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Negotiating with North Korea

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has provoked much apprehension inthe international community in recent years. The Six Party Talks were convenedin 2003 to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Theybrought together the US, China, Russia, Japan as well as North and SouthKorea in the effort to negotiate a multilateral resolution of North Korea’snuclear program but the parties had widely different views and approaches.This book will examine the Six Party Talks as a study in multilateral nego-tiation highlighting the expectations vested in them and their inability todevelop a common approach to the issue. It holds out some important lessonsfor multilateral negotiation, diplomacy and dealing with North Korea.

Leszek Buszynski is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre and the National Security College at the Australian National University,Canberra, Australia. He is also co-series editor of the Routledge Security inAsia Pacific Series.

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Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series

Series EditorsLeszek Buszynski, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the AustralianNational University, and William Tow, Australian National University

Security issues have become more prominent in the Asia Pacific regionbecause of the presence of global players, rising great powers, and confidentmiddle powers, which intersect in complicated ways. This series puts forwardimportant new work on key security issues in the region. It embraces the rolesof the major actors, their defense policies and postures and their securityinteraction over the key issues of the region. It includes coverage of theUnited States, China, Japan, Russia, the Koreas, as well as the middle powersof ASEAN and South Asia. It also covers issues relating to environmentaland economic security as well as transnational actors and regional groupings.

1 Bush and AsiaAmerica’s evolving relations withEast AsiaEdited by Mark Beeson

2 Japan, Australia and Asia-PacificSecurityEdited by Brad Williams andAndrew Newman

3 Regional Cooperation and ItsEnemies in Northeast AsiaThe impact of domestic forcesEdited by Edward Friedman andSung Chull Kim

4 Energy Security in AsiaEdited by Michael Wesley

5 Australia as an Asia PacificRegional PowerFriendships in flux?Edited by Brendan Taylor

6 Securing Southeast AsiaThe politics of security sector reformMark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy

7 Pakistan’s Nuclear WeaponsBhumitra Chakma

8 Human Security in East AsiaChallenges for collaborative actionEdited by Sorpong Peou

9 Security and International Politicsin the South China SeaTowards a co-operativemanagement regimeEdited by Sam Bateman andRalf Emmers

10 Japan’s Peace BuildingDiplomacy in AsiaSeeking a more active political roleLam Peng Er

11 Geopolitics and MaritimeTerritorial Disputes in East AsiaRalf Emmers

12 North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008Narushige Michishita

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13 Political Change, DemocraticTransitions and Security inSoutheast AsiaMely Caballero-Anthony

14 American Sanctions in theAsia-PacificBrendan Taylor

15 Southeast Asia and the Rise ofChinese and Indian Naval PowerBetween rising naval powersEdited by Sam Bateman andJoshua Ho

16 Human Security in Southeast AsiaYukiko Nishikawa

17 ASEAN and theInstitutionalization of East AsiaRalf Emmers

18 India as an Asia Pacific PowerDavid Brewster

19 ASEAN RegionalismCooperation, values andinstitutionalisationChristopher B. Roberts

20 Nuclear Power and EnergySecurity in AsiaEdited by Rajesh Basrur andKoh Swee Lean Collin

21 Human Security and ClimateChange in Southeast AsiaManaging risk and resilienceEdited by Lorraine Elliott andMely Caballero-Anthony

22 Maritime Challenges andPriorities in AsiaImplications for regional securityEdited by Joshua Ho andSam Bateman

23 Ten Years After 9/11 –Rethinking the Jihadist ThreatArabinda Acharya

24 Bilateralism, Multilateralism andAsia-Pacific SecurityContending cooperationEdited by William T. Tow andBrendan Taylor

25 Negotiating with North KoreaThe Six Party Talks andthe nuclear issueLeszek Buszynski

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Negotiating with North KoreaThe Six Party Talks and the nuclear issue

Leszek Buszynski

I~ ~~o~:~~n~~:upLONDON AND NEW YORK

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First published 2013by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2013 Leszek Buszynski

The right of Leszek Buszynski to be identified as author of this work hasbeen asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentAct 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced orutilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, nowknown or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or inany information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writingfrom the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks orregistered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanationwithout intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataBuszynski, Leszek.Negotiating with North Korea : the six party talks and the nuclear issue /

Leszek Buszynski.pages cm. – (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific ; 23)

Summary: "The North Korean nuclear threat has created an enormousamount of apprehension in the international community in recent years. In2003, the Six Party Talks brought together the US, China, Russia, Japan aswell as South and North Korea to negotiate a multilateral resolution of thisnuclear issue. This book examines this multilateral attempt, and will look atthe Six Party Talks as a study of multilateralism, differentiating it fromempirical studies on the Korean peninsula"– Provided by publisher.Includes bibliographical references and index.1. Nuclear arms control–Korea (North) 2. Nuclear nonproliferation–

International cooperation. I. Title.JZ6009.K7B87 2013327.1'747095193–dc23

2012047863

ISBN: 978-0-415-68273-2 (hbk)ISBN: 978-0-203-69419-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Romanby Taylor & Francis Books

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Contents

Acknowledgements viiiAbbreviations ix

Introduction 1

1 Bargaining and negotiation theory 5

2 Strategies and bargaining positions of the players 18

3 The formation of the Six Party Talks 53

4 South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement 78

5 The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement 111

6 From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks 140

7 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks 164

Conclusion 184

Bibliography 197Index 205

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Acknowledgements

In a book of this nature which deals with great complexity and diplomaticnuance there are many acknowledgements to make, not all of which can berecorded here. I would like to thank Charles Pritchard for sitting down withme over coffee in Seoul and Stockholm and sharing his experiences of theBush Administration’s dealings with the Six Party Talks. Ambassador ChoTae-yong was a member of the South Korea delegation to the Six Party Talksand his experiences were invaluable and fascinating. Others deserving thanksinclude Ambassador Lim Sung-nam, who is South Korea’s present envoy tothe Six Party Talks, Hideshi Takesada, who explained the Japanese position,Viktor Larin for arranging interviews with Russian scholars in his institute inVladivostok, Shin Chang-hoon and Bong Young-shik of the Asian Institute inSeoul, Shin Beom-chul and Lee Ho-ryung of the Korean Institute of DefenseAnalysis. There are many others to whom I am grateful for their ideas andinsights on the topic. Some I met at academic conferences, others at variousreceptions. Most had clear views when the subject of North Korea turned upand in view of their official status would prefer not to be named in any case. Ialso want to thank Yonas Tariku Metafaria for his diligence in acting asresearch assistant in the formative stages of the project, and Russell Mcaskiefor carefully reading the text and for his comments and very helpful sugges-tions. Needless to say, any errors of fact or interpretation are my own.

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Abbreviations

ABM Anti ballistic missileAPEC Asia Pacific Economic cooperationBDA Banco Delta AsiaCBM Confidence Building MeasureCVID Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible DismantlementDMZ Demilitarized ZoneDPRK Democratic People’s Republic of KoreaGNP Grand National PartyHEU Highly Enriched UraniumIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyKCNA Korean Central News AgencyKEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development OrganizationLDP Liberal Democratic PartyLWR Light water reactorMW MegawattsNPT Non-Proliferation TreatyNSC National Security CouncilPSI Proliferation Security InitiativeWMD Weapons of mass destruction

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Introduction

This is a study of bargaining and negotiation, though it does examine otherissues related to the security of the Korean Peninsula. It analyzes the conductof negotiations with North Korea and shows how the process of negotiationshapes the outcome. The conceptual literature on negotiation has been auseful starting point for this study and in particular I. William Zartman’sconcept of the structure of negotiation. Zartman observed that negotiationsdo not just reflect the distribution of power between the parties but how theyrelate to each other over issues that concern them. No matter which states areinvolved and despite their best intentions, once started, negotiations may goin unforeseen and surprising directions. As one diplomat with considerableexperience ruefully noted, negotiations become like an “animal” with a life ofits own. It is as though a living being is created which may be tame andcompliant or violent and uncontrollable, raising demands of its own and con-stantly requiring attention. No doubt, this does not happen in every situation,as most negotiations, those that deal with functional and household issuesbetween states, proceed with bureaucratic regularity and reach expected con-clusions. Those negotiations that deal with critical security issues and involveantagonistic states with opposing positions are a different story. In these casesthe act of coming together in negotiations creates a structure which is definedin terms of the interaction between the parties and the positions they assume.A superpower like the US would normally adopt a dominant position defin-ing the agenda and expecting the result to conform to its interests. Someparties may be supportive as they join the dominant player, others may somebecome openly confrontational, while others may feign cooperation butactually work to a very different agenda. The interaction between them thenshapes the negotiations as positions are expressed and then reformulatedaccording to feedback received in an ongoing process of mutual adjustment.In some situations the interaction may result in a satisfactory convergenceand agreement. In other cases, however, interaction may intensify the sus-picion and mutual antipathy resulting in a polarization of positions anddeadlock.

This study focuses on the Six Party Talks which were an attempt by the US,China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to negotiate the termination of North

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Korea’s nuclear program. They began in August 2003 and were last held inDecember 2008, when North Korea withdrew. They were called into beingbecause the Bush Administration refused to negotiate directly with NorthKorea over its nuclear program in the way the Clinton Administration didbefore it. The Bush Administration expected the other parties in the talks tojoin it in pressing the North to surrender the nuclear program. Very highexpectations were aroused by the talks which polarized opinion, not only inthe US but in South Korea as well, and deteriorated into partisan politics.Critics chastised the neoconservatives of the Bush Administration for resort-ing to an aggressive posture that, they argued, undermined the Six PartyTalks and compelled the North to develop nuclear weapons in response to thefear of an American attack. As they saw it, the way forward was to engageNorth Korea in dialogue. In their view the North had shown a willingness toabide by the 1994 Agreed Framework which terminated the first nuclear crisisof 1993–94 and it was likely to respond to a similar effort at dialogue. It wasobvious to them that the Bush Administration was to blame and they thoughtthat if engagement were given a chance, the situation would be resolved. Yetothers thought that North Korea was ruled by reasonable men who wereled astray by the exigencies of their condition and the American threat. Itseemed clear to them that if North Korea were offered assurances that the USwould not attack it, as well as economic aid to boost its weakened economy,it would surrender its nuclear weapons program. However, supporters of theBush Administration’s approach to North Korea regarded it as a pariah stateand it seemed obvious to them that the North was bent on obtaining nuclearweapons whatever the cost. As they saw it the North would hardly respond toany incentives that the US could offer, and what was required were disincentivesand punitive measures since the regime would understand nothing else.

In South Korea a similar polarization was noted given the extensiveexpectations attached to the Six Party Talks by supporters of the Roh MooHyun Administration, which was in office from 2003–9. This Administrationraised great hopes amongst its supporters that brotherly relations could beestablished with the North, which would spill over into the negotiations overthe nuclear program and induce the North to surrender it. The view was thatSouth Korea could tame the North through economic engagement and theestablishment of regular government and family interaction, and that a pro-cess of gradual change would set in which would bring about peace on theKorean Peninsula and eventual reunification. They pinned their hopes on anexhilarating and breathtaking leap into the establishment of a “peace regime”in Northeast Asia that would engage all the major players and finally removetensions and conflicts. Rather than immediately dealing with the nuclear issue,they called for a “peace regime” which would establish the conditions forthe North’s nuclear disarmament and the removal of all the other problems on theKorean Peninsula. The supporters of the Grand National Party, now theSaenuri party, were not persuaded by what they regarded as delusion andsaw the North as a continuing threat. They noted that every attempt to come

2 Introduction

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closer to the North resulted in a provocative incident as the regime saw the Southas a threat to its legitimacy. They also pointed out that the “peace regime”espoused by the proponents of engagement would undermine the alliancewith the US, which they regarded as the foundation of the South’s security.

Much has been written on the negotiations with North Korea from theperspective of these polemical debates. In the desire to appeal to their audi-ence, assumptions were taken for granted like universal truths that all wouldaccept, and the implications of their positions were not for the most partanalyzed. Those who called for engagement did not follow through andidentify how it could resolve the issue of the North’s nuclear program. Theliterature on the North from South Korean sources reflects the views of ageneration of scholars which has been influenced by the hope and expectationof “peace regime” formation, but what this meant in practical terms was leftvague. Some proponents of engagement called for dialogue and discussion asthough that was enough, others demanded that various incentives be offeredto North Korea to obtain its compliance. While the general notion wasappealing, the issues it stimulated never settled. What incentives could beoffered and what price would the North demand to surrender the nuclearprogram? How were the incentives to be related to the disablement of thenuclear program? Which would come first, the incentives or the terminationof the nuclear program? How would the North respond to the incentives andwas it really interested? Those in the US who called for isolation and expectedthe North Korean regime to collapse never really examined the impact oftheir approach upon the regime and its supporters. They had difficultyunderstanding the extent to which the US was dependent upon other powers,China in particular, to denuclearize North Korea, and could not commandthem to do its bidding over North Korea. They failed to realize how muchthe regime was supported by China and that it could survive at low levels ofeconomic activity for some time. They could not appreciate until much later thatisolation allowed the regime to develop its nuclear weapons program, and thethreat of American attack worked to strengthen it in the way that externalthreat solidifies oppressive regimes.

The polemics that surrounded the negotiations with North Korea stimu-lated untested and unfulfilled hopes, derived from expectations that were for themost part unrealistic at the outset. Some have argued that if the US had donethings differently, if the right concessions had been given to the North, if theBush Administration could understand what the North Koreans reallywanted, things would have been different. Others have argued that if therehad been an international coalition against, if China had cooperated with theUS and enforced sanctions, US efforts would have been suitably rewarded andso on. Despite everything North Korea went on to develop its nuclear pro-gram and conducted two nuclear tests, in October 2006 and May 2009. Thisbook will not deal with lost opportunities as perceived by any of the advo-cates of the above views and is intended to be an analysis of the Six PartyTalks in terms of their role, function and contribution to the security of the

Introduction 3

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Korean Peninsula. It is written from a non partisan perspective, one that isdisentangled from any of the partisan positions that have been adopted overthe subject of North Korea, both in the US and South Korea. The author’sapproach is to match the facts with the interpretations that were current atthe time, to identify what governments and diplomats engaged in the talksexpected, and what actually happened, particularly after the North’s nucleartests. It will trace these interpretations through the nuclear tests and will testtheir validity. The analysis will speak for itself and will not require an advo-cate of the kind that a partisan approach demands. It will have certainimplications for policy which have been outlined in the conclusion. It willidentify certain pertinent lessons for negotiation that should become clear asthe text proceeds. The approach adopted here may not be welcomed by thosewho are emotionally tied to a particular view, or who defend their govern-ment’s record during the negotiations, or whose views are shaped by their nationalposition. They may object that policy is more important than analysis, and thatit is not enough to understand a difficult situation but to know how to extricateourselves from it. This author’s response is that, one way or another, thefoundation for effective policy has to be sound and competent analysis, with-out which policy becomes directionless and hostage to the populism of theday. In the age of the internet and the personal blog, populism increasinglyinfects academic discourse, and judgment is made bewildered by the shiftingsands of ill informed opinion beneath it.

Academic works on this contentious subject often take their cue from dip-lomatic self-images, or how governments like to portray their national posi-tion. This is evident from the focus of these academic works and, even moreimportant, in what they avoid. American publications are strongly influencedby the expectation of a global partnership with China that would deal with abroad range of issues, security as well as economic. They focus on China’srole as mediator in the talks and tend to depict China as a supporter of USaims. They gloss over China’s close support for the North Korean regime andthe extent to which that support prevented the realization of America’s aims.In South Korea supporters of the “peace regime” approach avoid mention ofthe North’s provocations and see them as minor hiccups on the path toreconciliation. They do not examine the extent to which the peace regimevision triggers those provocations from the North and exacerbates the dilem-mas that the North faces in dealing with the South. One way or another, theintention of this analysis is to examine all these issues, those that are avoidedas well, for the task of laying the foundation for effective policy.

4 Introduction

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1 Bargaining and negotiation theory

Introduction

How are negotiation outcomes explained? Why is it that powerful partiescannot always get their way in negotiations? A commonly accepted idea ofnegotiations is that the strongest party wins. Nonetheless, power as defined interms of the usual indicators of national power may not always result in acapacity to prevail in negotiations for various reasons. In multilateral nego-tiations, parties come together with various objectives, not all in agreementwith the stronger party; some will be opposed while others will swing fromone side to another. With a sufficient number of parties involved each adopt-ing different functions, balancing and bargaining become necessary, and itbecomes much more difficult for stronger parties to impose their will on theproceedings. Power alone may not prevail in this situation and the way thenegotiations are conducted will very often impact on the final result, and insome cases may even decide the outcome. The interaction that developsbetween the parties shapes the pattern of negotiations, influences expectations,modifies bargaining positions, and eventually leads to an outcome. The resultcan be a considerable departure from what the stronger party had inten-ded, and its negotiating position may be weakened and undermined as aresult. If the US comes into negotiations with a number of small states orallies that are dependent upon it we can generally foresee how the negotiationswill develop, and we may predict the outcome. But if the US enters intonegotiations with a mixed group of powerful states such as China and Russiaas well as allies, the outcome of the negotiations becomes uncertain and isvery much dependent on the process, how the negotiations are structured andhow they are conducted. Interaction within negotiations is the key concept ofthis study

Power and the structure of negotiations

Power is a slippery concept. National power can be quantified according toeconomic and military indicators. It is not an inherent quality or element butis a relational concept based on an ability to bring about a desired outcome.

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Power has been defined in various ways as the ability to get results, or toachieve objectives, or to ensure outcomes.1 Power may be understood in termsof an ability to have others endorse and accept one’s viewpoint, to draw upand control the agenda in negotiations, and to have the outcome accepted. Itis relational because it very much depends upon the perceptions of others,their willingness to cooperate with intentions, or their inability or reluctanceto oppose them. Power may entail the use of force, which is direct physicalpressure, or influence being a derivative form of power which is suggestive ofpower as the capacity to persuade others to cooperate. What counts is theability to get one’s way which may not correspond to power rankings ininternational affairs. When a strong power, that is, one that is rated highlyaccording to the indicators of national power, is unable to prevail in negotia-tions for whatever reason we have a definitional problem. We can argue thatthe strong power becomes a weaker, or is unable to apply its power duringnegotiations, or it is hamstrung by all kinds of constraints and limitations.This is telling us, however, that the ability to get one’s way in negotiations issomething else and not automatically assured by national power. A moreconvenient way of dealing with this problem is to separate national powerfrom negotiating strength, which is evident when a strong power is unable toapply its power during the course of negotiations. What is important for thisstudy is the format of negotiations, the parties involved, the particular functionsthey adopt and the way the negotiations are conducted.

Negotiation is a process according to which conflicting positions are com-bined to form a common decision, when parties stipulate the terms of theircooperation and give priority to common over conflicting interests.2 Nego-tiation theory examines the format and conduct of negotiations or whatZartman calls structure to explain why power does not always determineoutcome.3 Structure is defined in terms of the factors that influence the pro-cess of interaction such as the number of the parties to the negotiations, theirassessment of the value of potential outcomes, and tactical possibilities.4

Negotiation theory identifies the roles of the parties and the positions theyadopt, the differences between public positions and their bottom line positions,the outcome they expect and press for, their relations with each other, thenegotiating coalitions they may form, the tactics they will adopt to reach theirobjective, and their commitment to the final result. An analysis of the struc-ture of negotiations will help us to understand that new dynamics are createdbetween the parties when they sit down to discuss a particular issue, whichwould influence the final outcome. Not every structure will shape the outcomeof negotiations and in many cases the positions are clear and the results arelargely predetermined. The US may assume a leadership position in negotia-tions when it is supported by smaller powers dependent upon its resources ordiplomatic leverage. As leader and framer of the consensus, the US role maybe accepted and uncontested for the most part, and it will act to coordinatethe views of others in a largely predetermined outcome where the major issueshave been defined by it in advance. In complex multilateral negotiations

6 Bargaining and negotiation theory

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where issues are contentious, and where parties are divided in their expecta-tions, the outcome becomes much more uncertain and may even work againstthe stronger party.

Negotiation as interaction

The structure of negotiations is largely shaped by the interaction of the par-ties. Indeed, interaction is the key to understand how negotiations proceed incomplex cases and the results obtained. When a strong power such as the USgoes into negotiations with parties of opposing positions, a dynamic of inter-action is created as they react to each other. As the US brings its influence tobear over the negotiations new power relationships are created that may con-strain and limit its options and which frustrate its intentions. When the USseeks to act with great powers that dispose of resources and apply diplomaticleverage of their own, it would then be obliged to negotiate with them toobtain their willing participation. Should a strong power have an overweeningsense of omnipotence and a belief that it can decide outcomes on its own, andshould the other parties be determined to resist it, a complex pattern ofinteraction is created. The stronger party may be committed to a particularview of the common purpose, one that it regards as the most importantobjective of the negotiations or the raison d’être of their meeting, but which isnot necessarily shared by others. The other parties may join for other reasonsfor which they hope to obtain the support of the strong party. They may planto steer the multilateral effort towards their own concerns, or they may alsovalue the multilateral effort for the relationships formed and the opportunityto work with others. They would, however, express their public intention tosupport the common purpose as understood by the strong power. Their trueintentions, however, may be elsewhere, and their public and true negotiatingpositions will be very different. They would tend to regard the common pur-pose as defined by the strong party as a restriction on their freedom of action,to which they may react in various ways. Some states may resort to the tacticsof opposition and frustration while others may appear to support the statedgoals of the multilateral effort but will pursue other priorities during thenegotiations, which are regarded primarily as a means to promote them.

Interaction is a learning process as each side attempts to gauge and test thecommitment of the others in various ways and to push them to change oradjust their positions. Negotiations therefore are about a mutual adjustmentof expectations in an action–reaction process which is intended to reach afinal outcome.5 States have the expectation that a bargaining position may beimproved, or protected through negotiation which motivates their entry intothe process. The adjustment of expectations is essential to the negotiatingprocess as negotiators test the waters and discover that their demands havebeen excessive, or that those of others cannot be supported. Negotiators bringin their as yet untested expectations into the negotiations and maneuver tohave them accepted and endorsed by the other parties. Negotiators also have

Bargaining and negotiation theory 7

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expectations of how other parties would respond to their own positions andnegotiate in conditions of uncertainty, not knowing exactly what the otherparties will accept. They will test the field with proposals or trial balloonsintended to draw a response in the hope that the bargaining positions ofothers would be exposed. States may harbor certain bottom-line positionswhich they cannot compromise, and come into negotiations with deliberatelyimprecise bargaining positions that will allow them to maximize the oppor-tunities which present themselves. The process of negotiation ultimately definesthe positions and interests of the parties more clearly and reveals what is possi-ble under the circumstances, and what may have to be surrendered. A processof interaction is created as the parties react to each other’s positions, some-times being drawn closer as they realize that they have common interests,while on other occasions pulling away as they understand what divides them.

Interaction unleashes new dynamics between negotiating parties as theylearn more about each other’s bargaining position, and the difference betweenwhat is said and what is actually demanded. Interaction reveals the dis-crepancies between public and actual bottom-line positions which are notunderstood at the time of entry into negotiations. Interaction will translateinterests which are broad policy positions into specific negotiating positionsrelated to the issue in hand, and will separate what is possible from what isnot. Non vital positions are dropped along the way if they obstruct the pro-cess of negotiations and may be sacrificed as a necessary quid pro quo to getthe negotiations moving. They may be held for some time and pushedaggressively in the hope of obtaining equivalent concessions, until the limitsare realized. States will protect their core position or their bottom line whichmay be reformulated according to a policy reassessment or reinterpretationbrought about by a continuing and frustrating deadlock. When no progress ismade and a party has a strong commitment to a positive outcome to thenegotiation, there may be a reassessment of its bargaining position to avoidthe prospect of a break down in negotiations. The interactive process com-prises three phases: first there is the pre-negotiation phase where the issues areidentified and the positions clarified before actual negotiations begin andcommitments are made. The agenda and the format for negotiations are laidout at this stage. Once the issues have been clarified, the parties move into thetesting phase. During this phase the parties test the permissible negotiationrange by making new demands or withdrawing from previous positions asthey attempt to establish the boundaries for the negotiations. Once they haveclarified what may be possible in negotiations they then enter the final stagewhen they move to secure an agreement.6

Negotiations are often understood according to the theory of utility max-imization. This assumes that negotiations have the purpose of maximizingtangible benefits for parties which are achieved through tradeoffs and con-cessions. It assumes that negotiation generates feedback according to whichpositions are adjusted and gradually there is convergence towards an accep-table agreement which maximizes the benefits for all involved.7 Utility

8 Bargaining and negotiation theory

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maximization may be applicable to dyadic negotiations where the parties seekto maximize tangible gains within a limited time framework. It assumes rea-sonability in negotiation in that the parties share a commitment to the out-come and will avoid deliberately obstructionist activities. This may be the casein negotiations over trade, market access, or arms control where the benefitsare identifiable. The difficulty is applying the theory to cases where intangiblesare involved, or where the benefits are unidentifiable or in dispute. In thesecases there may be no adjustment of expectations or convergence towardsagreement because of an absence of a consensus on how to proceed. Thetactics used may depart considerably from those expected according to thelogic of utility maximization. Willful caprice may be the means to induceindulgent attitudes from others and the appearance of irrational and unpre-dictable action can be a way of extracting concessions from them. There maybe a learning process as the positions of the parties are understood moreclearly but there is no assurance of a favorable outcome, or indeed, muchprogress.

States enter into negotiations with certain interests which are long-termpolicy objectives. They then devise suitable bargaining positions which are thetactical means to secure interests. Interaction is a process of testing bargainingpositions against interests to determine what is possible and acceptable. Ifcommon points are discovered with others well and good, the negotiatingposition is fleshed out in greater detail and given greater definition.Agreement should rapidly follow. However, if resistance or downright oppo-sition is encountered a feedback loop is created back to the decision makerswho will be required to decide whether the negotiating position should beadjusted, and whether the adjustment will continue to reflect their interests.Interaction reveals the external constraints to policy and decides what is fea-sible and what will be retained, and what is overly ambitious or unrealisticand should be discarded. In this sense, interaction contributes to the for-mulation of policy and resolves disputes and dilemmas that cannot beresolved domestically. In some cases, however, the feedback loop may beaborted for various reasons and the adjustment to external constraints maynot always take place. When interests or policy objectives outrun the ability ofa bargaining position to secure them no adjustment would be acceptable.Decision makers may suffer from ideological rigidity and prioritize unrealisticgoals in which case change is rejected. Alternatively, they may face inter-agency conflict or hostile public opinion, in which case their negotiatingposition is characterized by inflexibility. Negotiators concerned will thenbecome locked into futile positions which needlessly prolong the negotiationsfor no good purpose.

Negotiating tactics

Negotiators will resort to various tactics based on assessment of their relativestrength to achieve their objectives, and to include their own position in the

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final outcome, or to prevent others from gaining a particular advantage.Negotiation theory outlines a process of mutual concession-making in whicha compromise is achieved. Making fair concessions is regarded as an optimalstrategy as it would oblige the other side to reciprocate and would create apattern of convergence. It can be seen as a “social exchange” and has “strongpotential for creating lasting bonds of friendship.”8 Negotiators start withopening bids and exaggerate their demands expecting them to be reduced underpressure of negotiation to something closer to their basic position. Accordingto this approach, negotiators must be “scrupulously fair” and “avoid thetemptation to take advantage of the opponent.”9 Insisting on a harsh positionthat is disadvantageous to the opponent may result in concessions in the shortterm, but would create resentment in the longer term and may result in theundoing of an agreement. It could provoke a tough response in turn,prolonging and complicating negotiations and breaking the trust that mayhave been built up between negotiators. These generalizations were drawnfrom the experience of US–Soviet negotiations over strategic arms limitationtalks in the 1970s. As these negotiations were dyadic other parties were notinvolved to complicate the picture, and moreover both sides had an interestand a shared responsibility for the outcome. This example would not apply toa situation where the commitment of the parties is uncertain at best andwhere expectations are deliberately left ambiguous. In this situation conces-sion-making and scrupulous fairness would be the tactic of a loser. It wouldentail giving away concessions with no assurance of reciprocity, and couldencourage an opponent to increase his or her demands.

How do we know the expectations of parties? Negotiation tactics can be animportant indicator of intentions though they may not throw light on thecontent of negotiating positions. In the US–Soviet case, the two parties after muchrivalry realized that to avoid the risk of conflict they had to cooperate overstrategic arms control and crisis management, they communicated theirintentions accordingly. They adopted explicit bargaining tactics which entails theopen communication of intentions, demands, and concessions. Should partiesadopt explicit bargaining they would signal that they have a commitment to anagreement but are negotiating the terms and conditions. They may begin withissues of principle but they would then clarify the details of their negotiatingposition to send a signal to the other side that an agreement is possible. Theywould then move to the next step which involves testing the intentions of theother side and mutual concession-making, in a process of reciprocal adjust-ment. The negotiations over strategic arms limitation between the US and theSoviet Union, known as SALT I and II, and free trade agreements wherebenefits were tangible were conducted in this way. This approach, whichdepends so much on mutual concession-making, may resolve a territorial ortrade dispute where resources can be shared and where compromise is logical.

There are issues of principle, however, over which mutual compromisewould be constrained by the nature of the issue and would create an undesir-able precedent that concerned parties would wish to avoid. The application of

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Jus Cogens in international law, which embraces the prohibition on genocide,war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, racial discrimination, piracy, andtorture, cannot be subject to compromise or mutual concession-making innegotiations. Nuclear proliferation may not come under Jus Cogens but difficultysimilarly arises in the negotiation of agreements to prevent it. The US hastaken upon itself the task of defending the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)and has regarded it as an issue of principle that should not be compromisedin a process of mutual concession-making, particularly in the cases of NorthKorea and Iran. In Asia, however, concessions and compromise are regarded asa normal approach to dispute resolution, something dictated by common sense,and Asian governments have had difficulty understanding what they regard asthe unwavering American insistence on principle. For them compromise andconcessions are the only way to reach agreement over nuclear proliferation butfor the Americans this approach would undermine the NPT, and would createan unwelcome precedent for other potential nuclear powers. Negotiationsinvolving nuclear proliferation may be divided by the need to uphold princi-ple and the demand for mutual concession-making for these reasons.

On the other hand, communication in tacit bargaining is ambiguous andconducted in terms of hints, signs, and veiled intimations.10 Tacit negotiationhas the advantage of not defining a negotiating position clearly which allows forchange and escalation of demands according to the situation. It may be inten-ded to firm up a weak hand in the face of an opponent that is clamoring foran agreement. It can also be an effort to avoid agreement and to gain time for someother purpose by stringing the negotiations along. A series of vague proposalscould be offered at various times and then dropped to avoid the need forexplanation. They will excite the interest of the opponent who will clamor forclarification which is never forthcoming. The opponent may become persuadedthat a genuine agreement is possible and will be tempted to offer concessionsto get the negotiations moving. Tacit negotiation avoids the process of mutualconcession-making when positions are clearly understood and attempts tomanoeuver the other side into offering unilateral concessions. Tacit bargain-ing can be a powerful tactic on the part of weaker powers in dealing withimpatient and harried Western negotiators who are under pressure from theirgovernments and their media for results. It creates an impression of what iswanted, without actually saying anything clearly that could be interpreted as acommitment, and encourages the other side to guess the real demands of itsopponent. Cultivated ambiguity is its strength as it draws out the other sideand stimulates competing interpretations of its demands which will be testedin negotiations. If an interpretation of its intentions is off the mark orunsuitable it will be denied, and another will be encouraged until the desiredconcession is offered.

This form of bargaining takes place when trust is lacking and the partiesare deeply suspicious of each other. Alternatively, it may be the styleadopted when a government is undecided because of interagency conflict ordisagreement in which case negotiators would resort to deliberate ambiguity

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to gain sufficient time for a position to be clarified. Negotiators fromauthoritarian or autocratic systems may adopt this style when fear of error orrebuke from the top prevents open communication with the other side. It mayalso be characteristic of Asian cultures which are loathe to declare theirpositions openly and communicate in terms of innuendos. Japanese and Chi-nese negotiators may resort to this tactic when their own domestic position isuncertain and when there is no clear consensus to support negotiations.

Western democracies, where negotiations are conducted in the full glare ofthe media, have great difficulty coping with tacit bargaining. The pressure frompolitical parties and the media to exploit every opportunity for an agreementwould limit the options for negotiators who would be compelled to demonstrateprogress at every turn. Sometimes negotiations require time for a situation toclarify itself, or for the other side to reveal its intentions, but this is not anoption that a Western democracy can easily choose, or explain to the mediaor to the public. Tacit bargaining creates a pattern which confers bargainingadvantage to the seemingly weaker side, and correspondingly places the muchstronger opponent in a weaker position of constantly hankering after anagreement. The apparently weaker party will refuse to clarify its negotiatingposition since that would create pressure for concessions which would detractfrom its maximum demands. It would cloud its negotiating position withambiguity which would draw out its opponent into making blind concessionswithout the obligation on its part of making reciprocating gestures to securean agreement. Any concessions made in the hope of locking in the negotiatorsusing this approach into a process of reciprocation could be rejected as beinginsufficient without explanation, leaving those who drafted them perplexedand frustrated. There would be even greater pressure to offer still more con-cessions in a situation where negotiator anxiety about the continuation of thenegotiations would be stimulated. Should the responses not be satisfactorytacit negotiators can then threaten to break off contact which would heightenthe pressure on the other side to rush to an agreement. In this way the weakerside would control the agenda of the negotiations as well as their pace. Itcould decide whether agreement was desired after all and when it would takeplace.

