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RIPORT POLICY PAPERON

OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

10-C Railway Road, University Town, Peshawar Web:www.riport.org Ph: 091-9218411 Fax:091-9218411

Table of Contents

Background...................................................................................................................................................1

Agenda for Workshop...................................................................................................................................2

RIPORT Policy paper on options in Afghanistan............................................................................................3

De-facto Partition of Afghanistan..................................................................................................................3

Address at Workshop by Khalid Aziz Chairman RIPORT............................................................................10

Paper presented by Juma Khan Sufi “US Exit Plan for Afghanistan”.....................................................11

The dynamics of Post US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the repercussions on FATA & Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by Dr. Ijaz Khan Chairman: IR Department, University of Peshawar.................................14

Discussions..................................................................................................................................................17

Reality of US – Pak Relations...................................................................................................................19

Annexure- A - Consensus resolution at the conclusion of the in-camera joint sitting Of Parliament.......21

Annexure- B - List of Participants................................................................................................................24

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BackgroundThe Regional Institute of Research and Training organized a workshop to ponder about

“Future Regional Security in Pakistan & Afghanistan after 2011: issues and challenges”.

Participants were invited from different walks of life included researchers, bureaucrats,

scholars, journalists, armed forces, think tanks and analysts. (The list of participants

Annexure –A) The workshop was organized on 2nd December 2010 at Agriculture

University Peshawar. Two panelists presented paper belonging to the department of

International Relations and the Area Study Center University of Peshawar.

The first paper for the workshop was presented by Prof. Dr. Juma khan Sufi (Area Study

Center) on: “US Exit Plan for Afghanistan”. The second panelist guest speaker was Prof.

Dr. Ejaz (International Relation Department University of Peshawar), and he expressed his

views on “The dynamics of Post US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the repercussions

on FATA & Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”.

After the presentations the participants gave their views on the subject, possible future

problems resulting due to US- withdrawal or no- withdrawal condition.

One of the recommendations from participants was to organize similar workshops in other

provinces so that the people were equally aware of the various so the people were equally

aware of the various issues and problems. One important factor that was overlooked

during the review process was to seek guidance for a national policy on this matter based

upon the “War Resolution” passed by the joint session of parliament after receiving secret

briefings and discussions from 8th to 22nd Oct 2008. This subject will be hopefully dealt in

a subsequent Forum meeting. This important Resolution is available at Annex- A.

It is hoped that this workshop report will assist the policy making fraternity in making the

right choices when the security paradigm changes in Afghanistan

Khalid Aziz

Chairman RIPORT 21st December, 2010

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Agenda for Workshop

“Future Regional Security in Pakistan & Afghanistan after

2011: issues and challenges”

2nd December 2010

Agriculture University Peshawar

Recitation of verses from Holy Quran: 5:30 PM

Welcome address and introduction: Khalid Aziz Chairman RIPORT: 5:30 PM

“US Exit Plan for Afghanistan” by – Juma Khan Sufi: 5:45 PM

“The dynamics of Post US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the repercussions on FATA & Khyber Pakhtunkhwa- Prof Dr. Ijaz Khan: 6:15 PM

Discussion: 6:30- 9:00 PM

Dinner 9:00 PM

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Brief for the Workshop

1 RIPORT Policy paper on options in AfghanistanFaced with rising opposition at home, increased casualties on the battlefield, and

growing isolation amongst its allies, the United States is looking for a way to salvage

the war in Afghanistan. However, the suggested remedies may end up destabilizing

not only Afghanistan, but much of Central and South Asia.

2 De-facto Partition of AfghanistanOne of the high risks extreme proposal was recently mooted by a former U.S.

Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, a neoconservative mainstay of the US think

tank establishment and currently a lobbyist for India. In September 2010,

Ambassador Robert Blackwill, spoke about “Plan B: The de facto Partition of

Afghanistan.

2.1 Blackwill argues that the Obama administration’s counter-insurgency strategy in

Afghanistan has failed and the best alternative is a de-facto partition of Afghanistan.

According to this proposal Afghanistan’s Pakhtun areas are to be cordoned-off from

the rest of the country. Blackwill states that this cordoned off area will be like an

isolation zone to be policed by counter terrorism techniques reliant on drones and

special operation raids when required.

Blackwill further believes that such a quarantine of Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan will

allow the Taliban and anti-Taliban forces to consume themselves. He advocates that

while this drama plays itself out, the US should support the development of the rest of

Afghanistan. To conduct the military aspect of this plan Blackwill, advocates

retention of a 40,000-50,000 US force presence compared to the existing level of

about 110,000. Blackwill suggests that the US continue to target the Al- Qaeda and

Taliban within the indicated “killing zone” and in the terrorist safe havens in FATA

and other parts of Pakistan.

2.2 The negative aspect of this plan is that it would leave the Afghan Taliban in control in

most of their historic stronghold in the South and the East and feels that though it is

not the best outcome for the US in Afghanistan but it is the best that Washington can

achieve consistent with its national interests and domestic politics.

