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India’s National Security

Annual Review 2009

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ii India’s National Security

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India’s National Security

Annual Review 2009

Editor-in-Chief

SATISH KUMAR

LONDON NEW YORK NEW DELHI

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© 2009 Satish Kumar

Published 2010by Routledge912 Tolstoy House, 15–17 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi 110 001

Simultaneously published in the UKby Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Typeset byStar Compugraphics Pvt LtdD–156, Second Floor (Opposite Metropolis)Sector 7, NOIDA

Printed and bound in India by

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-0-415-57141-8

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Contents

Editorial Board viiiContributors xPreface xvMap xix

I National Security Review

1. National Security Environment Satish Kumar

(i) Global Security Trends 3 (ii) External Security Situation 32 (iii) Internal Security Developments 70

2. India’s Neighbourhood

(i) In Search of Solutions in Afghanistan (Af-Pak) 108 R.K. Sawhney

(ii) Political Dynamics in Nepal and Security Implications 124 Ashok Mehta

(iii) Bangladesh 2009 — The Elections and Beyond 142 Veena Sikri

(iv) Decline and Fall of the LTTE 163 V. Suryanarayan

3. India’s Engagement with Asia, Africa and Latin America 176 INSAR Research Staff

4. Talibanisation of Pakistan and the Growth of Jihadi Culture 192 Vikram Sood

5. China’s Strategic Interests in South and South East Asia 209 G.G. Dwivedi

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vi India’s National Security

6. India’s Defence Cooperation with Other Countries 223 Kapil Kak

7. India’s Defence and Security Initiatives 239 INSAR Research Staff

8. Challenges in Space: The Significance of Chandrayaan-1 254 Kaza Lalitendra

9. India’s Economic Security: Global Crisis Context 274 Chandrajit Banerjee

II National Security Threats and Challenges

10. Internal Security Administration in India: The Reform Process 297 V. Balachandran

11. India’s Maoist Movement 318 P.V. Ramana

12. The Transnational Terror Threat to India: Lashkar-e-Taiba as the Key Actor 334 Praveen Swami

13. India’s Maritime Challenges and Responses: From the Gulf of Aden to Malacca Straits 352 Arun Prakash

14. Rebuilding the Foundations of Defence Industry 367 Jasjit Singh

15. India’s Security and Cyber Warfare 387 Ashok Jhunjhunwala

16. Technology Challenges in National Security 403 P.S. Goel

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IIIMilitary Profile of Countries in the Neighbourhood

Table 1: Military Capability of China and Pakistan (1999–2009) 421

Table 2: Flow of Arms from Abroad to India’s Neighbours (1998–2008) 423

IVChronology of Major Events 2008

United States 443Europe 448Russia 450Japan 454China 454Pakistan 459Nepal 463Bangladesh 464Sri Lanka 465Bhutan 467Maldives 468Major Global Developments 468Major Regional Developments 469SAARC 474Africa and Latin America 474

Index 476

Contents vii

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Editorial Board

Chairman

Amb. M. Rasgotra, Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Former Chairman, National Security Advisory Board

Members

Dr Sanjaya Baru, Former Media Adviser to the Prime Minister, New DelhiSh. Tarun Das, Chief Mentor, Confederation of Indian Industry, New DelhiAmb. Arundhati Ghose, Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to UN Offices in Geneva and the Conference on DisarmamentProf. P.V. Indiresan, Former Director, Indian Institute of Technology, ChennaiLt. Gen. V.K. Kapoor, Former Commandant, Army War College, MhowLt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, Former Director, United Service Institution of India, New DelhiDr Roddam Narasimha, Chairman, Engineering Mechanics Unit, Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research, BangaloreDr S.D. Pradhan, Former Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, New DelhiSh. Y.S. Rajan, Principal Adviser, Confederation of Indian Industry, New DelhiDr V. Siddhartha, Former Scientist Emeritus, Defence Research and Development Organization, New DelhiAir Cmde. Jasjit Singh, Director, Centre for Air Power Studies, New DelhiSh. B.G. Verghese, Former Editor, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi

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Editor-in-Chief Research AssistantsProf. Satish Kumar Radhapiyari Devi Former Professor of Diplomacy Vineet ThakurJawaharlal Nehru University Naresh Kumar B.K.New Delhi Arun Kumar Nayak Indrani Talukdar

Editorial Office Computer-cum-Office AssistantZ-24, Ground Floor Yashvir Jaswal Hauz KhasNew Delhi – 110016Tel.: 91-11-41656842Fax: 91-11- 46018144 Email: prof.satishkumar@gmail.com

Editorial Board ix

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Contributors

V. Balachandran retired as Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. He served 17 years in Maharashtra Police & 19 years in federal intelligence. In 1987, he was deputed to head a two-man committee, on the request of the President of an important Indian Ocean country, to study and recommend reorganization of their security. In 1993–94, he headed Indian interagency groups for annual dialogue with USA on terrorism. Since retirement he has been writing and giving lectures on internal security issues. He was a member of the two-man ‘High Level Committee’ appointed to enquire into Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks.

Chandrajit Banerjee is presently the Director General of Con-federation of Indian Industry (CII). Mr Banerjee has over 20 years of experience in CII. He was also the Executive Director of the National Foundation of Corporate Governance (NFCG), an organization set up by the Ministry of Company Affairs, Government of India. Some of the important positions held by him in the past in CII include: Head of the Regional & States Operations in CII; Head as Regional Director of the Western, Southern and the Northern Regions; Head of Organizational functions – HRD/Training, Finance, Administration, Information Technology; headed CII’s Economics Department. Before taking over as DG, CII he was the Chief Operating Officer of the Bangalore International Exhibition Centre (BIEC).

Maj. Gen. G.G. Dwivedi, SM, VSM & Bar, has vast operational and staff experience. He commanded a platoon in Bangladesh war, later a Battalion in Siachen, Mountain Brigade in Kashmir Valley and Mountain Division in Northeast. An alumnus of NDC, he has been Directing Staff at DSSC and Defence Attaché in China (with concurrent accreditation to Mongolia and North Korea). As MGGS (Doctrine) and Assistant Chief (Strategy) at the HQ, IDS, he has been instrumental in the formulation of numerous doctrines, strategies and concept papers on Conventional/Unconventional Wars, Space Leadership and Human Resource Development. He is also an M.Phil and Doctoral Fellow, having published a number of books, articles and research papers.

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Contributors xi

Dr Prem Shanker Goel is currently Chairman, RAC/DRDO, President, Indian National Academy of Engineering, and Member, National Security Advisory Board. In his long career at ISRO, he has contributed to the development of its programs from Aryabhatta to Remote Sensing Satellites like Ocean Sat, Resource Sat, Cartosat-1, TES and Cartosat-2, communication satellites INSAT-I to INSAT-4 and scientific missions like IRS P-3 and Chandryan-I. He has held various positions including Director, TSRO Satellite Centre, Secretary, Department of Ocean Development which he helped transform into Ministry of Earth Sciences. Recipient of numerous awards, he was conferred Padma Shri in 2001.

