DSA Alert August-2012

7/30/2019 DSA Alert August-2012

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Mr Manvendra Singh, former Member of Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) was ourEditor-in-Chief and provided us the leadership and support during the criticalformative years of this magazine. It was entirely due to his untiring efforts that the

DSA has emerged as one of India's leading defence and security publications. However with the

forthcoming general elections, his political duties are now making increasingly heavy demandson his time and energies. Due to the pressure of these commitments he requested to be relievedof his duties as the Editor-in-Chief. However, at our earnest request he has kindly consented tocontinue his association with team DSA as our Founding Editor and we are certain that causeof the DSA will remain close to his heart. As a matter of fact I and Mr Manvendra Singh jointlyconceptualised and nurtured the dream to project a nationalist viewpoint in the realm of defenceand security journalism and together brought it to fruition in the form of Defence and SecurityAlert ( DSA) magazine. He will always be for us, a source of inspiration and strength and we will

seek his continued guidance and counsel. He hands over the baton to Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi, our Executive Editor.

I on behalf of team DSA wish Mr Manvendra Singh all the very best in his future endeavours and welcome thischange of guard. I look forward to DSA scaling newer and greater heights of prestige and popularity under theleadership of Gen Bakshi.

Pawan AgrawalPublisher and CEO

As I have been called upon to devote more time and attention to my political responsibilities,I am reluctantly withdrawing from my active involvement as Editor-in-Chief of DSA.I will however continue to be associated with the publication as Founding Editor and will

be happy to contribute in every way possible to the great future that awaits DSA.

I have thoroughly enjoyed my tenure as Editor-in-Chief of DSA and I am happy at the progressthe magazine has made since its inception in October 2009. I am sure in our new Editor-in-ChiefGen Bakshi we have a distinguished soldier and an eminent defence and security analyst takingcharge of the fortunes of DSA. I am certain under his guidance and scholarly leadership DSA will become the most read and respected defence and security magazine not only in India butglobally. I wish him and team DSA the very best.

Manvendra Singh

As the Indian general elections loom around the corner, Mr Manvendra Singh has beencalled upon to devote increasingly greater amount of his time and attention to his politicalresponsibilities. As such, he wished to be relieved of a share of his duties at the DSA.

It is at our earnest request that he has kindly consented to remain associated with us as theFounding Editor. I am personally grateful to him for his stewardship of team DSA. In fact, he hasmade it one of the leading defence journals of India and I will be hard put to maintain the highstandards set by him. We will of course continue to have the benet of his support and guidance.On behalf of Team DSA, I thank him wholeheartedly for his stewardship and support and welook forward to his continued guidance and patronage.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Change of Guard at DSA

August 2012 Deence AnD security Alert 1



pbh’ vw

Defence Forces and Statecraft"A person who cannot destroy the entire enemy with his

allies opens his own doors for destruction" – Chanakya

Source:http://www.defence.pk/forums/members-club/34081-chanakya-quotes.html#ixzz21Yxwkbhr

I am surprised to see the above quote of my idealChanakya on one of Pakistan’s defence websites. DSA’s mission statement is an eloquent quotation from Chanakya’streasure trove. I wonder if our neighbours have been inspired

by DSA! I am sure not many people know that the DSA website is regularly visitedby many Pakistani soldiers and ofcers. The reason is that they very well understandthe contemporaneity and relevance of one of Chanakya’s many nuggets of statecraftquoted and enshrined in the Indian national ethos hundreds of years back. Yet I havedoubts if this wisdom enlightens any of our current policy and decision makers.

We keep hearing day in and day out about modernisation of the defence apparatusbut the critical point, which is the mindset at the government level, is yet notprepared or, one suspects, capable of conceptualising and implementing. This stasisis what is really hampering the entire modernisation process in the defence forces.Military ofcers are emotionally attached to their troops and want to ensure that thebest weapon systems are available to them to be able to deal with the many securityproblems confronting the nation but because of the slow process of decision-making inthe government they are bound to see their men sacricing their lives on the bordersto safeguard their Motherland. The government has yet to nd a way to get past theself-inicted logjam caused by bans imposed on supplier companies on the basis ofmalpractices in contractual obligations.

We have seen how China and Pakistan, the two major threats to India, havemodernised their defence forces over the past 10 to 20 years and it is so pathetic to seethat our Armed Forces have been deprived of sophisticated artillery guns over the pastquarter century on grounds that kickbacks were paid in the Bofors deal in which one isstill not absolutely sure as who was responsible for it.

How can we close our eyes and not excel in the modernisation of our defence forceswhen we very well know that China and Pakistan are spending huge amounts on this.While China has all the money and more for this indulgence Pakistan has been divertingand spending almost the entire foreign aid on its defence expenditures and the majorchunk is spent on the modernisation of its forces.

I don’t see any valid reason for the unnecessary delay in modernising our forceswhich should be our top priority. Our esteemed contributors have highlighted manyfacts and the vulnerability scenario of our defence forces in this edition. You will alsond a comprehensive research based coverage on the defence procurement and itsprocedures which could be of great value for the industrial houses in India and abroad

who wish to manufacture and supply defence products for the Indian forces.

Every defence personnel serving or retired has great concern for the security of thecountry and its forces and thus instead of mere discussions on this matter of urgency,the government should act very speedily to equip the defence forces with all the bestequipment to counter every threat be it nuclear, conventional or asymmetric from ourneighbours. I think the government should now follow the edicts of Chanakya andmake the Indian Armed Forces strong, well equipped and war ready without losingany more time.

