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Coercing to Reconcile: North

Koreas Response to USHegemony1

NARUSHIGE MICHISHITA*

National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT Since 1993 North Koreas response to US hegemony has been aseemingly paradoxical attempt to bandwagon with the United States by means ofmilitary coercion. However, after more than a decade of effort, North Korea hasfailed to normalize its relations with the United States. In the years ahead, it caneither pursue more proactively the strategy of bandwagoning with the UnitedStates, shift its strategic focus to China, or embark upon a policy of equidistancebetween the United States and Japan on the one hand and China on the other.

KEY WORDS: North Korea, United States, hegemony

On 12 October 1993 North Korean diplomats presented their UScounterparts a memorandum entitled, Resolution of the Nuclear Issue:Elements to be Considered. The memo demanded that the UnitedStates agree to:

1. Conclusion of a peace agreement (or a treaty) to include legallybinding assurances on non-use, non-threat of forces [against the

*The views expressed in this article are the authors own.1For the history of North Koreas use of force, see the authors Calculated Adventurism:North Koreas Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, The Korean Journal of DefenseAnalysis 16/2 (Fall 2004), 181226 5www.kida.re.kr/english2005/publications/kjda2004.htm4; Calculated Adventurism: North Koreas Military-Diplomatic Cam-paigns, 19662000, a dissertation submitted to the Paul H. Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, May 2003; North Koreas SecondNuclear Diplomacy: Rising Risks and Expectations, and Korean Peninsula in the

Renewed Process for Change, in The National Institute for Defense Studies (ed.), EastAsian Strategic Review 2004 (Tokyo: Japan Times 2004), 5www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east asian/e2004 html4; and North Koreas First Nuclear Diplomacy

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 29, No. 6, 1015 1040, December 2006

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Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)] including nuclearweapons.

2. Take responsibilities to provide the DPRK with LWR [light-waterreactors] to finalize the resolution of N [nuclear] Issue.

3. Full normalization of diplomatic relations [between the DPRK andthe United States] to assure the mutual respect for sovereignty andnon-interference in internal affairs.

4. Pledge on a policy of balance towards the N & S [North and South]of Korea with a view to supporting the peaceful reunification.2

Since 1993 North Koreas response to US hegemony has been anattempt to bandwagon with the United States. North Korea seems tohave decided in the early 1990s that its foreign policy should be focused

on relations with the four surrounding great powers, namely theUnited States, Japan, China and Russia, of which the United States wasof utmost importance. In order to bandwagon with the United States,however, North Korea resorted to military coercion.

As a result of its effort, the United States and North Korea signed theAgreed Framework in October 1994. Toward the end of the Clintonadministration, the United States and North Korea came close tonormalizing or at least substantially improving their relationship.However, the incoming of the Bush Administration in 2001 altered the

US approach to North Korea. In addition, the revelation in 2002 thatNorth Korea had engaged in an additional covert nuclear programbased on highly enriched uranium pushed the United States towards amore hardline policy. By initiating another round of nuclear crisis,North Korea attempted to draw US attention and improve its relationswith the hegemon. Since then North Korea has been repeating thegame it played in the 1990s. However, the United States is notresponding to North Koreas actions in the way it did back then. So far,North Koreas attempt to normalize relations with the hegemon has

not produced a major breakthrough.This article will discuss North Koreas political objectives,strategy, foundations of the strategy, and its effectiveness. NorthKoreas goal of ensuring regime survival by improving relations withthe United States and Japan remains intact, and deterrence andcompellence constitute the main ingredients of its strategy. NorthKorea succeeded in achieving its bottom-line objective the survival ofthe Kim Jong Il regime but failed to normalize its relations withthe United States.

2Resolution of the Nuclear Issue: Elements to be Considered 12 Oct 1993 provided

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Political Objectives

It has become a cliche to say that North Korea has two major policygoals: one is regime survival and the other is unification of the KoreanPeninsula. There is a widely held consensus that survival is the regimesmost important policy goal. However, there is a debate as to howserious North Korea is in achieving the unification. Based on NorthKoreas past behavior, it seems that forceful unification has receded tothe backburner in its priority list. In fact, North Korea has not onceattempted to attack the South Korean leadership since its agents tried tokill then South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon, Burmain 1983. Prior to that, North Korea had attempted to assassinate theSouth Korean president in 1968, 1970, and 1974.

When the United States became a sole superpower with the collapseof the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea was forced to contemplatehow best to ensure its own survival in a world dominated by theUnited States. North Koreas answer was simple: Bandwagon with it.Even before the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korean attempts toimprove its relations with the United States and its ally, Japan, wereapparent. In 1989 North Korea invited Shin Kanemaru, vice presidentof Japans ruling Liberal Democratic Party, to Pyongyang in orderto initiate normalization talks. As a result, official Japan-DPRK

discussions began in 1991. In 1992 Kim Yong Sun, the North KoreanWorkers Partys secretary for international affairs, met with ArnoldKantor, the US undersecretary of state for political affairs. However,these talks ended in failure that same year when it became clear thatNorth Korea was developing nuclear weapons and was not respond-ing positively to the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA)demands that it be allowed to conduct necessary inspections of NorthKorean nuclear facilities. When the cooperative diplomatic approachto normalizing relations with the United States and Japan failed,

North Korean leaders decided to use coercion to achieve the samegoal. On 12 March 1993, the DPRK government announced itswithdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT).

North Koreas strategy of using coercion to normalize relations withthe United States produced its first tangible results in October 1994when the two countries signed the Agreed Framework. The UnitedStates promised to provide North Korea two light-water reactors via aninternational consortium, gave formal assurances against the threat oruse of nuclear weapons against North Korea, and offered to improveUS-DPRK relations. North Korea, for its part, promised to freeze itsnuclear development and to accept full nuclear inspections in the

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relatively amicable relationship until 1998 when they experienced thesecond bump in the road.

In August 1998, it was reported that US intelligence agencies haddetected a huge secret underground complex, seemingly related tonuclear development, in Kumchangri, 25 miles northeast of theNyongbyon nuclear site. This site was assessed to house a new nuclearreactor or a reprocessing plant. In addition, North Korea launched athree-stage rocket based on the Taepo Dong 1 medium-range ballisticmissile the same month. It was doubly shocking because the rocket flewover the Japanese main island in the direction of Hawaii. These twoevents prompted the United States to undertake a major review of itspolicy toward North Korea.