Prof. Ashok Jhunjhunwala teaches at IIT, Madras, and is a member of Prime Minister’s Scientific Advisory Committee. He has published 53 original research articles in peer-reviewed journals and authored several books and monographs. Awarded Padma Shri in 2002, he is also a recipient of numerous other awards, the most recent being ‘2009 Bernard Lown’ 42 Humanitarian award’ from University ofMaine, USA for serving India and ‘Excellence in Science and Tech-nology award’ for 2008–09 by Indian Science Congress. He is a fellow of World Wireless Research forum, IEEE and Indian academies including INAE, IAS, INSA and NAS. He is a Director on the boards of State Bank of India, TTML, Polaris, 3i Infotech, Sasken, Tejas, IDRBT, Tata Communications and Exicom.

Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak AVSM VSM (retd), formerly of the flying branch of the Air Force, is a well-known defence and security affairs analyst who earlier served as Deputy Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Postgraduate in Defence/Strategic Studies from Universities of Madras and Allahabad, he has, in recent years, authored more than 35 major book chapters and journal articles on a variety of strategic, national security and defence issues, and co-edited the book India and Pakistan: Pathways Ahead. He also did a 4-year stint as Advisor (Strategic Studies), University of Jammu. He is founder Additional Director, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

Wg. Cdr. Kaza Lalitendra, a fighter controller by profession, was commissioned in the Indian Air Force in 1991. Kaza has served with distinction in many front line air defence units of the Indian Air

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xii India’s National Security

Force. He was also the Chief Operations Officer of a strategically vital air defence unit in the eastern sector. An alumnus of Defence Services Staff College, he is a post graduate in Strategic and Defence studies from Madras University. Currently he is a Research Fellow with Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi and is working on a book length project titled ‘Militarisation and Weaponisation of Space: Policy Options for India’.

Maj. Gen. Ashok K. Mehta (retd) was commissioned in 1957, joined the Fifth Gorkhas and has walked nearly 30,000 km in Nepal since 1959. For his extensive travels in Nepal he was made a Fellow of Royal Geographic Society and for promoting the interests and welfare of Gorkha servicemen, awarded the AVSM. Gen Mehta has varied operational experience including UN peacekeeping. He was Force Commander IPKF (South) in Sri Lanka and founder-member of the Defence Planning Staff. He has written two books: War Despatches — Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004); and The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenge (2005).

Adm. Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in 2006. During a career spanning over 40 years, he commanded four warships, two air squadrons and a naval air station. In flag rank he commanded the Eastern Fleet, the National Defence Academy, the Andaman & Nicobar Command, and the Western Naval Command. A graduate of the IAF Test Pilots School, the Defence Services Staff College and the US Naval War College, he has published a book of speeches and writings titled From the Crow’s Nest. Admiral Prakash is currently a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board and Chairman of the National Maritime foundation.

Dr P.V. Ramana, currently Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, has researched extensively on India’s Maoist movement with over 80 publications on the subject — book chapters, research papers, newspaper, wire-service and website articles — of which several have appeared in inter-national journals. He has edited a book titled The Naxal Challenge in 2007. Dr Ramana is a guest faculty at Internal Security Academy, Mount Abu, and Border Security Force Academy, Gwalior. He has also been a Visiting Fellow at International Peace Research Institute, Norway, and Department of History, University of Calcutta.

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Lt. Gen. R. K. Sawhney retired as Deputy Chief of the Army Staff. He is currently Vice President, Perspective Planning Foundation, a think-tank in New Delhi consisting of retired armed forces officers, diplomats and civil servants. He is a postgraduate of Defence and Security Planning at National and International Levels Course at Royal College of Defence Studies, London, and Long Defence Management Course at College of Defence Management, India. During the Army service of approximately 40 years, he has held important appoint-ments in staff and command of combat units and field formations.

Prof. Veena Sikri holds the Ford Foundation Chair in Bangladesh Studies at the Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia. She is also a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore. A career diplomat with the Indian Foreign Service for 37 years, she served as India’s High Com-missioner to Malaysia and Bangladesh and India’s Consul General in Hong Kong. She held assignments in the Indian Embassies in Moscow, Paris, Kathmandu and in the Permanent Mission of India to the UN in New York. She was Director General of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations from 1989 to 1992.

Air Cmde. Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM, awarded Padma Bhushan for life-time’s contribution to national defence and security, is one of the leading defence experts in India. He graduated from the Air Force Academy with the Jodhpur Sword of Honour in 1956 retiring in 1988 as Air Commodore. He was Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, during 1987–2001 and currently heads the Centre for Air Power Studies, in New Delhi. He has published extensively and lectured regularly at defence and war colleges in India and abroad on strategic and security issues. He is a Fellow of the World Academy of Art and Science.

Vikram Sood headed India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), from January 2001 to March 2003. He joined the Indian Postal Service in 1966 and was transferred to RAW in 1972. After his retirement from RAW, he has been a com-mentator on international affairs, security and foreign policy issues. With a postgraduate degree in Economics from St Stephen’s College, Delhi, (1960–65), he maintains a blog of his perspectives on current affairs at soodvikram.blogspot.com. He is currently Vice President of

Contributors xiii

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xiv India’s National Security

the Centre for International Relations at Observer Research Foundation, an independent public policy think-tank based in Delhi.

Prof. V. Suryanarayan, formerly Senior Professor and Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras is currently Senior Research Fellow, Center for Asia Studies, Chennai.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editor at The Hindu, one of India’s lar-gest English-language newspapers. He reports on issues of security and low-intensity warfare, particularly the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and the operations of Islamist terror groups in India. Mr Swami has won several awards for his work, including the Indian Express-Ramnath Goenka Print Journalist of the Year prize, 2006; the Prem Bhatia Award for Political Journalism, 2003; and the Sanskriti Samman, 1999, for investigative work on the India-Pakistan war in Kargil. His most recent book India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: the Covert War in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947–2002, uncovers the history of the jihadist movement in Jammu and Kashmir.

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Preface

National Security 2009

Looking at the global security situation, one cannot say that we are living in a care-free world. There are problems like global terrorism and global warming which stare us in the face, impact our lives today and are likely to do so still more tomorrow. There are tensions between major powers which revive memories of the Cold War. There are threats and counter threats between major and middle powers and international hotspots where sparks keep flying. There are conflicts which have simmered for years and provide no hope of an early end. Thus, there is intense competition for strategic space between powers of the world.

It would be naïve to say that such an environment does not affect India. However, India’s national security policy has deftly tried to traverse the turbulent waters of global politics and built strategic partnerships with major actors. In 2008–09, India’s relations with the US and Russia were further strengthened, anchored in strong defence ties. Despite occasional irritations, the positive trend was maintained. So also with major European powers. India, for reasons of sustained economic growth, military capability and democratic stability has acquired a status which no power can afford to ignore. That enhances India’s sense of security.

China, however, is a cause for serious concern. China’s calculated procrastination in resolving the boundary dispute has not gone unnoticed in India. China’s frequent incursions across the border in the east and west, and its repeated claims on Arunachal Pradesh, accompanied by its rapid military modernisation, have led to the belief in India that China poses a serious threat. This is despite the Government of India’s attempts to minimise the significance of the media reports to this effect. At the same time, China and India are projected as future centres of gravity in world politics and both have common interests in decisions pertaining to global warming, energy security and terrorism. While India is conscious of common interests, and is keen to avoid any escalation of tension, it is giving due importance to the need to upgrade its defences vis-à-vis China.

