Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War by Leila Hudson

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Middle east Policy, Vol. XViii, No. 3, Fall 2011

Drone Warfare: BloWBackfromthe

neW american Wayof War

Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, Matt Flannes

Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the

School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of

Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of MiddleEast Conicts (SISMEC). Colin Owens and Matt Flannes are graduate

students in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies and the

School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. Both

work as research associates for the Southwest Initiative for the Study of

Middle East Conicts (SISMEC).

2011, The Author Middle East Policy 2011, Middle East Policy Council

Targeted killing by unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAV), commonly

known as drones, has become the

central element of U.S. counter-

terror operations in the Federally Admin-

istered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, a

safe haven for Taliban and al-Qaeda mili-

tants. Over nearly a decade, drone-attack

frequency and death rates have increaseddramatically. Rather than calming the

region through the precise elimination of

terrorist leaders, however, theaccelerating

counterterror program has compounded vi-

olence and instability. These consequences

need to be addressed, since the summer of

2011 has seen the dramatic expansion of

the drone program into Yemen, Somalia

and Libya.Drone warfare has complicated the

U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, a

sisyphean counterinsurgency and nation-

building project, by provoking militant

attacks in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.1

At the strategic level, fragmented U.S.

intelligence and military policies are work-

ing at cross purposes, eroding trust through

covert drone warfare on the Pakistani

side of the Durand line while trying tardily

to build trust on the Afghan side.2 The

growing outrage of Pakistani society came

to a head in spring 2011 over the Raymond

Davis incident and the Abbottabad raidthat killed Osama bin Laden. These events

put great stress on relations between the

United States and the worlds most volatile

nuclear state.

Although its proponents promote

drone warfare as more precise and effec-

tive than traditional counterterror mea-

sures, the death toll from drone attacks in

Pakistan since 2004 hovers impreciselybetween 1,500 and 2,500 people.3 The

public is routinely assured that a high per-

centage of those extrajudicially killed are

militants, but victims are often unnamed

and deaths rarely investigated.4 The few


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Hudson / owens / Flannes: drone warFare

successful drone attacks on high-prole

targets seem to have mobilized existing

networks of followers to conduct symbolic

revenge attacks of comparable magnitude,

like the December 2009 Khost bombing,

which sought to avenge the drone killing

of Beitullah Mehsud in Waziristan earlier

that year. By

extension,

non-militants

victimized by

drone attacks

directly or

indirectly far

outnumber

targeted mili-

tants. Thus, a stream of new adversaries is

produced in what is called the accidental

guerrilla phenomenon.5

On a different level, the erosion of

trust and lack of clarity in drone policy

produces strategic and tactical confusion

within the U.S. defense and intelligence

agencies. This confusion proves unhelp-

ful as exit strategies for the Afghan war

are debated and continuing evaluation

of U.S.-Pakistani relations are assessed

behind closed doors. By the same token,

the ongoing ambivalence of the Pakistani

civilian and military leadership on the

topic of U.S. drone strikes has fanned the

ames of popular discontent in the coun-

trys fragile political system, revealing the

infrastructure of contradictions in the roles

of its military-intelligence sectors that si-

multaneously work with the United States

and promote militant organizations. All

these forms of blowback the unintend-

ed consequences of policies not subjected

to the scrutiny of the American public

complicate U.S. policy in the region and

should be considered before drone warfare

is expanded into the Arabian Peninsula

and Africa.6

In total, we argue that drone warfare

has created ve distinct, yet overlapping,

forms of blowback: (1) the purposeful

retaliation against the United States, (2)

the creation of new insurgents, referred to

as the accidental guerrilla syndrome, (3)

the further complication of U.S. strategic

coordination

and inter-

ests in what

the Bush

and Obama

administra-

tions have

designated

the Afghan/

Pakistan (Af/Pak) theatre, (4) the further

destabilization of Pakistan and (5) the

deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistani relation-

ship. As the drone policy is adapted for

use in post-Saleh Yemen, it is important to

address these forms of blowback.