We will be celebrating the 65th Independence Day on 15th August and I think thiswill be the best day to announce a comprehensive policy on defence modernisation.This will be the real salute to the Indian soldiers and the people of India.

We at DSA salute each and every defence personnel, serving or retired and all Indianson this Independence Day which commemorates India’s emergence from colonialbondage to freedom.

Jai Hind!

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pawan agrawal

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Aprime requisite for the rise of a major power is the capacity to achieve autarky in criticalweapon systems. India has been struggling unsuccessfully to attain this autarky forthe last six decades. Self-reliance in defence is a vital imperative not just for achieving

strategic autarky but also to urgently generate jobs for a rising youth bulge in our demographicprole. By 2026 we will need to generate some 700 million jobs. Off-shoring defence production jobs to USA or France therefore becomes a particularly bad idea in this context.

How do we create a vibrant Defence Industrial Base (DIB) in India? Why have we failed to craftone so far? Till date India has passed through three cycles of weapons modernisation. The rst one, post independence,saw us spending a measly one per cent of our GDP on defence. This invited the disaster of 1962. The second, post-1962cycle of modernisation, saw a massive Soviet effort to subsidise our military build-up. It was in this phase that we saw theonset of licensed production in a big way to achieve self-reliance. This was purely an optical illusion. License productionas a quick x did great damage to our in-house Design and R&D capacities. The HF-24 design team, the teams that madeour 75/24 Howitzer and 105 mm Field guns were all disbanded and the experience irrevocably lost. Only the Indian Navyretained its Ship Design teams and is today building, rather than buying a new Navy. The Defence Public Sector withits captive customer base felt no need to innovate or carry out any Product improvement or technology development.It failed to carry out any in-house midlife upgrades of the equipment it was manufacturing. The sudden collapse of theUSSR in 1990 highlighted the hollowness and fragility of our self-reliance. We went panic buying for spares to keep ourSoviet era eets of jets, tanks and ships going. As it is, most of these were nearing the end of their life cycle. India had torecapitalise its military stock in a major way. The demise of the Soviet Union eclipsed our highly subsidised source ofhigh-tech weaponry. Our own economy came perilously close to collapse in 1991 and we had to divert all our energies inreviving our economy. Our military modernisation had thus to be postponed by over two decades.

We are now into our third cycle of military modernisation. Almost our entire capital military stock of the Soviet erais being replaced. Despite all claims of self-reliance, 74 per cent of this capital military stock is being imported fromRussia, Israel, USA and France. Our indigenous Public Sector Defence units have not been able to provide even basicreplacement of small arms and rookie trainer aircraft. Some 30 years down the line, we will enter the fourth cycle ofmilitary modernisation when the capital stock now being inducted will need to be replaced. Will we still be importing allour weapons in 2030-2040? It is a pathetic thought for a self-confessed Regional Power and an aspiring global power. Weneed to indigenise with a vengeance – not just for reasons of Strategic autonomy but even more for reasons of economicwell being. We need to create a vibrant Public-Private Partnership in Defence. The dynamism of the Private sector must beharnessed at the earliest. Aged and hierarchical defence bureaucracies of the public sector and DRDO by themselves cannever deliver self-reliance. Let us not forget that the Private Sector had, in just 17 years, transformed India from a failedeconomy to a Trillion dollar plus economy.

We need to learn lessons from the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex which is also being corporatised. The simplyamazing fact is that the failed state of Pakistan next door has been exporting its small arms and low grade militaryproducts to some 30 countries.

We must get in the Private Sector. We must revise FDI levels in defence Industry to 49 per cent from the unviable26 per cent. The Defence Industry needs to be given tax concessions and incentives (on par with SEZ). We must getthe brightest and the best for our R&D and Design Teams. The Private Sector will be able to get them easily. Wemust put in place the Public-Private Partnerships for foreign tie-ups for producing high-tech military equipment for2030-40 in place Now. We must not waste out the design experience gained in the LCA and Arjun Projects and build on

this to design gen-next tanks, ICVs and ghter jets. In the here and now we must invite Private Sector Indian consortiumsto produce a family of modern small arms, Future MBTs and ICVs, Medium Transport Aircraft, Tactical and MALE UAVsas also Multi-role Helicopters for the Navy at the earliest possible. The Private Sector is already getting in a big way intothe Homeland Security Sector. Why can’t it happen in the eld of Defence Production? The labyrinth of rules and red tapecreated by the ponderous Ministry of Defence cannot become an end in itself. The Country needs a DIB not a self-servingand self-perpetuating defence bureaucracy.

doh




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There is much speculation about the rise of India as a global player, both within the country and outside.Expectations are that the country will grow, in every sense of the word, to claim its place on the global hightable. The current economic and political glitches notwithstanding, there is belief that India will nd its role,

sooner rather than later. Surveys and research papers are produced to underline this expectation. But there are certainfundamentals that have yet to be addressed, let alone overcome, before the country can be considered to have becomea world player.

These range from the political, social, economic to the military aspects of being a global power. They are far too manyto be discussed and dissected in about 500 words. But for its soft power achievements, India has to go a long way inorder to be accepted as a global player. It is important, therefore, to be dispassionate in accepting the shortcomings thatprevent India from becoming a world power. Chief amongst which is the r ole of its military in power projections andpower statements. Ever since the disaster of Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, 1987-90, India as a polity has been charyof discussing the projection of its military power. Granted that the military itself needs to be re-jigged in order to play21st century power projection roles, but it is largely political deciencies that prevent India from emerging as a newglobal power. The political class remains ignorant of military shortcomings, as well the potential of its power.

