8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 1/53

The Druze (Arabic: يزرد , derzī  or durzī , plural, دروز durūz , Hebrew: םיזורד druzim) are an esoteric, monotheistic religiouscommunity, found primarily in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan, whichemerged during the 11th century from Ismailism. The Druze have an eclectic

set of beliefs that incorporate several elements from Abrahamic religions, Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and other philosophies. The Druze callthemselves Ahl al-Tawhid (People of Unitarianism or Monotheism) or al-

Muwaḥḥidūn (Unitarians, Monotheists) – the official name of the sect is al-

Muwaḥḥidūn al Dururz (The Unitarian Druze).

Contents

[hide]

• 1 Location

• 2 History

o 2.1 Origin of the name

o 2.2 Early history

o 2.3 The closing of the faith

o 2.4 During the Crusades

o 2.5 Persecution during the Mamluk and Ottoman period

o 2.6 Ma'an dynasty

o 2.7 Shihab Dynasty

o 2.8 Qaysites and the Yemenites

o 2.9 Civil War of 1860

o 2.10 Rebellion in Hauran

• 3 Modern history

o 3.1 In Syria

o 3.2 In Lebanon

o 3.3 In Israel

• 4 Beliefs of the Druze

o 4.1 God in the Druze faith

o 4.2 Scriptures

o 4.3 Esotericism

o 4.4 Precepts of the Druze faith

1

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 2/53

o 4.5 Religious Symbol

o 4.6 Uqqāl and Juhhālʻ  

• 5 Origins of the Druze people

o 5.1 Ethnic origins

o 5.2 Genetics

• 6 See also

• 7 Notes

• 8 Further reading

• 9 External links

[edit]Location

The Druze people reside primarily in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.[5]

TheIsraeli Druze are mostly in Galilee (81%), around Haifa (19%), and inthe Golan Heights,[6] which is home to about 20,000 Druze.[7] The Institute of Druze Studies estimates that 40%–50% of Druze live in Syria, 30%–40% inLebanon, 6%–7% in Israel, and 1%–2% in Jordan.[8][9]

Large communities of expatriate Druze also live outside the Middle East inAustralia, Canada, Europe, Latin America, the United States, and WestAfrica. They use the Arabic language and follow a social pattern very

similar to those of the other peoples of the eastern Mediterranean region.

[10]

The number of Druze people worldwide exceeds one million, with the vastmajority residing in the Levant or East Mediterranean.[11]

[edit]History

[edit]Origin of the name

The name Druze is derived from the name of Anushtakīn ad-Darazī  (from Persian, darzi, "seamster") who was an early preacher.Although the Druze consider ad-Darazī a heretic[12] the name had been usedto identify them.

Before becoming public, the movement was secretive and held closedmeetings in what was known as Sessions of Wisdom. During this stage adispute occurred between ad-Darazi and Hamza bin Ali mainly concerningad-Darazi's ghuluww (Arabic, "exaggeration"), which refers to the belief that

2

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 3/53

God was incarnated in human beings, especially 'Ali and his descendants,including Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah who was the current Caliph, and ad-Darazi naming himself "The Sword of the Faith" which led Hamza to writean epistle refuting the need for the sword to spread the faith and several

epistles refuting the beliefs of the ghulat.In 1016 ad-Darazi and his followers openly proclaimed their beliefs andcalled people to join them, causing riots in Cairo against the Unitarianmovement including Hamza bin Ali and his followers which led to thesuspension of the movement for one year and the expulsion of ad-Darazi andhis supporters.[13]

Although the Druze religious books describe ad-Darazi as the "insolent one"and as the "Calf" who is narrow minded and hasty, the name "Druze" is still

used for identification and for historical reasons. In 1018 ad-Darazi wasassassinated for his teachings, some sources claim to be executed by Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah.[12][14]

Some authorities see in the name "Druze" a descriptive epithet, derived fromArabic dâresah ("those who study").[15] Others have speculated that the wordcomes from the Arabic-Persian word Darazo  or (" "blissدرز)from Shaykh Hussayn ad-Darazī, who was one of the early converts to thefaith.[16] In the early stages of the movement, the word "Druze" is rarely

mentioned by historians, and in Druze religious texts only theword Muwaḥḥidūn("Unitarian") appears. The only early Arab historian whomentions the Druze is the 11th century Christian scholar Yahya of Antioch,who clearly refers to the heretical group created by ad-Darazī rather than thefollowers of Hamza ibn 'Alī.[16] As for Western sources, Benjamin of Tudela,the Jewish traveler who passed through Lebanon in or about 1165, was oneof the first European writers to refer to the Druzes by name. Theword Dogziyin("Druzes") occurs in an early Hebrew edition of his travels,

 but it is clear that this is a scribal error. Be that as it may, he described theDruze as "mountain dwellers, monotheists, who believe in 'soul eternity'and reincarnation."[17]

[edit]Early history

3

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 4/53

The Druze faith began as a movement in Ismailism, that was mainlyinfluenced by Greek philosophy and gnosticism and opposed certainreligious and philosophical ideologies that were present during that epoch.

The faith was preached by Hamza ibn 'Alī ibn Ahmad,a Persian Ismaili mystic and scholar. He came to Egypt in 1014 andassembled a group of scholars and leaders from across the world to establishthe Unitarian movement. The order's meetings were held in the RaydanMosque, near the Al-Hakim Mosque.[18]

In 1017, Hamza officially revealed the Druze faith and began to preach theUnitarian doctrine. Hamza gained the support of the Fātimid Caliph al-Hakim, who issued a decree promoting religious freedom prior to thedeclaration of the divine call.

Remove ye the causes of fear and estrangement from yourselves. Do awaywith the corruption of delusion and conformity. Be ye certain that the Princeof Believers hath given unto you free will, and hath spared you the trouble of disguising and concealing your true beliefs, so that when ye work ye maykeep your deeds pure for God. He hath done thus so that when yourelinquish your previous beliefs and doctrines ye shall not indeed lean onsuch causes of impediments and pretensions. By conveying to you the realityof his intention, the Prince of Believers hath spared you any excuse for doing so. He hath urged you to declare your belief openly. Ye are now safe

from any hand which may bring harm unto you. Ye now may find rest in hisassurance ye shall not be wronged. Let those who are present convey thismessage unto the absent so that it may be known by both the distinguishedand the common people. It shall thus become a rule to mankind; and DivineWisdom shall prevail for all the days to come.[19]

Al-Hakim became a central figure in the Druze faith even though his ownreligious position was disputed among scholars. John Esposito states that al-Hakim believed that "he was not only the divinely appointed religio-politicalleader but also the cosmic intellect linking God with creation.",[20] whileothers like Nissim Dana and Mordechai Nisan state that he is perceived asthe manifestation and the reincarnation of God or presumably the image of God.[21][22]

Some Druze and non-Druze scholars like Samy Swayd and Sami Makarem state that this confusion is due to confusion about the role of the

4

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 5/53

early heretical preacher ad-Darazi, whose teachings the Druze rejected asheretical.[23] These sources assert that al-Hakim rejected ad-Darazi's claimsof divinity,[14][24][25] and ordered the elimination of his movement whilesupporting that of Hamza ibn Ali.[26]

Al-Hakim disappeared one night while out on his evening ride - presumablyassassinated, perhaps at the behest of his formidable elder sister Sitt al-Mulk . The Druze believe he went intoOccultation with Hamza ibn Ali andthree other prominent preachers, leaving the care of the "Unitarianmissionary movement" to a new leader, Bahā'u d-Dīn.

[edit]The closing of the faith

Al-Hakim was replaced by his underage son, 'Alī az-Zahir . The UnitarianDruze movement, which existed in the Fatimid Caliphate, acknowledged az-Zahir as the Caliph, but followed Hamzah as its Imam.[14] The youngCaliph's regent, Sitt al-Mulk , ordered the army to destroy the movement in1021.[12] At the same time, Bahā'a ad-Dīn as-Samuki was assigned theleadership of the Unitarian Movement by Hamza Bin Ali.[14]

For the next seven years, the Druze faced extreme persecution by the newcaliph, al-Zahir, who wanted to eradicate the faith.[27] This was the result of a

 power struggle inside of the Fatimid empire in which the Druze were viewedwith suspicion because of their refusal to recognize the new Caliph, Ali az-

Zahir , as their Imam. Many spies, mainly the followers of Ad-Darazi, joinedthe Unitarian movement in order to infiltrate the Druze community. Thespies set about agitating trouble and soiling the reputation of the Druze. Thisresulted in friction with the new caliph who clashed militarily with theDruze community. The clashes ranged from Antioch to Alexandria, wheretens of thousands of Druze were slaughtered by the Fatimid army.[12] Thelargest massacre was at Antioch, where 5000 Druze religious leaders werekilled, followed by that of Aleppo.[12] . As a result, the faith went

underground in hope of survival, as those captured were either forced torenounce their faith or killed. Druze survivors "were found principally insouthern Lebanon and Syria."In 1038, two years after the death of al-Zahir,the Druze movement was able to resume because the new leadership thatreplaced him had friendly political ties with at least one prominent Druzeleader.[27]

5

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 6/53

In 1043 Bahā'a ad-Dīn declared that the sect would no longer accept new pledges, and since that time proselytization has been prohibited.[14][27]

[edit]During the Crusades

It was during the period of Crusader rule in Syria (1099–1291) that theDruze first emerged into the full light of history in the Gharb region of the Chouf  Mountains. As powerful warriors serving the Muslim rulers of Damascus against the Crusades, the Druze were given the task of keepingwatch over the crusaders in the seaport of Beirut, with the aim of preventingthem from making any encroachments inland. Subsequently, the Druzechiefs of the Gharb placed their considerable military experience at thedisposal of the Mamluk rulers of Egypt (1250–1516); first, to assist them in

 putting an end to what remained of Crusader rule in coastal Syria, and later 

to help them safeguard the Syrian coast against Crusader retaliation by sea.[28]

In the early period of the Crusader era, the Druze feudal power was in thehands of two families, the Tanukhs and the Arslans. From their fortresses inthe Gharb district (modern AleyProvince) of southern Mount Lebanon, theTanukhs led their incursions into the Phoenician coast and finally succeededin holding Beirut and the marine plain against the Franks. Because of their fierce battles with the crusaders, the Druzes earned the respect of 

the Sunni Muslim Caliphs and thus gained important political powers. After the middle of the twelfth century, the Ma'an family superseded the Tanukhsin Druze leadership. The origin of the family goes back to a Prince Ma'anwho made his appearance in the Lebanon in the days of the 'AbbasidCaliph al-Mustarshid (1118 AD-1135 AD). The Ma'ans chose for their abode the Chouf  district in the southern part of Western Lebanon,overlooking the maritime plain betweenBeirut and Sidon, and made their headquarters in Baaqlin, which is still a leading Druze village. They wereinvested with feudal authority by Sultan Nur-al-Dīn and furnishedrespectable contingents to the Muslim ranks in their struggle against theCrusaders.[29]