The policy review team, led by former Secretary of Defense William

Perry, produced the so-called Perry Report in September 1999. Thereport recommended the US government seek normalization ofrelations with North Korea if Pyongyang took positive steps on nuclearand missile developments. Subsequently, the United States and theDPRK issued the Joint US-DPRK Statement on International Terror-ism and the US-DPRK Joint Communique in October 2000. In thesame month, Madeleine Albright visited North Korea for the firsttime as US secretary of state. The United States and North Korea thuscame close to normalization or, at least, substantial improvement in the

bilateral relationship toward the end of the Clinton administration.The Bush administration in 2001 significantly altered the US approach

to North Korea. It demanded North Korea to address not only nuclearand missile issues but also its conventional force posture and humanrights. In addition, the tougher US position was compounded by therevelation in 2002 that North Korea had engaged in an additional covertnuclear development based on highly enriched uranium. The Bushadministration disclosed that it had developed what it called a boldapproach in the summer of 2002, in which North Korea would be

required to make substantial concessions on issues including its weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) programs, development and export ofballistic missiles, threats to its neighbors, support for terrorism, andtreatment of the North Korean people. The United States wouldreciprocate by improving its relationship with North Korea.3 Unfortu-nately, by engaging in a secret nuclear development program, NorthKorea raised the hurdle for the bold approach to be implemented.

By announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, NorthKorea set in motion its second nuclear diplomacy, the sequel to its199394 campaign. In an about-face from its earlier pronouncements that

3North Korean Nuclear Program Press Statement Richard Boucher Spokesman


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it had no intention to acquire nuclear weapons, it warned that unless theUnited States abandoned its hostile policy toward North Korea, it wouldhave no choice but to arm itself with nuclear weapons as a deterrent.However, at the same time, North Korea demanded in October 2002 anonaggression pact and normalization of diplomatic relations with theUnited States, realization of Japans economic assistance to North Korea,a supply of electricity, and the construction of light-water reactors.4

North Koreas goal of ensuring regime survival by improving relationswith the United States and Japan seemed to remain intact.

Strategy

The North Korean strategy to deal with the United States has two major

elements: deterrence and compellence. Through deterrence, North Koreahas tried to achieve its most fundamental goal: regime survival. Throughcompellence, it has attempted to encourage the United States and Japanto normalize relations with and provide economic assistance to thecountry. Development and deployment of WMD as well as medium- tolong-range ballistic missiles has played a central role in enhancing NorthKoreas ability to exercise these strategies.

Deterrence

North Koreas deterrent capabilities come mainly from three militaryassets: conventional and special operations forces, supposed nuclearcapabilities, and actual missile capabilities. Contrary to the widelyaccepted belief that nuclear weapons are the critical element of NorthKoreas deterrent, conventional and special operations forces havealways been the most important pillar of its deterrent. At the height ofthe 1994 nuclear crisis, the United States considered launching asurgical strike against North Koreas nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon.5

However, North Koreas ability to destroy Seoul and inflict enormouscasualties on US-ROK (Republic of Korea) forces in case of conflictprevented the United States from taking such an option.6 Althoughall-out war was not highly likely, US leaders expected North Korea totake some form of violent retaliation such as attacks along the

4Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks, Korean Central News Agency (henceforthKNCA), 29 Aug. 2003.5

The operation plan was named OP5026. For details, see OPLAN 5026Air Strikes5http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5026.htm4.6Don Oberdorfer The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading MA: Addison


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Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), long-range artillery shell strikes againstSeoul, and commando attacks somewhere deep in South Korea.7

Particularly important among these options was North Koreasability to attack Seoul with long-range artillery shells. North Korea haddeployed 170 mm self-propelled artillery along the DMZ, and startedto deploy 240 mm multiple rocket launchers (MRL) in 1993. Thenumber of the 170 mm artillery piece has reportedly grown from about200 in the early 1990s to over 600 in 2001, and that of the 240-mmMRL has increased to 430 by 2001.8 If chemical weapons are loadedon artillery shells, the expected number of casualties would shoot up. Itwas for this reason that the South Koreans expressed concern when theUnited States adopted the preemption strategy and decided to moveUS forces in Korea southward. South Koreans suspected that the United

States might first move its troops out of North Korean artillery rangeand then launch preemptive strikes against the North, sacrificing theSouth Korean population as a result.

The second pillar of North Koreas deterrent capabilities is nuclearweapons. In 1994 the assessment was that North Korea had at mostone or two nuclear weapons and that such weapons, if they existed,were primitive and might not have been miniaturized enough to fit atopballistic missiles. Moreover, North Korea had never tested them. And,above all, using nuclear weapons would not have assured North

Koreas victory and, instead, it would have meant that the NorthKorean regime would be wiped out. In fact, General Gary Luck,Commander in Chief, US-ROK Combined Forces Command, assessedin June 1994 that North Korea could be defeated even if it used the oneor two nuclear weapons it might have possessed.9 North Koreasnuclear deterrent was simply not credible in 1994.

This situation changed by 2006. In 2003 North Korea started toreprocess materials contained in the 8,000 spent fuel rods, and resumedthe operation of the five-megawatt reactor, both of which had been

frozen since 1994 under the Agreed Framework. This means that7Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The FirstNorth Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2004), 244.8Hwang Il-do, Bug Jangsajeongpo: Alryeojiji anhneun Daseos gaji Jinsil (NorthKoreas Long-Range Artillery: Five Unknown Facts), Sindong-a, Dec. 2004, 5www.donga.com/docs/magazine/shin/2004/11/23/200411230500004/200411230500004_1.html4; and Yu Yong Won, Sudogwon-eul Sajeonggeori An-e Neohgo IssneunBughan-ui Dayeonjang Rokes Mich Jajupo Yeongu (Study on North Korean MRL andSelf-Propelled Artillery that Put Seoul Metropolitan Area within their Range), Wolgan

Chosun, March 2001 5http://monthly.chosun.com/html/200102/200102280011_1.html4.9Ashton B Carter and William J Perry Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy


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North Korea has probably obtained plutonium enough for five to sixnuclear weapons, and continues to produce enough fissile material, ifreprocessed, for one to two bombs annually.10

Moreover, since the Agreed Framework did not prohibit activitiesrelated to the weaponization and miniaturization of nuclear devices,North Korea likely has improved its technologies to actually producedeliverable nuclear warheads. In June 2003 North Korea for the first timepublicly discussed the possession of nuclear deterrent force as a policyoption,11 and in February 2005 it announced that it had manufacturednuclear weapons for self-defence to cope with the Bush administrationsevermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK.12 Credibilityof North Koreas nuclear deterrent has improved since 1994. In addition,since North Koreas conventional forces are not being modernized and

the counter-fire capabilities on the US-ROK side continue to improve, therelative importance of nuclear weapons in North Koreas deterrent hasgrown and will continue to do so in the future.