There is a fundamental defect in the structure and functioning of the Ministry of Defence. Much has been writtenabout this subject. But what remains under-reported and therefore grossly misunderstood, is the importance of adomestic defence industrial base in order for the country to grow as a military power. Defence industry as it currentlyexists in the country is limited in technology, vision and capabilities. For far too long it has been a preserve of the PSUsand their Ordnance clones. And this is its biggest failing thus far. Even as the people of India globalise and integrateon equal terms with the developed world, the Indian defence sector remains mired in splendid isolation. But for afew technically acceptable items most of the Indian defence industry depends on imports that are assembled in thecountry and then marketed to the military. This cosy monopoly situation has given the military second rate equipment,at unacceptable prices. The Tatra truck scam is simply the most obvious one. There are many more that are currentlyhappening. The current arrangement is convenient for a few corrupted military men, bureaucrats and politicians. Noeffort is required to select the best, because that is simply out of reach. So the handout is acceptable and sold as anachievement.

India will never be a world power unless it demonstrates a strong domestic defence industrial base. It is only whenthe Indian military, on overseas missions, y, drive and sail in Indian made equipment would the country be regardedas having arrived. Because the original owner of the equipment can simply deny India permission from using itsequipment outside of the country. Which then means the Indian military is vulnerable to international vendors andtheir political authorities. This is an unacceptable situation for a country poised to play a greater global role. The soonerthis is resolved the better it is for Indian enterprise, innovation, the economy and its military might.

manvendra singh

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Volume 3 Issue 11 August 2012

Defence Industrial Base Special Issue August 2012

6 August 2012 Deence AnD security Alert August 2012 Deence AnD security Alert 7



Modernisation of its Armed Forces and the timely inductionof critical technologies and state-of-the-art equipment in

them is sine qua non for National security. This is, however,only possible if the country and its government step aside fromthe beaten track, courageously infuse a synergistic approachbetween its non-performing public sector and the grosslyunutilised private sector besides encouraging suitable defencemajors from friendly foreign countries across the world toset up manufacturing facilities in India. Defence productionwas, like in most critical areas, entrusted to the public sectoras enunciated in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948. The

rst Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) was enunciated in 2001with much fanfare permitting private sector participation in thedefence sector. This major policy initiative encompassed 100per cent participation by the private sector with foreign direct

investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent subject to securityclearances and licensing. The cap of 26 per cent has deterredthe inow of FDI. The Original Equipment Manufacturers(OEMs) were not keen to invest and share critical technologiesin a joint venture (JV) where they have only a 26 per cent stakewith no signicant control over their intellectual property,strict capacity and product constraints, no purchase guarantees,no access to exports for other markets and a perceived unfairadvantage to the public sector! In respect of all contractsabove Rs 300 crore, 30 per cent offsets have to be provided bythe foreign supplier, that is, specied goods and services tothe tune of 30 per cent of the value of the contract have to beprocured from the Indian industry. 17 offset contracts havebeen signed so far with a value of US$ 4.279 billion … howevermost of these offset projects are under implementation and thecorrect picture will emerge only later. A modest beginning hasbeen made by the government in the “Make” category wheretwo major programmes, the Fighting Infantry Combat Vehicle(FICV) and the Tactical Communication System (TCS) havebeen opened to both the private and public sectors to competein showcasing their products for development and subsequent

trials. Hopefully this will result in a level playing eld.

tiMe tO truly synerGise

The writer is a distinguished

soldier having served in all

theatres of operations in his

41 years of service. A veteran

of the 65 and 71 operations,

he was wounded in action in

the 1965 ops. Was the rst

armoured corps ofcer to be

specially selected to be GOC

Ladakh where he implemented

many operational and logistical

innovations. Has been Chief of

Staff of a Corps HQ in Jammu

and Kashmir and then as

GOC 11 Corps responsible

for the defence of Punjab. He

was especially selected by

the government of India to

raise the Defence Intelligence

Agency after the Kargil War.

After retirement the General

writes and lectures on security

issues. He is widely known

to passionately espouse the

cause of jointness in the

Indian Armed Forces. As the

rst DG,DIA, many intelligence

initiatives including abroad

were taken by him.

Lt Gen Kamal Davar

PVSM, AVSM (retd)









12 August 2012 Deence AnD security Alert



There should be long term integrated, indigenisationperspective plans similar to military plans. Creation of

a Military Industrial Commission with expertise from allentities and empowered to monitor self-reliance standards,performance and progress should become a mandate for theCabinet Committee on Security. Import imperatives areinescapable till we become robustly indigenised in combatequipment, systems and support logistics. Imports can becost effectively optimised through collegiate decision making pre-audited acquisition processes. This needs an integrated"Civil-Military" approach with mandated capability assessedprocurement. The bureaucracy and the military must be uniedto produce time and cost conscious, accountable practices.

PersPectiVe PlAnninG

Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd)

The writer is former Vice Chief

of Naval Staff. He also served

as Indian Naval Attache in

Washington DC, USA.

Buyer to a Builder’s Indian Military

MoD Organisation









LCA Tajas





Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi

SM, VSM (retd)

The writer is a combat

veteran of many skirmishes

on the Line of Control and

counter-terrorist operations

in Jammu and Kashmir and

Punjab. He subsequently

commanded the reputed

Romeo Force during intensive

counter-terrorist operations in

the Rajouri-Poonch districts.He has served two tenures

at the highly prestigious

Directorate General of Military

Operations. He is a prolic

writer on matters military

and non-military and has

published 24 books and

over 100 papers in many

prestigious research journals.