Brinkmanship and coercive threats can also be used when faced with muchstronger opponents in negotiations.11 Not all states are able to use such tacticssince it requires a capacity to threaten either by nuclear weapons or terrorismas well as a leadership whose threats would be taken seriously. Brinkmanshipcan be an effort to shock the other side into accepting maximum demands,and to avoid the regular process of negotiations when these demands arescaled back in mutual concession-making. It can also be a forceful attempt tobreak with negotiations and to compel other parties to bestow elevated statusupon those who resort to it. Like terrorism the effect of brinkmanshipdepends on the fear that the perpetrator has the freedom to strike at will, orto repeat a dangerous action which demands an immediate response. Shouldnegotiators facing such tactics hold firm and resist what they clearly perceive

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as blackmail they may be faced with strong domestic opposition which wouldrespond to each act of brinkmanship with the demand for concessions.12

Brinkmanship can only be conducted sparingly and it can continue only aslong as fear and alarm can be stimulated as repetition destroys its effect. Thismeans that over time the alarm-creating effect is reduced and the perpetratormust either up the ante or cease. If the perpetrator is unable to increase thepressure by further acts of brinkmanship its options are exhausted.

Structural analysis

Structural analysis examines the structure of negotiations and the interactionwithin them to understand the outcomes that may arise. It considers interna-tional bargaining as a process that engages both the power resources as wellas the abilities of the parties to negotiate and to make the best of a situation.Power is situational and depends not only on the way resources can beemployed to further a particular purpose but upon the factors that mayconstrain its use. In multilateral negotiations the number of parties, theroles they assume, their interests, bargaining positions and their ability topromote them will shape the conduct of negotiations and their eventual out-come. Initially, negotiations are called into being by a dominant player or agreat power, one that has the diplomatic authority and national power toinitiate negotiations and is sufficiently concerned about the issue to commititself to the proceedings. It may attempt to direct the negotiations towardsits own objectives and will push for an outcome on its own terms usingdiplomatic and other forms of leverage to hustle others in the negotiationsto its side.

However, should the dominant player require the cooperation of others toresolve the issue it will be constrained by them in what it can do. The parti-cular roles adopted by other parties and whether they are supportive, resis-tant, or swinging from one position to another will shape the negotiations andthe eventual outcome. One role that would be critical for negotiations is thatof the pivotal player whose cooperation is required to resolve the issue. Thepivotal player can be a major power autonomous in its own right and dis-posing of resources or diplomatic leverage that it can use to bring about aresolution. Should the pivotal player cooperate with the dominant party thepath to resolution would be smooth and the outcome would be predicted.Should it withhold cooperation from the dominant player because it seizesthe opportunity to promote its own objectives, tensions would immediatelyarise and the negotiations may stall. If we understand power as the ability toget others to do what one wants them to do then it is possible that a pivotalparty can wield power over more powerful parties and obtain the result itseeks in negotiations.13 Power reflects situations of dependence and a powerfulstate may be hamstrung from achieving a desired result in negotiationsbecause of its situational dependence.

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Aside from dominant and pivotal players there are the supporting partieswhich lack the resources and the diplomatic leverage to resolve an issue, buttheir presence is necessary for the negotiations to proceed. They may supportthe dominant player but should they react against it they may form align-ments with others similarly opposed to head off any pressure they face.Negotiating coalitions are then formed which can complicate the task of thedominant player compelling it to bargain for support to achieve a satisfactoryoutcome. When supporting states join a pivotal player a loose coalition of akind is formed whose purpose is to resist the dominant player and prevent itfrom overriding the others. One of the parties may assume the role of a swingstate or the holder of the balance in the negotiations as it swings from onegroup to another depending on its assessment of the situation, and changes ingovernment and the leadership. Should the negotiating coalition be evenlybalanced then the swing state may have an important role in moving thenegotiations forward. Indeed, alignments triggered during negotiations reducethe ability of the dominant player to employ its resources and limit theleverage it may bring to bear on the situation. When negotiations are linkedwith external issues over which there is considerable rivalry they become anextension of these rivalries which then prolongs the process. External rivalriescan motivate the formation of negotiating coalitions in which case the nego-tiations will not move forward and may collapse. Moreover, when negotiationsare intended to target a specific state to ensure that it abide by a rule or todesist from some action, and if that state is included as a party to negotiationsthere could be no end to difficulties.14

A successful example of the inclusion of a target state in negotiations is theCongress of Berlin which met in 1878. It was convened by Bismarck andincluded the major European powers, France, Britain, Austro-Hungary, andItaly, all which were alarmed by Russian territorial gains in the Balkans afterthe Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78. Russia was the target state and was com-pelled to surrender its gains under the combined diplomatic pressure of theseEuropean powers which were united over the issue.15 Unity was the key factorin the success of the Congress but if that were absent in negotiations and atarget state is present, a very different situation arises. Without unity a targetstate may exploit asymmetries in power relations by aligning with one groupor another and may extract concessions from them in a variety of ways. Itmay adopt a deliberate strategy of sabotage in which the rivalries betweenparties may be exploited and supporters played off against opponents byresorting to tacit bargaining techniques. It may engage in diplomacy bycharade to present a false face to parties in negotiations which are persuadedthat an agreement is possible with little additional effort. False starts can bestaged which would stimulate expectations and hopes that progress would bemade, an agreement may be accepted and then later repudiated in an seeminglyendless process that tests the patience of all concerned. A target state mayrefuse to implement agreements it has accepted or otherwise create difficultiesintended to exacerbate divisions within the group. Should exasperated

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members call for pressure or sanctions to enforce agreement, a target statecan then count on supporters to protect it thereby widening existing divisions.If a target state maintains a closed political system, it can conceal its bar-gaining strategy and create impressions which others are obliged to take atface value for lack of evidence to the contrary. It could also resort to brink-manship or deliberately unpredictable behavior which work in favor of atarget state, particularly in a multilateral situation where fear of the con-sequences would push other parties to agree to its terms. Brinkmanship wouldbecome effective in a situation where there are anxieties about the stability ofa target state and apprehensions that its collapse would trigger massive refu-gee flows across borders or conflict. A target state may engage in a form ofblackmail by exploiting the fear its own collapse, and once this pattern hasbeen set it could control the pace of negotiations and hold negotiations hostage toits own behavior.

The conceptual framework outlined above is intended to illustrate thedynamics of the Six Party Talks, how they functioned and why they failed tofulfill expectations. Once North Korea agreed to join the talks expectationswere stimulated that a resolution of its nuclear program was brought closer.In South Korea it was hoped that the talks would pave the way to a broaderregional organization which would embrace Northeast Asia. To explain thefailure of the Six Party Talks the concept of structure will be employed andthe various roles assumed by the players will be analyzed. The dominantplayer was the US as the most powerful state in the negotiations but it wasunable to utilize its power advantage to direct them towards its desired aim,which was the immediate denuclearization of North Korea. It required thecooperation of the pivotal party, China, to use its influence over North Koreato achieve this objective. The pivotal state, however, had other aims besidesthe denuclearization of the North and used the negotiations to further its ownobjectives. Russia acted as a supporter for China and similarly resisted thedominant player’s efforts to steer the negotiations towards its objective. SouthKorea acted as the swing state, and though an American ally, it swung behindboth China and Russia in the negotiations as they sought to deflect US pres-sure for a resolution of the issue on its terms. The sixth party Japan hadrendered itself ineffective as an American ally because of its insistence on theresolution of the abduction issue which was of no concern to the others. Theinclusion of North Korea as the target state complicated the negotiationsfor the US in the absence of any unity as to how to proceed. The alliancebetween the target state and the pivotal player China was crucial andprevented any unity amongst the parties in relation to the American goal ofdenuclearization which became a divisive issue. From the start unity wasabsent and though there were valiant attempts to bring about agreementbetween the parties their disparate interests would not allow it. The inter-action between these players largely determined the course of negotiations inthe Six Party Talks and explained the difference between the initial hope andthe final reality.

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Conclusion

The process of interaction in negotiation can define the positions of theparties more clearly and can separate what is desired from what is prac-tical and feasible under the circumstances. Parties may hold particular viewsof an issue based on the ideological dispositions of their leadership or theinterests of established agencies in the decision-making system, and enter intonegotiation expecting to obtain endorsement of their positions. A dominantparty like the US would in many cases expect to bring others on board byforceful persuasion or in some situations overriding the positions of others. Inmany cases the outcome of negotiations would reflect more or less the posi-tion of the dominant party, particularly if other parties were considerablyweaker or beholden to it for security or economic reasons. In certain circum-stances, however, the powerful do not prevail and are obliged to adjust theirpositions to accommodate others for which an explanation based on thestructure of negotiations is required. Furthermore, negotiation outcomes donot always reflect the distribution of power between the parties particularlyin complicated situations where there are multiple parties assuming differentroles according to whether they are pivotal, supporting or target states.Where a dominant party is dependent upon the cooperation of a pivotalplayer which is firmly allied to the target state in the negotiations, and shouldthe other parties not offer their support, it cannot expect to get its way. The SixParty Talks were an unusual case of multilateral negotiations in which thedominant player was hamstrung by its inability to attract support for its objec-tives. The conduct of the negotiations demonstrated that power may not alwaysachieve results and much depends upon the relationships between parties inthe negotiations, their commitment to the process and their expectation ofbenefit.

Notes1 On the concept of power see K. J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study ofInternational Relations,” Background, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1964), pp. 179–94; MichaelBarnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” InternationalOrganization, (2005), 59: pp. 39–75.

2 I William Zartman, “Two’s Company and More’s a Crowd,” in I William Zartman(editor) International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management ofComplexity, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, California, 1994, pp. 1–4.

3 I William Zartman, “Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Pro-cess,” Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1988.

4 I William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation,” in Victor A. Kremenyuk,(editor) International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Jossey-Bass, SanFrancisco, California, 1991, p. 66.

5 John G. Cross, “Negotiation as a Learning Process,” in I William Zartman,(editor) The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications, Sage publications,Beverly Hills, California, 1978, p. 51.

6 James A. Wall Jr. Negotiation: Theory and Practice, Scott, Foresman and Com-pany, Glenview, Illinois, 1985, pp. 8–9.

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7 Alan Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process, George Allen and Unwin,London, 1968, pp. 12–13.

8 Otomar J. Bartos, “Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View,”in I William Zartman, (editor) The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications,Sage publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1978, pp. 26–27.

9 Otomar J. Bartos, pp. 23–24.10 James A. Wall Jr. Negotiation: Theory and Practice, Scott, Foresman and Com-

pany, Glenview, Illinois, 1985.11 James A. Wall Jr. p. 65.12 Fen Osler Hampton with Michael Hart, Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from

Arms Control, Trade and the Environment, Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti-more, maryland, 1995, pp. 8–11, 16–17.

13 Christophe Dupont, “Coalition Theory: Using power to Build Cooperation,” in IWilliam Zartman (editor), International Multilateral Negotiation, Jossey-Bass, SanFrancisco, California, 1994, pp. 151–55.

14 William Zartman, “Two’s Company and More’s a Crowd,” p. 4.15 W.N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the

Near Eastern Settlement, 1878–1880, Methuen, London, 1938.

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2 Strategies and bargaining positions ofthe players

Introduction

The Six Party Talks were a process of interaction in which positions weredeclared, defended, and then adjusted according to the opportunities revealedand the reactions of others. They were called into being by the US, whichrefused to negotiate directly with North Korea over its nuclear program, andrequired a multilateral format to deal with the issue. As the main player theUS regarded nuclear proliferation as the central issue for negotiations andexpected that the other parties would join it in pressing the North into sur-rendering its nuclear program. The Bush administration assumed that it couldorchestrate multilateral pressure against North Korea as the target state byinvolving China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. It sought the denuclear-ization of the North while the other parties, though they understood thedangers of a nuclear North, sought to establish, maintain or expand theirposition on the Korean Peninsula in preparation for eventual reunification.As the pivotal player in the talks China’s interests were considerably differentfrom the American; its main concern was supporting the North and prevent-ing its collapse as an ally on the Korean Peninsula. It joined the talksexpecting that the issue would be resolved expeditiously, and that the US andthe North would come to an agreement which would preserve its ally. Russiawas a supporting state for China and although the two may have differentinterests on the Korean Peninsula, Russia worked with China to prevent theUS from resorting to harsh measures against the North. South Korea was theswing state; the Roh Administration believed it could develop a close rela-tionship with the North to remove the threat it posed and to prepare foreventual reunification. It sided with China to head off American pressure onthe North but it could never allow its alliance with the US to deteriorate, andso vacillated. Japan was the outsider in the talks though it did not begin thisway. It had intended to forge an independent relationship with the North butthis effort was derailed by the abduction issue which effectively cast Japan tothe sidelines. The parties were variously motivated by an effort to positionthemselves for the end game on the Korean peninsula and to ensure them-selves a place of influence in the event of reunification. For China, Russia,

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and South Korea the negotiations over the nuclear issue were linked to long-termstrategic interests in Northeast Asia to ensure that rivals would not benefit.This factor prevented them from wholeheartedly siding with the US over thenuclear issue, and motivated them to maintain some kind of relationship withthe North which would offer them influence over the Korean Peninsula.

The dominant player: the US

US priorities in relation to the nuclear issue were global as it had assumedresponsibility for the NPTon the basis that its forces and allies would be threa-tened by its breach. It had a fear that if the North were allowed to get awaywith a nuclear program, for whatever reason, it would encourage other aspir-ants for nuclear weapons, such as Iran and Libya, which would “reap awardsfor bad behavior” at the expense of the US.1 The US wanted to bring the Northback into the NPT and expected it to fulfill its obligations under the nuclearsafeguards agreement which it had signed with the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) in January 1992, and the 1991 North–South denu-clearization agreement.2 The US came into the Six Party Talks expecting toprevent the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but its belligerencetransformed the talks from a multilateral forum into an adversarial gathering,in which the other parties, China, Russia, and South Korea resisted Americanpressure. It reshaped the positions of the other parties to the point whereresisting a forceful American approach assumed greater priority during thenegotiations and became an aim in itself. US pugnacity affected the otherparties and made them even more determined to avoid the prospect of conflictor war, and to search for dialogue with the North.

Why did the Americans come into the negotiations with such belligerence?Could they not perceive that China was determined to preserve its own rela-tionship with the North, even at the expense of progress over the nuclearissue? Diplomacy would teach that aggression would invite deliberate resis-tance from those whose cooperation was most required, yet the US ignoredthis basic lesson. One reason was that the neoconservatives in the BushAdministration were convinced that in a unipolar global order they could belargely oblivious to the concerns of others. Another reason was that the decision-making system that flourished under the Bush Administration allowed theneoconservatives unbridled influence over policy, even when they had noformal responsibility over the issues. Vice President Dick Cheney, Under-secretaries of State for Arms Control and International Security John R.Bolton and his successor Robert G. Joseph wielded greater influence overpolicy than the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretaries, and the NationalSecurity Advisor, because their views had the support of the president.3 Thosewithout immediate responsibility for the negotiations often become moreextreme in their demands, and in this case they pushed the administration’spolicy towards unsustainable belligerence that undercut support for theAmerican position.

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The Clinton administration had compromised with the North over thenuclear issue when it concluded the Agreed Framework on October 22 1994.4

In February 1993 the North rejected IAEA requests to inspect two suspectnuclear waste sites and explain discrepancies arising from six earlier inspec-tions. The North on March 12 1993 announced its intention to withdrawfrom the NPT and in May 1994 it reprocessed 8,000 fuel rods at the 5-MWreactor at Yongbyon, removing and storing the plutonium, a violation of thesafeguards agreement it had signed with the IAEA. Clinton notes in hismemoirs that he considered sanctions and “refused to rule out militaryaction.”5 Clinton discussed an operation similar to the Israeli strike on theOsirak reactor in Iraq in June 1981, and prepared a draft resolution forgraduated sanctions in the UN in order to jolt the Chinese into action and getthem to push the North to negotiate.6 In late May 1994 the Pentagon presenteda detailed contingency plan for bombing the Yongbyon nuclear facilities andwas preparing it for presidential approval on 16 June.7 According to Ober-dorfer, on June 16 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashviliwas explaining the contingency plan when it was announced that ex-presidentJimmy Carter was in Pyongyang: it was like “a bombshell” in the cabinetroom.8 Wit and Poneman wrote that but for the Carter mission the US wouldhave launched an attack on the North.9 In a momentous event which changedthe course of events Carter met Kim Il-sung on June 16. He then relayed theNorth’s willingness to negotiate in a telephone call to Washington fromPyongyang, and also in a declaration on CNN. As a result of this interven-tion the Clinton Administration was maneuvered into bilateral negotiationswith the North at Geneva, which resulted in the Agreed Framework.

The Agreed Framework was considered a treaty because it imposed bind-ing obligations on the parties, but the Clinton Administration was concernedabout the Senate’s reactions and called it a “framework” instead.10 Its essen-tial feature was the North’s promise to freeze and eventually dismantle itsnuclear facilities, and the postponement of verification and inspections until alater unspecified time. It established a body called the Korean EconomicDevelopment Organization (KEDO), which was to fund and construct twolight water reactors (LWRs) that were to replace the North’s aging graphitereactors. The US agreed to supply the North with 500,000 tons of heavyheating oil annually to compensate for the loss of energy pending completionof the LWRs. The freeze was to begin when the North received US assurancesas to the provision of the LWRs and the supplies of heavy oil. Verificationwould commence “when a significant portion of the LWR project is com-pleted, but before the delivery of key nuclear components.” Other provisionscalled for the full normalization of political and diplomatic relations betweenthe US and the North, and the US would also provide the North with formalassurances that it would not threaten it with nuclear weapons.11

The Agreed Framework polarized American opinion. Supporters of theClinton Administration argued that postponement was better than war andthey believed that the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime justified

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it. They saw it as the “best of a bad situation” which would prevent the Northfrom producing more plutonium. The North had by 1994 produced sufficientplutonium for one or two nuclear weapons, and the 8,000 spent fuel rodscontained enough plutonium for another for four or five. Because of theAgreed Framework the IAEA could place the 8,000 fuel rods in a safe storagecooling pond and have them monitored. Without this agreement, it wasargued that the North could have produced sufficient plutonium for at least30 nuclear weapons.12 The Administration also argued that it had prevented anuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan and perhaps South Koreawould have been provoked to go nuclear themselves; it reduced the incentivefor the North to engage in the proliferation of nuclear technology, and pro-vided an opportunity for the North to break out of its isolation which wouldcreate an external environment of reduced hostility and would encourage eco-nomic reform and cooperation.13 Critics of the agreement were particularlysevere. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger called it “one of the worstexamples of appeasement by our government,” since it allowed the North tomaintain its nuclear weapons program. He saw the postponement of verificationto the distant future as inexcusable and declared that the agreement amountedto a “waiver of NPT requirements” and gave North Korea “everything theyhave said they want and more”14

These criticisms became the basis of Republican attacks on the ClintonAdministration in the highly charged and polarized political situation whichreduced the debate over policy to bitter and rancorous polemics, when com-plex positions were simplified into slogans which replaced cool analysis.American policy could not rid itself of the distorting effects of these polemicswhen negotiations would be subject to partisan attack and the threat of veto byan angry Republican Congress. Democrats and supporters of the ClintonAdministration rallied around the idea of engagement to fend off pressure fromthe Republicans but they were unclear of what this really meant. Engagementcould mean keeping the diplomatic channels open and negotiating with theNorth without specifying the content of the negotiations any more clearly.Engagement could also mean coming to an agreement with the North thatwould resolve the immediate problem. It could also mean giving the Northwhat it ostensibly wanted which was an assurance of its security and eco-nomic aid. Opponents and critics called for isolation and punishment of anodious regime but they could not explain how this would resolve the issue.Their confident belief that the regime would collapse in time may have been acomfort to them, but for neighbors of the North it was a nightmare scenario.

The Agreed Framework was the only option available to the US if it wasunwilling to resort to a military strike on the North. It set the parameters ofpossible negotiations with the North, and anything that the US might agreewith the North in the future would one way or another follow it as a pre-cedent, despite the hostility it met in Republican circles. Former DefenseSecretary William Perry visited Pyongyang in May 1999, the highest rankingUS official to do so since the Korean War, and in October he conducted a

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review of policy towards the North which advised an extension of the AgreedFramework. The Perry Review called for “complete and verifiable assur-ances” from the North that it had no nuclear weapons program, and wouldnot test, deploy, or export ballistic missiles beyond the range permitted by theMissile Technology Control Regime. In return the US would normalize rela-tions with the North and gradually relax the sanctions that had been imposedon it as a state sponsor of terrorism.15 Verification experts from the IAEAthought that the agreement created an anomaly by placing North Korea in a“permanent state of non compliance” with the NPT, and that the postpone-ment of IAEA inspections would make it impossible for later inspectors toretrace the development of the North’s nuclear program.16 Supporters of theAgreed Framework argued that the North had cooperated with the IAEA andKEDO and had kept to the agreements it had reached with them. Theyargued that North Korea should be taken out of its isolation by allowing it tojoin international financial institutions like the World Bank which wouldcreate a favorable environment for the resolution of the nuclear and otherissues.17

Under the Agreed Framework the US was to install critical components forthe light water reactors while the North was to reveal all processing records ofthe Yongbyon nuclear reactor. It quickly broke down however. CharlesPritchard who was the US representative to KEDO said that “we got close”to an eventual resolution of the issue but two major hurdles emerged. Thefirst was procedural as the North demanded delivery of the componentsbefore providing the processing records, while the US insisted on receiving therecords first. Secondly, and perhaps more important, before the US couldsupply the critical components congressional approval was required, and asPritchard observed ruefully it was a constant battle to obtain funding forKEDO from a hostile Republican Congress. Benjamin Gilman, Chair of theHouse Committee on Foreign Affairs said that the North was the US’s “mostfavoured rogue state” and demanded short notice inspections of its nuclearsites.18 The Republicans also opposed shipments of heavy fuel oil to the Northwhich resulted in delivery delays and then the eventual repudiation of thearrangement by the North. As Pritchard complained this was “inappropriatedistribution of a promised good.”19

Proponents would argue that if the US had kept to the agreement andsupplied the components for the light water reactors and the heavy fuel, theNorth might have responded with verification of its nuclear sites and a fullaccounting of its nuclear past. In the closing days of the Clinton Adminis-tration there was the hope of a breakthrough when the President consideredvisiting Pyongyang in a dramatic gesture similar to Nixon’s visit to Beijing inFebruary 1972. The North searched for some way to revive negotiations withthe US when Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the second most senior official inNorth Korea, visited Washington and met Clinton on October 10 2000. Jopresented a letter to Clinton from Kim Jong-il which promised to deal withall outstanding issues.20 Clinton sent Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in

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November and despite repeated attempts to identify the agenda for the talks,Kim Jong-il told her that it would be revealed only when he met with Clin-ton. Albright did not recommend that Clinton carry out the visit as the riskwas too great and the results uncertain, but Clinton was intrigued nonethelessand felt that he could not pass up this opportunity.21 On 28 December 2000he declared that “We’ve made a lot of progress with the North Koreans” andthat his efforts had “opened an opportunity to reduce if not eliminate thethreat posed by North Korean missile development and exports.”22 HoweverClinton had run out of time as he was already heavily involved in the CampDavid talks between Ehud Barack and Yasser Arafat over the Middle Eastand the matter was dropped.23 Clinton and William Perry had intended topursue a comprehensive and integrated approach towards the North, and hadexpected to resolve all issues including the ballistic missile and the nuclearprograms in one grand gesture, which appeared enticing. Whether the Northwould have responded in kind is another matter as its intentions were unclear.It could have conceded the ballistic missile issue to obtain a further post-ponement of verification, but it was unlikely that it would have surrenderedthe nuclear program.

The Bush Administration’s initial approach was to maintain continuitywith the policy of the Clinton Administration. Secretary of State Colin Powelltold Clinton administration officials that that “we will pick up where you leftoff.” Robert L. Gallucci who was the US negotiator for the first nuclear crisisover 1993–94 outlined the US position in a Senate hearing in 2001. Galluccideclared that the US aim was the engagement of the North in negotiations toprevent it from developing nuclear weapons, to reduce the risk of a war on theKorean Peninsula, and to prevent the North from testing, producing,deploying or exporting ballistic missiles or ballistic missile technology. Thekey point emphasized by Gallucci was that the US would work to preservethe 1994 Agreed Framework and that it should pursue “the long-termobjective of reducing tensions on the Peninsula and contributing to a processthat would lead to reunification.”24 The Bush Administration conducted aninteragency review of policy towards the Korean Peninsula over March–May2001 which involved Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and James Kelly, whowere all members of the elder Bush Administration. They drafted PresidentBush’s concluding statement of June 6 in which he declared that the US hadadopted a “comprehensive approach” towards the North that would includeballistic missiles, conventional as well as nuclear forces. The President claimedthat if North Korea took “serious steps” to improve relations, the US wouldreciprocate and would ease sanctions, and take other practical steps torespond.25 Colin Powell on June 7 announced that the US would initiatenegotiations with the North “without preconditions” and that everything wasnegotiable.26 US envoy Charles Pritchard revealed that after the President’sstatement he made an effort on June 13 to hold bilateral meetings withVice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan through what was called the NewYork channel.

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The State Department wanted to send Charles Pritchard to Pyongyang toinitiate the dialogue but there was resistance within the Administration fromUndersecretary of State John Bolton, whose hard line attitude towards theNorth was well known. Further progress was prevented by the terroristattacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 9 2001 whichtransformed the attitude of the Administration towards “rogue” states likeNorth Korea. Bush in his State of the Union Address of January 29 2002included North Korea along with Iran and Iraq in the “axis of evil” as countriessponsoring terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bushhas been described as a man whose “instincts are almost his second religion,”and who had a “blind faith in instincts.” He let his heart rule his head and isreported to have said “I loathe Kim Jong-il” and “I feel passionate aboutthis.”27 On April 30 2002 the North indicated that it was prepared to beginnegotiations but by then the Bush Administration’s attitude had hardened. OnMay 6 and August 29 John Bolton publicly attacked North Korea and indi-cated that a shift was taking place in the administration towards a hard linepolicy.28 The State Department sent Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to the North over 1–3 October 2002 toclarify troubling reports it had received about a Highly Enriched Uranium(HEU) nuclear program.29 Kang Sok-ju North Korea’s First Vice-Ministerfor Foreign Affairs was shocked when the American delegation confrontedhim with evidence of the HEU program and he offered to terminate the pro-gram if the US promised not to attack it.30 The admission that the North hadindeed such a nuclear program was a breach of the Agreed Framework andhad a dramatic effect upon the Administration.

At first there were doubts about the accuracy of the report which was madepublic in US Today on October 16 2002. Initially it was thought it could havebeen a mistranslation where the right to the program was confused withactual possession, but the reports were cross checked and error was dis-counted. This admission of the existence of the HEU program revealed thatthe North had little trust in the Agreed Framework anyway despite the Clin-ton Administration’s efforts to make it work. It had prepared a fallbackposition where the plutonium-based nuclear program would be sacrificed fora deal with the US while it would retain the HEU program as ultimate cardin case the US reneged on the deal. Clinton wrote that in 1998 he had learnedthat the North had begun to produce HEU in a laboratory in violation of theAgreed Framework.31 Very much later reports emerged about the North’sreceipt of centrifuges from the A. Q. Khan network in late 2000, around thetime when Clinton had considered a breakthrough visit to the North. Later,reports circulated within the Bush Administration that the North was developingclandestine HEU facilities and in 2001 the CIA observed the North’s purchaseof related equipment.32 The result was that the Bush Administration decisi-vely broke with the Clinton Administration’s approach and condemned theNorth as a pariah state with which there could be no further dialogue. It renouncedthe Agreed Framework, terminated American participation in KEDO, and

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stopped delivery of the promised heavy fuel oil to the North. Within the Admin-istration the North was regarded as a “proven violator of agreements” whichincluded the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards agree-ment, the North–South De-Nuclearization Accords, as well as the Agreed Fra-mework.33 The Bush Administration demanded that the North surrender itsnuclear program and agree to full verification before there could be any fur-ther negotiations. Official contact with the North was banned and therewould be no discussion of economic aid or other incentives for the Northuntil it agreed to these demands.

As the neoconservatives in the Bush administration gained influence overpolicy, the State Department became progressively marginalized. Secretary ofState Colin Powell’s position was repeatedly undercut by the neoconservatives,particularly after his speech to the UN Security Council on February 5 2003 whenhe claimed that that there was evidence of WMD in Iraq. State Departmentofficials were proscribed from meeting with their North Korean counterpartsunless Defense Department officials and representatives from the Vice President’sOffice were present.34 NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice was sidelined by bothCheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and was known to be singularlyineffective in this position.35 Bush did little to clarify the decision-makingsystem which undermined accountability and allowed the neoconservatives toinfluence policy without taking responsibility themselves.36 In many respectsBush was hostage to his own appointees and allowed them to make policywhich he subsequently endorsed. It was even reported that Cheney andRumsfeld would undermine presidential decisions they opposed by instructingtheir subordinates to do otherwise, which indicated an alarming lack ofrespect for the President.37 According to Colin Powell, Bush was usuallyinfluenced by the last person who saw him which illustrated a particularlyimpressionable nature, one who compensated for his inability to understandcomplex situations by resorting to tough language and emotional vehemence.

Unwilling to engage North Korea directly in negotiations over the nuclearissue the Bush Administration searched for a united front to compel theNorth to surrender its nuclear program. The Bush Administration stumbledinto multilateralism over the Korean Peninsula for which it was unprepared.A combination of ideological conviction, based on what was then America’s“unparalleled” military strength and economic power, as well as shatteringexternal events triggered an assertive unilateralism in the US. The Adminis-tration’s understanding of multilateralism was evident in its attitudes andpublic statements and included trusted allies and friends as necessary supportfor America’s unilateral initiatives. In this respect the Bush Administrationturned its back on the broader and overarching theme of multilateralism thathad motivated earlier administrations in building inclusive institutions such asthe UN. It focused upon a narrower and exclusive form of multilateralismthat was an instrument and extension of its security policy, and one thatcould be controlled by it. The Bush Administration’s National SecurityStrategy, which had been announced on September 17, 2002 stressed the

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importance of coalitions to support its “proactive counterproliferation efforts.”38

In regard to the Korean Peninsula the US-sponsored Trilateral Coordinationand Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings with Japan and South Korea served tocoordinate policy during the North Korea policy review process in early2001.39 The TCOG continued to serve the purpose of coordinating policybetween allies during the Six Party Talks. The Bush administration also sponsoredtrilateral security dialogue with Japan and Australia, which followed US–Australia defense talks in July 2001. However, multilateralism did not extendto competitor states such as China and Russia, though the Bush Administra-tion did acknowledge the need to work with them to defuse regional conflicts.Ill prepared to work with China and Russia, the Bush Administration wasobliged to seek their cooperation to prevent North Korea from realizing itsnuclear weapons program. Simply by standing tough the US could not pre-vent the North from developing nuclear weapons unless it was ready to resortto a dangerous military strike with unpredictable consequences. While theBush Administration was developing military strategies and boosting itsmilitary power to counter the rise of China it expected Chinese cooperationover this issue, based on the assumption that China shared the same concernabout nuclear proliferation, and that America and China were equally committedto a nuclear-free Korea. Despite the Administration’s efforts to counter Chinamilitarily Chinese compliance with American aims over the Korean Peninsulawas never seriously questioned. The fact that China had other aims on theKorean Peninsula, and that US military strategies directed against Chinawould reduce Chinese support for American objectives was not taken intoaccount at the policy level.

The US could not bring about the denuclearization of the North withoutChina’s cooperation and publicly maintained the view that China was sup-portive. In doing so it fell into a diplomatic trap produced by its own unrea-listic expectations. It created the image of China’s willing cooperation andconsistently claimed that China was working with the US to prevent nuclearproliferation on the Korean peninsula, despite that fact that Chinese behaviorsuggested otherwise. The US was well aware that China would not cooperatewith UN sanctions in regard to North Korea. Even before the Agreed Fra-mework was concluded Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis was asked aboutthe Chinese position during Senate hearings in March 1994. She said thatChinese refusal to cooperate in imposing sanctions on the North was “not theofficial position” of the Chinese government and that the Chinese were “par-ticipating and supporting our overall goal.”40 China had communicated itsopposition to sanctions and to that extent was not supporting this Americangoal but the US was obliged to declare otherwise. No doubt the public facethe Chinese Foreign Ministry projected to the Americans was one of willingcooperation and in name of diplomatic expedience the Chinese told theAmericans what they wanted to hear. The Foreign Ministry, however, did notrepresent Chinese policy over North Korea, which was the preserve of theParty. The US was faced with a dual task which it did not acknowledge

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openly, it had to persuade China as well as the North to cooperate fully withthe denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and it failed in both tasks.

