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DRAFT

George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and

International Affairs

PUBP 504: Grand Strategy

Wednesdays 7:20-10:00 PM

Founders’ Hall (Arlington)

Spring 2018

Professor John Gordon

Office Hours: Wednesdays, 6:300-7:00 PM (Adjunct office, 6th floor) -

also available by appointment

Email: jgordon@rand.org (preferred)

Telephone: (703) 303-6616

Grand strategy represents a nation’s high-level, long-term goals. It

normally includes the application of all aspects of national power,

including diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. In the case

of the U.S., grand strategy is often supplemented with more detailed,

subordinate regional strategies.

This course is intended to provide students with a thorough

understanding of the concept of grand strategy, how it is developed,

examples of how this process takes place, and the tools that are

available to national leaders to accomplish high-level strategic

objectives. The goal is to gain an in-depth understanding of past

effective and ineffective grand strategies so as to inform U.S. policy, or

the policies of other countries, in the future. The course will consist of

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a mixture of theory and historical case studies.

Readings:

The following books are required for the course:

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)

Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford University Press,

2009)

Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: Free Press, 2002)

Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the

Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, 1986)

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of

American National Security, Oxford, 2005

Tosi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Strategy in the Second Nuclear

Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, Georgetown

University Press, 2012

Required for all SPGIA courses: Diane Hacker, A Pocket Manual of

Style (New York: Bedford-St.Martin’s, 2000, 3rd edition).

Class Format

The course will be conducted in both lecture and in class discussion. It

is important that students read each week’s assignments prior to

arriving in class. Active class participation is strongly encouraged.

Objectives:

This course will help to prepare students for professional positions in

public service, including in the executive or legislative branches of U.S.

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government at the federal (both military and civilian), state or local

levels; private sector businesses dealing with public policy; non-profit

organizations concerned with public policy; non-US governments; and

international organizations. This advanced seminar tackles the

challenging task of building an effective grand strategy in both theory

and practice. It will prepare students for positions that involve the

development of effective national strategy and policy.

Learning Outcomes:

Students who complete this course will have a good understanding of

the concept of grand strategy, how strategies have been developed in

the past, good and bad examples of grand strategy, and

Course Evaluation

This course will rely heavily upon extensive reading, active class

participation, one take-home quiz, and a final paper (14-15 pages; 12

point font; 1.5 spacing; tables, photos, maps, footnotes, and

bibliography will not count against the page limit).

Final Paper

The final paper will be a case study of why and how a strategy was

developed. Students will evaluate the case in terms of the historical

context when the strategy was developed, the key players involved, the

strategic choices that were available, what decisions were reached and

why, and how effective (or not) the strategy was in actual execution.

Grading will be done according to the following criteria:

Class participation 20 %

Mid-term quiz 35 %

Final paper 45 %

Unless there is prior approval by the instructor, late papers are subject

to a reduction of one grade level for each day that they are delayed.

For example, a paper due on Monday that is not turned in until

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Wednesday could be reduced from an A to a B+.

Mobile Phones must be turned off during class. Taking notes on your

laptop is allowed, but please refrain from using a laptop for non-class-

related purposes while in the classroom.

Students who need to miss class must let the instructor know prior to

class. In general, students should plan on missing no more than two

classes during the semester.

Students with Special Needs

If you are a student with a disability and need academic

accommodations, please inform the instructor and contact the Disability

Resource Center at 703-993-2474. All academic accommodations must

be arranged through the DRC.

Weekly Schedule:

Class 1: Course Introduction

This class will be an overview of the course objectives and content,

and will include a review of military terminology and basic

concepts. The value (or lack thereof) of strategy will be discussed.