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xvi India’s National Security

Pakistan poses a highly complex security threat to India. It is not Pakistan’s nuclear or conventional military capability that worries India. It is the reign of terror that has come to pervade Pakistan in the last few years. The state of Pakistan, wholly or partially, has been sponsoring acts of terrorism against India. It has been indulgent to organisations which swear to work against India. Besides, the Taliban, in league with Al Qaeda, are committed to the creation of a Sharia-based state in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A section of the security establishment in Pakistan regards the Taliban as a strategic asset, particularly against Afghanistan. This is a scenario to which there is no easy military response. The situation calls for highest ingenuity on the part of India to marshal its political, diplomatic and military capabilities.

India’s South Asian neighbourhood, with the exception of Pakistan, is a friendly zone. Irrespective of whether there is democracy or not, all the neighbours recognise a high degree of interdependence with India. Challenges exist in the form of China’s attempts to counter Indian influence in the region, Pakistan’s attempts to encourage Islamic extremists in these countries to undertake anti-India acts, illegal migrations into India, and anti-India activities of certain endemically hostile sections of society in these countries. India has to live with this geopolitical reality and explore the imperatives of interdependence.

India has massive internal security problems, the most serious of which is Naxalite violence. In 2009, new and vigorous steps have been taken to combat this threat. But the country has to prepare itself to cope with the threat of terrorism which is being unleashed by Lashkar-e-Taiba from Pakistan.

In this volume, a detailed analysis of the regional security en-vironment has been undertaken by assessing the situation in Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The threat of Talibanisation of Pakistan and its implications has been examined. China’s strategic objectives in the region have been analysed. The importance of India’s defence cooperation with other countries has been duly em-phasised. India’s achievements in space have been highlighted. An evaluation of India’s performance in the context of the global economic crisis has been made.

The volume examines the internal security administration of the country and evaluates the reforms recently undertaken. It puts the spotlight on the Maoist (Naxalite) movement and delves deep into

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their tactics and strategies. It brings out very lucidly the role played by Lashkar-e-Taiba in instigating and organising terrorism in India.

Recommendations have been made in this volume on how to manage some critical threats and challenges. Attention has been drawn to maritime threats that India faces and it has been suggested that a broadbased dialogue on maritime security issues should be initiated between contending naval powers in the region, namely, China, India, Australia, Japan, and perhaps Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. A strong plea has been made to give importance to indigenous design and development in building the defence industry of the country. The nature of cyber-warfare in today’s world has been examined and it has been pointed out that in order to protect our strategic sectors, we need to design and build India-specific systems and software for which we have enough capability. And lastly, it has been said that lamentably we are not using terrorism-specific technologies that we have because they have not been made available to the user law enforcement agencies. If technology has to be harnessed to national security, there needs to be greater interface between the scientists and the security organisations.

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xviii India’s National Security

AcknowledgementsThis publication is being supported by the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) of India and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). We are grateful to them for their support. However, the views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the NSCS or the CII.

The publication derives its guidance from the Editorial Board which at the beginning of the year decides its contents and con-tributors. The Editor is grateful to the Chairman of the Board, Amb. M. Rasgotra and its members for their invaluable advice and support throughout the year.

Sambit Rath, a Ph.D scholar at the Centre for Studies in Science Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and a Consultant at the Planning Commission, Government of India, was the guest scholar who prepared the section on Military Profile of Countries in the Neighbourhood. The research staff for this volume consisted of Radhapiyari Devi, Vineet Thakur, Naresh Kumar B.K., Arun Kumar Nayak and Indrani Talukdar, all of them Ph.D scholars at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. They worked with great dedication, commitment and diligence and rose up to the standards expected of them. The Editor acknowledges with gratitude the contribution made by them. The map was prepared by KBK, a professional graphics company.

September 2009 Satish Kumar

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National Security Environment

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2 India’s National Security

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1

National Security Environment

(i) Global Security Trends

Satish Kumar

IntroductionThe global security situation cannot be said to be threatened by the prospect of a war between major powers, but there are enough causes to keep tensions brewing between them, and to keep alive the possibility of wars between major powers and middle powers. The dominant feature of the international security landscape seems to be the contending endeavours of major powers to expand their con-trol and influence in energy-rich areas of the world. Nuclear weapons powers want to maintain their monopoly of nuclear weapons, tech-nology and materials, and in the name of non-proliferation deny it to others. There is a sharp divergence between the perceptions of the US and Russia on major global security issues. China’s con-tinued emphasis on massive enhancement of its military capability without obvious justification has become a noteworthy feature of world politics.

International hotspots like Georgia, Afghanistan and Iran, and issues like missile deployment in Eastern Europe, continue to be matters of concern for regional security. Global terrorism, the most serious threat to international peace, is not being tackled at its roots. Global warming, even while receiving sufficient media attention, is not driving nations towards an international consensus with the urgency required.

Strategic Thinking of Major PowersUnited StatesThe US Department of Defense on 31 July 2008 announced the National Defense Strategy, which primarily focused on the need to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against the US, its allies and friends. It also recog-nised the importance of preventing enemies from threatening it, its allies and its friends with weapons of mass destruction, and working

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4 India’s National Security

with other states to defuse regional conflicts, including conflict inter-vention. And finally, it emphasised the need to transform national security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. The do-cument also stressed that in order to win unconventional wars, such as the anti-terror war, the US military should shift from heavy reliance on military force to making use of both hard and soft power.1

The new defence strategy singled out Iran and North Korea as threatening ‘international order’ and meriting US concern. This strategy also warned about potential threats from China and Russia, and urged the United States to build ‘collaborative and cooperative relationships’ with them while hedging against their increasing military capabilities. Similarly, it also looked to India to assume greater responsibility as a stakeholder in the international system, commensurate with its growing economic, military and soft power. Besides, the strategy strongly affirmed emphasis on the importance of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism to tackle Al Qaeda and other terrorists.2

In the course of his address to a conference organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, at Singapore on 31 May 2008, US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates outlined the contours of America’s policy towards the Pacific region by emphasising that the United States is a Pacific nation with an enduring role and interests in Asia. The continued presence of the United States in this part of the world has been an essential element in the rise of Asia — ‘opening doors, protecting and preserving common spaces on the high seas, in space, and more and more in the cyber world’.3

In northeast Asia, mature alliances bind the US to Japan and South Korea and these alliances are being transformed to fit the realities of the 21st century. The Republic of Korea is assuming more responsibilities for its own defence while the US reduces its footprint. The US is realigning and refocusing its forces in Japan while cooperating in areas such as missile defence. Down south, Australia remains America’s stalwart ally and partner. The US maintains other formal treaty alliances throughout the region, including the Philippines and Thailand, each being aware that ‘this special American connection adds to, or even enables, its freedom of maneuver’.4 This web of relationships includes America’s growing ties with India and increasing engagement with China. While referring to the ongoing discussions about a ‘new security architecture’ in Asia, Gates said that the US would like to participate in those discussions but would

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National Security Environment 5

meanwhile continue to depend on ‘our time-tested Asian alliance architecture, a framework embracing many overlapping security relationships’.5

Robert M. Gates revealed the latest US thinking with regard to nuclear weapons stockpile in the course of his address delivered to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC on 28 October 2008. He said that with the end of the Cold War much of the need for a massive nuclear arsenal of the same size and composition as that period warranted is no longer valid. Our policies reflect a new set of post-Cold War requirements:

We have taken numerous weapons systems out of service —including the Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), half our Minuteman ICBMs, and a number of ballistic missile submarines. Our B-1 heavy bombers and four Trident submarines no longer have a nuclear mission.