The pivotal player: China

As the pivotal player, China’s cooperation was essential for the goal of elim-inating the North’s nuclear program. China is linked with the North throughthe 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance andmaintains a special relationship with the North Korean regime, one that hasbeen reinforced by the North’s economic dependence. The Americansassumed that the Chinese shared their apprehension over the development ofthe North’s nuclear program and would use their leverage in the Six PartyTalks to bring it back into the NPT. The Americans were encouraged in theirview of China by the attitudes of what the International Crisis Group (ICG)called the strategists, otherwise called reformers who are Foreign Ministryofficials in the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, US andinternational relations experts in the top universities and think tanks whohave experience of the West and have been educated there. For this groupNorth Korea is a strategic liability and cooperation with the US in multi-lateralism is important to prevent the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,and Northeast Asia.41 In their view a nuclear North Korea could pushJapan, South Korea, and even Taiwan toward nuclear weapons whichwould severely affect China’s security.42 They see policy towards North Koreaas an extension of China’s relationship with the US, and an opportunity todevelop a closer relationship with the Americans. Cooperation with the USover North Korea would allow China to demand a more cooperative attitudefrom the Americans over issues that concern them such as Taiwan, and alsoJapan.43

The strategists or reformers, however, do not control policy towards NorthKorea which has been in the hands of what the ICG has called traditionalists,otherwise called conservatives. The relationship with North Korea has beenconducted by the Party’s International Liaison Department on a part-partybasis in which ideological ties have been stressed. The traditionalists or con-servatives are found in the party, the PLA and its think tanks, as well as theeditorial boards of various conservative and newspapers. For these partyofficials, China sacrificed blood to defend the North Korean regime duringthe Korean War and this sacrifice created a special relationship between them.They are deeply distrustful of the US and regard it as a challenge to China inthe Western Pacific and see little reason to cooperate with it. For them NorthKorea is China’s only remaining ideological ally which demands constanteconomic and political support, and its survival is China’s priority for tworeasons. The first is strategic as the North is regarded as an ally against theAmerican military presence in Northeast Asia and also Japanese influence onthe Korean Peninsula. These party officials do not share American concernsabout global nuclear proliferation and habitually regard this as an American

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distraction. In their view the Korean nuclear issue has obscured a deepercompetition for influence over the Peninsula and Northeast Asia betweenChina and the US.44 The relationship with the North is also a means ofensuring influence over the reunification of the Korean Peninsula to ensurethat it would not immediately fall under American and South Korean control.The second reason is the fear of North Korea’s collapse which would bringchaos to the Peninsula and the possibility of American and South Koreantroop deployments in the North to secure the nuclear facilities and to main-tain order. Regime collapse would bring hordes of refugees across the Chineseborder extending the chaos to China’s Northeastern provinces. The Chinesehave been very sensitive to the revival of ethnic Korean nationalism in anextensive region bordering North Korea which the ancient Korean states ofKoguryo, unified Silla and Balhae claimed as their own. There are an esti-mated 2 million Koreans in these border regions, which include Liaoning,Jilin, and Shandong Provinces.45 In June 1995 ethnic nationalists from SouthKorea visited these border regions and called for the return of this territorywhich they claimed was Korean.46

There is a division of labor in the Chinese decision-making system so thatthe Foreign Ministry works with the US and the international communitywhile the International Liaison Department nurtures and cultivates the spe-cial relationship with North Korea.47 The Foreign Ministry may stress coop-eration with the US over North Korea but it is essentially the public relationsbranch of the Party and has become progressively marginalized over decision-making.48 Friction may arise between a ministry that values the relationshipwith the US and the party organs which stress the importance of the North,but there is more cooperation than division based on a shared concern withChina’s interests. Outside the decision-making circle there are prominentacademics, depicted as strategist or reformist, who have complained bitterlyabout the general direction of Chinese policy over North Korea but they donot represent government or party. Western press reports can give a distortedview of Chinese decision-making when English-speaking Foreign Ministryofficials and academics with experience of the West appear in public andspeak at international conferences on Chinese policy creating an impressionof Chinese support for multilateralism over North Korea. The conservativesin the party and military do not often appear in the international press or atconferences and their views are not familiar to external observers. In a poli-tical system where a free press is absent they are able to work behind thescenes and are known by their impact upon events.

China joined the Six Party Talks to mediate between the North and the USand to bring about resolution of the nuclear issue that would stabilize theKorean Peninsula. Since 1993–94 China had regarded the nuclear issue as abilateral problem between North Korea and the US and one that did notinvolve it, but the Bush Administration’s belligerence prompted it into amediatory effort for the first time.49 The Chinese invested heavy diplomaticcapital in the talks to ensure they would succeed in bringing the US and the

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North to a deal that would defuse the situation. Their immediate goal was tohead off the pressure from within the Bush Administration for a military strikeon the North, which after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a possibilitythat was taken very seriously. They wanted the US to desist from demandingthe North’s nuclear disarmament as an immediate step and sought to lock in theUS behind an agreement that would satisfy the North’s demand for securityagainst American attack. The Chinese attempted to manage both the US andNorth Korea and to lead both to “peaceful denuclearization,” which would fendoff aggressive American pressure and allow them to maintain their position ofinfluence over the North.50 This meant working with the Americans in the SixParty Talks, assuring them that China shared their goals, arranging thenegotiation rounds and preparing the agendas together with draft proposals.They had to convince the Americans of their desire to resolve the nuclear issue,yet they also had to avoid siding with the US which could undermine theirrelationship with the North. The Chinese played a classic double game duringthe Six Party Talks which depended on the American belief that China hadinfluence over the North and would bring about the results the US wanted, whileassuring the North that this influence would not be used against them. Thefact that the Bush Administration turned towards China to arrange the SixParty Talks indicated the extent to which the Americans held this belief andexplained why they repeatedly pressed the Chinese to use their influence withthe North to come up with the desired results.

In 2003 when the talks began, the Chinese were persuaded that a resolutionwas possible, and that the US and the North could be brought to an agree-ment.51 What the Chinese expected from their mediation was to nudge theUS and the North into a compromise resolution which was preferable toinstability and the risk of conflict that would arise if the US insisted uponconfronting the North. The Chinese approach sought to separate the nuclearissue from the issue of the stability and the security of the Korean Peninsula.China’s intention was to stabilize the Korean Peninsula first and to postponethe nuclear issue until a propitious time in the future when conditions wouldbe more favorable for a resolution of the issue. A compromise agreement withthe North over the nuclear issue would remove the hostility that had cloudedAmerican relations with the North since the Korean war, and would preparethe regime for a soft landing rather than a hard and unanticipated crash. TheNorth would receive international economic aid on a scale which wouldreorient its priorities from paranoiac defense to economic development andforeign investment. With an economy saved from collapse by internationalassistance North Korea would become more dependent on the external world.Pressure from the international community for a full accounting of thenuclear program would then make much more sense.

Despite the logical appeal of this approach there were several practicaldifficulties inherent in the Chinese approach. One was that for the Americansnuclear non proliferation was a matter of principle and compromise with theNorth would set a dangerous precedent for other powers with nuclear programs

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such as Iran. The second was that the North was a militarized regimeunder a ruling dynasty that had been isolated for all of its existence andany effort to open it up to the external world would threaten it. The regimehad no incentive to follow the Chinese path of economic reform and anyreforms which were attempted were quickly reversed. A third was that theChinese approach could avoid one danger, which was the collapse of theregime and resultant chaos, by bringing about another, that is a NorthKorea in possession of nuclear weapons. Even if the North could reformand survive there was no assurance that the regime would surrender itsnuclear weapons program once it had started in this direction, and thatthe end result would be a reformed and strengthened North with nuclearweapons. The Chinese themselves were anxious that if their efforts succeededtoo well the US and North Korea would come to a deal to China’s detri-ment. The idea may seem preposterous to Americans but there was genuineconcern in China that the US may switch policy and seize the opportunity toengage the North as a means to curb Chinese influence on the KoreanPeninsula.52

The target state: North Korea

Kim Il-sung apparently had an “obsessive” desire for nuclear weapons whenhe saw Japan surrender after the atomic bombing in 1945.53 The North pro-duced plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor over 1993–94 for its nuclearweapons program but the plutonium program was frozen by the AgreedFramework. The North’s acceptance of this freeze has been regarded as awillingness to surrender the nuclear program, and evidence that its intentionwas to use it as a bargaining chip for American security assurances, economicaid and other tangible benefits. Placed in context, however, the freeze wasreally a means to commit the US to an agreement that would remove thethreat of force against the North and allow it to pursue a nuclear program inanother way. The North developed a HEU program, the technology forwhich was obtained through the A. Q. Khan network. This proliferationnetwork was encouraged by supporters in the Pakistani military who saw it inPakistan’s national interest to reduce the dominance of the US by assistingmore countries to develop nuclear weapons, and to create a multi-polarworld.54 A. Q. Khan was impressed by the test flight of the Nodong missile inMay 1993 and proposed that Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visitNorth Korea to obtain the missile technology. Benazir Bhutto visited NorthKorea in December 1993 and arranged a deal whereby Pakistan wouldreceive Nodong ballistic missile designs in exchange for $40 million, butbecause Pakistan could not pay it offered HEU technology instead.55 Pakistantested five nuclear devices on 28 May 1998 and another two days later on 30May, witnessed by North Korean technical teams.

The US intelligence community noted that five HEU devices were tested on28 May and Pakistan was known to have a developed HEU program. On 30

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May, however, Pakistan tested a plutonium nuclear device and it was notknown to have a plutonium program while North Korea did. For US intelli-gence, the conclusion was that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device on NorthKorea’s behalf.56 Later in 1998 Khan flew to Pyongyang on a Pakistani Airforce Boeing 707 carrying five crates of P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, technicaldetail, drawings and uranium hexafluoride.57 Pervez Musharraf who deniedall knowledge of the network in his memoirs nonetheless admitted that Khantransferred “nearly two dozen” P-1 and P-2 centrifuges to North Korea, witha flow meter, and special oil for centrifuges. North Korean engineers visitedtop centrifuge plants in Pakistan and were given secret briefings on cen-trifuges in the Khan Research Laboratories.58 On February 2 2004 A. Q.Khan admitted selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea,obliged to do so after the IAEA had received evidence about the extent of hisnetwork; the sales began in 1989 and continued for ten years.59

The accusation that the US did not live up to the Agreed Framework, anddid not take seriously the North’s repeated declaration that it would give upits nuclear program if the Americans stopped treating it as an enemy, isunconvincing. North Korea had already an established plutonium nuclearprogram and was actively collaborating with Pakistan over the HEU programwell before the breakdown of the Agreed Framework.60 By developing theHEU program the North had indeed violated the Agreement and provokedthe US into open renunciation. This fact changes the discussion about theNorth’s motives and what could have been accomplished before the BushAdministration came to office in 2001. The North has often justified itsnuclear program as a response to the threat of the US, which breaks downwhen the sequence of events is examined. Indeed it was the nuclear programwhich attracted the American threat over 1993–94 and the danger of anAmerican military strike which both North Koreans and Chinese feared. TheNorth was developing its HEU program even after the Agreed Frameworkwas signed when the threat to the North had diminished under the ClintonAdministration. This reveals that there were other motives. Under the AgreedFramework the North would accept a freeze on its plutonium program as anecessary price to allow the HEU program to continue. It was important forthe North to have Clinton visit Pyongyang before he stepped down as pre-sident to extend the Agreed Framework and protect it against the incomingRepublican Administration. Clinton had hoped for a breakthrough in makinga grand gesture in visiting the North but he was saved by lack of time from amonumental blunder. All he could have done under the circumstances was toobtain a further freeze on the plutonium program without a commitment toverification and inspections, while the HEU program would have remainedoutside the agreement. Clinton would have cheerfully declared victory andannounced the triumphal resolution of the North Korean problem but thereal issues would have been postponed yet again, this time with more fatefulconsequences since the HEU program would have been allowed to reachcompletion.

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A related argument is that the North wanted bilateral talks with the US toobtain formal assurances of American non aggression which would makethem feel secure, and could obviate the need for the nuclear program. TheNorth sought assurances and reassurances of non aggression from the USduring bilateral talks in June 1993 and in August 1994.61 The US respondedby offering formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weaponsagainst the North in the Agreed Framework. During the Six Party Talks theNorth demanded a non aggression pact with the US which was somethingmore formal and wider in its implications. The US could not agree to aformal treaty since it would require ratification by a hostile Senate which theAdministration wanted to avoid, but it was prepared to offer security assur-ances to the North. It is difficult to accept, however, that American securityassurances could have eased the North’s fears to the extent that it would havegiven up its nuclear program. A paranoiac state that has to develop nuclearweapons and ballistic missiles for its survival would be most unlikely to trustpaper guarantees of its security, let alone verbal assurances. The North mayhave calculated that a formal American assurance of its security would free itto engage in provocative acts against the South and Japan while constrainingan American response. It would have the effect of undermining the US com-mitment to its allies in certain circumstances by assuring the North ofAmerican special treatment. Certainly special treatment for the North wouldalarm the South and Japan. During the negotiations for the Agreed Frame-work in September 1994 when the US negotiated directly with the North, theKim Young-sam government was concerned about its exclusion and feared adeal behind its back. The South became much more wary of US intentions asa consequence.62

There was also the view that were two contending groups in the NorthKorean leadership, the hawks and the moderates, and that if the US hadcrafted a policy of engagement that would have appealed to the moderates thenuclear program could have been scrapped. This notion was popularized bySelig Harrison who claims that there was intense policy debate between themoderates and the old guard, and Kim Jong-il played a mediating rolebetween them.63 There is ample evidence of internal conflict in the North asrevealed by several events including Kim Jong-il’s decision to return USwarrant officer Bobby Hall against the objections of the military after he hadstrayed over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in a helicopter on December 171994. Hwang Jang-yop’s defection in February 12 1997 in Beijing has beenoften cited as evidence of this conflict between moderates and hardliners.Hwang had married a niece of Kim Jong-il and was well connected with theruling family. He was the foremost authority on the party ideology juche, oneof 11 Central Committee secretaries in the party in charge of foreign policy,and was also chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the SupremePeople’s Assembly. He was rated as twenty-fourth in the party hierarchy andwas the highest ranking member to defect from the North to avoid a purge bythe hardliners. His explanation for his defection was that after Kim Il-sung’s

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death there was a shift of power to the military and “red banner” ideologywhich stressed revolutionary martial spirit began to supplant juche.

In February 1996 Hwang advocated Chinese market style reforms to revivethe deteriorating economy when he understood that he was being targeted bythe hardliners.64 Technocrats were purged in this period including the PremierKang Song San who had called for closer economic relations with SouthKorea, Former Deputy Premier Yon Hyong-muk, State Vice President KimPyong-shik and Party Secretary for South Pyongan province So Yun-sok.Kim Jong-il stood behind the hardliners in the military who were identified asMarshal Ri Ul-sol commander of Capital Garrison Command, which pro-tects ruling family and Pyongyang, Air Force Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok,and Army Vice Marshal and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Kim Yong-chun.65

Nonetheless, the evidence does not point to contending groups of moder-ates and hardliners within the leadership since as Hwang attested, one ofthose groups was eliminated during the period of famine over 1995–98. Therewas a consolidation of power by the leadership allied to the military whichhas since controlled the country.66 There have been times when the leadershipwould constrain the hard liners in the military as when Kim Jong-il overrodetheir objections to the Agreed Framework and ordered the release of BobbyHall, but since that time there have been fewer such cases. The marketreforms that were introduced in July 2002 had the strong support of KimJong-il himself who had been pressed in this direction by the Chinese. Theywere terminated as they created too many difficulties for the system of controlthat had been established.67 The main driving force for the reforms wasexternal rather than internal and they were not indicative of a group of techno-cratic moderates that could challenge the hard liners. The picture that emer-ges of the North is one of tight control from the top and a ruling dynasty thathas of necessity become more dependent upon the military for its survival.

The Bush Administration, with its call for regime change, its consigning ofthe North to the “axis of evil” and its unveiling of the strategy of preemptionin September 2002, threw the North into a crisis.68 The invasion of Iraq inMarch 2003 made the prospect of an American attack very real to NorthKorea which could never free itself from the “nagging fear of American mili-tary might.”69 It was under these conditions that the Six Party Talks wereconvened, though initially the North had little interest in them and demandedbilateral talks with the US. Eventually, because of American insistence andChinese pressure, it conceded. From 2003 there were two concurrent processesin North Korea; one was the diplomatic process where negotiations to elim-inate the nuclear program continued in the Six Party Talks; the second wasthe development of both the plutonium and HEU nuclear programs which byall accounts were accelerated after the invasion of Iraq. The results of theseprograms were witnessed three years later when North Korea detonated itsfirst plutonium nuclear device. One view is that they represent autonomoustracks, and the diplomatic track was conducted as a shield against an Americanattack and to buy time for the nuclear weapons program to reach completion.

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Another view is that the two tracks intersected and that with sufficient poli-tical will diplomacy could have headed off the nuclear track with a resolutionof the nuclear issue.

The difficulty was that the North Korea’s bargaining tactics during the SixParty Talks revealed little interest in reaching a deal over the nuclear issuethat would produce anything other than a return to the Agreed Framework.This was not a resolution of the nuclear issue but a postponement whichsuited the North’s purposes very well. The North was the target state in theSix Party Talks and theory would suggest that it would have been placed in adisadvantageous position. The American expectation was that it would besubject to the concerted pressure of all the parties and compelled to complywith their demands. However, the negotiation pattern that developed in thetalks was more complex in a way that gave the target state certain unantici-pated advantages. The North discovered that it could depend on Chinese,Russian and also South Korean support against the aggressive demands ofthe US and turned the tables on the Americans. It engaged in negotiationtactics to ensure that the parties would remain divided and resorted tounpredictable behavior including delaying tactics which exasperated theAmericans as well as the Chinese. The taunting unpredictability of theNorth’s behavior, the capricious swings and changes of position, and theoutbursts of rancor and hostility were all tactical responses to its position as atarget state which feared that the others would combine against it. It dangledthe prospect of agreement and quickly removed it, and by it keeping theAmericans in a state of perpetual hostility, it would draw Chinese and Rus-sian support. In this way it could exploit the divisions between the US andChina and could entangle the talks in issues which were really peripheral tothe nuclear issue, but which were taken seriously by the other negotiators.

The most striking aspect about the North’s negotiating behavior was itsconsistent unwillingness to explain its position in any detail. As negotiationtheory proposes, tacit bargaining can be indicative of several things; it couldbe an effort to extract maximum advantage from the negotiations, or it couldindicate a lack of interest in the negotiations and an intention to prolong themindecisively. The North’s negotiators diligently followed instructions given tothem and reported regularly to headquarters, unsure of their bottom line.70

They had to keep their options open by avoiding agreement or commitmentwhich could be later repudiated by their leadership.71 Various proposals wereraised, sometimes it was the demand for a LWR, or deliveries of heavy oil, orsecurity assurances from the US but then they were dropped just as quickly.72

The North’s diplomats would put on displays of outrage and walk out of thenegotiations while other parties scrambled to get them to return. By agreeingto return to the negotiations, they demanded and expected concessions. Theywould leave negotiation sessions without specifying a date for their resumptionwhich would shift the purpose of the negotiations from the nuclear issue tosimply ensuring their presence at the negotiations.73 They avoided any agree-ment to which their capricious leadership might object stimulating the other

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parties to formulate proposals which could be rejected at will. In this waythey exploited the anxiety of their opponents who were eager for an agree-ment and willing to read into the North’s behavior their own hopes.

The calculated vagueness of the North’s negotiating tactics placed greatpressure upon democratic governments in the US and South Korea, wherediplomacy is conducted through a very public process and critical nuances areglossed over in the demand for immediate results. One salient case of tacitbargaining was the North’s demand that the US terminate its hostility as acondition for the elimination of the nuclear program. It never explained whatthis meant and left it open to interpretation which allowed it to pose as anunfortunate victim of American malice. This posture gave it the advantage ofbeing able to reject proposals while always appearing to be committed tonegotiations. What did the end of US hostility to the North mean? If it meantAmerican security assurances, the North lost interest when the US was will-ing to oblige. If it meant avoiding all public recriminations and criticisms ofthe North, then it was beyond the ability of a democracy to control the mediaor to suppress free expression. If it meant that the US should offer diplomaticimmunity to the North for its human rights violations as well as its nuclearprogram, and become a protector of the its ruling dynasty to ensure its sur-vival, then it was fantasy. Demands were deliberately and tantalizingly keptvague to give the North a seemingly legitimate reason to avoid agreement.

This was not the negotiating behavior of a state that wanted to surrender itsnuclear program for economic benefits or a security guarantee, or even toidentify the terms and conditions by which this would be possible. Thedemands for LWRs and heavy oil deliveries were peripheral and even if theyhad been met, the nuclear problem would not have been resolved. For theNorth the Six Party Talks served a dual purpose, they provided camouflagefor the development of the nuclear program and entangled the US in nego-tiations that would divert it from considering a military strike on its nuclearfacilities. For this reason it refused to spell out clearly what it wanted and itresorted to tacit bargaining and tortuous negotiating tactics to divert pressurefor clarity from the other negotiating parties. The talks were also used tomaneuver the US into an agreement on the North’s terms, or somethingsimilar to the Agreed Framework based on a freeze and the promise of ver-ification in the future. This was achieved in the 19 September 2005 agreement.For this agreement the North was prepared to freeze the plutonium program,but not the HEU program, and promise that it would be open to verificationin the future. As a result, US pressure on the North would be eased and thedanger of a military strike would be removed. If the US resisted the desiredagreement, then the North would rapidly move ahead with the nuclear pro-gram and conduct a nuclear test which would change the nature of thenegotiations and its relationship with the US. To implement this strategy theNorth kept its nuclear program in being until it was compelled to decidewhether to move forward to the test stage, or to accept a freeze. That timecame with the breakdown of the September 2005 agreement when the North

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withdrew from the Six party Talks and prepared for its first nuclear test in thefollowing year.

Russia: the supporting player

Russia attempted to compensate for its virtual exclusion from the KoreanPeninsula since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was linked withthe North through the 1961 Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship andMutual Cooperation, which gave it a foothold on the Korean Peninsula.President Yeltsin in his emotional repudiation of the Soviet past wanted tobreak the connection with North Korea in order to expand the relationshipwith the economically progressive South. The South demanded that Russiarenounce the treaty with theNorth soRussia renegotiated the treaty with theNorthbut without Article One which committed Russia to the North’s defense.Without any viable influence in the North, South Korea lost interest in Russiaand turned to China which had established a key position on the KoreanPeninsula by having relations with both Koreas.74 To its great consternationRussia discovered that it was marginal to the negotiations over the North’snuclear program, which were conducted bilaterally between the North andthe US.75

To overcome its marginalization on 24 March 1994 the Russian ForeignMinistry proposed an international conference to devise a comprehensivesolution to the Korean peninsula. This multilateral forum would deal with thenuclear issue and provide guarantees to both Koreas, and discuss the nor-malization of relations between Pyongyang, Japan, and the US. Eight partieswere to be included: Russia, the US, China, Japan, the two Koreas, theIAEA, and the UN Secretary-General. Deputy Foreign Minister AlexanderPanov tried to strike a deal with the Americans and said that Russia wouldsupport the US in the Security Council if the US supported its proposal foran international conference. The Clinton Administration had no interest inwhat was called Russia’s “tried and tested technique” to gain entry intonegotiations from which it felt excluded.76 Russians resented their exclusionfrom the Agreed Framework since they had hoped to supply the North withLWRs under its terms.77 Subsequently Russia was also excluded from theFour Party Talks that were held over April 16 1996 to August 1999 whichwere convened by the US and South Korea to discuss the nuclear issue.Russia believed that this exclusion was deliberate policy on the American sideand that the US took the opportunity to ensure that Russia would be con-signed to the sidelines of any negotiations over the Korean Peninsula.78

To strengthen their position on the Korean Peninsula, the Russians movedto revive their relationship with the North. When the Soviet era academic andbureaucrat Yevgenni Primakov took charge of foreign policy, an effort wasmade to renew relations with former Soviet allies including North Korea. Anew treaty was agreed with in Pyongyang in March 1999, without the auto-matic response obligation in Article One.79 By the time Vladimir Putin

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emerged as Acting President in December 1999, the first steps towardsupgrading the relationship with the North had been taken. Putin understoodthat Russia’s major card was this relationship, the absence of which hadhampered Russia’s effort to become a key player on the Korean Peninsula.For this reason Putin visited Pyongyang over July 19–20 2000 in an effort todevelop the relationship but he found Kim Jong-il too erratic and unpredict-able. Russia attempted to develop its own policy over the Korean Peninsulaand seized the opportunity when the North searched for a means to counterUS pressure. Kim Jong-il reciprocated Putin’s visit by traveling to Moscow inan armored train over a total of 24 days in July–August 2001. The NorthKorean leader sought a common interest with Russia when he declared thatthe Bush Administration was “out to isolate” the North, indicating that theUS plan for ballistic missile defense “brought us together.”80 Putin met KimJong-il for the third time in Vladivostok in August 2002 when the NorthKorean leader traveled through the Far East by train.

The Russian President saw that his task was to remove the North from the“axis of evil,” and to encourage it to change without pressure or condemnation.Russians assumed that they had particular advantages in befriending theNorth which would allow them to act as its international sponsor. Oneassumed advantage was that the North was a product of the Stalinist systemwhich the Russians had experienced and understood well. After meeting KimJong-il Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov claimed that the North wasready for constructive dialogue with the US and Japan without preconditions, butRussia’s efforts to act as a sponsor of the North were distrusted by the BushAdministration.81 A second assumed advantage was that a weakened Russiawas an alternative to China and would not be in a position to dominate thePeninsula. Kim Jong-il could use Russia to bargain for greater freedom ofmaneuver and better economic terms with China, and also to avoid becominga Chinese dependency. Putin succeeded in cultivating personal relations withKim Jong-il and had offered Russia as a means to reduce the North’s isolationas well as its dependence upon China. Russia had exaggerated expectations of therelationship claiming that it was based on “shared geopolitical interests,” that theNorth saw Russia as a “desirable developmental model,” and relied on“Russian global influence to deflect and diminish the US military pressure, andto check the ambitions of other great and middle powers on the Peninsula.”82

Despite these claims, the North looked to China as a developmental modeland for protection against the US in the UN Security Council. A personalrelationship with Kim Jong-il was no basis for enduring influence on theKorean Peninsula, and yet to maintain the pretense of a relationship with theNorth, Russia was obliged to endorse and excuse its behavior. This was evi-dent in October 2002 when the North admitted the existence of a HEU pro-gram to American Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. The Russianssupported the North and claimed that it did not admit to any nuclear pro-gram, and that the American accusation was a “lie.”83 Pique and mountingresentments against the Americans for ignoring Russia’s interests in the

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former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe resulted in the loss of Russianflexibility over the Korean issue to the point where Russia simply followedand supported the Chinese.

On the basis of these considerations Russia went into the Six Party Talkswith several goals. Its immediate intention was to prevent American militaryaction against the North’s nuclear facilities which could threaten the RussianFar East with a nuclear catastrophe.84 Russia’s Far East indeed felt the dan-gers more keenly than did Moscow, which was eight time zones away, andwas more anxious about events on the Korean Peninsula.85 Of all the playersRussia was the most conscious of the end game and attempted to maneuveritself into a favorable position in preparation for reunification. It attempted toconvert the Six Party Talks into a permanent regional grouping that wouldprepare it for reunification. Influence with a united Korea would allow it tobreak free of the constraints imposed by its relationship with China and topress Japan to accept that the Northern Islands, which are in dispute withRussia, will never be returned. Indeed, some Russians believe that a unitedKorea would strengthen Russia’s role in Northeast Asia, and that it would bea “natural partner” of Russia as they would both share concerns about Chinaand Japan.86 For the end game Russia required a relationship with the Northwhich Putin had attempted to consolidate but failed as Russia could notmatch China’s importance for the North. The problem for Russia was that itpursued conflicting objectives. It supported the American goal of ridding theNorth of nuclear weapons but was strongly opposed to the Bush Adminis-tration’s approach to the issue. It wanted to stave off American pressure onthe North but it was obliged to work with China, which undermined itsefforts to develop an independent position on the Korean Peninsula. Despiteall its efforts Russia could not escape its role as a supporter of China and thelimitations it imposed upon its policy.

The swing state South Korea

The Korean War and numerous provocations by the North had turned theSouth into a staunch ally of the US, but the unfortunate division of thecountry stimulated a longing for closer ties with the North and reunification.The alliance with the US was a matter of necessity and survival but the Northrepresented the possibility of making Korea whole again. Deep emotions wereroused by the division of the Peninsula, the separation of families and thefeeling of being victimized by fate and the surrounding great powers. EverySouth Korean leader has voiced a desire for closer relations with the Northeven in the midst the provocations perpetrated by the Northern regime.Under the dictators, Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, andRoh Tae-woo the South suppressed the attraction of the North and the venera-tion of Kim Il-sung amongst student circles which threatened their legitimacy.When the opposition leader and critic of the dictators Kim Young-sambecame the South’s first democratically elected president in December 1992

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this sentiment could no longer be repressed. Democracy released the con-straints on the expression of conciliatory policies towards the North andpolitics in the South became strongly polarized between the conservatives,who sided with the Grand National Party (GNP) and insisted on the alliancewith the US, and those who sought reconciliation with the North.

This dilemma was faced by Kim Young-sam during the American nego-tiations with the North which led to the Agreed Framework. President Kimopposed the American proposal to impose sanctions on the North which wasreiterated by subsequent leaders. South Korea was vulnerable to Northernattack and the urban conurbation Seoul which accounted for half of theSouth’s population was within 40 kilometers of the DMZ, and could bedevastated by the North’s short range missiles.87 Kim, however, was alarmedby the possibility of a deal between the US and the North which would comeat the South’s expense. This dilemma was evident when on 13 October 1993the Clinton administration agreed to a “comprehensive approach” to theNorth. After having opposed sanctions on the North Kim Young-sam wasconcerned that the US was being too conciliatory. During his visit toWashington on 23 November 1993 Kim raised his objections to Clinton’spolicy directly and because of his opposition, the “comprehensive approach”was changed into a “thorough and broad approach.” Kim was also insistentthat Exercise Team Spirit, which the Americans wanted to postpone so asnot to provoke the North at a delicate time, should not be cancelled. Thisleft the Americans with the impression of an erratic ally.88 Most disturbing forthe South was the Agreed Framework from which the South was excludedwhile it was expected to fund the LWRs that were to be given to the North.President Kim wanted to repudiate the deal and claimed that the US wasbeing duped by the North, and it was only after the entreaties of ForeignMinister Han Soon-joo that he accepted the agreement.

The Agreed Framework widened the fissures between the US and theSouth and raised doubts about the value of the US alliance. It demonstratedthat the US could not strike a bilateral deal with the North without under-mining the relationship and the alliance with the South. On September 18 1996when a North Korean submarine ran aground near Kangnung on the EastCoast of South Korea, Kim Young-sam demanded an immediate apology andpunishment for those responsible as well as a pledge from the North that itwould never infiltrate the South again. With its new relationship with theNorth, the US wanted to calm the waters and on October 12 sent AssistantSecretary of State Winston Lord to Seoul with the task of moderatingPresident’s Kim’s anger against the North. Kim was incensed by the USaction which he called “appeasement” and refused to continue participationin the Four Party Talks until the North apologized.89 Fortunately the Northapologized for its action and in a two sentence statement agreed previously bythe US it expressed “deep regret for the casualties caused by the submarineincursion.90 The event demonstrated that the US could not move forward in arelationship with the North without impairing the alliance with the South and

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that by calling for closer relations with the US, the North could drive a wedgebetween the two allies.

KimDae-jung whowas elected President on 18 December 1997 expressed theemotional longing in South Korea to reunify the country, he proclaimedhis Sunshine Policy of approaching the North as a step in this direction. As theMinistry of Unification explained, the Sunshine Policy entailed an improvementof intra Korean relations and “peaceful coexistence” to create an appropriateatmosphere for eventual reunification.91 In one of his first moves on 27 March1998 President Kim Dae-jung removed restrictions for South Korean companiesinterested in investing in the North and the prohibition on visits to the Northby South Koreans. The difficulty was that South Korea could not create the con-ditions for coexistence with the North on its own. If it wanted to reduce theNorth’s obsession with external threat, it had to obtain American support.The Sunshine Policy would not succeed in isolation. To obtain the support of themajor powers Kim Dae-jung visited Tokyo in October 1998, Moscow in May1999, Washington in September 2001, and Beijing in October 2001.92 In Feb-ruary 1999 he announced what he called a “package deal” which was intendedto turn the North into a responsible member of the international community.International agencies would provide food aid to the North, the US andJapan would terminate sanctions on the North and would normalize relationswith it, while the North would cease the production of WMD.93

The Sunshine Policy, however, created wide fissures in South Korean poli-tics that the president had not foreseen. First, the price for the SunshinePolicy was government tolerance of human rights violations by both theNorth and China whose cooperation was required for its implementation.The Sunshine Policy was unveiled at a time of famine in the North whensome 100,000–300,000 refugees streamed across the border into China, many ofwhom were forcibly repatriated by the Chinese.94 In September 1998 the Northdeclared a “shoot to kill” policy to deter the flow but many made the crossinginto China by bribing North Korean border guards. South Korea did notwant to jeopardize relations with the North and with China by raising theissue of refugees with them. The South Korean Embassy in Beijing eventurned away defectors from the North which became a scandal. Secondly, theSunshine Policy did not deter the North from engaging in provocationsagainst the South which raised doubts as to its effectiveness. In June 1999 aneight day naval clash occurred in the West over the Northern line that wasdrawn by UN command in 1953 and was never accepted by the North.95 OneNorthern patrol vessel was sunk prompting the North to demand an apologyand compensation from the South. This clash took place at a time when talksbetween the two Koreas were being conducted in Beijing over family reunions andhighlighted the inherent risks of the “Sunshine Policy.” South Korea’s oppo-sition leader Lee Hoi-chang claimed that there was no reciprocity and bitterlydenounced the “Sunshine Policy.”