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2.3 But it would not mean that US will completely cut itself from the areas of the Taliban;

rather it would control it by shaping the Taliban from a distance, so that the

capabilities of the Al-Qaida and Taliban are kept within a manageable limit hoping to

reduce them into insignificance over time. US Special Forces would be relied for

implementing this policy. He adds, “We would also target Afghan Taliban

encroachments across the de facto partition lines and terrorist sanctuaries along the

Pakistan border.

2.4 In other words this control proposal would affect Pakistan and that has its own

implications. Blackwill admits that his plan, "would allow Washington to focus on

four issues more vital to its national interests: the rise of Chinese power, the Iranian

nuclear program, nuclear terrorism and the future of Iraq". It is ironic that only a

couple of months ago the US foreign policy intelligentsia admitted that Iraq was the

wrong war and the real problem was in Afghanistan. The US foreign policy like a see-

saw advocates the return of US to Iraq. Apparently, the US foreign policy will

become schizophrenic if the Blackwill prescription is accepted. It is a panacea for a

long term war that will definitely find support amongst the US Hawks and the military

however, it will be financially crippling in the long term.

2.6 Impact of de-facto partition of Afghanistan on Pakistan and neighboring countries :

a. Blackwill’s creation of a ‘killing zone’ in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan’s

Pakhtuns in FATA, KP and Baluchistan. Secondly, this will change the

strategic balance in the neighboring borders with China, Iran, India,

Afghanistan and Central Asian States. The Durand Line that is the

international border extending some 2640 kilometers and dividing Pakistan

from Afghanistan will disappear as the killing zone extends East and

Southwards from Afghanistan. Therefore, the plan will not only de-stabilize

Afghanistan but also Pakistan. It will also shift the war deeper into

Pakistan. If Blackwill’s policies are implemented then the existentialist

threat to Pakistan will increase, its military will be over stretched to curb

the Taliban revival in their core areas of Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur and

Orakzai that operations against the Taliban will generate. . it will also

threaten the security of KP and particularly Peshawar

b. Furthermore, about 40 million Pashtuns who reside in Pakistan will at some

stage be pushed into the dynamics of establishing a separate state.

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c. Given Pakistan’s ethnic fragility and simmering discontent in Baluchistan,

Blackwill’s prescription will place Pakistan into a stall that may perhaps

make her extremely vulnerable as a state.

d. A bigger nightmare is also a piggy-backing the Blackwill plan. If as is

proposed occurs and the writ of the Pakistani state deteriorates then

Pakistani Jihadi outfits will emerge as international agents in their own

right. Their narrative will not be of Pan Islamism like Osama’,s but more

attuned to the Sub-Continental religious rivalry between the Hindu and the

Muslims. Their obvious target will be India - that is the only way that they

will be able to be consumed by martyrdom.

e. As the local Jihadi organizations emerge they will direct their efforts

against India. In the event of such a likelihood coupled with a disengaged

US, Indian strikes would follow. Pakistan threatened with disintegration

will likely opt to use the nuclear option. In the absence of a US restraint as

in December, 2008 such a situation could lead to nuclear finale.

f. India is developing into a future intermediate great power of the 21st

century and thus has much more to lose from the affects of this plan as it

will lose its direction and become mined in security concerns. How this will

actually unfold is anyone’s guess.

g. Another unintended consequence of the Blackwill plan is the likely

dispersal of the Islamic warrior core composed of the Uzbek IMU.

2.7 Gerard Russell, who ran the British government’s outreach to the Muslim world from

2001 to 2003 is doubtful about the efficacy of the Blackwill plan, he feels:

a. Iran and Russia will be supporting Northern Afghan tribes, and Pakistan will

support the Pashtuns. This will create a potentially lethal proxy war that

would be worse than the civil war of the 1990s, because the stakes will be

higher.

b. Afghanistan and her immediate neighbors will oppose this plan – Pakistan in

particular dislikes the idea of ethnic separatism and the Central Asian States

show little enthusiasm to open their borders with Afghanistan. This will also

create a logistics problem for the US to support their reduced forces in

Afghanistan through the Northern route.

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3. Firewall Option:

3.1 Another proposal to deal with Afghanistan in the post US withdrawal scenario and

penned by thinkers in India proposes that instead of a partition as proposed by

Blackwill the AfPak region should be firewalled by policing its borders physically

and electronically. One such report prepared by Sushant Sareen and Col. Harinder of

Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, states that in the

event of the NATO member states disengagement from Afghanistan, it would be

prudent to firewall the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) region from all sides with only

a minimal foreign military presence inside Afghanistan.

3.2 The IDSA study writes "Such an approach would not only free the United States

from aimlessly paying for Pakistan’s follies and hemorrhaging its own economy and

military, but also drive its rival China to act more responsibly in the global fight

against terrorism."