J. Boone Bartholomees , Jr., ed. US Army War College Guide to

National Security Issues, June 2008., pp. 3 – 49. (Blackboard)

Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (The Macmillan Company,

1973), pp. 433-496. (Blackboard)

Colin Gray, “Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint Forces

Quarterly, Summer 1999, pp. 6-12. (Blackboard)

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Class 2: The Nature of Grand Strategy

Early thinking about strategy will be described, primarily using

two classic 19th Century theorists, the German Carl von Clausewitz

and Antoine-Henri Jomini. The elements of grand strategy and

national power will be discussed including diplomacy,

information, military power, and economics. The relationship of

grand strategy to military strategy, operations, and tactics will be

reviewed.

Clausewitz, On War, Books 1 & 2, pp. 75 – 182 and Book 8, pp.

577 – 610.

John Shy, “Jomini”, in Peter Paret, Editor, Makers of Modern

Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.

143-185.

Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Peter Paret, Editor, Makers of

Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1986), pp. 186-213.

National Security Strategy of the United States,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_natio

nal_security_strategy.pdf

Class 3: Early Examples of Strategy and Grand Strategy

Historical examples from the 17th to 19th Centuries will be

examined. European and American cases will be reviewed.

Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2009), pp. 38-93

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Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1986), pp. 11-142, 408-443

Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S.

Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 1-21.

(Blackboard)

Class 4: The American Civil War

This class session will review the strategy developed by both the

North and South during the Civil War, reviewing how both sides

attempted to craft a course of action that would lead to success.

Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, pp. 1-51

Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1986), pp. 409-443

Class 5: The First World War

The development of national grand strategies before and during the

First World War will be the focus of this class. The assumptions

various nations made about their strategic situations, and the

understanding key nations had of the military potential of their

own forces and those of their opponents will be reviewed. How

grand strategies evolved over time as the war progressed will be

evaluated.

Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, pp. 52-94.

Holger H. Herwig, “Total Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany’s

U-Boat Campaign 1917-1918,” Journal of Military and

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Strategic Studies, Vol 1, No 1 (1998) at

http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/19/18

Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1986), pp. 281-325, 510-554

Class 6: Development of Strategy in the Interwar Period, the

1920s and 1930s

Following the carnage of World War I, many nations found

themselves in very different strategic situations compared to the

pre-1914 period. New strategies were needed. Additionally,

military technology was evolving rapidly, which had an effect on

strategic thinking.

Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 481-509, 598-647

Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2009), pp. 116-136

Steven Pedler, “Institutional Politics and the US Military’s War

Plan Orange”,

https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/document/get/bgsu1182351613

/inline

Class 7: Grand Strategy in World War II – Part 1

World War II was the largest, most devastating conflict in human

history. Waged for nearly six years by the most advanced

industrial nations of that era, the war saw the bringing together of

various military concepts, new technologies, and the different

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strategic goals of the participants. This class will focus on the

European theater.

Maurice Matloff, “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945,” in

Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 677-702.

Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine

Warfare, 1914-1945,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 572-

597.

Eliot A. Cohen, “Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World

War II,” in Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and

Peace, (New Haven, CT: Yale), pp.43-67 (blackboard)

Class 8: Grand Strategy in World War II – Part 2

As a continuation of the WW II discussion, this class will

concentrate on the Pacific theater.

D. Clayton James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the

Pacific War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.703-732.

US Strategy the Pacific War,

https://www.kokodatreks.com/history/thepacificwar1942/unit

edstatesstrategy.cfm

Class 9: The Cold War – Conventional and Nuclear

Following the end of World War II a new strategic reality was in

place, with the US and USSR having emerged as the dominant

global powers. The end of the Second World War also included

the emergence of nuclear weapons, which had a major influence on

strategic thinking.

Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 735-814

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John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical

Appraisal of American National Security, Chapters 2-10.

Class 10: Revolutionary Warfare

The end of World War II also saw much greater importance

attached to what has become known as “irregular” or

“revolutionary” warfare. The threat of nuclear devastation often

led the major powers, particularly the USSR and Communist

China, to use this approach, which was also favored by Third

World nationalists seeking to overthrow European colonial

regimes in the years after 1945. The move toward this form of

conflict had a major influence on strategic thinking.