DRONE WARFARE 101

Drones were rst used for battleeld

reconnaissance, but over the last 10 years

have evolved into Americas preferred kill-

ing machines for locations where the U.S.

military does not operate openly on the

ground. The evolution of drone technology

has been quick, with new developments al-

lowing for longer ight, heavier payloads,

vertical takeoff from ships, and deploy-

ment to more areas of the world. While the

Predator MQ-1 and Predator B (Reaper)

MQ-9 have carried out most surveillance

and attacks, new platforms have been de-

ployed that will likely be engaging targets

in the near future. The most recent evolu-

tion of UAVs are the RQ-4 Global Hawk

(designed and used for surveillance only)

and the MQ-8B Fire Scout. The latter is

currently deployed on ships off the Horn of

Africa and in the Caribbean.7 With basic

The success of the drone program during

its infancy, as dened by the ability to

kill high-value targets, gave the Bushadministration the impression that if

limited drone strikes were successful,

more strikes would be even better.


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The third phase of drone warfare took

place during the end of the Bush adminis-tration and consisted of an acceleration of

attack frequency: 37 during 2008, com-

pared to a total of nine in the rst two pe-

riods.11 The success of the drone program

during its infancy, as dened by the ability

to kill high-value targets like Harethi and

Nek Mohammad, gave the Bush adminis-

tration the impression that if limited drone

strikes were successful, more strikes would

be even better.

The Bush administrations increased

reliance on the program started in 2008;

however, it is with the Obama adminis-

tration that we see the most rapid prolif-

eration of attacks. The nal phase of the

drone program is characterized by an even

greater increase in attack frequency and

an expansion of the target list to include

targets of opportunity and unidentied

militants of dubious rank and funer-

als.12 As of May 2011, the CIA under the

Obama administration has conducted

nearly 200 drone strikes. This suggests

that the drone target list now includes

targets of opportunity, likely including

some selected in consultation with the

Pakistani authorities in order to facilitate

the increasingly unpopular program. This

development, in turn, has now decreased

the effectiveness of the program when as-

sessed in terms of the ratio of high-value

to accidental kills.

models starting at $4.5 million, these air-

craft are cost efcient and carry little risk

burden, especially since human pilots are

removed from the equation.

The use of armed drones by the United

States has developed over nearly a decade.

The programs evolution can be broken

into four phases. Phase one, roughly 2002-

04, served as a testing period of limited

strikes on high-value targets. The rst

use of remotely piloted drones for missile

attacks outside identied war zones took

place in 2002. This attack, in northeastern

Yemen, killed al-Qaeda member Salim

Sinan al-Harethi, who was suspected of

masterminding the 2000 USS Cole bomb-

ing in Aden. The next attack, in 2004, tar-

geted Nek Mohammad, a formermujahed

who became an inuential member of the

Taliban and ed to Pakistan after the 2001

U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. 9

The second phase, 2005-07, consisted

of a slight increase in strikes but retained

the same target set: high-value terrorist

suspects. These attacks were conducted

exclusively in Pakistan and followed the

initial success of the program, dened by

eliminating high-value targets. In 2005, the

United States claimed it killed al-Qaedas

number three, Hamza Rabia, but conict-

ing reports cast doubts on Rabias actual

position and foreshadowed the ambiguity

involved in targeting and identifying high-

value targets.10

Figure 1: Types of Drones8

Make Model/Name Use Payload*General Atomics Predator/MQ-1 Surveillance/ Armed Strikes 450 lbs.

General Atomics Predator B/Reaper/MQ-9 Surveillance/ Armed Strikes 850 lbs.

Northrop Grumman Global Hawk Surveillance 2,000 lbs.

Northrop Grumman Fire Scout MQ-8B Surveillance/ Armed Strikes 800 lbs.

* Approximate


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Over time, these more deadly drone

attacks have failed to effectively de-

capitate the leadership of anti-U.S. or-

ganizations but have killed hundreds of

other people subsequently alleged to be

militants; many were civilians.15 The

rapidly growing population of survivors

and witnesses of these brutal attacks have

emotional and social needs and incentives

to join the ranks of groups that access and

attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan across

the porous border.

Drone attacks themselves deliver a po-

litically satisfying short-term bang for the

buck for U.S. constituencies ignorant of

and indifferent to those affected by drone

warfare or the phenomenon of blowback.