[edit]Persecution during the Mamluk and Ottoman period

Having cleared Syria of the Franks, the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt turnedtheir attention to the schismatic Muslims of Syria. In 1305, after the issuing

6

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 7/53

of a fatwa   by the Hanbali Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyyah callingfor  jihad against all non-Sunni Muslims like the Druze, Alawites, Ismaili,and twelver Shiites. al-Malik al-Nasir inflicted a disastrous defeat on theDruze atKeserwan and forced outward compliance on their part to orthodox

Sunni Islam. Later, under the Ottoman Turks, they were severely attackedat Ayn-Ṣawfar in 1585 after the Ottomans claimed that they assaulted their caravans near Tripoli.[29]

Consequently, the 16th and 17th centuries were to witness a succession of armed Druze rebellions against the Ottomans, countered by repeatedOttoman punitive expeditions against the Chouf, in which the Druze

 population of the area was severely depleted and many villages destroyed.These military measures, severe as they were, did not succeed in reducing

the local Druze to the required degree of subordination. This led theOttoman government to agree to an arrangement whereby thedifferent nahiyes (districts) of the Chouf  would be granted iniltizam ("fiscalconcession") to one of the region's amirs, or leading chiefs, leaving themaintenance of law and order and the collection of its taxes in the area in thehands of the appointed amir. This arrangement was to provide thecornerstone for the privileged status which ultimately came to be enjoyed bythe whole of Mount Lebanon in Ottoman Syria, Druze and Christian areasalike.[30]

[edit]Ma'an dynasty

Main article: Maan family

Fakhreddin castle in Palmyra

7

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 8/53

With the advent of the Ottoman Turks and the conquest of Syria by Sultan Selim I in 1516, the Ma'ans were acknowledged by the new rulers as thefeudal lords of southern Lebanon. Druze villages spread and prospered inthat region, which under Ma'an leadership so flourished that it acquired the

generic term of   Jabal Bayt-Ma'an(the mountain of the Ma'an family)or   Jabal al-Druze. The latter title has since been usurped bythe Hawran region, which since the middle of the 19th century has proven ahaven of refuge to Druze emigrants from Lebanon and has become theheadquarters of Druze power.[29]

Under Fakhreddin II, the Druze dominion increased until it included almostall Syria, extending from the edge of the Antioch plain in the northto Safad in the south, with a part of the Syrian desert dominated

 by Fakhreddin's castle at Tadmur (Palmyra), the ancient capital of Zenobia.The ruins of this castle still stand on a steep hill overlooking the town.Fakhr-al-Dīn became too strong for his Turkish sovereign in Constantinople.He went so far in 1608 as to sign a commercial treaty withDuke Ferdinand I of Tuscany containing secret military clauses. The Sultan then sent a forceagainst him, and he was compelled to flee the land and seek refuge in thecourts of Tuscany and Naples in 1614.

In 1618 political changes in the Ottoman sultanate had resulted in the

removal of many enemies of Fakhr-al-Din from power, signaling the prince'striumphant return to Lebanon soon afterwards.

In 1632 Ahmad Koujak was named Lord of Damascus. Koujak was a rivalof Fakhr-al-Din and a friend of the sultan Murad IV, who ordered Koujak and the sultanat navy to attack Lebanon and depose Fakhr-El-Din.

This time the prince decided to remain in Lebanon and resist the offensive, but the death of his son Ali in Wadi el-Taym was the beginning of hisdefeat. He later took refuge in Jezzine's grotto, closely followed by Koujak 

who eventually caught up with him and his family.Fakhr-al-Din finally traveled to Turkey, appearing before the sultan,defending himself so skillfully that the sultan gave him permission to returnto Lebanon.

Later, however, the sultan changed his orders and had Fakhr-al-Din and hisfamily killed on 13 April 1635 in Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman 

8

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 9/53

Empire, bringing an end to an era in the history of Lebanon, a country whichwould not regain its current boundaries, which Fakhr-al-Din once ruled,until Lebanon was proclaimed a republic in 1920.

Fakhr-al-Din was the first ruler in modern Lebanon to open the doors of hiscountry to foreign Western influences. Under his auspices the Frenchestablished a khān (hostel) in Sidon, theFlorentines a consulate, andChristian missionaries were admitted into the country. Beirut and Sidon,which Fakhr-al-Dīn beautified, still bear traces of his benign rule.

[edit]Shihab Dynasty

Main article: Shihab family

Druze woman wearing a tantour , Chouf , Lebanon – 1870s

As early as the days of Saladin, and while the Ma'ans were still in completecontrol over southern Lebanon, the Shihab tribe, originally HijazArabs butlater settled in Ḥawran, advanced from Ḥawran, in 1172, and settledin Wadi-al-Taym at the foot of Mt. Hermon. They soon made an alliance

with the Ma'ans and were acknowledged as the Druze chiefs in Wadi-al-Taym. At the end of the 17th century (1697) the Shihabs succeeded theMa'ans in the feudal leadership of Druze southern Lebanon, although theyreportedly professed Sunni Islam, they showed sympathy with Druzism, thereligion of the majority of their subjects.

9

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 10/53

The Shihab leadership continued until the middle of the 19th century andculminated in the illustrious governorship of Amir Bashir Shihab II(1788– 1840) who, after Fakhr-al-Din, was the most powerful feudal lord Lebanon

 produced. Though governor of the Druze Mountain Bashir was a crypto-

Christian, and it was he whose aid Napoleon solicited in 1799 during hiscampaign against Syria.

Having consolidated his conquests in Syria (1831–1838), Ibrahim Pasha, sonof the viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, made the fatal mistake of trying to disarm the Christians and Druzes of the Lebanon and to draft thelatter into his army. This was contrary to the principles of the life of independence which these mountaineers had always lived, and resulted in ageneral uprising against Egyptian rule. The uprising was encouraged, for 

 political reasons, by the British. The Druzes of Wadi-al-Taym and Ḥawran,under the leadership of Shibli al-Aryan, distinguished themselves in their stubborn resistance at their inaccessible headquarters, al-Laja, lyingsoutheast of Damascus.[29]

[edit]Qaysites and the Yemenites

Main article: Battle of Ain Darra

Meeting of Druze and Ottoman leaders inDamascus, about the control of Jebel Druze

The conquest of Syria by the Muslim Arabs in the middle of the seventhcentury introduced into the land two political factions later calledthe Qaysites and the Yemenites. The Qaysite party represented the Ḥijazand Bedouin Arabs who were regarded as inferior by the Yemenites whowere earlier and more cultured emigrants into Syria from southern Arabia.

Druzes and Christians grouped in political rather than religious parties so the party lines in Lebanon obliterated racial and religious lines and the peoplegrouped themselves regardless of their religious affiliations, into one or theother of these two parties. The sanguinary feuds between these two factionsdepleted, in course of time, the manhood of the Lebanon and ended in thedecisive battle of Ain Dara in 1711, which resulted in the utter defeat of the

10

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 11/53

Yemenite party. Many Yemenite Druzes thereupon immigrated tothe Hawran region and thus laid the foundation of Druze power there.[29]

[edit]Civil War of 1860

Main article: 1860 Lebanon conflict 

The Druzes and their Christian Maronite neighbors, who had thus far livedas religious communities on friendly terms, entered a period of socialdisturbance in the year 1840, which culminated in the civil war of 1860.[29]

After the Shehab dynasty converted to Christianity, the Druze communityand feudal leaders came under attack from the regime with the collaborationof the Catholic Church, and the Druze lost most of their political and feudal

  powers. Also, the Druze formed an alliance withBritain andallowed Protestant missionaries to enter Mount Lebanon, creating tension

  between them and the Catholic Maronites, who were supported by theFrench.

The Maronite-Druze conflict in 1840-60 was an outgrowth of the MaroniteChristian independence movement directed against the Druze, Druzefeudalism and the Ottoman-Turks. The civil war was not therefore areligious war, except in Damascus where it spread and where the vastly non-druze population was anti-Christian. The movement culminated with the1859-60 massacre and defeat of the Christians by the Druzes. The civil war 

of 1860 cost the Christians some ten thousand livesin Damascus, Zahlé, Deir al-Qamar , Hasbaya and other towns of Lebanon.

The European powers then determined to intervene and authorized thelanding in Beirut of a body of French troops under General Beaufort d'Hautpoul, whose inscription can still be seen on the historic rock at themouth of  Nahr al-Kalb. French intervention on behalf of the Maronites didnot help the Maronite national movement since France was restricted in1860 by Britain which did not want the Ottoman Empire dismembered. But

European intervention pressured the Turks to treat the Maronites more justly.[31] Following the recommendations of the powers, the Ottoman Portegranted Lebanon local autonomy, guaranteed by the powers, under aChristian governor. This autonomy was maintained until World War I.[29][32]

[edit]Rebellion in Hauran

Main article: Hauran Druze Rebellion

11

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 12/53

The Hauran rebellion was a violent Druze uprising against Ottomanauthority in the Syrian province, which erupted in 1909. The rebellion wasled by al-Atrash family in an aim to gain independence, but ended in brutalsuppression of the Druze, significant depopulation of the Hauran region and

execution of the Druze leaders in 1910.[edit]Modern history

In Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, the Druze have official recognition as aseparate religious community with its own religious court system. Druze areknown for their loyalty to the countries they reside in, [33] though they have astrong community feeling, in which they identify themselves as related evenacross borders of countries.[34]

Despite their practice of blending with dominant groups in order to avoid  persecution and because the Druze religion doesn't endorse separatistsentiments, urging the Druze to blend with the communities they reside in,nevertheless the Druze have had a history of brave resistance to occupying

  powers, and they have at times enjoyed more freedom than most other groups living in the Levant.[34]

[edit]In Syria

Druze warriors preparing to go to battle with Sultan Pasha al-Atrash in 1925

In Syria, most Druze live in the Jebel al-Druze, a rugged and mountainous

region in the southwest of the country, which is more than 90 percent Druzeinhabited; some 120 villages are exclusively so.[35]

12

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 13/53

Flag of Jabal el Druze representing the five Druze principles; other variations of the flag exist

The Druze always played a far more important role in Syrian politics than itscomparatively small population would suggest. With a community of littlemore than 100,000 in 1949, or roughly three percent of the Syrian

 population, the Druze of Syria's southeastern mountains constituted a potentforce in Syrian politics and played a leading role in the nationalist struggleagainst the French. Under the military leadership of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash,the Druze provided much of the military force behind the Syrian Revolution of 1925-1927. In 1945, Amir Hasan al-Atrash, the paramount

  political leader of the Jebel al-Druze, led the Druze military units in asuccessful revolt against the French, making the Jebel al-Druze the first andonly region in Syria to liberate itself from French rule without Britishassistance. At independence the Druze, made confident by their successes,

expected that Damascus would reward them for their many sacrifices on the battlefield. They demanded to keep their autonomous administration andmany political privileges accorded them by the French and sought generouseconomic assistance from the newly independent government.[35]

Druze leaders meeting in Jebel al-Druze,Syria, 1926

13

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 14/53

Well-led by the Atrash household and jealous of their reputation as Arabnationalists and proud warriors, the Druze leaders refused to be beaten intosubmission by Damascus or cowed by threats. When a local paper in 1945reported that President Shukri al-Quwatli (1943–1949) had called the Druzes

a "dangerous minority", Sultan Pasha al-Atrash flew into a rage anddemanded a public retraction. If it were not forthcoming, he announced, theDruzes would indeed become "dangerous" and a force of 4,000 Druzewarriors would "occupy the city of Damascus." Quwwatli could not dismissSultan Pasha's threat. The military balance of power in Syria was tilted infavor of the Druzes, at least until the military build up during the 1948 War in Palestine. One advisor to the Syrian Defense Department warned in 1946that the Syrian army was "useless", and that the Druzes could "take

Damascus and capture the present leaders in a breeze."