In 1992, we unilaterally stopped nuclear testing, and developed the Stockpile Stewardship Programme to improve the safety, security and reliability of our stockpile in the absence of further testing.

We have completed all the reductions required under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — or START.

We are planning to reach the limits of the Moscow Treaty — a two-thirds reduction of our deployed nuclear force levels of eight years ago — by 2010, nearly two years early.6

Gates further said that the US cannot ignore efforts by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran to develop and deploy nuclear weapons, or Russian or Chinese strategic modernisation programmes. As long as other states have or seek nuclear weapons — and potentially can threaten the US, its allies and friends — the US must have a deterrent capacity that makes it clear that challenging the United States in the nuclear arena — or with other weapons of mass destruction – could result in an overwhelming, catastrophic response.7

The Bush Administration requested $518.3 billion to cover the peacetime costs of the Department of Defense (DOD) in the Financial Year (FY) 2009. In addition, the request included $70 billion to cover costs associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — the so-called global war on terror. Taken together, DOD was projected to receive some $588.3 billion in FY 2009. The defence budget was submitted on 4 February 2008.8

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The request for DOD’s base budget (i.e., the budget exclusive of war costs) amounted to a nominal increase of about 7.5 per cent from the level of funding approved by the Congress for FY 2008. In real terms though, the increase would be some 5 per cent. This would bring the DOD base budget to its highest level ever.9

For FY 2010, the Obama administration on 7 May 2009 requested a total of $664 billion for defence, including $533.8 billion for the base DOD budget and $130 billion for ongoing military operations around the world.10

RussiaDisclosing a policy shift in Russia’s attitude towards other countries, President Dmitry A. Medvedev said on 31 August 2008 that his gov-ernment would adhere to five principles of foreign policy: Russia would observe international law; it would reject United States’ dominance of world affairs in a unipolar world; it would seek friendly relations with other nations; it would defend Russian citizens and business interests abroad; and, it would claim a sphere of influence in the world. Medvedev laid down these principles in the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, while speaking on the eve of a summit of European leaders in Brussels.11

Earlier, in a speech on 15 July 2008, President Medvedev said that Russia will defend its interests abroad and made clear that he would not soften the assertive policies that annoyed the West under Mr Putin. Addressing a gathering of Russia’s top diplomats, he said he would stick to Putin’s doctrine of seeking a role for Russia on the world stage worthy of its resurgent power. He also pointed out, ‘Russia has become stronger and is capable of assuming greater re-sponsibility for solving problems on both regional and global scale’. Medvedev said security arrangements established in Europe at the end of the Cold War could collapse if the United States continued to chip away at their foundations, notably by deploying missile shields in Eastern Europe.12

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had warned on 23 January that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) military ex-pansion toward the borders of Russia was a throwback to the Cold War that only serves to cause antagonism. During a news conference he said that there was no security justification for the enlargement, and he warned former Soviet states they could hurt their ties with

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National Security Environment 7

Russia if they joined NATO. Russia expressed displeasure after Ukraine, formerly a part of the Soviet Union, applied to NATO to take the first steps towards membership.13

Russia put forward a set of proposals to establish a security structure that would stretch from Canada across Russia to China. At the heart of the proposals, presented to NATO by the Russian envoy Dmitry Rogozin on 28 July, was a new European security treaty that would be a legally binding document based on the United Nations Charter. The main reason for a new security pact was that ‘modern European security is overwhelmed with problems, ranging from NATO enlargement to illegal migration, drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism’. The new Russian proposals indicated that since Russia’s economy had revived after the chaos of the 1990s, the country was seeking ways to expand its influence.14

In a string of energy acquisitions, Russia took control of Serbia’s oil monopoly on 22 January. The deal will allow Moscow to send more natural gas to Europe through its South Stream pipeline. The Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom agreed to buy a 51 per cent stake in Nafta Industrija Srbije (NIS), the Serbian state-owned oil company. The deal was a blow to the European Union’s (EU) ambitions to build its own 2,000-mile pipeline to bring gas to Europe from Iran and Azerbaijan via Turkey. The Nabucco pipeline project of the European Union which was conceived to allow Europe to reduce its dependence on Russia had been dogged by logistical delays, lack of political will and disputes over financing. Gazprom took advantage of the disarray inside the European Union by forging ahead with its own contracts with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Serbia, thus consolidating its presence in southeastern Europe.15

Russia, Iran and Qatar on 21 October expressed their willingness to set up a ‘gas troika’, an Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-style group. After a meeting with Gazprom chief Alexei Miller and Qatar’s Energy Minister Abdullah al-Attiyah in Tehran, Iranian Oil Minister Gholamhossein Nozari said that there was a consensus between the three to set up a gas OPEC. Russia, Iran and Qatar are ranked first, second and third largest holders of natural gas reserves and together constitute more than half the global total. However, Europe and the United States warned against establishing such a body, saying it could pose a threat to global energy security and create room for price manipulation.16

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Russia on 22 January sent two long-range bombers to the Bay of Biscay, off the French and Spanish Atlantic coasts, to test-fire missiles in its biggest navy exercises in the area since Soviet times. Firing missiles off the coastline of two members of the NATO military alliance was the latest in a series of Kremlin moves flexing its military muscle on the world stage.17

Russia conducted a military exercise from 22 September to 21 October, called Stability 2008, with thousands of vehicles and a number of combat aircraft across all 11 time zones of Russian territory in the largest war game since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The strategic experts in Moscow said the exercise was visualised to quell unrest along Russia’s southern border and to repulse an American-led attack by NATO forces. Russian military also launched three inter-continental ballistic missiles capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads. Analysts said the new Kremlin leadership intends to create a force that could defend the nation’s interests.18

Russia said on 3 December that it would send a warship, Admiral Chabanenko, through the Panama Canal for the first time since World War II, a short journey loaded with symbolic weight. The destroyer would dock at Balboa Naval Base, a former US naval base, showcasing Russia’s growing influence in the region. Russia’s move symbolised its resolve to question the idea of the US as a global power.19

ChinaChina announced a sharp increase in military spending on 4 March, a day after the United States renewed its warning that a lack of openness surrounding the rapid buildup of China’s armed forces posed a threat to stability in Asia. At a news conference, Jiang Enzhu, spokesman for the National People’s Congress, said that China’s military budget for 2008 would be increased by 17.6 per cent to 417.8 billion Yuan, or about $58.8 billion. The 2007 military budget witnessed a 17.8 per cent increase. Thus the sustained increase in military spending had put China on track to become a major military power and the country most capable of challenging American dominance in East Asia. Military experts in the United States were of the view that Beijing’s real military spending could be at least double the announced figure. China’s main objective could also be to develop the firepower to overwhelm Taiwan in the event of a conflict while deterring or delaying any American forces sent to help defend the island.20

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In its annual report to the Congress on Chinese military power released on 3 March, the Pentagon said that China is developing the ability to limit or prevent the use of satellites by potential adversar-ies. The report highlighted developments in China’s commercial space programme and asserted that some of it could be of military use. The report said ‘writings’ by the Chinese military ‘emphasise the necessity of destroying, damaging and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance/observation and communications satellites’. Such writings suggest that those satellites, and navigation and early-warning satellites, ‘could be among initial targets of attack to blind and deafen the enemy’. The report further said that China also appeared to be developing cyberwarfare ability.21

