTX). Unit leaders are called to duty for four to

seven days (depending on rank) before the training begins.15

In practice, units have gone five to six years between call-

ups because of budgetary reasons. Furthermore, the Ministry

of Defense has imposed a freeze on these call-ups for the

second half of 1990 aAd all of 1991.16

There are also provisions for the officers and NCOs of a

reserve unit to be activated annually for four days cf

training. However, according to the U.S. Defense Attache's

8

Office in Brussels, this does not always take place.17

Reserve officers and NCOs may volunteer for certain

training activities. These periods normally involve unit

administrative duties or professional development sessions

sponsored by national reserve organizations. 18'9 The amount

of voluntary training an individual can perform is limited to

thirty days.20

There are also legal and budgetary restrictions on

obligatory reserve training. Officers are limited to thirty

days of training per year; while NCOs may only perform twenty-

seven days of duty. The toughest restrictions are placed on

enlisted reservists who cannot train more than sixty-six days

in fifteen years. In practice; however, the Ministry of

Defense permits only twenty-four days of enlisted training in

fifteen years.21

MOBILIZATION

Belgium has developed a flexible military mobilization

system. This system is designed to bring standing units up to

wartime strength with complements, mobilize reserve units, and

activate individual reservists from the reinforcing line.

Flexibility is achieved because each of these activities can

be undertaken simultaneously or independently as the situation

dictates. In a general war, the leadership of the Army

believes all reserve units can be mobilized in six days.22

Mobilization planning for Belgium's four hundred Army

Reserve units is the respcoisibility of Mobilization Division,

Interior Forces. This task is undertaken through five

administrative organizations known as "mobilization units."

9

There are four or five depots subordinate to each mobilization

unit where reserve unikcs equipment is stored and

maintained.2 4

Belgium has organized an efficient alert notification

system for mobilization. It uses a combination of electronic

media, as well as personal delivery of orders by the Gendarmes

(para-military police).25 Upon notification, about 30 percent

of each reserve unit will report directly to one of the

mobilization depots to begin receiving equipment. The

remainder of the unit reports to predetermined assembly

areas. 26

FUTURE

Major changes are expected in the Belgian Reserve system

because of personnel and budget reductions. Many of the

proposed changes resemble elements of the Dutch system.27

The proposals being discussed in the Belgian Ministry of

Defense are based on three assumptions:

o Belgium will continue to have conscription.

o At least eight months of active duty will be required

of all conscripts.

o There will be sufficient preparation time for a period

of intensive training before future conflicts.28

There are four proposals, or "enhancements" (as the Army

staff calls them) that impact on the reserves:

o Create partnerships between active and reserve units.

o Integrate an active/reserve composite battalion into

Army schools.

o Change complement assignment policies.

10

o Change infrastructure.29

The first proposal is to create one on one partnerships

between as many active and reserve battalions as possible.

Under this proposal, an active battalion will be collocated

with a reserve battalion and would be responsible for training

the reserve battalion's officers and NCOs, maintaining its

equipment, and assisting the unit if mobilized. During

mobilization, 40 percent of the active battalion would be

transferred to the reserve unit in order to give it a higher

number of trained cadre personnel.30

The second proposal calls for integration of a composite

battalion into army schools. This battalion would be composed

of a headquarters, a school service company, one Flemish

speaking reserve company, one French speaking reserve company,

and an operations company. The operations company would have

conscripts assigned, and would be responsible for operational

demonstrations at the school or training center where it is

located. When these conscripts are released from active duty,

they would be transferred to one of the reserve companies.31

With fresh conscripts continually moving through the reserve

companies, this proposal, in theory, should provide well

trained organizations of a particular arm or specialty. Over

time, when their skills have started to wane, these soldiers

will be transferred to the Reinforcing Line and replaced by a

new set of soldiers with recent training.

The third proposal calls for a change in complement

service to four months. The Belgians propose to call this

service "short leave," a term used in the Netherlands.3 2

11

Leave status will allow for a recall at the General Staff

level rather than a mobilization decision by the Prime

Minister.33 After this four month period, the soldier would

be assigned to a reserve unit.3'

The final proposal calls for an infrastructure change

which would convert the mobilization depots to units.35

With these new "enhancements," has come a recommendation

that unit call-ups for training be discontinued. As

mentioned earlier, the staff believes there will be sufficient

time in future mobilizations to allow for training.

12

NOTES - CHAPTER II

1. Interview with Roger N. Yarbro, LTC, Assistant Army Attache,U.S. Embassy, Brussels, 5 December 1990.

2. Ibid.

3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalance 1990-1991, p. 59.

4. Interview with Willy Van Caester, COL, Belgium Army,Mobilization Division, Interior Forces, Brussels, 5 December1990.

5. Robert R. Ulin, "Belgium: The Strategic Hub," in NATO -Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, ed. by Jeffrey Simon, pp. 417-418.

6. Yarbro interview.

7. "Reserve has Bigger Role as Result of Reduction," TheOfficer, July 1990, p. 23.

8. Ulin, p. 408.

9. Ibid., pp. 408-409.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Van Caester interview.

13. Ulin, p. 409.

14. Ibid., p. 408.


16. Roger N. Yarbro, LTC, Assistant Army Attache, U.S. Embassy,Brussels, memorandum to author, 4 March 1991.

17. Yarbro interview.

18. Ibid.

19. In some European countries, reserve associations take on analmost semi-official character. In this case, the Belgiumgovernment provides subsidies to the Reserve Officers NationalRoyal Union and the Reserve NCOs National Royal Union for suchtraining ("Reserve has Bigger Role as Result of Reduction," TheOfficer, p. 23).

13


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. There are a total of 22 depots across Belgium.

24. Ibid.

25. Ulin, pp. 411-413.


27. See Chapter IX.

28. Interview with Jean Herreweghe, LTC, Belgium Army Staff,Brussels, 5 December 1990.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Yarbro memorandum.

34. Herreweghe interview.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

14

CHAPTER III

CANADA

GENERAL

Geographically, Canada is the second largest country in

the world. It also has the world's longest coastline since it

boarders three oceans.1

The Canadian military structure is unique. Since 1968,

the Canadian Forces have been unified without separate service

components.2 Its land element is one of only three in NATO to

be made up entirely of volunteers.

Strategically, its defense priorities are (from highest

to lowest):3

o Protection of Canadian Territory.

o Defense of North America.

o Defense in NATO areas Atlantic and Europe.

o Cooperation in United Nations peace keeping measures.

ORGANIZATION

The Canadian forces are organized into functional

commands. With no army per se, one can find it difficult to

count soldiers. For example, Canada has a communications

command responsible for strategic communications. The

question arises whether to count communicators as soldiers,

sailors, or airmen. To avoid such pitfalls, I have relied on

figures provided by the International Institute for Strategic

Studies. It counts the active land forces at about 23,500

soldiers.4

15

Most of the land warfare organizations are found in the

Mobile Command and in Canadian Forces Europe. The active

elements of the Mobile Command include a division headquarters

(minus), two brigade groups, and a special service force.5

The land forces in Europe are comprised of a forward deployed

divisional headquarters element and a mechanized brigade

group. 6

CANADIAN RESERVE SYSTEM

Like the Regular Force, Canada's Reserve Force is an all-

volunteer organization. This force has four sub-components

called the Primary Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, Cadet

Instructor List, and Canadian Rangers.7

The Primary Reserve is essentially what we have come to

know in the United States as the Selected Reserve. It

includes the Militia, Communications Reserve, Naval Reserve,

and Air Reserve.8 Members of the Primary Reserve typically

train one evening a week, one weekend per month, and two weeks

each summer.9 There is no job-protection legislation for

reserve participation in Canada, so many reservists must use

vacation time to train.10

The Supplementary Reserve is a mobilization pool of

individual reservists.11 It numbers about 28,500 for all

elements of the Canadian Forces.12

The Militia, Communications Reserve, Cadet Instructors

and Rangers will be covered in separate sections in this

chapter.

MILITIA

The mission of the Militia is "to supply units, sub-units

16

or individuals to the Regular Force and to provide a base for

mobilization.,13 There are 18,800 soldiers in the Militia,

making it the largest element in the Primary Reserve.14

The Militia is under the control of the Mobile Command.

It is organized geographically into areas and districts.'5

Units include eight armored battalions, eighteen field

artillery battalions, fifty-two infantry battalions, eleven

engineer battalions, twenty support battalions of various

types, and a medical company.16

Militia soldiers periodically participate in exercises

like Rendezvous, Fallex, and En Garde. They do so by

augmenting Regular Forces with individuals, sections, and

platoons. These arrangements have proven successful in the

past, and are a plus for Canada's Total Force concept.17

Elements of the Militia have taken on "real world"

missions as well. Companies from the Governor General's Foot

Guard and the Canadian Grenadier Guards perform ceremonial

duties in Ottawa each summer. Militia units have also

undertaken security duties at Canadian Forces bases. Some of

their most important missions have been U.N. peacekeeping

duties in Cyprus, Namibia, and the Golan Heights.18

COMMUNICATIONS RESERVE

The Communications Reserve augments the regular

Communications Command with its 1,700 personnel. This element

of the Primary Reserve is organized into twelve squadrons and

three separate troops.19

These organizations are equipped with tactical and

strategic communications equipment which makes them valuable

17

both as mobilization entities and as support to civil

emergency authorities. Like the Militia, the Communications

Reserve has been used in peacekeeping operations.20

CADET INSTRUCTORS LIST

There are 7,000 reserve officers on the Cadet Instructors

List. Their primary duty is to provide training to the

Canadian Cadet Leagues. The Cadet Leagues are comprised of

some 70,000 Canadian young people between the ages of twelve

and eighteen.21 Their training program consists of

leadership, physical fitness, and military related activities

in the land, sea, and air disciplines.22 Besides providing a

valiable service to Canada's youth, Cadet Instructors are also

developing potential recruits for the Regular and Reserve

Forces.

CANADIAN RANGERS

The Canadian Rangers were formed in 1947. Their primary

function is to provide reconnaissance and surveillance in the

sparsely populated northern and coastal regions.23 They also

act as guides, advisors and survival instructors in operations

and exercises.24

There are 750 rangers under the Northern Region Command

and about nine hundred assigned to the Maritime Command.25

Rangers are organized into patrols, companies, and platoons.

Each ranger is equipped with a .303 bolt action rifle and two

hundred rounds of ammunition. They normally do not wear

uniforms in the course of their duties.26

FUTURE

Rear Admiral Waldron N. Fox-Decent, Canadian Forces Chief

18

of Reserve and Cadets, recently wrote, "...the 90's may well

be the era of the Reserves. ''2 The Admiral expects Canada's

Reserve Forces may increase in importance especially if the

number of Regular Forces are reduced.28

There have been recent pay increases and benefit packages

passed in Canada which should create more equity between the

Reserve and Regular Forces.29

19

NOTES - CHAPTER III

1. Waldron N. Fox-Decent, "Barrier Between Regular, ReserveForces Down," The Officer, July 1990, p. 24.

2. "Allied Forces Central Europe," Truppendienst Handbook, TheArmies of the NATO Nations, p. 119.

3. Ibid., pp. 118-119.


5. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, Defence 89, pp. 139-140.

6. Ibid., p. 147.

7. Fox-Decent, p. 26.

8. Ibid., p. 26.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., pp. 24-26.

11. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

12. International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 60.


14. International Center for Strategic Studies, p. 60.


16. International Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 60.

17. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, pp. 46-47.

18. Ibid.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 28.

22. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, p. 24.


24. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, p. 82.

20



27. Ibid., p. 24.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 26.

21

CHAPTER IV

DENMARK

GENERAL

Denmark, in close cooperation with Germany, helps guard

NATO against hostile action from the Baltic Sea. In wartime,

most of this mission would come under the "umbrella" of Allied

Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), a principal subordinate

command to Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH). BALTAP is

commanded by a Danish general officer who doubles as

Commander-in-Chief, Danish Operational Forces in wartime.'