[35]

During the four years of Adib Shishakli's rule in Syria (December 1949 toFebruary 1954) (on August 25, 1952: Adib al-Shishakli created theArab Liberation Movement (ALM), a progressive party with pan-Arabist and socialist views),[36] the Druze community was subjected to aheavy attack by the Syrian regime. Shishakli believed that among his manyopponents in Syria, the Druzes were the most potentially dangerous, and hewas determined to crush them. He frequently proclaimed: "My enemies arelike a serpent: the head is the Jebel al-Druze, the stomachHoms, and the tailAleppo. If I crush the head the serpent will die." Shishakli dispatched 10,000regular troops to occupy the Jebel al-Druze. Several towns were bombardedwith heavy weapons, killing scores of civilians and destroying many houses.According to Druze accounts, Shishakli encouraged neighboring bedouintribes to plunder the defenseless population and allowed his own troops torun amok.[35]

Shishakli launched a brutal campaign to defame the Druzes for their religionand politics. He accused the entire community of treason, at times claiming

they were agents of the British and Hashimites, at others that they werefighting for Israel against the Arabs. He even produced a cache of Israeliweapons allegedly discovered in the Jabal. Even more painful for the Druzecommunity was his publication of "falsified Druze religious texts" and falsetestimonials ascribed to leading Druze sheikhs designed to stir up sectarianhatred. This propaganda also was broadcast in the Arab world, mainly

14

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 15/53

Egypt. Shishakli was assassinated in Brazil on September 27, 1964 by aDruze seeking revenge for Shishakli's bombardment of the Jebel al-Druze.[35]

He forcibly integrated minorities into the national Syrian social structure, his"Syrianization" of Alawite and Druze territories had to be accomplished in

 part using violence, he declared: "My enemies are like serpent. The head isthe Jabal Druze, If I crush the head the serpent will die" (Seale 1963:132).[35] To this end, al-Shishakli encouraged the stigmatization of minorities. Hesaw minority demands as tantamount to treason. His increasinglychauvinistic notions of Arab nationalism were predicated on the denial that"minorities" existed in Syria.[37]

After the Shishakli's military campaign, the Druze community lost a lot of its political influence, but many Druze military officers played an important

role when it comes to the Baathistregime currently ruling Syria.[35]

[edit]In Lebanon

Prophet Job shrine in Lebanon the Chouf region

The Druze community played an important role in the formation of themodern state of Lebanon, and even though they are a minority they playedan important role in the Lebanese political scene. Before and duringthe Lebanese Civil War  (1975–1990), the Druze were in favor of Pan-Arabism and Palestinian resistance represented by the PLO. Most of thecommunity supported the Progressive Socialist Party formed by the

Lebanese leader Kamal Jumblatt and they fought alongside other leftist andPalestinian parties against the Lebanese Front that was mainly constituted of Christians. After the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt on March 16, 1977, hisson Walid Jumblatt took the leadership of the party and played an importantrole in preserving his father's legacy and sustained the existence of the Druzecommunity during the sectarian bloodshed that lasted until 1990.

15

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 16/53

In August 2001, Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir  toured the predominantlyDruze Chouf region of Mount Lebanon and visited Mukhtara, the ancestralstronghold of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. The tumultuous reception thatSfeir received not only signified a historic reconciliation between Maronites

and Druze, who fought a bloody war in 1983-1984, but underscored the factthat the banner of Lebanese sovereignty had broad multi-confessionalappeal[38] and was a cornerstone for the Cedar Revolution. The secondlargest political party supported by Druze is the Lebanese Democratic Party led by Prince Talal Arslan the son of Lebanese independencehero Prince Magid Arslan.Many Druze also support the Syrian Social 

 Nationalist Party.

[edit]In Israel

Main article: Israeli Druze[edit]Beliefs of the Druze

The Druze are considered to be a social group as well as a religion, but not adistinct ethnic group. Also complicating their identity is the customof Taqiya —concealing or disguising their beliefs when necessary—that theyadopted from Shia Islam and the esoteric nature of the faith, in which manyteachings are kept secretive. Druze in different states can have radicallydifferent lifestyles. Some claim to be Muslim, some do not. The Druze faith

is said to abide by Islamic principles, but they tend to be separatist in their treatment of Druze-hood, and their religion differs from mainstream Islamon a number of fundamental points.[39]

Druze does not allow conversion to the religion. Marriage between Druzeand non-Druze is strongly discouraged for religious, political and historicalreasons.

[edit]God in the Druze faith

The Druze conception of the deity is declared by them to be one of strict and

uncompromising unity. The main Druze doctrine states that God is both transcendent and immanent, in which He is above all attributes but atthe same time He is present.[40]

In their desire to maintain a rigid confession of unity, they stripped fromGod all attributes ( tanzīh ) which may lead to polytheism (  shirk  ). In God,there are no attributes distinct from his essence. He is wise, mighty, and just,

16

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 17/53

not by wisdom, might, and justice, but by his own essence. God is "theWhole of Existence", rather than "above existence" or on His throne, whichwould make Him "limited." There is neither "how", "when", nor "where"about him; he is incomprehensible.[41]

In this dogma, they are similar to the semi-philosophical, semi-religious  body which flourished under Al-Ma'mun and was known by the nameof Mu'tazila and the fraternal order of theBrethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-

Ṣafa).[29]

Unlike the Mu'tazilla, however, and similar to some branches of Sufism, theDruze believe in the concept of Tajalli (meaning "theophany").[41] Tajalli,which is more often misunderstood by scholars and writers and is usuallyconfused with the concept of incarnation,

...is the core spiritual beliefs [sic] in the Druze and some other intellectualand spiritual traditions.... In a mystical sense, it refers to the light of Godexperienced by certain mystics who have reached a high level of purity intheir spiritual journey. Thus, God is perceived as the Lahut [the divine] whomanifests His Light in the Station (Maqaam) of the Nasut [material realm]without the Nasut becoming Lahut. This is like one's image in the mirror:one is in the mirror but does not become the mirror. The Druze manuscriptsare emphatic and warn against the belief that the Nasut is God.... Neglecting

this warning, individual seekers, scholars, and other spectators haveconsidered al-Hakim and other figures divine.

...In the Druze scriptural view, Tajalli 'takes a central stage.' One author comments that Tajalli occurs when the seeker's humanity is annihilated sothat divine attributes and light are experienced by the person."[41]

The concept of God incarnating either as or in a human seems "to contradictwith what the Druze scriptural view has to teach about the Oneness of God,

while tajalli [sic] is at the center of the Druze and some other, oftenmystical, traditions."[41]

[edit]Scriptures

Druze Sacred texts include the Kitab Al Hikma (Epistles of Wisdom).[42]

[edit]Esotericism

17

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 18/53

The Druze believe that many teachings given by Prophets, religious leaders,and Holy Books, had esoteric meanings preserved for those of intellect, inwhich some teachings are mere symbols and allegoristic in nature and for that they divide the understanding of holy books and teachings into three

layers. These layers according to the Druze are:

The obvious or exoteric (  Zahir  ), accessible to anyone who can read or hear;

The hidden or esoteric (  Batin ), accessible to those who are willing tosearch and learn through the concept of ( exegesis ); and

The hidden of the hidden, a concept known as Anagoge, inaccessibleto all but a few really enlightened individuals who truly understand thenature of the universe.[43]

Unlike some Islamic esoteric movements known as the batinids at that time,the Druzes don't believe that the esoteric meaning abrogates or necessarilyabolishes the exoteric one. For example, Hamza bin Ali, refutes such claims

 by stating that, if the esoteric interpretation of Taharah (purity), is the purityof the heart and soul, it doesn't mean that a person can discard his physical

 purity, as Salah (prayer) is useless if a person is untruthful in his speech andfor that the esoteric and exoteric meanings complement each other .[44]

[edit]Precepts of the Druze faithMain article: Seven pillars of Ismailism

The Druze follow seven precepts that are considered the core of the faith,and are perceived by them as the essence of the pillars of Islam. The SevenDruze precepts are:

1. Veracity in speech and the truthfulness of the tongue.

2. Protection and mutual aid to the brethren in faith.

3. Renunciation of all forms of former worship (specifically,invalid creeds) and false belief.

4. Repudiation of the devil (  Iblis ), and all forces of evil (translatedfrom Arabic Toghyan meaning " despotism" ).

5. Confession of God's unity.

6. Acquiescence in God's acts no matter what they be.

18

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 19/53

7. Absolute submission and resignation to God's divine will in both secret and public.[45]

[edit]Religious Symbol

Their symbol is an array of five colors: green, red, yellow, blue, and white.Each color pertains to a symbol defining its principles: green for  Aql "theUniversal Mind/ Nous", red for  Nafs "the Universal Soul/Anima mundi",yellow for   Kalima "the Word/Logos", blue for  Sabq "thePotentiality/Cause/Precedent", and white for  Talī  "theActuality/Effect/Immanence".These principles are usually representedsymbolically by a five-pointed star .

[edit]ʻUqqāl and Juhhāl

Druze Sheikh (ʻUqqāl) wearing religious dress

The Druze are divided into two groups. The largely secular majority,

called al-Juhhāl (لاهج ) ("the Ignorant") are not granted access to the Druzeholy literature or allowed to attend the initiated Uqqal' s religious meetings.They are around 80% of the Druze population and are not obliged to followthe ascetic traditions of the Uqqal .

The initiated religious group, which includes both men and women (about20% of the population), is called al-ʻUqqāl (لاققع), ("the Knowledgeable

19

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 20/53

Initiates"). They have a special mode of dress designed to comply withQuranic traditions. Women can opt to wear al-mandīl , a loose white veil,especially in the presence of other people. They wear al-mandīl on their heads to cover their hair and wrap it around their mouths and sometimes

over their noses as well. They wear black shirts and long skirts coveringtheir legs to their ankles. Male ʻuqqāl grow mustaches, and wear dark Levantine/Turkish traditional dresses, called the shirwal , with white turbansthat vary according to the Uqqal' s hierarchy.