3.3 The study is of the view that "India has been fairly successful in firewalling the

radical blowback emanating from Pakistan in the past and need not be overly worried

about the impending U.S. withdrawal."

3.4. The writer believes that Indians would ideally like to see the West succeed in its

mission of cleansing Afghanistan of the influence of Islamist terror groups like the

Taliban and Al-Qaeda, "But if the West fails to achieve this objective, as is becoming

increasingly apparent, then it is unlikely that India will step in to replace them in

Afghanistan. While India could provide some military assistance in the form of

advisors and trainers to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan, the chances of India

putting military boots on the ground are simply remote, the. Instead, India would

most likely prefer to beef up its security along the border areas with Pakistan in order

to insulate itself from the adverse impact of Taliban ascendancy in Afghanistan.

3.5 The writer say, "After all, the source of India’s insecurity is not Afghanistan; it is

Pakistan. And Pakistan will continue to be a problem regardless of whether or not

Americans stay in Afghanistan. The much tainted Taliban becomes a menace for

India only if they are deliberately directed or pushed into India by their Pakistani

patrons or if they take over the Pakistani state."The authors of the IDSA study odd:

"While the former is something that India has been contending with for over two

decades, the latter possibility will become a problem not just for India but also for

the rest of the civilized world. Short of direct intervention in Pakistan to rescue and

reform the Pakistani state, the only way to restrict the fallout of a Talibanised

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Afghanistan and the inevitability of this development resulting in a Talibanised

Pakistan is for the West to take a cue from India and follow a strategy of firewalling

the AfPak region."

4. Impact of a Firewall:

4.1 The paper argues that there is little doubt that the strategic vacuum that will be

created by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan will be filled by the

Taliban and other assorted terror groups who comprise the Jihad International’. This,

it says, will certainly have local, regional and global repercussions. Afghanistan will

either descend into chaos and civil war or else revert to the peace of a graveyard that

the Taliban imposed between 1996 and 2001. The report adds "With the Taliban in

control, Islamic radicalism will of course get a fillip. But more serious is the

imminent prospect of Afghanistan becoming a sanctuary and launching pad for all

varieties of Islamic terror groups from around the world,"

4.2 While the immediate impact of such a development will be felt by countries in the

region — the Central Asian states, Iran, and China — the global ramifications of a

Taliban regime in Afghanistan in terms of the spread of Islamic terrorism cannot be

understated, the authors say.

4.3 But the country likely to be worst affected is Pakistan. Rather than providing

Pakistan ‘strategic depth’, a Taliban victory in Afghanistan will transform the

country into a ‘strategic black hole’. For Pakistan, "In its obsession with sponsoring,

supporting and providing sanctuary to the entire Taliban leadership and directing its

war effort against the U.S. troops in an elaborate double-game, Pakistan does not

seem to have thought things through."

4.4 The firewall will likely be manned by Iran in the West, by the CAS in the North with

US assistance, by India in the East and by the US Navy in the Arabian Sea in the

South.

5. Effect on Pakistan

5.1 Pakistan will be affected especially KP and FATA because if the Pak Afghan borders

are quarantined, the Pashtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan will unite and rise against

such a policy which will result in regional instability; the very eventuality that the

firewall wants to prevent.

5.2 This will affect the peace and economy of Pakistan and Afghanistan. By fire-walling

the Afghan-Pakistan region, the goal of preventing the Taliban and other militant

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groups from entering Pakistan will not be possible. Thus instead of Afghanistan the

region will have to contend with a very large area and a population of 200 million to

content with. Disengagement is not an option.

5.3 According Indian analyst Sanjay Kumar war is not just bound to logistics or materials

rather it is the war of minds. If a firewall has to be planted then it should be imposed

on the minds of the people who support terrorism by educating and reconciling with

them rather than physically ostracizing them.

6. Consequences of allowing situation to drift:

Through it is unlikely that the world will turn its back to the region as it did after the

Mujahideen victory in Afghanistan in 1989 but the brief considers the consequences if a

similar option ever occurs:

6.1 It will create a situation that persisted in Afghanistan from 1996-2001 where there is

intense internal struggle in Afghanistan that is supported by Pakistani Jihadist and

others. It will spread to Pakistani areas and is likely to attain ethnic dimensions. The

demography and fighting capabilities as well as organizational abilities of the

Taliban will provide them an edge that will result in their domination of Afghanistan.

After a bloody war of the genocidal proportion with grave violations of human

rights.

6.2 The effect of a Taliban government will transform the Pakistani national narrative

into an Islamist shape that will lead to two distinct possibilities:

a. FATA and KP will become similar to the war zone in Afghanistan will the Taliban

using it as a safe haven on a large scale Increase in the hate volume against India,

the West and even China

b. There will be rightist influence over Pakistani politics and security policy.

c. There will be more radicalization of the Pakistani population.

d. There is likely to be an increase in hate against India eventually against West and

China.

e. There is a definite possibility of deterioration of relations between Pakistan and

the rest of the world particularly India.

f. The Pakistani military will be so involved in internal policing that it will not have

space to concentrate on defending the border with India and it will thus allow

India to encroach further on water resources in the Himalayas and shape Pakistani

policies.