John Shy and Thomas Collier, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.

815-862

Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The

Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics Vol. 27, #2

(January 1975). (Blackboard)

Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1986), pp. 164-214. (Blackboard)

Class 11: Post-Cold War Challenges – Nation States

The end of the generally bi-polar Cold War brought significant

changes to the strategic environment. The grand strategic

implications of regional powers in the aftermath of the fall of the

Soviet Union will be examined.

Tosi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Strategy in the Second

Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon,

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Georgetown University Press, 2012

Class 12: Post-Cold War Challenges – Non-State Entities

The rise of non-state actors who have local, regional, or global

influence is a new grand strategic reality that US policy makers

have to contend with.

Steven Van Evera, Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on

Terror: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/vanevera/Annals%20-

%20Assessing%20US%20Strategy%20in%20War%20on%2

0Terror.pdf

National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism,

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-

terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf

The Strategic Blunder Behind the War on Terror,

http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/paris-massacre-was-

declaration-new-kind-war-298810.html

Class 13: Future U.S. Grand Strategy

Near and mid-term challenges to US interest will be reviewed

including the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the

reemergence of Russian power. How the U.S. might cope with

these and other challenges will be discussed.

China’s Military Rise,

http://www.economist.com/node/21552212

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China’s Rising Military Might, a Grand Strategic Surprise?,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-rising-military-

might-grand-strategy-surprise-10640

China’s Plan to Challenge US as a Rising Global Power,

http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/06/chinas-plan-to-challenge-

us-as-a-rising-global-power/

Resurgent Russia is Already Starting to Show Worrying Signs

of Decline,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2015/10/13/resur

gent-russia-is-actually-starting-to-show-worrying-signs-of-

decline/#758bc6d7b634

Resurgent Russia Poses Threat to NATO, New Commander

Says, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-

View/Article/751800/resurgent-russia-poses-threat-to-nato-

new-commander-says

Class 14: Final Class

The final class will be a review of the key points from the course.

Final papers are due the day the Exam is scheduled for this course.

GMU Plagiarism Statement

Plagiarism means using the exact words, opinions, or factual

information from another person without giving that person credit.

Writers give credit through accepted documentation styles, such as

parenthetical citation, footnotes, or endnotes; a simple listing of

books and articles is not sufficient. Plagiarism is the equivalent of

intellectual robbery and cannot be tolerated in an academic setting.

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Student writers are often confused as to what should be cited.

Some think that only direct quotations need to be credited. While

direct quotations do need citations, so do paraphrases and

summaries of opinions or factual information formerly unknown to

the writers or which the writers did not discover themselves.

Exceptions for this include factual information which can be

obtained from a variety of sources, the writers' own insights or

findings from their own field research, and what has been termed

common knowledge. What constitutes common knowledge can

sometimes be precarious; what is common knowledge for one

audience may not be so for another. In such situations, it is helpful,

to keep the reader in mind and to think of citations as being "reader

friendly." In other words, writers provide a citation for any piece of

information that they think their readers might want to investigate

further. Not only is this attitude considerate of readers, it will

almost certainly ensure that writers will never be guilty of

plagiarism. (statement of English Department at George Mason

University.

Plagiarism and the Internet

Copyright rules also apply to users of the Internet who cite from

Internet sources. Information and graphics accessed electronically

must also be cited, giving credit to the sources. This material

includes but is not limited to e-mail (don't cite or forward someone

else's e-mail without permission), newsgroup material, information

from Web sites, including graphics. Even if you give credit, you

must get permission from the original source to put any graphic

that you did not create on your web page. Shareware graphics are

not free. Freeware clipart is available for you to freely use. If the

material does not say "free," assume it is not. Putting someone

else's Internet material on your web page is stealing intellectual

property. Making links to a site is, at this time, okay, but getting

permission is strongly advised, since many Web sites have their

own requirements for linking to their material.

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Source:

http://mason.gmu.edu/~montecin/plagiarism.htm#plagiarism