In the Pakistani and Afghan contexts, they

iname the populations and destabilize the

institutions that drive regional develop-

ment. In addition to taking on an unaccept-

able and extrajudicial toll in human life, the

drone strikes in unintended ways compli-

cate the U.S. strategic mission in Afghani-

stan, as well as the fragile relationship with

Pakistan. As a result, the U.S. militarys

counterinsurgency project in Afghanistan

becomes a victim of the rst two forms of

blowback.

As Figure 2shows, the steady increase

in drone attacks conducted in Pakistan

between 2004 and 2010 has resulted in a

far higher number of deaths overall, but a

lower rate of successful killings of high-

value militant leaders who command, con-

trol and inspire organizations. If we dene

a high-value target as an organizational

leader known to intelligence sources and

the international media prior to attack and

not someone whose death is justied with

a posthumous militant status, we see fewer

and fewer such hits the alleged killing

of al-Qaeda commander Ilyas al-Kashmiri

in 2009 and again in June 2011 notwith-

standing.13

Data analysis shows that at the begin-

ning of the drone program (2002-04), ve

or six people were killed for each dened

high-value target. As part of that high-

value targets immediate entourage, they

were much more likely to be militants

than civilians. By 2010, one high-value

target was killed per 147 total deaths. The

increased lethality of each attack is due to

larger payloads, broader target sets such

as funeral processions, and probable new

targeting guidelines (including targets of

opportunity).14

Figure 2 -Drone Strikes by Phase16

Phase Strikes High ValueTargets Killed

Total Deaths HVT-to-Total-Deaths Ratio

1 (2002-2004) 2 2 11 1:5

2 (2005-2007) 6 2 53 1:26

3 (2008-2009)

End of Bushs Term

48 5 333 1:66

4 (2009-2010)

Obama Administration

161 7 1029 1:147


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number of drone strikes and the increasing

number of retaliation attacks.

For every high-prole, purposeful

attack like the Khost bombing, many

more low-prole attacks take place. These

types of attacks can be explained by what

military strategist David Kilcullen calls the

accidental-guerrilla phenomenon, a local

rejection of external forces.19 By using

drone warfare as the only policy tool in the

FATA without any local political engage-

ment, the United States is almost certainly

creating accidental guerrillas. These new

combatants, unable to retaliate against the

United States within FATA, will likely

cross the border into Afghanistan, where

U.S. troops and NATO and Afghan secu-

rity forces are concentrated and present

easily identiable targets. Or they may

join the ranks of groups like the Pakistani

Taliban, whose attacks within Pakistan

destabilize the U.S.-Pakistani alliance. The

last days of June 2011 illustrated the worst

extremes of this phenomenon: a married

couple carrying out a suicide attack in

Pakistan, and an eight-year-old duped (not

recruited) into an Afghan suicide attack.20

It should be emphasized that only a

small minority of those affected by drone

attacks become the kinds of radicals en-

visioned by Kilcullen. However, with the

average frequency of a drone strike every

three days in 2010, this would be enough

to provide a steady stream of new recruits

and destabilize the region through direct

violence. The less direct effect of steady

drone attacks and militant counterattacks is

a smoldering dissatisfaction with dead-end

policy. On the U.S. military, intelligence

and policy side, this results in division in

the ranks, preventing a unied effort.21

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, this cycle

results in anti-government agitation and

anti-American sentiment, which may force

1. PURPOSEFUL RETALIATION

The Khost Bombing, December 2009

The Khost bombing exemplies the

dynamic of drone provocation in Pakistan

and terrorist retaliation in Afghanistan. In

late December 2009, Humam Khalil Abu

Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian national,

entered the CIA compound within Camp

Chapman, located just outside of Khost,

Afghanistan. Shortly after entering the

compound, al-Balawi detonated an ex-

plosive vest, killing himself, seven CIA

ofcers including the station chief, and a

Jordanian intelligence ofcer. Before this

incident, U.S. and Jordanian intelligence

services had recruited al-Balawi, a medical

doctor, to gather information on al-Qaedas

then number two, Ayman al-Zawahri.