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g. Apparently the policy of drift is also not a prudent option because if the US

disengages from Afghanistan without laying a solid framework on which peace

can be built will be a sure recipe for chaos that will get out of hand very quickly.

7. Re- instituting former traditional systems of governance

7.1 Afghanistan historically was a loosely governed confederation of tribes and clans

where the King and his officials exchanged influence for the flow of money and

exchanged for loyalties for the central government. The country was administered in

a minimalist manner where the community elders had a responsible role to play and

were answerable to the King in Kabul. Whenever a certain individual rebelled he was

dealt with by the Afghan army.

7.2 This model was functional in its pristine form during the reign of Amir Abdur

Rehman (1880-1901). His achievements were impressive. His main task was the

integration of rebellious tribes into a single polity. He weakened the autonomy of the

tribes by transferring many of the military and administrative functions of the chiefs

to the central government. He transferred loyal tribesmen as settlers into rebellious

regions, and neutralized the independence of Hazaras and Nuristanis. [6]

7.3 Over a period of time Afghanistan’s leaders have struggled to modernize their nation

however in the absence of a strong military it has been a risky proposition. King

Amanullah( 1919-1929) the most enthusiastic modernizer of Afghanistan before,

Sardar Daud failed because he did not have the military capacity to defeat the tribal

challengers.

7.4 Sardar Daud( 1973-1978) was another modernizer yet his attempts to provide a

modern base for the development of Afghanistan from 1953-63 failed. As a matter of

fact the Helmand Valley Development initiative that was massive by Afghan

standards ushered in unintended consequences that helped in creation of a leftist base

inside Afghanistan. In July 1973 Daud led a coup ousting King Zahir Shah (1933-

1973) and declaring Afghanistan a Republic. Thus ended the rule of a king who

presided over the most peaceful and prosperous era in Afghani history for 40 years.

7.5. It is a good point for discussion whether the time is not ripe to revert to the only

model of stability that Afghanistan has known in its history and look for a neutral

figure as King who is acceptable to all the groups in Afghanistan. It is clear that such

a consensus will need to be built through the institution of the Loe Jirga – a

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collection of tribal representatives who meet at critical times in Afghan history who

are able to bring unity.

Once this phase is complete then it is for the new dispensation to end war and usher a

period of reconciliation and re-integration of those who were ousted from the

national fabric since the last decade. May be this option has the greatest potential of

generating momentum towards peace. However, this option will need the support of

the West and Afghan neighbors for its success.

7.6 Clearly genuine reconciliation and peace may be difficult to achieve in Afghanistan

unless the West seriously engages the Taliban. Such talks can only come about after

the exact terms of a post- war Afghanistan have been determined. Even under such

conditions the role of having a pivot of statehood under a monarch may be

inevitable.

8. Address at Workshop by Khalid Aziz Chairman RIPORT

Gentlemen Good evening

8.1 On behalf of RIPORT and Agricultural University I want to thank you for joining us

in this policy formulation workshop. I especially welcome those from government.

8.2 As we all know the war in this region is reaching a terminal phase with a withdrawal

of troops looking plainly imminent – it is likely to begin in 2011.

8.3 The public in the US and NATO countries are less enthusiastic about the presence of

troops in Afghanistan. Secondly the rampant increase of the cost of war in

Afghanistan that is $120 billion a year is becoming a burden.

8.4 The Pakistan public and government are for from enthusiastic about the war and the

public support for it is fast dwindling.

8.5 Let us begin the proceedings please.

As you know that soon there will be changes in Afghanistan and we are gathered to

discuss options that will be transformed into policy paper after the workshop.

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Paper presented by Juma Khan Sufi

US Exit Plan for Afghanistan

9.1 The recent Lisbon Summit of NATO was a major development. It dispelled the

impression that US, NATO and coalition are eager to wind up sooner than latter.

Fixing 2014 as the aspirational goal rather than an actual deadline for the withdrawal

of combat forces in consonance with July 2010 pronouncement by President Karzai

that by then the Afghan security forces would be ready to take full responsibility of

the military and law enforcement operations throughout Afghanistan should be

viewed as such in this context. The upcoming December review by the US aimed at

to recalculate its military presence will further clear the clouds over the horizon.

There were fears that US administration of President Barrack Obama would most

probably begin shifting to a counter-terrorism (CT) strategy requiring many fewer

troops in Afghanistan if the pending review finds that the current counter-insurgency

(COIN) strategy is not working, according to a new report published prior to the

Summit by a bipartisan task force of 25 prominent analysts and former top foreign

policy officials.

9.2 But the Lisbon summit set no clear game strategy for Afghanistan. The AfPak

Special Representative, Richard Holbrooke, has aptly described that US has no exit

strategy but a transition strategy. July 2011 draw down date given by President

Obama would be just a symbolic gesture. Both dates are mainly focused to appease

the domestic unease over the continuation of infinite war – the war they must fight.