Strong opposition to the Sunshine Policy from the conservatives resulted ina number of bizarre incidents where some officials from the Agency for

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National Security Planning (ANSP) or the intelligence agency were implicatedin a smear campaign against the President.96 Thirdly, the Sunshine Policyresulted in what the opposition GNP chairman Suh Ching-won claimed was acover up of the North’s HEU program and the centrifuge purchases which theDefense Ministry had known about by 1999.97 Kim Dae-jung’s summit withKim Jong-il in Pyongyang in June 2000 was a great achievement for theSunshine Policy, but it required a total payment to the North of $800 millionby Hyundai. There was little progress over the South’s demands which inclu-ded a military hotline and military confidence-building measures. Inter-Korean defense talks were held in September 2000 but without results.98

Without the desired progress, a crisis in South Korean politics ensued whenthe Unification Minister Lim Dong-won was accused of making too manyconcessions to the North and on September 3 2001 he was forced to resign bythe National Assembly. He had authorized a visit by 300 peace activists to theNorth to celebrate the anniversary of the end of Japanese rule; during thevisit some of these delegates unwittingly endorsed the North’s confederationproposal. On September 4 the entire South Korean cabinet resigned.99 Asecond naval clash occurred in the West Sea in July 2002 and Lee Hoi-changagain blamed the Sunshine Policy.100

Elected president on 19 December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun vowed to continuewith the “Sunshine Policy.” Roh represented the so-called 386 generation inSouth Korea, those in their thirties, who were born in the 1960s and educatedin the 1980s. They had not experienced the Korean War, and did not sharetheir parent’s gratitude to the Americans for saving the country and weregiven to strong criticism of the US. The revival of the Sunshine Policy tookplace in South Korea when both the US and Japan had lost their enthusiasmfor it. The Bush Administration had already adopted its hard line positionagainst the North, particularly after the North had admitted the existence ofthe HEU program. The Japanese, moreover, had swung against the Northafter Kim Jong-il had admitted kidnapping Japanese citizens which inflamedJapanese public opinion. Without great power support the new Presidentcould make little headway with his policy yet he persisted in formulating greatplans and sketching out visions which he could not realize. In his inaugura-tion speech in February 2003 Roh called upon the South to assume a “pivotalrole to realize a regional community in Northeast Asia.”101 Roh’s vision of aNortheast Asian regional community galvanized his supporters and gavethem the hope that the South could be an important regional actor, buthis aims were beyond South Korea’s reach. The regional community hevisualized required American support but the anti-Americanism of many ofhis followers alienated the US.102 Roh talked about the South’s “balancing”role in the building of cooperative security in the region but by then he hadconfused rather than clarified his intentions.103 He had hoped to promotedialogue with the North but to do so he also required Chinese support. Thealliance with the US, however, placed strict limits on this approach.104

Indeed, despite its aspiration for an autonomous role the South could never

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shake off its dependence upon the US, or its need for Chinese cooperation toapproach the North.

Under Roh, the South came into the Six Party talks as a swing state. Thetalks were an opportunity for Roh and his supporters to implement theirpolicy of dialogue with the North, which they hoped would bring aboutfamily reunions, closer economic ties and eventual reunification. Their firstpriority was dialogue and engagement with the North which in their viewwould lead to changes in North Korean policy and would then make nucleardisarmament possible. They were frustrated by the Bush Administration’sinsistence on nuclear disarmament first, which in their view closed off thepossibility of meaningful engagement of the North and perpetuated existingtensions on the Korean Peninsula. These aspirations brought South Koreacloser to China and Russia with which the Roh administration shared con-cerns over the direction of US policy under the Bush Administration, andalarm over American bellicosity. During the Six Party Talks the South swungover to China and Russia but it remained an American ally and could notescape the constraints of the alliance. These external constraints had theircounterparts in domestic politics as the Grand National Party in oppositionwas bitterly opposed to Roh’s policies and concerned about their impact uponthe alliance with the US. The South may have entered the Six Party Talks onthe crest of a popular wave with one President, but in the face of lack ofprogress with the North and the North’s deliberate provocations it wouldswing back to a tougher position with Roh’s successor.

The peripheral player: Japan

The Japanese had not intended to be peripheral players but this was the out-come of the conflicting influences on their policy. The Korean Peninsula wasof major strategic concern to the Japanese who wanted to prevent it fromfalling under the influence of any hostile power which could threaten them.Russian penetration of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria had triggeredthe outbreak of the 1904–5 war with Japan which has been very sensitive togreat power maneuvering there ever since. The Japanese were disturbed by theChinese role on the Peninsula and thought that China was too close to NorthKorea to act as mediator. They feared that China would use the Six PartyTalks to strengthen its position there against Japan, and suspected that Chinawould tolerate a nuclear North Korea giving rise to the nightmare scenario ofa reunited Korea with nuclear weapons. Koreans and Chinese would thencome together with their shared grievances against Japan. The Japanese werealso troubled by the prospect that the Americans would rapidly tire of thesituation and negotiate a deal over the Korean Peninsula with the Chinese.Japanese and American strategic perspectives in relation to the KoreanPeninsula differed as the US could always walk away while for the Japaneseproximity made the issue crucial. They attempted to devise their ownapproach towards North Korea which would give them some influence over

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the situation and a favorable position for the end game of reunification.Japanese efforts in this direction were hijacked, however, by domestic opinionafter the North admitted to the abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970sand 1980s. Public outrage meant that progress towards normalization of therelationship with the North was terminated. In the Six Party Talks, Japan’spriority was a resolution of the abduction issue which was more immediatethan the nuclear issue. Japan’s concerns were domestic and of little interest tothe other parties which simply resulted in its relegation to the sidelines.

The Japanese had long been aware of their vulnerability in relation to theKorean Peninsula and had attempted to normalize relations with the North earlierbut without success. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader Kanemaru Shinvisited Pyongyang and initiated talks over 1991–92 during which the Japaneseinsisted on a resolution of the abduction issue. The North demanded anapology for the period of Japanese colonization and compensation which theJapanese then resisted.105 One factor slowing down the normalization effortswas South Korea’s suspicion that Japan wanted to keep the Peninsula divi-ded.106 Several events spurred the Japanese to renew their efforts to normalizerelations with the North; one of which was Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy.KimDae-jung visited Tokyo from 7 to 10 October 1998 revealing that the Southno longer opposed Japan’s moves towards the North and that he wantedJapanese endorsement of the Sunshine Policy. He agreed with the Japanesethat the Agreed Framework and KEDO were the “most feasible and effective”mechanisms to stop North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.107 Asecond event was the North’s launching of a Taepodong missile over northernJapan on August 31 1998. The launch galvanized the Japanese and hardenedattitudes towards the North, particularly among the younger generation of Dietmembers. This event prompted the Japanese to strengthen defense cooperationwith the US particularly over ballistic missile defense (BMD) which acceler-ated in subsequent years.108 Japan temporarily froze economic assistance andfood aid to the North as of September in that year. Revelations about theintrusion of North Korean spy vessels into Japanese waters to pick up spies inMarch 1999 also troubled the Japanese.109 Hardening attitudes towards theNorth, particularly within conservative circles of the ruling LDP, threatenedto derail any attempt by the government to improve relations with the North.

Nonetheless, the Japanese Foreign Ministry again attempted to renew thedialogue with the North after the missile launch, this time offering food aidand also insisting that the North resolve 10 cases of abductions.110 Again theNorth laid down its conditions when Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun, in aspeech to UN General Assembly in September 1999 demanded an apologyfor Japanese colonization and compensation. Talks between Japan and theNorth were resumed in Beijing over December 21–22 1999. While the Northdemanded $5–10 billion in compensation, the Japanese offered economic aidup to $9 billion but would not allow it to be called compensation, nor wouldthey offer a public apology.111 Talks continued in August and October 2000when the Japanese again offered economic assistance to the North which the

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North rejected without satisfaction of the earlier demands.112 It was in thiscontext that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang in Sep-tember 2002 at a time when Bush Administration attitudes towards the Northwere deteriorating. Koizumi’s intention was to break the logjam in negotia-tions with the North over the normalization of relations and the abductionissue, as well as to get the North to agree to an extension of the moratoriumon ballistic missile testing. As an independent initiative it was carefully pre-pared by Hitoshi Tanaka who was Director-General of the Asian and Ocea-nian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and encouraged by ChiefCabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda. Tanaka had hoped that normalized rela-tions with the North would give Japan a position of influence over bothChina and the South and would bring about Japan’s “geopolitical revival.”113

The visit was, as some have argued, an unprecedented opportunity for Japanto take a “leadership position” in negotiations with the North.114 If the strat-egy were successful Japan’s isolation on the Korean Peninsulawould be overcomeand Japan’s idea of a multilateral regional grouping for Northeast Asia wouldbe closer to realization115

When Koizumi met Kim Jong-il on September 17 2002; the North Koreanleader admitted to the abductions, which had been previously denied withsuch vehemence. Why he did so has been the subject of much speculation.Some Japanese claim that the admission was an effort to break with the pastand to begin a new relationship; others say that this was yet another exampleof Kim Jong-il’s erratic behavior and capriciousness which conflicted with hisinterests. Others have argued that this was an attempt to draw Japan awayfrom the US into separate negotiations with the North, but if this was the case ithad the opposite effect in a very dramatic way.116 According to Jiji Press,which cited a document issued by the Korean People’s Army PublishingHouse in October 2002, Kim Jong-il boasted to senior military officials thatKoizumi’s visit was a “gesture of subservience.”117 The North revealed that13 Japanese had been abducted, 8 had died, and five were allowed to returnto Japan on 15 October for two weeks. All chose to stay in Japan and werenot returned against their will. Kim Jong-il claimed that he did not knowabout the intrusions into Japanese waters by North Korean special missionsunits and told Koizumi that they would not reoccur.118

With this revelation, a political storm erupted in Japan. The Association ofFamilies of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) and the NationalAssociation for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea(NARKN) had always accused the government of ignoring their cases, and itwas only in 1988 that the Japanese authorities had admitted that NorthKorea was implicated.119 The families of the abductees went public to givevent to their frustrations and emotions, appearing regularly on television newsprograms expressing their grief in a way that attracts much sympathy in Japan.Japanese politicians took up the cause of the abduction families and demandeda harder line towards the North. Both Hitoshi Tanaka and Fukuda wanted tosend the five abductees back to North Korea since it was agreed that their stay in

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Japan would be temporary but this was opposed by Deputy Cabinet SecretaryShinzo Abe and Shotaro Yachi in the Prime Minister’s Office.120 When thisbecame known it fueled public vituperation of the Foreign Ministry and the socalled “Korean school” in the ministry was blamed for negotiating the dealwith the North. Hitoshi Tanaka and the Foreign Ministry were publicly vili-fied and humiliated.121 The Japanese government could not proceed againstthis public outburst and the initiative was stymied. Koizumi made one moreeffort to visit Pyongyang in May 2004 but the damage had been done and nofurther progress could be made.

The Japanese position hardened after the failure of the Koizumi initiative.North Korea must have realized the error because in November it resorted tointimidation when it warned Japan that it would resume ballistic missile test-ing.122 On the Japanese side Defense Agency Chief Shigeru Ishiba pushed forcloser cooperation with the US over BMD. Construction progressed onAmerican anti-ballistic missile radar sites in the Northern Tohoku region andin Okinawa. Japan, which had previously been prepared to offer economicassistance and food aid to the North, now began to demand the dismantling ofthe North’s nuclear program as a pre-condition.123 Japanese foreign ministryofficials were greatly distressed by the loss of initiative over this issue whichmade them appear as traitors before the people. Some Japanese have arguedthat but for this issue, Japan would have been able to create a special relation-ship with Kim Jong-il giving it influence over the nuclear issue. They arguedthat had this been possible, Japan could have emerged as the main player on theKorean Peninsula and not China.124 As it was, Japanese officials were obliged todemand that the abduction issue be placed on the agenda of the Six PartyTalks which was resented by the Americans and the South Koreans.125 Japanwas regarded as a “spoiler” and the Americans in particular were irritated bytheir efforts to take the attention away from the nuclear problem and tohighlight an issue they considered unimportant.126 It added to that tendencyamongst Americans to dismiss Japan as an ineffectual power and to rely onChina for a resolution of the nuclear issue. Japan failed to prepare aposition for itself in relation to the eventual reunification of Korea anddealt itself out of the negotiations in the Six Party Talks.

Conclusion

From the beginning there was no common strategy for resolving the nuclearissue and the inclusion of the North as the target state was a result of a fun-damental inability to agree on one. The deep divisions that existed between theparties at the outset gave the North the opportunity to use the Six Party Talksto pull the Chinese and the Russians, who were alarmed by the belligerence ofthe Bush Administration, to their side. The US as the main player was per-haps the most clear about its bargaining position. It came to the talksexpecting to obtain six party endorsement of its hard line policy over theNorth’s nuclear program. It sought multilateral endorsement of its own

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position over the issue and assumed that other parties shared the same senseof urgency about the nuclear program. As the pivotal player, China was in thekey position of making the talks succeed or fail; its links with the North gaveit some leverage over Pyongyang but it became alarmed about Americanintentions and saw the Six Party Talks as an opportunity to moderate andreshape the US negotiating position away from force and belligerence, andtowards a deal with the North. It sought American endorsement of the sur-vival and security of the North which would secure its own interests on theKorean Peninsula, and place it in a dominant position there. The divisionsbetween the US and China were particularly wide and their public positionsand declarations indicated a commonality that was not supported by theirinterests. The Bush administration discovered that it could not influence theNorth on its own and that it had few levers of influence over Pyongyang, andthat it was compelled to seek Chinese support over the nuclear program. Thissituation gave China the opportunity to demonstrate its importance to the USand to ensure influence over the Korean Peninsula, and any regionalarrangements that may be negotiated there. For China the nuclear programwas not the main issue and it could be dealt with subsequently, but getting theAmericans involved in negotiations which were expected to moderate itsposition was the immediate priority. Other parties took various positions insupport of these positions. Russia had intended to stake out an autonomousposition on the Korean Peninsula but the Bush Administration’s hard lineapproach pushed it into the role of a supporting party for China. SouthKorea was the swing player; it was torn between its desire for an autonomousrole in relation to the North and its need for American alliance support as adeterrent of the North. Japan was the peripheral player but it began with thehighest of expectations of establishing a relationship with the North whichwould ensure it of influence over the end game on the Korean Peninsula.Domestic politics, however, undermined diplomatic strategy when the abductionissue erupted and thereafter determined Japanese policy over the issue.

Notes1 Statement by Senator Robbs, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Hearing beforethe Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on ForeignRelations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 2nd session,March 3 1994, p. 3, 24.

2 Statement by Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for International SecurityAffairs, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Hearing before the Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, UnitedStates Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 2nd session, March 3 1994, p. 14.

3 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul 16 May 2011.4 In Russia, Japan and China there was “little enthusiasm for even the most mildestset of sanctions,” Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Cri-tical The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press,Washington, DC, 2004 p. 318.

5 Bill Clinton, My Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2004, p. 602.

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6 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 325.7 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley,Reading, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 317, 323–24.

8 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, pp. 317, 323–24.9 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 221–41.10 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley,

Reading, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 356–57.11 Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea, October 21 1994, The Korean Peninsula EnergyDevelopment Organization, www.kedo.or,=g/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.

12 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, pp. 356–57.13 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci p. 390, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the

national emergency regarding proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”November 9 2000, William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of theUnited States. 2000–2001, Book III-October 12 to January 20 2000, United StatesGovernment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2002. p. 2509–10\.

14 Statement of Hon. Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, US–NorthKorea States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, January 19 1995.

15 Dr. William J. Perry, Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Find-ings and Recommendations, Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator, UnitedStates Department of State, October 12 1999, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2017/review_of_united_states_policy_toward_north_korea.html.

16 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in TreacherousTimes, Henry Holt, New York, 2011, p 45.

17 Donald P. Gregg, and Mitchell B Reiss, “Washington Should Try Engagementwith Pyongyang” International Herald Tribune, March 12 1999.

18 International Herald Tribune, March 20 1999.19 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011, Stockholm August 24

2011 The communiqué from the visit said that neither government would have hostileintent toward each other” and both governments “would redouble their commit-ments and their efforts to fulfill their obligations under the Agreed Framework.”“letter to Congressional Leaders on the national emergency regarding prolifera-tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction” November 9 2000. William J. Clinton,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2000–2001, Book III-October12 to January 20 2000, United States Government Printing Office, Washington,DC, 2002. p. 2509.

20 Interview Charles Pritchard Seoul, May 16 2011, Stockholm August 24 2011.21 Interview Charles Pritchard.22 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 2000–

2001, Book III—October 12 to January 20 2000, United States GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 2807, 2811.

23 Albright visited Pyongyang over October 23–24 and was convinced that if Clintonvisited Pyongyang a deal over ballistic missiles could be negotiated. Clinton wrote“although I wanted to take the next step I could not risk being half way aroundthe world when we were so close to peace in the Middle East.” Bill Clinton, MyLife, p. 938. William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the UnitedStates. 2000–2001, Book II—June 27 to October 11 2000, United States GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 2057.

24 Statement of Hon. Robert l. Gallucci, Dean, Georgetown University, Edmund A.Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC, U.S. Policy toward North Korea:where do we go from here? Hearing before the Committee on Foreign RelationsUnited States Senate One Hundred Seventh Congress First Session, May 23 2001.

25 C. Kenneth Quinones, ‘Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North KoreaPolicy,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003, p. 210.

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26 Statement of Charles l. Pritchard, special envoy for Korean peace talks, U.S.representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, U.S.Department of State, U.S.–North Korea relations after the policy review, hearingbefore the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Committee onInternational Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh congress,First session July 26 2001.

27 Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House history, 2006–2008,Simon & Schuster, New York, 2008, pp. 431, 432.

28 C. Kenneth Quinones, “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North KoreaPolicy,” p. 213.

29 Kelly visited as part of the State Department’s “bold approach” to transformingthe relationship with US from hostility to cooperation and engagement, providedthat the North met US concerns over this and other issues; Joel Wit, Daniel B.Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 378.

30 Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, andthe Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, Walker, New York, 2007, p. 338.

31 Bill Clinton, My Life, p. 625.32 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 375, 379.33 Howard M. Krawitz, “Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for

China,” Strategic Forum, No. 201, Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University, August 2003.

34 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North KoreaDeal,” The New York Times 16 February 2007.

35 Father Bush said that “Condi Rice was not up to the job” she was a disappointment.Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, part II, Simon & Schuster, NewYork, 2006, p. 420.

36 Bush had little interest in ordered and systematic decision-making anyway Bushwas described as a unilateralist, and said that “we will never get people to agree,”and that international coalitions and the UN are not the way to deal with roguestates. See Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House history, 2006–2008, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2008, pp. 431, 432.

37 Interview Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011, Stockholm August 24 2011.38 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf.39 Statement of Charles l. Pritchard, special envoy for Korean peace talks, U.S.

representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, U.S.Department of State, U.S.–North Korea relations after the policy review, hearingbefore the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Committee onInternational Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh congress,First session July 26 2001 serial no. 107–39, Washington, DC, 2001.

40 Statement by Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for International SecurityAffairs, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, Hearing before the Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, UnitedStates Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 2nd session, March 3 1994, p. 36.

41 Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John S. Park, “Chinese views on North Korea,”The Japan Times, February 14 2008.

42 Shi Yinhong, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Problem” in Guoguang Wu,Helen Landsdowne (editors), China turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy andRegional Security, Routledge, London, 2008.

43 Shi Yinhong, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Problem, p. 178; Fei-LangWang, “Stability with Uncertainties: US–China Relations and the Korean Penin-sula,” in Tae Hwan Kwak, Seung Ho Joo, The United States and the KoreanPeninsula in the 21st Century, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006.

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44 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four PartiesCaught between North Korea and the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, NewYork, 2007, pp. 124–25, 130.

45 Howard M. Krawitz, Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China,Strategic forum, No 201, Institute for National Strategic Studies NationalDefense University, August 2003.

46 Shim Jae Hoon, “Darkness at Noon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 101996.

47 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four, 2006.48 The Foreign Ministry’s Department of North American and Oceanic Affairs,

Department of Asian Affairs, Office of Korean Peninsula Affairs, Delegation tothe UN and Department of Arms Control have different views on the Koreanissue. Ibid, pp. 6, 7.

49 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald May 28 2008.50 Dr. Pang Zhongying, The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and

China-U.S. Cooperation: Toward a Regional Security Mechanism for a NewNortheast Asia? the Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian PolicyStudies, March 2009.

51 Interview with Cho Tae-yong, Deputy Head of South Korean delegation to theSix Party Talks, Canberra, April 24, May 30 2012.

52 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald 28 May 2008,also Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John S. Park, “Chinese views on NorthKorea,” The Japan Times 14 February 2008.

53 Han S. Park, “The Rationales behind North Korean Foreign Policy,” LinusHagström and Marie Söderberg (editors), North Korea Policy, Routledge,London, 2006, p. 38.

54 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, Technology Transfer and the Spread ofNuclear Weapons, Cornell, Ithaca, New York, 2010, p. 142.

55 Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, andthe Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, Walker, New York, 2007, pp. 248–49, 256.

56 Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, andthe Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad,“North Korea and Pakistan: a joint nuclear test?” International Herald Tribune,28 February 2004.

57 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, Technology Transfer and the Spread ofNuclear Weapons, Cornell, Ithaca, New York, 2010, p. 278.

58 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press, New York, 2006, pp.288–90.

59 Matthew Pennington, “Pakistan Nuclear Expert Gave Info to Iran,” AssociatedPress, February 2 2004 http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/P/PAKISTAN_NUCLEAR_DETENTIONS?SITE=DCTMS& section=HOME.

60 Leon V. Sigal, “North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship, 1993–94 and 2002–3,” inByung Chul Koh (editor) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’sForeign Policy, Kyungnam University Press, Seoul, 2004.

61 Byung Chul Koh, “Understanding North Korean Foreign Policy: An Overview,”in Byung Chuk Koh (editor) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyon-gyang’s Foreign Policy.

62 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley,Reading, Massachusetts, 1997 p. 358.

63 Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disen-gagement, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2002, Chapter 4.

64 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A contemporary History, Addison-Wesley,Reading, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 399–406.

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65 Shim Jae Hoon, “Dancing in the Dark,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March1997, The Japan Times, 15 April 1997.

66 Byung Chul Koh, “Understanding North Korean Foreign Policy: An Overview,”in Byung Chul Koh (ed.) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’sForeign Policy, pp. 31–32.

67 Christopher D. Hale, “Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002Economic Measures,” Asian Survey, vol. 45, no. 6 (November/December 2005).

68 North Korea’s behavior can be understood in terms of starts, stops, and then afinal lunge towards nuclear weapons according to threats perceived in the externalenvironment and available opportunities. According to this view the North beganwith the intention of becoming a nuclear power but the program was suspendedafter the Agreed Framework was signed. When the Bush Administration came tooffice; however, the suspension was lifted and the North accelerated its efforts toachieve nuclear weapons status as quickly as possible. Han S. Park, “The Ratio-nales behind North Korean Foreign Policy,” Linus Hagström and Marie Söder-berg (editors), North Korea Policy, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 40–41.

69 Byung Chul Koh, “Understanding North Korean Foreign Policy: An Overview,”in Byung Chul Koh (ed.) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’sForeign Policy.

70 Interview with Cho Tae-yong, Deputy head of South Korean delegation to the SixParty Talks, 2004–6, Canberra, April 24, May 30 2012.

71 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First NorthKorean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 382,

72 Interview with Cho Tae Yong, Deputy head of South Korean delegation to theSix Party Talks, 2004–6, Canberra, April 24, May 30 2012.

73 Chuck Downs, “Discerning North Korea’s Intentions,” in Nicholas Eberstadt andRichard Ellings, (eds), Korea’s Future and the Great Powers, National Bureau of AsianResearch/University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, 2001, pp. 102–4.

74 Gennadi Zardeev, “ Rossiya gotovitsya k podpisaniyu dogovora s yuzhnoi Korei,”[Russia is preparing to sign a treaty with South Korea], Izvestiya, August 13 1992.

75 Evgeny Bazhanov, “The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis,” in GilbertRozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caughtbetween North Korea and the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,2007, p. 194–95.

76 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 156–58.77 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 29 1994.78 Alexander Vorontsov, Current Russia-North Korea Relations: Challenges and

Achievements, The Brookings Institution, Centre for Northeast Asian Policy Stu-dies, Working Paper Series, February 2007 www.ciaonet.org/wps/bi9952/bi9952.pdf; Aleksander Vorontsov, “Chem nam dorog Pkhen’yan,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,August 23 2002.

79 Article 2 of the 1999 treaty said that “in the event of the emergence of the dangerof an aggression against one of the countries or a situation jeopardizing peace andsecurity, and in the event there is a necessity for consultations and cooperation, the[two] sides [will] enter into contact with each other immediately,” Seung-ho Jooand Tae-Hwan Kwak, “Military Relations Between Russia and North Korea,”The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 15, No, 2, Fall/Winter 2001, pp. 297–323.

80 “My dorozhim Koreisko-rossiskoi druzhboi,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 27 2001.81 Karen DeYoung, “N. Korea Eager for Talks, Russian Says,” The Washington

Post, July 30 2002,82 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Kim Jong-il Re-embraces the bear, looking for the

morning calm: North Korea’s policy toward Russia since 1994,” in Byung ChulKoh (editor) North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy,pp. 283–84.

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83 See comment by Deputy Director of First Asia Department of the Russian For-eign Ministry Georgi Georgii Toloraya, “Yadernyi poker v Koree,” Centre for theStudy of Contemporary Korea, Far Eastern Institute, Moscow 9 December 2004,http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_o_i/a9628.shtml.

84 “Severokoreiskaya ugroza i ee potentisal’nye pokypateli,” Politicheskii ZhurnalArkhiv No. 6 (57) February 21 2005, www.politjournal.ru.preview.php?action=Articles&dirid=40&.

85 Interview with researchers Vladivostok 2009.86 Evgeny Bazhanov, “; “The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis,” in Gilbert

Rozman, Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four PartiesCaught between North Korea and the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, NewYork, 2007, p. 212.

87 “Kim, Roh Urge Bush to Show Restraint on NK,” The Korea Times, December30 2002.

88 Joel Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First NorthKorean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2004, pp.110–11, 114.

89 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas pp. 387–88, 391.90 The Japan Times December 31 1996.91 The North Korea Policy of the Kim Dae-jung Administration, Ministry of unifica-

tion, Republic of Korea, 1998, p. 5.92 Shin Yong bae, “Kim Wins major powers’ support for N.K. policy,” The Korean

Herald, October 20 2001.93 International Herald Tribune, February 25 1999.94 Famine deaths over 1995–98 vary according to the sources; 220,000 according to

the North’s State Food Damage Rehabilitation Committee, 270,000 according tothe South’s statistical office, 2 million according to a US Congressional estimate, 3million according to South Korean intelligence and 3.5 million according to aSouth Korean Buddhist NGO, The Japan Times, May 11 1999. Out of 24 millionthe percentage varied from 1 to over 10 percent of the population.

95 Terence Roehrig “The Northern Limit Line and North Korean Provocations” inSuk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig and Bernhard Seliger (editors) The Survival ofNorth Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations, McFar-land & Co., Jefferson, North Carolina, 2011.

96 Kim Dae-jung accused the former Korean CIA, now the Agency for NationalSecurity Planning (ANSP) of plotting with North Korea to prevent the oppositionfrom coming to power. He claimed that the North had sent troops into the DMZbefore the 1996 National Assembly elections, to shift support away from theopposition. It was reported that members of the GNP met North Korean agentsin Beijing in November 1997 and called for North Korean cooperation againstKim Dae-jung for which a payment $3.6 million was made. Another reportclaimed that the South offered the North $100 million in food aid if it portrayedKim Dae-jung as its supporter and staged incidents along the border. See TheJapan Times, March 21 1998; The Straits Times March 18, 24 1998.

97 Hwang Jang jin, “Seoul Criticized for sweeping information on North Koreannukes under carpet,” The Korea Herald, October 22 2002.

98 Sah Dong-seok, “Little Progress on Miltary Issues: Critics,” The Korea Times, 26September 2000.

99 International Herald Tribune, September 4 2001.100 Kim Hyung-jin, “Kim’s Sunshine Policy under attack” The Korea Herald, July 2

2002.101 Lim Wonhyuk, “Regional Multilateralism in Asia and the Korean Question,” in

Michael J. Green, Bates Gill, Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, and theSearch for Community, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 83–84.

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102 Robert J. Fouser, “Anti Americanization of South Korea,” The Korea Herald, 23October 2002.

103 Lim Wonhyuk, “Regional Multilateralism in Asia and the Korean Question, p. 93.104 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 128.105 David E. Sanger, “Japan Ends Talks with North Korea,” The New York Times

May 26 1991.106 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean

Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 71.107 The Japan Times October 9 1998.108 The Japan Times March 5 1999.109 The Japan Times 25, March 26 1999.110 Takeshi Sato, “Tokyo, Pyongyang bending to renew ties,” The Japan Times January

3 1998.111 Victor D. Cha, “Hypothesis on History and Hate: Japan and the Korean Penin-

sula,” Yoichi Funabashi, (editor) Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific, United StatesInstitute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 53–56.

112 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan and the recurrent nuclear crisis,” in Linus Hagström andMarie Söderberg (editors), North Korea Policy, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 22.

113 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis, pp. 149–50.114 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism,”

in Kent E. Calder, Frances Fukuyama (editors) East Asian Multilateralism: Pro-spects for Regional Security, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,Maryland, 2008, p. 183.

115 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second KoreanNuclear Crisis, pp. 8, 67.

116 ‘“Pyongyang overtures,” The Japan Times, January 5 2003.117 “Kim Jong-il ‘s Illusions of Grandeur,” The Japan Times, May 14 2003.118 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean

Nuclear Crisis, pp. 5, 6.119 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism,”

in Kent E. Calder, Frances Fukuyama (editors) East Asian Multilateralism: Pro-spects for Regional Security, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,Maryland, 2008, p. 184.

120 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism.”121 Hitoshi Tanaka was in 2002 promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister for his efforts

where he remained until August 2005 when he resigned. He then joined the JapanCenter for International Exchange as a commentator on Japanese foreign policy.

122 Howard W. French, “North Korea Says it May Restart Missile Tests after TalksFail,” The New York Times, 6 November 2002.

123 James Brooke, “A Missile Shield Appeals to a Worried Japan,” The New YorkTimes, November 11 2002.

124 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Regionalism,”p. 186.

125 Japan’s negotiating position in the Six party Talks was no normalization of rela-tions or economic assistance unless the abduction issue was fully resolved; com-pensation was also demanded for the crime; The North was also to terminate thenuclear program and cease all other aggressive behavior such as sending armedvessels into Japanese waters for illegal missions. See Yutaka Kawashima, JapaneseForeign Policy at the Cross Roads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty FirstCentury, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2003, pp. 89–90.

126 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 191.

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3 The formation of the Six Party Talks

Introduction

Since the first nuclear crisis of 1993–94 the North had insisted that its nuclearprogram was a matter for bilateral negotiations with the US. The AgreedFramework was a result of bilateral negotiations which had defused the crisisand provided a precedent for subsequent efforts to deal with the North. TheClinton Administration was willing to negotiate bilaterally with the North,not only over the nuclear program but over the ballistic missile program aswell. Why then was there a need for multilateralism? The search for anappropriate form of multilateralism to engage the North was a result of dis-satisfaction with bilateralism for two reasons. One was that the Republicansin the US saw the Agreed Framework as a sell out and after the HEU revela-tions of September 2002 rejected bilateralism with the North which they regar-ded with distaste. Secondly, US bilateralism with the North had excluded otherplayers who sought to be involved to secure their interests and whose coop-eration was required to ensure that the negotiations would succeed. Thequestion was which parties should be involved and what issues would be onthe agenda? Four Party Talks, which involved the two Koreas, the US andChina, had been conducted during the 1990s to support inter-Korean nego-tiations, but they made no progress. In 2003 Three Party Talks were attemptedwhich included China as the facilitator with the US and the North but thesewere unsatisfactory for the Americans. The US wanted a broader format toavoid being maneuvered into bilateral negotiations with the North and toshare responsibility for the outcome. The result was the Six Party formatwhich would include all external parties that had interests on the Peninsula.

Four Party Talks

Four Party Talks were the first attempt at multilateralism on the Peninsula sincethe Korean War and were conducted in six plenary sessions over 1997–1999.They were proposed by Kim Young-sam during his national day speech onAugust 15 1995 to rectify South Korea’s exclusion from the Agreed Frame-work and to insert itself directly into the negotiations over the Peninsula.1

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This proposal was for a “two plus two” format with the South negotiatingdirectly with the North, supported by the US and China, to replace the 1953armistice agreement with a peace treaty. President Kim obtained US endor-sement of his proposal when he met Clinton in Cheju Island on April 151996. The North, however, was indifferent and had no interest in involvingthe South since it did not sign the armistice agreement. It was alreadyengaged in bilateral US–North Korea negotiations over ballistic missiles, andsaw little purpose in two plus two negotiations. The negotiations over ballisticmissiles had begun on April 20 1996 in Berlin and continued for seven roundsin Kuala Lumpur until November 2000. These talks were limited by the USto the aim of negotiating the termination of the North’s Nodong and Scudballistic missile programs, and its exports of Scud missile technology. TheNorth demanded that the agenda for the bilateral talks be widened to includea peace treaty with the US as a replacement for the 1953 armistice, as well asthe withdrawal of US forces from the South which it declared was a conditionfor its participation in the talks.2 The US countered with the Four Party Talksproposal, which as Clinton explained, would be a “framework within whichNorth and South could talk, “the goal being a “final peace agreement.”3 TheAmericans would not accept negotiations over the replacement for the 1953Armistice agreement without the South and resorted to the two plus twoformat to ensure that Seoul would be included. The North requested a briefingfrom the US on the purpose and agenda of the Four Party Talks proposal; thiswas conducted on March 7 1997 in New York.