In a video released after the bombing at

Camp Chapman, al-Balawi states, This

attack will be the rst of revenge opera-

tions against the Americans and their drone

teams outside the Pakistani borders.17

Al-Balawis video testimony makes

clear that he was motivated to avenge

the death of Beitullah Mehsud, killed in

August 2009 by a drone strike in Zengara,

South Waziristan. Ironically, in the case

of the Khost bombing, it was the United

States that was subject to a decapitation

attack aimed at a strategic intelligence

center.

2. THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA

Radicalization and Recruitment

Between 2004 and 2009, our research

and databases compiled by others docu-

ment a dramatic spike in deaths by suicide

bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan.18

While it is impossible to prove direct cau-

sality from data analysis alone, it is prob-

able that drone strikes provide motivation

for retaliation, and that there is a substan-

tive relationship between the increasing


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are cheaper, less risky to U.S. personnel

and easy to run with minimal accountabil-

ity.23 The same lack of accountability that

makes them a favorite of covert intel-

ligence programs disguises the long-term

and local effects of regularly, but unpre-

dictably, unleashing violence from the

skies. However, if and when a high-value

target is killed, the death is celebrated in

Western media. The rst example of this

was Harethis death in 2002, which has

been followed by a handful of successful

attacks, such as the alleged but unproven

killing of Ilyas al-Kashmiri in 2011.

Debate over the drone program con-

tinues within the U.S. policy and strategic

community. The CIA wants to continue its

mission in Pakistan unabated; the Depart-

ment of State and the Pentagon would like

more restrictions on the program. No one

is willing to argue that the program needs

be cut completely, but many within State

and the Pentagon believe that the current

pace of drone strikes risks destabilizing a

nuclear-armed ally and makes the task of

U.S. diplomats more difcult.24

4. DESTABILIZING PAKISTAN

Exposing the Contradictions

Loss of life from drone strikes is an

emotional and enormously volatile public

issue in Pakistan. Drone attacks on Paki-

stani territory killing Pakistani citizens

every two to three days are a constant chal-

lenge to established ideas of sovereignty

by a putative ally and patron. The notion

of attack from the skies, without direct

agency or accountability, may in theory be

an attractive vehicle for U.S. counterter-

rorism, but it comes at a high price. Drone

attacks compound the feeling of those on

the ground in the target area of their asym-

metrical vulnerability and the necessity of

ghting back smartly.25

sudden policy adjustments by political and

military actors.

3. U.S. COMPLICATIONS

Strategic Confusion

In Afghanistan, the U.S. military is

using newly codied counterinsurgency

doctrine distilled from Iraq. It focuses on

diminishing the political, social and eco-

nomic conditions that create and bolster

the armed resistance seen as insurgency.

The rules governing the use of force in

U.S. counterinsurgency theory have been

designed to reduce deaths generally and

thus prevent creating new insurgents.22

This type of strategy was long sidelined in

favor of a counterterrorism policy targeting

militants. However, the U.S. military has

been forced to acknowledge the centrality

of this strategy in stabilizing Iraq, as indi-

cated by the massive decrease in civilian

and coalition casualties.

Ironically, the initial success of drone

killings in disrupting strategic organiza-

tions has bred its own downfall. The

further down the militant hierarchy drone

strikes aim and hit, the fewer the high-val-

ue targets and the less critical the disrup-

tion to the organization. On the other hand,

due to counterinsurgency policy across the

border in Afghanistan which relies on

hearts and minds and troops living on

the ground side by side with civilians

the damage to the high-cost campaign is

even more palpable.

The strategic disconnect between coun-

terinsurgency and counterterrorism is only

exacerbated by the remote-control nature

of the covert drone program, which allows

the U.S. public to turn a blind eye. Drone

strikes, launched from bases within Paki-

stan but directed from sites as far away as

the American Southwest, are popular with

their proponents for several reasons. They


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secured through traditional blood-money

payments.27 During the rst half of Daviss

imprisonment through February 20, drone

strikes within Pakistan stopped altogether.

As a deal between the two governments

took shape, drone strikes resumed, as if the

incident had never occurred. While negoti-

ations were taking place, Pakistan was able

to call for a reduction of actions by the

CIA and U.S. Special Operations within

their territory and for a reduction of drone

strikes, but this demand was not perma-

nently realized.28 The incident illustrates

the precarious position of the Pakistani

government, torn between local popular

opposition and its overbearing U.S. patron.