Against this background, North Korea conducted a nuclear test inOctober 2006. It was a major step forward in North Koreas nucleardevelopment, but it became clear that it is a long way from possessingcredible and operational nuclear weapons. The bomb actually exploded,but the magnitude of the explosion fell short of expectations, apparently,because the chain reaction went less than half way through. In a way, the

nuclear test has created a window of vulnerability for North Korea inwhich it has not acquired credible nuclear capabilities, but its intentionto possess nuclear weapons has become undeniable. Moreover, NorthKorea will not be able to get away with using nuclear weapons. The factremains that using nuclear weapons would result in the end of the NorthKorean state. In this sense, North Koreas nuclear deterrent is useful onlyin the extreme scenario in which the United States blatantly invades thecountry and threatens its regime survival. Nuclear deterrence would beless credible in the face of more limited use or threat of force.

The third pillar of North Koreas deterrent capabilities is its ballisticmissiles. No matter how many nuclear weapons North Korea mighthave, they would be useless without ballistic missiles. In this sense,North Koreas deterrent capabilities have been strengthened in the pastten years due to the deployment of more than 100 No Dong missilescapable of striking most of Japanese territory, in addition to over 500

10See, for example, Joel S. Wit, Jon Wolfsthal, Choong-suk Oh, The Six Party Talksand Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea, A Report of the CSIS

International Security Program, Dec. 2005, 1 and 6.11KCNA on DPRKs nuclear deterrent force, KCNA, 9 June 2003.12DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six party Talks for Indefinite


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Scud missiles targeted at South Korea. North Korea flight-tested the NoDong in 1993 and started deploying it in the late 1990s. Then in July2006 North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles including six Scudand No Dong missiles, and one Taepo Dong 2 missile in the Sea of Japan.While the Taepo Dong 2 apparently failed to fly as it was designed to, theScud and No Dong missiles were successfully launched. By now, not onlySouth Korea but also Japan has become a hostage to North Korean,potentially nuclear, missile attack. Moreover, North Korea hasreportedly flight-tested new solid-fuel mobile ballistic missiles based onthe Soviet SS-21 Scarab in May 2005 and March 2006.13 There wasalso a report that North Korea might have acquired 3,000-kilometer-range Kh-55 cruise missile technologies from Ukraine via Iran.14

On the credibility scale, ballistic missiles are located between the

conventional forces and nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles offerflexibility in terms of warhead choices. They can deliver conventional,chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. As already pointed out,using nuclear weapons would certainly invite massive retaliation.However, using ballistic missiles with conventional warhead in alimited manner will not necessarily result in a major escalation of thesituation. In this sense, ballistic missiles provide important flexibility inthe North Korean deterrent forces.

Compellence

The second element of the North Korean strategy is the exercise ofcompellence to encourage the United States and Japan to normalizerelations with and provide economic assistance to the country. This con-trast between ends and means is one of the most interesting charac-teristics of North Korean military-diplomatic campaigns. Pyongyangsmessage is: Unless you abandon your hostile policy and normalizerelations with us, we will continue to develop and deploy dangerous

weapons, and we might sell them to somebody else or even use them.This approach has produced some limited results. First, North Koreasigned the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994, and thetwo countries came to the verge of substantially improving the bilateralrelations toward the end of 2000. In 2002 North Korea succeeded ininviting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Pyongyang totalk about normalization. Japan and North Korea agreed to makeevery possible effort for an early normalization of the relations.15

13

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities, 22 March 2006, 3.14Sankei Shimbun 26 June 2005 1


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However, North Korea has yet to achieve its ultimate goal ofnormalizing diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan.

Second, North Korea succeeded in having the United States eliminatesome of the sanctions it had imposed on Pyongyang following theKorean War, and in obtaining some economic assistance from theUnited States and Japan. North Korea received substantial amount ofheavy fuel oil from the United States, and acquired food andagricultural assistance. However, it has not succeeded in eliminatingall the sanctions that the United States imposes on it.

Third, North Korea has decided to freeze some parts of its nuclearand missiles programs, but it did not completely abandon them. NorthKorea decided to freeze the critical part of its plutonium-based nuclearfacilities in 1994 and the freeze lasted until 2003. It also agreed to

freeze ballistic missile flight-testing in 1999. However, North Korea hasmaintained all of its nuclear facilities, and resumed their operations in2003. It initiated a covert uranium-based nuclear program sometimebetween 1997 and 2001. And it tested ballistic missiles and nuclearbombs in 2006.

All this suggests that North Koreas strategy has been executed half-heartedly and has produced commensurately half-hearted results. Thereason behind this is the fact that North Korea is using the same setof tools to achieve two separate objectives. In other words, it is using

the same nuclear and missiles capabilities for both deterrence andcompellence. On the one hand, since the North Koreans want tomaintain deterrence, they cannot discard these military capabilities.On the other hand, if they want to normalize relations with theUnited States, they would have to abandon them. By continuing toincrease their nuclear and missile arsenals, they can strengthen theirdeterrent and compellent power. But in doing so, they are raising thehurdle for normalization. This is the fundamental dilemma that NorthKorea faces in dealing with the United States. In fact, North Korea

had attempted to solve this dilemma by turning the Six Party Talksinto disarmament talks. In March 2005 the North Korean foreignministry announced, Now that the DPRK has become a full-fledgednuclear weapons state, the six-party talks should be disarmamenttalks where the participating countries negotiate the issue on an equalfooting.16 However, the United States simply ignored the NorthKorean suggestion.

Despite the mixed record of the past and the dilemma it faces, NorthKorea continues to use compellence to achieve its political, economic,

16DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Denuclearization of Korea KCNA 31


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and security goals. As a result, the September 2005 Joint Statement ofthe Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks provided that:

(a) The Six Parties reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks isthe verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in apeaceful manner.

(b) The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons andexisting nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEAsafeguards.

(c) The United States affirmed that it has no intention to attack orinvade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

(d) The non-North Korea parties expressed their respect and agreed to

discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision oflight-water reactors to the DPRK.

(e) The DPRK and the United States undertook to take steps tonormalize their relations.

(f) The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize theirrelations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration.