At the outset, the Americans made it clear that progress in relations betweenthe US and the North required parallel progress in relations between the Northand South.4 The Americans insisted that they would not allow the North toturn the proposal for two plus two negotiations into a bilateral negotiatingsession. The North then agreed to participate in the preparatory three partymeeting in Columbia University, New York, in March 1997 despite its initialconditions; this was the first time that North and South Korean delegationshad met since 1972 but they did not speak to each other. Three meetings ofthree party talks were held. The North used the occasion to press for bilateraltalks and a peace treaty with the US, and stressed that the danger of war onthe Peninsula would be removed when the US gave up its “hostile policy”towards the North. The US was interested in recovering the remains ofAmerican servicemen who went missing during the Korean war and openinga liaison office in the North for this purpose.5 It was only in the followingJune that the North agreed to continue with the negotiations, and attendpreparatory meetings to determine an agenda for the plenary four partymeetings when substantial issues would be discussed.6

Over August 5–7 1997 the first preparatory four party meeting was con-ducted in New York, this time with China despite its reluctance to getinvolved. At first China had little interest in the negotiations and stressedbilateral dialogue between the North and the South. Only when the Northindicated a willingness to accept three party negotiations with the US did

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China decide to participate.7 The parties could not agree on an agenda andnegotiated at cross purposes. The North insisted on the withdrawal of Amer-ican forces from the South and argued that a peace regime could not beestablished on the Peninsula otherwise, while the US pressed for tensionreduction measures including CBMs.8 This basic conflict over the agenda wasnever resolved and continued throughout the talks. Kim Jong-il was quoted assaying that “we have no intention of regarding the US as our eternal swornenemy … we hope to normalize the Korea–US relationship,” and he calledon the US to give up its “hostile policy” towards the North.9 Two morerounds of preparatory meetings were conducted in September and Novemberbefore the Four Party Talks opened in Geneva over December 9–10 1997.Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth declared that this was the firstmajor international conference on the Korean Peninsula, but it stumbled overthe agenda. Roth explained that the US stood by its refusal to put troopwithdrawals on the agenda in the face of the North’s insistence that troopwithdrawals and a peace agreement with the US were fundamentaldemands.10 A total of six plenary sessions were held without progress on theagenda; the second was held over March 16–21 1998, the third over October21–24 1998, the fourth over January 18–22 1999, the fifth over April 24–271999, while the sixth and final session was held over August 5–9 1999.11 InOctober 1998 the parties had agreed to form two subcommittees relating tothe establishment of a “peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula and tensionreduction which was as far as they went. In the final session the parties agreedto meet again but the North refused to attend further meetings as it sawgreater benefits in Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement. The USwas exasperated by the absence of progress and lost interest.12

The Four Party Talks revealed the tensions and dynamics that would arisein any subsequent attempt at multilateral negotiations involving the North,the Six Party Talks in particular. First, the North came into the negotiationswith impossible demands that the US could not possibly meet and refused toaccept a common agenda. It clearly was not interested in what the US andthe South proposed and used the talks as a sounding board to make its viewsknown. It used these impossible demands to prevent the Americans fromraising proposals such as the reduction of conventional forces and CBMs towhich it objected. Aside from the bilateral missile talks that were conductedwith the US the North had no other contact with the US. If it could sabotagemultilateral negotiations in this way it could bring the Americans to thebilateral negotiations it wanted without the South. Secondly, China did notplay a major role in these talks as it had little interest in multilateralism atthis stage. It feared that multilateralism would be dominated by the US andwanted bilateral US–North Korea or direct North–South negotiations.Thirdly, the South expected to be a major player in the talks but was virtuallyside lined by the North whose intention was to negotiate directly with the US.

However, there were two benefits from the Four Party Talks which showedthat they were not simply a wasted effort. First, they provided a model as to

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how inter-Korean relations could be conducted for Kim Dae-jung’s SunshinePolicy. The Kim Young-sam proposal was to have the two Koreas and twoexternal players together in the dialogue. Kim Dae-jung separated them sothat inter-Korean dialogue would come first, the results of which would beendorsed by external players subsequently. The Sunshine Policy was to bringthe two Koreas together to building upon the 1991 agreement on reconcilia-tion and non-aggression. The intention was to use the Four Party Talks as a“vehicle to expand cooperation with neighboring countries as well as with theinternational community, and to create a durable peace on the peninsula.”13

When the Four Party Talks were deadlocked, inter-Korean negotiations car-ried on and reached their culmination in the summit of June 2000. Secondly,the Four Party Talks acted as a precedent for the Six Party Talks. They hadexcluded Japan and Russia, who both had major interests on the KoreanPeninsula and pressed for their inclusion in the negotiations. The Russians felttheir exclusion keenly and again proposed a multilateral conference along thelines of their 1994 proposal. Japan had not raised the issue of its exclusionwhen Four Party Talks were proposed, but North Korea’s launching of theTaepodong long range ballistic missile over northern Japan on August 311998 made it imperative that Japan become involved in these negotiations.Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi first raised the proposal for Six PartyTalks as a means to address Northeast Asian security when he met Clinton inNew York in September 1998. The American response was not reassuring andthough they could accept Japan’s inclusion they were very skeptical aboutRussia.14 Obuchi raised the proposal again when Kim Dae-jung visited Tokyoon October 8 1998 to obtain Japanese support for the Sunshine Policy, andduring Jiang Zemin’s visit on November 25 1998.15 Neither was interested atthat stage and the Chinese were particularly dismissive. Nonetheless theJapanese Foreign Ministry continued to promote the idea of Six PartyTalks.16 The appropriate occasion came in late 2002 after the North admittedthe existence of its HEU program.

The end of the Agreed Framework

This admission was a defining moment for negotiations with the North butthere were doubts about what North Korea’s Deputy Foreign Minister KangSok-ju had told James Kelly on October 2 2002. There was some discussionthat it could have been a translation error, and that “entitled to own” nuclearweapons may have been mistaken for “come to own.” South Korea’s newsagency Yonhap noted that the North used the phrase “has come to own” inthe past which was translated by the North’s Central News Agency as “enti-tled” rather than actual possession. Three Korean language experts in the USdelegation could not clarify the situation as the North Korean’s language wasunclear and it seemed that Kang deliberately chose an expression which couldmean “right to possess” or “come to possess.”17 Nonetheless the US delega-tion had the view that the resort to deliberate ambiguity indicated that it was

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an admission of the existence of the HEU program.18 At first the revelationwas kept quiet by the Bush administration until it was leaked to US Today onOctober 16. On October 25 the North’s Foreign Ministry issued a statementto the effect that it was “entitled” to have nuclear weapons.19 The Northattempted to deny the existence of the program through diplomatic channelswhich strengthened the view that an admission had indeed been made. JamesKelly thought that the North realized its error and tried to correct it throughlater denials and by claiming that it meant entitlement and not ownership.20

The Americans were puzzled by the event which, together with Kim Jong-il’sadmission of abductions during the meeting with Koizumi one month earlier,was characterized as “diplomacy by confession.”21 This innovative style ofdiplomacy was understood to have the purpose of keeping the US engagedand to prompt South Korea and Japan to place pressure on the US tonegotiate with the North.22 The Chinese were not impressed and the admis-sion made no sense to their way of thinking.23 Condoleezza Rice thought thatthe North wanted to persuade the world that it had changed and would breakout of its economic isolation, but others thought that it was intended as anact of brazen defiance of the US.24

Considerable differences between the US, South Korea, and Japan emergedas to what the North’s intentions were and how best to respond to them.South Koreans desperately struggled to prevent the Sunshine Policy frombeing derailed, and cajoled the US into dialogue and away from confronta-tion. They claimed that the North had disclosed its HEU program to prodthe US to negotiate a comprehensive agreement over all issues, and to pres-sure it into lifting economic sanctions. Senior Presidential Secretary for For-eign Affairs Yim Sung-joon declared that the admission indicated anintention for serious negotiations with the US.25 The Korea Herald opinedthat the North wanted to up the ante to the maximum and to push the USinto a deal whereby economic aid would be exchanged for the North’s con-cessions over the nuclear program.26 When the North’s Kim Yong-nam, whowas head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, told the SouthKoreans during the inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang that theNorth would settle the nuclear issue if the US abandoned its hostile policytoward it, this was positively reported in the South and was seen as vindica-tion of their approach.27 The South seized upon the North’s declaration of 25October, which called for a non-aggression pact with the US and an Amer-ican promise that it would recognize the North’s sovereignty, to show thatPyongyang was serious about negotiations.28 When American and SouthKorean officials met on 11 November to discuss a common response, differ-ences emerged over heavy oil deliveries to the North which the Americanswanted to terminate immediately, while the South wanted to continue theshipments until January when the worst of the winter would be over.29 OnNovember 14 KEDO announced that these shipments were suspended andwould be resumed only if Pyongyang were to take “concrete and credible actionsto dismantle completely its highly-enriched uranium program.”30 KEDO’s

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Executive Board included the US, as well as South Korea and Japan both ofwhom pressed the US not to close the door on the North; theUS, however, wasinsistent over this issue.31 On November 21 the North declared that the AgreedFramework was dead, and that a non-aggression treaty was the only “realisticsolution” to the nuclear issue.32 The North began to disrupt the monitoringequipment at the Yongbyon nuclear facility that had been installed there by theIAEA earlier and ejected IAEA inspectors on December 31. Finally, on January10 2003 the North withdrew from the NPT for a second time.

In the face of this deteriorating situation what were the options for theBush Administration? It was preoccupied with the Iraqi crisis and wasunprepared to back up its neo conservative hard line rhetoric with militaryaction at that stage. Unlike the situation in 1994 when the ClintonAdministration considered a military strike on the North’s nuclear facilities,the Bush administration wavered.33 South Korea’s President Roh Moo-hyunin a TV interview in December 2002 said that high level US officials haddiscussed the possibility of a military strike on the North but had settled on apeaceful resolution of the issue.34 The US could not ride out the situationas time would allow the North to bring its nuclear weapons program tocompletion without hindrance. Indeed, the North began to activate theYongbyon nuclear reactor and had threatened to reprocess the plutoniumproduced by it.35 According to a CIA assessment distributed to Congress,reprocessing the spent reactor fuel then kept in storage in Yongbyon wouldprovide sufficient plutonium for several nuclear weapons.36 According toprojections at the time, the North would be able to develop nuclear weaponsby 2004.37 Some estimates claimed that the North had already developed twonuclear devices and could bring the number to five to seven by July 2003.38

Accurate intelligence about the North’s nuclear program was lacking, how-ever, but it was certain that the North had recovered plutonium sufficient forseveral nuclear devices, and without IAEA monitoring would be able todevelop some more. Whether the North had the technical capacity to con-struct a nuclear device including nuclear fuel and detonators remained amatter of conjecture.

There is an argument that the Bush Administration should have held theNorth to the Agreed Framework and its refusal to do so was a missedopportunity to restrain the development of the North’s nuclear program. Acorollary of this argument is that the North would have been willing to abideby the Agreed Framework and that the US undermined it when it failed tolive up to its side of the bargain by not delivering the LWRs.39 The North hadbeen preparing to develop a “nuclear hedge” in the form of the HEU pro-gram since 1998 in case the plutonium program had to be sacrificed for sucha deal. The Americans could have ignored the HEU program and pretendedthat it did not exist but that would have emboldened the North in its decep-tive practices. The US could have could have insisted that the HEU programbe specifically included in the Agreed Framework but the North denied itsexistence. The Bush Administration could have replaced the Agreed

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Framework with a comprehensive agreement that would remove some of itsdeficiencies. This would have entailed incentives for the North to surrenderthe nuclear program including economic aid and security reassurances, whichwould be staged over five to seven years according to the North’s willingnessto accept inspections.40 Any agreement of this kind would require a majorpolitical volte face for which the Bush Administration was unprepared. It hadcome into office with a neoconservative agenda with powerful proponentssuch as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld who had resolved to deal withthis and other issues on the basis of the unilateral application of Americanpower, and it would not change at this stage.

The need for allies

When the Bush Administration discovered that the North Korean problemcould not be resolved by confrontation, and realizing that it was sliding into aconflict with Iraq, it had little choice but to seek out allies and supporters toform a coalition that would be willing to press the North over its nuclearprogram. The Bush Administration, in its anger and sense of betrayal at theNorth’s duplicity, demanded verification and inspections up front. It waspsychologically incapable of dealing with the regime otherwise, but its needfor allies and supporters softened its approach. The US required support fromChina and South Korea but they were particularly resistant to Americantruculence and called for incentives as a first step to engage the North. In theclosing month of his administration, Kim Dae-jung was determined toremedy South Korea’s exclusion from the Agreed Framework by conductingtrilateral diplomacy with both China and Russia in an effort to steer the USinto dialogue with the North. South Korea sent diplomatic envoys to Beijingand Moscow to sound out their views.41 Both Kim and the President-electRoh publicly urged the US to avoid punitive measures against the North,concerned as they were about reprisals against the South and the capitalSeoul.42 Roh said that he wanted to present a compromise solution whichwould require concessions from both sides, and not just one.43 Roh devised afive-year plan according to which South Korea, Japan and China wouldfinance the rebuilding of the North’s economy.44 Japan conducted its owndiplomacy but for the purpose of resolving the abduction issue which had firstplace on the Japanese agenda. Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi met herRussian counterpart Ivan Ivanov and urged Russia to press the North overthe abduction issue as well as the nuclear program.45

Within the Bush Administration at this critical time there were serious dif-ferences about how to proceed. President Bush sharply distinguished Iraqfrom North Korea and said that Saddam Hussein was facing his day ofreckoning, but the North Korean issue would be resolved peacefully. None-theless, the neoconservatives pressed for “tailored containment” whichentailed the slow economic strangulation and eventual collapse of the North.The normally bellicose Republicans were divided; Senator John McCain

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criticized Bush for not considering military action echoing views in the partythat force would be the only way to prevent the North from developingnuclear weapons. Republican Senator and Chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee Richard Lugar called for incentives for the North tonegotiate, which revealed how opinion was shifting.46 US intelligence esti-mates fared no better with North Korea than they did with Iraq and couldnot decide as to whether the North wanted time to develop nuclear weapons,or wanted to negotiate the termination for the nuclear program in return forthe right deal. The State Department sought a cooperative resolution of theissue and spokesman Richard Boucher declared that “it’s a diplomatic issue,not a military issue and we’re working on all fronts.”47 The State Departmentannounced that a regular working group on North Korea composed of dip-lomats from the US, South Korea and Japan would meet in Washington toforge a common position, and then the US would reach out to China. Inview of the various pressures on the Administration and its preoccupationwith Iraq, Bush tilted towards a moderation that was imposed upon him bycircumstances. He adopted a surprisingly moderate response which reflec-ted the indecision of his administration and the reluctance to resort to ahard line.

In a speech on January 14 2003 Bush declared that the US would offerincentives to the North in the form of energy and agricultural support toinduce it to dismantle its nuclear program.48 Bush sent James Kelly to Seoulover January 13–14 2003 to bring the South Koreans on board and to assurethem that a military strike was not being considered. Kelly met members ofthe National Assembly Committee on National Reunification and told themthat the US could offer the North a security guarantee which they had pre-viously demanded.49 Kelly then moved on to Beijing with the same message.During this visit the Chinese offered to host talks between the US and theNorth which was the first intimation of a Chinese interest in facilitation. USDeputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Tokyo and on 17 Januarysaid that the US was considering a “comprehensive deal” with the Northwhich would cover the HEU program and the full range of WMD includingchemical and conventional weapons. Armitage said that the deal wouldinclude a written assurance of non-aggression effected by an exchange of let-ters or official statements if the North agreed to dismantle its weapons pro-grams. The US wanted to avoid the idea of a treaty which would requireratification by an unreceptive Senate and preferred the idea of security assur-ance.50 Armitage announced that “we are desirous of also having discussions”with the North Koreans over WMD which angered Bush and the neo-conservatives who had demanded no contact with the North, and insistedthat negotiations be conducted in a multilateral context.51 Discussion thenturned to an appropriate multilateral “forum” to deal with these issues.52

The Bush Administration latched on to the idea of a security assurance orguarantee for North Korea but the details and the implications were neverexamined. It was an untested proposal which was intended to get the

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negotiations moving but it could not be realistically implemented for severalreasons. If it could not be a treaty because of US ratification procedures, itwould have to be an executive agreement. Paper assurances were easy to makebut why should North Korea trust an American executive agreement whichcould be easily revoked by another administration? If the North had anyinterest in an American security assurance or guarantee it was probably fordifferent reasons. Guaranteeing the security of a regime that threatens alliessuch as the South and Japan would be a risky business for the US. It couldgive carte blanche to the North for an attack on the South and would alsoallow the North to threaten Japan with its ballistic missile capability withoutfear of an American response. If these cases were inserted in the agreement bythe Americans as exclusion clauses the usefulness of a non-aggression agree-ment for the North would diminish considerably. Moreover, the Americanshad to consider the impact of such an agreement upon allies as the Japanesewere disturbed that it could undermine the US alliance. As it was US DefenseSecretary Donald Rumsfeld had to assure the Japanese that the US would notmake any arrangement with North Korea that would weaken the alliancewith Japan.53

The second part of Bush’s response was to sound out China which hadalready offered to facilitate negotiations between the US and the North. OnFebruary 8 2003 Bush telephoned Jiang Zemin and told him that China hada responsibility to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons.54 USSecretary of State Colin Powell on 24 February visited Beijing and called forChinese support in resolving the issue, but Chinese Foreign Minister TangJiaxuan insisted that the US should deal directly with the North.55 The Chi-nese attitude at this stage was one of indifference to US entreaties and theyrefused to send a delegation to the North to deal with the issue.56 Their viewwas that the US should resume negotiations with the North on the basis ofthe Agreed Framework which suited them well. The Chinese told the Amer-icans that they had “limited” influence over the North and that North Koreawas basically an American problem. Nonetheless, divisions within Chinaappeared as to how to deal with the North. Younger officials particularly inthe Foreign Ministry wanted China to assume greater responsibility in inter-national affairs while party conservatives demanded that the North be sup-ported as a buffer state. Tang Jiaxuan, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi andother Foreign Ministry officials met their North Korean counterparts inBeijing and stressed Chinese concerns over the nuclear issue.57

These officials made the case in Beijing that a nuclear North Korea coulddestabilize the Korean Peninsula and the wider region, and that China hadmore at stake in preserving peace on the peninsula than in supporting theregime. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership resorted to standard indifferencein brushing off the Americans. Colin Powell subsequently attended the inau-guration of Roh Moo-hyun on February 25 2003 and found him opposingeconomic sanctions and any form of military action against the North. Rohcalled for an economic community to bring the two Koreas together and even

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talked about guaranteeing the North’s security.58 The view surfaced in theSouth that a nuclear armed North Korea would be a better alternative thancollapse and chaos on the Peninsula, and the US should draw the line atnuclear proliferation which would be easier to police. Roh’s inaugurationindeed portended trouble for the US alliance.

China could not stand aside for too long and its pretense that this was anAmerican problem was becoming increasingly transparent. China was beyondthe point where it could feign indifference to the situation in view of the fearthat the Bush Administration might be tempted to resort to a military strikeagainst the North if all else failed. When Bush spoke to Jiang Zemin by tele-phone he stressed that all options were on the table including military force.To show that the US was serious, Rumsfeld ordered the aircraft carrier CarlVinson from the west coast to Japan to replace the Kitty Hawk which wasmoved to the Persian Gulf for the Iraqi scenario.59 The military optionreceived much publicity in the American press which reported that circlesaround Cheney, Rumsfeld and in the NSC were examining surgical strikes byTomahawk cruise missiles, sledgehammer bombing, and even the use of tac-tical nuclear weapons.60 It was also reported that 12 B-52s and 12 B-1 bom-bers were sent from the mainland US to Guam to be within striking distanceof the North. Rumsfeld intended to deal with simultaneous crises and toprovide some insurance against North Korean attacks on the South as the USwas becoming embroiled in Iraq.61 Reports appeared that the North waspreparing to restart the Yongbyon reactor, and US spy satellites detected themovement of nuclear fuel out of storage without any effort at camouflage.62

Japanese Chief Cabinet secretary Shinzo Abe declared that the North restar-ted the Yongbyon reactor in late February, and since it already had enoughplutonium to make one or two nuclear weapons it would soon be able toincrease the number.63 Reports from Canberra from sources close to the USindicated that the Pentagon had produced detailed plans to bomb theYongbyon reactor if the North went ahead with the reprocessing of pluto-nium. The plan included air strikes against the North’s heavy artillery abovethe DMZ to destroy its ability to retaliate by shelling Seoul.64 Nonetheless,the State Department pressed for an alternative to head off the militaryoption and called for measures such as economic sanctions and the diplo-matic isolation of the North to bring international opinion on its side. If theUS drew back from the crisis China, Japan and Russia might be galvanizedinto supporting a tougher position after all.65 Various proposals jostled forattention within the Bush Administration but the very uncertainty wasunsettling and had its effect upon the others.66

The North’s re-starting of the Yongbyon reactor in February was ominousand it was interpreted in two ways. The Roh government in South Koreathought that the North was preparing to negotiate the nuclear program foreconomic aid and a security guarantee and chastised the Americans for notagreeing. The problem with this interpretation is that it was the North’snuclear program which drew the American threat to itself and for which it

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required a security guarantee from the Americans. To remove the Americanthreat, the termination of the program would be sufficient. Moreover, if theNorth were serious about negotiating, it would bargain over concrete issues,the extent of the economic aid, how the security guarantee would be worded,and it would put a high price on its nuclear program but it showed little suchinclination. On the other hand if the North’s intention was to bring thenuclear program to completion as rapidly as possible, then its bargainingstrategy in negotiations would be different. It would have little interest innegotiation and would adopt tacit bargaining tactics to avoid defining con-crete issues. It would use the negotiations to buy time for the completion ofthe nuclear program and when completed, it would withdraw from the nego-tiations. The North had to be pushed into negotiations by the Chinese andjoined the talks reluctantly. It did not bargain over concrete issues as theChinese and South Koreans had hoped, and resorted to tacit bargaining andavoided agreement in each situation. Such behavior did not indicate anintention to surrender the nuclear program for the benefits mentioned at thisstage. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight it seems that preparation on theNorth’s nuclear program was accelerated at this time.

The Three Party Talks

Alarm at the turn of events prompted the Chinese to bring pressure to bearupon the North to join negotiations over the nuclear issue. They feared thatthe North intended to develop nuclear weapons which would provoke a mili-tary response from the US.67 Despite what the Chinese had told Colin Powellin late February they had been active in pushing the North to negotiate.Chinese envoy Dai Bingguo, who was also head of the Party’s InternationalDepartment, met Chief negotiator for North Korea Deputy Foreign MinisterKang Sok-ju in January 2003, a meeting described as a “decisive event” in thechange of China’s attitude towards the crisis. The North insisted on bilateralnegotiations with the US which the Bush Administration rejected. ColinPowell brought with him a proposal for ten party multilateral talks when hevisited Tokyo in late February, but it was unacceptable to the Japanese andthe Chinese. Powell also told the South’s Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwanthat the US wanted a “multilateral approach” and mentioned Six Party Talksplus “other countries” which were not identified. Neither North Korea norChina wanted Japan or Russia involved in negotiations and insisted that theirinterests were not directly related to the Korean Peninsula.68 The Japanese,however, insisted on the Obuchi six party format and Press Secretary Hatsu-hisa Takashima said that Japan favored Russia’s involvement, and that Japanwas in close contact with Russia over the issue.69 For a while the North calledfor the involvement of the EU in the negotiations in the hope that its economiclargesse could be tapped; the South called for a two plus four format, that is thetwo Koreas plus the US, China, Russia and Japan which was a variant ofthe Obuchi proposal for six party talks.70 The North refused to join the talks

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unless China was the only additional party and was adamant that theSouth and Japan be excluded.71 Hu Jintao then proposed three party talks, withChina, the US and the North. Bush initially baulked at the exclusion of Japanand South Korea but went ahead with the Chinese proposal, calling Koizumi andRoh to apologize for their exclusion.72 The Americans and the Chineseviewed the three party format as temporary, and both had promised SouthKorea’'s newly appointed Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan that the Southwould join in the next round and that Japan and Russia would also be included.73

The three party format was a temporary measure intended to bring the Northinto negotiations while the final format would be Six Party Talks. The USwanted to include its allies, South Korea and Japan, while the Japanese wereworking to bring in Russia. Once multilateral negotiations were initiated theynaturally moved to a six party format because of the relationships whichlinked the players and their interests on the Korean Peninsula.

What was most interesting about the events that led up to the Three PartyTalks was China’s involvement and the pressure it brought to bear on theNorth to join the negotiations, the first time this had been attempted. TheChinese warned the North against its provocative behavior after it fired ashort range missile into the Japan/East Sea on 10 March. China interruptedoil supplies to the North for three days claiming technical problems in the oilpipeline running from Liaoning in Northeast China to North Korea whichwas interpreted as pressure on the North to participate in the talks. As themain supplier to the North, Chinese oil deliveries were then estimated at 1million tons a year which was 90 percent of its needs so the temporary inter-ruption would have some effect.74 At the same time China prevented the USraising the issue of the North’s withdrawal from the NPT at the UN SecurityCouncil and would not join in public condemnation of the North.75 Theincident revealed that China could press the North when it wanted to and itsprotestations to the contrary were intended to mask its close support theregime. It showed that any pressure the Chinese would use against the Northwould be balanced by a defense of its interests in the UN Security Counciland elsewhere. China would then turn to the US and claim that it had actedas expected, and to the North, it could point to its continuing support. Chinahad more leeway in pressing the North than it admitted since without Chinesesupport the North had nowhere else to turn. The problem lay in the diffusionof power in Chinese decision-making and the unwillingness of the politicalleadership to test their strength and to take the lead over this issue.

Bush was upbeat about the prospects for the talks and declared that “Ibelieve that all of us working together have a good chance of convincingNorth Korea to abandon her ambitions to develop nuclear arsenals.” Despitethis optimism, on April 18 the North indicated that it was ready to reprocessthe spent fuel rods, which the Americans considered provocative, before thetalks were to begin.76 The event triggered interagency conflict within theBush Administration as a secret Rumsfeld memorandum revealed when it wasleaked to the press on the same day that James Kelly left for Beijing for

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the talks. It demanded inspections of the nuclear facilities and was opposed toany economic assistance which would keep the North Korean regime afloat.The memorandum proposed working with China to remove the regime, aperspective which revealed little understanding of China’s goals andmotives. Nonetheless, Colin Powell was able to head off the pressure fromRumsfeld and obtained Bush’s agreement for a “carrot and stick” approachfor the talks, involving security assurances and threats to withhold aid andinvestment.77 The Chinese had their own problems with the North Koreanswhose attendance at the talks was still uncertain. North Korea’s first ViceChairman of the National Defense Commission Vice Marshal Chi Myong-nok visited Beijing on April 20 2003, two days before the Three Party Talkswere scheduled to begin and called for Chinese support. The Chinese wereobliged to assure North Korea of security from an American attack but oncondition that it dismantled its nuclear weapons program, engage the US indialogue and that it did not present a threat to either the South or Japan.78

The Chinese were confronted with a difficult dilemma and in the effort to getNorth Korea to the talks they had to give assurances of protection whichwould allow the North to become even more intransigent. To keep theAmericans interested in the talks, they had to assume the public face of amediator who would press the North Koreans into an agreement. How-ever, as long as they feared an American attack on the North, the Chinesewould be tied to the North, and obliged to protect it against Americandemands.

The Three Party Talks were conducted in Beijing on April 23–25 2003.They were notable for the fact that this was the first time that China hadmoved to a mediator’s position in any conflict which revealed the extent to whichthe Chinese had been troubled by the issue. The Chinese had to reconcile theNorth Korean demand for bilateral negotiations with the American insis-tence on multilateral negotiations. They had assured the North that therewould be bilateral negotiations with the Americans within the context of theThree Party Talks, while they told the Americans that the negotiations wouldbe multilateral. With this classic diplomatic ruse the negotiations could con-tinue. From the outset, the US delegation led by James Kelly sought “irre-vocable verifiable dismantlement” of the nuclear weapons program. TheNorth demanded a step-by-step process according to which it would receiveoil shipments, food aid, security guarantees and economic benefits first, afterwhich it would dismantle its nuclear programs.79 On the first day the threeparties met but the North demanded a separate meeting with the Americans.James Kelly called Washington for instructions and was told to reject alldirect contact with the North. During a break on the first day of the talks, thehead of the North Korean delegation Li Gun took James Kelly aside and toldhim that North Korea had nuclear weapons and would not dismantle them,stating “it is up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transferthem.” Li also told Kelly that North Korea had just completed the reproces-sing of 8,000 fuel rods producing plutonium sufficient for two or three nuclear

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bombs.80 Since this comment was made on the side of the Three Party Talksthe Americans were puzzled and asked for clarification which was not forth-coming. On the second day of the talks separate negotiating sessions withNorth Korea were conducted and a short plenary meeting was held for a fewa minutes to meet the American demand for multilateralism.81

The Chinese were disappointed by the outcome and the inability of eitherside to move beyond its stated position. They were particularly disturbed bythe North Korean comment to James Kelly outlined above which seemed tomake the negotiations futile.82 The first result of the talks was that the Chi-nese realized that mediation could not be a one off event, and that greatereffort was required over the nuclear issue that had become critical to them.An absence of consensus continued to hinder Chinese efforts. Hu Jintao whohad pushed meditation had not consolidated his power as Jiang Zeminremained chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) until March2005. This made it difficult for Hu to develop a new policy on North Korea.83

China could not let tensions rise between the North and the US which couldtempt the Bush Administration into a military response and was compelled tocontinue with its efforts.84 The American neoconservatives believed that theUS had to become even more belligerent to press the Chinese to becomemore active in pushing the North to surrender its nuclear program. There wasmuch shadow-play in relation to the negotiations over North Korea whichwas intended to influence negotiating positions. The North resorted to rheto-ric and provocations while the Americans countered with press leaks of anintention to resort to military force. The result was to push the Chinese andalso the Russians into becoming more supportive of the North, which madeAmerican efforts to seek the dismantling of the North’s nuclear programmuch more difficult.

A second outcome was that the Americans were pushed into a tougherposition and were less inclined to offer concessions of the kind for which theChinese had been angling. Colin Powell was particularly angered by Li Gun’sprovocative remarks at the Three Party Talks which indicated that Americanmoderates were becoming more hardline over North Korea. Before the For-eign Operations Sub Committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on29 April, Powell asserted that the US would not be intimidated by threats,“we will not be blackmailed.” He rejected the idea put forward by the Chi-nese and South Koreans that the North would give up its nuclear program ifthe US abandoned its “hostile attitude” toward the North, and in exchangefor diplomatic relations, economic aid and a security guarantee.85 How woulda “hostile attitude” be defined? The sheer ambiguity would allow the Northto interpret anything as hostile. It served as a convenient device to cover theNorth’s negotiating position and to elicit further protection and support fromChina and South Korea. On this occasion it was the North’s remarks thathad provoked the US, and if it required a demonstration of American hosti-lity to draw out the negotiations, or to scare China, Russia and South Koreainto demanding concessions from the US, the North could resort to the same

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tactic whenever it pleased. A third result was that the US would never acceptthree party talks again. Bush told James Kelly that South Korea and Japanwould have to be involved in future talks to increase the pressure on theNorth and to avoid any chance of direct contact between it and the US.

To sum up, the North accepted the three party format in the expectationthat they would serve as a cover for bilateral negotiations with the US.86 TheThree Party Talks were the first step towards dialogue over the nuclear issue,one which satisfied no one. The Americans were infuriated by the North’sprovocative comments about its nuclear program which made them doubt thevalue of continuing. The Chinese had been bitterly disappointed as instead ofmutual concession-making they had presided over a polarization of positionsthat could derail the whole process. The North was pressured and cajoled intothe talks with the promise from the Chinese that they would have directnegotiations with the Americans. The unsatisfactory conclusion to the talksspurred efforts towards a continuation but this time with an expanded formatwhich would, it was hoped, resolve the imbalances associated with three par-ties. The US convened a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group(TCOG) meeting in Honolulu on June 13 2003 to prepare a coordinatedapproach to multilateral negotiations with the North which would ensure theparticipation of both South Korea and Japan in a five party format. TheAmericans had intended to obtain the support of its allies for Complete,Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) which became the USposition over the nuclear issue in later negotiations. The Koreans, however,demanded that this should be done through “peaceful, diplomatic means.”87

America and South Korea were moving in different directions which complicatedthe task of coordinating a response to the North.

The South under Roh Moon-hyun craved a more prominent role whichundermined US intentions to orchestrate a coalition of allies that wouldsupport it in negotiations with the North. Kim Dae-jung’s government hadreacted differently to the revelation about the North’s HEU program than theUS and regarded it as an opportunity for negotiations. Roh who hailed fromKim Dae-jung’s party campaigned in the presidential elections on the basis ofcontinuing Kim’s Sunshine Policy. He declared that the South should assumea “leading role” to resolve the issue and proposed a two-staged package dealwith North Korea. According to his proposal the US would first drop its“hostile stance” towards the North which would then freeze its nuclear pro-grams. In the next stage the South, the US and Japan would provide financialassistance to the North in exchange for international inspections of its nuclearsites.88 A human rights lawyer with no experience of national security, Rohwas elected President on 19 December 2002 and declared in his first pressconference that he would “open the age of peace and prosperity on theKorean Peninsula.”89 He placed the establishment of a “peace regime” on theKorean Peninsula at the top of his agenda, and proposed the economic inte-gration of Northeast Asia, in a way which would place South Korea up front.He also talked about equality in the relationship with the US and mediation

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between the Americans and North Korea.90 In his attempt to elevate SouthKorea into a leading role he rode on a wave of support from the youngergeneration of voters in their 20s and 30s whose sentiments had turned againstthe US, which was seen as preventing Korea’s rise and threatening war withthe North. Roh declared that he would differ from the US position over theissue if that would prevent an attack on the North which would engulf theentire peninsula.91 The US regarded Roh as the most “anti-American”Korean president in history and preferred the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-changduring the 2002 elections. In the American view he would have been morewilling to support the Bush administration in adopting punitive measuresagainst the North.92

Rather than the most anti-American president Roh was perhaps the mostconfused of South Korea presidents, and as his Korean critics have stated, outof his depth in security issues. Like a surfer he rode on a wave of voter sup-port which took him in directions he did not understand, resulting in embar-rassing contradictions which obliged him to scramble about to make sense ofwhat he may have proposed earlier. He talked about an independent policyfor the South and whipped up expectations amongst his youthful followerswho had anticipated great things under his presidency. Some of those sup-porters accepted what was called national cooperation theory according towhich the US was a foreign country while the North was a long lostbrother and threatened by the Americans.93 Roh advocated the withdrawal ofAmerican forces from the South and called for an independent defense cap-ability. Nonetheless, he demonstrated support for the alliance with the US inother ways. He later declared that US troops were a “stabilizing factor” andaffirmed support for the US troop presence in the South.94 In May 2003 Rohsent a small contingent of medics and engineers to Iraq which in February2004 was followed up by the dispatch of 3,000 troops, overwhelminglyapproved by a vote in the National Assembly. He visited Washington and metBush on May 14 2003 where he affirmed the importance of the alliance withthe US three times. He agreed with the US president that they would notallow the North to have nuclear weapons and that they would use peacefulmeans to eliminate its nuclear program in a verifiable way.95

In June, Roh called upon Koizumi in Tokyo to obtain support for dialoguerather than confrontation and said that ‘I conveyed my determination toresolve the North Korea nuclear issue through dialogue and rule out thepossibility of using force or other means that could destabilize regionalsecurity.”96 The Tokyo joint statement dated June 1 however carried a dif-ferent emphasis; Koizumi declared that both dialogue and pressure upon theNorth were necessary and that both would consider countermeasures. Rohsaw the key to the resolution of the issue in China and wanted it to press theNorth to join the negotiations, and also to expand the format of the nego-tiations to five or six parties which would include the South.97 He visitedBeijing over July 7–10 2003 and pressed the Chinese requesting support forhis proposal for Northeast Asian regionalism with the South at the hub.