While Pakistanis have protested drone

strikes in the past, most of these protests

have gone unnoticed in the U.S. media. It

took what was presented in the Western

press as a human-interest story about an

American citizen engaging in self-defense

to remind the U.S. population what the

Obama administration is doing in Pakistan

and bring Washingtons strategy to the

forefront. But what, if anything, has been

learned from the Raymond Davis incident?

The United States continues to conduct

drone attacks without apparent regard for

even the acute anger created in the wake of

the Davis negotiations.

In the early hours of May 2, 2011, U.S.

Navy SEALs raided a compound in Abbot-

tabad, Pakistan, killing Osama bin Laden.

The fact that soldiers, not drones, con-

ducted the raid is telling. It is clear that the

U.S. administration and military command

at least recognize that the use of drones is

not a silver bullet, and that human discre-

tion and judgment are needed when com-

bating an elusive and uid network. Again,

it took a sensational U.S. media story

the story of the decade, no less to focus

American public opinion and congressio-

In a country whose political structure

is ambiguous, Pakistanis who hope to

petition their government with grievances

regarding the drone program, or report

critically on Islamabads relationship with

the United States and militants, are met

with stiff resistance and sometimes vio-

lence. A recent attack resulted in the death

of the prominent Pakistani journalist Syed

Saleem Shahzad, bureau chief forThe Asia

Times. Shahzad was reporting on links be-

tween al-Qaeda and the Pakistani security

apparatus, which may have facilitated the

attack on Pakistans Mehran Naval Base

late in May 2011. Internal reporting on the

Pakistani military and Inter Services Intel-

ligence (ISI) is often self-censored because

of its inherent dangers; those bold enough

to report on it often face physical danger.

Shahzads body was found in a ditch south

of Islamabad two days after he missed

a scheduled television appearance. The

ISI claims no knowledge of, and takes no

responsibility for, the abduction and death

of Shahzad, but other journalists reject that

claim.26 In sum, the drone program serves

to further destabilize an already fragile

system by deepening divides between a

citizenry that abhors the attacks and gov-

ernment institutions that tolerate or facili-

tate them and brook no critical oversight.

5. PRECARIOUS ALLIANCE

U.S.-Pakistani Tensions

On January 27, 2011, American citi-

zen Raymond Davis shot and killed two

Pakistanis in the streets of Lahore. Davis,

a CIA contract employee gathering intel-

ligence on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed

the two men were attempting to rob him

when he red upon them. Davis spent a

total of seven weeks incarcerated while

the United States and Pakistan worked on

the conditions of his release, ultimately


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It is possible that the exchange of per-

sonnel among the military, the intelligence

community and the Department of Defense

will clear up the confusion over com-

mand and targeting, though this is far from

given. The more serious forms of blow-

back stemming directly from the effects of

extrajudicial killing, however, do not seem

to have been addressed. If the Pakistani

campaign spawned purposeful vengeance,

like the Khost bombing, and opportunities

for recruitment of noncombatants for re-

taliatory attacks, then the same purposeful

and accidental escalation will most likely

occur in the Arabian Peninsula and the

Horn of Africa, compounding Yemens and

Somalias volatility.

In many ways, Yemen resembles both

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the unde-

clared drone war there will share the most

dysfunctional characteristics of both sides

of the Af/Pak theatre. Like Afghanistan,

Yemen is a fragmented tribal society

ideally suited for harboring pockets of

militancy in a de-centered system with

strong social ties.33 Like Pakistan, Yemens

military and the other institutions of a fail-

ing state may still function well enough to

both channel counterterror funds from the

United States and apply them according

to its own interests and criteria.34 Another

whisky-swilling military steeped in hypoc-

risy and addicted to counterterror as a way

to make a living is hardly the ideal local

spotter for U.S. attacks from the skies.35

Drone warfare as it has evolved in the Af/

Pak theatre is not the answer to Yemens

unrest.

The lessons of drone warfare in

Pakistan are clear. First, if extrajudicial

dispatching of high-value targets is a goal,

such targets are best dealt with as Osama

bin Laden was through face-to-face

assaults by crack JSOC troops based on re-

nal oversight briey on the decline of U.S.-

Pakistani relations. These two incidents,

the Raymond Davis negotiations and the

Bin Laden raid, reveal that drone warfare

has brought the U.S.-Pakistani marriage to

a volatile nadir. And yet the drone policy,

like the drones themselves, remains out of

the limelight.