President Hu Jintao during the First Session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC) on 10 March remarked that China must intensify efforts to strengthen national defence and step up army building while going all out for economic, political, cultural and social development, so as to support and guarantee the progress of social-ism with Chinese characteristics and make a greater contribution to world peace. He also pointed out that the modernisation of the armed forces should be aimed at combat readiness, and military training should be conditioned to the age of information technology. He also noted that China must aim at improving the capability to win high-tech regional wars and keep enhancing the ability of the military to respond to security threats and accomplish a diverse array of military tasks.22

A high-ranking Chinese military official, Maj. Gen. Quan Lihua, on 17 November revealed China’s plan to acquire an aircraft carrier, a move that would stoke tensions with the United States military and its allies in Asia. Pentagon officials who had been following China’s military buildup said that since 2000, China had constructed at least 60 warships and a fleet of about 60 submarines.23

In China’s first modern deployment of battle-ready warships beyond the Pacific, a naval task force was sent on 26 December to begin escorts and patrols in the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden. A supply ship and two destroyers — the Wuhan and the Haikou — departed from Sanya, on Hainan Island, carrying a total crew of about 800. The Stratfor analysis said that the Chinese ‘would monitor the way NATO (and especially American) warships communicate with each other and with their shipborne helicopters. The navy would acquire new skills under the banner of internationalism’.24

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FranceIn a major strategic development, France would set up its first per-manent naval base in the Gulf, just across from Iran, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced on 15 January 2008 during his visit to the United Arab Emirates. The 400-strong military base would be built in Abu Dhabi and include a significant intelligence operation, making France another major Western power alongside the United States to have a military presence in this geostrategic region. After signing the accord, President Sarkozy said, ‘the agreement is a sign to all that France is participating in the stability of this region of the world’.25

While inaugurating a new generation of nuclear submarine of the Triomphant class, named Le Terrible on 21 March, President Sarkozy defended his country’s arsenal as vital to deter a range of new threats, including the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with intercontinental missiles. The nuclear submarine would be equipped with a new, nuclear-tipped missile, the M-51, with an estimated range of 4,970 miles, able to reach Asia. Clearly trying to balance nuclear modernisation with a gesture towards a European population more interested in eliminating nuclear weapons than improving them, President Sarkozy said that France would continue to reduce the number of warheads on airplanes, bringing its total nuclear force to fewer than 300 warheads, half the number during the Cold War. In early 2008, the Federation of American Scientists, which tracks nuclear arsenals, said that France had 348 warheads — 288 on sub-marines, 50 on air-launched cruise missiles and ten bombs.26

In its first new national defence policy in 14 years, France decided that its security lies within Europe and NATO, establishing a sig-nificant shift from the country’s long-standing notion of moral and military self-sufficiency. President Sarkozy decided that France is best served by participating fully with Washington and NATO, in part because the vast majority of members of the European Union are also members of the alliance. The new military and security strategy presented on 17 June called for a smaller, more mobile French army, with savings spent on better intelligence and modern equipment. France’s plan foresees raising the budget for military acquisitions, for example, by more than 16 per cent, without immediately raising spending on defence. It also envisions spending twice as much on space defence, with the intention of creating a space-based early warning system against missile attacks.27

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In a speech to Israel’s parliament on 23 June, President Sarkozy offered to act as a Middle East peace broker to help reach agreement with Palestine and mobilise French troops if necessary. While deviating from his previous stance, ‘friend of Israel’, Sarkozy suggested that peace with the Palestinians was possible if Israel stopped all settlement activity, lifted the checkpoints that crisscross the West Bank, ended a blockade of Gaza and accepted Jerusalem as capital of two states.28

Union for the Mediterranean, a brainchild of President Sarkozy, during its first summit held at Paris on 13 July, pledged to work for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (significant in the light of developments in Iran). President Sarkozy viewed that the Union has a better chance of succeeding than a previous cooperation process launched in Barcelona in 1995 because the new body focuses on practical projects parallel to efforts towards Middle East peace.29 The meeting was a significant accomplishment for French diplomacy, with only Libya refusing to attend and the other countries represented by prime ministers and other high-level delegates. The meeting also marked an end to the diplomatic isolation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.30

BritainThe draft of a treaty to ban cluster munitions, which had been under negotiation since February 2007, was adopted by a group of 111 nations on 28 May in Dublin after Britain dropped its long-standing opposition to any limitations on the weapons. The sudden shift by Prime Minister Gordon Brown created fresh pressures on the United States, which had counted Britain as one of its staunchest allies in opposing the ban. The draft treaty would still leave most of world’s stockpile of cluster weapons untouched, with major military powers such as the United States, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Brazil refusing to sign it. The draft treaty sets an eight-year deadline for signatory nations to destroy most of their stockpiles of cluster weapons, along with other provisions that would ultimately eliminate all but a small fraction of cluster munitions in nations that sign the treaty. It also obliges nations that adopt it to provide ‘technical, financial or material assistance’ for clearing up cluster munitions ‘remnants’ that remain on the territory of other states. The proposed treaty would not ban a new lightweight generation of so-called smart cluster munitions, each carrying fewer than ten bomblets and designed

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to self-destruct within a short period after impact if they have not detonated against a target.31

International ConflictsGeorgiaRussia and the West had conflicting interests in and approaches to the flare up in Georgia of which two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, had broken away on ethnic grounds some years ago. Russia, on 15 February 2008, vowed to increase its support for the separatists if Kosovo declared its independence and was recognised by the West. The Kremlin had long objected to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and even threatened to retaliate by recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.32

President Dmitry A. Medvedev of Russia warned the Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili, on 4 July that Georgia joining NATO would deepen the conflict between Russia and Georgia. President Medvedev argued that NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine (which had also sought NATO membership) would threaten Russia’s security.33

Russia conducted airstrikes on Georgia on 8 August. The United States and other Western nations joined by NATO condemned the violence and demanded a ceasefire.34 Russia escalated its attack on Georgia on 10 August, despite warnings from the US and European leaders, underscoring the limits of Western influence over Russia at a time when the rest of Europe depends heavily on Russia for natural gas, and the United States needs Moscow’s cooperation to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme. The military action was the largest engagement by Russian forces outside its borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union.35

President Bush sent American troops to Georgia on 13 August to oversee a ‘vigorous and ongoing’ humanitarian mission, in a direct challenge to Russia’s display of military dominance over the region. President Bush also demanded that Russia abide by the ceasefire and withdraw its forces or risk its place in ‘the diplomatic, political, economic and security structures of the 21st century’.36

The Russian military deployed several SS-21 missile launchers and supply vehicles in South Ossetia on 15 August,37 and built checkpoints north of the Georgian city of Gory on 19 August.38 Thus, despite agreeing for a French-brokered ceasefire framework, Russia was striving to maintain considerable economic and military pressure

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on Georgia, the ultimate goal being ouster of its president, Mikhail Saakashvili.39

On 26 August Russia recognised the independence of the two enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The action deepened the strains with the West over conflict in this vital crossroads of the Caucasus.40