He is also Executive Editor of

Defence and Security Alert

(DSA) magazine.Establishing a vibrant DIB in India is an imperative not justfor reasons of Strategic Autarky but also to provide urgently

needed Jobs for our rising demographic youth bulge. The veryscope and scale of this imperative is little understood in ourcountry. No viable DIB can be established in India withouta vibrant Public-Private partnership. The License Productionroute gave us an optical illusion of self-sufciency. The DPSUssimply failed to innovate and even improve upon the productsthey were producing under license. They were not able todo any continuous technology development nor do midlifeupgrades on their own. We have so far seen three cycles ofmilitary modernisation. The rst one, post independence, saw

us spending a measly one per cent of our GDP on defence.The second cycle was heavily subsidised by the Soviet Union.The current third cycle is almost entirely premised uponforeign imports - a sad reection upon our failure to crafta modern DIB. The Fourth cycle will come some two / threedecades down the line when the capital military stock being inducted now will have to be replaced. It would be a tragedyif we still have to bank on imports then. To indigenise truly,we will have to visualise the products we would need thenand commence preliminary design and R&D work now interms of Public-Private Partnerships with suitable foreigntie-ups at the earliest feasible. We must exploit the potential ofDisruptive technologies.

CRAFTINGAVIBRANTDEFENCEINDUSTRIALBASE

FORINDIA

PuBlic-PriVAte PArtnersHiP












Ahighly insightful article on theactual status of the “Holy Grail“of

a DIB in India. Till the opening of theproduction of components, assembliesand sub-assemblies to the private sectorin 1991, defence industry remained theexclusive preserve of the public sector.By 2002, the private sector had emergedas a vibrant and dynamic force,especially in information technology,service sector and manufacturing elds.On the other hand, the public sectorentities had stagnated and failed todeliver. Defence production was openedto the private sector in January 2002 –

with 100 per cent private equity with26 per cent Foreign Direct Investment(FDI). The very fact that the proportionof defence imports has increased fromthe erstwhile 70 per cent to close to74 per cent during the last decadeattests to the failure of the currentdispensation. The Kelkar Committee,constituted in 2004, had made manycommendable recommendations. Theseseem to have fallen by the wayside.The Udyog Navratnas are yet to beidentied. There is a total absence ofan effective institutionalised interfacebetween MoD, the services and theprivate sector. Resultantly, the privatesector continues to be a peripheralplayer. India’s much overrated DefenceProcurement Procedure (DPP) doesnot include a single word about thepromotion of the private sector. All

policy provisions are deliberatelytweaked to perpetuate preferentialtreatment of the public sector. Forexample, to prohibit the private sectorfrom participating in the Rs 10,000 croreTactical Communication System, a newcategory called ‘Make by DPSU’ wasdeceitfully invented. It is time Indiarecognises the technological prowessof the private sector. The objectiveof achieving self-reliance in defenceproduction will remain a pipedreamunless the immense potential of theprivate sector is duly harnessed.

leVel PlAyinG ielD

Private Sector and Development of aVibrant Defence Production Sector

Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman

AVSM, VSM (retd)

The writer heads Defence

Technical Assessment and

Advisory Service (DTAAS)

of Confederation of Indian

Industry (CII). He did MSc in

Defence Studies and Doctorate

in Public Administration. He

commanded an Engineer

Regiment in the most hostile

battleeld in the world i.e.,

the Siachen Glacier. He was

awarded a gold medal for

being 'the most outstanding

engineer of the year'. He was

the rst Technical Manager

[Land Systems] when the newly

created Acquisition Wing was

established in the Ministry of

Defence in 2001. He has been

closely associated with the

evolution and promulgation of

the new defence procurement

mechanism.




Illustration: Harnessing potential of Public and Private Sectors

leVel PlAyinG ielD




An insightful article on reforms needed to promoteindigenisation for the Air Force requirements. The writer

suggests that the responsibility for Indigenisation shouldbe completely vested with IAF. DGAQA should play theadvisory role to coin specications and schedules. DGAQAshould be fully responsible for quality control. IAF shouldbe authorised to task DRDO, PSUs and Private Industries forimport substitution. A National Policy should be formulatedto encourage Indigenisation and Import substitution byPrivate Industry and Academic Institutions by providing:Tax holidays in substantial measure, Finance Import substitutesand partake development cost, Grant export license, Allowtransfer of technology to civil sector and provide export marketinformation. An R&D Group should be formed in IAF withSDI, ASTE, ADE, CABS and ASIEO as constituents.

inDiGenisAtiOn

DefenceIndustryReforms:Aviation

The direct linking of

industry with user calls for

some organisational structure

to be created within IAF, to

interact with the DRDO Labs,

PSUs and private sector to

catalyse and accelerate the

pace of indigenisation. Most

importantly, the responsibility of

indigenisation cannot continue

to be vested with TC Aero or

DGAQA particularly for aviation

items. Indigenisation of any

such item, will demand, a day

to day and sustained interaction

between the user and the

prospective vendor

Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary

VSM (retd)

The writer commanded a

MiG-29 Squadron in late

80s. His various command

and staff appointments like

Chief Operations Ofcer at

a major Wing, operational

planning at Command level,

Director Concept Studies at

Air HQ, Command of a major

ying base, Head of the

Training Team (Air) at Defence

Services Staff College and

Senior Directing Staff (Air)

at National Defence College

have conferred a rich practical

experience. The air staff course

at DSSC Wellington (TN),

Command and Air War Course

at the Air University, Maxwell

Airbase, Montgomery (USA),

all inducted and accelerated

his interest in air war studies.