(g) China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States statedtheir willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK, and

(h) The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime

on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.17

The significance of this joint statement is that it clearly spelled out theend scenario in which all parties would be satisfied. This was a positivestep forward. However, two major difficulties still lie ahead. First, sincethere are so many items included in the joint statement that the focus hasbeen lost. Currently, there is a serious division among the non-NorthKorea parties to the Six Party Talks. South Korea, China, and Russiaadvocate a soft accommodative approach to North Korea, whereas the

United States and Japan take a tough approach to the country. The jointstatement gave ammunition to the soft approach advocates toemphasize normalization, economic assistance, and the permanent peaceregime, deflecting the pressure on North Korea to address the nuclearissue immediately. At the same time, it gave more room for North Koreato attempt to drive a wedge between the tough and soft parties. As wehave seen in the past, the North Koreans are skilled tacticians.18 As aresult, a fundamental solution of the issue remains difficult to obtain.

Second, the fundamental dilemma that North Korea faces still exists.In order to normalize relations with the United States, the communist

17Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks Beijing 19 Sept 2005


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state should eliminate its nuclear capabilities, which happen to beimportant part of its deterrent. The partial answer to this question wasthe security assurances that the United States provided to North Korea.In the joint statement, the United States affirmed that it had nointention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventionalweapons. However, from the North Korean perspective, no assurancewithout actual military-strategic reality to support it would be enough.

Another argument is that if North Korea normalizes relations withJapan and obtain large amount of economic assistance, which wouldenable the country to rehabilitate its economic and social life, itssurvival would be secured. However, this scenario does not distinguishbetween the well-being of the state and the survival of the regime. TheNorth Korean leaders may not think that the former automatically

leads to the latter.In order to implement the joint statement to its advantage, North

Korea suggested in the fifth round of the Six Party Talks a five-step roadmap for denuclearization. According to the road map, North Koreawould (a) refrain from conducting a nuclear test, (b) promise not totransfer nuclear materials, (c) stop producing additional nuclearmaterials, (d) stop nuclear activities and dismantle nuclear facilitiesbased on inspections, and finally (e) return to the NPT and the IAEA.19

North Korea seems to have attempted to maximize its gains by phasing

the nuclear dismantlement process.

Foundations of North Koreas Strategy

To understand the North Korean strategy, one should understand itsfoundations: why has North Korea continued to use the same strategyfor more than ten years? I argue that four factors play important roles:North Koreas political system; weakness; rationality; and luck.

Political System

The nature of North Koreas political system has enabled its leaders to usecoercive strategy for a long time. First, only the highly centralizeddictatorship like North Koreas can justify the continued expenditure ofthe large amount of resources on military buildup that puts an enormousburden on its people. The same characteristics make it possible for theNorth to be engaged in the long, stressful bargaining process, and tooutlast its interlocutors in the protracted negotiation process.

Second, the system ensures tremendous flexibility. In 1993 NorthKorea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT, test-launched


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the No Dong missile, and then asked the United States to hold bilateraltalks. It launched a missile over Japan while holding high-leveltalks with the United States in August 1998. The two Koreas held theSummit meeting precisely one year after the North-South naval clash(which reportedly killed several tens of North Korean sailors) in June1999. Contrary to most observers expectations, Kim Jong Il usedplausible deniability and acknowledged in September 2001 that hismen had actually abducted Japanese citizens back in the 1970s whileclaiming that he did not know the fact. The North Koreans can refuseto come to the negotiation table one day and call for it on the next.

The North Korean leadership also allows its people to defect fairlyliberally. There are reportedly more than 100,000 temporary orpermanent North Korean defectors living in the northeastern part of

China. Allowing potential dissidents to defect seems to have deflectedthe internal pressure, which, if contained inside, might have exploded.

Third, the system ensures significant level of organizational memory.In the North Korean system, a small number of specialists tend to stay inthe same position for a long time, resulting in a deep understanding oftechnical issues and historical background.20 A former North Koreandiplomat who defected revealed that there were many aged officials in theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and that almost 90 percent of the officials inthe ministry stayed in the same section throughout their lives. Such a

personnel management system certainly creates rigidity. However, it alsoguarantees consistency, continuity, and a significant level of profession-alism.21 It is quite suggestive, therefore, that a North Korean publicationcharacterized the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 199394 nucleardiplomacy as two examples of Kim Jong Ils war of brains, orpsychological war.22 After detaining the USS Pueblo, North Koreasucceeded in persuading the Americans into holding the first substantivebilateral talks in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, whichlasted for ten months and resulted in the return of Pueblo crew before

Christmas. The North Koreans must have studied the Pueblo affair andreflected the lessons learned upon their nuclear and missile diplomacy.One important shortcoming in the North Korean political system is a

creation of major human rights problems within the country. Wide-spread awareness of the dismal human rights record has emboldened

20Bong-Geun Jun, interview by author, Seoul, ROK, 16 May 2002.21A defected former North Korean diplomat, interview by author, Seoul, ROK, 15 May2002.22

Kim Nam Jin et al., Hyangdo-ui Taeyang Gim Jeong Il Janggun [Gen. Kim Jong Il:The Leading Sun] (Pyongyang: Pyeongyang Chulpansa 1995), 397402. The Englishedition of this book is Kim Jong Il: The Lodestar of the 21st Century Vol 2 (Tokyo:


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international public opinion and, in particular, conservative politicalforces in the United States, which has made it harder for the USgovernment to come to terms with North Korea. In December 2005 aresolution criticizing North Koreas human rights situation wasadopted in the United Nations General Assembly.23

Weakness as Strength

In a paradoxical way, North Koreas weakness has also worked as itsstrength. Despite the differences in nuance, all of the non-North Koreanparties of the Six Party Talks including the United States and Japanofficially support engagement with the North. The engagement policywas adopted in 1988 as South Koreas official policy toward North

Korea, and a more proactive version of engagement policy, or SunshinePolicy, was initiated in 1998. With the adoption of the Sunshine Policy,South Koreas policy toward North Korea became that of peacefulcoexistence, even at the cost of precluding early unification. TheSunshine Policy claimed that South Korea would neither harm norabsorb North Korea. Seouls adoption of the proactive engagementpolicy was a reflection of its perception that it had practically won thecompetition with North Korea, and that collapse of the country hadbecome a more important threat than armed aggression from it. Against

this backdrop, SouthKorea, together with its friends andallies, wasforcedto walk the thin line between allowing North Korea to possess nuclearweapons and having it collapse with all the negative consequences.