YEMEN

Lessons for the Future

The rst lethal drone strike outside a

war zone took place in Yemen in 2002; and

in 2011, the Obama administration an-

nounced plans to begin an aggressive new

drone-warfare campaign in Yemen directed

against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP).29 Yemen is currently in turmoil

as the various opposition movements

to strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh jostle

against remnants of the regime and one

another after months of a long and incon-

clusive Arab Spring uprising.30

The new Yemeni drone campaign

comes at the very moment former CIA di-

rector Leon Panetta replaces Robert Gates

as secretary of defense and General David

Petraeus, former CENTCOM and Interna-

tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Afghanistan commander and a counterin-

surgency proponent transitions into a civil-

ian role: head of the CIA. During 2010,

the Joint Special Operations Command

(JSOC) was central to the design of the

new Yemeni drone program and this year

has brought about increased cooperation.31

In June 2011, the CIA returned to the Horn

of Africa to work with JSOC on the drone

program, and outside observers have noted

that the strategic confusion of divided

command (drone counterterror in Pakistan

vs. boots-on-the-ground counterinsurgency

in Afghanistan) is an issue that may be

mitigated by the high-level reshufe.32


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which thousands of noncombatants may

be extrajudicially killed, traumatized and

materially damaged fuels instability and

escalates violent retaliation against con-

venient targets. With Yemen and Somalia

as the east-west axis of a maritime system

that unites South Asia with the Horn of

Africa through one of the worlds most

sensitive and pirate-infested shipping

channels, counterterror measures must

be both precise and well-reasoned. The

Pakistani model is neither. Drone strikes

leave little scope for the civic reform that

the Arab Spring in Yemen demands.37

liable intelligence. Second, chronic testing

of national sovereignty through an unde-

clared war of drone attacks puts fragile

governing structures in the target country

under enormous pressure while exacerbat-

ing social volatility, a recipe for unpredict-

able outcomes.36 Third, the complacency

engendered in the American public, which

is largely blind to the costs and conse-

quences of, and anesthetized to, the legal

and moral issues of drone warfare, pre-

cludes recognition, let alone discussion of

this new form of warfare. Finally, a trend

in increasing collateral damage in

1 In his address to the nation on June 22, 2011, President Obama announced a planned withdrawal from

Afghanistan. Only 10,000 troops are slated for withdrawal by the end of 2011 and another 23,000 by theend of 2012. President Obama on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, accessed June 26, 2011, http://www.

whitehouse.gov.blog/2011/06/22/president-obama-way-forward-afghanistan; and Obama to Cut Afghanistan

Surge Troops, Al Jazeera, June 23, 2011, accessed June 26, 2011, https://docs.google.com/a/email.arizona.

edu/document/d/1Off1hZ-qjkdfwcPcg5Klm41PUWllEGnnf65zbZ7lYUI/edit?hl=en_US.2 Drone strikes are announced in the media, but neither the United States nor the Pakistani governments admit

their roles in conducting these strikes. The covert nature of the drone program refers to the inability to clearly

identify the agencies responsible for the missions.3 Muhammad Idress Ahmad, The Magical Realism of Body Counts, Al Jazeera, June 13, 2011, accessed

June 15, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011613931606455.html.4 Ronald Sokol, Can the U.S. Assassinate an American Citizen Living in Yemen? The Christian Science

Monitor, September 29, 2010,accessed June 10, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opin-ion/2010/0929/Can-the-US-assassinate-an-American-citizen-living-in-Yemen; and A Better Way to Get

Awlaki,Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2010, accessed June 10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/

sep/20/opinion/la-ed-awlaki-20100920.5 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 2009).6 Chalmers Johnson,Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (Metropolitan Books,

2000).7 Nathan Hodge, Robo-Copters Eye Enemies, The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011, accessed

May 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704281504576327602503154790.

html?KEYWORDS=Robo-Copters+Eye+Enemies; and Unmanned Fire Scout Helicopter to Begin Military