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The Chinese demurred in regard to the framework of negotiations with theNorth but did at least agree with Roh that a resolution of the issue should takeinto account the North’s security concerns.98 Roh discovered that negotiat-ing with the major players was not as easy as he had thought and that theSouth did not carry the diplomatic weight to influence their positions over theissue. In his summit diplomacy he had hoped to have the South’s independentposition endorsed by these players but ended up accommodating their posi-tions and confusing his own.99 Through its efforts to build closer rapport withthe Chinese over the issue, the South would weaken the Bush Administration’sinsistence on its negotiating position. It would give China greater confidencein handling the negotiations and in managing the US, eventually to bring itaround to a less confrontational posture.

In contrast, Japan was moving in the opposite direction and hardening itsattitude towards the North. Pyongyang resorted to threats after Koizumi’svisit in September with the intention to force the Japanese into conces-sions. On November 5 2002 the North warned Japan that that unless relationswere normalized it would resume ballistic missile testing.100 At that time theNorth had around 100 medium-range Nodong missiles which could targetmost of Japan within their 1,000-kilometer range so the Japanese regardedthe threat seriously. Japan then demanded that the North dismantle itsnuclear weapons program before receiving economic aid, previously it hadbeen vague about the issue.101 Deputy Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe andKatsuya Suzuki, who was special envoy to normalization talks with theNorth, demonstrated a tougher attitude. Suzuki stressed that the militaryoption should not be excluded as this would have a “persuasive effect” uponPyongyang. The Director of the Defense Agency Shigeru Ishiba raised eye-brows with his remark that Japan should prepare for preemptive strikesagainst missile sites in the North should they be readied for launching againstJapan.102 Ishiba’s comment reflected the thinking amongst younger officials inJapan, who were less constrained by the past, to resort to a military response. Inany case, it was unclear how Japan could launch such strikes as it did not havethe capability to respond and, moreover, there were legal implications for thepeace constitution that the Japanese would have to resolve. Ishiba attemptedto pull the South Koreans closer to the Japanese view when he visitedSeoul in March 2003 and met his South Korean counterpart DefenseMinister Cho Young-kil. He stressed that the North must not possessnuclear weapons and that South Korea and Japan should maintain solidarityover this issue.103 As an effort to undercut Roh Moo Hyun’s approach to theissue, it attempted to play upon the South Korean military’s resentmentsagainst Roh’s line.

Six Party Talks

The Three Party Talks were intended to be a one-off event but the lack ofprogress obliged China to become more involved in the search for a resolution

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of the nuclear issue. In May 2003 Hu Jintao made the decision to assume therole of a mediator in the nuclear issue in what has been described as a“defining moment” for Chinese diplomacy.104 China moved into the positionof pivotal player in the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, onewhose presence was required for the negotiations to make any progress. It wasthe first time that China had taken this role upon itself which was an indica-tion of Chinese concern over the Bush Administration’s aggressive behaviorafter the invasion of Iraq in March. What troubled the Chinese was that theNorth’s nuclear program would tempt the Americans into a military strikewith devastating consequences for the stability of the Korean Peninsula andthe border with China. Hu Jintao visited Moscow in May 2003 to coordinatepolicy with Russia over North Korea. He agreed with Putin that the KoreanPeninsula should be non-nuclear and that the North should return to theNPT, but the resolution of the nuclear issue by force was unacceptable. Theyalso agreed that the North should be offered a security guarantee and eco-nomic support.105 Both China and Russia stressed that the American threatto the North prevented the resolution of the issue. Its removal would free theNorth from its obsession with its security and would allow it to return tothe NPT.

This strategy reduced the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but italso removed the pressure for the North to comply with the NPT. There wasalways the danger that the North would be encouraged in the development ofits nuclear weapons program, which would make it more difficult to reverse ata later date. China, Russia and South Korea shared similar views of thenegotiations with the North which they had adopted as a response to theconfrontational policy of the Bush Administration. Chinese Vice ForeignMinister Dai Bingguo visited Pyongyang on July 12–15. He met Kim Jong-iland presented a letter from Hu Jintao which most likely outlined theapproach agreed with the Russians as a way of enticing the North back intothe talks.106 Afterwards Dai Bingguo told South Korean officials that theNorth was ready for talks. It had accepted an extension of the three partyformat with Chinese assurances that negotiations with the US would be pos-sible in a multilateral format. At that stage five parties were envisaged butthen the North, called for Russia’s inclusion to prevent the US and its alliesfrom forming a bloc against it, which expanded the five party format to SixParty Talks. The value of Six Party Talks was that they included not only thetwo Koreas but external players with a stake in the security of the KoreanPeninsula. Previous efforts to negotiate with the North fell short in thisrespect and the six party format promised to be more enduring.

In preparation for the talks the North insisted on a nonaggression treatyfrom the US during working level meetings with the US and its allies, SouthKorea and Japan, in Washington earlier in July.107 After meeting with alliesSecretary of State Colin Powell dropped his previous resistance and shiftedtowards a more accommodating position. Powell consulted with the Presidentand later told the press that the Administration was considering providing “a

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written assurance” to North Korea instead of a formal treaty which wouldrequire Senate ratification. On 6 August the Secretary of State raised the ideaof a Congressional resolution if the Six Party Talks would support one.108

Powell thought that a Congressional resolution was a better option since itwould require a majority vote in both houses of Congress while a treatywould demand a two thirds vote in the Senate. In view of Congressionalantipathy towards North Korea it is difficult to imagine that this path wouldhave been any easier, particularly as the Republicans controlled Congressuntil 2005. Powell’s remarks had an uplifting effect in South Korea as TheKorea Herald opined that a resolution of the nuclear issue was near.109 Theymade it easier for the North to attend the Six Party Talks which it agreed todo on 31 July when its Ambassador to Russia delivered his government’sformal acceptance to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Nonetheless, it becameclear that the Secretary of State could not carry the Administration with him,and that the neoconservatives had exerted influence to scotch the notion of awritten security guarantee for the North. South Korean Foreign MinisterYoon Young-kwan was more restrained when he told the press not to expect aquick resolution of the nuclear issue, that the talks would be the first step in along process of negotiation.110

In its capacity as mediator China arranged the Six Party Talks in the Dia-oyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing over August 27–29 2003. Despite theoptimism that Colin Powell’s talk of security assurances had stimulated littleprogress was made. The US delegation demanded the complete, verifiable andnon-reversible elimination of the North’s nuclear program and insisted thatdiplomatic relations, security assurances and economic assistance would onlyfollow if the North took this step. The North proposed a “package” solutionbased on “simultaneous actions” which meant that it would dismantle itsnuclear program while the US would phase in its commitments at the sametime.111 This approach appeared reasonable to the Chinese and Russiandelegations who were demanding a compromise but it blurred the issue ofverification which the Americans regarded as the core of the issue. Simulta-neous actions could not be effectively verified and it would be possible for theNorth to receive the benefits it demanded without completely dismantling itsnuclear program. North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il told theassembled parties at the talks that the North had developed nuclear weaponsand would conduct a demonstration test. He also said that the North woulddismantle its nuclear program if the US dropped its hostile policy, suggestingthat the “benchmark” or indicator of American hostility towards the Northwas its willingness to conclude a legally binding non-aggression treaty withit.112 Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov had proposedthat Russia and China could offer security guarantees to the North if the USwas unprepared to do so. This was an attempt to forge a collective securityarrangement to assuage the North’s security concerns in a way that wouldmake a resolution of the nuclear issue possible. However, it was meaninglessfor the North which focused only on the US and which had Chinese and

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Russian support in the UN Security Council in any case. The Americansinsisted that there would be no separate and formal meetings with the NorthKoreans but Assistant Secretary James Kelly did speak to Kim Yong-il forabout 35 or 40 minutes during a plenary meeting. The Japanese delegationcame to the talks with the abduction issue in top place on their agenda.Japan’s representative to the talks Mitoji Yabunaka talked with Kim Yong-ilfor about ten minutes on the sidelines of the talks. He called for the return toJapan of the families of abduction victims and a full investigation of theissue.113 The only thing the parties could agree upon was to continue the talksat a later date.114 The US demands were the same as they were during theThree Party Talks and the North opposed them in the same way. ChineseVice Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed that all the parties had agreed toresolve the nuclear problem peacefully through dialogue, and “in a mannerthat is phased and synchronized or parallel in implementation.”115 What thatmeant was that there was some discussion about the incentives that couldcommence once the North began the process of dismantling its nuclear pro-gram, which would continue until it achieved its full and complete elimina-tion. For the Americans the principle was that the North should begin theprocess in a verifiable way before it would take any of the other steps. In anycase the North’s view was that both processes should begin together, whichthe US strongly opposed. After the talks had concluded the Bush Adminis-tration grasped at incentives to encourage the North to surrender its nuclearprogram, revealing the extent to which it had been influenced by China andSouth Korea. It proposed a new multilateral peace mechanism on the KoreanPeninsula to replace the 1953 armistice, and offered a written security guar-antee to the North, provided that the North surrender the nuclear pro-gram.116 The bottom line for the Americans was that the North shouldcommit itself to the elimination of the nuclear program first, which the Northresisted.

Conclusion

The basic bargaining positions of the parties were made clear by the time ofthe first round of the Six Party Talks, positions which were retained throughsubsequent rounds. The US joined the talks with the expectation that theother parties would pressure the North over the nuclear issue and woulduphold the principle of verifiable disarmament, only to discover that that itwas pressed to modify its position. China, South Korea and also Russiaformed a negotiating coalition within the Six Party Talks that exerted pres-sure on the US to offer incentives, such as a security guarantee and economicsupport to encourage the North’s compliance. For them the priority was get-ting an agreement with the North in a way which would remove theimmediate danger created by what they regarded as the American propensityto resort to force. The North continued to insist upon a non-aggression treatywhich it knew the Americans could not provide, and called for a legally

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binding agreement when it had no trust in legalities. It insisted that the USdrop its “hostile” attitude which was a vague and indefinable demand andallowed it to shift the blame for the lack of progress in negotiations to the USwhich would appear rigid and unbending. It demanded the incentives beoffered first and it claimed that disarmament would then follow, a sequencethat the Americans rejected. The North edged towards a compromise when itproposed simultaneous actions in the talks which meant that the dismantlingof the nuclear program would take place at the same time as the US wouldprovide the desired incentives to the North. Compromise was expected by theChinese and the South Koreans but the Americans could not engage inmutual accommodation over the NPT without undermining it and turning itsmandatory requirements into bargaining chips. This proposal left out theissue of verification and inspection which, for the Americans, would be animportant part of any agreement with the North, and upon which they insis-ted. It would place the North’s efforts to possess nuclear weapons at the samelevel as the US effort to uphold the NPT, which the US could not accept. TheNorth was either putting a very high price on its nuclear program, which theChinese, Russians and South Koreans believed to be the case, or it was pro-tecting the nuclear program by fending off all proposals that would terminateit. In any case, further rounds of the Six Party Talks were required to clarifyits intentions.

Notes1 David E. Brown, “No Thanks Expected: America’s Effort to Nurture a ‘softlanding,’” in Wonmo Dong (editor) The Two Koreas and the United States: Issuesof Peace, Security, and Economic Cooperation, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, NewYork, 2000, pp. 191–92.

2 The Japan Times September 9 1996, March 6, 7 1997, The Japan Times April 171996, also USIS May 10 1966.

3 Bill Clinton, My Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2004, p. 707.4 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing March 3, 1997, briefer: NicholasBurns www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/msg00066d.htm.

5 The Japan Times, March 6, 7 1997.6 Steven Lee Myers, “North Korea Agrees to Join 4-Party Talks,” The New YorkTimes, July 1 1997.

7 Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, “Chinese-North Korean Relations: ManagingAsymmetrical Interdependence,” in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee (editors),North Korea and Northeast Asia, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 2002, p. 120.

8 See The Japan Times, August 7 1997; Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Korean Peace-Building Process: Problems and Prospects,” in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-HoJoo (editors) The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers, Ashgate, Aldershot,2003, pp. 18–19.

9 The Japan Times, August 24 1997.10 “Transcript: Roth Statement, Briefing on Korea Four-Party Talks,” USIS,

Washington fileDecember 10 1997. www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/97121003_epo.html.11 Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Korean Peace-Building Process: Problems and Prospects,”

in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, (editors) The Korean Peace Process andthe Four Powers, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 18–19.

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12 For the report of the Sixth Session see; “Korea Four Party Talks August 9 JointPress Statement,” USIS Washington File, August 10 1999 www.fas.org/news/dprk/1999/990809-dprk-usia1.htm.

13 The North Korea Policy of the Kim Dae-jung Administration, Ministry of Uni-fication, Republic of Korea, 1998, pp. 9, 11, 12.

14 “U.S. negative toward Japan-proposed 6-way talks,” Kyodo September 29 1998.15 “Press Conference by the Press Secretary 26 November, 1998,” Ministry of For-

eign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/11/1126.html; TheJapan Times October 15 1998.

16 Kuniko Ashizawa, “Tokyo’s Quandary, Beijing’s Moment in the Six Party Talks:A Regional Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK’s Nuclear Problem,”Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, (Fall, 2006), pp. 411–32.

17 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second KoreanNuclear Crisis, The Brookings Institution, Washigton, DC, 2007, p. 107.

18 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011.19 “North Korea may or may not have claimed to have nukes,” The Japan Times,

November 20 2002.20 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 107.21 Howard W. French, “North Korea’s admission’ a sign of a desperate leadership?”

International Herald Tribune, October 21 2002.22 Brian Knowlton, “North Korea arms pact is now dead, Powell says,” Interna-

tional Herald Tribune, October 21 2002.23 George Gedda, “North Korean Weapons Program Prompt,” The Washington

Post, October 18 2002.24 Brian Knowlton, “North Korea arms pact is now dead, Powell says,” Interna-

tional Herald Tribune, October 21 2002.25 Kim Ji-ho, “Seoul, Washington view NK nuclear threat differently,” The Korea

Herald, October 21 2002; Seo Hyun-jin, “North hopes for package deal with US,”The Korea Herald October 19 2002.

26 Editorial Crisis or Opportunity,” The Korea Herald October 19 2002.27 Seo Hyun jin, “North ready to talk about nukes,” The Korea Herald, October 22 2002.28 Seo Hyun-jin, “N.K. floats non aggression pact,” The Korea Herald, October 26

2002.29 Martin Nesirky, “US, S. Korea Disagree Ahead of N. Korea Meeting,” The

Washington Post, November 12 2002.30 Paul Kerr, “KEDO Suspends Oil Shipments to North Korea,” Arms Control

Association www.armscontrol.org/print/1169.31 Kim Ji ho, “Seoul, Washington still at odds on oil shipment to North Korea,”

The Korea Herald, November 11 2002.32 Howard W. French, “citing US Hostility, North Korea says pact is dead,” Inter-

national Herald Tribune, November 22 2002.33 Glenn Kessler, “No support for strikes against N. Korea,” The Washington Post,

January 2 2003.34 “US considers security deal with North Korea,” The Japan Times, January 20 2003.35 “Kim slams N. Korea for moving nuclear fuel rods,” The Japan Times, December

28 2002.36 “N. Korea has ‘plutonium for more weapons,” The Japan Times, November 24 2002.37 “N. Korea tipped to get nukes by 2004,” The Japan Times, November 21 2002.38 James T. Laney, and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 March/April 2003.39 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous

Times, Henry Holt, New York, 2011, p. 47.40 James T. Laney, and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 March/April 2003.

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41 Seo Soo-min,” Seoul’s trilateral diplomacy” The Korea Times, 30 December 2002;James Brooke, “China ‘looming large’ in South Korea as Biggest Player, Repla-cing the US,” New York Times, January 3 2003.

42 “Kim, Roh urge Bush to show restraint on NK,” The Korea Times, December 302002.

43 ‘Concessions will ease Korea tension: Roh,” The Japan Times, January 5 2003.44 John Larkin, “NewLeader, newCrisis,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 9 2003.45 “Russia to help press North Korea,” The Japan Times, December 20 2002.46 Glenn Kessler, “Bush Team Spilt on N. Korea move,” The Washington Post,

January 11 2003.47 Glenn Kessler, “Bush Stresses Iraq, N. Korea differences,” The Washington Post,

January 3 2003.48 Susan V. Lawrence, Murray Hiebert, Jay Solomon, Kim Jung Min, “Time to

Talk,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 23 2003.49 Seo Hyun-jin, “US envoy sees possible N.K. Security Guarantee,” The Korea

Herald, January 15 2003.50 “US considers security deal with North Korea,” The Japan Times, January 20 2003.51 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Secret, Scary Plans,” The New York Times, February 28 2003.52 Doug Struck, “US signals it won’t seek sanctions against N. Korea; at talks in

Seoul Pyongyang’s delegates appeal for unity,” The Washington Post, January 232003 “US considers security deal with North Korea,” The Japan Times, January20 2003.

53 “Rumsfeld Reassures Japan Over any N. Korea Deal,” The Washington PostNovember 14 2003.

54 James Dao, “Bush urges Chinese President to press North Korea on Arms,” TheNew York Times, February 8 2003.

55 “China refuses to help solve N. Korea crisis,” The Japan Times February 13 2003.56 John Pomfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s reluctance on N Korea Irks US,” The

Washington Post, February 4 2003.57 David Lague, “Beijing’s tough Korea Call,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March

6 2003, John Pomfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s reluctance on N Korea Irks US,”58 Howard W. French, “North Korea Crisis Straining Washington’s Asian alliances,”

International Herald Tribune, February 25 2003.59 James Dao, “Bush Urges Chinese President to Press North Korea on Arms,” New

York Times, February 8 2003.60 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Secret, Scary Plans,” The New York Times, February 28 2003.61 David E. Sanger, “US begin deploying bombers within easy range,” International

Herald Tribune, March 6 2003.62 “North Korea likely moving nuclear fuel rods: paper,” The Japan Times, February

2 2003.63 “Abe: NKorea has enough Plutonium to make 1 to 2 bombs,”Nikkei,March 10 2003.64 Greg Sheridan, “US Plan to Bomb North Korea,” The Australian, April 22 2003.65 Doug Struck, Glen Kessler, “Foes giving in to N. Korea’s Nuclear Aims,” The

Washington Post, March 5 2003.66 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 278–79.67 Ibid pp. 263, 278–79.68 “Seoul urges flexibility on N. Korea,” The Japan Times, March 31 2003.69 “Press Conference, 15 April 2003,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 15

2003 www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2003/4/0415.html.70 “N. Korea, China want Japan, Russia out of talks, paper says,” Kyodo News

International, April 15 2003, also same reference in Japan Today, April 15. http//find articles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2003_April_21/ai_100443205/print.

71 “US, China Cooperate on N Korean Issue to avert crisis,” Nikkei, April 17 2003.72 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 272–73.

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73 “Korean crisis talks breakthrough made,” The Japan Times, April 18 2003: “USwants Japan, S Korea in Nuclear agreement,” Nikkei, April 18 2003.

74 “China leans on North Korea,” The Japan Times, April 2 2003, “China cuts oilsupply to warn off North Korea,” The Straits Times, March 29 2003.

75 John Pomfret, “China urges N. Korea dialogue; Beijing sees risk of losing influ-ence in Area,” The Washington Post, April 4 2003.

76 “Bush Sees ‘Good Chance’ that N Korea will go non-nuclear,” Nikkei, April 212003, the English translation of the North Korean Statement of April 18 said thatit had started reprocessing while the Korean version said that it was ready tobegin reprocessing; Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “China Talks on Korea,”Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1 2003.

77 David Rennie, “Rumsfeld calls for regime change in North Korea,” The DailyTelegraph, April 22 2003.

78 Ching Cheong, “China offers North Korea security from any US attack,” TheStraits Times, May 3 2003.

79 Joel Brinkley, “US Rejects North Korean Proposal,” International Herald Tri-bune, April 30 2003.

80 Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea says it has Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, April25 2003.

81 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Seoul, May 16 2011; Glenn Kessler, JohnPomfret, “North Korea’s Threats Prod China Toward US,” The Washington Post,April 26 2003.

82 Glenn Kessler, John Pomfret, “North Korea’s Threats Prod China Toward US.”83 Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “Powell says ‘No,’” Far Eastern Economic

Review, May 8 2003.84 Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “China Talks On Korea,” Far Eastern Eco-

nomic Review, May 1 2003.85 “Powell says N Korea Threatened to Make Nukes, Export them,” Nikkei, 1 May

2003: Murray Hiebert, Susan V. Lawrence, “Powell says ‘No,’” Far Eastern Eco-nomic Review, May 8 2003.

86 “N Korea Opposes Japan, S Korean participation in Nuke Talks,” Nikkei, April22 2003.

87 “Joint Press Statement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 13 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/nt/joint0306.html.

88 Kim Hyung-jin, “Lee, Roh differ on how to resolve nuke issue,” The KoreaHerald October 25 2002.

89 “People chose progressive reform,” The Korea Times, December 20 2002.90 Change in Foreign Policy,” The Korea Herald, January 15 2003.91 “President elect opposes military option against N. Korea,” The Japan Times,

February 21 2003.92 Editorial “A mature alliance,” The Korea Herald, January 13 2003; “55% of S

Koreans want US troops to stay’ Survey” The Korea Times, December 23 2002.93 “the Truth behind “We are One,” Digital Chosun Ilbo, September 1 2003.94 Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh calls for greater self defense ability,” The Korea Herald,

April 21 2003.95 “US, S Korea move to repair relationship,” Nikkei, May 16 2003.96 Hwang Jang Jin, “Roh says force not an option on NK,” The Korea Herald, June

11 2003.97 Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh, HU agree on peaceful solution to NK nuke issue,” The

Korea Herald, May 3 2000; “Roh arrives in Beijing to Enhance Ties,” ChinaDaily, July7 2003, www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–7/07/content_243667.htm;Kim Young Sae, Seoul fails to get support for multilateral talks,” The StraitsTimes July 10 2003 Chua Chin Hon, “Beijing, Seoul push for end to N. Korea

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nuclear dispute,” The Straits Times, July 2003 8, “Seoul looks to Beijing to breaknuclear impasse,” The Straits Times, July 5 2003.

98 “Roh’s Nuclear Diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, July 11 2003.99 Editorial “Roh’s Nuclear diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, July 11 2003.100 Howard W. French, “North Korea says it may restart missile tests after talks fail,”

The New York Times, November 6 2002.101 James Brooke, “A Missile shield appeals to a worried Japan,” The New York

Times, November 11 2002.102 “Officials seek hard line on North Korea,” The Japan Times, May 14 2003.103 “N Korea must not possess Nuclear Weapons’ Japan Defence Chief,” Nikkei,

March 29 2003.104 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China andNorth Korea,”China Security, issue four, 2006.105 Mikhail Petrov, “Sotrudnichestvo-priortetny kurs RF i KNDR,” Itar-Tass, 27

May 2003.106 Benjamin Kang and John Ruwitch, “China in Overdrive to Restart N. Korea

Talks,” The Washington Post, July 15 2003.107 SeoHyun-jin, “Talks on nukes seem backon track,” The Korea Herald, August 2 2003.108 Seo Hyun-jin “U.S. move brightens prospects for N.K. talks,” The Korea Herald

August 9 2003.109 “Peace deal on horizon,” The Korea Herald August 11 2003.110 Seo Hyun-jin “Seoul expects minor gains in talks; Foreign minister cautions

Beijing parley on N.K. only beginning,” The Korea Herald, August 21 2003.111 “Six Party Talks on the North Korea Nuclear Crisis, Beijing, August 27–29:

Statements and Comment,” The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm.

112 ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry On Six-way Talks, Pyongyang, August 30, 2003,’Korean Central News Agency, September 1,” The Acronym Institute op cit.

113 “Tokyo, Pyongyang agree to talk about abductions,” The Japan Times, August 312003.

114 “North Korea threatens nuclear tests,” The Japan Times August 31 2003.115 “Six Party Talks on North Korean Issues (Overview and Evaluation),” Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 2003, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party0308.html.

116 “US Proposes New Peace Framework on Korean Peninsula,” Nikkei, November 52003.

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4 South Korea and China and theSeptember 2005 agreement

Introduction

The two tracks in the North’s policy became clearer after the first round ofthe Six Party Talks. It joined the talks under Chinese pressure and SouthKorean encouragement but it also continued with the development of itsnuclear program and eventually declared that it had manufactured a nuclearcapability. The South Koreans and Chinese believed that the North’s nucleartrack was a bluff intended to maximize concessions from the US in a com-plicated process of bargaining. What the Chinese and South Koreans wantedwas an agreement which would bring an end to the tensions on the Peninsulafor which they blamed the US. Chinese involvement became more frantic,spurred by the fear that the US may fail to take the opportunity to come to adeal with the North. South Korea pursued its goal of dialogue and reconci-liation with the North which it believed should provide favorable conditionsfor the elimination of the North’s nuclear program. Both South Korea andChina assumed that with the right incentives the North would surrender thenuclear program and to this end they pressed the US to adjust its position. Inthe third and fourth rounds of the talks the US agreed to offer a securityguarantee as well as energy incentives to the North, without giving up itsdemand for dismantlement of the nuclear program up front. The differences wereseemingly irreconcilable until September 2005 when agreement was reachedas the culmination of the efforts to resolve the nuclear issue. This agreementseemed to vindicate the South Korean and Chinese position that the North’snuclear program was indeed negotiable, and that there was nothing inevitableabout its development.

South Korea’s differences with the US

The Bush Administration’s approach pushed the Roh Moo-hyun administra-tion in the South to devise an independent policy towards the North, onewhich would point to an alternative and more promising path towards theresolution of the nuclear issue. Roh’s supporters in the Uri party argued thatthe improvement of inter-Korean relations through the offering of economic

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incentives would create the conditions for it to reform and if sustained wouldbring about an agreement over the nuclear issue. The Roh government popu-larized the notion that the North would surrender its nuclear program inreturn for security assurances and economic aid and sought to influence theBush Administration in this direction. Roh wanted to elevate the South to amore prominent role and was unsatisfied with the secondary position of justbeing an American ally. He declared that he wanted to place the South on an“equal footing” with the US, but his ambitions exacerbated the divisionswithin the South, with the conservatives in the GNP and also within his ownForeign Ministry. Roh discovered that his Foreign Ministry was not support-ing him, its North America Affairs Bureau criticized his presidential aideswhen they called for greater independence from the US. The President wasparticularly angry with his Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan for opposinghis plan for the relocation of US bases in Seoul.1 Yoon was removed as ForeignMinister on January 16 2004 and replaced by Ban Ki-moon. Senior pre-sidential aide Jeong Chan-yong criticized the Foreign Ministry for its inabilityto shake off its dependence upon the US, and for not understanding the “newspirit of independence” that had emerged in the country.2 Roh threatened to“shake up” the Foreign Ministry which had the Japanese worried as theyfeared that the Six Party Talks would be affected.3

Despite the nationalistic posture that Roh and his supporters adopted theyfaced opposition in the country. Roh had no party but was associated with theUri or “our” party that was supported by young liberal and nationalisticreformers. Uri was formed in 2003 by defectors from Kim Dae-jung’s Mil-lennium Democratic Party and in the legislative elections of April 15 2004 itwon 152 of 299 seats and 38.3 percent of the vote. Its supporters demandedgreater independence from the US and were opposed to the US occupation ofIraq.4 Despite their zealous liberal and nationalist supporters Uri leaders weresubject to diverse and contrary pressures which tempered their enthusiasmand resulted in a frustrated nationalism. Like the Foreign Ministry theystrongly criticized, they themselves could not quite break free of the US. Thediscrepancy between party leaders and members widened as a result. Chairmanof the Uri party Shin Ki-nam declared that the US was South Korea’s mostimportant diplomatic partner while a survey of rank and file Uri lawmakersin April 2004 noted that while 60 percent considered China the South’s mostimportant diplomatic partner, only 26 percent chose the US.5 By August inthe same year opinion in the party had shifted considerably. A survey ofNational Assembly members conducted by The Korea Herald newspaperconducted between July 20 and August 12 elicited responses from 237 of 299members; 195 respondents regarded the US as more important to SouthKorea than China. Within the Uri party 72 percent of members or 94 of 123members agreed, while 17 members thought that North Korea was theSouth’s main priority, and significantly only 12 chose China. Within theGNP all but four of its 96 lawmakers chose the US as the South’s mostimportant ally.6

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Views within the Uri party had changed because of China. In January 2004the Chinese expressed their claim to the ancient kingdom of Koguryo, whichwas one of three kingdoms into which ancient Korea was divided until 668AD. At its greatest extent Koguryo ruled over the northern half of the KoreanPeninsula, a part of Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula in China. Con-troversy arose when Chinese scholars contributing to the Northeast Project ofthe Chinese Academy of Sciences claimed that Koguryo was a Chinese vassalstate which paid tribute to China, that two-thirds of the kingdom was inChina, and that the people of the kingdom constituted one of the manyminorities which were absorbed into Chinese nation. The dispute broke out inearnest in 2004 when the Chinese moved to list the cities and tombs of theancient kingdom as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The Koreans wereincensed by the Chinese action as they regarded Koguryo as an independentkingdom. Ban Ki-moon reflected public anger when he declared thatKoguryo was the “root of the Korean nation.” South Korean Foreign Ministryrepresentatives met with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi but repor-ted that the Chinese were indifferent to the South’s requests to correct these“historical errors,” and some even called for countermeasures against China.7

An editorial in The Korea Herald declared that South Korea “is not a Chi-nese satellite state that can be bullied around or even forcibly annexed likeTibet.”8 The Koguryo controversy had serious implications as Koreans fearedthat China might claim parts of the Korean Peninsula should the area becomeunstable as a result of regime collapse in the North.9 The Northeast Project,some Koreans suspected, was a “pretext” for expanding China’s borders byco-opting Korean history and redefining ancient borders in a way that wouldjustify present day claims.10

A second reason for the change of views within the Uri Party was thethreatened reduction of US forces in the South. If the young liberals of theUri party had been consistent in their thinking they would have welcomed USplans to withdraw these forces as a demonstration of independence. Theirattitudes, which had been formed in the heady presidential campaign ofDecember 2002, had changed somewhat as they became more aware of theconstraints on the South. After months of preparation on June 7 2004 the USannounced a plan to withdraw 12,500 of its 37,000 troops from South Koreaby the end of 2005. The 3,600 troops of the 2nd infantry division which wasdeployed along the DMZ were to be sent to Iraq and replaced by SouthKorean forces. The plan was submitted to a Future of the Alliance PolicyInitiative meeting (FOTA) with the South’s Defense Minister Chi Young-kilon 5 June. The South Koreans demanded that the plan be shelved until 2007to allow the South to expand its defense capability and to avoid a securityvacuum. The Americans, however, insisted on going ahead with the reductionsas part of their Global Defense Posture Review.11

South Korean views of the US were indeed complicated; while Uri sup-porters called for greater independence from the US they did not want a rapiddrawdown of US forces before the South would be able to build up its own

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capability to compensate for the reductions. They also opposed the removalof the 2nd infantry division from along the DMZ on the basis that it actedlike a “tripwire” and a restraint on the US. Without American troops in thefiring line the US could be tempted to resort to aggressive or provocativeaction in relation to the North with immediate consequences for a very vul-nerable South. They also expected a more equal and cooperative relationshipwith the US and objected to the American proclivity for unilateral decision-making. They demanded of the US that it avoid confronting the North andthat it encourage inter-Korean rapprochement as a way of dealing with thesecurity of the Korean Peninsula including the nuclear issue.12 To be sure, theGNP was highly critical of the Uri party’s policies and a party spokesmandeclared that as a result of these developments the US no longer consideredthe South as a “true ally,” and may not share intelligence with it.13 PresidentRoh illustrated the dilemma that South Koreans felt in relation to the USwhen he declared that the South would continue with self-defense whilestrengthening the alliance with the US, and that the alliance with the US wasthe “cornerstone” of the South’s independence rather than a violation of itssovereignty. Roh announced that South Koreans had to “get over the naïvedichotomy between alliance and independence” which were complementaryconcepts and not mutually exclusive.14

The Roh Administration wanted rapprochement with the North with thecooperation of the US and Japan. In this context it thought it could removethe source of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and create those conditionsthat would encourage the North to respond. When Kim Dae-jung pursued hisSunshine Policy the Clinton Administration and Japan had been supportive,but with a suspicious Bush Administration and a sulky Japan those favorableconditions were removed. Roh was angry with the Bush Administration butdenied that anti-Americanism was an ideology in the South and explainedthat it was an “expression of opinion in relation to certain issues.”15 In this he wasessentially correct as the South could not be really anti American while itssecurity depended upon the US. The issue for Roh was not so much the alli-ance with the US but the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to support hisdesire for closer relations with the North. Roh’s anger was also vented againstJapan for its lack of support for his policy towards the North and he was notabove whipping up popular anger against the Japanese. After Shimane Pre-fecture designated 22 February as Takeshima Day, Roh declared ‘diplomaticwar’ on Japan for what he said was its record of defending its colonial ruleover Korea as well as its claim to the Dokto/Takeshima Islands, a very emotionalissue in Korea.16

Roh made an effort to build closer relations with the North by forgingdialogue between the two militaries. On May 26 2004 the first general-levelmeeting between the Southern and Northern militaries was held at Mt.Geumgang which is on the Northern side of the DMZ. The meeting wasintended to implement the North–South declaration of June 15 2000 whichwas the main result of the first summit between the two Koreas. On June 3

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after repeated requests by the South representatives of the two militaries metagain at the Mt. Seorak resort in the South. The intention was to discuss andresolve the problem of the northern sea border on the Western side of thePeninsula where naval clashes had occurred in 1999 and 2002. The meetingresulted in a number of agreements which encouraged the South to pursuedialogue with the North further, and to broaden it to include other areas. TheNorth agreed to hold working level talks at Gaesong to deal with the differ-ences over the northern limit line, and to cease propaganda broadcasts alongthe DMZ.17 Both parties also agreed that their navies would use the sameradio frequencies so they could contact each other in a crisis, they also agreedto a military hotline, and strict measures to keep their naval vessels fromengaging in conflicts.18 This was the first time an agreement had been reachedbetween the Northern and Southern militaries although it was very limitedand did not resolve the troubling issue of the northern line in the western sea.A major breakthrough in terms of easing tensions on the Peninsula hadeluded Roh.