 Al-ʻuqqāl have equal rights to al-Juhhāl , but establish a hierarchy of respect  based on religious service.The most influential 5% of  Al-

ʻuqqāl  become Ajawīd , recognized religious leaders, and from this group thespiritual leaders of the Druze are assigned. While the Shaykh al- ̒Aql , which

is an official position in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, is elected by the localcommunity and serves as the head of the Druze religious council, judgesfrom the Druze religious courts are usually elected for this position. Unlikethe spiritual leaders, the Shaykh al- ̒Aql's authority is local to the country heis elected in, though in some instances spiritual leaders are elected to this

 position.

The Druze believe in the unity of God, and are often known as the "Peopleof Monotheism" or simply "Monotheists". Their theology has a Neo-

Platonic view about how God interacts with the world through emanationsand is similar to some gnostic and other esoteric sects. Druze philosophyalso shows Sufi influences.

Druze principles focus on honesty, loyalty, filial piety, altruism, patrioticsacrifice, and monotheism. They reject tobacco smoking, alcohol,consumption of  pork , and marriage to non-Druze. Also, in contrast to mostIslamic sects, the Druze reject polygamy, believe in reincarnation, and arenot obliged to observe most of the religious rituals. The Druze believe that

rituals are symbolic and have an individualistic effect on the person, for which reason Druze are free to perform them, or not. The community doescelebrate Eid al-Adha, however, considered their most significant holiday.

[edit]Origins of the Druze people

[edit]Ethnic origins

20

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 21/53

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 22/53

and Yezidis of Asia Minor and Persia, the modern representatives of theancient Hittites.[49]

During the 18th century, there were two branches of Druze living inLebanon: the Yemeni Druze, headed by the Hamdan and Al-Atrash families;and the Kaysi Druze, headed by theJumblat and Arsalan families.

The Hamdan family was banished from Mount Lebanon following the battle of Ain Dara in 1711. This battle was fought between two Druze factions: theYemeni and the Kaysi. Following their dramatic defeat, the Yemeni factionmigrated to Syria in the Jebel-Druze region and its capital, Soueida.However, it has been argued that these two factions were of political naturerather than ethnic, and had both Christian and Druze supporters.

[edit]Genetics

In a 2005 study of ASPM gene variants, Mekel-Bobrov et al. found thatthe Israeli Druze people of the Carmel region have among the highest rate of the newly evolved ASPM haplogroup D, at 52.2% occurrence of theapproximately 6,000-year-old allele.[50] While it is not yet known exactlywhat selective advantage is provided by this gene variant, the haplogroup Dallele is thought to be positively selected in populations and to confer somesubstantial advantage that has caused its frequency to rapidly increase.

According to DNA testing, Druze are remarkable for the high frequency(35%) of males who carry the Y-chromosomal haplogroup L, which isotherwise uncommon in the Mideast (Shen et al. 2004).[51] This haplogrouporiginates from prehistoric South Asia and has spread from Pakistan intosouthern Iran.

Cruciani in 2007 found E1b1b1a2 (E-V13) [one from Sub Clades of E1b1b1a1 (E-V12)] in high levels (>10% of the male population) in TurkishCypriot and Druze Arab lineages. Recent genetic clustering analyses of ethnic groups are consistent with the close ancestral relationship between theDruze and Cypriots, and also identified similarity to the general Syrian andLebanese populations, as well as a variety of Jewish lineages (Ashkenazi,Sephardi, Iraqi, and Moroccan)(Behar et al 2010).[52]

Also, a new study concluded that the Druze harbor a remarkable diversityof mitochondrial DNA lineages that appear to have separated from each

22

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 23/53

other thousands of years ago. But instead of dispersing throughout the worldafter their separation, the full range of lineages can still be found within theDruze population.[53]

The researchers noted that the Druze villages contained a striking range of high frequency and high diversity of the X haplogroup, suggesting that this

 population provides a glimpse into the past genetic landscape of the Near  East at a time when the X haplogroup was more prevalent.[53]

These findings are consistent with the Druze oral tradition, that claims thatthe adherents of the faith came from diverse ancestral lineages stretching

 back tens of thousands of years.[53]

Israeli Knesset member Ayoob Kara, a Druze himslef, speculated that the

Druze are descended from one of the Lost Tribes of Israel, probably Zebulun. Kara stated that the Druze share many of the same beliefsas Jews, and that he has genetic evidence to prove that the Druze weredescended from Jews.[54]

That was after the Israeli author Tsvi Misinai claimed that the cultural andgenetic background of Arabs living west of the Jordan River, proved that themajority of them descended from the Jewish nation,and that the geneticcluster of Druze coincides closely with those of the Samaritans, and is veryclose to the genetic clusters of Ashkenazim, Sephardim, and Jews from theCaucasus, but he asserted that such findings do not prove Kara's conclusionsince several Jewish villages in Palestine converted to Druze faith whichmeans the samples can be linked to those lineages and not a broad Druzelinkage.[54]

[edit]See also

List of Druze

 Neoplatonism and Gnosticism

Syncretism

23

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 24/53

The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (also spelled Ba'th or Baath which means"resurrection" or "renaissance" (reddyah); Arabic: كتقش قب ثق قح )is a political party, mixing Arab nationalist and Arab socialist interests,opposed to Western imperialism and calling for the renaissance or 

resurrection of the Arab World and its unity in one united state.[1]

Its motto  — "Unity, Liberty, Socialism" (wahda, hurriya, ishtirakiya) — refers toArab unity, freedom from non-Arab control and interference. Its ideologyof Arab socialism is notably separate in origins and practice from Marxism.

The party was founded in Damascus in 1946 bythe Syrian intellectuals Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Bitar , and since itsinception has established branches in different Arab countries, although theonly countries it has ever held power in are Syria and Iraq. In Syria it has

had a monopoly on political power since the party's 1963 coup. Ba'athistsalso seized power in Iraq in 1963, but were deposed some months later.They returned to power in a 1968 coup and remained the sole party of government until the 2003 Iraq invasion. Since then they have been bannedin Iraq.

In 1966 a coup d'état    by the military against the historical leadershipof Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar led the Syrian and Iraqi parties to split intorival organizations — the Qotri (or Regionalist) Syria-based party and the

Qawmi (or Nationalist) Iraq-based party.

[2]

 Both Ba'ath parties retained thesame name and maintained parallel structures in the Arab World, but became so antagonistic that the Syrian Ba'ath regime became the only Arabgovernment to support non-Arab Iran against Iraq during the bloody Iran-Iraq War .

]Underlying political philosophy

24

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 25/53

The motto of the Party—"Unity, Liberty, Socialism" (Arabic ،ةققح ،ققحو )—was inspired by the FrenchJacobinشققتكة political doctrine linkingnational unity and social equity,[3] Unity refers to Arab unity, or Pan-Arabism; liberty emphasizes being free from foreign control and interference

(self-determination); and socialism refers to Arab socialism, rather than toEuropean socialism or communism. The idea that the national freedom andglory of the  Arab Nationhad been destroyed by Ottoman and Westernimperialism was expounded on in Michel Aflaq’s works On the Way of 

 Resurrection.

Arab nationalism had been influenced by 19th Century mainland Europeanthinkers, notably conservative German philosophers such asJohann Gottlieb Fichte of the Königsberg University Kantian school[4] and French

“Positivists” such as Auguste Comte and professor Ernest Renan of the Collège de France in Paris.[5] Tellingly, Ba'ath party co-founders Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar   both studied at the Sorbonne in the early 1930s, at atime when Positivism was still the dominant ideology amongst France’sacademic elite.

The “Kulturnation” concept of Johann Gottfried Herder and the Grimm Brothers had a certain impact. Kulturnation defines a nationality more by acommon cultural tradition and popular folklore than by national, political or 

religious boundaries and was considered by some as being more suitable for the German, Arab or Ottoman and Turkic countries.

Germany was seen as an anti-colonial power and friend of the Arab world;cultural and economic exchange and infrastructure projects such asthe Baghdad Railway supported that impression. According to Paul Berman,one of the early Arab nationalist thinkers Sati' al-Husri was influenced

 byFichte, a German philosopher famous for his conception of the nationstate and his influence on the German unification movement.

The Ba'ath party also had a significant number of Christian Arabs among itsfounding members. For them, most prominently Michel Aflaq, a resolutelynationalist and secular political framework was a suitable way to evadefaith-based Islamic orientation and the minority status it would give non-Muslims and to get full acknowledgment as citizens. Also, duringGeneral Rashid Ali al-Gaylani's short-lived anti-British military coup in

25

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 26/53

1941, Iraq-based Arab nationalists (Sunni Muslims as well as ChaldeanChristians) asked the Nazi German government to support them againstBritish colonial rule.

[edit]Structure

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please helpimprove this section by adding citations toreliable sources.Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010)

The Ba'ath Party was created as a cell-based organization, with an emphasison withstanding government repression and infiltration. Hierarchical lines of command ran from top to bottom, and members were forbidden to initiatecontacts between groups on the same level of organization; all contacts had

to pass through a higher command level. This made the party somewhatunwieldy, but helped prevent the formation of factions and cordoned off members from each other, making the party very difficult to infiltrate, aseven members would not know the identity of many other Ba'athists. As theU.S. and its allies discovered in Iraq in 2003, the cell structure has also madethe Party highly resilient as an armed resistance organization.

A peculiarity stemming from its Arab unity ideology is the fact that it hasalways been intended to operate on a pan-Arab level, joined together by a

supreme National Command, which is to serve as a party leadership for  branches throughout the Arab world.

From its lowest organizational level, the cell, to the highest, the NationalCommand, the party is structured as follows:

The Party Cell or Circle, composed of three to seven members,constitutes the basic organisational unit of the Ba'ath Party. There aretwo sorts of Cells: Member Cells and Supporter Cells. The latter consistof candidate members, who are being gradually introduced into Party

work without being allowed membership privileges or knowledge of the party apparatus; at the same time, they are expected to follow all orders passed down to them by the full member that acts as the contact for their Cell. This serves both to prevent infiltration and to train and screen Partycadres. Cells functioned at the neighborhood, workplace or village level,

26

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 27/53

where members would meet to discuss and execute party directivesintroduced from above.

A Party Division comprises two to seven Cells, controlled by a

Division Commander. Such Ba'athist groups occur throughout the  bureaucracy and the military, where they function as the Party’swatchdog, an effective form of covert surveillance within a publicadministration.

A Party Section, which comprises two to five Divisions, functions atthe level of a large city quarter, a town, or a rural district.

The Branch comes above the Sections; it comprises at least two

sections, and operates at the provincial level and also, at least in Syria,with one Branch each in the country's four universities.