President Bush proposed $1 billion in humanitarian and economic assistance on 3 September to help rebuild Georgia after its disastrous war with Russia, but he didn’t commit to re-equip its battered military.41 However, Vice President Dick Cheney visited Georgia on 4 September to deliver America’s pledge to rebuild Georgia and its economy, to preserve its sovereignty and its territory, and to bring it into the NATO alliance in defiance of Russia.42

After a meeting with President Nicolas Sarkozy, who held the European Union’s rotating presidency, President Dmitry Medvedev announced on 8 September that Russia had agreed to withdraw its troops by mid-October from its positions in Georgia outside the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He also agreed to allow 200 observers from the European Union to monitor the conflict.43

Russian troops withdrew from the region around Georgia’s Black Sea port of Poti on 13 September 2008 as part of the first phase of a pullback brokered by France.44 On 17 September, President Medvedev signed separate treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, guaranteeing them protection in case of attack. The treaties also allowed Russia to build military bases and station additional troops in the territories, violating the European-brokered ceasefire that ended Russia’s war with Georgia.45

US Missile Deployment in Eastern EuropeThe US decision to deploy missiles on the periphery of Russia con-stituted another contentious issue between the West and Russia. Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg said on 16 January 2008 that the Czech Republic and the United States were signing three framework agreements on the deployment of the missile shield. One agreement related to the deployment of radar installations on Czech territory. The second would involve American and Czech companies cooperating in research, development and deployment of the ballistic missile defence system. The third would establish the status of the United States on Czech territory.46

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While strongly criticising the US plan, the Kremlin pointed out that deployment of the missile defence shield was a threat to Russia’s national security. President Vladimir Putin on 30 January warned that his country could target the prospective missile defence sites and deploy missiles in the Kaliningrad region if the US pushes ahead with the plans.47

Poland’s top diplomats visited the US on 7 July to discuss the terms for deployment of a part of the Pentagon’s anti-ballistic missile shield on its territory. The Polish government had asked the United States to pay for the modernisation of Polish air defences in return for the country allowing deployment of missile interceptors. But the Untied States had not agreed to the Polish request and said that if the talks with Warsaw ended without an agreement, it would consider the Baltic state of Lithuania as an alternative.48 On the other hand, the US and the Czech Republic signed a landmark accord on 8 July to allow the Pentagon to deploy part of its anti-ballistic missile shield despite strong opposition from Russia.49 This would complete the Czech Republic’s goal of becoming integrated into the US security and strategic system.

The Kremlin perceives the presence of the missile shield as directed against Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued in July that the defence plan was part of the US’s goal of exerting influence in Central Europe, in southeastern Europe, where the United States will have military bases in Romania and Bulgaria, and in the Caucasus where Russia has opposed NATO plans to admit Georgia into the alliance.50

The Polish government on 19 August approved a missile defence deal with the US to host 10 missile interceptors. In order to address the security concerns of Poland, the missile defence deal also provided for Patriot missiles to be placed in Poland. Moscow said the US installations in Poland will target Russia, but Washington strongly denied this, arguing that the system was designed to protect the US and Europe against threats from countries like Iran, and would in any case be powerless against Russia’s arsenal of missiles.51

Dmitry A. Medvedev in an address to the Federal Assembly on 5 November warned the US that Moscow would place short-range missiles on Russia’s western border as a responsive measure if Washington proceeded with its planned missile defence system in Eastern Europe. He said that Russia would deploy mobile Iskander

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missiles — tactical weapons designed for use against targets like long-range artillery and airfields — in addition to missile defence systems around Kaliningrad. He also said Russia would use radio equipment to jam the Western missile defence system.52 Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces chief Nikolai Solovtsov on 1 December warned that Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles would be modernised to protect them from space-based components of the US missile-defence system. The upgrade would make the missiles’ warheads capable of flying outside the range of the space-based system of the US.53

IranThe United States and Iran remained at loggerheads on the latter’s alleged nuclear weapons programme. President Bush rebuked Iran on 8 January for continuing a ‘provocative act’ of confronting United States navy warships in the Persian Gulf on 6 January. Iranian officials played down the encounter, but US officials said that Iran was trying to provoke the United States on the eve of the president’s visit to the Middle East.54

Meanwhile, Iran’s media reported on 28 January that the country had received the final shipment of enriched uranium from Russia for its first light-water nuclear plant at Bushehr. The Iranian government heralded the shipments as a victory, saying they proved that its nu-clear programme was peaceful, not a cover for weapons develop-ment, as alleged by the United States and some of its allies.55

Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced on 16 June that Britain and the European Union would freeze the overseas assets of Iran’s largest commercial bank, Bank Melli, over its refusal to address international concern around its nuclear activities. In London, along with President Bush, he said that they remained open to resolving the dispute with Iran diplomatically, but only after it suspended uranium enrichment.56

The confrontation between Iran and the United States sharpened on 11 July as Iran said it tested missiles for a second day and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the US would defend its allies and protect its interests against an attack.57 To diffuse the tension, President Bush on 15 July authorised the most significant American diplomatic contact with Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 by deciding to send the State Department’s third-ranking official, William J. Burns, to Geneva for an international meeting on Iran’s nuclear programme.58

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The Bush administration’s decision to send a senior American official to participate in the talks with Iran reflected a double policy shift on its part. First, the Bush administration decided to abandon its long-standing position that it would meet face-to-face with Iran only after the country suspended its uranium enrichment, as demanded by the United Nations Security Council. Second, an American partner at the table would inject new importance to the negotiating track of the six global powers confronting Iran — France, Britain, Germany, Russia, China and the United States — even though their official stance was that no substantive talks could begin until uranium enrichment was stopped. But the administration sought to describe the talks as a continuation of the same strategy it had always pursued: halting Iran’s nuclear activities without having to resort to military force.59

The EU tightened trade sanctions against Iran on 8 August with new restrictions designed to deny public loans or export credits to companies trading with Iran. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department announced on 12 August that it had imposed economic sanctions on five Iranian companies accused of helping Iran pursue a nuclear weapons programme.60

The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, in a report on Iran’s nuclear programme to the IAEA Board of Governors on 19 November, claimed that Iran was rapidly increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium, which could be rendered into weapons-grade material. The report also said that there had been a breakdown of communication between the IAEA and Iran over alleged research on the atomic weapons.61

IraqA new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq which was completed in the first week of April cited significant improvement in healing sectarian political rift, but concluded that security remains fragile and terrorist groups remain capable of initiating large attacks.62

A White House statement on 18 July announced that President Bush agreed to ‘a general time horizon’ for meeting ‘aspirational goals’ such as the resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the further reduction of US combat forces from Iraq, a major policy shift that reflected both progress in stabilising Iraq and the depth of political opposition to an open-ended military presence in Iraq and at home.63 One factor in the consideration was the pressing need for US troops in Afghanistan, where the Taliban

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and other fighters had intensified their insurgency and inflicted a growing number of casualties on Afghans and US-led forces.64

Iraqi and American negotiators on 20 August agreed to a draft of a security agreement to govern the presence of American troops in Iraq. Technically the document would provide the legal basis for American troops to remain in Iraq beyond 2008. But it would also amount to a political document, spelling out for the people of each nation the most difficult issues of this war, notably how long American troops will remain.65 Mohammed Hamoud, the chief Iraqi negotiator on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), said that the draft agreement contained two dates: 30 June 2009, for the withdrawal of US forces from ‘cities and villages’, and 31 December 2011, for US combat troops to leave Iraq altogether.66