Second, implementation of the engagement policy, combined withhumanitarian considerations, has encouraged South Korea and China aswell as the United States and Japan to a lesser extent to providehumanitarian assistance to North Korea. In the 19952002 period,international assistance provided to North Korea through the WorldFood Programme (WFP) amounted to $1,156 million, and that provided

by non-governmental organizations (NGO) totaled $173 million.Cumulative assistance provided by individual countries including theUnited States, the European Union, China and Japan by 2002 was$1,080 million.24 Partly due to such assistance, the North Koreaneconomy started to record positive growth in 1999 after experiencingaverage 4.3 percent negative growth between 1990 and 1998.25 In 2005

23Situation of human rights in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, A/RES/60/173, 16 Dec. 2005, GA/10437.24

Ministry of Unification, Bughan Gaeyo 2004 (Survey of North Korea 2004) (Seoul:Ministry of Unification 2004), 299.25The Bank of Korea Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2004 31 May 2005


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its grain production grew by 5.3 percent and was estimated to be 4.54million tons. As a result, grain production has grown for five years.26

Despite the increasing diplomatic pressure on the nuclear issue,economic pressure has eased. North Korea seems to be in a goodposition to cope with the prolonged bargaining and negotiation processwith the United States and other countries.

Third, North Koreas collapse is anathema to not only South Koreabut also China. China has a long and loosely controlled border withNorth Korea, and has already absorbed a large number of defectors fromthe North. Already experiencing a significant level of socioeconomicpressure within, China cannot afford another source of instability.

Finally, North Koreas relative weakness has put it on the backburnerof US foreign policy. Although Iraq became a target for US strategy of

preemption, North Korea does not seem to be one. Given thecontinuing accumulation of fissile materials in the North Korean nuclearfacilities, anybody would agree that North Korea is a big problem.However, given the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the situation in Iraq, andincreasingly fundamentalist Iran, North Korea has become a lesser threatto the United States in relative terms. Al Qaeda attacked the UShomeland. Iraq and Iran posed a threat not only to Israel and the MiddleEast peace process but also to the international economy. North Korea isdeveloping the Taepo Dong missile with the potential capability to

deliver chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons to thecontinental United States. But the threat was not regarded as imminent.The United States was willing to arrest or kill Osama Bin Laden andSaddam Hussein, but it is negotiating with Kim Jong Il. Of course, this isnot necessarily a blessing for North Korea. Although North Korea hasnot become a target for preemption, it has also failed to become acounterpart for immediate and serious negotiations.

Rationality

Related to the previous point is North Koreas rationality. In the pastten years, grade given to North Korean leaders rationality hasimproved from extremely poor to fair. During the 199394 nuclear

energy supply has improved somewhat and efforts have been made to increaseproduction capacity since the implementation of the Economic ManagementImprovement Measures in July 2002. Education Center for Unification, BughanGyeongje, Eodikkaji wassna? [What is the status of North Korean economy?] (Seoul:

Education Center for Unification 2005), 212.26Rural Development Administration, 2005 Bughan-ui Gogmul SaengsanryangChujeong Balpyo [Assessment of North Korean Grain Production in 2005


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crisis, the perceived lack of rationality on the part of North Koreanleadership seems to have reinforced the effectiveness of their threats.Past actions such as the Axe Murder incident of 1976, the bombingin Rangoon in 1983, and the bombing of a Korean Airliner in 1987 hadhelped create such a perception. As Denny Roy suggested, the NorthKoreans seem to have used madman tactics in that they depictedthemselves as irrational and dangerous in order to keep the other sideon the defensive and put themselves in an advantageous position.27

In the past ten years, it has become clear that the North Koreanleaders, particularly Kim Jong Il, are much more rational thanpreviously believed. Despite all the aggressive rhetoric, North Koreahas never physically attacked Americans since 1981 when North Korealaunched surface-to-air missiles at a US SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft

(although they missed it). North Korea has ended its active interactionswith foreign terrorist groups. On this point, Richard Armitage said inDecember 2002, Since 1987, in the explosion of the Korean airliner, asfar as I know, North Korea has not been involved in terrorism.28 Inrecent years, Kim Jong Il has met all of the top leaders of majorconcerned countries except the United States. Kims frequent interna-tional exposure has demonstrated that however idiosyncratic his aimsmight be, he is a calculating and rational actor.

As a result, the situation has been created where the United States

and other parties can relatively safely assume that North Korea will nottake self-destructive actions such as exporting nuclear weapons to thirdparties let alone terrorists. This has had two opposite effects on NorthKorea. On the one hand, the North Koreans have become someone onecan do business with. This is why the United States signed the AgreedFramework in 1994 and Madeleine Albright visited North Korea in2000. Even the Bush administration is negotiating with North Koreawithout using preemption. On the other hand, the United States hasbecome more relaxed than before in dealing with North Korea. In 1994

the United States planned a preemptive strike against North Koreannuclear facilities when it started to unload 8,000 spent fuel rods, whichsupposedly contained enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons.In 2003 the United States did not even file a case in the United Nations(UN) Security Council when North Korea started reprocessing the samespent fuel or when it declared the possession of nuclear weapons. TheUnited States did not panic even in the face of highly provocative

27Denny Roy, North Korea and the Madman Theory, Security Dialogue 25/3

(1994), 311.28Press Conference with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Richard L.Armitage Deputy Secretary of State Commonwealth Parliamentary Offices 13 Dec


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missile and nuclear tests in 2006. If North Korean leaders are rational,the containment policy might work well enough, and neitherpreemption nor engagement will be needed.

Luck

Luck is one of the important assets that North Korea has enjoyed in therecent years. Of particularly importance has been the rise of China,change in South Korean politics, and the situations in Iraq and Iran.

First, the rise of China seems to have given the North Koreans leeway.Throughout the 1990s, China played the role of the ultimate guarantorof the North Korean regime. However, it was relatively passive in doingso. Chinas future was still unpredictable. China was still suffering from

the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident of 1989. Some argued thatChina would grow into a strong and rich nation while others contendedthat it might disintegrate due to mounting political and socioeconomicpressure. In the mid 1990s, it also experienced crises across the TaiwanStrait. China was busy taking care of itself, and did not have room tomake a substantial commitment to North Korea. In addition, Chinaestablished diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, deprivingNorth Korea of its traditional special relationship with Beijing.