These dates are conditions- based and the ground realities belie the aspirations.

Neither NATO nor Karzai are telling the whole truth. The mostly illiterate Afghan

security forces recruited and trained on uneven ground mainly drawn from the ethnic

minorities and not led by Pashtoon officers, the traditional officer class, with current

large scale desertions will not be able to fight on their own without the active backup

of the International Security Assistance Force. Secondly, the troops surge started

with big fanfare expected to turn around the insurgency, win the war and force the

weakened Taliban to negotiate and reintegrate, is not going to succeed. The

widespread corruption and mis-governance of Karzai administration also adds fuel to

the fire of insurgency.

9.3 On the other hand, the rising human and material costs of the ongoing counter-

insurgency operations are not sustainable for indefinite period of time. The

continuation of the present counter-insurgency strategy further swells the ranks of

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Taliban, unifies the extremist groups, threatens the health of US economy, diverts its

attention away from other pressing issues and alienates its population. But the

consequences of the defeat and total withdrawal would be catastrophic for the US,

NATO, coalition and even for the neighboring states, first and foremost, Pakistan.

Russia, China and India must have heaved a sigh of relief over the Lisbon

declaration about Afghanistan. The expansion of military infrastructure in the North

and West of Afghanistan, the opening of alternative rail route passing through

Ukraine or Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Mazar-i- Sharif, the new

found love affair with Russia, the extension of Kabul and Islamabad US embassies

costing billions of dollars indicate that the US wants to remain engaged for longer

period of time in the region.

9.4 We remain victim of the insurgency, as well as counter-insurgency. We have no

choices. The US would like to broaden cooperation from tribal area to the cities in

Pakistan, minimize the role of security forces of Pakistan and directly deal with the

insurgents. Pakistan does not want to give free walk to Americans inside the

country, still pins its hope on some of the Taliban combatants for fear of Indian

influence in Afghanistan, but at the same time the deepening economic crisis needing

continuous intake of US military and civilian aid remain our Achilles heal. Besides,

we also face insurgency and terrorism on a wider scale. The more this war drags on,

the more we would face the negative consequences. Believing that the withdrawal of

the foreign forces from Afghanistan will automatically end insurgency and terrorism

here in Pakistan is negation of history and taking casual view of the phenomenon.

Similarly to believe that terrorism and insurgency will remain at manageable level

whatever happens in Afghanistan also tantamount to wishful thinking.

9.5 Given the fact that US is determined to remain engaged, the present counter-

insurgency strategy is leading nowhere and US would like to achieve its goal by

different means, say counter terrorism conducted with application of minimal

military boots, high-tech weaponry or even withdrawing from Pashtoon populated

areas in the south and east of Afghanistan, then Pakistan would face a worst case

scenario on an unimaginable magnitude. Continuing the present reactive policy vis-

à-vis Afghanistan might lead us to more disasters. Our over obsession with Indian

factor might not blind us to ignoring the existential threat emanating from the

situation beyond our control.

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9.6 This is the time of reckoning and Pakistani establishment must seize the opportunity

to adopt a proactive policy. Taliban led Afghanistan will not take place and the world

is not going to let it happen. A negotiated settlement with Taliban is in our interest,

as well as in the interest of the world. We have natural clout of geography, history

and ethnicity and war or peace in Afghanistan is unthinkable without Pakistan’s help.

Instead of repeatedly listening to US mantra to do more, we must take the initiative

and shed the past baggage.

Whatever clout we have, we must use it in favor of a settlement. The stakes are high

for us. In order to develop an alternative narrative, we should shift the paradigm.

The security doctrine pursued so far does not fit into the reality of the present day

world. This does not mean that we must ignore the eastern threat. It means that

adopting a more robust approach, we dispel the widely held impression that Pakistan

uses extremism as a foreign policy tool.

The ambiguity no longer favors us. The alternatives to COIN are dreadful. Before the

US decides to go for a Counter Terrorism strategy, we must act and act decisively.

We also face the problem of governance and corruption like Afghanistan, but our

security establishment is capable enough to act on its own.

9.7 Pakistan can only force an earlier exit from Afghanistan when it is ready to play the

role of an honest facilitator. By allowing making it further difficult for Americans to

stay in Afghanistan, we would actually impose alternative strategy on them, which

would harm Pakistan more than anybody else. With the passage of time the space of

maneuver is narrowing down for us.

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The dynamics of Post US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the repercussions on FATA & Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Dr. Ijaz KhanChairman: Department of International Relations University of Peshawar

10.1 US President Obama announced last year that US forces would start withdrawal from

Afghanistan from July 2001 In Kabul Conference on Afghanistan in July and then re

confirmed at Lisbon meeting of NATA last month, the US /NATO announced plan

to hand over all operations to Afghan security forces by 2014. These two statements

have created a lot of debate and different reactions. There are different interpretations

of these announcements as well. The most popular and common interpretation, at

least within Pakistan is that US is leaving Afghanistan – is looking for a face saving

formula – and has lost the War in Afghanistan.