On 10 December the BBC quoted Britain’s Defence Ministry officials that the country would begin to withdraw its remaining troops in Iraq in March 2009 based on a timetable that would aim to leave only a small training force of 300 to 400 by June.67

Meanwhile, Gen. Ray Odierno of the US said that some soldiers would remain in cities beyond summer 2009 in order to help sup-port and train Iraqi forces. He reiterated that the these soldiers would not be combat forces but rather would provide services like medical care, air traffic control and helicopter support that the Iraqis cannot perform themselves.68

AfghanistanThe war on terror in Afghanistan was stuck on the reluctance of Western nations to send more troops, being unsure of the objectives they were trying to achieve, and how soon. Condoleezza Rice on6 February said that European governments needed to convince their people that sending troops to Afghanistan — and keeping them there — should remain a priority for NATO. Underscoring the chal-lenges for the United States, which wanted Europe to increase its troop strength in Afghanistan significantly, Germany announced on 6 February that it would send only enough additional troops to replace a Norwegian contingent of about 250.69 However, under pressure from NATO, Germany said on 24 June that it would increase the number of soldiers available for duty in Afghanistan by almost one-third to 4,500, but that it would maintain its policy of keeping the bulk of them away from the relatively violent southern provinces.70

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Prime Minister Gordon Brown visited Afghanistan on 21 August 2008 to reaffirm Britain’s commitment to Afghanistan’s security and development and said that British troops had faced some of the toughest fighting of the last two years in the vast poppy-growing province of Helmand. But he said the long-term future depended on building up the Afghan army and police force. He said that Britain would support increasing the army to 120,000 and suggested that, given the size of the country, the size of the army would probably need to increase.71

In a measure of how precarious the war effort had become, American military commanders in Afghanistan said that most of the additional troops to arrive in early 2009 would be deployed near Kabul. The decision reflected the rising concerns among military officers, diplomats and government officials about the increased vulnerability of the capital and surrounding areas.72

General David McKiernan, the US commander of NATO’s Inter-national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and commander of US forces in Afghanistan, acknowledged on 10 December that the struggle against the Taliban insurgents in much of southern Afghanistan had become a tactical stalemate. McKiernan insisted that the insurgents were not winning the war but suggested that the country was at a ‘tipping point’ and that 2009 was going to be a ‘critical year for this campaign’. He confirmed that the US government was to deploy in excess of 20,000 extra troops, beginning in January 2009, in an effort to bolster the 32,000 already serving in Afghanistan and to create the sort of surge that had proved successful in reducing the insurgency in Iraq. Later in the month, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that up to 30,000 extra US troops could be deployed. It was widely supposed that the US troop surge would be accompanied by increased pressure upon other NATO countries to increase their contribution to the ISAF force.73

UkraineUS inducement to Ukraine to join NATO was another act considered provocative by Russia. President Bush on 1 April expressed strong support for Ukraine’s attempt to join the alliance. However, two strong NATO allies, France and Germany, said that they do not favour Ukraine’s membership, partly out of concern that it would unnecessarily antagonise Russia.74

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Vice President Dick Cheney on 5 September expressed strong support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO and said that ‘the US fully supports the right of Ukraine to build ever stronger ties of cooperation and security throughout Europe and across the Atlantic’. The Bush administration considers alliance’s expansion an important part of President Bush’s ‘freedom agenda’.75

On 24 September Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko said his country would be undeterred in a bid for NATO membership despite Russian opposition. He told the annual General Assembly gathering of world leaders at the UN that ‘Ukraine rejects pressure of any kind regarding ways to ensure its own security and to determine membership in collective security structures’.76

The United States on 2 December agreed to support a modest reopening of NATO’s dialogue with Russia, despite Moscow’s con-tinued occupation of the separatist Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This signified the Bush administration’s inability to ignore Russian protests over the issue of NATO’s membership to Ukraine and Georgia.77

KosovoThe province of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on17 February 2008. However, it brought to a climax a showdown between the West, which argued that Serbia’s brutal subjugation of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority cost it any right to rule the terri-tory, and the Serbian government and its allies in the Kremlin. Meanwhile, the European Commission appealed for calm, while NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said the alliance would respond ‘swiftly and firmly against anyone who might resort to violence’.78 However, the European Union was divided over the legitimacy of Europe’s newest nation. While Britain, France, Italy and Germany granted recognition, other members like Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia expressed reservations.79

Washington’s stalwart support of Kosovo statehood in the face of fierce resistance from Russia had raised the stakes in its increasingly testy relations with a Kremlin ever eager to shore up its influence among the former pro-Soviet states. By backing Kosovo’s inde-pendence outside the United Nations Security Council, the US and its European allies had taken a calculated risk. Reflecting the con-cern, President Bush on 16 February had said that the US would work

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to prevent violence. On the other hand, Kremlin contended that it would set a dangerous precedent for secessionist movements across the former Soviet Union, including Chechnya and Georgia.80

Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates on his visit to Kosovo, first by a US cabinet member since Kosovo’s independence declaration, said on 7 October that the United States will maintain its troop presence in Kosovo until at least late 2009, underlining American support for the country. He added that the United States wanted to balance the need to show Russia that its war with Georgia in August had altered Russian-American relations, with an effort to keep avenues open for cooperation on significant issues like Iranian nuclear proliferation.81

North KoreaThe international stand-off with North Korea on the question of its nuclear weapons programme remained unresolved. Administration officials in the US expressed increasing concern in the wake of a North Korean statement on 4 January 2008, in which North Korea accused the United States and other countries in the six-party talks of reneging on promises made under the October 2007 deal, including the shipment of one million tons of fuel and the removal of North Korea from the United States’ list of states that sponsored terrorism.82

Condoleezza Rice met with her North Korean counterpart in Singapore on 23 July for the first time and asked Pyongyang to move quickly to dismantle its nuclear arms programme. The meeting was the latest step in the Bush administration’s turnaround on North Korea, after several years of isolation, in an effort to make the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. In the October accord, North Korea had agreed to dismantle its nuclear programme, in exchange for food and fuel aid and US agreement to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.83

The Bush administration announced on 11 October that it had removed North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism after Pyongyang agreed to resume disabling a plutonium plant and to allow some inspections to verify that it had halted its nuclear programme.84

However, a final push by President Bush to complete an agree-ment to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme collapsed on 11 December 2008 in Beijing with North Korea refusing to agree to a system of verification.85

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WMD Proliferation and Arms ControlAt the stalemated Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Russia urged states to pursue separate pacts to outlaw all arms in space and also ban certain types of missiles already forsworn by Russia and theUnited States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov submitted draft frameworks of the two agreements to the Conference on 12 February. But the negotiating climate was clouded by the US’s destruction of a defunct US satellite on 20 February using a modified Standard Missile-3 interceptor, which is designed to counter short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Russia considered such an event to be the test of an anti-satellite weapon, and tests, in essence, mean the creation of a new strategic weapon.86

The second review conference for the Chemical Weapons Con-vention (CWC) took place from 7 to 18 April in The Hague. The negotiations got stuck when the Non-aligned countries introduced their version of the text, which proposed changes to almost all paragraphs contained in the British draft. There was disagreement between the countries on various issues such as the balance between the obligations on disarmament and non-proliferation, destruction and verification, national implementation and international cooperation, and references to resolutions/activities outside the CWC such as UN Security Council resolutions.87