Realizing that neutrality did not prevent an attack by

Nazi Germany in April 1940, and a Nordic defense system not

being possible, the r)anes have favored NATO membership since

the beginning of the Alliance. Ironically, the majority of

Danish citizens do not support increases in defense spending.2

The Danish Government is also sensitive to the peacetime

stationing of foreign troops on its soil. Therefore, plans

have been developed to deploy about 25,000 U.S. Marines and

other allied reinforcements to Denmark if they are needed in

wartime.3

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Danish Army is mainly a mobilization force. It

relies on reserve augmentation more than its sister services.4

There are over 52,000 Army Reservists in contrast with only

19,400 active soldiers, including 9,900 conscripts. The Army

is organized with a Covering Force and a Regional Defense

22

Force.5

The Covering Force is made up of two geographical

commands and a division headquarters. Major subordinate

organizations include five mechanized infantry brigades and a

standard infantry brigade (minus). Each mechanized infantry

brigade has one armored battalion, one active mechanized

infantry battalion, one reserve mechanized infantry battalion,

an artillery battalion, and support units.6

The Regional Defense Force is organized geographically

with seven regional headquarters, two infantry brigades, and

seven regimental combat teams. This command is a cadre

organization heavily dependent on the Army Reserve during

mobilization.

DANISH RESERVE SYSTEM

Conscripts serve on active duty for nine to twelve

months. After basic training, an entire conscript training

unit is assigned to an operational command. Then, at the end

of that unit's active duty commitment, it changes in place to

a reserve unit. These soldiers, becoming reservists, will

continue to train and exercise with their units during

periodic call-ups.9 Ei:iisted reservists serve an obligation

until they are fifty years old.

Reserve officers and NCOs have an active commitment of 27

months. The first eighteen to twenty-four months are devoted

to training. Then, they serve out the remainder of their

active duty period in a mobilization unit.10 The reserve

obligation for officers and NCOs is to a maximum of sixty

years of age.11

23

MOBILIZATION RESERVE FORCE

The Danes believe they can mobilize their reserve forces

in twenty-four hours. 12 They also plan for their division and

brigades to be in position within forty-eight hours.

Upon mobilization, reservists assigned to Covering Force

units will have the initial responsibility for securing

reception facilities for allied reinforcements.13 Regional

Defense Command units will be involved in coastal defense and

territorial security missions. They will be assisted in these

missions by the Danish Home Guard.14

DANISH HOME GUARD

The Danish Hjemmevaernet, or Home Guard, is a volunteer

territorial defense organization which can be mobilized in

time of war. While it is part of the National Defense

establishment, it is not considered part of the Army Reserve.

The Home Guard was founded in 1945 by veterans of the

resistance movement during World War II. It was later

institutionalized by Parliament in 1948.15

The purpose of the Home Guard is to support the three

military services in their home defense missions; consequently

its branches are the Army Home Guard, the Naval Home Guard and

the Air Force Home Guard.16 For the purposes of this study,

only the Army Home Guard will be discussed.

The Army Home Guard has over 55,000 personnel assigned.17

Its members are permitted to keep their weapons, ammunition,

and equipment at home. In this way, response time would be

reduced if they are called up. In fact, the Home Guard plans

on being mobilized with one hour's notice. 18

24

To be a member of the Home Guard, a Danish man or woman

must be at least eighteen years of age. Enlistment is for one

year and contracts are renewed annually.19 The upper age

limit is fifty.20

The mission of the Army Home Guard includes:

o Surveillance and reconnaissance.

o Security of permanent installations, depots and, key

points.

o Isolating and enveloping small enemy forces.

o Immediate action against enemy airborne or seaborne

landings. 21

Basic training for the Home Guard involves two hundred

hours of instruction over a three year period. Recruits with

prior military service are exempted from basic training, but

must complete twenty-four hours of continuation training a

year like all other Home Guard members.22 Unit commanders

also attend courses which are about a week in duration.23

The Home Guard is under the Ministry of Defense in

peacetime. It is commanded by the Chief of the Home Guard who

has a joint service staff to assist him.

The Army Home Guard is organized geographically into

regions, districts, and companies. During mobilization, land

units of the Home Guard would be transferred to Army regional

commands. 24

In terms of readiness, there are two positive things

happening in the Home Guard. First, the average age of

members is being lowered. Secondly, enlistments of

individuals with prior military service is increasing.25

25

Reservists are permitted to be members of both the Home

Guard and the Reserve as long as they are not assigned to key

positions. The purpose for this consent is to improve

reservists' training. However, mobilization could deplete

Home Guard companies at a time when they would be needed

most. 26

26

NOTES - CHAPTER IV

1. "Allied Forces Northern Europe," Truppendienst Handbook:The Armies of NATO Nations, 1987, p. 246.

2. Christian Thune, "Danish Defense Problems," in NATO - WarsawPact Force Mobilization, ed. by Jeffrey Simon, pp. 501 & 503.

3. Ibid., p. 503.

4. 0. K. Lind, et al., "Danish Defence," in Denmark's Defence,ed. by R. Watt Boolsen, p. 23.

5. International Center for Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalance 1990-1991, p. 62..

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. "Allied Forces Northern Europe," p. 247.

9. Joaen C. Essemann, "Danes Rely on Volunteer Principle forOfficer Staff," The Officer, p. 32.

10. Essemann, p. 33.

11. Alexander A. C. Gerry, "Concepts and Issues in the 1990s,"The Officer, July 1990, p. 13.

12. Thune, p. 504.

13. Ibid.

14. "Allied Forces Northern Europe," pp. 247-248.

15. Danish Ministry of Defense, The Danish Home Quard, p. 1.

16. 0. K. Lind, et al., p. 26.


18. Thune, p. 504.

19. Danish Ministry of Defense, p. 4.



22. George J. Stein, "Home Guard Forces in NATO," MilitaryReview, February 1990.

27


24. Ibid., p. 2.

25. Thune, p. 504.

26. Ibid.

28

CHAPTER V

FRANCE

GENERAL

France is a country with a long military tradition.

While the Army of the French Republic has had its ups and

downs with respect to popularity at home, it currently enjoys

a "high reputation" with most of the French population.' This

factor is important to a strong army and reserve system.

France is a charter member of NATO and a nuclear power.

In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his country from

the integrated military command structure of the Alliance; a

situation which still exists today. In spite of this fact,

France has maintained a cooperative stance within NATO through

bilateral agreements with other members.2

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The French Army is organized into the First (French) Army

which is comprised of three corps. It also consists of the

Rapid Reaction Force (FAR), Foreign Legion, Territorial

Defense Army, and the multinational Franco/German Brigade.3

Reserves make up two light armored divisions, most of a

separate territorial division, and the bulk of the Territorial

Defense Army. They also provide individual replacements to

First Army and the FAR.'

The Territorial Defense Army is comprised of six military

regions with one or two defense zone brigades assigned,

twenty-two territorial divisions, an infantry division, and

29

six frontier infantry regiments.5

FRENCH RESERVE SYSTEM

The French Army Reserve has 325,000 soldiers earmarked

for mobilization.6 According to the International Institute

for Strategic Studies in London, the French Army has a total

mobilization potential of 915,000 reservists. These figures

contrast with an active army strength of 288,000.7

In France, as in many other countries, reservists have

not always been considered to be "full partners" in the

Nation's defense. In fact, the Chief of Staff of the French

Army was relieved in 1911 for suggesting an increase to the

number of reserve regiments and an organization which, if

implemented, would have been an early total force concept.8

Today, however, reservists in the French Army comprise 35

percent of armored and mechanized organizations, 29 percent of

the FAR, 77 percent of all support troops, and 70 percent of

the territorial forces.9

Conscripts serve on active duty for a total of twelve

months. Following this commitment, they are transferred to

the "Military Service Reserves."10 These reservists will

normally be assigned to a unit in their home locality, and are

subject to periodic refresher training. Refresher training

cannot exceed one month each year or a total of six months.11

Reserve soldiers are transferred to the "Defense Service

Reserve" after they are thirty-five years old. They remain in

this status until age fifty.'2

Reserve officers and NCOs are normally assigned as

augmentees in active units or Army schools.13 To better

30

prepare reserve officers for service on division or higher

level staffs, the Reserve Officers Staff College was founded

in 1958. This school provides centralized and decentralized

training for reserve officers over a period of three years.

At the end of the training, graduates are awarded a "staff

certificate" which authorizes them to be assigned to certain

staff assignments. 14

MOBILIZATION

The French Army plans to be able to mobilize its entire

reserve force in ninety-six hours. Reserve units will process

through mobilization centers geographically located throughout

France. Reserve augmentees to active units would report

directly to those units.15

Like their Belgian counterparts, the French Gendarmerie

will assist the Army by distributing mobilization orders to

individual reservists. 16

FUTURE

There is a reorganization taking place in the French Army

known as Armees 2000. It is reported there will be some

policy and structure changes as well as equipment

modernization. However, it is not anticipated this

reorganization or the CFE agreement will significantly alter

the role of the French Reserve.17

31

NOTES - CHAPTER V

1. "Allied Forces Central Europe," Truppendienst Handbook: TheArmies of the NATO Nations, 1987, p. 136.

2. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

3. International Center for Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalance 1990-1991, p. 63.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," in NATO - Warsaw Pact ForceMobilization, ed. by Jeffrey Simon, p. 271.

9. "Les Reserves et Armees 2000," Terre information, December1990, pp. 4-5.

10. Ruiz Palmer, p. 287.

11. Ibid., pp. 286-287.

12. Ibid., p. 287.

13. Ibid.

14. Robert Erickson, LTC, Assistant Army Attache, U.S. Embassy,Paris, Memorandum to author, 21 December 1990.

15. Ruiz Palmer, pp. 286-287.

16. "Reserve Forces Remaining Vital in "Armees 2000Reorganization," The Officer, July 1990, p. 37.

17. Ibid., p. 34.

32

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY

GENERAL

The Bundeswehr, or Federal Armed Forces, was created in

1955 in response to the Soviet threat.' The new German Army

was designed to be a twelve-division force; however, it took a

number of years before this force structure was fully in

place. To compensate for volunteer shortfalls, German

authcrities established a system of national conscription.2

While reserve manpower pools were created in the German

Army as a result of conscription, it was not until the

Heerstruktur III reorganization that an effective reserve

structure was created.3 Heerstruktur III began in 1967 as a

result of NATO's doctrine of "Flexible Response.''4&5 It

provided for a more effective means of providing reservists as

wartime replacements and fillers for the Field Army, and it

also created a Territorial Army.6

FIELD ARMY

The Field Army is composed of three corps. All of these

corps would fall under NATO command in wartime. I (German)

Corps is designated to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG);

while II and III Corps will be under Central Army Group

(CENTAG). German divisions include six armored, four armored

infantry, one airborne and one mountain.7

For years Germany was thought to be NATO's front line in

the Central Region. Before unification, it was considered

33

probable that Army maneuver elements might be engaged with a

Warsaw Pact enemy before reservists could be sufficiently

mobilized. Consequently, Active Component soldiers are about

90 percent of a Field Army brigade's wartime strength.8

In the Field Army, most reservists fill positions in

division headquarters and combat service support units.9 Since

divisional brigades have enough organic logistical dssets to

operate independently for short periods of time, the

division's dependency on reservists was not considered to be

as time-critical.10

TERRITORIAL ARMY

The Territorial Army is responsible for Germany's home

defense mission, as well as rear area security and support.

Most of its strength are reservists, thereby freeing up more

active soldiers for combat organizations in the Field Army."

The Territorial Army is divided into three Territorial-

Kommandes, or territorial commands: Northern, Southern, and

Schleswig-Holstein. The German Territorial Northern and

Southern Commands are broken down into districts (WBK),

regions (VBK), and subregions (VKK). There are no districts

in Territorial Command Schleswig-Holstein.12 Each command has

a varying number of home defense brigades assigned to it.

With the exception of two home defense brigades, the rest

of the Territorial Army will remain under national control in

wartime. 13

ARMED FORCES COMMAND. EAST

The Bundeswehrkommando Ost, or Armed Forces Command,

East, has been organized to oversee the dissolution of the

34

National Volksarmee (NVA) of the now defunct German Democratic

Republic (GDR); as well as the integration of a some NVA

elements into the bundeswehr.

One important function of this organization is the

formation of the Territorial Eastern Command. This new

command will differ in structure from the established

territorial commands as it will be organized as an army

corps. 14

Two new district commands (WBK VII and WBK VIII) will be

organized as divisions. Within these divisions will be a

total of six brigades organized from the remnants of six NVA

divisiors. These brigades will not be fully manned, and will

be augmented by reserves in order to bring them to full

wartime strength.15

GERMAN RESERVE SYSTEM

As of November 1990, the German Army numbered

approximately 340,000 active duty soldiers. When reservists

are added, the mobilizable wartime strength comes to about

1.045 million.16

The German Army Reserve system is based on conscription.