This seems to have changed in recent years. By now, Chinas rise has

become a solid assumption on which major powers base their foreignand security policies. One of the expressions of deepening Chinesecommitment is its leadership in organizing and convening the Six PartyTalks in 2003. China started to play an active role in bringing NorthKorea and other parties, especially the United States, together.Moreover, in October 2005, Hu Jintao visited North Korea as theGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese topleaders visit to North Korea took place for the first time since JiangZemins visit in September 2001. Wang Jiarui, head of the International

Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party ofChina, said that China would not only provide North Korea witheconomic aid, but also help it build factories, and that it would renderhelp to the best of our ability when North Korea faces difficulties.29

In return, Kim Jong Il went to China in January 2006 and visitedmajor special economic zones in the country. Since 2000 trade betweenChina and North Korea has grown annually by 30 percent on average,contributing to estimated 3.5 percent annual growth rate for the NorthKorean economy. In 2005 Chinas trade with North Korea totaled$1,305 million, up from $488 million in 2000. (Trade with Chinaamounted to 40 percent of North Koreas total trade in 2004, about


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twice the size of the inter-Korean trade in the same year. The tradebetween North Korea and Japan was $195 million in 2005, down from$1,298 million in 2001. This sharp decline was partly due to thereluctance of the Japanese consumers to buy North Korean goods sincethe abduction issue became widely known in 2001 and Japans ban onthe entry of ships weighing over 100 metric tons without insurance intoits ports.)30 China has become the most important external partner forthe North Korean economy.

Second, sea change in South Korean politics has helped NorthKoreas position. In the 2002 presidential election in South Korea, thewidespread e-politics and an accident in which two South Koreanschoolgirls were killed by a US armored vehicle helped the unlikelyprogressive presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun win the election.

Based on his Policy for Peace and Prosperity, Roh strongly promoted aproactive and accommodative engagement policy toward North Korea.As a result, economic transaction between the North and the South hasincreased from $111 million in 1991, $425 million in 2000, $642million in 2002 to $1,056 million in 2005. In 2005 the South-NorthKorea trade surpassed $1 billion for the first time, up 51.5 percent from2004. Transactional trade has diminished, but non-transactional tradeincreased owing to aid for construction of South Korean-led GaeseongIndustrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tourism District in the

North.31

The two Koreas are engaged in joint development projectsin North Korea, including reconnection of railways and roads,32

tourism in Mount Geumgang,33 and development of the GaeseongIndustrial Complex.34 In February 2006 the Hyundai Asan, one of the

30Lee Young Hun, Bug-Jung Muyeog-ui Hyeonhwang-gwa Bughan Gyeongje-eMichineun Yeonghyang (Current Status of North Korea-China Trade and its Impacton North Korean Economy), Institute for Monetary and Economic Research, 13 Feb.2006; Ministry of Unification, Peace and Prosperity: White Paper on Korean

Unification 2005 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification 2005), 54; and Ministry ofUnification, Trade Volume between North Korea and Japan, 2 March 2006.31Ministry of Unification homepage 5www.unikorea.go.kr/en/EPA/EPA0101L.jsp4;Ministry of Unification, Inter-Korean Trade Volume from 2000 to 2005 (23 Jan.2006), 5www.unikorea.go.kr/en/EPA/EPA0101L.jsp4; Korea International TradeAssociation, 2005 Inter-Korean Trade Exceeds a Historic High US$1 Billion, 26 Jan.2006, 5http://global.kita.net/kita/kitanews_viw.jsp?no4824; and the Bank of Korea, Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2004.32Ministry of Unification homepage 5http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/EUF/EUF0101R.jsp4.33

Ibid.; and Ministry of Unification, Achievements and Prospects of the ParticipatoryGovernments Policy toward North Korea after the First Half of its Term, 26 Aug.2005


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Hyundai Group companies and a major investor in North Korea,decided to invest additional $2.26 billion in the Mount Kumgangproject. Moreover, South Korea regularly provides humanitarianassistance to North Korea. In 2005 it sent 350,000 tons of fertilizerand 500,000 tons of rice to North Korea.

South Korea has been seeking to mediate between the United Statesand the DPRK since the Six Party Talks began. On the one hand, SouthKorea urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs. But on theother hand, it urged the United States to become more flexible in itsapproach to North Korea. In November 2004 President Roh stated thatthe North Korean contention that their nuclear weapons and missilesconstituted a means of safeguarding their security by deterring threatsfrom the outside was understandable, and argued that the North

Korean nuclear issue boiled down to whether security would beprovided to the North, and whether or not it would be given anopportunity to overcome its plight through reform and openness.35

In this context, it is noteworthy that in 2005 Roh Moo-hyun startedto espouse the view that South Korea should become a balancer inNortheast Asia. The definition of the balancer is not totally clear, butit basically means that South Korea would take more equidistant policytoward the neighboring countries. In other words, it would distant itselffrom traditional friends the United States and Japan and come

closer to new friends China and North Korea. Recent developmentswill likely reinforce such a tendency. In July 2005 South Koreaproposed that it provide 200 megawatts of electricity to the Northevery year if the nuclear issue is resolved. It was part of Seouls attemptto encourage Pyongyang to come to a deal.

The bolstered China and South Koreas commitments could have twosomewhat contradictory effects. On the one hand, feeling more relaxedabout its security and survival, the North Koreans are in a betterposition to make a strategic decision to eliminate their nuclear

weapons programs. On the other hand, now that North Koreaspolitical and economic situation is better served by Chinese and SouthKorean support, it is encouraged to wait out the Bush administrationthat has been reluctant to negotiate a deal.

Finally, events in other parts of the world seem to have helped NorthKorea. Particularly important are the situation in Iraq and the nuclearissue arising from Iran. The situations in Iraq and Iran loom larger inUS foreign policy than North Korea for several reasons. Whereas NorthKorea is a marginal player in Northeast Asia, Iraq and Iran are criticalactors in the politics of the Middle East. Whereas North Korea has

35Address at a Luncheon Hosted by the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Cheong


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practically terminated its terrorist connections, Iran maintains itsrelationship with terrorist groups. And whereas North Korean leadersare regarded as relatively rational, Saddam Hussein was and Iranianleaders are perceived as reckless and potentially dangerous.

However, these events cut in both ways. On the one hand, since theUS policy has been focused heavily on Iraq and Iran, North Korea willnot likely become a target of the preemption strategy. However, onthe other hand, the communist state remains at best first in the secondtier items of US foreign policy priorities. Under such circumstances,North Koreas deterrent works well, but compellence does not.