10.2 I will address this interpretation which I consider to be not wholly correct. But before

doing so, I will also present my view of those who interpret such and try to see what

can be the implications of that as well as what some expect from such a scenario

10.3 President Obama’s announcement of the commencement of withdrawal accompanied

by an increase in US troops in Afghanistan as well as announcement of plans and

commitments to increase the economic, administrative and military/Police capability

of Afghanistan. There was no final deadline about when the withdrawal will be

completed. Also an important part of the announcement was the plan to review the

progress in December 2010.

10.4 In Pakistan initially only the withdrawal word and the increase in troops was heard,

then gradually people noticed the other parts including the part that troops will not

withdraw by July 2010 but start withdrawing by then, the other parts were

downplayed even if noticed. The review part was rarely noticed.

10.5 The current announcement about handing over operations in Afghanistan to Afghans

has been interpreted as the final announcement of the missing deadline part in the

earlier announcement. Again no one noted that US has not said it will leave

Afghanistan by 2014.

All this has been accompanied by US direct or indirect negotiations with Taliban.

And various quarters in US talking negatively about Karzai, the Afghan President

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10.6 Those interpreting these announcements as US acceptance of its loss and US as

being about to leave Afghanistan can be divided into groups

Outright supporters of Taliban / Al Qaeda and agreeing with their political agenda.

They consider time has arrived or is about to arrive for a religious takeover of the Af-

Pak region.

Traditional Pakistani mindset that continues to consider Taliban as the best bet for

Pakistan in Afghanistan and religious extremists as a good tool of policy – they look

at all the scenario with focus on India

Some left of the center opinion, which considers this will result in return of Taliban

in Afghanistan and may even result in Talibanization of Pakistan – the end of a

possibility of a liberal democratic Pakistan. May also lead to a situation which will

force the return US in the near future with much more destructive force. Or at least

unleash a war with India.

There is also an opinion in between all the above, which considers US withdrawal

without addressing the issue of smooth transition to peace in Afghanistan will have

negative implications for at least the Af-Pak region. They must leave but first they

must address the issues of peaceful transition in Afghanistan as well as address the

issues of regional geo politics, especially the India Pakistan problems and their

manifestation in the Afghan imbroglio.

10.7 In my opinion, US is not about to leave Afghanistan. If it does, it will not do so in

defeat, unless the whole global balance of power undergoes a radical change. We

must also try to understand US political system especially the politics of the two

parties Republicans and Democrats. While Republicans are conservatives,

Democrats have more Centers left strand. Republicans, especially in Foreign Policy

are more militaristic and gives less importance to other elements in foreign policy.

For republicans socio economic aspects and human rights etc. play a lesser role in

any policy than democrats.

10.8 It must be understood that the difference is of degree and not absolute. The language

of both also differs, however, it must be remembered that on Afghanistan as on most,

if not all Foreign Policy issues they have bi partisan approach. Democratic losses in

the recent elections were not because of Foreign Policy let alone Afghanistan. They

were more about domestic economic and social issues. The pressire on US

administration from is still from the fringe of US public and has not reached the 15

popular mainstream opposition that US intervention Vietnam faced or the issues of

ethics connected with Iraq.

10.9 This is not to argue that US does not want to leave Afghanistan. It would love to at

the first opportunity, but it will only do so after ensuring that the scenario presented

by the third group presented above does not result. Negotiations with Taliban are

more a part of what has been termed by some as peeling off strategy and not a

compromise with Taliban.

10.10There are opportunities and challenges for Pakistan. US will do whatever it takes to

bring Pakistan on board. They know the vital position of Pakistan in the helping US

exit from Afghanistan the way they want to. Pakistan can really help US and gain in

many areas or US will try to make Pakistan help it. To what extent it will go to do

that and what it can or will do is any body’s guess.

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Discussions

Withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan:

2014 aspirational date of withdrawal of NATO Forces from Afghanistan; but not final

It will be a condition-based withdrawal if it occurs

ANA will not be able to secure peace as there are many problems making

expansion uneven

Mis-governance in Afghanistan is the principle reason for its problems

Peace in Afghanistan does not really have a deep impact on the stability of

Pakistan. There are other issues as well to be addressed related to security and

governance

US will remain in the region for a long time although number of troops and strategy

will vary

Pakistan’s main problem is its financial weakness and thus reduces its options.

Counter Insurgency is not effective as policies for ‘hold’ and ‘build’ phase need

strengthening; they are now weak.

A negotiated settlement with the Taliban is the path to peace. Pakistan should help

the Afghans.

Focus on Pakistan First

We should shift the national paradigm; Pakistan should stay away from Jihad and redefine

its paradigm.

US announced its troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. It generated debate

different interpretations.