Nonetheless, the North revealed a willingness to be minimally cooperativewhich was some kind of achievement. By responding to Roh’s overtures evenin a limited way the North could separate the South from the US andencourage the Roh Administration to press the Bush Administration into amore conciliatory policy towards the North. The North skillfully played uponthose expectations in the Roh Administration by making concessions overminor issues to an extent sufficient to allow the South to claim success and toarouse interest in further dialogue and negotiation. The South then couldclaim a success which it could use to press the US to soften its position duringthe preparations for the third round of the Six Party Talks. This round, how-ever, had few results which could justify the effort. When the North lostinterest in the talks the South was spurred to further efforts to encourage theNorth to rejoin them. Simply by playing hard to get, the North could shiftthe blame for lack of progress onto the Bush Administration and could enticethe South to work on the US to soften its position. Roh declared that theNorth would indeed surrender its nuclear weapons program if it was assuredof its security, and that it would reform and open up if it were given interna-tional assistance to overcome its current hardships. In his first message toBush after his re-election as US President in November, Roh stressed thatneither military force nor economic blockade was necessary against theNorth and that there was no other way but dialogue.19 He repeated hisviews on a visit to Brasilia in the same month when he debunked the ideathat the North had adopted delaying tactics to buy time for the developmentof its nuclear program. He demanded that the US accept the North as a dia-logue partner.20 Significantly, The South’s Ministry of National Defensedeclared that it would remove the designation of the North as “main enemy”from the 2004 Defense White Paper to be published on February 4 2005. Ithad been designated as the main enemy since 1995 and from now on wouldbe regarded as just a “military threat.”21

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Roh’s South Korea moved close to the Chinese position in this periodwhich strained the alliance with the US considerably. This swing towardsChina was influenced by the prolonged suspension of the Six Party Talks over2004–05 and the fear that the Bush Administration had little interest in anissue that vitally concerned the South. Roh scrambled to make the South’svoice heard in the face of what he and followers regarded as US indifference,which prompted his attempt to position the South as a “balancer” in North-east Asia. Roh first raised this idea on February 25 2005 when he said thatthe South’s military could be a “balancer in Northeast Asia.” In a speech tothe Korean Air Force Academy on March 8 he declared that the SouthKorean military would “work to build close cooperation with the neighboringnations,” but he added that this would be done “on the basis of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.” He then announced that the South was fully capableof defending itself against the North and that the US would not be able todeploy forces from the South without his approval, which was intended toprevent them being deployed to Taiwan against China.22 Roh repeated theseideas on 22 March at a graduation ceremony at the Korean Military Acad-emy, and on 30 March when the balancing role was again linked to the alli-ance with the US. Later, Roh added that South would act as a “peacemaker”between the US, Japan and China which was understood to mean that in theevent of conflict in the region the South would not take sides.23 The South’sbalancing role had a wider meaning as it was intended also to dispel what Urisupporters claimed was the “Cold War mentality” on the Peninsula wherebythe “northern triangle” of China, Russia, and the North was pitted againstthe “southern triangle” of South Korea, Japan and the US.24 Much later Rohalso connected the South’s balancing role with the proposal for a multilateralsecurity regime which would have to include China. He criticized what hecalled South Korean–Japan–US trilateralism to counter China and called foran effort to move beyond “Cold War confrontation.”25

To act as a balancer the South would have to demonstrate distance fromthe US, yet Roh and other Uri leaders had affirmed the importance of thealliance for the South and its central role in the South’s security. Roh thoughthe could lessen dependence on the US by reducing the South’s contingent inIraq from 3,600 to 3,360, and by decreasing the South’s contribution to thecost of US forces based in South Korea by 8 percent. However, he could notescape the US alliance which was, as his government had reiterated, “still thefoundation of Korea’s national security.”26 Defense Minister Yoon Kwan-gung, wanted to give the idea of a balancer some substance by increasingmilitary exchanges with Beijing and elevating military cooperation withChina to the level of that with Japan.27 While Roh’s Uri supporters regardedthis idea as an expression of their hopes and aspiration for a greater regionalrole, GNP spokesman Park Jin said it was dangerous.28 Others in Korea’ssecurity circles thought it was unbridled fantasy. Senior administration offi-cials thought it meant that the South should find a place in a new NortheastAsian security community, or play the role of a go-between to stabilize the

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Peninsula while anchoring its balancing role in the US alliance. An opinionsurvey noted the various interpretations; some thought it meant raising theSouth’s independent voice in regional affairs, others thought it meant shiftingfrom dependence on the US to expanded cooperation with China, whileothers thought it meant countering Chinese and Japanese hegemonism.29

China, however, supported the idea and Ambassador Li Bin echoed Roh’sremarks by saying that there would be no prosperity on the Peninsula if theregional actors were trapped in a “Cold War mentality.”30

The Roh Government conceived the idea of a peace regime on the Koreanpeninsula which would lead to a broad process of reconciliation between thetwo Koreas and eventual reunification. For Roh the peace regime wouldcreate the conditions for the North’s denuclearization by reducing tensions on theKorean Peninsula, as dialogue with the North would come first and denu-clearization later. Roh’s government adopted various measures to kick startthe inter-Korean dialogue process. It promised to deliver 200,000 tons of fer-tilizer to the North, and proposed the establishment of liaison offices in Seoul andPyongyang which would act as dialogue channels to reduce tensions betweenthem.31 It also proposed a multinational development program which wouldinclude the Northeastern parts of China, Siberia and North Korea and createa “region of peace and prosperity.” As a step towards this goal Deputy PrimeMinister and Finance-Economy Minister Han Duck-soo proposed at the 12thAPEC Finance Ministers meeting that North Korea be invited to join as aspecial guest conditional on the success of the Six Party Talks.32 South Koreahad already proposed North Korea’s membership of the IMF and the WorldBank but other members of these bodies thought it was premature. SouthKorea also promoted a more specific proposal for the modernization of theNorth Korean economy under a scheme called the “Korean Peninsula’s peaceand economy initiative,” which was intended to prepare the way for reunifi-cation. According to this initiative the South would provide energy, logisticsand telecoms infrastructure to the North, again contingent on the success ofthe Six Party Talks.33 Uri party leaders including Chairman Moon Hee-sanghad raised the idea of another inter-Korean summit to bring reconciliation tothe peninsula which would follow on from the last summit of June 2000.34

The difficulty was that inter-Korean dialogue could not proceed indepen-dently of the denuclearization of the North which was demanded by the USand Japan as a first step. To achieve its aims Roh’s government was compelledto make the Six Party Talks a success.

The second round

The first round of the talks had been indecisive though the parties did agreeto meet again in December 2003. Yoon Young-kwan spoke to the UN Gen-eral Assembly on 23 September 2003 and called for tangible proposals thatwould allay North Korea’s security fears, which was an appeal to the US tosoften its position accordingly. He claimed that all parties in the first round had

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agreed on the need to address the North’s security concerns, and declared that“We strongly hope that the security concerns of the North, along with thenuclear issue, will be dealt with in more detail at the next Six Party Talks.”35

North Korea was not prepared to meet in December and was not persuadedthat the US would take its security concerns into account at this stage. FuYing, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department,revealed that China had consulted with the North on December 25–27 andpressed it to rejoin the talks as soon as possible. The North’s Foreign Ministrystressed again that it would break with the talks unless the US abandoned its“hostile policy” toward it.36

The US was buoyed by the example of Libya which on 19 December 2003declared that it would dismantle its WMD programs and accept immediateand comprehensive inspections. The declaration included all chemical andnuclear weapons programs, and all ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometerrange with a payload of 500 kilograms which was the limit imposed by theMissile Technology Control Regime of 1987. It stated that all nuclear activ-ities would be reported to the IAEA, and that it would accept internationalinspections to ensure Libya’s complete adherence to the NPT.37 The Libyandeclaration was a culmination of a decade of international pressure on thecountry and its timing may have been related to the US capture of Iraqi dic-tator Saddam Hussein, as it came several days after his capture near hishometown of Tikrit on December 13.38 The Libyan example held out theprospect of a similar capitulation by North Korea if pressure were sustainedby all parties. Libya, however, had no great power protector like China and ithad already suffered punitive air strikes from France and the US in Februaryand April 1986 respectively, against which it had few defenses. On December23 in an interview with Nikkei Richard Armitage said that if North Koreafollowed the Libyan example it “would very rapidly find herself integratedinto the vibrant community of East Asia,” but he admitted that this wasunlikely. To clear the path for the next round of talks he declared that the USwas not seeking regime change in North Korea, would discuss the North’slong-term energy needs under KEDO, and was willing to offer the North asecurity guarantee of some kind.39

On October 30 2003 The North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)announced that the North would join the Six Party Talks if they offered apackage solution based on “simultaneous actions.” It also dropped thedemand for a non aggression pact with the US but it did not specify what itwanted, nor did it define what it meant by “simultaneous actions.” PresidentRoh was buoyed by the announcement and expressed confidence in a peacefulsettlement of the nuclear issue.40 Some clarification of “simultaneous actions”came later when Li Gun, who had led the North Korean delegation to theThree Party Talks, explained the North’s bargaining position at the Center forNational Policy in Washington. First, the US should resume shipments ofheavy oil and greatly expand food aid to the North while the North wouldrenounce its intention to be a nuclear power. Then the US would provide

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security assurances in writing and energy compensation to the North whichwould in exchange freeze its nuclear facilities and allow inspections. TheNorth would only dismantle its nuclear program after it had received theLWRs. Its missile program would be dismantled only after US and Japanestablished diplomatic relations with the North.41 According to this approachthe North had no intention of quickly surrendering its nuclear program as aresult of the Six Party Talks, and needed to preserve it for as long as possible.James Kelly explained that for the North a nuclear arsenal was a “core not aperipheral element” of its national defense strategy.42 The direction of theNorth’s diplomacy was to shift the Bush Administration from its key demandfor the dismantling of the North’s nuclear facilities as a first step. The Northwanted the dismantling of the nuclear program and the provision of incentivesto be concurrent processes, as verification and inspection would be postponedto some later date, while the HEU program would be forgotten in the process.From the US perspective this approach would allow the North sufficient timeto bring its nuclear program to completion and to emerge as a closet nuclearpower, with US diplomatic recognition and a security guarantee.

The North’s bargaining strategy depended on it convincing the US that ithad a “nuclear deterrent,” or was on the way to getting one. It could thenbargain with the US, the South and Japan as a nuclear power and one enti-tled to concessions over a range of issues. The North was taking a differentdirection from Libya as it regularly announced its intention to reprocessnuclear fuel rods and to acquire a nuclear capability. The North’s ForeignMinistry on 2 October 2003 declared that it had finished reprocessing the8,000 spent fuel rods and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon announced thatthe North now possessed “nuclear deterrence.” The CIA claimed that theNorth had diverted 9–10 kilograms of plutonium over 1993–94 for at leastone or two nuclear weapons and the reprocessing of the fuel rods on thisoccasion would bring the total to four or five.43 US intelligence was gropingin the dark when it came to North Korea as it did not know with certaintyhow much plutonium was produced over 1993–94, or how much plutoniumthe North would require to produce a nuclear device, or the number of fuelrods that had been reprocessed.44 In any case this was the third time that theNorth had declared that it had reprocessed nuclear fuel, the other occasionsbeing in December 2002 and April 2003.45 American officials were unsurewhat to make of these declarations and surmised that their intention was toincrease Chinese and South Korean pressure on the US to come to an agree-ment with the North.

Clearly, the North had not persuaded Americans that it had a “nucleardeterrent” and invited a US delegation to visit Yongbyon in January 2004 tosee for itself. The US delegation was headed by Professor John W. Lewis ofStanford University, and included Charles Pritchard then with the NSC,Siegfried Hecker who was former head of the Los Alamos National Labora-tory in New Mexico, and various officials and congressional aides. The dele-gation visited the 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon on January 8. The North

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Korean News Agency (KCNA) reported that the delegation had seen first-hand that the North had recently reprocessed plutonium and had a “nucleardeterrent.”46 Siegfried Hecker’s report on the visit, however, was somewhatdifferent. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on thevisit he explained that a “nuclear deterrent” would require three things; theability to produce plutonium, the ability to design and build a nuclear device,and the ability to build a delivery system which could carry the device to atarget. The North could produce plutonium but he thought that there was noevidence that that it could produce a nuclear device, let alone a deliverysystem.47 Hecker’s report confirmed American suspicions that the productionof plutonium alone would not constitute the nuclear deterrent that the Northwas so anxious to obtain. If the US disbelieved the North, then it would haveto prepare for a demonstration of its nuclear capability in a test, but thatwould take time and considerable preparation.

The Chinese thought it was possible to interdict the nuclear program at thisstage if a suitable agreement could be reached at the Six Party Talks. Thismeant offering the North sufficient incentives to give up the program andshifting the US from its insistence on dismantlement of the nuclear programup front. The US was prepared to grant the North a security guarantee forwhat it was worth, but the Americans would not budge from their position onthe removal of the program first. Still, if the purpose of the North’s nuclearprogram was to bargain for economic aid and American security assurances,this would have been the opportune moment for the North to accept anagreement, and the fact that it did not indicates that there were other motives.To ensure success at the second round China attempted to get US and Koreanagreement in advance on the text of a statement that would be issued after thetalks. The Chinese attempted to forge a compromise between the North’sdemand for simultaneous actions and the US demand for the dismantling ofthe nuclear program first. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi told theAmericans that the North was willing to freeze all its nuclear activities as astep towards total abolition.48 In this they were frustrated by the refusal ofthe Americans to move from their stated position since there were manyissues that required clarification, including which programs would be frozenand when verification would begin. James Kelly on February 13 averred thathe expected the North to follow the Libyan example and make a “funda-mental decision” to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. He declared that“we insist on the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all ofNorth Korea’s nuclear programs.” He particularly stressed that the US couldnot live with a solution that was not verifiable and irreversible and whichwould allow the North to resume its nuclear threats.49 The Americans nego-tiated a proposal with Japan and South Korea that would incorporate theirown demand for up front elimination of the nuclear program with the simul-taneous actions as demanded by the North. They agreed to provide a securityguarantee for the North if it agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program.While freezing and dismantling its nuclear program, the North could be

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offered a “temporary” security guarantee which would not take effect untilthe nuclear program was entirely eliminated and verified through inspections.This process would take several years and in the meantime if the Northreneged on the deal both sanctions and military options could be invoked.50

How a temporary security guarantee would differ from a full guarantee wasunclear in any case as the obligations and conditions would be the same.

The Americans were buoyed by revelations of the contributions that A. Q.Khan had made to the North’s HEU program which justified their position.On February 4 2004 on Pakistan television Khan confessed that he hadoperated a nuclear proliferation network which would, so the Americansthought, dispel doubts that the other parties in the talks had about the exis-tence of the HEU program.51 Both Japan and South Korea called for clar-ification of the HEU program, China which had consistently doubted itsexistence feared that taking up the issue would create needless difficulties.52

The Chinese continued to deny the existence of the HEU program andDeputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong said later that the Americans hadnot provided convincing evidence. The Americans in turn claimed that they hadfully briefed the Chinese and speculated that the Chinese adopted a positionof feigned disbelief over the issue to assist their mediation prospects with theNorth Koreans.53 The South proposed a three stage formula described as a“perfect road map” to get around the impasse. In the first stage multilateralsecurity assurances would be offered to the North in exchange for a freeze ofall nuclear programs. In the second stage there would be verification of thedismantling of the Yongbyon reactor, the third stage would require a “probe”into the HEU program with simultaneous economic aid.54 The Japaneseagain wanted to raise the abduction issue at the Six Party Talks. Vice ForeignMinister Ichiro Aisawa asked the Chinese to help arrange contact with theNorth on the sidelines of the talks to discuss the issue.55 The Japanese insistedthat the abduction issue be included in a comprehensive solution in relation tothe North and without that Japan would not be part of any solution involvingeconomic cooperation with the North.56

The Chinese made a heavy investment in the talks and reportedly had topay the North $50 million to ensure its attendance, though on what terms canonly be a matter of speculation.57 The second round of the Six Party Talkswere held on February 25–28 2004 which once again was an occasion for theparties to restate their positions. The Chinese delegate Wang Yi explainedthat the North offered to freeze its nuclear activities as a step towards the fullelimination of its nuclear program, and demanded compensation in terms ofenergy. The nuclear freeze the North insisted would apply to its nuclearweapons program and not the civilian program. China and Russia supportedthe proposal for a freeze and the Russians together with South Koreaagreed to offer energy aid to the North as compensation.58 Kelly, however,stressed that the nuclear issue had to be resolved first before there could bediscussions over a wide range of issues that could lead to an improvement inrelations.59 The North refused to admit the existence of its HEU program.

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Kim Kye-kwan revealed that the North had sold missiles to Pakistan toacquire foreign currency but said that “I want to make clear that we do nothave enriched uranium, that we do not have the facilities, scientists or expertsrelated to HEU.”60 The US did not supply evidence at the talks so the skep-ticism surrounding this program remained, despite the US hope that A.Q.Khan’s earlier revelations would have dispelled them. The US and Japanrejected a draft statement prepared by China because it did not mention theneed for the North to dismantle its nuclear program first. China pressed for ajoint statement that would meet the positions of both sides but the differenceswere not resolved. Indeed, on the last day of the talks, Saturday February 28,the closing ceremony was delayed for three hours because North Koreawanted to change the wording of the statement by including mention of“differences” between the sides. Instead of a joint statement the Chineseissued a chairman’s statement because of what Wang Yi described as an“extreme lack of trust” between the parties.61 The Chairman’s statementmentioned that the discussion was “beneficial and positive” and that “differ-ences remained.62 Kim Kye-kwan, however, said that the talks had no “posi-tive result” for which he blamed the Americans. The parties agreed at least tocontinue the talks and to hold the third round of the Six Party Talks in Beij-ing no later than the end of the second quarter of 2004. The one positiveresult of the second round was the creation of a working group of officials todeal with the issues and to prepare the agenda for the next round.63

The third round

The third round followed on from the second as the same issues were raisedand the same differences surfaced. In May 2004 China convened the workinggroup created in the second round in Beijing which revealed that the differ-ences had become irreconcilable. The North Korean delegate Pak Myong-kukdeclared that the North would not continue with the talks unless the Amer-icans dropped their demand for the complete dismantling of its nuclear pro-gram. The US, however, continued to insist on CVID and would not giveway.64 There were signs, however, of emerging differences within the BushAdministration which were undermining the confidence of the neoconserva-tives. Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, Donald Rumsfeld and the Penta-gon, and John Bolton held sway over policy towards North Korea anddictated the bargaining position to the American delegation at the talks. Theyinsisted on CVID, the isolation of the North and its collapse, a position fromwhich the other parties China, the South, and Russia naturally resiled withalarm. The first two rounds demonstrated that negotiations were goingnowhere, and that they gave time for the North to develop its nuclear pro-gram. It was obvious that the more the US pressed the North the greater thecounter pressure from China, Russia and the South for a negotiated resolu-tion of the issue, that would in some way accommodate the North’s securityand economic concerns. Doubts were raised within the State Department and

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in some parts of the NSC about the wisdom of continuing with this line whilethe US was heavily embroiled in Iraq. Some called for a softer position inrelation to the North which would stress the incentives to surrender thenuclear program rather than focusing on the disincentives.65 Immediatelybefore the third round began President Clinton’s negotiator with the North,Robert Gallucci, gave expression to this frustration in an interview with theBBC. He declared that the Bush Administration’s policy towards the Northwas “going nowhere,” and that the main threat from Pyongyang was theproliferation of nuclear technology which the Bush Administration was doinglittle to stem. He called in question the multilateralism of the Six Party Talksas a case of the US “sub contracting” North Korean policy to China whichhad very different strategic interests from the US. Gallucci revived the call fordirect negotiations with the North which is what the North and China haddemanded in the first place.66 Gallucci had made a case for the return to theAgreed Framework which he had negotiated, the very mention of which wasanathema to the Bush Administration.

During the third round which was held over June 23–26 2004 the US out-lined a seven page modified proposal which was intended to break the log jamand move the negotiations forward. It was drafted in consultation with theSouth and incorporated ideas from both China and Japan who had pressedthe US to offer economic incentives to the North. It was described as a“turning point” in the negotiations by a member of the South Korean dele-gation.67 It called upon the North to disclose its nuclear program completely,submit to inspections, and then pledge to eliminate both the plutonium andHEU nuclear programs after three months. In exchange the North wouldreceive shipments of heavy oil while the US would provide it with a provi-sional security guarantee, and would also consider taking the North off thelist of states sponsoring terrorists. The US would also begin direct talksover sanctions imposed earlier on the North. Japan’s chief delegate MitojiYabunaka offered to provide energy aid to the North if it froze its nuclearprogram, which was a departure from the American proposal where thenuclear program was to be dismantled first.68 China, Russia, the South and Japanwere willing to provide fuel oil to the North which demanded at least 2,000MW of power annually in exchange for the freeze.69 The other parties however,were willing to offer energy aid as compensation for a freeze of the nuclearprogram which indicated significant differences from the Americans, particu-larly on the Japanese side. The Bush Administration had softened itsapproach to meet the concerns of the other parties by avoiding mention ofCVID but otherwise its policy had not changed in essence. The key point wasthat the US would not phase in any of the incentives until the North agreed todismantle the nuclear program and allow inspections. As the US repre-sentatives noted CVID was still the goal but its constant repetition in the SixParty Talks had inflamed the situation and it was therefore downplayed.70

If the North expected to bargain with its nuclear program for a specialdeal, could it do better? The North countered with its own proposal which

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showed it was attempting to move the negotiations towards a freeze of thenuclear program which would avoid the issue of verification. Kim Kye-kwansaid that the goal was the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,and that the North was ready to present its own proposal for compensationfor freezing its nuclear program. He stressed that its main condition was that theUS drop its demand for CVID.71 North Korean Vice Foreign Minister ChoeSu-hon in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 27 2004 explainedthat the North had proposed a “package solution” based on the notion of a“reward for freeze.” The North proposed to freeze all its nuclear facilities andthe US would in return abandon its “hostile policy,” which meant that the USwould drop the demand for CVID, lift its economic sanctions and its“blockade” of the North. It would also remove the North from the list of“state sponsors of terrorism,” and would participate in compensation ofenergy worth 2,000 MW. Choe added that the freeze would be the first steptowards eventual dismantlement of the nuclear program and would be fol-lowed by “objective verification.”72 CVID was for the Americans the bottomline in the negotiations and a return to the Agreed Framework which thisproposal represented was unacceptable for the Bush Administration. TheNorth was rapidly losing interest in the Six Party Talks which it had attendedthis time largely because of Chinese insistence. In dealing with the Americandelegation Kim Kye-kwan invoked the idea of a factional struggle in theNorth as a way of demanding concessions. He claimed that hardliners in themilitary and diplomats within the Foreign Ministry were struggling for influ-ence in Pyongyang, the hardliners wanting to develop the nuclear programwhile the diplomats were willing to come to agreement with the US. Kim toldJames Kelly that to persuade the hardliners to desist from the nuclear path wasnot an easy task and it required a justification.73 The North Korean delegationtold the Americans that the hardliners wanted to test a nuclear weapon ifthe talks did not come up with results.74 There may have been reformersin the economic and trade ministries in the North but it was a great leap ofimagination to say that they were in a position to influence policy over thenuclear program, or that they could counter the military. Even if the Amer-icans had made the desired concessions to the North in the belief that themoderates would be strengthened and the hardliners weakened, it is doubtfulif the North would have changed its position. It was too far along the nuclearpath to reverse course.

Three rounds of talks had demonstrated that the differences were irre-concilable, and that the ability of either side to compromise in the way theChinese had hoped was constrained by institutional and policy considera-tions. The record shows that the North had embarked on the development ofits nuclear program earlier and required more time to conduct a demonstra-tion test which would alter the situation entirely. It had seen the balance offorces within the Six Party Talks tilt against the hard line position of the BushAdministration and had learned that it had the superior hand. Its attendanceat the talks could be a matter for negotiation that would require maximum

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diplomatic exertion and some pecuniary incentives from the Chinese. Simplyby withholding attendance it could raise the pressure on the Americans tooffer incentives or make concessions. By threatening to develop nuclearweapons and conducting a test it could create alarm amongst others, whowould demand that the Americans do something to prevent this from occur-ring. When the Americans held fast to their bargaining position in demandingthe elimination of the nuclear program they attracted the opprobrium ofrigidity and were blamed for the impasse. Other parties in the talks wereprompted to offer incentives to the North which undermined the Americanposition and the insistence on CVID. The North could appeal to the Chinese,the Russians and the South Koreans with the prospect of modifying theAmerican position.

A fourth round had been planned for September 2004 but the Northblamed the US for its “hostile attitude” and refused to return to the negotiationsuntil July 2005. One reason was that the North had hoped that George Bushwould lose the presidential elections of 2 November in which case a demo-cratic administration under John Kerry might return to the Clinton Admin-istration’s policies.75 Kerry had expressed the Democrats’ frustration with theBush Administration over North Korea and had declared that he wouldconduct bilateral talks with the North alongside the Six Party Talks, whichthe North wanted.76 A second reason for delay was internal dissension in theNorth as there were reports of considerable discontent within the militaryover the market reforms which were introduced in July 2002. Under pressurefrom the Chinese, Kim Jong-il pushed the reforms to stave off economic col-lapse. Markets arose throughout the country and prices and exchange rateswere allowed to float. The result was the creation of a class of very richpeople in the North while the urban population became impoverished. TheSouth’s former Unification Minister Chung Se-hyun claimed that peoplebecame less loyal to the regime, military discipline and cohesion were under-mined and as defections increased more border patrols were introduced to stopdefectors crossing over into China.77 In November 2004 Kim Jong-il purgedhis brother-in-law Jang Song-taek, who reportedly opposed the reforms. Janghad married Kim’s younger sister, he was a Central Committee member withsecurity responsibilities and was considered a possible successor to Kim Jong-il himself. He clashed with Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju who was in charge ofthe economic reform program and who presided over a major reshuffle of theWorker’s Party to remove party obstructionism.78 Director General of theJapanese Public Security Intelligence Agency Ohizumi Takahashi said thatthe reforms could be destabilizing for the regime as they were introducedpiecemeal, the widening gap between rich and poor created “social destabili-zation.” A similar rift was observed in the military as high ranking officerspursued personal gain.79 The military pilfered humanitarian aid donated bythe US, Japan and South Korea and sold it on the open markets. On October1 2005 the reforms were partially halted when the sale of rice and grain atprivate markets was banned, public distribution centers were re-introduced for

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these commodities.80 With the suspension of the reforms Jang Song-taek res-urfaced in March 2006, and after Kim Jong-il’s stroke in August 2008 he wasreportedly governing the country.81 If conditions in the North had been moresuitable the reforms may have succeeded, and the engagement policyapproach promoted by China and South Korea may have led to a favorableresolution of the nuclear issue. As it was, however, the North’s attitude towardsthe talks hardened.

The North declares it has nuclear weapons

On February 10 2005 the North’s Foreign Ministry declared that the Northhad “manufactured nuclear weapons,” and it would withdraw from the SixParty Talks.82 A few days earlier Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan toldvisiting US Congressman Curt Weldon that the North’s nuclear developmentprogram had been completed.83 The North had often threatened to developnuclear weapons so this announcement was déjà vu. Vice Foreign MinisterChoe Su-hon had done so in October 2003 and before the UN GeneralAssembly on 27 September 2004 announced that the Bush Administrationhad left the North with “no other option but to possess a nuclear deterrent”84

The US believed that the North had one or two nuclear weapons whilethe South’s Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck declared that theNorth would have eight nuclear weapons if all 8,000 rods had beenreprocessed.85 Director of the IAEA Mohammed El Baradei said that he wascertain that nuclear material from the 8,000 rods had been converted into fuelfor four to six nuclear weapons, which was more than what the US hadadmitted in public.86 Nevertheless, on March 31 the North claimed thatthe situation had changed and that it would now negotiate as a “nuclearpower,” and would not return to the Six Party Talks. It demanded theremoval of the US nuclear threat to the region, and the upgrading of the SixParty Talks into comprehensive disarmament talks in which the other partieswould participate as equals to achieve the de nuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula.87 This sentiment was echoed by the South Korean newspaperHankyorae which claimed that the North wanted “dialogue and not disrup-tion” and that the South should advise the US on the need for “mutualcompromise.”88

The North wanted to change the format of the Six Party Talks which had, upto this point, proceeded on the basis that it was the target state and thereforerightfully subject to the demands of others. If the North were no longer thetarget state the Six Party Talks would be turned into nuclear disarmamentnegotiations in which the US would be obliged to accept a compromise.CVID would be dropped, and the dismantling of the North’s nuclear programwould require equivalent concessions from the US in relation to its militarypresence in the South and its nuclear umbrella. The North had learned that itwas possible to obtain nuclear weapons if they are developed quickly enoughso that the international community had little time to respond. Libya was

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caught before it was able to so, but India and Pakistan were able to take the US bysurprise with their nuclear weapons tests in May 1998. North Korean repre-sentatives would often refer to India and Pakistan implying that if the US got usedto a nuclear India and Pakistan it could get used to a nuclear North Korea aswell. It was a calculated risk as the North was not certain of the US responseand it had made too many threats in the past to be taken seriously this time.Many thought at the time that the North was engaging in its usual brinks-manship intended to gain an advantage in the Six Party Talks. The South’s Uni-fication Minister and National Security Advisor Chung Dong-young revealedskepticism and thought that the announcement meant that the North had a claimto nuclear weapons, and not a claim to be a nuclear weapons state.89 TheNorth had to undertake a test of its nuclear weapon to convince the world thatit was not bluffing, but it required more time for this demonstration.