German conscripts serve in the Active Army for a period of

twelve months and are then transferred to the Reserve. This

is in contrast to a year ago when the obligation was fifteen

months. 17

By law, these soldiers are obliged to re,.-ain in the

Reserve until they are forty-five years old. In practice,

however, most are released at age thirty-two.8

Conscripts who serve as NCOs remain on active duty for

35

fifteen months. They then serve as reservists until age

forty-five; however, NCOs can be required to remain on the

roles until age sixty if they are needed.19

Reserve officers have an active commitment of eighteen

months with a esetve obligation to sixty years of age.20

So-.,,thing needs to be said at this point about NVA

reservists. While a few active soldiers from the NVA are

being allowed to transfer to the Bundeswehr, the NVA Reserve

is beinj completely dissolved. However, active personnel who

have trarsferred from the NVA 11 incur an obligatio. in the

Bundeswehr Peserve.21

TRAINING

The amount of training a German Army Reserve soldier

receives is limited by law. Enlisted soldiers may not have

more than nine months of training in his entire reserve

career. NCOs are limited to fifteen months while reserve

officers are limited to eighteen months of training.22

The average reservist performs approximately twelve days

of training over a two year period. As a rul:, this will be

in the form of a unit mobilization exercise or some form of

individual training.23 Individual training periods are

designed to meet the requirements of a reservist's

mobilization unit or to attend courses at Army schools.24

The German Army is having a problem with attendance at

exercises. According to the German Ministry of Defense, a

full 40 percent of reservists called-up for training are

excused.25 Also, a poll conducted in 1988 of German

reservists, their families, and employers showed significant

36

dissatisfaction with training exercises. Over 66 percent of

reservists polled had "little consent" for exercises; nearly

28 percent had "medium consent," and only six percent

"agreed." Employers had similar views with nearly 68 percent

of them voicing a "low" or "very low" approval rating. Wives

or partners of reservists registered a whopping 71.8 percent

"low" to "very low" consent level. 26 Reservists told

pollsters the "...predominately negative factors in the

civilian environment... could be alleviated if the exercises

would be useful, challenging, and as an equitable

burden .... ,,27 In the opinion of those reservists, "...the

unavoidable burden involved in military service is aggravated

by the manner in which the exercises are conducted."'28

Neither the "no-show" nor the satisfaction problems were

specifically attributed to the amount of notification

reservists received before an exercise. However, it may have

had an impact. German law only requires four weeks prior

notification. In practice, most reservists have been getting

about four months warning,29 but even that much may not be

enough for some employers. The Bundeswehr is correcting the

problem by attempting to give notice to participating

reservists one year in advance.30

FUTURE

The future organization of the Bundeswehr will be

somewhat different than it is today. A reorganization has

been planned for some time. Initially, it was demographic

problems and budget reductions drove these changes, but now

these initiatives seem to fit comfortably into the European

37

peace process.3 1

The combined field force/ territorial structure being

adopted in the former GDR may become the model for

reorganizations in the western part of the country. Under

this concept, home defense brigades would be inactivated.

Combat arms brigades would be formed in their place with a

combination of active and semi-active (cadre) battalions. The

Ministry of Defense sees this as an efficient way to reduce

strength while maintaining effective force structure capable

of rapid build-up.32

38

NOTES - CHAPTER VI

1. Phillip A. Karber and John H. Milam, "The Federal Republicof Germany," in NATO - Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization ed. byJeffrey Simon. p. 247.

2. Ibid., pp. 248-250.

3. Ibid., p. 250-253.

4. Ibid.

5. See also NATO MC 14/3.

6. Karber and Milam, p. 252-253.

7. Federal Ministry of Defense (Germany), White Paper 1985:The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces,p. 193.

8. Karber and Milam, p. 255.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 259.

11. Ibid, p. 253.

12. Interview with Fritz Shreiber, LTC (GS), German Army,Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 16November 1990.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


18. Schreiber interview.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. "Reserve Set to Function as Planned by Mid-'90s," TheOfficer, July 1990, pp. 41-42.

39

23. Ibid., p. 42.

24. Federal Ministry of Defense (Germany), p. 41.

25. Shreiber interview.

26. Ruediger Moniac, "Poll: Reservations Vis-A-Vis Commitmentas Reservist," Die Welt (Bonn!, 25 August 1988, p. 4.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Schreiber interview.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

40

CHAPTER VII

GREECE

GENERAL

Greece is located on the Balkan Peninsula between the

Ionian and Aegean Seas. Its position in the Eastern

Mediterranean Region makes it strategically important to NATO.

Greece has been a member of the Alliance since 1954. It

left the integrated military command structure in 1974 because

NATO failed to prevent the Turkish attack on Cyprus. It

returned to the command structure in 1980; however, the Cyprus

issue is still one of considerable sensitivity.1

ARMY ORGANIZATION

Land defense in Greece is organized with an Active Army

(117,000 soldiers), an Army Reserve (230,000 soldiers), and a

National Guard (120,000 soldiers).2 The Army force structure

is divided between the Field army and the Territorial Army.

The Field Army is organized with four corps headquarters,

eleven infantry divisions, one mechanized division, an armored

division, and a commando division. In wartime, 230,000

reservists would fill positions within these organizations.3

The Territorial Army consists of one active brigade and

five active light infantry regiments for a total of 16,500

soldiers. The remainder of this force is comprised of eighty

National Guard battalions.

The Greek National Guard has been given the island and

coastal defense portion of the territorial mission. Its units

41

are manned with a cadre of 13,500 active duty and 120,000

mobilizable soldiers.4

HELLENIC RESERVE SYSTEM

In the Greek system, a conscript enters service at around

twenty-one years of age and serves on active duty for about

twenty months.5" Once leaving active service, the conscript

fulfills a reserve obligation. The upper age limit of that

obligation could be from age thirty-five to fifty, depending

on rank and specialty.7

Reserve officers are selected from conscripts after basic

training. Selection is based on the candidates education

level, civilian skills and the needs of the service. Training

for these prospective officers is carried out in a number of

Army Reserve schools around Greece.8

Reserve NCOs are also selected from conscripts following

initial active duty training. Unlike officers, however, NCO

training is conducted within individual regiments.9

Greek reservists may be called to active service for

training, emergency, or war.10 However, these reservists are

limited to a maximum of thirty days of training in a three

year period.11

A particularly interesting feature of the Greek Reserve

System is the statutory support required of civilian

employers. Reservists are provided leaves of absence with

full pay while on duty. Government employees may choose

whether to continue with their civilian salary or accept

military pay.12

42

MOBILIZATION

Mobilization is declared by the Greek Government through

the Ministry of Defense. Notification of reservists may be

written, or take place by means of mass media .13

In peacetime, units in the Greek Army are manned at one

of three different levels. Category "A" units are at 85

percent fill and considered fully ready. Category "B" units

are filled to 60 percent strength and can be ready in twenty-

four hours. Category "C" units are manned at 20 percent

strength and can be ready in forty-eight hours. Most of the

Field Army units are either Category "A" or "B". National

Guard battalions are all Category "C".14

43

NOTES - CHAPTER VII

1. "Allied Forces Southern Europe," Truppendienst Handbook: TheArmies of the NATO Nations, p. 303.


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. "Reserve Forces Ensure Country Meets National SecurityGoals," The Officer, July 1990, p. 46.


7. "Reserve Forces Ensure Country Meets National SecurityGoals," p. 46.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Alexander A. C. Gerry, "Concepts and Issues in the 1990s,"The Officer, p. 13.

12. "Reserve Forces Ensure Country Meets National SecurityGoals," p. 46.

13. NATO Defense College Course 73, The Employment of "Reserve"Forces within ACE (Turkey and Greece), pp. 5-6.


44

CHAPTER VIII

ITALY

GENERAL

Italy is a charter member of NATO. It has particular

strategic significance as it borders Yugoslavia and the alpine

neutrals of Switzerland and Austria on the north, with much of

its land mass extending into the Mediterranean Sea toward

Africa.

Italy is host to a number of NATO command headquarters.

Among them are Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern

Europe (CINCSOUTH); Commander, Allied Land Forces Southern

Europe (LANDSOUTH); and Commander, Southern European Task

Force (SETAF).

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Italian Army is organized with a field Army and a

territorial defense organization. The Field Army is organized

into three corps. The Territorial Defense Forces primarily

consist of two independent mechanized brigades, three

independent motorized brigades and a "Rapid Intervention Force

(FIR).,,'

Active soldiers in the Army number 260,000; including

some 207,000 conscripts. There are 520,000 Italian Army

Reservists.2 These figures do not include Carabinieri units

which perform military police duties for the Army.

ITALIAN RESERVE SYSTEM

Conscription is the major source of personnel in the

45

Italian Army.3 Enlisted conscripts and reserve NCOs serve on

active duty for twelve months. Reserve officers serve on

active duty for fifteen months before transferring to reserve

status. The obligation for all categories of reserve

personnel is to age forty-five.4

Reservists fill out operational forces, as well as serve

in logistical and medical units.5 Similar to "complements" in

Belgium, Italian conscripts are subject to immediate recall to

the units in which they last served on active duty.6 In

Italy, reserve soldiers remain in this status for twelve

months, with soldiers in some specialties subject to recall

for twenty-four months.7

There are no prescribed training call-up requirements for

Italian reservists.8

MOBILIZATION

Mobilization planning in Italy assumes two contingencies,

general mobilization and gradual mobilization. General

mobilization assumes a rapid call-up of reservists and

transition to war. Gradual mobilization presumes events will

allow for a period of preparation and adjustment resulting in

a well-ordered call-up.9

The actual mobilization decree will be issued by the

Italian Government with the consent of Parliament. The

mobilization system can provide for either a partial or full

mobilization. It is implemented through traditional means of

personal and media notification.10

FUTURE

Change in the Italian Reserve system is being advocated

46

by some people. According to an article in The Officer,

Colonel (Doctor) Luigi Sartori, Italian Army Reserve (and

former president of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve

Officers), presented a study to the Italian Center for High

Military Studies which advocates more reserve integration with

the active force and more reserve call-up periods.11

There has also been a debate in Italy whether to reduce

conscription to six or nine months.1 2 This may have readiness

implications, especially since there is already criticism that

the current twelve month requirement is too short. In order

to stabilize the size of the Army, more conscripts will need

to be drafted 13 or a larger number of long-term career or

volunteer personnel will be required. Either option would

increase training costs.

The challenge to advocates for change will be Italian

public opinion. According to one source, the Italian public

has never regarded the Soviet threat as being as serious as

its northern and North American allies have perceived it.

Obviously, the Gorbachev era has not altered this point of

view. 14

47

NOTES - CHAPTER VIII


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Alexander A. C. Gerry, "Concepts and Issues 1990," TheOfficer, p. 13.

5. "Reserve Needs More Training for Readiness in '90s," TheOfficer, p. 50.

6. See Chapter II (p. 7) for explanation of Belgian"complements."

7. "Reserve Needs More Training for Readiness in '90s, pp. 50& 52.

8. Gerry, p. 13.

9. NATO Defense College Course 73, Italy, pp. 4-5.

10. Ibid.

11. "Reserve Needs more Training for Readiness in the '90s, p.53.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 52.

48

CHAPTER IX

NETHERLANDS

GENERAL

The Netherlands is a small country with a population of

about 15 million people.1 It has excellent ports, inland

transportation, and communications systems.2

Like Belgium, the Netherlands had a policy of armed

neutrality prior to World War II. Also like Belgium, it

renounced that policy and entered NATO as a founding member in

1949. Support for NATO membership continues to the present

day with polls showing 75 to 80 percent of Dutch public

opinion favoring Alliance membership.3 The Netherlands hosts

Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) in

Brunssum.

While it is a small country, the Netherlands'

proportionally high population provides for one of the finest

conscription-based Army reserve systems found in NATO.

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The active strength of the Royal Netherlands Army is

about 53,000 soldiers, of which nearly two-thirds are

conscripts. It is organized with a corps and a territorial

defense command.4

The I (Netherlands) Corps is commanded by Commander,

NORTHAG in wartime, and is responsible for the defense of a

sector of the North German Plain.5 It consists of three

divisions, but only one reinforced armored brigade is forward

49

deployed in Germany.6 The Corps' brigades include three

armored (one cadre), six mechanized infantry (two cadre), and

one independent infantry (cadre). 7 I should note that cadre

brigades are only partially manned with active duty soldiers,

and rely heavily on reservists to bring them to wartime

strength.

The National Territorial Command is completely

mobilization dependent.8 Its mission is to defend the

territory of the Netherlands and secure the lines of

communication through the country.9 An infantry brigade and a

number of support units are designated to this command.10

Subordinate to the Territorial Command is the Dutch National

Reserve Corps which has the home guard mission in the

Netherlands.