On 30 May 2008, 111 countries agreed on a draft treaty to outlaw nearly all cluster munitions after final negotiations in Dublin. The United States and several other countries with the largest stockpiles of such weapons did not endorse the treaty. The treaty requires the destruction of all forbidden cluster munitions within eight years and the clearance of all areas afflicted with unexploded cluster submunition remnants within 10 years. Countries would be able to officially sign the treaty on 3 December 2008 in Oslo and it would come into force six months after 30 governments have signed and ratified it.88

Ninety-four countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) during 2-4 December at Oslo, including many western European countries that have stockpiled and produced the weapons. Countries such as China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the USA did not sign the treaty.89

The UN Non-proliferation Committee issued a progress report on 30 July 2008 on states’ efforts to implement a global instrument aimed at preventing terrorists and other non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The report indicated that although

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many states have instituted a range of measures for this purpose, countries need to do far more than they have already to fulfill their international obligations in this regard. According to the report, the majority of states that have submitted reports have adopted very few of the 313 specific national measures identified by the Committee as necessary for fulfilling the obligations under Resolution 1540.90

Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in a speech on 27 October that the number of reports of nuclear or radioactive material stolen around the world in 2007 was ‘disturbingly high’. Dr ElBaradei, in his annual report to the UN General Assembly, said nearly 250 such thefts were reported in the year ending in June. But IAEA staff and outside experts cautioned that the amount of missing materials remained relatively small. If put together, the stolen radioactive materials would not be enough to build even one nuclear device.91

The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism established by the US House in pursuance of the reco-mmendations of the 9/11 Commission, in its report ‘World At Risk’, warned that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency it is more likely that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The report further speculated that terrorists were more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.92

The Commission also said that Pakistan posed a particular danger for a WMD attack because Al Qaeda and other terrorists have a safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and there is a risk of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile falling into terrorists’ hands. The report notes that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile consists of about 85 nuclear warheads and that China had agreed to build two nuclear power plants in Pakistan.93

Global Warming and Climate ChangeThe World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in its statement on the status of global climate in 2008 pointed out that the year 2008 was one of the warmest years ever. The WMO said so on the basis of the analyses made by the Met Office Hadley Centre of UK which showed that the global combined sea surface and land surface air temperature for 2008 was 0.31°C (0.56°F) above the 1961–90 annual average of 14.0°C (57.2°F), ranking 2008 as the tenth warmest year

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on record. Similarly, the National Climatic Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the US pointed out that the global mean surface temperature anomaly in 2008 was 0.49ºC (0.88ºF) above the 20th century average (1901–2000), which ranks 2008 as the eighth warmest year on record.94

The Global Humanitarian Forum, an organisation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, released a report, The Human Impact Report: Climate Change — The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis, on 29 May 2009, primarily focused on the impact of climate change on human life globally. The first-ever report exclusively focused on the global human impact of climate change, it calculates that more than 300 million people are seriously affected by climate change at a total economic cost of $125 billion per year. The report projects that by 2030, worldwide deaths will reach almost 500,000 per year; people affected by climate change annually expected to rise to over 600 million and the total annual economic cost to increase to around $300 billion.95

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso on 23 January 2008 unveiled a new plan to cut greenhouse gas emissions which would cost the bloc around 60 billion euros ($100 billion) a year. The package aims at translating into legislation EU goals to slash emissions of carbon dioxide by 20 per cent by 2020, compared to levels in 1990. To help achieve that, the 27 member nations have been given individual targets for renewable energy use, which must total 20 per cent of all forms used in 12 years’ time.96

European Union leaders threatened the United States and China with trade sanctions on 14 March if the world’s two biggest polluters don’t commit to ambitious cuts in greenhouse gases by 2009. The warning came as the economic downturn focused European leaders on the impact on industry of their ground-breaking agreement in 2007 to cut carbon emissions by 20 per cent from 1990 levels by 2020. European Union leaders wanted similar commitments from other major economies by 2009, when a conference on global warming would take place in Copenhagen in December.97

President George W. Bush in his address at the White House on 17 April set a timeline of 2025 for reducing emissions and accused India and China of emitting increasingly large quantities of greenhouse gases with consequences for the global climate. He pointed out that to reach the 2025 goal, the US needs to more rapidly slow the growth of power sector greenhouse gas emissions. By doing so, the

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US can reduce emission levels in the power sector well below what was projected when the country first announced its climate change strategy in 2002.98

President-elect Barack Obama confirmed on 18 November 2008 that his administration would be committed to meeting the targets for fighting climate change and to develop clean-energy technology. Obama promised to set strong annual targets that would seek to reduce emissions by 2020 to their 1990 levels and reduce them an additional 80 per cent by 2050.99

The United Nations Climate Change Conference concluded in the Polish city of Poznan on 13 December 2008 with a clear commitment from governments to shift into full negotiating mode in 2009 in order to shape an ambitious and effective international response to climate change, to be agreed in Copenhagen in December 2009. The Conference of Parties (COP) agreed that the first draft of a concrete negotiating text would be available at a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gathering in Bonn in June of 2009. At Poznan, finishing touches were put to the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, with parties agreeing that the Adaptation Fund Board should have legal capacity to grant direct access to developing countries. Progress was also made on a number of important ongoing issues that are particularly important for developing countries, including adaptation; finance; technology; reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD); and disaster management.100

Global TerrorismGlobal Terrorism continued to be a major worry across the globe even though the year 2008 saw a marginal decrease in incidents ascompared with 2007. There were 11,770 terrorist attacks against non-combatants which occurred in various countries during the year, resulting in over 54,000 deaths, injuries and kidnappings, with deaths being 15,675. Compared to 2007, attacks decreased by 2,700 in 2008 while deaths due to terrorism decreased by 6,700.101

West Asia witnessed some improvement from 2007, although it still reported the largest number of terrorist attacks. Of the 11,770 worldwide attacks, about 4,600 (nearly 40 per cent) occurred in this region where approximately 5,500 fatalities (35 per cent) were reported for 2008. Significantly, attacks in Iraq followed the trend from 2007 and declined further.102

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Conversely, South Asia witnessed an increase in fatalities due to terrorist attacks, with Afghanistan and Pakistan bolstering this trend. In total, 35 per cent of total attacks occurred in the region. The two regions — West Asia and South Asia — were also the locations for 75 per cent of the 235 high-casualty attacks (those that killed 10 or more people) in 2008.103

Al-QaedaIn the year 2008, Al-Qaeda continued to inflict terror and violence across the world. The US Department of State annual report titled Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 revealed that although Al-Qaeda and its associated groups had lost some ground since 9/11, some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities had been reconstituted through the exploitation of Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri. In fact, the report noted, global efforts to counter terrorist financing had resulted in Al-Qaeda appealing for money in its last few messages.104

In Afghanistan, the report noted, the Al-Qaeda had moved across the border to the remote areas of Pakistan’s FATA, using this terrain as a safe haven to hide, train terrorists, communicate with followers, plot attacks and send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. It meant that FATA provided Al-Qaeda many of the benefits it once derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan.105

The threat from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), however, continued to diminish. While still dangerous, AQI exp