Service, The Telegraph, August 29, 2009, accessed May 13, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/northamerica/usa/6092244/Unmanned-Fire-Scout-helicopter-to-begin-military-service.html.8 MQ-1 Predator, General Atomics Aeronautical, accessed January 17, 2011, http://www.ga-asi.com/

products/aircraft/pdf/MQ-1_Predator.pdf; Predator B/MQ-9 Reaper, General Atomics Aeronautical, ac-

cessed January 17, 2011, http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/pdf/Predator_B.pdf; RQ-4 Global Hawk,

Northrop Grumman, accessed May 15, 2011, http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/ghrq4a/assets/

GHMD-New-Brochure.pdf; and MQ-8B Fire Scout, Northrop Grumman, accessed May 28, 2011, http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8brescout_navy/assets/rescout-new-brochure.pdf.


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9 Syed Saleem Shahzad,Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11 (Pluto, 2011); Ahmed

Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2nd Edition (Yale University

Press, 2010).10 Gretchen Peters, Drone Said to Have Killed Al Qaedas No. 3, TheChristian Science Monitor, December

5, 2005, accessed February 20, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1205/p04s02-wosc.html.11The Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle Eastern Conicts (SISMEC), housed in the School of

Middle East and North African Studies at the University of Arizona, has compiled a drone database to track

all U.S. drone attacks outside identied war zones.12 U.S. Drone Hits Pakistan Funeral, Al Jazeera, June 24, 2009, accessed December 12, 2010, http://eng-

lish.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/06/20096244230395712.html; and Pir Zubair Shah and, Salman Masood,

U.S. Drone Strike Said to Kill 60 in Pakistan, The New York Times, June 23, 2009, accessed December 12,

2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/world/asia/24pstan.html.13 Daud Khattak, The Mysterious Death of Ilyas Kashmiri,Foreign Policy,June 8, 2011, accessed June 10,

2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/08/the_mysterious_death_of_ilyas_kashmiri.14 Saeed Shah, U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Claiming Many Civilian Victims, Says Campaigner, The

Guardian, July 17, 2011, accessed July 20, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/17/us-drone-

strikes-pakistan-waziristan.15 Ahmad, The Magical Realism of Body Counts.16 The numbers of deaths in Figure 2 have been taken from the SISMECs drone database and represents the

most conservative death toll. We have used the lowest death toll reported in any newspaper. We chose to use

the lowest numbers to highlight the increasingly inaccurate nature of the drone program without embellish-

ment.17 Balawi believed the CIA used Camp Chapman to locate targets in the FATA for drone assassination. For

more on al-Balawi, see: CIA Bomber Vowing Revenge for Baitullah Mehsuds Death, YouTube, January

9, 2010, accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HB1NJ8zOOso; and Joby Warrick, TheTriple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infltrated the CIA (Random House, 2011).18 Suicide Attack Database, Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), University of Chicago,

accessed January 12, 2011, http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php; and Database of Worldwide Terrorism In-

cidents, The RAND Corporation, accessed January 14, 2011, http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php.19 Kilcullen divides the accidental guerrilla syndrome into four phases: infection, contagion, intervention, and

rejection. Infection is aided by lack of governance in a specic region or country (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ye-

men, Somalia) and allows violent movements the space to establish themselves. Contagion takes place when

the movement spreads their ideals and increases violence to continue growing. Intervention is spurred by

local or international forces trying to curb the movement, which leads to rejection. During the rejection phase

the local population reacts negatively to the intervention, often bolstering recruitment and popularity of the

movement.20 Declan Walsh, Taliban Use Girl, 8, as Bomb Mule in Attack on Afghan Police Post, The Guardian, June

26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/26/afghanistan-taliban-girl-

bomb-police.21 Warren Chin, Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in

Iraq, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2007): 1.22The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual(University of Chicago Press, 2007).23 Pakistan Tells U.S. to Leave Secret Base, Press TV, June 29, 2011, accessed June 29, 2011, http://www.

presstv.ir/detail/186804.html; and Shamsi Air Base under UAE Control: Air Chief, The Nation, May 13,

2011, accessed June 30, 2011, http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/

Islamabad/13-May-2011/Shamsi-Air-Base-under-UAE-control-Air-Chief.24 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Matthew Rosenberg, Drone Attacks Split U.S. Ofcials, The WallStreet Journal, June 4, 2011, accessed June 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230456

3104576363812217915914.html.25 Protest against American Drone Attacks in Northern Pakistan, The Telegraph,June 28, 2011, ac-

cessed June 28, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8586658/Pro-

tests-against-American-drone-attacks-in-northern-Pakistan.html; and Pakistanis Protest against U.S.