Moreover, it is not clear how long these trends will last. The Taiwanissue remains. Chinese growth appears to be steady, but ongoingsocioeconomic changes in China are so dynamic that things might get

out of control more easily than widely expected. Presidential electionsare scheduled in 2007 in South Korea, and currently conservativecandidates are running ahead of their liberal counterparts. Thesituation in Iraq continues to be volatile, and the Iranian nuclear issueremains very active. However, situations change, and nobody can denythat the international environment can become a more difficult one forNorth Korea in the future.

Evaluation: Limits of the North Korean Strategy

So far, North Koreas strategy to deal with the United States has provedto be fairly successful. It has not achieved major success, but it has notmade big mistakes either. It has failed to normalize relations with theUnited States, and Japan for that matter, but successfully avoidedcreating the situation where its regime survival was seriously threatened.Given the relative power position of the two countries in 2004 the USgross domestic product was 531 times larger , and US defense spending254 times bigger36 North Koreas success is fairly remarkable.

In the years ahead, there are broadly two different paths that NorthKorea could take to deal with the US hegemon. At one end of thespectrum, the DPRK could pursue more proactively the strategy ofbandwagoning with the United States, and decide to make the strategicdecision to renounce nuclear weapons. If this were the case, US policywould be a single most important factor determining the outcome ofNorth Koreas strategy. Even if North Korea makes a major concession,it would not be reciprocated unless the United States makes its ownstrategic decision to accept non-ideological, traditional-realist policyof solving the nuclear issue at the cost of having to downplay human

36International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2005/2006


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rights and other liberal agendas. At the other end, North Korea wouldshift its strategic focus away from the hegemon to the old Chinesefriends. If North Korea chooses the old friend scenario, it might meanthat it will attempt to balance, in conjunction with China, against theUnited States and Japan. The DPRK would go back to the future to thedays when it and China were close communist allies.

Somewhere between the two extremes lies the scenario in whichNorth Korea follows a policy of equidistance toward the United Statesand Japan on the one hand and China on the other. In another, moremoderate scenario, Pyonyang would attempt to simply wait out theBush administration to negotiate a strategic deal with the next,preferably Democratic, US president.

Reluctant Patron Candidates: The United States and Japan

Currently, the Bush administration is taking a long-term strategicapproach to the North Korea issue rather than a short-term tacticalapproach (although it might be a result of disagreements over the NorthKorea policy). The US demand for North Korea to make a strategicdecision as well as the fact that the Bush administration once named itsNorth Korea policy as a bold approach or bold initiative indicatesthis.37 In other words, the Bush policy seeks a broader and more

conclusive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue than the AgreedFramework. In order to encourage North Korea to make a strategicdecision, the United States would use wide-ranging policy measuressuch as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and cracking down onthe money laundering, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting that theNorth Koreans have long engaged in. These are part of so-called smartsanctions targeted against North Koreas leadership. They are expectedto dry up sources of income for that leadership while minimizingnegative effects on its people.38 The US Treasurys decision in

September 2005 to designate Macao-based Banco Delta Asia as of

37North Korean Nuclear Program, Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman,Washington DC, 16 Oct. 2002; President Bush Discusses Iraq, Remarks by PresidentBush and Polish President Kwasniewski in Photo Opportunity, Office of the PressSecretary, 14 Jan. 2003; and Dealing With North Koreas Nuclear Programs,Prepared Statement of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian andPacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 July 2004.38According to David Asher, North Koreas criminal sector may account for as much as

3540 percent of its exports and a much larger percentage of its total cash earnings.David L. Asher, The North Korean Criminal State, its ties to Organized Crime, and thePossibility of WMD Proliferation Remarks to the Counter Proliferation Strategy


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primary money laundering concern was an important recent exampleof such a policy.39 In addition, the US Congress passed the NorthKorean Human Rights Act in October 2004.

The problem of this approach is that it is not clear whether suchindirect pressure will produce expected results in time. From NorthKoreas reaction, it is widely assessed that the Banco Delta Asia caseaffected the leadership significantly. However, it is not clear whetherthat pressure will convince the North Koreans to come back to the tableand seriously negotiate a denuclearization deal in the Six Party Talks.

While the United States puts additional pressure on North Korea,Pyongyang produces additional fissile materials on its soil. In June2006, it was reported that North Korea might have possessed eight toseventeen nuclear weapons.40 A growing nuclear arsenal might or

might not help the Asian states bandwagoning strategy with the UnitedStates. On the one hand, a larger nuclear arsenal might provide astronger bargaining position. On the other hand, the larger arsenalmight make a negotiated settlement more difficult, preventing theUnited States and North Korea from reconciling. We are yet to seewhich effect will prove to be stronger.

The US proposal demands North Korea eliminate its nuclearprogram in a short period of time. However, concerned about the lossof its deterrence and bargaining power, North Korea will not likely give

up its nuclear programs easily. In addition, both the Bush administra-tion and the Congress remain tough on North Korea, and moreconcerned about the situation in Iraq and Iran than North Korea.However, the Democratic victory in November 2006 mid-term electionmight change the attitude of the US Congress toward North Korea.More fundamentally, it is not clear what the ultimate US policy goal is:to encourage the DPRK regime to take positive diplomatic steps, or toundermine the regime. It appears that US policymakers are divided onthis point. Unless this internal division is eliminated, the grand bargain

with North Korea will not be possible.Despite the bold initiative that the Japanese government took inSeptember 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Koreaand signed the Pyongyang Declaration calling for normalization, therevelation that the North Korean authorities had actually abducted

Japanese citizens and the reemergence of the nuclear issue prevented thetwo countries from normalizing relations quickly. First, resolvingthe abduction issue is not easy. For one, the North Korean authorities

39

Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern underUSA PATRIOT Act, JS-2720, 15 Sept. 2005.40David Albright and Paul Brannan The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid 2006


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have claimed that some of the confirmed abductees were already dead.The Japanese government demands convincing evidence of their deaths,but the North Koreans have been reluctant, or possibly unable, topresent such evidence. For another, in addition to the confirmedabductees, there are supposed to be a larger number of unconfirmedabductees. Since it is practically impossible to find out the whereaboutsof all of them, Japan and North Korea will have to make a politicaldecision that the abduction issue has been resolved at some point.However, it will not be easy particularly for Japanese leaders to put anend to the highly politicized abduction issue.

Second, the reemergence of the nuclear issue in 2002 precluded theoption for Japan and North Korea to normalize relations without firstsolving the nuclear issue. Bilateral talks between Japan and North

Korea take place separately from the Six Party Talks, but the formercannot go too far ahead of the latter.