The Regional Congress, which combines all the branches, was set upto elect the Regional Command as the core of the Party leadership andtop decision-making mechanism, even if this later changed to anappointive procedure in Syria. A "Region" (quṭ r ), in Ba'athist parlance,is an Arab state, such as Syria or Iraq or Lebanon, reflecting the Party'srefusal to acknowledge them as nation-states.

The National Command of the Ba'ath Party ranked over the RegionalCommands. Until the 1960s, it formed the highest policy-making andcoordinating council for the Ba'ath movement throughout the Arab worldat large in both theory and practice. However, from 1966, there hasexisted two rival National Commands for the Ba'ath Party, both largelyceremonial, after the Iraqi and Syrian Regional Commands entered intoconflict and set up puppet National Commands in order to further their rival claims to represent the original party.

[edit]The Ba'ath in Syria, 1954–1963

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please helpimprove this section by adding citations to reliable sources.Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010)

27

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 28/53

Syrian politics took a dramatic turn in 1954 when the military regimeof Adib al-Shishakli was overthrown and a democratic system restored. TheBa'ath, now a large and popular organisation, gained representation in the

  parliamentary elections that year. Ideologically-based organisations

appealing to the intelligentsia, the  petty bourgeoisie and the working classwere gaining ground in Syria, threatening to displace the old parties thatrepresented the notables and bourgeoisie. The Ba'ath was one of these newformations, but faced considerable competition from ideological enemies,notably the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which was intrinsicallyopposed to Arab nationalism and was portrayed by the Ba'ath as pro-Western, and the Syrian Communist Party (SCP), whose support for classstruggle and internationalism was also anathema to the Ba'ath. In addition to

the parliamentary level, all these parties as well as Islamists competed instreet-level activity and sought to recruit support among the military.

The assassination of Ba'athist colonel Adnan al-Malki by a member of theSSNP allowed the Ba'ath and its allies to launch a crackdown on that party,thus eliminating one rival, but by the late 1950s, the Ba'ath itself was facingconsiderable problems, riven by factionalism and faced with ideologicalconfusion among its base. The growth of the Communist Party was also amajor threat. These considerations undoubtedly contributed to the party’sdecision to support unification with Nasser ’s Egypt in 1958, an extremely

 popular position in any case. In 1958, Syria merged with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. As political parties other than Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union were not permitted to operate, the Ba'th along with Syria’s other 

 parties faced the choice of dissolution or suppression.

In August 1959, the Ba'ath Party held a congress which, in line with Aflaq’sviews, approved of its liquidation into the Arab Socialist Union. Thisdecision was not universally accepted in party ranks, however manydissented and the following year a fourth party congress was convened

which reversed it.

Meanwhile, a small group of Syrian Ba'athist officers stationed in Egyptwere observing with alarm the party’s poor position and the increasingfragility of the union. They decided to form a secret military committee: itsinitial members were Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad 'Umran, majors Salah 

28

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 29/53

Jadid and Ahmad al-Mir , and captains Hafiz al-Asad and 'Abd al-Karim al-Jundi.

The merger was not a happy experience for Syria, and in 1961, a militarycoup in Damascus brought it to an end. Sixteen prominent politicians signeda statement supporting the coup, among them al-Hurani and al-Bitar (although the latter soon retracted his signature). The party was in crisis: thesecession was extremely controversial among Syrians in general and mostunpopular among the radical nationalists who formed the Ba'athmembership. A large section of the membership left in protest, setting upthe Socialist Unity Vanguard and gaining considerable support. Theleadership around Aflaq was bitterly contested for its timidity in opposingthe separation. Al-Hawrani, now a determined opponent of reunification, left

the Ba'ath and re-established his Arab Socialist Party.Aflaq sought to reactivate the splintered party by calling a Fifth NationalCongress held in Homs in May 1962, from which both al-Hawrani’ssupporters and the Socialist Unity Vanguard were excluded. A compromisewas reached between the pro-Nasser elements and the more cautiousleadership. The leadership line was reflected in the position the congressadopted in favour of "considered unity" as opposed to the demands for "immediate unity" launched by the Socialist Unity Vanguard (later the

Socialist Unity Movement), the Nasserists and the Arab Nationalist Movement. Meanwhile the Syrian party’s secret Military Committee wasalso planning how to take power, having been granted considerable freedomof action by the civilian leadership in recognition of its need for secrecy.

[edit]The Ba'ath takes power in Syria and Iraq, 1963

Main articles: 1963 Syrian coup d'état  and  February 1963 Iraqi coup d'état 

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please helpimprove this section by adding citations to reliable sources.

Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010)

In February 1963, the Iraqi Ba'ath took power  after violentlyoverthrowing Abd al-Karim Qasim and quashing communist-led resistance.

That same year, the Syrian party’s military committee succeeded in persuading Nasserist and independent officers to make common cause with

29

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 30/53

it, and they successfully carried out amilitary coup on 8 March. A NationalRevolutionary Command Council took control and assigned itself legislative

  power; it appointed Salah al-Din al-Bitar as head of a "national front"government. The Ba'ath participated in this government along with the Arab

  Nationalist Movement, the United Arab Front and the Socialist UnityMovement.

As historian Hanna Batatu notes, this took place without the fundamentaldisagreement over immediate or "considered" reunification having beenresolved. The Ba'ath moved to consolidate its power within the new regime,

 purging Nasserist officers in April. Subsequent disturbances led to the fall of the al-Bitar government, and in the aftermath of Jasim Alwan’s failed

 Nasserist coup in July, the Ba'ath monopolized power.

[edit]Ideological transformation and division, 1963–1968

See also: 1966 Syrian coup d'état 

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please helpimprove this section by adding citations to reliable sources.Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010)

The challenges of building a Ba'athist state led to considerable ideologicaldiscussion and internal struggle in the party. The Iraqi party was

increasingly dominated by Ali Salih al-Sa'di, an unsophisticated thinker according to Batatu, who took a hardline leftist approach, declaring himself a Marxist. He gained support in this from Syrian regional secretary Hamoud el Choufi and from Yasin al-Hafiz, one of the party’s few ideologicaltheorists. Some members of the secret military committee also sympathizedwith this line.

The far-left tendency gained control at the party’s Sixth National Congressof 1963, where hardliners from the dominant Syrian and Iraqi regional

  parties joined forces to impose a hard left line, calling for "socialist planning", "collective farms run by peasants", "workers' democratic controlof the means of production", a party based on workers and peasants, andother demands reflecting a certain emulation of Soviet-style socialism. In acoded attack on Aflaq, the congress also condemned "ideological notability"within the party (Batatu, p. 1020). Aflaq, bitterly angry at this

30

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 31/53

transformation of his party, retained a nominal leadership role, but the National Command as a whole came under the control of the radicals.

The volte-face was received with anger by elements in the Iraqi party, whichsuffered considerable internal division. The Nationalist Guard, a

 paramilitary unit which had been extremely effective, and extremely brutal,in suppressing opposition to the new regime, supported al-Sa'di, as did theBa'athist Federation of Students, the Union of Workers, and most partymembers. Most of its members among the military officer corps wasopposed, as was President Abd al-Salam 'Arif . Coup and counter-coupensued within the party, whose factions did not shrink from employing themilitary in settling their internal differences. This eventually allowed 'Arif totake control and eliminate Ba'thist power in Iraq for the time being.

After disposing of its Nasserist rivals in 1963, the Ba'ath functioned as theonly officially recognized Syrian political party, but factionalism andsplintering within the party led to a succession of governments and newconstitutions. On 23 February 1966, a bloody coup d'état led by left-wingextremists, a radical Ba'athist faction headed by Chief of Staff Salah Jadid,overthrew the Syrian Government. A late warning telegram of the coupd'état was sent from President Gamal Abdel Nasser to  Nasim Al Safarjalani (The General Secretary of Presidential Council), on the early

morning of the coup d'état. The coup sprung out of factional rivalry betweenJadid's "regionalist" (qutri) camp of the Ba'ath Party, which promotedambitions for a Greater Syria and the more traditionally pan-Arab, in power faction, called the "nationalist" (qawmi) faction. Jadid's supporters were alsoseen as more radically left-wing. Several Ba'ath leaders were sentenced todeath in absentia by a special military court headed by later Syrian DefenceMinister, Mustafa Tlass, and Interim Syrian President and Vice President of SyriaAbdul Halim Khaddam, as prosecutor. Many managed to make their escape and flee to Beirut. The Ba'ath wing led by Salah Jadid took power,

and set the party out on a more radical line. Although they had not beensupporters of the victorious far-left line at the Sixth Party Congress, they hadnow moved to adopt its positions and displaced the more moderate wing in

 power, purging from the party its original founders, Aflaq and al-Bitar.

The Syrian Ba'ath and the Iraqi Ba'ath were by now two separate parties,each maintaining that it was the genuine party and electing a National

31

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 32/53

Command to take charge of the party across the Arab world. However, inSyria, the Regional Command was the real centre of party power, and themembership of the National Command was a largely honorary position,often the destination of figures being eased out of the leadership.

At this juncture, the Syrian Ba'ath party split into two factions: the'progressive' faction, led by President and Regional Secretary Nureddin al-Atassi gave priority to the radical Marxist-influenced line the Ba'ath was

  pursuing, but was closely linked to the security forces of DeputySecretary Salah Jadid, the country's strongman from 1966. This faction wasstrongly preoccupied with what it termed the "Socialist transformation" inSyria, ordering large-scale nationalization of economic assets and agrarianreform. It favored an equally radical approach in external affairs, and

condemned "reactionary" Arab regimes while preaching "people's war"against Israel; this led to Syria's virtual isolation even within the Arab world.The other faction, which came to dominate the armed forces, was headed byDefense Minister Hafez al-Assad. He took a more pragmatic political line,viewing reconciliation with the conservative Arab states,notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as essential for Syria’s strategic positionregardless of their political color. He also called for reversing some of thesocialist economic measures and for allowing a limited role for non-Ba'athist

 political parties in state and society.

In early January 1965 the Syrian Ba'ath Party nationalized about a hundredcompanies, "many of them mere workshops, employing in all some 12,000workers." Conservative Damascusmerchants closing their shops and "withthe help of Muslim preachers, called out the populace" to protest against theexpropriation. The regime fought back with the Ba'ath Party National Guardand "newly formed Workers' Militia." In retaliation for the uprising the stateassumed new powers to appoint and dismiss Sunni Muslim Friday prayer-leaders and took over the administration of religious foundations (awqaf ),

"the main source of funds of the Muslim establishment." [6]

Despite constant maneuvering and government changes, the two factionsremained in an uneasy coalition of power. After the 1967 Six-Day War ,tensions increased, and Assad's faction strengthened its hold on the military;from late 1968, it began dismantling Salah Jadid's support networks, facingineffectual resistance from the civilian branch of the party that remained

32

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 33/53

under his control. This duality of power persisted until November 1970,when, in another coup, Assad succeeded in ousting Atassi as prime minister and imprisoned both him and Jadid. He then set upon a project of rapidinstitution-building, reopening parliament and adopting a permanent

constitution for the country, which had been ruled by military fiat or   provisional constitutional documents since 1963. The Ba'ath Party wasturned into a patronage network closely intertwined with the bureaucracy,and soon became virtually indistinguishable from the state, whilemembership numbers were increased to well over one million (reflecting

 both a conscious desire to turn the previous vanguard  party into a regime-supporting mass organization, and the fact that party membership was nowvital to advancement in many sectors). The party simultaneously lost its

independence from the state, and was turned into a tool of the Assad regime,which remained based essentially in the security forces. Other socialist parties that accepted the basic orientation of the regime were permitted tooperate again, and in 1972 the National Progressive Front was established asa coalition of these legal parties; however, they were only permitted to act as

  junior partners to the Ba'ath, with very little room for independentorganization.