Drone Strikes, Al Jazeera, May 22, 2011, accessed June 28, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/


11/11

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asia/2011/05/201152262955326528.html.26 Huma Imtiaz, Angels of Death,Foreign Policy, May 31, 2011, accessed June 1, 2011, http://afpak.for-

eignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/31/angels_of_death.27 Carotta Gall and Mark Mazzetti, Hushed Deal Frees C.I.A. Contractor in Pakistan, The New York Times,

March 16, 2011, accessed March 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/world/asia/17pakistan.html.28 Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, Pakistan Tells U.S. It Must Sharply Cut CIA Activities, The New York

Times, April 11, 2011, accessed May 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/asia/12pakistan.

html?scp=17&sq=raymond%20davis&st=cse; and Mark Hosenball, U.S. Rejects Demands to Vacate

Pakistan Drone Base, Reuters, June 30, 2011, accessed June 30, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/arti-

cle/2011/06/30/us-pakistan-usa-drones-idUSTRE75T69120110630?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&r

pc=71.29 Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes, The New York Times, June

8, 2011, accessed June 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09intel.html?hp; and

Jeb Boone, Yemens Trouble with Drones, The Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2011, accessed June 20,2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0617/Yemen-s-trouble-with-drones.30 At the time of writing this article, Saleh was still in Saudi Arabia undergoing treatment for injuries

received in a palace attack in early June 2011. Leila Hudson, and Dylan Baun, The Arab Springs Sec-

ond Wave, Al Jazeera, May 16, 2011, accessed May 16, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opin-

ion/2011/05/20115151582859118.html.31 Con Coughlin and Philip Sherwell, Americans Drones Deployed to Target Yemeni Terrorist, The Tele-

graph, May 02, 2010, accessed June 26, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ye-

men/7663661/American-drones-deployed-to-target-Yemeni-terrorist.html.32 Felicia Sonmez, Leon Panetta, CIA Director, Unanimously Conrmed by Senate as Defense Secretary,

The Washington Post, June 21, 2011, accessed June 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/na-

tional-security/leon-panetta-cia-director-unanimously-conrmed-by-senate-as-defense-secretary/2011/06/21/AGajizeH_story.html; Glenn Greenwald, The War on Terror, Now Starring Yemen and Somalia, Salon,

July 18, 2011, accessed July 20, 2011, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2011/07/18/ter-

rorism/index.html; Greg Miller, CIA to Operate Drones over Yemen, The Washington Post, June 13, 2011

accessed June 21, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/cia-to-operate-drones-

over-yemen/2011/06/13/AG7VyyTH_story.html.33 Robert F. Worth, Chaos in Yemen Creates Opening for Islamist Gangs, The New York Times, June 26,

2011, accessed June 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/world/middleeast/27yemen.html?_r=1;

and Militants Enforce Strict Islamic Law in Yemeni City, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2011, ac-

cessed June 28, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303627104576411911591751014.

html?mod=googlenews_wsj.34 Hakim Almasmari, U.S. Drone Attacks in Yemen Ignore Al Qaeda for Local Militants, The National,June 21, 2011, accessed June 23, 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/us-drone-

attacks-in-yemen-ignore-al-qaeda-for-local-militants.35 Nick Allen, WikiLeaks: Yemen Covered Up U.S. Drone Strikes, The Telegraph,June 28, 2011, accessed

June 28, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8166610/WikiLeaks-Yemen-

covered-up-US-drone-strikes.html.36 Boone, Yemens Trouble with Drones.37 Mohammed Al-Qadhi, Tens of Thousands in Yemens Streets Call for Transitional Presidential Coun-

cil, The Washington Post, June 26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

middle-east/tens-of-thousands-in-yemens-streets-call-for-transitional-presidential-council/2011/06/26/

AG1jeYmH_story.html.

Documents

Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War by Leila Hudson