Given the issues stated so far, the most likely scenario for the nearfuture is that the United States and Japan take the path of containmentspelled out in the 1999 Perry Report. Faced with the stalemate, the twocountries are taking steps to bolster their defense capabilities. In 2005 theUnited States deployed 15 F-117 stealth bombers at the Kunsan Air ForceBase in South Korea. In October 2005, the United States and Japan jointlyreleased the Security Consultative Committee Document, entitled, US-

Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, inwhich they agreed to improve several specific areas of cooperationincluding ballistic missile defense, the PSI, response to WMD attacks, andjoint transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other relatedactivities for non-combatant evacuation operations.41 Japan will startdeploying ballistic missile defense systems in 2007.

China and South Korea as Alternative Patrons?

Despite its rhetoric that the country is self-reliant (Juche), NorthKorea has always sought to find great power patrons. In the Cold Warperiod, the Soviet Union and China provided such patronage. After theend of the Cold War, North Korea lost the commitment from thesecommunist friends, and started to seek the alternative patronage of theUnited States.

After ten years of struggle, North Korea has come to realize twothings: one is that the United States might not be willing to provide such

41

US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, SecurityConsultative Committee Document by Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura and Minister of State for Defense


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an alternative; the other is that China, together with South Korea,could become a new patron. Both China and South Korea haveincreased their strategic weight in the past ten years and have becomewilling to make stronger commitment to the survival of the NorthKorean regime. The latter might not be able to balance against the UShegemon in conjunction with China and South Korea, however, itmight be able to adopt a policy of equidistance toward the UnitedStates and Japan on the one hand and China and South Korea on theother.

There are limits to this choice, however. First, North Korea mustalter its behavior in order to obtain fuller support from China. Chinawould require its neighbor to freeze, or at least slow down, nuclear andmissile development, refrain from conducting brinkmanship diplomacy

and engaging in illicit activities, and not take any other actions thatmight destabilize the region. In fact, China seems to have substantiallystrengthened its pressure on North Korea after the nuclear test.China would be loath to see North Korea give ammunition tothe strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and development of itscombined missile defense and other defense capabilities. However,without brinkmanship and illicit activities, North Koreas diplomaticinfluence would be seriously limited and its leadership vitalitysignificantly undermined.

Moreover, North Koreas economic dependence on China hasdeepened rapidly. If this trend continues, the smaller countrys freedomof actions will gradually be undercut. In the long run, North Koreashould also be concerned about the United States and China cutting astrategic deal to attempt regime change in the North.

Second, moving too close to China might make it more difficult forNorth Korea to normalize its relations with the United States. TheUnited States chose a multilateral forum the Six Party Talks partlybecause it hoped China would take care of managing North Korea.

Heavily engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States wouldcertainly welcome increased Chinese commitment to North Korea sincethat would free the United States from the business of engaging with it.It may be that the original US hope comes true. It will also mean that

Japan would be discouraged from taking a proactive engagement policytoward North Korea. The latters chance of obtaining substantialeconomic assistance from Japan will diminish.

Third, related to the second point, China might try not to take fullresponsibility for managing an irresponsible North Korea. Chinesepolicy has long been that of urging the United States and North Koreato come to a deal and normalize their bilateral relations. China hopesthe United States will take care of North Korea just as the United States


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2006, Hu Jintao described the Six Party Talks as an efficientmechanism to solve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, and said thatChina was ready to unswervingly make joint efforts to promote theSix Party Talks.42

There are also limits to North Koreas option of choosing SouthKorea as a strategic partner. Although the Roh Moo-hyun administra-tion has been strongly committed to a proactive and accommodativeengagement policy toward the North, South Korea is still allied withthe United States. If pressed hard, South Korea could choose the UnitedStates and discard North Korea as a partner (although in an extremeopposite scenario, if pressed hard, president Roh might choose to cut astrategic deal with North Korea by holding an inter-Korean summit).In addition, the South Korean presidential election is scheduled in

2007, and conservative candidates are currently running ahead of theirliberal counterparts. While engagement policy will likely to outlive thecurrent administration, a conservative government in South Korea willcertainly change the tone and nuance of engagement. Moreover,domestic political rivalry in South Korea might affect its North Koreapolicy as all but Clinton logic changed US policy significantly in 2001.

Conclusion

North Koreas strategy to deal with the US hegemon has worked fairlywell in the sense that it succeeded in achieving its bottom-line objective:the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime. North Korea has successfullydeterred the United States from taking military actions against it,arranged the Agreed Framework and other bilateral agreements andstatements, established formal and informal communication channels,and obtained security assurances.

Nevertheless, after more than a decade of effort, North Korea hasfailed to normalize its relations with the United States. Neither has it

succeeded in obtaining substantial economic assistance from Japan.The US-DPRK relationship in 2006 is no better than in 1993 whenNorth Korea embarked on the coercive normalization policy towardWashington.

There are significant limits to North Koreas potential strategicpartnership with the United States, China, or South Korea. At thepresent time, the most likely policy option for North Korea is tocontinue its traditional, realist policy of playing one against anothertoward the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea while drivinga wedge in their relationships whenever possible. If the powertransition from Kim Jong Il to one of his sons is actually underway


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in the country as widely reported, North Korea will likely remaincautious on the diplomatic front in coming years.

If this is the case, the most likely US strategy will be that ofcontainment as the 1999 Perry Report suggested as the second path(the first path being that of normalization). In the second path, theUnited States and its allies will take steps to assure their security andcontain the threat.43 The United States, in conjunction with Japan, willcontinue to crack down on North Koreas illicit activities, strengthencounter-proliferation policy such as PSI, and develop missile defenseand other defense measures. In the meantime, China and South Koreawill seek to restrain North Koreas misbehavior while preventing Kim

Jong Il regimes catastrophic collapse.In 2006 North Korea launched ballistic missiles and conducted a

nuclear test, most likely in an attempt to force the United States toseriously negotiate a new agreement with the country. We have yet tosee whether this renewed compellent action will make the bandwagon-ing with the hegemon come true.

Acknowledgements

I thank Robert Dujarric, Michael Green, and Thomas Mahnken fortheir invaluable comments on the earlier drafts of this article. This

article was originally presented in the panel on Strategies toAccommodate US Military Dominance: Friends, Enemies, and Neu-trals, organized by Thomas Mahnken, at the 47th Annual Interna-tional Studies Association Convention held in San Diego, California, on24 March 2006.

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