During the factional struggles of the 1960s, three breakout factions from the party had emerged. A pro-Nasser group split from the party at the breakup of union with Egypt in 1961, and later became the Socialist Unionists' party.This group later splintered several times, but one branch of the movementwas coopted by the Ba'ath into the National Progressive Front, and remainsin existence as a very minor pro-regime organization. The far-left line of Yasin al-Hafiz, which had impressed Marxist influences on the party in1963, broke off the following year to form what later becamethe Revolutionary Workers' Party, while Jadid's and Atassi's wing of theorganization reunited as the clandestine Arab Socialist Democratic Ba'ath 

Party. Both the latter organizations in 1979 joined an opposition coalitioncalled the National Democratic Gathering.

Hafez al-Assad, one of the longest-ruling leaders of the modern Arab world,remained as president of Syria until his death in 2000, when his son Bashar  al Assad succeeded him as President and as Regional and National Secretaryof the party. Since then, the party has experienced an important generational

33

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 34/53

shift, and a discreet ideological reorientation decreasing the emphasis onsocialist planning in the economy, but no significant changes have taken

 place in its relation to the state and state power. It remains essentially a patronage and supervisory tool of the regime elite.

The Ba'ath today holds 134 of the 250 seats in the Syrian Parliament, afigure which is dictated by election regulations rather than by voting

 patterns, and the Syrian Constitutionstipulates that it is "the leading party of society and state", granting it a legally enforced monopoly on real political

 power.

[edit]The party outside Syria

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please helpimprove this section by adding citations to reliable sources.Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010)

Through its Damascus-based National Command, the Syrian Ba'th Party has  branches inLebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq (currently split into twofactions),[citation needed ] etc., although none of the non-Syrian branches have anymajor strength. Among the Palestinians, as-Sa'iqa, a member organization of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, is the Syrian Ba'ath party branch.

[edit]The Iraq-based Ba'ath Party

Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party student cell, Cairo, in the period 1959-63.

In Iraq, the Ba'ath party remained a civilian group and lacked strong supportwithin the military. The party had little impact, and the movement split intoseveral factions after 1958 and again in 1966. The movement was reportedto have lacked strong popular support,[7]  but through the construction of a

strong party apparatus the party succeeded in gaining power.The Ba'athists first came to power in the coup of February 1963, when Abdal-Salam 'Arif became president. Interference from the historic leadershiparound Aflaq and disputes between the moderates and extremists,culminating in an attempted coup by the latter in November 1963, served todiscredit the party. After Arif’s takeover in November 1963, the moderate

34

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 35/53

military Ba'athist officers initially retained some influence but weregradually eased out of power over the following months.

In July 1968, a bloodless coup led by General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr , Saddam Hussein and Salah Omar Al-Ali brought the Ba'ath Party back to power. In 1974 the Iraqi Ba'athists formed the National Progressive Front to broaden support for the government's initiatives. Wranglings withinthe party continued, and the government periodically purged its dissidentmembers. Emerging as a party strongman, Hussein eventually used hisgrowing power to push al-Bakr aside in 1979 and ruled Iraq until 2003.Under Saddam's tenure Iraq experienced its most dramatic and successful

 period of economic growth, with its citizens enjoying standards of healthcare, housing, instruction and salaries/stipends well comparable to those of 

European countries. Several major infrastructures were laid down to helpwith the country's growth, although many had to be scaled down or abandoned as the costs of the Iran-Iraq War   became heavier and heavier.

Author Fred Halliday writes about 1958-1979: Arab Nationalismconfronting Imperial Iran, Ba'thist ideology, where, under the influence of al-Husri, Iran was presented as the age-old enemy of the Arabs. Al-Husri'simpact on the Iraqi education system was made during the period of themonarchy, but it was the Ba'thists, trained in that period and destined to take

  power later, who brought his ideas to their full, official and racist,culmination. For the Ba'thists their  pan-Arab ideology was laced with anti-Persian racism, it rested on the pursuit of anti-Persian themes, over thedecade and a half after coming to power, Baghdad organised the expulsionof Iraqis of Persian origin, beginning with 40,000 Fayli Kurds, but totallingup to 200,000 or more, by the early years of the war itself. Such racist

 policies were reinforced by ideology: in 1981, a year after the start of theIran-Iraq war, Dar al-Hurriya, the government publishing house, issued"Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies". by

the author, Khairallah Talfah (Tulfah), the foster-father and father-in-law of Saddam Hussein. Halliday says that it was the Ba'thists too who, claiming to

 be the defenders of 'Arabism' on the eastern frontiers, brought to the fore thechauvinist myth of Persian migrants and communities in the Gulf.[8]

[edit]Post-Saddam

35

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 36/53

See also: De-Ba'athification

In June 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority  banned the Ba'ath party.Some criticize the additional step the CPA took—of banning all members of the top four tiers of the Ba'ath Party from the new government, as well as

from public schools and colleges—as blocking too many experienced peoplefrom participation in the new government. Thousands were removed fromtheir positions, including doctors, professors, school teachers, bureaucratsand more. Many teachers lost their jobs, causing protests and demonstrationsat schools and universities. Under the previous rule of the Ba'ath party, onecould not reach high positions in the government or in the schools without

 becoming a party member. In fact, party membership was a prerequisite for university admission. In other words, while many Ba'athists joined for 

ideological reasons, many more were members because it was a way to  better their options. After much pressure by the US, the policy of de-Ba'athification was addressed by the Iraqi government in January, 2008 inthe highly controversial "Accountability and Justice Act" which wassupposed to ease the policy, but which many feared would actually lead tofurther dismissals.[9]

The new Constitution of Iraq approved by a referendum on October 15,2005, reaffirmed the Ba'ath party ban, stating that:

"No entity or program, under any name, may adopt racism, terrorism, thecalling of others infidels, ethnic cleansing, or incite, facilitate, glorify,

 promote, or justify thereto, especially the Saddamist Baath in Iraq and itssymbols, regardless of the name that it adopts. This may not be part of the

 political pluralism in Iraq."

On December 17, 2008, the New York Times reported that up to 35 officialsin the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior ranking as high as general had beenarrested over the three previous days accused of quietly working to

reconstitute the Ba'ath Party.[10][11]

[The Iraq-based Ba'ath Party had branches in various Arab countries, suchas Lebanon, Mauritania and Jordan. After the fall of the Saddamgovernment, some branches have distanced themselves from the central

 party, such as the branches in Yemen and Sudan.

36

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 37/53

In Lebanon, the party is led by former Sunni MP for Tripoli, Abdul-MajeedAl-Rafei.

In Yemen, the 'Qawmi'/pro-Saddam branch of the Ba'ath party is led byDr. Qasim Sallam (former MP for the district of Ta'izz), a US-educated

 philosopher author of "The Baath and the Arab homeland" (1980).

The party works amongst the Palestinians directly through the Arab Liberation Front (known as ALF or  Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyah) founded

 by Zeid Heidar , and indirectly through the relatively small pro-Iraqi wingof Fatah formerly led by Khaled Yashruti. ALF formed the major Palestinian

 political faction in Iraq during the Saddam years. It is numerically small, butgained some prominence due to the support given to it by the Iraqigovernment. It is a member organization of PLO.

In Bahrain, Rasul al-Jeshy leads the local pro-Saddam faction of the Ba'athParty, the secular    Nationalist Democratic Rally Society (  Jami'at al-

Tajammu' al-Qawmi al-Dimuqrati), which in an alliancewith Shiite Islamists opposes the Bahrain government’s economic policies.

An Iraq-oriented Ba'ath Party branch led by exiled Ba'ath party co-founder Salah ad-Din al-Bitar and Gen. Amin Hafiz formerly existedin Syria, which the Syrian government severely repressed.

The Alawis, also knownas Alawites, Nusayris and Ansaris (‘Alawīyyah Arabic: ةع, Nu ayrī ṣ  Arabic: نقق , صقققق and al-An āriyyahṣ  ) are a prominent mystical andsyncretic[8] religious group centred in Syria

|last=Kramer |first=Martin |quote=In their mountainous corner of Syria, the‘Alawī claim to represent the furthest extension of Twelver Shi'ism.}}</ref>[9]

Zulfiqar , a stylized representation of the sword of Ali, is an importantsymbol for Alawis

37

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 38/53

The Alawis take their name from ‘Alī ibn Abī ālibṬ cousin and son-in-lawof Mu ammadḥ ,[10]who was the first Shi'a Imam and the fourth and last"Rightly Guided Caliph" of Sunni Islam.

Until fairly recently Alawis were referred to as " Nusairis", named after AbuShu'ayb Muhammadibn Nusayr (d. ca 270 h, 863 AD) who is reported tohave attended the circles of the last threeImams of the prophet Muhammad'sline. This name is considered derogatory, and Alawis refer to themselves asAlawis.[ page needed ][11] Nusairis have allegedly "generally preferred" to be called'Alawis, because of its association with 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, rather than AbuShu'ayb Muhammad Ibn Nusayr.[12] In September 1920, French occupationalforces instituted the policy of referring to them by the term "'Alawi".

In older sources they are often referred to as Ansaris, as this is how they

referred to themselves, according to the Reverend Samuel Lyde, who livedamong Alawis in the mid-19th century. Another source states that "Ansari",as referring to Alawites, is simply a Western mistransliteration of Nosairi.[ page needed ][13][14]

Alawis are distinct from the Turkish-based Alevi religious sect, although theterms share similar etymologies.