"RIki" SYSTEM

The Dutch Reserve system is called "RIM," which is an

acronym for Rechtsstreeks Instromend Mobilisabel (loosely

translated: Direct Intake to Reserve Units). Elements of

this system may be found in the German Army Reserve, and have

been proposed for the Belgium Army.11

About 40,000 conscripts enter the army every year. By

law, the initial term of active service is twenty-four months.

In practice; however, most conscripts only serve from fourteen

to sixteen ronths. Reserve officers and NCOs have a sixteen-

month commitment. 12

The Reserve obligation for conscripts in the Netherlands

Army is to age thirty-five. Reserve NCOs and officers have an

obligation to ages forty and forty-five, respectively.13

50

After their four month basic training, conscripts serve

in an active company. Toward the end of their active

commitment they are transferred to a RIM company of the same

type in the same battalion. Upon completion of active service

the whole RIM company goes on "short leave" for four to six

months. During this time, these soldiers technically remain

on active duty and, during emergency, can be recalled with

twenty-four hour notice.1 &15

When the short leave period is over, the RIM company

enters reserve status and remains in that status for fourteen

to sixteen months. At that point, the company is disbanded

and the soldiers are transferred either to a reserve pool or

to another RIM unit. By this time, the reservist's military

skills will have deteriorated somewhat; therefore, they would

also be subject to recall for three weeks of refresher

training. 16

A typical RIM battalion has two active companies, one

company training new conscripts, and three RIM companies. In

wartime; therefore, a battalion will double in size in a short

period of time.17

The equipment for the RIM company is stored in depots in

unit sets, and is identical to the equipment the reservists

trained with on active duty. This factor, coupled with the

camaraderie and team spirit that comes with remaining in one

unit, are positive aspects of the RIM system.18

DUTCH NATIONAL RESERVE CORPS

The Korps Nationale Reserve, or National Reserve Corps,

is an organization of about 5,500 volunteer reservists charged

51

with the defense of key points and important installations

such as mobilization depots. 19 As mentioned earlier, it is

under the control of the Territorial Command.

Each volunteer has served on active duty either as a

conscript or a regular soldier, and must be between the ages

of nineteen and forty-nine years of age to join. A soldier

serving in a RIM unit may request assignment to the National

Reserve Corps.20 21

The basic unit of the National Reserve Corps is the

platoon. There are 140 of these security platoons and fifty

companies in this organization. Each platoon has one officer,

four NCOs, and twenty-nine enlisted personnel assigned. All

members are required to live within ten miles of their

assigned units. They are armed with light infantry weapons.22

Initial training is conducted in segments of three to

five hours one night a month. Statutes require at least fifty

hours training each year. Training exercises include full

platoon/company exercises twice a year, an annual weekend

exercise, and a week-long exercise once every four years.23

MOBILIZATION

The Netherlands has had many mobilizations in its

history. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 it mobilized

60,000 soldiers. In 1914, it mobilized 200,000 reservists for

World War I; and in 1939, the Netherlands called 250,000 to

arms for World War 11.24

Normally, the first step in a crisis would be to recall

the 7,000 soldiers who would be on short leave at any point in

time. As these soldiers are still on active duty, this is

52

essentially an administrative process within the Ministry of

Defense. 25

Formal mobilization of reservists and RIM companies must

have parliamentary approval. The Dutch have planned for

mobilization to take place in three phases involving 50,000

personnel each. Twenty-four hours are planned to implement

the first phase, thirty-six hours for the second phase, and

forty-eight hours for the third. The Dutch government

believes these intervals are important for continued analysis

of the situation, and to keep from overtaxing mobilization

depots. 26&27

53

NOTES - CHAPTER IX


2. Sjouke de Jong, "Mobilization Goal Training Stresses fromDay No.1," The Officer, p. 56.

3. Peter M. E. Volten, "The Dutch Contribution to NATO," inNATO - Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, ed. by Jeffrey Simon, p.444.

4. International Center for Strategic Studies, p. 74.

5. Volten, p. 436.

6. George J. Stein, "Home Guard Forces in NATO," MilitaryReview, February 1990, p. 34.


8. Ibid.

9. Volten, p. 436.


11. See Chapters II and VI.

12. de Jong, p. 58.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid. p. 58.

15. Volten, p. 437.

16. Ibid., p. 439.

17. Ibid., p. 437.

18. Ibid.

19. de Jong, p. 60.

20. Ibid.

21. Stein, p. 36.

22. Ibid., pp. '5-36.

23. Ibid.

54

24. Volten, pp. 433-434.

25. de Jong, p. 59.

26. Ibid.

27. Volten, p. 439.

55

CHAPTER X

NORWAY

GENERAL

Norway is a large country in the Northern Region. The

land surface of the mainland alone is about 324,000 square

kilometers.' In spite of its large land area, it only has a

population of 4.2 million people.2

Norway borders the Soviet Union. In fact, the border is

near Murmansk, home of the Soviet Northern Fleet.3

During World War I, Norway provided a credible defense to

maintain its neutrality. In World War II, however, it was not

so fortunate. The Germans, with an eye on Norwegian air and

naval bases, attacked by surprise in 1940 then occupied the

country. According to Lieutenant General (Retired) Tonne

Huitfeldt, Strategic Studies Associate at the Norwegian

Institute for Defense Studies, this situation was the result

of "...political authorities either not providing adequate

training and equipment for the mobilizable forces, or simply

not giving the necessary orders."'4

Since the end of World War II, the Norwegian public has

favored a strong defense. A poll conducted in 1946 showed 69

percent of Norwegians favoring such a defense. Over the

years, this figure has risen to over 80 percent.5

Norway has a total-nation defense system which requires

standing forces, mobilizable forces, and citizenry to combine

their efforts in wartime for the defense of their country. As

56

General Huitfeldt writes, "Norway's defense is based not on a

regular army, but on a citizenry willing to fully mobilize.6

ARMY ORGANIZATION

There are two principle army commands in Norway, one for

the North and one for the South. Each reports to the

commanders-in-chief of the joint Defense Commands North and

South, which in wartime function as the commanders of Allied

Forces North Norway and South Norway.7

Norwegians do not like distinctions between "regulars"

and "reserves."'8 More often they are referred to as Standing

Forces and Mobilization Forces.

The Standing Forces of the Norwegian Army consist of

19,000 soldiers, including 13,000 conscripts. They are

organized into one reinforced mechanized infantry brigade; a

number of separate battalions; and other units, including the

King's Guard and special purpose garrison organizations.9

Active soldiers also provide cadre for Mobilization Forces

units.

The Mobilization Forces include approximately 146,000

soldiers. They are organized into three division

headquarters, three armored brigades, four mechanized infantry

brigades, six light infantry brigades, plus several

independent and support units.10

NORWEGIAN RESERVE SYSTEM

Like many of the other countries already discussed,

Norway's reserve system is based on conscription with a "roll

over" of conscripts into the Mobilization Forces. Norway sees

emphasis on reserve forces as a cost savings.11

57

By law, all male citizens are required to serve twelve

months on active duty. While women are not required to serve,

they have been permitted to volunteer since 1979.12 During

their year on active duty, Norwegian soldiers receive basic

military training. After initial service, they are

transferred to a mobilization unit.

Enlisted soldiers have a reserve obligation until they

are forty-four years old. NCOs and officers with less than

one year of training also have an obligation to age forty-

four. NCOs and officers who have received more than one year

of training are obligated until they are fifty-five years of

age.13

Members of the Mobilization Forces serve in field units

until age thirty-five, at which time they are transferred to a

territorial or local defense organization.14 This makes for

relatively young combat formations.

Reservists are paid for duty performed, but do not

receive retirement pay.15

TRAINING

Members of the Mobilization Forces are called up about

every three years for refresher training 16. A typical

reservist may be called up for as many as four periods of

twenty-one days while assigned to field units. Members of

local defense forces may be called up twice for twelve days

each.17 Officers and NCOs of the mobilization forces are

required to take professional development courses in addition

to refresher training.18

58

EOUIPMENT

The Norwegian Army is armed with such weapons systems as

the German Leopard I and U.S M-48A5 tanks. Its antitank

capability includes the TOW.'9 However, General Huitfeldt

explains "...budgetary constraints are causing differences in

the level of firepower, mobility, and armor protection in the

various types of brigades.''20 Equipment modernization is

occurring in both the Standing and Mobilization Forces.

Naturally, priority remains with the active brigade in

Northern Norway, and those organizations in the Mobilization

Forces which would deploy there.21

Arms, armunition and equipment are stored in several

company-level mobilization depots around the country. These

items are sorted in unit sets, and designated down to the

individual soldier.22

NORWEGIAN HOME GUARD

The Norwegian Home Guard was established in December

1946.23 Its mission is as follows:

o Secure and implement mobilization.

o Defend local areas from enemy penetration.

o Take part in local defense operations. In the event

the Home Guard can no longer fight conventionally, it will

fight as a resistance movement.24

The branches of the Home Guard are the Land Home Guard,

Sea Home Guard, and Anti-Air Home Guard.25 Since this paper

is oriented toward army forces, I shall cover only the land

element.

In peacetime, the Home Guard is under the control of a

59

joint staff headed by the Inspector General of the Home

Guard.26 The Inspector General has a system of civilian

representatives, councils, and committees to advise him and

his subordinate commanders on all significant matters

affecting the Home Guard.27

The mobilization strength of the Land Home Guard is

75,000 personnel.28 The Home Guard receives its members from

the following sources:

0 Conscripts designated for Home Guard service by

medical examination.

o Conscripts transferred to the Home Guard from the

Army, Navy, and Air Force.

o Volunteers who have been approved by a local Home

Guard Committee.29

The Land Home Guard is organized into eighteen districts.

Each district is divided into two to six sub-districts.30

In wartime, control of the sub-districts is transferred from

the Home Guard districts to Norwegian Army Land Defense

Districts. 31

The basic Home Guard element is the Home Guard "area"

(generally a platoon-size unit). There are 470 if these

organizations which are subordinate to the sub-district

commander.32 Home Guard weapons depend on mission, but

include rifles, machine guns, mortars and anti-tank guns.33

Members are permitted to keep many of these weapons,

ammunition, and personal equipment at home.

Conscripts who are transferred to the Home Guard receive

their basic training with one of the traditional three

60

services. Sometimes this means Home Guard soldiers will have

to be trained on weapons systems they have never used, as well

as be familiarized with infantry tactics.35

Each year, a Home Guard soldier will train for up to

fifty hours in his spare time, or be called to up for six days

continuous service. Officers, NCOs, and specialists may be

given three additional days of training in conjunction with a

five to six day exercise.6

For the most part, the Home Guard trains its own officers

and NCOs. This is undertaken at two training centers located

in Dombas and on the Torpo Moor.37

MOBILIZATION

Since the year 950, Norway has had a tradition of

mobilizing its citizens in time of crisis.3 In the event

mobilization is required again in Norway, a modern system is

in place which is in "full harmony with the NATO alert

system. 09

The Norwegian Constitution gives the King the authority

to mobilize the Armed Forces. However, memories of the World

War II mobilization with its confusing and conflicting orders

have caused the Defense Ministry to build a safeguard into

their system. That safeguard is in the form of a directive

which states that an attack against Norway will automatically

initiate full mobilization. The directive further states that

any order to the contrary should be considered as false.40

In the Norwegian Army, companies can be mobilized between

six and twelve hours. Battalion formations could be ready to

move within twelve to twenty-four hours, and brigades would be

61

constituted within thirty-six hours.41 Since the population

is predominately in the South, and the strategically important

areas are in the North, it is critical that mobilization

decisions be made early so priority units can transit the

required 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers in a timely manner.42 The

system has been tested and found that rapid mobilization and

deployment is possible in Norway.43

The Home Guard can be mobilized in two to six hours."

This can be accomplished because its members normally live in

close proximity to their units. This rapid mobilization is

advantageous, as the Home Guard will provide security while

the rest of the Army is still mobilizing.

FUTURE

An article in the July 1990 issue of The Officer

indicates cuts are expected in the Norwegian defense budget

because of the CFE treaty. The article states that this will

cause a reduction in the number and length of training

exercises. It goes on to say there will also be reductions in

the number of officers and NCOs in the Standing Forces.

Consequently, expansion of the Mobilization Forces' role

should be expected. 5

62

NOTES - CHAPTER X

1. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, CIOR Forumfor Allied Reservists, Norway: A Citizen-Soldier Country, p. 1.