After premature retirement he

now ies as Commander on

Boeing 737-800 NG.




inDiGenisAtiOn




An invaluable article that provides in-depth research andinsights into the defence Procurement Process, Procedures

and Practice and provides an industry perspective. The writercontends that the way forward is to promote the Buy andMake Indian procedure to be the default procedure. BuyGlobal acquisitions should be the last resort as the MoDand the Indian regulatory framework leak like a sieve in themonitoring of offset contracts and no real capacity is being built through this process. On the other hand in Buy andMake Indian categorisations, foreign OEMs will have nochoice but to engage with Indian industry, both DPSUs andPrivate, to win projects in India. Since these are competitive noIndian Prime will ever accept loading the commercials withToT costs as that would be lose-lose for both foreign OEM andIndian Prime. Therefore, the Non-recurring Expenditure

burden would have to be mostly borne by the foreign OEM andhence the induction of technology would be cheaper and faster.Forming JVs with Indian partners will build Indian capacityand open the route for India to become part of the global supplychain for the aerospace and defence industry. This would alsopromote Indian industry to innovate, something it cannot do asa mere offset partner.

cHAllenGes AnD OPPOrtunities

Defence Procurements, Policy,

Procedure, Process and Practice:

An Industry PerspectiveThe writer retired as the

Principal Director Naval Plans.

He served NOVA Integrated

Systems - A TATA Enterprise

as Vice President (Operations)

until October 2011. He is

presently Director and CEO,

ShinMaywa Industries India

Limited.

Cmde Sujeet Samaddar

NM (retd)




















F ac tor L ic en sed P ro duc ti on Mo del a s ( Buyand Make with ToT)

JV / Sub-contract Model (Buy and Make Indian)

PrimeContractor

OEM Indian JV / SPV

Accountabilityfor ProductSupport

OEM Indian JV/ SPV

NationalVision

Short Term – no capacity building asdriven partner

Long Term – genuine capacity building throughparticipation as driving partner

BusinessModel

Royal ty and License Fee Joint Revenue Generat ion for Growth and prot sharingthrough dividends with investments

Termination One Off and at discretion of OEM Not possible due contractual and business commitments

Brand

Ownership

OEM Joint with Indian Industry Partner (IIP)

Valuation As an OEM Product. “ManufacturedUnder license from OEM”

Branded as a Joint “OEM-IIP” Product.

Sustenance Short and dependent upon Productlife cycle

Longer sustenance and for more products, includingDesign and Engineering to meet India specicrequirements

Relationship Conned and limited to immediateBusiness opportunity on purenancial terms

Larger and more comprehensive, stable and sustainedrelationship

Indigenisation No scope as LP may be competitorto OEM.Offsets may not go to LP.ToT extremely limited andcontractually driven

50 per cent indigenous content and in the interest of bothcompanies to be cost and technologically competitiveto do utmost to reduce production cost and increasetechnical features for second sale to exiting customer oropen new markets

Precedence Su30MK ; AJT LPD: Radars for the Indian Navy





in Pon and coon w nd o o h box hnkng and mhodoogyo ap and hod, anayz and na h po whh ad an

nma o radazaon, o von xmm. Pak t Dnavy’ book the ferile soil o Jihad pan a ohn p o h radazaonpo n h pon. Pon a pa o vnaby … hghy nngnvonmn n whh ndvda a mo ky han wh o xponw b and aoaon. An ndandng ndd o ap hgop and ndvda, opaon and bhavo whn h pon wa.

to d, mak o onvon and onon o pdon mapo apab, nd and od h pon wa. ca obvaon o movmn nd o b mappd, o -o-, zon-o-zon.

PlAces O VulnerABility

Radicalization in Prisons

Dr Rupali Jeswal

th om a ig ad tom Aa, ca Phoog ad ca Hpohap bad

sohea Aa. sh ha ao vd ag pad aa dg oom, g ad aa

opao. sh pa ogv ag po ad a pahwa po ad how h ao app

o pad ag.

sh a xp h d o ovba mo ad mao xpo o dpo ad do ad ao g

ovba a o phooga am ojo wh emooa ig o ha h hma

md, poa, mag ad p.

sh a mmb o icPA (iaoa coo & Po Aoao), iAcsP (iaoa Aoao

o cotom ad s Pooa) ad a mmb o APA (Ama Phooga Aoao),

APP (Aoao o Pooa Phoog), uK cd Hpohap ad Ga Hpohap rg.












The Indian Navy's efforts at indigenisation of navaltechnologies, over the past ve decades have resulted in

building of nearly 80 per cent of warships within the country, inits four Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU) shipyards.At present, Indian Navy has placed orders for 47 warships withshipyards, 44 of which are being built in Indian shipyards andis planning to induct at the rate of ve to seven ships a year overthe next ve years. The Navy has also been encouraging the entryof private sector into arms development. The Arihant projectis a good example of public–private cooperation in defenceproduction. While the Navy is proud to be a ‘builder’s navy’ thefact remains that the shipyards still import gas turbines, engines,gear boxes, hydraulic systems, sensor and weapon packages etc.which take away between 75 per cent to 55 per cent of the cost ofthe ship to foreign vendors. The writer makes a strong case for

developing and elding Disruptive technologies and questionsthe value of Offsets in creating a DIB.

DisruPtiVe tecHnOlOGies

Incubating Technologies Today For

A Vibrant ‘DIB’ TomorrowThe writer has held the

post of Director General

Naval Armament Inspection

at the NHQ prior to his

superannuation. He is an ardent

exponent of indigenisation

and self-reliance in the eld of

military weapons.

1. ‘Creating a Vibrant Domestic Defence Manufacturing Sector’ A CII-Boston Consulting Group report 2012.