[edit]History

[hide]

Part of  a series onShī‘ah Islam

Beliefs and practices

Succession of Ali

38

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 39/53

Imamate of the FamilyMourning of MuharramIntercession · IsmahThe Occultation · Clergy

Views

The Qur'an · SahabaMu'awiya I · Abu Bakr  Umar  · Ghulat

Holy days

Ashura · Arba'een · MawlidEid ul-Fitr  · Eid al-AdhaEid al-Ghadeer  Eid al-Mubahila

History

Twelver  · Ismā īlī ʿ  · Zaidi

The verse of purificationMubahala · Two thingsKhumm · Fatimah's houseFirst Fitna · Second FitnaThe Battle of KarbalaPersecution

Ahl al-Kisa

Muhammad · Ali · FatimahHasan · Hussein

Some companions

Salman the Persian

39

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 40/53

Miqdad ibn AswadAbu Dharr al-GhifariAmmar ibn Yasir  Bilal ibn Rabah

v · d · e

The origin of the Alawis is disputed. The Alawis themselves trace their origins to the followers of the eleventh Imām, Hassan al-'Askarī  (d. 873),and his pupil ibn Nu ayr ṣ  (d. 868). [15]

The sect seems to have been organised by a follower of Mu ammad ibnḥ   Nu ayr ṣ  known as al-Khasibi, who died in Aleppo about 969. In 1032 Al-

Khaṣ ībī's grandson and pupil al-Tabarani moved to Latakia, which was thencontrolled by the Byzantine Empire. Al-Tabarani became the perfector of theAlawi faith through his numerous writings. He and his pupils converted therural population of the Syrian Coastal Mountain Range and the plainof Cilicia to the Alawi faith.[16] Samuel Lyde believed the population was of ancient Canaanite origins, but that parts had come from where the sectoriginated.[ page needed ][17]Professor Felix von Luschan (1911), according to hisconclusions from anthropometric measurements, makesthe Druze, Maronites, and Alawites, together with the Armenians, Bektashis,‘Ali-Ilahis, and Yezidis of Asia Minor and Persia, the modernrepresentatives of the ancient Hittites.[18]

Under the Ottoman Empire they were ill treated,[19] and they resisted anattempt to convert them to Sunni Islam.[20] They revolted against theOttomans on several occasions, and maintained virtual autonomy in their mountains.[21] T. E. Lawrence wrote of their isolationism: "The sect, vital initself, was clannish in feeling and politics. One Nosairi would not betrayanother, and would hardly not betray an unbeliever."[22]

40

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 41/53

Flag of the Alawi State

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Lebanon came under a French mandate. The French, when they occupied Syria in 1920,recognized the term "Alawi", gave autonomy to them and other minoritygroups, and accepted them into their colonial troops.[23] Under the mandate,

many Alawi chieftains supported the notion of a separate Alawi nation andtried to convert their autonomy into independence. A territory of "Alaouites"was created in 1925. In May 1930, the Government of Latakia was created;it lasted until February 28, 1937, when it was incorporated into Syria.[24]

In 1939 a portion of northwest Syria, the Sanjak of Alexandretta,now Hatay, that contained a large number of Alawis, was given to Turkey bythe French following a plebiscite carried out in the province under theguidance of League of Nations which favored joining Turkey. However, this

development greatly angered the Alawi community and Syrians in general.In 1938, the Turkish military had gone into Alexandretta and expelled mostof its Arab and Armenian inhabitants[neutrality is disputed ].[25] Before this, AlawiArabs and Armenians were the majority of the province's

 population[neutrality is disputed ][25] Zaki al-Arsuzi, the young Alawi leader from Iskandarun province in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, who led theresistance to the annexation of his province to the Turks, later became afounder of the Ba'ath Party along with the Eastern Orthodox Christianschoolteacher Michel Aflaq. After World War II, Salman Al Murshid played

a major role in uniting the Alawi province with Syria. He was executed bythe newly independent Syrian government in Damascus on December 12,1946 only three days after a hasty political trial.

Syria became independent on April 17, 1946. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War , Syria endured a succession of military coups in 1949, the rise of theBa'ath Party, and unification of the country with Egypt in the United 

41

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 42/53

Arab Republic in 1958. The UAR lasted for three years and broke apart in1961, when a group of army officers seized power and declared Syriaindependent again. A further succession of coups ensued until a secretivemilitary committee, which included a number of disgruntled Alawi officers,

including Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid, helped the Ba'ath Party take  power in 1963. In 1966, Alawi-oriented military officers successfullyrebelled and expelled the old Ba'ath that had looked to the Christian MichelAflaq and the Sunni Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar for leadership. They

 promoted Zaki al-Arsuzi as the "Socrates" of their reconstituted Ba'ath Party.

The Assad family

In 1970, then-Air Force General Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, took power and instigated a "Correctionist Movement" in the Ba'ath Party.[26] Hiscoming to power has been compared to "an untouchable becomingmaharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia—an unprecedenteddevelopment shocking to the majority population which had monopolized

 power for so many centuries."[23]

In 1971 al-Assad became president of Syria, a function that the Constitutionallows only a Sunni Muslim to hold. In 1973 a new constitution was

 published that omitted the old requirement that the religion of the state isIslam and replaced it with the statement that the religion of the republic's

 president is Islam. Protests erupted when the statement was altered,[27] and to

satisfy this requirement in 1974, Musa Sadr , a leader of  theTwelvers of Lebanon and founder of the Amal Movement who hadearlier sought to unite Lebanese Alawis and Shias under the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council without success,[3] issued a fatwa stating that Alawiswere a community of Twelver Shia Muslims. [28][29] Under the dictatorial

42

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 43/53

 but secular Assad regime, religious minorities were tolerated, politicaldissent was not.

After the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad maintained the outlines of his father's regime.[citation needed ] Although theAlawis predominate among the top military and intelligence offices, thecivilian government and national economy is largely led by Sunnis, whorepresent about 74% of Syria's population. The Assad regime is careful toallow all of the religious sects a share of power and influence in thegovernment. Today the Alawis exist as a minority but politically powerfulsect in Syria.

[edit]Beliefs

Alawis are self-described Shi'i Muslims, and have been called Shia by other sources[30][9] including the highly influential Lebanese Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr of Lebanon.[28] On the other hand, Sunni Muslims do not recognizeAlawi as Muslims.[19] At least one source has compared themto Baha'is, Babis, Bektashis, Ahmadis, and "similar groups that have arisenwithin the Muslim community", and declared that "it has always been theconsensus of the Muslim Ulama, both Sunni and Shi'i, that the NusayriAlawi are kuffar (unbelievers) and mushrikun( polytheists)."[12] On the other hand, the prominent Sunni Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin al-

Husayni, issued a fatwah recognizing them as part of the Muslimcommunity.[31]

The Alawite sect initially resisted encouragement to be categorized as Shi'iteMuslims.[32] Alawites have had a mixed view of themselves propagated. AliSulayman al-Ahmad, chief judge of the Alawite state, replied “We are AlawiMuslims. Our book is the Quran. Our prophet is Muhammad. The Ka`ba isour qibla, and our religion is Islam.”[33]

[edit]Heterodox

43

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 44/53

Alawis celebrating a festival in Banyas, Syria, during World War II

Many of the tenets of the faith are secret and known only to a select fewAlawi.[19] In the 19th century, however, an Alawite named Sulaiman al-Adni

converted to Christianity and in 1863, compiled a book called Al-Bakurahas-Suliamaniya fi Kashf Asrar ad-Diyanah an-Nusairiyah (The First Fruitsof Sulaiman in Revealing the Secrets of the Nusairi Religion). Orientalistslike Louis Massignon gained access to a number of Nusairi manuscripts.[12]

According to some sources, Alawis have integrated doctrines from other religions (Syncretism), in particular from Ismaili Islam andChristianity.[8][19]

[29] According to scholar Cyril Glasse, it is thought that "as a small,historically beleaguered ethnic group", the Alawi "absorbed elements" from

the different religions that influenced their area from Hellenistic timesonward,[29] while maintaining their own beliefs, and "pretended to adhere tothe dominant religion of the age."[29] Alawites are reported to celebratecertain Christian festivals, "in their own way",[29] including Christmas,Easter, and Palm Sunday, and their religious ceremonies make use of breadand wine.[23] According to Matti Moosa, a "leading scholar of the Nusayris",

The Christian elements in the Nusayri religion are unmistakable. Theyinclude the concept of trinity; the celebration of Christmas, the consecration

of the Qurban, that is, the sacrament of the flesh and blood which Christoffered to his disciples, and, most important, the celebration of the Quddas(a lengthy prayer proclaiming the divine attributes of Ali and the

 personification of all the biblical patriarchs from Adam to Simon Peter,founder of the Church, who is seen, paradoxically, as the embodiment of true Islam).[34]

44

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 45/53

Glasse writes that they also practice a religious feast called by the Persianname Naw Ruz.

Alawi man in Latakia, early 20th century

Alawis have much in common with the Ismailis in terms of overall beliefs,and they are sometimes regarded as "an offshoot of thisgroup."[12] According to scholar Umar F. Abd-Allah, who uses Sulaiman al-Adni's book along with other sources, the Alawis, like the Ismailis andrelated groups, believe that the Shariah has both an esoteric, allegorical( Batini) meaning and an exoteric, literal ( zahiri) meaning and that only thehidden meaning is intended. Alawis believe the esoteric meaning is known

only to the Imams and later to the Bab and was hidden even to the Islamic  prophet Muhammad himself. Only the Bab has access to this esotericmeaning in the absence of the Imam.[12]

Alawis believe in a "trinity"[19] or "schema"[29] of `Ain-Mim-Sin, whichstands for `Ali, Muhammad, and Salman al-Farsi, the Persian Companion of Muhammad. Muhammad is known as ism, or "name", Ali as bab, or "door",and Salman al-Farsi as ma'na, or "meaning", with both Muhammad and Aliconsidered to be emanations of Salman al-Farsi.[29] According to Abd-Allah,

each of these three is said to have been an incarnation of God. Ali, however,constitutes the most important part of this trinity. The Alawi testimony of faith is: `I have borne witness that there is no God but He, the most High, theobject of worship and that there is no concealing veil (hijab) except the lordMuhammad, the object of praise, (as-Sayyid Muhmmad al-Mahmud), andthere is not Bab except the lord Salman al-Farisi` The Nusairis believe in thesubsequent incarnation of God in other persons after the passing of `Ali,Muhammad, and Salman al-Farisi...[12]

Some sources have suggested that the non-Muslim nature of many of thehistorical Alawi beliefs notwithstanding, Alawi beliefs may have changed inrecent decades. In the early 1970s a booklet entitled al-`Alawiyyun Shi'atu

 Ahl al-Bait  (The Alawis are Followers of the Household of the Prophet), wasissued in which doctrines of the Imami Shi'ah were described as 'Alawi, andwhich was "signed by of numerous `Alawi` men of religion". [12] This book 

45

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 46/53

and Musa Sadr's proclamation have led one scholar to wonder whether "amass conversion from Nusairism to Shi'ah Islam" has taken place.[12] Another scholar suggests that factors such as the high profile of Alawi inSyria, the strong aversion of the Muslim majority to apostasy, and the

relative lack of importance of religious doctrine to Alawi identity may haveinduced Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad and his successor son to press their fellow Alawi "to behave like 'regular Muslims', shedding or at leastconcealing their distinctive aspects."[35]

Alawis have their own scholars, referred to as shaikhs, although morerecently there has been a movement to bring Alawism and the other 

 branches of Twelver Islam together through educational exchange programsin Syria and Qumm.[36] Distinct Alawi beliefs include the belief that prayers

are not necessary, they don't fast, nor perform pilgrimage, nor have specific places of worship.[37]

[edit]Population

[edit]Syria

Alawi women in Syria, early 20th century

Traditionally Alawis have lived in the Alawite Mountains along theMediterranean coast of Syria. Latakia and Tartous are the region's principalcities. Today Alawis are also concentrated in the plainsaround Hama and Homs. Alawis also live in all major cities of Syria. Theyhave been estimated to constitute about 15% of Syria's population (whichwould be in 2011 about 3.5 million people of about 23.1 million people inSyria).