3. Int _dllied Confederation of Reserve Officers, p. 1.

4. Tonne Huitfeldt, "Force Mobilization in Norway," in NATO -Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, ed. by Jeffrey Simon, p. 540.

5. Ibid., p. 524.

6. Ibid., p. 541.

7. Royal Ministry of Defcnse (Norway), 7orwegian Defence Factsand Figures 1990, pp. 11-12.

8. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, p. 2.

9. Royal Ministry of Defense (Norway), p. 18.

10. International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 75-76.

11. Huitfeldt, pp. 527-528.

12. "Total Forces Encompass All National Resources," TheOfficer, July 1990, p. 64.

13. Ibid., p. 65.


15. "Total Forces Encompass All National Resources," p. 65.


17. Huitfeldt, p. 526.


19. International Institute for Strategic St-dies, p. 76.

20. huitfeldt, p. 529.

21. Dagfinn Danielsen, "iReplacement of Equipment in the ArmyWell Under Way," Norwegian Defence Review, 1988, pp. 20-21.


63

23. Home Guard Staff (Norway), Heimevernet The Home Guard, p.

1.1.

24. Ibid., p. 2.1.

25. Ibid., p. 3.1.

26. Ibid., p. 3.2.

27. Ibid., p. 4.1.


29. Home Guard Staff (Norway), p. 9.1.


31. Royal Ministry of Defense (Norway), p. 31.

32. Ibid., p. 30.

33. Home Guard Staff (Norway), pp. 6.3-6.5.


35. Home Guard Staff (Norway), p. 9.1.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 3.5.


39. NATO Defense College Class 73, Employment of Reserve ForcesNorway, p. 5.

40. "Total Forces Encompass All National Resources," pp. 64-65.

41. Ibid., p. 64.

42. NATO Defense College Class 73, p. 6.

43. Vigleik Eide, "We Will Maintain a Strong and CredibleDefence in the Future," NorweQian Defence Review, 1988, p. 18.



64

CHAPTER XI

PORTUGAL

GENERAL

Portugal is comprised of its mainland, on the western

part of the Iberian Peninsula, and the archipelagos of the

Azores and Madeira. These three areas form what is sometimes

referred to as the "Portuguese Strategic Triangle."' Many

resuppl ad reinforcement routes from North America transit

through this area.2

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Portuguese Army has 32,000 active soldiers assigned,

of which 23,000 are conscripts.3 All of the Army

organizations are in the active force. They include the 1st

Independent Mixed Brigade, six territorial commands, two

infantry brigades, and one airborne/light infantry brigade.'

The 1st Independent Mixed Brigade is Portugal's land

contribution to Allied Command Europe.5

There are no accurate figures on the number of Army

reservists in Portugal. According to the Defense Attache's

Office at the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, even the NATO Defense

Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) figures are an estimate and do

not account for deaths and emigration.6

There are three types of reserves in the Army. These are

the Regular Reserve, General Reserve, and para-military

security forces.

65

REGULAR RESERVE

Regular Reserves are Regular Army officers and NCOs who

have reached a designated age and leave the service. While no

longer on active duty, they continue to receive full pay until

retirement at age sixty-five. For example, colonels go into

this status at age fifty-seven; lieutenant colonels and below

at age fifty-six. NCCs have a similar system with sergeants-

major leaving active duty at age sixty, and other NCOs at age

fifty-seven.7 There are about 11,500 of these reservists

throughout the Portuguese defense system.8

GENERAL RESERVE

General Reserves are the largest group of reservists.

These are conscripts who have completed their active duty

obligation. Up until recently, their active service

obligation was fifteen months. In 1990 active service was

reduced to twelve months, with some conscripts serving eight

to nine months. A new military service law is expected to

change required active service to only four months.9

Annually, there are 40,000 to 50,000 conscripts drafted

into the Portuguese Armed Forces.10 Traditionally these

conscripts undergo three to six months training; the remainder

of the obligatory period would be served in an operational

battalion.1" After being released from active service,

conscript soldiers remain subject to recall to age forty-

five.1 2 Since there is no reserve force structure, these

soldiers are transferred to a manpower pool to be used as

fillers in the event of call-up.13

Reserve NCOs are conscripts who have completed at least

66

the eleventh grade in school. They receive a NCO course of

instruction which lasts for six weeks after basic training.14

Reserve officers may be conscripts who have compieted the

twelfth grade. 15 These soldiers take a seven week course

after they complete basic training. Reserve officers may

extend their conscription period to five years by annual

contracts. 16 They may serve on active duty as lieutenants,

command platoons, and take the captain's course; however, they

may not be promoted to that rank. Reserve obligation for

these officers is to age seventy.17

Portuguese law provides for up to two weeks of refresher

training each year; however, at the present time no Army

reservists are receiving any training.18

PARA-MILITARY SECURITY FORCES

As mentioned earlier, there are para-military security

forces in Portugal which serve as reserves of the Army. They

include the Republican Guard with 16,581 personnel, and the

Fiscal Guard with 7,858 personnel. 19

FUTURE

During the first quarter of Calendar Year 1991, a new

military service law is expected to be implemented. This law

will reduce mandatory service for conscripts to four months.

This will mean there will no longer be first term draftees in

operational units.20 It will also mean reservists will be

untrained, unless they are periodically called to active duty

for training.

The strength of the Portuguese Army is coming down. In

the current edition of The Military Balance 1990-1991, the

67

Portuguese Army is reported at 44,000 men. This is about

12,000 fewer soldiers than what is authorized for Calendar

Year 1991. In spite of the decreased strength, the number of

conscripts drafted will have to be increased to 60,000 per

year to make up for the shorter commitment.21 On the

positive side, the Portuguese Government believes it will have

fewer deferments because of the very short active duty period.

It should also be noted that in order to provide upward

mobility in this smaller force, some personnel will be

permitted to enter the Regular Reserve at age fifty if they

have thirty years of service.22

Not all senior Portuguese officers agree with the new

obligation period. At a symposium held last September at the

Portuguese Higher Military Studies Institute, there was

general agreement among the participants that eight months was

the minimum supportable period of conscript service.23

The Portuguese Army is receiving new equipment from both

normal acquisition and "cascading" resulting from the CFE

agreement. Among the new acquisitions are M-60A3 Tanks, M-113

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), M-109 Howitzers, and

Chaparral Air Defense Missiles. This equipment will allow for

the total mechanization of what is now the Ist Independent

Mixed Brigade and progress toward modernization of the rest of

the force.24

Equipment modernization is part of a reorganization

process which the Portuguese Secretary of State for Defense

refers to as "3 Rs" (Restructuring, Redimensioning, and Re-

equipping).25 One of the focusses of this process is for

68

higher quality equipment in a smaller force.26 The question

arises, will reserve fillers in wartime have sufficient

training to effectively operate this new equipment?

69

NOTES - CHAPTER XI

1. "Modernization Hinges on Better Use of Manpower," TheOfficer, July 1990, pp. 65-66.

2. Ibid., p. 68.

3. Robert G. Hasty Jr., COL, U.S. Army Attache, U.S. Embassy,Lisbon; memorandum to author, undated.


5. "Modernization Hinges on Better Use of Manpower," p. 68.

6. Hasty memorandum.

7. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, CIOR Forumfor Allied Reservists: Portugal has Many Reservists but LacksWeaponry, p. 4.








15. Ibid.





20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

70

24. Ibid.

25. "The '3 Rs' of Portugal's Defense Policy," InternationalDefense Review, March 1990, p. 278.


71

CHAPTER XII

SPAIN

GENERAL

Spain is situated on the Iberian Peninsula in proximity

to Gibraltar and the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.

A newcomer to NATO, Spain joined the Alliance in 1982.

Like France, it is not part of the integrated military command

structure.' But unlike France, Spain is represented on the

NATO Military Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.2

Unfortunately, Spain's defense spending is below the median

rates of other nations in the Alliance.3

According to the Office of the U.S. Defense Attache in

Madrid, the Spanish Army perceives its greatest external

threat as coming from North Africa.4 This is not surprising

when one considers Spain's geographical position and the fact

that it has enclaves on the North African coast.

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Armed Forces of Spain are under the supreme command

of the King. The Army and the other Armed Forces are under

the control of a unified Defense Ministry.5

According to the Spanish Constitution, the army's mission

is to defend the sovereign territory of the Nation. It is also

charged with being the last line of defense against terrorism

and regional unrest. To date, it has not had to be used in

this last role.6

The Army has 258,000 active duty soldiers, of which

72

23,000 are officers. It is broken down into divisions,

brigades and battalions for garrisoning purposes. It has a

regimental command structure with two battalions per regiment.

This structure would disappear in wartime.7

There are six regional headquarters. These will become

corps headquarters in time of war. Three corps support

commands were formed during the last reorganization; however,

budgetary constraints precluded the creation of the other

three. 8

In peacetime, the Army is divided into General Force

units and General Reserve Force units. General Force units

include five divisions, four brigades, and the Spanish Legion.

General Reserve Force (not to be confused with "mobilizable

reserve" or "Reserve Component") include units of the

Artillery Command, Air Defense Command, Communications

Command, Engineer Command, and Army Helicopter Command. Each

of these commands are about brigade size organizations.9

SPANISH RESERVE SYSTEM

All previous members of the active army are obligated to

serve in reserve status until they are fifty years old. There

are about two million army reservists in Spain.10

There is no force structure for the Army Reserve so, like

Portugal, Spain plans to use reservists to round oLt active

units in time of war. In fact, a normal Army unit is only

manned at between 75 and 80 percent strength in peacetime.11

There would be a problem equipping a fully mobilized Army

in Spain. There is neither enough equipment nor personal

weapons for reservists if they were called to duty.12

73

Training is also a problem. Currently, no refresher

training or field exercises are being conducted for

reservists. There have been telephone alert notification

exercises; however, they have not been very successful. In

the last of these exercises, conducted in September 1990, only

48 percent of a selected group of reservists could be

contacted.13

EOUIPMENT

Among the weapons systems members of the Spanish Army,

and presumably mobilized reserves in wartime, operate include

the French AMX-30, U.S. M-47 series and M-48A5 tanks; the

"Teruel" Multiple Rocket System (Spanish design); and the

"Roland" Air Defense System. Infantry vehicles include the

U.S. M-113 APCs; the Spanish BLR and BMR-600. Field Artillery

pieces in Spain include various types of 105mm, 155mm, and

203mm weapons.14

FUTURE

Spain has a new reserve law which will change the reserve

obligation to five years after leaving active status. This

will reduce the number of personnel to 90,000; hopefully,

making alert notification more manageable. The new law also

addresses, in general terms, the need for refresher

training. 15

74

NOTES - CHAPTER XII

1. "Forces Enhance NATO," The Officer, p. 69.

2. "Allied Forces Southern Europe," Truppendienst Handbook: TheArmies of NATO Nations, 1987, pp. 323-324.

3. "Forces Enhance NATO," p. 69.

4. Joseph D. Tullbane, LTC, Assistant U.S. Army Attache, U.S.Embassy, Madrid, letter to author, 14 January 1991.

5. "Allied Forces Southern Europe," p. 325.

6. Tullbane letter.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Tullbane letter.

75

CHAPTER XIII

TURKEY

GENERAL

One need only look at a map of 7ATO's Southern Region to

understand Turkey's importance. It controls access through

the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. It borders the USSR and the

Islamic nations of Iran and Iraq.

In a timely sense, Turkey, with a 98 percent Islamic

population, is NATO's official link with the Arab world.'

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Turkish Army is comprised of 525,000 active soldiers,

including approximately 475,000 conscripts. Army reservists

number about 800,000.2 Turkish soldiers are intensively

trained and adhere to a strict disciplinary system.3 The

organization of the Army includes four army headquarters, ten

corps headquarters, a mechanized division, thirteen infantry

divisions, seven armored brigades, six mechanized brigades,

ten infantry brigades, an airborne brigade and one commando

brigade.4 In wartime much of this force would fall under NATO

command through LANDSOUTHEAST in Izmir. Except for shortfalls

in equipment modernization, these units are reported to have a

high state of combat readiness.5

TURKISH RESERVE SYSTEM

Like most nations in NATO, Turkey is dependent upon

conscripts to fill the ranks of its Army, and ultimately its

Reserve. All Turkish males who are not potential Regular Army

76

or Reserve officer or NCO candidates are Crafted for some form

of National service at age twenty. Those conscripts who serve

as Army enlisted soldiers have an active duty commitment of

twenty months.6 There are deferments, mostly for university

study; however, the majority of students eventually do serve.7

During active duty, the typical enlisted draftee will

receive three months initial training. He is then sent to an

operational or garrison unit for the remainder of his active

service.8 After active duty, enlisted soldiers have a reserve

obligation until they are forty-six years old.9

Reserve officers receive four months initial training,

then serve in units as third lieutenants for fourteen months

on active duty.10 Their reserve obligation is also to age

forty-six."1

There is no separate force structure for the Army

Reserve; therefore, equipment reservists would use during

mobilization is maintained by the Active Army.12

MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING

Turkish soldiers receive mobilization assignments before

they are separated from the active service. Once in reserve

status, these soldiers may be mobilized for training, special

assignments, emergencies, and national defense. Plans call

for the entire force to be mobilized in seventy-two hours or

less. 13 Normally, reserve soldiers are called up for fifteen

days training each year for the first five years after release

from active duty.14

77

NOTES - CHAPTER XIII

I. "Allied Forces Southern Europe," Truppendeinst Handbook:The Armies nf the NATO Nations, p. 312.

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalance 1990-199', p. 81.