2. ibid

3. Ibid.

4. Brauer Jurgen and Paul Dunne. “Arms Trade Offsets and Developments” June 2005.

5. ibid

Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha

(retd)




DisruPtiVe tecHnOlOGies

6. Baskaran A. The Role of Offsets in Indian Defence Procurement Policy in Arms Trade and Economic Development:

Theory, Policy and cases in Arms Trade Offsets. Jurgen Brauer. New York. NY: Routledge 2004.

7. ibid

8. Keefe, John C. “Disruptive Technologies for Weapon Systems: Achieving the Asymmetric Edge on the Battleeld.”

The WSTIAC Quarterly 7. No 4: 1-5.




India had a head start vis a vis China as far as indigenous defence

production is concerned with a vastbase of Ordnance Factories whichkept Commonwealth forces going during the Second World War.Today, despite pious protestationsto the contrary, we are the biggestimporter of arms while Chinahas made impressive strides inindigenisation. There is unlikelyto be any change in status ofindigenisation at least till the endof 14th Five Year Plan (2022-2027)unless effective remedial measures

are undertaken now. This wouldalso imply that strategic autonomywill remain elusive for India till 2030or so. This cannot be and should notbe accepted. The writer advocatesthe clear enunciation of a strategyfor indigenisation and synergisationof the efforts of various ministries,the Armed Forces, the academicinstitutions and the DRDO.

strAteGic AutOnOMy

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (retd)

The writer is an army veteran

presently Director of Sasia

Security-Risks.com Pvt Ltd,

a South Asian security risk

and knowledge management

consultancy. His most recent

book is, "Securing India:

Assessment of Security and

Defence Capabilities".

FastTrackIndigenisationStrategyfor India




strAteGic AutOnOMy




The Navy has claimed it is becoming a ‘Builder’s Navy’but only on the back of PSUs and the nation needs to be a

shipbuilding nation as in the past. All shipyards have recentlyreceived licenses to build warships and have inadequatecivil orders but for shipbuilding to survive and thrive inthis economic downturn the Ministry of Defence will haveto open the competition and not nominate orders to its PSUyards if India is to gain as a shipbuilding nation. Indigenousshipbuilding which boosts the nation’s industrial base andprovides widespread employment is an imperative. Regrettably,after Independence shipbuilding along with aviation wereclassied as ‘Strategic Industries’ and private sector was deniedinroads into this sector which policy lasted till the 1980s andis still subject to licensing. Historically, maritime nations haverisen with shipbuilding and industrialisation at the core of their

economies to become exporters of ships and ancillary equipment.The Indian Navy even issued a publication to revitalise Indianshipbuilding in 2005 and proposed a ‘Maritime Commission’to co-ordinate efforts, but only progress has been made toencourage warship building and FDI in private shipbuilding is awaited and even joint ventures have been delayed. ThePublic Sector defence shipyards have cornered 36 of the current42 warship and Coast Guard OPV orders, worth Rs 42,000 croreat costs higher than normal. Indigenous shipbuilding whichboosts the nation’s industrial base and provides widespreademployment is an imperative.

PriOritisAtiOn

mde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd)

The writer is a former Director

Naval Intelligence and Director

Naval Operations. Presently

he is Vice President of

Indian Maritime Foundation,

New Delhi.

NAVALANDMERCHANTSHIPBUILDING:ANIMPERATIVEFORARISINGPOWERLIKEINDIATOADDCLOUTTOINDIA'SINDUSTRIALRISE




PriOritisAtiOn




th om Pd ad ch exv Of, nw V, ra id lmd ad Dghdow, Obv rah odao.

ea h wa V Pd ad co Had, Bog D spa ad s ad had ao vd a MaaggDo o Bog comma Apa ida. Po o Bog h wokd o raho ad wh nAsA Am rahc vao mdpa gg d. H ha h PhD Aopa egg om Wha sauv Kaa ad h MBA om c uv Wahgo. H vd a chama o h D commo h Aoao o chamb o comm ad id o ida (AssOcHAM). H ao vd a h chama,D eqpm comm, AMcHAM ad o h pa o h icci D tak o. H had h dhoo o pg 2,500 ompa a rgoa Pd o h idoAma chamb o comm, h ousida baa hamb. i Ap 2012, h ha b appod a chama o h idous sag Daog b hidoAma chamb o comm.

th om ha b appod cocha o h icci Homad s comm aog whM Gopa Pa, om Hom sa, Govm o ida.

Making Smart Procurement Decisions

l cy cong (lcc) a oo whh mpow haqon / pomn manag o mak mo nomd

don by nabng hm o nopoa o and bn hao ov h lifetime o a pod no h pomn don. to mga lcc vaaon hang, h nx p wod b omov owad a Poman-Bad log (PBl) appoah. thgnan o PBl ha h OeM / pp ompnad no

on pom o poman no on o: ompnaon badon h aa poman o h pod. PBl wa nodd byh us Dpamn o Dn (DoD) n 2001 o wapon ymaqon and og managmn. PBl wa mad mandaoyh am ya - na gdan wa pomgad by h of o say o Dn. th pona anna avng o h us DoD j om dd nvnoy hodng and anpoaon mado ang om us$ 2.8 - 3.7 bon annay.