Operations will be handed over to Afghanistan forces

Pakistan has supporters of Al-Qaeda and Taliban within the country; we are

divided.

Some people say that Taliban are trying to spread religious education.

Some say that the government of Pakistan’s policy of supporting Taliban is good

for regional security.

The impression amongst many persons is that the US is about to leave Afghanistan.

According to panelists the US will not leave Afghanistan; they want to leave after

winning

US has influenced Pakistani by its economic and financial assistance.

More challenges to Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.

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Keeping US aims in mind; it is essential for Pakistan to decide; how to play the

pressure.

Study International Dynamics:

US want to leave but at the moment they want to leave after winning

Presumptions need to be examined with clarity

We must understand what is the internal dynamics of FATA/ KP and impact on the

once withdrawal of foreign forces occur in Afghanistan- will the militants go away?

Local Jihadists have become more autonomous and now wage their own war.

Even Barelvis (a sub sect of Sunni Muslims) have also joined violence and it has

now become a Sunni driven violence.

Pakistan is relevant to US as it serves US interests.

Pakistan is not pursuing its own issues, like the Kashmir issue, or India’s intent to

divert Indus waters. While we remain focused on Afghanistan other national

matters are left Madrassah.

Issues of FATA /KP will remain same, if we remain in a drift. Internal cohesion is

must and it is related to better security and governance.

National consensus to fight the war is essential- people in other provinces are least

concerned with the war. Some of the equally important issues for us are:-

o Investing more resources in security

o Implementing the 18th Amendment

More engaged leadership in KP.

In the past violence was against British, now the Islamist are calling other Muslims

Kafirs and they are better armed & funded.

Nation building has been back staged.

The Afghanistan refugee issue will revive in a Blackwill plan; Pakistan has a deficit

of trust.

Afghanistan has always been chaotic:

Afghanistan is black hole and no solution is workable.

Afghanistan was never at peace in history. Let us not waste our efforts to make it

peaceful now.

Pakistan is becoming more corrupt and weak in fighting someone else war.

Most parts of the country is indifferent to the terrorist activities and the war- like

situation prevailing in KP e.g. cities of Punjab. Cities like Lahore present a very

different kind of perception than is prevalent in KP.18

The whole nation should be sensitized about the different crises that Pakistan is

facing.

We are facing energy crises, water resources and water shortages, poor security

and weak dispensation of justice. These issues need to have higher priority than the

war.

We need to educate our people- education is prescription against radicalism.

Our wrong Policies

For USSR, the Mujahidden war their defeat in which Pakistan was used as a tool.

Afghanistan still believes that Pakistan is responsible for their ills and hate

Pakistan.

US can never exit cleanly, because the Russians and Chinese will not let them to

quit.

Permitting refugees to settle in Pakistan has done us harm as they introduced

weaponization and the drug culture.

We should obtain US aid in return for our favors to the US to overcome our

economic crises.

US cannot have a clean exit from Afghanistan without Pakistani support.

US is dependent on Pakistan for the execution of its plans in the region. But US

cannot be trusted as its sincerity towards Pakistan is doubtful and that is quite

obvious from the US stand on Kashmir issue.

Formation of a committee for institutional revival be created and it should consist

of bureaucrats and Ex MNAs for revival of the system.

Reality of US – Pak Relations US will not withdraw unless its security interests are met.

US is more concerned for security of US mainland then bothered about Pakistan.

Pakistan fiscal and foreign policy is dependent on events in Afghanistan since 1978,

that’s why we have been over emphasizing Afghanistan. We should focus

internally.

Pakistan is facing energy crises and illiteracy problem. As a nation we are short

sighted.

We brought US into the region and that has generated other evils – we cannot

prevent without extra regional influences and hence we are become weakened.

Therefore, we need to correct our policies that must be focused on implementing

universal values of peace within Pakistan. 19

During Zulfiqar Bhutto’s reign, we were recognized as a more respected nation

and we also had self-respect..

We must relinquish policies based to not pleasing anymore others.

Focus on culture for winning peace based on tribal dynamics; we need to revive

and support peace, love and brotherhood.

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Annexure- A

CONSENSUS RESOLUTION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE IN-CAMERA JOINT SITTING OF PARLIAMENT (8TH OCT - 22TH OCT 2008)

This in-camera joint session of Parliament has noted with great concern that extremism,

militancy and terrorism in all forms and manifestations pose a grave danger to the stability

and integrity of the nation-state. It was recalled that in the past the dictatorial regimes

pursued policies aimed at perpetuating their own power at the cost of national interest.

This House, having considered the issue thoroughly and at great length is of the view that

in terms of framing laws, building institutions; protecting our citizens from violence,

eradication of terror at its roots, re-building our economy and developing opportunities for

the disadvantaged, we all commit to the following:-

1. That we need an urgent review of our national security strategy and revisit the

methodology of combating terrorism in order to restore peace and stability to Pakistan

and the region through an independent foreign policy.