3. "Allied Forces Southern Europe," p. 315.


5. "Allied Forces Southern Europe" p. 315.

6. "Mobilizable Assets Total 6.5 Million Reservists," TheOfficer, July 1990, p. 72.

7. NkTO Defense College Cou: ;,! 73, The Employment of Reserveswithin ACE (Greece and Turke , p 1.

1. Ibid., p. 2.

9. Alexander A. C. Gerry, "Concepts and Issues in the 1990s,"The Officer, July 1990, p. 13.

10. "Mobilizable Assets Total 6.5 Million Reservists," p. 72.

11. Gerry, p. 13.

12. NATO Defense College Course 73, p. 5.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

14. Gerry, p. 13.

78

CHAPTER XIV

UNITED KINGDOM

GENERAL

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

a land mass of just over 244,000 square kilometers, is

strategically located between the Atlantic and the North Sea.'

Great Britain has a very rich military tradition which is

embodied in its Regular Army and its volunteer system.

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The British Regular Army is 306,000 strong. Its

principal organizations include a corps, three armored

divisions, an infantry division, and several separate

brigades. 2

The Reserve Component with 264,000 soldiers is smaller

than its Regular counterpart.3 It consists of the Individual

Reserve and the Territorial Army.

INDIVIDUAL RESERVE

Individual Reservists are soldiers who have left active

service and have incurred a reserve obligation. The length of

obligation depends on how long the soldier served on active

duty.4 There are four categories of these reservists. They

are:

o The Regular Reserve.

o The Regular Army Reserve ot Officers.

o The Long Term Reserve.

o Army Pensioners.5

79

By law, members of the Individual Reserve could be

required to train fifteen days per year; however, only members

of the Regular Reserve are currently performing any training

at all, and that is only one day annually.6

TERRITORIAL ARMY

The Territorial Army has its roots in the old militia,

yeomanry, and volunteer systems of pre-Twentieth Century

English society. In modern history, the territorial soldier

is known to have distinguished himself in both world wars in

spite of serious deficiencies, particularly before World War

Ii.7

Like the Regular Army, the Territorial Army (TA) is

comprised completely of volunteers. Each is between 17 1/2

and fifty years of age. 9 The TA has an authorized strength

of 91,000 soldiers.10 However, according to the International

Institute for Strategic Studies in London, there are currently

about 76,000 members.11

Like the reserve forces in the United States, the

Territorial Army has had its ups and downs in funding and

appropriate recognition by its Regular Army brothers-at-arms.

With the adoption of the One Army Concept in 1967, its image

has improved. The TA has taken on viable missions with some

units currently designated for the British Army of the Rhine

(BOAR).12 In fact, the TA now accounts for about one-third of

the British Army's wartime strength including 54 percent of

the infantry, 61 percent of the logistical support, and 50

percent of the medical support.13

The Territorial Army consists of independent units,

80

specialist units, the University Officer Training Corps

(UOTC), the Home Service Force, and the Continental TA.14" 15

Independent units are battalion size formations of combat

and combat support units which are recruited locally. The

combat units are largely infantry with some artillery. There

are no armor or mechanized organizations in the TA.16

Independent units have a permanently assigned Regular Army

staff. In the case of infantry units, these may come from an

affiliated regular unit.17

These units train an average of one evening a week, one

weekend each month, and fifteen days of annual training each

year. 18 The leadership of some of these units could have as

many as sixty paid days of duty each year.19

Territorial Army soldiers have been issued, and are

training with, the equipment they would use in time of war.20

This equipment is comparable to that of the Regular Army and

much of it is modern. However, there are normally a fewer

number of these items in TA units.21

Specialist units account for about 14 percent of the

TA.22 These organizations consist of soldiers, such as doctors

or nurses, who use their civilian specialty in military

service.23 Specialist units are recruited country-wide, and

train in centralized facilities for a total of nineteen days

every year.24

The University Officer Training Corps, or UOTC, is the

British equivalent to the Reserve Officer Training Corps

(ROTC) in the United States. In the United Kingdom, this

function is found in the Territorial Army. UOTC is organized

81

into nineteen units which are structured similar to

independent units.25 These units are spread over some

seventy-two educational institutions around the country.26

The Home Service Force (HSF) is a small organization with

an authorized strength of 3,000 personnel. There are forty-

three HSF companies around Great Britain.27 These soldiers

are recruited from former regular and TA soldiers from other

categories. They are responsible for guarding key points in

wartime.28 The training commitment for the HSF is only ten

days per year.9

The Continental TA is that portion of the Territorial

Army whose members live on the European Continent. There are

about 1,000 members in this category, and they serve in some

250 locations in the BAOR.3°

Recruitment of TA soldiers is the responsibility of the

Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve Associations. Unlike

the American Reserve Components, TA recruits are not required

to go on active duty for initial training. While there are

obvious disadvantages to this system, Mr. David Isby, a

Washington-based national security analyst, argues this system

"can attract a high quality recruit" from the civilian

sector.31

Command and Control of the TA starts with the Commanding

General, United Kingdom Land Forces, a full general. Under him

is Commander, U.K. Field Army, who is also the Inspector

General of the Territorial Army. The chain of command then

follows along home defense lines with ten district

headquarters in command of brigades composed of a mixture of

82

regular and territorial regiments.32 Like the CAPSTONE

program in the United States, a number of TA units have a

peacetime chain of command and a different one in wartime.33

This is particularly true for units earmarked for the BOAR

after mobilization occurs.

RESERVE PAY AND BENEFITS

British reservists are paid for training at a rate

equivalent to the Regular Army; however, there is no

retirement pay in the Army Reserve. There is, however, a tax-

free bounty paid for each successful year in the Territorial

Army. This bounty will increase to seven hundred pounds

(approximately $1,100.) in 1991 for service in the third year

and beyond.3 4

BRITISH RESERVES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND FOREIGN AREAS

The British are using the Territorial Army and local

defense forces in Hong Kong, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands,

and Northern Ireland.35 Among the contributions are the

3,300 part-time members of the Ulster Defense Regiment, the

company size Falkland Islands' Defense Force, and several

Territorial Army companies that serve in Gibraltar each

y a .36&37

CHALLENGES

Colonel Wallace Earl Walker, Professor of Public Policy

at the United States Military Academy, conducted a case study

of the British Territorial Army. In his study, Colonel Walker

indicates that British requlars now see the TA "...as a useful

force and an acceptable alternative to fewer Regular

regiments.... ,,38 However, he goes on to say that with a

83

diminishing threat to Western Europe, and increased pressure

to cut defense spending, the TA's circumstances may not

improve. In fact, a peace scenario in Europe may cause both

the Regular Army and Territorial Army to compete for limited

funding.39

Colonel Walker's study also identifies other potential

recruiting and retention problems. He predicts that social

mobility, as well as alternative economic and leisure

incentives, may also challenge the TA.40 These are not bright

prospects for a force which is experiencing a 30 percent

annual turnover rate in personnel. 1

84

NOTES - CHAPTER XIV

1. "Allied Forces Central Europe," Truppendienst Handbook: TheArmies of the NATO Nations, p. 86.


3. Ibid.

4. D. Murray Naylor, "British Volunteer Would Give Good Accountin Battle," The Officer, p. 77.

5. David C. Isby, "The United Kingdom," NATO - Warsaw PactForce Mobilization, p. 328.

6. Naylor, p. 77.

7. Wallace Earl Walker, Reserve Forces and the BritishTerritorial Army, A Case Study in the 1990s, pp. 16-18.

8. There are provisions for some former Regular officers toremain a little longer.

9. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, CIOR Forumfor Allied Reservists: Regulars and Reserves Have Almost an EvenShare in Great Britain's Defence, p. 4.

10. Walker, p. 1.


12. Walker, p. 29.

13. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, pp. 3-4.

14. Naylor, p. 77.

15. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, p.7.

16. Isby, p. 325.

17. Walker, p. 36.

18. Naylor, p.77.

19. Walker, p. 6.

20. Naylor, p. 78.

21. Isby, p. 329.


85

23. Naylor, p. 77.

24. Walker, p. 2.

25. Naylor, p. 77.

26. Walker, p.3.


28. Naylor, p. 78.


30. Ibid., p. 7.

31. Isby, pp. 329-330.

32. Walker, pp. 34-35.

33. See chapter XV for information on the U.S. Army CAPSTONEprogram.

34. Naylor, p.76.

35. Isby, p.334.


37. Isby, p. 339.

38. Walker, p. 135.

39. Ibid. p. 137.

40. Ibid., pp. 136-137.

41. Ibid., p. 34.

86

CHAPTER XV

UNITED STATES

GENERAL

The United States of America is a founding member of

NATO. Along with Canada, it forms the important

"Transatlantic Link." Besides NATO, the United States is a

signatory of three other multilateral defense treaties.1

Consequently, it has plans for many military contingencies;

although NATO has traditionally been among its highest

priorities.

Defense planning in the United States has included

Reserve Component forces, to a lessor or greater degree, over

much of its history. In fact, the United States Constitution

provides for an Army, Navy, and Militia.2

One cannot look at a military history of the United

States, particularly of the Army, without seeing the

designations of numerous regiments of the Militia, later

renamed the Army National Guard. In the Twentieth Century,

contributions by both the Army Reserve and the National Guard

have been recognized by the U.S. Defense establishment.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The Total Force Concept in the United States was

introduced in 1970 by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

It called for integrated use of the Reserve Components to

augment the Active Components of the Armed Forces as an

alternative to conscription. It was formally adopted as a

87

Department of Defense policy in 1973 by Secretary Melvin

Laird. The objective of this policy is ". ..to provide maximum

military capability within fiscal constraints by integrating

the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve units in

the most cost-effective manner."0

U.S. RESERVE CATEGORIES

Before moving on to the United States Army and its

Reserve Components, a description of the reserve categories

common to all services is in order. They are the Ready

Reserve, Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.4

The Ready Reserve consists of units and individual

reservists assigned either to active units, or those subject

to a call to active duty in wartime or national emergency.

The Selected Reserve is a subcategory of the Ready Reserve.

According to U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DoD)

1215.15-H, it includes:

"...those units and individuals designated by their

respective service and approved by the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial

wartime missions that they have priority for

training, equipment, and personnel over all other

Reserve elements. Individual mobilization

augmentees (IMAs) are members of the Selected

Reserve not assigned to a Reserve Component unit but

rather assigned to and trained for an Active

component organization, Selective Service System, or

Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must

be filled on or shortly after mobilization. '5

88

Two more subcategories of the Ready Reserve, the Individual

Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard, will be covered

later in this chapter.

The Standby Reserve is composed of reservists who have

completed all obligated service or who have been removed from

the Ready Reserve for ". ..civilian employment, temporary

hardship or disability.''6 Soldiers in this category are not

members of units and are not required to train.

The Retired Reserve consists of retired personnel from

both the Active and Reserve Components. Members of this

category receive retired pay once they reach age sixty or

immediately upon retirement if the individual has had at least

twenty years of active duty.7

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The United States Army is composed of the Active

Component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. The

Active Component numbers about 761,000 men and women. It is

composed of seven army headquarters, six corps headquarters,

eighteen divisions, and several separate brigades.8 Six of

the eighteen divisions are comprised of two active brigades

and one National Guard "roundout" brigade.9 I will discuss

more about the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve

portions of the force as each component is covered.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The Army National Guard (ARNG) is the largest and oldest

of the U.S. Reserve Components. In fact, the Army National

Guard is the oldest military force in the United States. The

first National Guard units were formed in 1636 as the North,

89

East, and South Regiments of the Massachusetts Bay Colony

Militia. Linage of these units is perpetuated in existing

organizations of the Massachusetts Army National Guard. As

alluded to earlier, National Guard soldiers have fought in

every major American conflict since the beginning of the

Republic.10

The ARNG has two distinct missions. It has a state

mission to provide emergency support and relief such as

natural disasters, search and rescue, and civil disturbances.