Dr Vivek Lall

PerOrMAnce-BAseD lOGistics




PerOrMAnce-BAseD lOGistics

Dr Rajiv Nayan

The writer is a Senior Research

Associate at the Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses

(IDSA), New Delhi since 1993,

where he specialises in export

control, non-proliferation

and arms control. He was a

Visiting Research Fellow at

Japan Institute of International

Affairs, Tokyo, where hepublished his monograph -

Non-Proliferation Issues in

South Asia.

eVOlutiOn AnD tHe WAy OrWArD

India’sDefenceIndustryBaseDuring the British period, ordnance factories were established

to do some military related work. To manufacture guns andammunition, the rst ordnance factory was set up at Cossiporein 1801. In 1942, the Council of Scientic and Industrial Researchwas set as an autonomous body. In 1947, some technicaldevelopment establishments came up. Some of these technicaldevelopment establishments became laboratories of DefenceResearch and Development Organisation (DRDO) later. Before1950, India had only 19 ordnance factories. At present, the IndianDIB refers to 39 Ordnance Factories geographically spreadin 24 different Indian locations, eight public sector defenceundertakings and increasing number of large, medium, smalland micro undertakings from the private sector. Also, morethan 50 defence laboratories are considered part of the DIB. TheIndian government adopted a policy of permitting 100 per centIndian private sector participation and 26 per cent Foreign Direct

Investment. As of May 7, 2012, 181 Industrial Licenses / Letters ofIntent were given to the private sector companies to manufacturedefence items. An in-depth analysis of the evolution and theway forward for India’s DIB.






The symbiotic relationship between defence industrialinnovation and its positive impact on overall industrialisation

and economic development remains pertinent to this day. In spiteof much lip service for greater self-sufciency in the indigenousproduction of defence equipment, reality is that India’s defenceestablishments are still very reluctant to allow the Indian privatesector to play a bigger role in the manufacturing of defenceequipment in India. Yet it is thanks to India’s Private sectorthat in less than seventeen years, from the verge of bankruptcyIndia broke into the trillion dollar club. It is surprising thatfor a country of India’s size and industrialisation, its ordnancefactories manufacture a mere 1,00,000 INSAS 5.56 mm assault riesand another 6,000 7.62 mm SLRs per year. Given the fact thatIndia has an estimated 1.3 million personnel in its armed forcesin addition to a near 2 million state police personnel and another

near 8,00,000 Central Armed Police Forces, modernising India’sentire force engaged in defence and maintenance of law and orderwith at least a modern assault rie would thus take decades. Thevoid in most cases is lled by ad hoc purchase of mostly AK seriesof ries from countries like Bulgaria. It is shocking that a countrywhich manufactures 4.7 million cars per year (almost entirely inthe private sector) cannot produce more than a hundred thousandries a year. There is no reason to believe that L&T or Tatas orMahindras or even Reliance, which are known all over for theirproject management skills and their ability to execute criticalturnkey projects in record time would not be able to make aquality rie for India.

PriVAte sectOr As PAnAceA?

The writer is an alumnus

of S Rajaratnam School

of International Studies at

Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore. He was

previously associated with

The Sunday Indian magazine

and is presently a Senior

Researcher with a New Delhi

based think tank.

Pathikrit Payne

Finding Nemo - Can Indiaever come up with its owndefence industrial base?












DePenDence cOnunDruM

Cecil Victor

The writer has covered

all wars with Pakistan as

War Correspondent and

reported from the conict

zones in Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia in South East Asia

as well as from Afghanistan.

He is author of “India: The

Security Dilemma”.

License produced self-reliance was supposed to be a temporary phenomenonto help Indian defence scientists to acquire hands-on competence.

“Self-reliance” was clearly intended to be a stepping stone to that moredesirable goal of “self-sufciency” in major weapons platforms. It has nowbecome the norm that perpetuates dependency on Foreign suppliers. India’sattempt at creating a viable military industrial complex has been chequered.Scientic manpower became trapped in the “license produced” syndromewhich prevented the application of innovation, upgradation and nallyreproducing new varieties of products obtained from foreign source. It wasonly in shipbuilding that the Naval Design Bureau covered itself with glory.The Bofors scam generated a stasis that has lasted a quarter of a century.

Neither here nor there




DePenDence cOnunDruM




Patrick T Dunleavy is the former Deputy Inspector General for New York State Department of Corrections and authorof The Fertile Soil of Jihad - a book about terrorism recruitment inside the prison, where it starts, how it develops andthe belief where one cell ends another begins. The book is a portrayal of a prisoner’s capabilities and using the inside

environment to work for their own agenda outside the prison walls.

http://www.amazon.com/Fertile-Soil-Jihad-Terrorisms-Connection/dp/1597975486

The author is a highly accomplished Law Enforcement Professional; he worked as part of an elite team of investigators formore than 26 years, inltrating criminal enterprise, contract murder conspiracies and negotiating for the release of hostages.

He was a key gure in Operation Hades, a four year joint investigation conducted by United States law enforcementand intelligence agencies that probed the radical Islamic recruitment movement for jihad from both inside and outside theprison walls.

He is not only a prolic writer but his rst hand experience with radicalization in American prisons and the vivid detailsof his investigations is an eye-opener for all Law Enforcement Agencies. His exploration in how the prison subculture fostersradicalization is food for thought, not just restricted to America but globally as the issue of radicalization in prison, transcendsall borders. Since the publishing of his book, September 2011, Mr Dunleavy continues to write and speak out on current events and issuesrelated to radicalization and terrorism, which can be viewed at his website www.patrickdunleavy.com

In the past weeks, I have been in touch with the author regularly and found him to be most gracious in his attitude and very approachable.He is not only well armed with wits and expertise but with humility and with a great sense of commitment, in his personal and professional life.

While reading The Fertile soil of Jihad and further diving into his published written materials, I have enhanced and enriched my ownunderstandings tremendously and know that all who read his book would feel the same as I did.