2. The challenge of militancy and extremism must be met through developing a

consensus and dialogue with all genuine stakeholders.

3. The nation stands united to combat this growing menace, with a strong public message

condemning all forms and manifestations of terrorism, including the spread of

sectarian hatred and violence, with a firm resolve to combat it and to address its root

causes.

4. That Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be safeguarded. The nation

stands united against any incursions and invasions of the homeland, and calls upon the

government to deal with it effectively.

5. That Pakistan’s territory shall not be used for any kind of attacks on other countries

and all foreign fighters, if found, shall be expelled from our soil.

6. That dialogue must now be the highest priority, as a principal instrument of conflict

management and resolution. Dialogue will be encouraged with all those elements

willing to abide by the Constitution of Pakistan and rule of law.

7. That the development of troubled zones, particularly the tribal areas, and NWFP

(Pukhtoonkhwa), must also be pursued through all possible ways and legitimate means

to create genuine stakeholders in peace. New economic opportunities shall be created

in order to bring the less privileged areas at par with the rest of Pakistan.

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8. That a political dialogue with the people of Balochistan, the redressal of grievances

and redistribution of resources shall be enhanced and accelerated.

9. That the state shall maintain the rule of law, and that when it has to intervene to protect

the lives of its citizens, caution must be exercised to avoid casualties of non-

combatants in conflict zones.

10. That the federation must be strengthened through the process of democratic pluralism,

social justice, religious values and tolerance, and equitable resource sharing between

the provinces as enshrined in the Constitution of 1973.

11. That the state shall establish its writ in the troubled zones, and confidence building

mechanisms by using customary and local communities (jirga) and that the military

will be replaced as early as possible by civilian law enforcement agencies with

enhanced capacity and a sustainable political system achieved through a consultative

process.

12. That Pakistan’s strategic interests be protected by developing stakes in regional peace

and trade, both on the western and eastern borders.

13. That mechanisms for internal security be institutionalized by; paying compensation for

victims of violence; and rehabilitate those displaced from their homes as soon as

possible; that spill-over effects of terrorism be contained throughout the country and

that public consensus be built against terrorism through media and religious

participation.

14. That a Special Committee of Parliament be constituted to periodically review, provide

guidelines and monitor the implementation of the principles framed and roadmap given

in this Resolution. This House authorizes the Speaker to constitute the said Committee

in consultation with the parliamentary leaders of both Houses. The Committee will

frame its own rules upon meeting

Sd/-

1. Mrs. Sherry Rehman

2. Mian Raza Rabbani

3. Dr. Babar Awan

4. IqbalZafar Jhagra

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5. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman

6. Mr.Wasim Sajjad

7. Anisa Zeb Tahirkheli

8. Abdul Rahim Khan Mandokhel

9. Justice (R) Abdul Razak A. Thahim

10. Munir Khan Orakzai

11. Mir Israrullah Zehri

12. Shahid Hassan Bugti

13. Pervaiz Khan

14. Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi

15. Maulana Sami-ul-Haq

16. Prof. Khursheed Ahmed

17. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan

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Annexure- B

List of Participants for the workshop on: “Future Regional Security in Pakistan & Afghanistan after 2011: issues and challenges”

Name Designation Organization

Juma Khan Sufi Research Assistant Area Study CenterM. Naeem Khan DCR RIPORT RIPORTRiaz Khan Mahsud PA Orakzai Agency FATA sect Azam Durrani Former FATA sect

Fakhre –e- Alam DG of Projects FATA sect

Khan B. Marwat Vice chancellor KPK AUP

Khalid Aziz Chairman RIPORT RIPORT

Ashfaq Toru Producer/ director Seven colors productionNur -Bashr Naveed Writer Fakhar kakakhel Journalist Aaj News Zia –ul – Haq Bureau Chief ARY news M. Munir Reporter Aaj NewsMian Duad Nazim Assistant Director (AUP) KPK AUPIjaz Khan Chairman I.R. dept ( UOP)Habib ullah Khan ACS FATA secretariat Brig (R) Javed Iqbal Cilivil military affairs specialist FATA CBPNisar Mohd Khan Director culture Directorate Culture Col. Hameed Ullah Afridi Rtd. Army Officer Pak Army Dr. Sarfaraz Khan Dircetor Area Study center University of Peshawar

Yousuf Ghaffar Khan Asif Nisar Ismail Khan Reporter DawnBrig (R) Pervaiz Khalid Babar Pak Army Ahad Baig Reporter Aaj Tv Rizwan Ahmed AD P & D KPK AUP

Prof. Dr. Mohd Naeem Dean Faculty of Crops KPK AUP

Prof. Dr. Amjad Hussain Dean Faculty of Vet sciences KPK AUP

Prof. Dr. Munir Khattak Dean Faculty of Social Sciences KPK AUP

Prof. Dr. Hameed Ulllah Dean Faculty of Nutrition Sciences KPK AUP

Prof. Mohammad Jamal Khan Director P & D KPK AUP

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