Its Federal mission is ". ..to provide properly trained and

equipped units available for prompt mobilization in the event

of war, national emergency or as otherwise needed."11

The ARNG is to be found in every State in the Union, the

District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands,

and Guam. In peacetime, the Guard is under the command of

each state governor. The authorized strength of the ARNG is

over 457,424 personnel. 12&13

The ARNG is comprised of ten combat divisions, twenty

separate brigades (including six roundout brigades), and

numerous combat support/combat service support brigades and

battalions.14 To break it down another way, the ARNG provides

44 percent of the U.S. Army's combat units including:

o 100 percent of Army's infantry scout groups.

o 25 percent of the Army's special forces groups.

o 40 percent of the Army's armored cavalry regiments.

o 53 percent of Army's standard infantry battalions.

o 47 percent of Army's mechanized infantry battalions.

o 47 percent of Army's armored battalions.

90

o 51 percent of Army's field artillery battalions.

o 35 percent of Army's corps attack helicopter

battalions.15

Most members of the ARNG are considered part of the

Selected Reserve. There is also a small Inactive National

Guard made up of ARNG personnel who cannot participate in

training activities. These personnel are attached to ARNG

units and would mobilize with those units if required.16

While under state control in peacetime, the Guard

primarily trains for its Federal wartime mission. Federal

oversight is accomplished by the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

NGB is a joint bureau responsible to both the Secretaries of

the Army and Air Force for the Federal resources of the Army

and Air National Guard. Its mission includes:

o Developing, coordinating, and administering all

National Guard policies, plans, and programs.

o Channeling communications between the services,

states, and units.

o Assisting the states in organization, maintenance,

and operation of National Guard units.17

The Chief, National Guard Bureau is an Army or Air National

Guard officer, on active duty, in the rank of lieutenant

general.

U.S. ARMY RESERVE

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) has its roots with the

establishment of the Medical Corps Reserve in 1908. From that

time until the end of World War II, the USAR was primarily

comprised of officers. Twenty-six inactivated divisions were

91

assigned to the USAR after the War; howev~r, these were

eliminated in 1967. At that time, eighteen Army Reserve

Commands (ARCOMs) were formed. That number has since been

increased to twenty.18

Unlike the ARNz, the USAR is completely a Federal reserve

force. Except for one ARCOM in Europe, its units are

commanded by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Force, Command

(FORSCOM) through one of five >ontinental Army commanders.19

Besides the ARCOMs, the USAR has twelve training

divisions, three training brigades, three complete separate

combat arms brigades, and three more brigade headquarters.20

Most of the Army Reserve is made up of combat support and

combat service support units. Some percentages of the USAR's

contribution to the Total Army are:

o 97 percent of the Army's civil affairs units.

o 68 percent of the Army's smoke generator units.

o 61 percent of the Army's hospitals.

o 54 percent of the Army's intelligence units.

o 50 percent of the Army's pathfinder units.21

Also, of particular note to NATO, the USAR would provide units

for the defense of Iceland during wartime.

There are about 588,000 soldiers in the USAR.22 Most of

these (about 320,000) are considered part of the Selected

Reserve.23 The remainder belcng to the Individual Ready

Reserve (IRR). The IRR is the U.S. Aimy's manpower pool. Its

members are trained soldiers who have previously served in the

Active Component or the Selected Reserve.24

The USAR is represented on the Army Staff by the Chief,

92

Army Reserve (CAR). The CAR is a USAR officer, on active

duty, with the grade of major general.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT

Most of the members of the National Guard and Reserve are

part-time soldiers. However, there are also various

categories of full-time personnel who essentially manage the

day-to-day planning, maintenance, recruiting, and

administration of their particular components.25

Active Guard/Reserve personnel are essentially active

duty guardsmen or reservists. These personnel serve in ARNG

or USAR units, various headquarters (to include active Army

commands), the National Guard Bureau, and the Army or Defense

Department staffs.

Military technicians are personnel who serve as

reservists, but who also work for the or Guard as Federal

civilian employees.

The National Guard may also have state government

employees working for the State Adjutant General, or at other

ARNG headquarters within a state. Their number and locations

are determined by the state concerned.

CAPSTONE

The Army's CAPSTONE program was established in 1979.

This program "...organizes the Total Force into cohesive

groupings of Reserve Component (RC) and Active Component (AC)

units based on contingency mission requirements. ',26 Under

this program, "CAPSTONE traces" have been established which

align ARNG and USAR units with wartime commands. A single

unit may have multiple traces because of different

93

contingencies. In such cases, only one trace is considered

priority. It should be mentioned that roundout brigades

mentioned earlier are special examples of CAPSTONE alignments.

Wartime commanders provide Guard and Reserve units with

mission and training guidance. Recognizing that training time

is limited for these organizations, FORSCOM has directed that

units give priority to guidance from within their primary

CAPSTONE trace.27 It is not unusual for Guard and Reserve

commanders and their staffs to have informal ties, conduct

staff visits, and train with their CAPSTONE commands.28

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

ARNG and USAR members (Selected Reserve) are required to

participate in at least forty-eight paid "inactive duty"

training (IDT) assemblies each year. Each of these assemblies

is a minimum of four hours duration. They usually take place

one weekend each month (four assemblies).

In addition to inactive duty training, Guard and Reserve

members must perform at least two weeks of "annual training

(AT)" each year. This training may take many forms depending

on the type and CAPSTONE mission of the unit. ARNG and

Reserve soldiers who train at the National Training Center,

Ft. Irwin, California; or participate in NATO exercises in

Europe, may experience as many as 21 days of annual training.

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

In recent years, AT has sometimes meant Overseas

Deployment Training (ODT). ODT is a program that allows

Reserve Component units or individuals to train and

participate in exercises within their CAPSTONE organizations.

94

According to Army Regulation 350-9, the principal objectives

of ODT are:

o To strengthen CAPSTONE relationships.

o To provide units projected for deployment in support

of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) operations plans with the

opportunity to conduct wartime mission-oriented training and

planning in an overseas area.

o Provide CONUS based units with the opportunity to

conduct mobilization, reception, execution of training and

redeployment activities.29

There has been a great deal of ODT ini Europe during the

past few years. During Fiscal Year 1990, a total 8,061 ARNG

soldiers and 8,000 USAR soldiers participated in that theater;

many participating in NATO and JCS and Army Europe (USAREUR)

exercises.30

In Fiscal Year 1991 (FY 91), USAREUR is anticipating

8,511 ARNG and another 8,000 USAR soldiers to train in the

European theater.31 These numbers may change with VII Corps

deployment to Operation Desert Storm. The focus for FY 91

will be the REFORGER exercise as well as transportation and

ammunition units at the Seventh Army Training Center.32

KEY PERSONNEL UPGRADE PROGRAM

The Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP) is a National

Guard program designed to allow ARNG personnel to individually

train with active Army counterparts. Its intent is to enhance

ARNG soldiers' proficiency in assigned duty skills at the

operational level.." A by-product, which is a stated

objective of KPUP in USAREUR, is the fostering of the Total

95

Army Program "through shared training experiences."3'

KPUP may be conducted either in the continental United

States or with the Army overseas. Soldiers will train where

their skills are required. Sometimes this means participating

in an Active Component field training exercise in Europe. In

such cases, and unlike ODT, CAPSTONE alignment is not

required.

KPUP is supported by a "pull" system which means training

opportunities are identified by an Army major command, such as

USAREUR. National Guard Bureau would then try to find ARNG

soldiers who would benefit from this training and are

available at the time specified.

In Europe there have been more opportunities than available

soldiers. In FY 1990, USAREUR major commands requested a

total of 7,718 personnel for KPUP training (47 percent of all

KPUP requests worldwide). However, the ARNG was only able to

provide 588 soldiers.35 Given the fact that most members of

the National Guard are part-time soldiers, 588 is a

substantial number.

CINC USAREUR would like to see more KPUP in Europe,

particularly at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at

Hohenfels. Consequently, he has sent a message to the Army

Chief of Staff and CINC FORSCOM to try to channel more ARNG

soldiers into the European Theater.3

OTHER TRAINING PROGRAMS

Reserve Component officers and NCOs must complete the

same professional development programs as their regular

counterparts. They do this by taking correspondence courses,

96

attending Army schools, or a combination of the two methods.

When attendance at Army schools is required, the reservist or

National Guard soldier enters active duty for training (ADT)

status.

ADT may be used for other types of training as well.

Reserve and National Guard soldiers may be available to

undertake training requirements and experiences in addition to

those performed in IDT and AT status. In those cases ADT is

generally used.37

Of particular interest to NATO is the Training Exchange

Program. This program "provides Guard and Reserve individuals

and units an opportunity to orient themselves in their

military duties while serving with counterparts in the armed

forces of the host nation.'' The ARNG alone has had

exchanges with French Martinique, Jamaica, the Netherlands,

Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and individual exchanges with

the Federal Republic of Germany.39

There is a host of other training initiatives which are

unique to the Reserve Components. They include the ARNG

Battle Skills Course, Reserve Component Tank Commanders

Course, the ARNG Mountain Warfare School, Regional Training

Sites-Maintenance, and Field Medical Training Sites. I will

mention other opportunities in the section on real world

missions.

EQUIPMENT

Over the last several years, the Total Force Policy has

improved the equipment readiness of the ARNG and USAR. Units

which would be expected to deploy early in wartime, be they

97

Reserve or Active Component, have priority for equipment fill.

Consequently, many Army National Guard combat battalions have

received M-1 Abrams Tanks and the M-2 Bradley Fighting

Vehicles. Also, a number of Reserve Component aviation

battalions have received Black Hawk and Apache helicopters.

REAL-WORLD MISSIONS

Under "Total Force," the U.S. Army Reserve Components

have been involved in activities unheard of in the reserve

forces of other armies, NATO or otherwise.

In Brussels, Belgium there is an activity known as the

Aviation Classification and Repair Depot (AVCRAD). This

activity is a joint venture of the U.S. Army Aviation Systems

Command and National Guard Bureau. It provides a ". ..broad

range of aviation maintenance support to USARER ...... ,,40 The

AVCRAD also maintains a fleet of ARNG UH-l helicopters which

can be used by ARNG organizations when they deploy to Europe

for ODT. These aircraft are also considered forward deployed

for mobilization purposes.41

The AVCRAD undertakes its mission with a seventy-man

contract team from DYNCORP and ODT rotations from an ARNG

aviation maintenance organization which would deploy to the

facility during wartime. The AVCRAD is commanded by a

National Guard AGR officer assisted by a small staff of ARNG

personnel.42

Another Reserve Component-staffed facility in Europe is

the Equipment Maintenance Center (EMC) in Kaiserslautern,

Germany. This facility was initially created as a test,

mandated by the U.S. Congress, to determine the feasibility of

98

the Reserve Components assuming some active component

missions, and to help reduce the Army's maintenance backlog in

Europe. Work at the EMC is accomplished by ARNG and USAR

heavy equipment maintenance companies (HEMCOs) rotating

through the facility on three-week ODT periods. During the

first year (FY 1989), six HEMCOs participated. They

S...contributed 38,888 productive hours towards the repair of

3,100 items of equipment.'43 The plan now is to rotate about

twelve HEMCOs through the EMC per year; each for three weeks

of ODT.

The EMC is under the control of the 21st Theater Army

Area Command. It is commanded by a National Guard AGR

lieutenant colonel and is staffed with Active Component, ARNG

and USAR AGR personnel.

The National Guard and Army Reserve have participated in

road construction projects in places like Panama and Honduras.

Similarly, the ARNG constructed a Field Medical Training Site

in Panama and participates in about twelve to fourteen medical

deployments per year in Central and South America. 4 Such

deployments contribute to "nation building" in that part of

the world.

The National Guard and Army Reserve are also involved in

counter-narcotic operations. A total of $212.9 million has

been appropriated for Reserve Component (Defense-wide)

participation in these operations.