The Fertile Soil of Jihad - starts with the Abdel Nasser Zaben, a young Palestinian, arrested for kidnapping and robberyin 1993 and in the consecutive years America witnesses the call and attacks of jihad and war on terrorism begins. Aftermathof 9/11 irked the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to take upon the information from 1999 of how Middle Easterninmates in the American prison system were recruiting to produce jihadist who would progress to use acts of terrorism inAmerica. The combing through, leads the investigating team to the same man Abdel Nasser Zaben arrested in 1993 andDunleavy’s fast paced recount of events starts.

The insulated yet permeable environment of prison leads this same

young man, Abdel Zaben, seemingly a common criminal, to swearhis allegiance to Osama bin Laden and he embarks on his path torecruit and convert selectively other young minds to the cause of

jihad.

The Fertile Soil of JihadReviewed By Dr Rupali Jeswal

Jihadi Tentacles

BOOK reVieW

The Fertile Soil of JihadTerrorism's Prison Connection 160 pages; 6" x 9";

Notes; Bibliography; Index

Clothbound

Published: September 2011

ISBN: 978-1-59797-548-3

Published by:

Potomac Books, Inc22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, VA 20166

Patrick T Dunleavy

In The Fertile Soil of Jihad , the reader’s sensation is further amplied, brilliantly, by PatrickDunleavy’s use of analogy to Dante’s rst canto Inferno (Hell), of his 14 th century epic poem The DivineComedy.

The pace of the book is fast, ever developing and magnetic by virtue of its author’s consummate power of analysis andnarrative. Meticulously arranged for any reader to grasp the unfolding of events within the primed walls of prisons, it is abook with a case to learn from, for all those who are in Police, Intelligence and Prison and Correctional Services. This effortof Patrick Dunleavy’s will assist us in understanding not “why?” things happen but most importantly “HOW?” thingshappen.

The author’s keen observational, analytical and rhetorical skills will lead the reader to microscopic details, showing theholes in our system and what must be anticipated and what can be used as a counter-measure to prevent radicalizationin prison taking place. In the end, the book leaves us with a foresight with our own thinking pattern changed to“Expect the Unexpected” and work towards anticipating and reinventing counter-measures for prevention, leaving asidebasic assumption and false positives.

In Dunleavy’s words “In prison, time often works to the great advantage ofthe convict. Mainstream society often forgets the most heinous of

criminals once they are locked away. But the terrorist never forgetsand knows how to manipulate the system.”

In his testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security on “The Threat ofMuslim American Radicalization In US Prisons” June 15, 2011, he stated:




th vw a ig ad tom Aa, ca Phoog ad ca Hpohap bad soheaAa. sh ha ao vd ag pad aa dg oom, g ad aa opao. shpa ogv ag po ad a pahwa po ad how h ao app o pad ag.

sh a xp h d o ovba mo ad mao xpo o dpo ad do ad ao govba a o phooga am ojo wh emooa ig o ha h hma md,poa, mag ad p.

sh a mmb o icPA (iaoa coo & Po Aoao), iAcsP (iaoa Aoaoo cotom ad s Pooa) ad a mmb o APA (Ama Phooga Aoao),APP (Aoao o Pooa Phoog), uK cd Hpohap ad Ga Hpohap rg.

Dr Rupali Jeswal

"The task force investigation also found that although the initial exposure / conversion / indoctrination to extremist jihadi Islam maybegin in prison, it often matures and deepens after release through the contacts on the outside that the inmates made while they were servingtheir sentences in prison."

He also noted:

“Despite appearances, prison walls are porous. It is easy for outside inuences to access those on the inside and for inmates to reach fromthe inside out.”

“The problem of prison radicalization often begins at the county jail level and continues on through the state prison system and the postrelease period.”

Law enforcement agencies should cast aside the notion that there is such a term as “Self-radicalization”. Radicalization bydenition means to change fundamentally and a “change” takes place due to an insertion. This insertion can be in any formand as Mr Dunleavy, author of The Fertile soil of Jihad eloquently conveys: “The constant interaction that occurs within a prison negates that (Self-radicalization). There is always a facilitator, an inuence, or a catalyst. Be that literature, another cellmate or a clergy.”

Prison radicalization, unfortunately, is not unique to the

United States, this is an issue plaguing many countries and manyare conducting research, building case studies and reinventing

countermeasures. India lacks literature on Prison Culture andsubcultures and the “knowing” of holes in its fabric, it may have.

This book will give us a picture of real-life events that took place in the American prisons and how the negative ripple effectwas followed outside the prison walls. Even our best practices are on foundations of other professionals’ trials and errors and the ndings of it, so to read this book and understand the mechanics of human capabilities within prison connement is a lesson to learn fromand utilise it in formulating effective counter-measures.

Evidence suggests that Prison and Correctional facilities have been and are increasingly becoming congregations whereterrorists and organised criminals establish channels of communication and co-operation and more importantly recruit newmembers. Here a systematic capturing and analysis of the social processes within detention facilities can enhance intelligenceand law enforcement agencies’ understanding of the groups’ operation and behaviour.

Terrorists and organised crime-related inmates are very sophisticated in using the correction environment to their advantage.Incarceration is part of the game for these inmates: it is a time to rest, recoup and recruit. They are model inmates. They arecareful to deect any attention to their schemes and communication strategies.

Police and correction professionals need immersion in theintelligence operations and strategies of their respective agencies.

This linkage will result in the production of mutually benecialintelligence tools and operations.

To prevent “cognitive-sabotage” ofcials must use their own interpretative lens in their own facilities using this book as a tool of knowledge because what assumptions were appropriate yesterday can easily be null today, misleading us.

BOOK reVieW




Documents

DSA Alert August-2012