There are four Alawi confederations — Kalbiyah, Khaiyatin, Haddadin, andMatawirah — each divided into tribes.[19] Alawis are concentrated in

46

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 47/53

the Latakia region of Syria, extending north to Antioch (Antakya), Turkey,and in and around Homs and Hama.[38]

Before 1953 they held reserved seats in the Syrian Parliament, like all other religious communities. After that, including for the 1960 census, there wereonly general Muslim and Christian categories, without mention of subgroupsin order to reduce "communalism" (taïfiyya).

[edit]Lebanon

There are an estimated 40.000 to 100,000[3][39] Alawis in Lebanon, wherethey are recognized as one of the 18 official Lebanese sects. Due to theefforts of their leader Ali Eid, the Taif Agreement of 1989 gave them tworeserved seats in the Parliament. Lebanese Alawis live mostly in the JabalMohsen neighbourhood of Tripoliand Akkar , in 15 villages,[40][41][42] and aremainly represented by the Arab Democratic Party.

[edit]Turkey

In order to avoid confusion with Alevis, they prefer the self-appellation  Arap Alevileri("Arab Alevis") in Turkish. The term Nusayrī ,which used to exist in (often polemical) theological texts is also revived inrecent studies. In Çukurova, they are named as Fellah and Arabuşağı, thelatter considered highly offensive by Alawis, by the Sunni population. Aquasi-official name used particularly in 1930s by Turkish authorities was Eti

Türkleri ("Hittite Turks"), in order to conceal their Arab origins. Today, thisterm is almost obsolete but it is still used by some people of older generations as a euphemism.

The exact number of ‘Alawī in Turkey is unknown, but there were 185000 Alawis in 1970[43] (this number suggest ca 400 000 in 2009).As Muslims, they are not recorded separately from Sunnis in ID registration.In the 1965 census (the last Turkish census where informants were askedtheir mother tongue), 180,000 people in the three provinces declared their 

mother tongue as Arabic. However, Arabic-speaking Sunniand Christian people are also included in this figure.

Alawis traditionally speak the same dialect of  Levantine Arabic with Syrian Alawis. Arabic is best preserved in rural communitiesand Samandağ. Younger people in Çukurova cities and (to a lesser extent) inİskenderun tend to speak Turkish. Turkish spoken by ‘Alawī is distinguished

47

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 48/53

 by ‘Alawī and non-‘Alawī alike with its particular accents and vocabulary.Knowledge of Arabic alphabet is confined to religious leaders and men whohad worked or studied in Arab countries.

‘Alawī show a considerable pattern of social mobility. Until 1960s, theyused to work bound to Sunni aghas around Antakya and they were amongthe poorest folk in Çukurova. Today, ‘Alawī are prominent in economicsectors such as transportation and commerce. A large professional middle-class had also emerged.

In recent years, there has been a tendency of exogamy, particularly amongmales who had attended universities and/or had lived in other parts of Turkey. These marriages are highly tolerated but exogamy of women, aswith other  patrilineal groups, is usually disfavoured.

‘Alawī , like Alevis, mainly have strong leftist political preferences.However, some people in rural areas (usually members of notable ‘Alawī families) may be found supporting secularistconservative  parties suchas True Path Party. Most ‘Alawī s feel discriminated by the policiesof Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı.[44][45]

[edit]Golan Heights

There are also about 2000 Alawis living in the village of Ghajar , split

 between Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

[46]

48

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 49/53

Rumors in the WorkplaceManaging and Preventing Them

Gossiping: It's not nice and it's not professional!

© iStockphoto/phildateRumors. If you haven't been a victim of one, you may have participated inone. The whispers when a colleague is fired. The looks of understandingwhen two co-workers routinely "stay late to catch up on paperwork" on thesame evening. The emails back and forth guessing at which department willsuffer the largest budget cuts.

49

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 50/53

It's difficult not to become involved in gossip at work. After all, people likegossip and interesting bits of information: you only have to look at thenumber of celebrity-focused publications to realize that we have a hugeappetite for discussing other people's lives. At work, however, this type of interaction is harmful and costly. It wastes time, damages reputations,

 promotes divisiveness, creates anxiety, and destroys morale.So why do people start and spread rumors? Much of it has to do with our need to make sense of what's happening around us. To understand what'sgoing on, people talk to one-another. And, together, they fill in the holes inthe story with a little bit of fact – and a lot of guesswork. This new storyspreads, with bits and pieces added along the way, until you have an out-of-control rumor spreading throughout your company.Why Rumors StartRumors often grow because people like to be "in the know." Knowledge is

 power, and that's why the people with the least amount of power in anorganization can often be the ones to start and spread rumors. It can makethem feel important if they're seen to know things that others don't.This knowledge is at the center of why and how rumors start and spread.Insufficient knowledge or incomplete information are often to blame.Consider these examples:

• People don't know why a colleague was fired, so they make up areason based on some limited knowledge or insignificant fact. "I sawJohn override the cash register the other day without a supervisor 

 present. Maybe he stole some money and that's why he went."

• People see a pattern of behavior between two individuals and theyadd their own explanation. "Joseph and Samantha spend a lot of timetogether after hours ‘catching up on paperwork.' And just yesterday,they were sitting awfully close to each other in the meeting. I bet

 paperwork isn't all that's getting done after quitting time!"

• People know that budget meetings are being held, and they're all behind closed doors and kept very quiet. To help these people dealwith the stress, they try to gain some control and predict the outcome."When Steve came out of the budget meeting today, he looked reallyangry. The other day, he said how nervous he was about his

 presentation to the board. I bet he made mistakes and had his budgetcut."

Some rumors, like the one in the second example, take on a more personaltone. These are generally what we think of as gossip. Gossip tends to be

50

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 51/53

related to interpersonal relationships, and is often malicious in nature. It canget out of control quickly, and should be addressed promptly – before itleads to harassment or bullying.

These rumors are typical of the things you'll face at work, and they spread

 because of a lack of accurate information. So, the best way to fight rumors iswith good communication. When you communicate well, your team knowswhat's happening, and they trust that you'll keep them informed. Goodcommunication within your team also means that you will become aware of any rumors that are starting, and you'll be able to address them quickly andeffectively.Dealing with rumors requires a two-pronged attack. Firstly, you need to setup an environment where rumors are not as likely to start. And secondly,you need to establish a pattern of open communication that allows you to

remain aware of what's being said.Preventing Rumors• Keep workers informed – When workers know what's going onwithin an organization, they don't need to guess as much. Usenewsletters, weekly meetings, or regular updates via the intranet to let

 people know what's happening.• Communicate – When you face adversity in your business, keepthe lines of communication open. This is when distrust and stress arelikely to be highest. Whether it's communicating during a 

crisis, dealing with a shrinking team, or managing during a 

downturn, it's fundamentally important to communicate clearly.• Be open and honest – When you can't reveal ALL of theinformation about a certain situation or event, be up front about it.People know when they aren't being told the whole story. Cut off therumors from the start by explaining that you'll provide moreinformation after you have all the details.• Establish transparency within your systems – Develop a

 promotion process that's clear and fair. Hold meetings behind closeddoors only when absolutely necessary. Share industry reports and

company performance data. The more people understand, the morethey trust.• Practice Management By Wandering Around  – The closer youare to your team and to other workers, the easier it is to communicateinformation and the greater the sense of trust. This also gives you anopportunity to hear rumors when they start, instead of only after they're out of control.

51

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 52/53

• Let people know that rumors are unacceptable – Establish a policy for dealing with rumors and gossip. Outline what you'll do to prevent rumors from starting, and address how you'll deal with the people who engage in this behavior. Talk about the effects of rumorsin the workplace. The more that people understand why the behavior is damaging, the more likely they'll be to monitor their own

 participation.• Build a culture that promotes cooperation rather than

competition – Putting people in direct competition with one another for reward and recognition creates an opportunity for conflict andresentment. This lays a foundation of distrust between people anddepartments, and it allows rumors to start and grow. It's a good idea tomonitor the level of competitiveness within your organization on aregular basis, and then make adjustments as necessary.

Managing Rumors• Deal with rumors immediately – Rumors can spread quickly, andthey can often change and grow far beyond the small bit of truth thatcaused them to start. When you hear of a rumor, talk to the peopleinvolved. Where appropriate, hold a meeting to address the rumor,and then communicate the truth. Again, if you can't provide all of thedetails, be honest – and restate your policy about rumor and gossip inthe workplace.• Set a good example – When someone comes to you with an"interesting" or entertaining story, refuse to get involved. When youhear a story from someone other than a direct source, ask questions.Do what you can to find out the truth. Talk to your boss about whatyou heard. Again, this keeps the lines of communication open

 between different channels, and it helps stop rumors.• Watch for patterns with rumors – If a certain type of rumor continues to spread, this may mean that you need to provide moreinformation or more regular updates. If a particular person seems tostart or spread rumors often, address the situation directly. Rumorsaffect productivity, so you must deal with them directly as a

 performance issue.• Regularly audit your rumor behavior – Also, encourage your team to do the same. Think about what you might have done over the

  past month or two to spread rumors. Ask yourself why you participated. Prepare a plan of action so that you'll be less tempted toget involved in the future. If everyone holds themselves a bit more

52

8/4/2019 DRUZIALLAWITI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/druziallawiti 53/53

accountable for rumors in the workplace, their frequency – and their negative consequences – will drop.

Key PointsRumors at work aren't likely to disappear. It's human nature to want to knowwhat's happening around us, and when people don't have completeinformation, they may fill in the gaps with suppositions that may not beaccurate. Fortunately, a little bit of accurate information goes a long way tostop the need to spread rumors.Focus on open, honest, and regular communication. It's also important to

 build a culture of mutual respect and integrity. Rumors are spread by people,so you can stop rumors at the source by talking about the negative effects of rumors and gossip, and by outlining your expectations. You probably won'tever stop rumors completely, however, you can use these strategies to create

more harmony and trust within your work team.You can learn 600 similar skills elsewhere on this site. Click here to seeour full toolkit. If you like our approach, you can subscribe to our free 

newsletter, or become a member for just US$1.