FUTURE

If one walks the corridors of the Pentagon and asks the

future of the U.S. Army Reserve Components, the different

99

responses will probably be as numerous as the number of

persons asked. There are reasons for this uncertainty, not

the least of which is the call-up of approximately 80,000

Reserve Component soldiers who have been deployed for

Operation Desert Storm.45 Another possible reason is the

uncertainty of the threat from the Soviet Union, and just how

much the so-called "peace dividend" will draw funds away from

defense programs, and ultimately the Army Reserve Components.

President Bush, while speaking to the Aspen Institute

Symposium last August said,

"In our restructured forces, reserves will be

important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared

for a massive, short-term mobilization has

diminished. We can now adjust the size, structure

and readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal

with the more likely challenges we will face."'46

Just what the "new ways" will be, is not yet clear. However,

some facts are known.

Last year, the Department of the Army directed National

Guard Bureau to reduce ARNG force structure by 76,000

authorizations. These reductions were to take place over a

four-year period with 10,000 in FY 1991; 25,000 in FY 1992;

30,000 in FY 1993; and 11,000 in FY 1994. The Army's guidance

also called for the elimination of two ARNG divisions and an

ARNG armored cavalry regiment.'7

An interim report to Congress by the Total Force Study

Group also reflects an apparent Department of Defense position

that reserve forces should be reduced along with active

100

forces.4 8 Much of the thinking for this position is based on

what the report calls "...a reduced need for large forces on

short notice.... ,49

The position of the Congress is not consistent with the

DoD's and the Army's position in this area. The Conference

Report from the House of Representatives for 1991 Defense

appropriations states:

"The conferees believe that during a period of

decreasing Defense budgets, it makes sense to put

more, not less, force structure into the Reserve

components. At a minimum, the current Guard and

Reserve force structure should be retained.",50

As a consequence, Congress restored the 1991 National Guard

and Army Reserve end-strength to 1990 levels.51

Members of Congress also took issue with the Department

of Defense's decision not to call up ARNG combat units in the

earl- stager of nper~-*on N ert Shiel . 52 Manv ARNc- and USAR

combat support and combat service support units were

mobilized, but no major combat units. Even two active

roundout divisions deployed without their ARNG brignipc. Pn--

officials I spoke with believed the President's call-up

authority (ninety days plus a ninety-day extension) did not

allow for sufficient time to prepare these units for combat.

Consequently, Congress has extended the authority to 180 days

plus a 180-day extension for combat organizations. These

brigades have since been called to active duty but not

deployed.

These issues have put the meaning of "Total Force" to the

101

test; therefore, post "Cold War" missions and force structure

of the Army's Reserve Components have not been totally worked

out. One option being looked at is a cadre division concept.

Other options include rotational missions similar to the EMC

and European AVCRAD.

One of the strongest supporters of the Reserve Compone-Its

in Congress is Representative G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery,

chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee and member

of the House Armed Services Committee. Mr. Montgomery

believes the "... Guard and Reserve are the best buy for our

defense dollar."5 3 He also believes consideration must be

given to transferring more missions to the Reserve Components.

However, he cautions this should be done only after taking a

"hard critical look" at requirements, and determining which

missions can best be performed by the Guard and Reserve. Mr.

Montgomery sees a need to revalidate the Total Force Policy,

and believes the call-up of Guard and Reserve units for the

Persian Gulf crisis as ". ..going a long way towards this

revalidatior.,, 4

The biggest variable in determining the future of the

Army's Reserve Components, is the Soviet Union. If events in

that country are such that the Soviets are onie again

perceived as a threat by the American and European public, it

is likely discussions of reductions in Reserve Component force

structure may cease.55

102

NOTES - CHAPTER XV

I. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalarge 1990-1991, p. 12.

2. United States Constitution, 1789, Article I, Section 8.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Total Force Policy interimReport to the Congress, pp. 3-4.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive1215.15-H, p. 12 (hereafter referred to as "DoD 1215.15-H").

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 13.

7. Ibid.


9. National Guard Bureau (U.S.), 1991 Black Book, p. 1-2.

10. DoD 1215.15-H, pp. 18-19.

11. Ibid. p 16.

12. Before Operation Desert Storm mobilizations.

13. U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Conference, MakingAppropriations for the Department of Defense, p. 40.

14. 1991 Black Book, p. 1-2.

15. DoD 1215.15-H, p. 21.

16. Ibid., p. 12.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 19.

19. Ibid.


21. DoD 1215.15-H., p. 20.

22. International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 19,

23. DoD 1215.15-H, p. 13.

24. Ibid., p. 12.

103

25. Ibid., p. 48.

26. U.S. Forces Command, FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, p. 3.

27. Ibid.

28. DoD 1215.15-H, p. 45.

29. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-9, p. 2.

30. Interview with William F. Haenn, LTC; Calvin Kennedy, LTC;and Joseph L. Luckett, LTC; Overseas Deployment Training Branch,Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Heidelberg: 13November 1990.

31. Haenn, Kennedy, and Luckett interview.

32. !bid.

33. National Guard Bureau (U.S.), 1990 Gold Book, p. 1-18.

34. U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, USAREUR KPUP Memorandumof Instruction, p. 1.

35. Interview with Charles M. McCracken, COL, Senior ArmyNational Advisor, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and SeventhArmy, Heidelberg, 13 November 1990.

36. Ibid.

37. DoD 1215.15-H, p. 45.

38. Ibid., p. 46.

39. Interview with Gus L. Hargett, Jr., LTC, Chief, ARNGOperations and Exercise Branch, National Guard Bureau,Telephonic, 24 January 1991.

40. U.S. Army Materiel Command-Europe, AMC-Europe Regulation 10-1, p. 15-2 (hereafter referred to as "AMC-Europe Reg 10-1").

41. Interview with James E. Sutton, LTC, Commander, EuropeanAviation Classification Repair Depot, Brussels, 24 October 1990.

42. Ibid.

43. Stephen M. Duncan, "Components See Changes in World as NewChallenge for Leadership," The Officer, July 1990, p. 83.

44. 1990 Gold Book, pp. 1-11 - 1-12.

45. J. Paul Scicchitano, "Total Force Policy Takes a Beating,"Army Times (Springfield, VA), p. 12.

46. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the AspenInstitute Symposium, p. 4.

104

47. 1991 Black Book, p. I-1O.

48. U.S. Department of Defense, Total Force Policy InterimReport to Congress, p. 5.

49. b p. 8.

50. U.S. Congress, p. 40.

51. Ibid.

52. Les Aspin, Beverly Byrc , and G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Iraq,Saudi Arabia and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for aFuture Force Structure, p. 1.

53. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Representative in Congress, letterto author, 27 November 1990.

54. Ibid.

55. U.S. Department of the Army, The Chief, Army Reserve's Long-Range Plan 1990-2020, p. 2-22.

105

CHAPTER XVI

NATO RESERVE ASSOCIATIONS

INTERALLIED CONFEDERATION OF RESERVE OFFICERS

The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR)l

is an organization made up of national reserve officers

associations from twelve NATO member nations. It is a non-

governmental, non-political, non-profit-making organization.2

The CIOR was formed in 1948 by the reserve officers

associations of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Today,

it has approximately 800,000 members from around the

Alliance.3

According to the NATO Handbook, its purpose is "...to

contribute to the organisation, administration and training of

reserve forces in NATO countries and to improve their

motivation, capabilities, interoperability and mutual

confidence through common and exchange training programs."'

An important by-product is the "1 ... improvement of public

understanding of NATO and the strengthening of public support

for its policies."'5 The CIOR undertakes its work through six

commissions made up of officers from each national delegation.

Both the International Military Staff at Headquarters, NATO,

and SHAPE have liaison officers working with the CIOR.6

THE INTERALLIED CONFEDERATION OF MEDICAL RESERVE OFFICERS

Closely affiliated with the CIOR is the Interallied

Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (CIOMR).2 This

organization was also founded in 1948. Like the CIOR its

106

charter members were from Belgium, France and the Netherlands.

After the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, it came to

include members from other nations in the Alliance.8

NATIONAL RESERVE FORCES COMMITTEE

The National Reserve Forces Committee is comprised of the

chiefs of reserve forces from each of the NATO member nations.

They normally meet in conjunction with the annual congresses

of the CIOR to discuss issues and problems of mutual interest.

107

NOTES - CHAPTER XVI

1. Acronym comes from the French translation: ConfederationInterallies des Officers de Reserve.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North AtlanticTreaty Organization Facts and Figures, p. 371.

73. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, p. 90.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p.91.

6. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, SummaryRecord of Executive Committee Meeting. Calgary, 22-28 July 1990,p.11.

7. NATO Handbook, p. 91.

8. Michael J. Allwood, "CIOMR-The Interallied Confederation ofMedical Reserve Officers," in CIOR - A Contribution to Vigilance,ed. by Hans-Udo Pfeiffer, p. 36.

108

CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

From the chapters contained in this study, the following

conclusions are drawn:

1. The greater part of the wartime strength of NATO armies

are reservists. From the figures presented in this paper,

mobilizable forces comprise about 60 percent of the combined

strength wartime armies of NATO member nations. This

percentage includes all categories of reserve component and

home guard forces. Excluded are para-military organizations

which may be considered reserves of these armies.

2. The reserve forces in each country are different. Three

countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States)

are completely volunteer. The others have systems based on

conscription. Some reserve systems have force structures;

others are used only as fillers for Regular Army

organizations.

3. Volunteer reserves tend to train more frequently than

reserve forces based on conscript accessions. Reservists in

Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States will

typically train at least one weekend per month and participate

in an annual training period of about fifteen days. Training

in other conscription-based countries range from a mere sixty-

six days in eighteen years for Belgium, to a maximum of

twenty-one days every three years for Greece. To be fair,

109

some countries, such as the Netherlands, do not leave

reservists in priority units very long after release from

active service. In this way, units are continually filled

with freshly trained personnel. However, countries who are

shortening the active commitment for conscripts, especially

those considering less than eight months of active duty, may

have mobilizable armies with insufficiently trained soldiers.

4. The reserve forces in the NATO armies are experiencing

change because of peace initiatives, demographic problems and

budget constraints. As can be seen in the preceding chapters,

some of these armies are being reorganized or making other

changes affecting their reserve forces. These include changes

in the frequency of refresher training, the amount of active

conscript service and reserve obligation, as well as major

restructuring. Depending on what happens in the Soviet Union,

and the resulting threat perception, more changes may be in

the offing.

5. Reserve associations affiliated with NATO are a mechanism

for communication. The NRFC provides opportunities for the

chiefs of reserve elements in NATO to exchange ideas and to

discuss solutions to common reserve related problems for the

betterment of the Alliance. The CIOR and CIOMR provide

national reserve associations and individual reserve officers

a means of doing the same thing at their level. Because

reservists provide an army's best liaison with civilian

communities, these organizations can be influential in

communicating NATO positions to the public.

110

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are my recommendations as a result of

undertaking this study:

1. NATO should continue to give reserve matters high

priority. The active-reserve mix of each army in NATO is a

national decision; consequently, it is not up to NATO (or a

U.S. senior service college fellow) to recommend changes in

the composition of foreign armies. Having said that, NATO can

be involved in reinforcement and mobilization issues that

impact on the Alliance. The reserve contribution tn NATO's

war-fighting capability is just too large to ignore or

relegate to second priority. As active forces are reduced, it

is likely that reserves will become an even larger percentage

of this capability; hence reserve issues will become even more

important.

2. Within NATO, the term "reserve, should be dropped in

favor of ",mobilizable forces" as is the case in the Norwegian

Army.' This change will emphasize the important part these

forces play in NATO's defense structure rather than just

considering them forces in reserve.

3. Consideration needs to be given to using tne capabilities

of mobilizable personnel and units in assisting countries in

Eastern Europe to make the transition to western style

democracies. Perhaps the type of projects would not be the

same as has been undertaken in Central and South America by

the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard.2 It is likely the

needs will be different; however, the capabilities available

in the mobilizable forces of NATO could go a long way to

111

strengthening ties between Eastern Europe and the West.

4. More studies should be undertaken on NATO reserves. The

use of reserve organizations and personnel in multinational

forces, "out of area" training missions, and possib reserve

assistance to Eastern Europe should be considered as separate

research projects. Mr. David Lightburn of the NATO

InLernational Staff has suggested reserve forces might be able

to contribute to the CFE verification process.3 This is

another idea that deserves study. As reserves become more

important to the Alliance, knowledge of them and suggestions

for their improvement and utilization will become

indispensable.

112

NOTES - CHAPTER XVII

I. See Chapter 10.

2. See Chapter XV.

3. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, SummaryRecord of Executive Committee Meeting, Calgary, 22-28 July 1990,p. 72.

113

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