The first American reaction to the North’s declaration was to take theissue to the UN Security Council, a move which was strongly opposed bythe South.90 The Chinese made yet another effort to re-start the talks in theface of North Korean resistance and sent Wang Jiarui, who was Chairman ofthe Party’s International Department, to Pyongyang.91 America’s new repre-sentative to the Six Party Talks as from February 14 was the Ambassador toSouth Korea Christopher Hill who replaced James Kelly. On April 26 Hillasked the Chinese to cut off the oil supply to the North as a “technical inter-ruption” to press it to return to the talks. Condoleezza Rice had made thesame request in 2003 which the Chinese rebuffed. There were signs of adebate in China about the efficacy of such pressure upon the North assome in Beijing argued that cutting off food aid would have an immediateeffect on the North. Reports indicated that China was considering a ban oncertain exports to the North to press it to rejoin the talks.92 Publicly, however,China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman opposed any suggestion that Chinashould reduce economic support for the North.93 South Korea similarly madean effort to entice the North back into the talks by offering economic incen-tives. On July 12 Roh announced that the South would build power linesacross the DMZ to provide the North with 2,000 MW of electricity as wellas 500,000 tons of rice, the largest ever rice shipment promised to theNorth. South Korea also proposed setting up assembly industries in theNorth for garments, footwear and soap.94 Chung Dong-young announcedthat seven new enterprises would be created in the North in relation toenergy cooperation, the modernization of railways, tours to Mt. Baekdu,the upgrading of Nampo port, the reforestation of the North, the jointdevelopment of farmlands and river usage. The plans would be placed onthe agenda and would be implemented once the nuclear issue was resolved.Fertilizer would also be delivered to the North and for the first time since1984 a Northern vessel docked at a Southern port to pick up 200,000 tonsof fertilizer as a gift.95 With these incentives the Unification Ministerannounced that the “right atmosphere” had been created for dialogue in theSix Party Talks.96

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The fourth round

The Chinese and the South Koreans managed to entice the North into parti-cipating in the fourth round of the Six Party Talks which was conducted fromJuly 26 to August 7 2005. They were the longest on record and went on for 13days. The Chinese made a major effort to ensure that this round would suc-ceed, with 200 officials mobilized from nine Foreign Ministry departments towork on the negotiations.97 In the fourth round the North was offered whatthe South Koreans thought it wanted in terms of economic aid and Americansecurity assurances but they were not important for the North. It was on itsway to becoming a nuclear power and wanted to prolong the negotiations toavoid premature agreement, but it was still constrained from withdrawingfrom the talks because of fears of a forceful American response. The Chineseyet again attempted to mediate between the North and the US and tabled adraft joint statement for the first time which reflected a sense of urgency. TheNorth objected to the demand that it abandon all nuclear weapons andnuclear programs and insisted on its right to a civilian nuclear program. ChrisHill had been instructed by Robert Joseph to demand that the North surren-der all nuclear programs, civilian as well.98 The Chinese draft also includednon aggression assurances from the US, economic incentives and energy aid,it made provision for the normalization of relations with the US and Japanand implementation of the 1991 joint declaration between the two Koreas.99

In response, the North demanded that American nuclear protection of theSouth be included in the agenda as the issue in its view was the completedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Americans demanded that theNorth include the HEU program while the North yet again denied its exis-tence.100 The Chinese representative Wu Dawei expended much effort to per-suade the North to cooperate but it refused and strung the talks out for aslong as possible, prompting Chris Hill to warn that the US would walk outfrom the talks if there was no progress. After 13 days the talks were termi-nated.101 Wu Dawei said that “profound discord” had prevented agreementwhich was a big disappointment for China.102

The biggest stumbling block during the negotiations was the North’s civi-lian nuclear program. By all accounts the North latched onto this issuebecause it would keep the Six Party Talks preoccupied and deflect attentionfrom its nuclear weapons program. The North could expose rifts between theUS and its ally in the South, and also within the South, and it could benefitfrom the various proposals raised to assist it with the provision of energy. TheSouth’s Chung Dong-young supported the North’s right to peaceful use ofnuclear energy on condition that it joined the NPT and allowed inspectionsfrom the IAEA.103 On July 12 2005 Chung announced that the South wouldsupply the North with 2,000MWof electricity annually if it agreed to dismantle itsnuclear weapons program. The proposal was intended to encourage thedevelopment of inter-Korean relations but its cost for the South was prohibitive.The plan was that supplies would begin in 2008 until 2018 for which transmission

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lines would be built putting the total cost up to $11.5 billion.104 Roh’s sup-porters were struggling to encourage the development of inter-Korean rela-tions and thought that public opposition to the US over this issue would helpthem gain the trust of the North. As though to accentuate the differences Chungsaid publicly that “we think differently from the US.” Chris Hill expressed theAmerican objection to the North’s civilian nuclear program commenting thatthis is a country that “had trouble keeping peaceful nuclear energy peaceful.”The South’s proposal to supply the North with electricity made it unnecessaryfor it to have nuclear power in any case.105 Different nuances were observed in theSouth from officials who downplayed the differences with the US and stressedthe commonalities. Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said that the North coulddevelop peaceful nuclear energy if it dismantled its nuclear programs andcomplied with IAEA demands.106 The US and the South also discussed theidea of a forum separate from the Six Party Talks which would address theissue of a peace treaty as a security guarantee for the North, as well as asecurity structure for the Korean peninsula.107

The breakthrough: the September 19 2005 agreement

Despite the apparent failure of the July–August talks, the fourth round wasre-convened over September 13–19 because of a new flexibility in the USposition. This was credited to Chris Hill who demonstrated independencefrom the neoconservatives. He supported the South’s offer to provide elec-tricity to the North and agreed to place the issue of the LWRs on the agenda.Hill ended the North’s “propaganda advantage” which it had obtained overthe US because of the Bush Administration’s rigidity.108 With characteristicoptimism Ban Ki-moon thought that the North was ready to surrender itsnuclear program, that a “breakthrough” in negotiations was likely and thatthey had entered a stage of “real and substantive negotiations”109 In theSeptember talks, the Bush Administration allowed China to mediate directlywith the North, and shifted its position as a result of both Chinese and SouthKorean pressure when it accepted the North’s right to LWRs. The Southproposed to provide the North with 2,000 MW of electricity in exchange forthe elimination of the nuclear program; it also declared that it would recog-nize the North’s right to civilian nuclear energy despite American objec-tions.110 Some reports claim that the South Koreans “threatened” to re-thinktheir commitment to the US alliance if the Americans refused to make con-cessions to the North.111 During the talks the US resorted to tough tactics toobtain an agreement and was prepared to walk out without one. It threatenedsanctions and a freezing of the North’s international assets if one did noteventuate. Agreement came just as US delegation was packing its bags.112

The American acceptance of the North’s right to LWRs made possible thefirst substantial agreement which was reached on September 19. The agree-ment stated that the North had the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy,which was not contested by the US, and that the “parties agreed to discuss at

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an appropriate time the provision of LWRs to the North.” The time was leftopen. China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US also “stated their will-ingness to provide energy assistance to the North,” while the South reaffirmedits proposal to supply it with electricity. In return, the North declared that itwould abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returnto the NPT, and to IAEA safeguards. To assuage the North’s concerns, theAmericans accepted a formula whereby the US and the North agreed torespect each other’s sovereignty, to exist peacefully together, and take steps tonormalize their relations. The US also declared that it had no intention ofattacking or invading the North with nuclear or conventional weapons.113 Asa demonstration of optimism, the agreement mentioned that the “directlyrelated parties” would negotiate a “permanent peace regime on the KoreanPeninsula at an appropriate separate forum,” a proposal promoted by theSouth. The creation of this separate forum would be contingent upon successin the Six Party Talks, which seemed close. With this expectation in mind theparties agreed that the next round of talks would be held in November.

It seemed that South Korean and Chinese views of the North were justifiedand that with the right incentives the North would accept a deal over itsnuclear program. Chris Hill called the agreement “one of the best examples ofmultilateral diplomacy in this part of the world,” but he admitted thatimplementation of the agreement was a further step.114 It was regarded as a“significant victory” for China’s efforts at mediation and a demonstration ofwhat it could do to bring the principal antagonists together. Chinese chiefdelegate Wu Dawei thought that the agreement was the most important sincethe Six Party Talks began.115 The South Koreans were equally effusive andclaimed that the agreement was made possible by their “unprecedentedlyactive role.”116 Unification Minister Chung Dong-young called the Septemberagreement “the triumph of South Korean diplomacy,” and claimed that“without the South Korean government’s creative ideas and persistent nego-tiating efforts, reaching the agreement of the Six Party Talks would have beenvery difficult.” Chung thought that the success was largely his doing as he hadvisited Pyongyang in June for the anniversary of the June 2000 summit. Heclaimed that he persuaded Kim Jong-il to re-join the Six Party Talks whichresulted in this agreement.117 The Korea Herald opined that “the parties havea shared interest in the fulfillment of the commitments accompanied by acertain level of trust,” and it also claimed that “the communist regime hasexhibited adaptability to the norms of international society”118 The Amer-icans attributed the success of the agreement to Chris Hill who brought flex-ibility to the American negotiating position and ended America’s “diplomaticisolation” over the issue which had bedeviled the Bush Administration sincethe talks began. Chris Hill had entered the talks stating that the North’sdemand for LWRs was a “nonstarter” for the US which could not allow it tohave any nuclear facility, as it could transform an electricity-generating LWRinto a facility which could make weapons-grade plutonium.119 Despite thisinitial position the Americans eventually accepted the South’s offer to provide

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electricity to the North and agreed to place the LWRS on the agenda in thetalks.120 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained that “We debatedlong and hard as to whether or not we wanted to agree to that draft.” Thedeciding point was that all parties had accepted the position that the Northwould receive the LWRs only after it had dismantled its nuclear weaponsprogram.121

Nonetheless, the problems with the agreement were immediately apparent.It made no provision for timing and scheduling and did not stipulate whenthe disarmament would begin; it did not identify whether the provision of theLWRs would follow or precede disarmament, a critical point which becameone of the reasons for its breakdown. According to the Chinese, these issueswere to be discussed when the talks reconvened in November. The BushAdministration had made a major concession in agreeing to the provision ofLWRs and dropping its insistence that the North had no right to the peacefuluse of nuclear energy. Chris Hill said that Bush did not want any mention ofthe LWRs, but the Chinese had included it in the draft and obtained theagreement of the other parties. The Chinese then told the Americans that theywere isolated over this issue and that if the Americans rejected it, they wouldgo to the press to say that the US was to blame for destroying the accord. Theissue triggered a debate within the Bush Administration as it was alreadyheavily embroiled in Iraq, faced difficulties with Iran’s nuclear program andencountered domestic fallout from Hurricane Katrina. It conceded that theNorth Korean problem had to be postponed and accepted the agreement.122

Under its terms LWRs would be provided at an “appropriate time” whichwas vague enough to create new disputes. The American interpretation of an“appropriate” time was, as Chris Hill said, when the North had visibly andverifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons program. Hill insisted that theNorth had to return to the NPT and comply with the IAEA before it canexpect delivery of an LWR.123 Even then the Americans stressed that theywould only allow the LWRs to produce electricity for the North under strin-gent circumstances.124 The Japanese supported the Americans and ForeignMinister Nobutaka Machimura agreed that only when the North gave up itsnuclear weapons program could it receive an LWR.125 The South Koreanresponse was again divided. Deputy Foreign Minister and chief delegate tothe talks Song Min-soon argued that there was a “window of opportunity”for the North to have its LWRs. Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon during aspeech at Harvard University told the Americans that the LWR issue wouldbe discussed only when Pyongyang returns to the NPT and to the IAEAsafeguards.126 Unification Minister Chung Dong-young adopted an approachreflecting his position in the Uri party when he thought that an “appropriatetime” for the provision of the LWRs could be negotiated.127 The Chinesewere silent over this issue though Chris Hill claimed that all the parties wereagreed that the North should not receive LWRs before it had abandoned itsnuclear weapons program.128 On Tuesday September 20, the North’s ForeignMinistry declared that the US “should not even dream of the issue of the

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DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs”which was described as “our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeplyrooted rock.” It reiterated that “we will return to the NPT and sign theSafeguards Agreement with the IAEA and comply with it immediately uponthe U.S. provision of LWRs.”129

At this point it is worth asking whether the end of the North’s nuclearweapons program was in sight. It seemed that the North had put forwardreasonable demands that could be easily met, and that the provision of LWRsshould not have caused so much dissension. Why could the US not seize theopportunity to dismantle the North’s nuclear weapons program? The firstproblem was the issue of scheduling and when the dismantlement of theNorth’s nuclear program would take place. The North insisted that this wouldoccur after the LWRs had been constructed which would postpone the issueto ten or 15 years into the future. Chris Hill, however, demanded dismantle-ment within three years.130 Another problem was the HEU program whichwas not specifically mentioned in the agreement though the Americans insis-ted that it covered “all” nuclear programs.131 Still, the North had not admit-ted to the HEU program and neither China nor the South was willing toaccept American claims as to its existence, or to question the North’s motivesdeeply. A third difficulty was that the North’s declaration of September 20was conditional which was glossed over in the euphoria that followed theagreement. In that statement, the North’s Foreign Ministry said that “we willfeel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if the DPRK–U.S. relationsare normalized, bilateral confidence is built and we are not exposed to the USnuclear threat any longer.”132 The North had reserved for itself an escapeclause which allowed it to be the judge of when there would be “bilateralconfidence” in the relationship, and when it would no longer be exposed tothe “US nuclear threat.” It could be, as some have surmised, that the North’sdeclaration was a product of different inputs which linked the reasonabledemand made by the Foreign Ministry in regard to the LWRS to the unde-fined and unlimited demand made by the military. Alternatively, it could havebeen the North’s intention to play the parties along with a tantalizing agree-ment and then impose the escape clause at the end. The US also had its ownreservations about normalizing relations with the North which indicated thatit would be a prolonged and complicated process. South Korean and Chinesepressure on the US to make concessions to the North was resented by theneoconservatives of the Bush Administration and the Republican members ofCongress who thought that the US was giving away too much. Chris Hill saidon 6 October that normalization of relations with the North would be “subjectto resolution of our longstanding concerns” which the US had to discuss withthe North such as “human rights, biological and chemical weapons, ballisticmissile programs, proliferation of conventional weapons, terrorism and otherillicit activities.”133 There were still too many details to negotiate which wouldtest the North’s willingness to go through with an agreement and, moreover,both sides had their deeply rooted reservations about dealing with each other

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that were a product of decades of hostility. Such mutual antipathy would notvanish as a result of just one agreement.

What happened to the breakthrough? The fifth round

A fifth round of talks was required to negotiate the details of the Septemberagreement but to ensure the North’s attendance, the State Department sentNew Mexico Governor Bill Richardson to Pyongyang for four days in Octo-ber and provided him with an Air Force plane. Richardson was US Ambas-sador to the UN while Clinton was president and had developed contactswith the North Koreans. In the North on October 18–21 Richardson metKim Yong-nam, who was President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’sAssembly and second only to Kim Jong-il. He also met first Vice ForeignMinister Kang Sok-ju. He toured the Yongbyon nuclear facility and wasgiven a full briefing by its director. Upon his return to Tokyo, he declared thatNorth Korea was “fully committed” to return to the talks and was showing“flexibility” on the LWR issue. He said that “they were very clear aboutadhering to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, very clear,” and “itwas the most positive tone I have seen.”134 He stressed that the North Kor-eans “were very specific to me that they were prepared to dismantle all theirnuclear weapons, consistent with the statement of principles (of the 19 Sep-tember agreement).”135 Hu Jintao made his first state visit to the North over28–30 October in a similar effort to press the North Koreans to turn up at thenext round. Chinese officials reported that Kim Jong-il told the Chinese Pre-sident that he was committed to ending the North’s nuclear weapons programand that he would push forward with multinational negotiations on thematter.136 The Chinese encouraged the North to continue with the Six PartyTalks by offering $2 billion in long-term economic aid, and to prevent itbacksliding on the economic reforms that were introduced in 2002.137

Expectations had been heightened by the September agreement. Ban Ki-moon said that they would hold talks on how to schedule the compensationthat would be offered in exchange for the North’s nuclear dismantlement.According to Ban “While the fourth round of talks produced word-for-wordagreements, the fifth round of talks is even more important as it will be dis-cussing an actions-for-actions agreement.”138 The South Koreans were con-cerned about timetabling the actions-when the North Koreans would finishthe task of dismantlement, when the shipments of heavy oil would resume, thepossibility of constructing LWRs, the coupling of the North’s dismantlementwith the normalization of diplomatic relations between the North and the USand Japan and so on.139 The fifth round was held over November 9–11, thistime for a shorter period. The Chinese declared that the talks would adjournafter three days to let everyone attend the APEC forum in Busan. Chris Hill,told the parties that they should first agree on what specific steps NorthKorea must take to disarm, while the benefits it would receive would be leftuntil later. The North Koreans, however, repeated their demand for an LWR

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before the dismantling of the nuclear program and reverted to an issue thatthe other parties thought had been resolved. The North Koreans wereangered by Bush’s remark in Brazil when he called Kim Jong-il a “tyrant.”They raised the issue of the sanctions imposed by the US Treasury Depart-ment on North Korean companies accused of proliferating WMD technologyand on Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macau bank that was accused of laun-dering money from the North’s illicit activities. The North Koreans wereparticularly incensed by these sanctions and claimed that they violated the 19September agreement.140 The American delegation insisted that the financialissue was separate from the nuclear problem that they were discussing at theSix Party Talks. This issue then became the main stumbling block in the SixParty Talks for the next 18 months for reasons that will require explanation.Rather than the expected progress, deadlock ensued. The Chinese drafted thechairman’s statement which called the talks “serious, pragmatic and con-structive” but there was no date set for their resumption, the statement simplystated that discussions will resume “at the earliest possible date.”141

The US had long been concerned about the North’s shadow activities such asdrugs trafficking and counterfeiting. The North had been cultivating opiumpoppies since the late 1970s and had been producing heroin for distributionby companies and diplomats.142 The North was also involved in the counter-feiting of US currency and produced nearly flawless intaglio printed hundreddollar “supernotes” which first appeared in December 1989.143 The US Treas-ury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Center claimed that NorthKorea earned as much as $500 million annually from counterfeiting, andanother $100–200 million annually from narcotics trafficking.144 The coun-terfeit money was put into circulation by the Banco Delta Asia while the earn-ings from narcotics were used for a variety of purposes. One was to purchaseluxuries for Kim Jong-il and presents for his high-ranking military officers,another was to pay for equipment from Japanese companies that could be usedfor the manufacture of WMD. Suspicions were aroused when in April 2003 anelectrical power supply unit which could be used to enrich uranium was pur-chased from Japan and exported to North Korea via Thailand.145 With thismoney North Korea could develop the technology to process uranium usingcomponents and equipment which, it was suspected, had been purchasedfrom Japan or Europe.146 President Bush on 29 June 2005 issued an ExecutiveOrder which targeted the financial and trade dealings of eight North Koreanagencies suspected of involvement in the purchases of this equipment. Whilethe Six Party Talks were proceeding, on September 12 the Treasury Depart-ment designated BDA as a “financial institution of primary money launder-ing concern” under Section 311 of the Patriot Act which would preventAmerican financial institutions from having any dealings with the Bank.147

On September 15 the Treasury Department announced its findings publiclyand declared that the Bank had been a “willing pawn” for North Korea. Itwas accused of accepting “large deposits of cash” from North Korea,including counterfeit US currency, and agreeing to place that currency into

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circulation.148 The result was that the bank closed all the North Koreanaccounts which contained some $25 million.

US Treasury sanctions on BDA were declared on 15 September but theNorth went ahead and signed the September 19 agreement. The North prob-ably did not at first realize the significance of the Treasury announcementwhich did not penetrate the decision-making system until later. The NorthKoreans could not accept that one agency in government could act indepen-dently of another which had struck a deal with the North. To them it seemedthat the Bush Administration had arranged it this way so that the talks wouldbe torpedoed. The North could have refused to attend the fifth round in pro-test but the fact that it did return indicated a commitment to see themthrough. Both South Korea and China were disturbed by the US sanctionswhich to them had closed the window of opportunity that they had perceived.Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met President Roh at the ASEAN plus threemeeting in Kuala Lumpur, they shared their fears that US financial sanctionswould damage or delay the Six Party Talks.149 The South Koreans were par-ticularly angry with the American action and though they publicly supportedthe US Treasury Department’s action in dealing with counterfeiting as anillegal activity, they did not want it to be linked with the Six Party Talks.Unification Minister Chung Dong-young was incensed. During the inter-Korean ministerial talks which were conducted in Cheju over December 13–16,Chung said that “We emphasized that those issues are not to be linked withthe Six Party Talks.” He also said that this was a bilateral issue between theUS and the North which should not concern the others, and that “our gov-ernment has maintained that such bilateral issues should be separated fromthe six nation talks, as it would be difficult to achieve the denuclearization ofthe Korean Peninsula when the six nation talks stumble every time such issuessurface.”150 The irony was that the American delegation at the talks agreedwith the principle that the South Koreans had expressed, their position beingthat financial sanctions were a law enforcement issue and unrelated to thenuclear standoff in which case the problem lay with the North Koreans whomade the connection.151 The South Koreans struggled to revive the talks inJanuary 2006 and hoped that they could obtain Chinese assistance in thismatter. Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon was anxious that the pro-spect of an agreement with North Korea was being undermined by the sanc-tions. The South Koreans had hoped that preparatory talks could beconvened on Cheju Island in December which would then pave the way forthe resumption of full negotiations in Beijing in January.152 By this timehowever, President Roh lost confidence in his grand vision for the Korean Penin-sula after the Uri party suffered a severe setback in the National Assembly by-elections on April 30 and October 26, which were described as “crushingdefeats.”153 When President Roh met with George Bush on the sidelines ofthe APEC summit in Busan in November he fell behind the American line.Bush declared that they presented a “united front” over the North and agreedthat LWRs would not be provided until the North disarms.154 While Chung

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Dong-young was talking about doubling economic aid to the North andachieving economic union with it in 15 years, Bush rejected the idea of economicaid before it disarmed.155 The South’s role as a swing state in the Six PartyTalks was coming to an end.

Conclusion

The North pursued two tracks in its policy towards the US; one was thenuclear program which was developing in two forms, the plutonium and theHEU programs; the other was the diplomatic track in the Six Party Talks. Therelationship between these two tracks had been the subject of much speculationamongst the parties. If the North had intended to develop nuclear weaponscome what may, then the Six Party Talks were futile, a dalliance for the North anda means to keep the US occupied while it was preparing the nuclear programfor the tests which were to follow. South Korea and China both rejected thisinterpretation and insisted that the second track was more important to theNorth, and that the nuclear program was a bargaining chip which would besacrificed if the right incentives were offered in the negotiations. Upon this basis,South Korea and China prevailed upon the US to modify its position in thesecond and third rounds to offer incentives to the North to accept an agree-ment. The September 2005 agreement was the culmination of these effortswhen the US eased its demand that the North dismantle its nuclear program firstand accepted vaguer terms which glossed over the time when the dismantle-ment of the nuclear program would begin. This agreement was possible becausethe US softened its public position but unresolved difficulties remained inrelation to the sequencing of the incentives and the phasing out of the nuclearprogram. This shift on the part of the US made the September 2005 agreementpossible and allowed South Korea and China to announce that a “break-through” had been reached. The real issues were postponed for the nextround which was aborted because of the issue of American financial sanc-tions. In the meantime, however, the North was preparing for the missile andnuclear tests which were to change the nature of the negotiations.

Notes1 Anthony Faiola, “S. Korean Foreign Minister Resigns After Dispute over USTies,” The Washington Post, January 15 2004.

2 Hans Greimel, “S. Korean Gov’t Divided over US Ties,” The Washington Post,January 15 2004.

3 Kim So-young, “Yoon’s exit not to affect NK talks,” The Korea Herald, January17 2004.

4 Choi Soung-ah, “Uri dominance may shift foreign policy,” The Korea Herald,April 21 2004.

5 Kim So-young, “US remains most important ally: new Uri leader,” The KoreaHerald, May 19 2004.

6 Choi Soung-ah, “Uri Members lean more to US than China,” The Korea Herald,August 16 2004.

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7 Yoo Dong-ho, “Roh Orders Study of Regional history,” The Korea Times, August8 2004.

8 The Chinese have become “impertinent, insolent really, in dealing with theirneighbours,” and “arrogant and nauseatingly overbearing toward others” Editorial“China: a Giant with a Pygmy mentality,” The Korea Herald, January 25 2005.

9 Ryu In, “Seoul to ask China to clarify Koguryo report,” The Korea Times, 7 May2004; “China, S. Korea row over ancient history,” The Japan Times, February 42004.

10 Editorial “What China’s Northeast Project Is All About,” The Chosun Ilbo 30September 2009 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/05/30/2008053061001.html.

11 Shim Jae-yun, “Seoul Seeks to Delay Pullout,” The Korea Times, June 8 2004:“South Korea to bolster its defence capability,” International herald Tribune, June8 2004.

12 Lee Sook-jong, “Anti US sentiment roils alliance,” The Korea Herald, June 10 2004.13 “Park speaks of growing US antipathy to Seoul,” The Korea Times, May 30 2004.14 Ryu Jin, “Self Defence, Alliance to be pursued together: Roh,” The Korea Times,

June 6 2004.15 Shim Jae-yun, Roh Says NK will give up nukes if given compensation,” The

Korea Times, November 17 2004.16 Park Song-wu, “GNP Hits Roh’s Diplomacy on Japan,” The Korea Times, March

24 2005.17 Ryu Jin, “2 Koreas strike package deal to avoid naval clash,” The Korea Times,

June 4 2004.18 Joo Sang-min, “Koreas agree to ease tensions,” The Korea Herald, June 5 2004.19 Seo Hyun-jin, “Roh appeals for softer Bush stance toward N. Korea,” The Korea

Herald, November 15 2004.20 Shim Jae-yun, Roh Says NK will give up nukes if given compensation,” The

Korea Times, November 17 2004.21 Yoon Won-sup, “‘Main Enemy’ to be removed from Defense White Paper,” The

Korea Times, January 28 2005.22 Richard Halloran, “Roh publicly belittles alliance with US,” The Japan Times,

March 20 2005.23 Jung Sung-ki, “‘Power Balancer’ policy faces criticism,”TheKorea Times,April 5 2005.24 Ryu Jin, “Where is Roh Steering the Korean Ship?” The Korea Times, April 7 2005.25 Ryu-Jin, “Roh seeks N-E Asian Security Regime,” The Korea Times,October 21 2005.26 Editorial “Cracks in the alliance,” The Korea Herald, April 12 2005.27 Jung Sung-ki, “‘Power Balancer’ policy faces criticism,” The Korea Times, April 5

2005.28 Jung Sung-ki, “‘Power Balancer’ policy faces criticism.”29 Editorial “Roh’s ‘balancer’ idea,” The Korea Herald, April 12 2005.30 Ryu Jin, Yoon Won-sup, “China supports S. Korea’s Balancing Role,” The Korea

Times, April 6 2005.31 Annie I. Bang, “Seoul proposes liaison offices in Koreas,” The Korea Herald

September 2005.32 “Finance Minister Han Invites NK to Next APEC Meet,” The Korea Times

September 9, 2005.33 Lee Joo hee, “Seoul prepares ‘Korean Peninsula initiative,” The Korea Herald,

October 31 2005.34 “Inter-Korean summit,” The Korea Herald October 20 2005.35 “NK Security Fears Must Be Addressed: Yoon,” The Korea Times September 27

2003.36 Seo Hyun-jin ‘N.K. agreed to reopen 6-party talks early next year,’ The Korea

Herald, December 30 2003.

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37 Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, Disarming Libya: Weapons of MassDestruction, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, TheLibrary of Congress, April 22 2004. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32007.pdf.

38 Seo Hyun-jin “‘Libya may be good reference for N.K.’; Minister says six-partytalks may take place without prior agreed statement,” The Korea Herald,December 27 2003.

39 “Armitage Urges North Korea to Follow Example of Libya on WMD,” U.S.Department of State, December 23 2003, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/department_state/briefings_speeches_testimony/179.pdf.

40 “Roh Confident of Peaceful Settlement of Nuclear Crisis,” The Korea TimesNovember 1 2003.

41 Glenn Kessler, “N Korea Displays ‘nuclear deterrent,’” The Washington PostJanuary 11 2004.

42 Ensuring a Korea peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, James A. Kelly, AssistantSecretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Remarks to the ResearchConference-North Korea: Towards a New International Engagement Framework,U.S. Department of State, February 13 2004.

43 Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Claims Nuclear Advance,” The Washington Post, 3October 2003 Martin Nesirsky, “N. Korea says it reprocessed Atomic Fuel Rodsin June,” The Washington Post, October 3 2003.

44 Murray Hiebert, “The North Korea Mystery,” Far Eastern Economic Review,October 21 2004.

45 David E. Sanger, “Intelligence Snarl over North Korea,” International HeraldTribune, October 15 2003.

46 Glenn Kessler, “N Korea Displays ‘nuclear deterrent,’” The Washington PostJanuary 11 2004.

47 “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea”Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory University ofCalifornia, January 21 2004 www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf.

48 “N. Korea Tells China It is prepared to Abolish Nuclear Program,” Nikkei, Feb-ruary 23 2004; Glenn Kessler, “N Korea Displays ‘nuclear deterrent,’” TheWashington Post January 11 2004.

49 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific AffairsRemarks to The Research Conference, “North Korea: Towards a New Interna-tional Engagement Framework” Washington, DC February 13 2004 The Acro-nym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01.

50 “Japan, US., S Korea Agree on N Korea Security Guarantee Proposal,” Nikkei,February 24 2004.

51 Murray Hiebert and Donald Greenlees, “An Alliance under Stress,” Far EasternEconomic Review, February 26 2004.

52 “N. Korea Tells China It is prepared to Abolish Nuclear Program,” Nikkei, 23February 2004.

53 “China View on Arms in North Korea puzzles US,” International Herald Tribune,June 10 2004.

54 “Saving the North’s face,” The Korea Herald, February 24 2004.55 “N. Korea Tells China It is prepared to Abolish Nuclear Program,” Nikkei, Feb-

ruary 23 2004.56 Press Conference 27 February 2004, with Press Secretary Hatsuhisa Takashima,

Japan Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01.

57 Murray Hiebert and Donald Greenlees, “An Alliance under Stress,” Far EasternEconomic Review, 26 February 2004; David E. Sanger, “Behind Bush step liesAsian Pressure,” International Herald Tribune, June 25 2004.

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58 ‘Three Features and Five Advancements,’ Wang Yi Commenting on the SecondRound of Six Party Talks in Beijing, February 28 2004, The Acronym Institutewww.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01.

59 “Opening Remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Kelly,Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” March 24 2004The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01.

60 “Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea’s vice foreign minister and chief delegate to thetalks, at a news conference in North Korea’s embassy after the talks.” The Acro-nym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01.

61 “Talks on North Korea nuclear program end,” the Associated Press, MSNB.com,February 2004 28, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4365670/ns/world_news/t/talks-north-korea-nuclear-program-end/.

62 Chairman’s Statement for The Second Round of Six Party Talks, February 282004, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc26.htm#01.

63 Jack Kim and Teruaki Ueno, “N. Korea Nuclear Talks Plagued by Contra-dictions,” The Washington Post, February 27 2004.

64 Jack Kim and John Ruwitch, “US Must Back Down on Nuclear Demands, NKorea Says,” The Washington Post, May 14 2004.

65 David E. Sanger, “Behind Bush step lies Asian Pressure,” International HeraldTribune, June 25 2004.

66 Jonathan Marcus, “Bush’s Pyongyang policy ‘futile,’” BBC News, June 22 2004http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3831231.stm.

67 Ryu Jin, “US N Korea Raise Hope for Breakthrough,” The Korea Times, 24 June2004; “US offers incentives for NKorea to Freeze, Scrap Nukes,”Nikkei, June 24 2004.

68 “Japan offers to give Energy aid if N Korea nuke Freeze confirmed,” Nikkei, June24 2004.

69 David E. Sanger, “Behind Bush step lies Asian Pressure,” International HeraldTribune, June 25 2004.

70 Joseph Kahn, “US makes overture to North Koreans,” International Herald Tri-bune, June 24 2004.

71 Ryu Jin, “US N Korea Raise Hope for Breakthrough,” The Korea Times, June 242004.

72 “North Korea: H.E. Mr. Choe Su Hon, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, September 27” in “UN General Assem-bly General Debate, September 21–September 30, 2004: Excerpts on Disarma-ment, Non-Proliferation the Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0409/doc22.htm#dprk.

73 “Threat Reveals N. Korea power Struggle,” The Japan Times, June 27 2004.74 Ryu Jin, “AP Reports on NK Threat creates [sic] Stir,” The Korea Times, June 25

2004.75 “Pyongyang’s Deceptiveness: Show sincere attitude to end nuclear standoff,” The

Korea Times, November 15 2004.76 Masayuki Kitano, “US Says N Korea Miscalculating by stalling on Talks,” The

Washington Post October 12 2004.77 Joo Sang–min, “NK Preoccupied with controlling regime: experts,” The Korea

Herald, November 17 2004.78 In the reshuffle three of the 22 bureaus of the Central Control Committee Secre-

tariat were eliminated and Secretariat staff were reassigned to other duties.Soyoung Kwon, Glyn Ford, “Foggy North Korean Shuffle,” The Japan TimesJanuary 28 2005.

79 Teruaki Ueno, “North Korea crumbling under reforms,” The Japan Times,March 26 2005.

80 “N Korea rolls back economic reforms,” The Japan Times, October 5 2005.

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81 Kim Sue-young, “Kim Jong-il’s Brother-in-law Plays Bigger Role in N. Korea:Report,” The Korea Times, November 9 2008.

82 Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Declares Itself a Nuclear Power,” The WashingtonPost, February 10 2005.

83 “N Korea Official admits Pyongyang has nuclear Arms: US Congressman,”Nikkei, January 28 2005.

84 Choe added that “The nuclear deterrent of the DPRK constitutes a legitimateself-defensive means to counter ever-growing US nuclear threat and aggressionagainst the DPRK and reliably defend sovereignty, peace and security of thecountry.” See “North Korea: H.E. Mr. Choe Su Hon, Deputy Minister for For-eign Affairs, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, September 27” in “UNGeneral Assembly General Debate, September 21–September 30, 2004: Excerptson Disarmament, Non-Proliferation The Acronym Institute www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0409/doc22.htm#dprk.

85 “N. Korea claims it has nuclear weapons,” The Japan Times, September 30 2004.86 David Sanger and William J. Broad, “N. Korea said to expand Arms drive,”

International Herald Tribune, December 7 2004.87 “North Korea Wants comprehensive Arms Talks-Yonhap,” The Washington Post,

March 31 2005.88 “Make the Mood make for peace on the Peninsula,” Hankyorae, February 12

2005. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/10183.html.89 “North Korea not yet a nuclear Weapons State: Seoul,” The Washington Post,

February 13 2005.90 Lee Joo-hee, “Government, Uri oppose UN option on N Korea,” The Korea

Herald, April 21 2005.91 Joseph E. DeTrani, “Six Party Talks and China’s role as an intermediary in the

process,” US Department of State, March 10 2005, www.state.gov/p/rls/rm/2005/42347.htm.

92 Glenn Kessler, “China Rejected US suggestion to cut off Oil to pressure NorthKorea,” The Washington Post, May 7 2005.

93 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese rule out sanctions on North Korea,” International HeraldTribune, May 11 2005.

94 “Seoul Drives North’s Diplomatic Engagement,” The Japan Times July 27 2005.95 Lee Joo-hee, “7 Point economic aid offer to NK devised by Seoul,” The Korea

Herald, June 29 2005.96 Ryu Jin, “Koreas agree on Nuclear Free Peninsula,” The Korea Times, June 32

2005.97 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald May 28 2008.98 Interview with Charles Pritchard, Stockholm August 24 2011.99 “Focus on N Korea Response as 6 way talks enter 10th day,” Nikkei, August 4

2005.100 “China Mediates between US, North Korea as talks reach critical stage,” Nikkei,

August 3 2005.101 Lee Joo-hee and Kim Man-Yong,” US, China Show off newfound Partnership at

Six party Talks,” The Korea Herald, August 5 2005.102 Edward Cody, “North Korea Nuclear Talks Adjourn Without Agreement,” The

Washington Post, August 7 2005.103 Bill Sammon “Seoul Nuke stance blindsides US,” The Washington Times, August

13 2005.104 “NK Energy Aid May Top $12 Bil.” The Korea Times, September 22 2005.105 Reuben Staines, “S Korea, US Feud Over NK Nukes,” The Korea Times, August

12 2005.106 “NK appears willing to drop nuclear programs, Ban says,” The Korea Herald,

August 23 2005.

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107 Lee Joo-hee, “Ban: NK Peace Treaty after Six Party Talks,” The Korea Herald,August 22 2005.

108 Larry A. Niksch “The Six Party Statement: Is it a Viable Roadmap or a Road toNowhere?” in Larry A. Niksch, Jong Chul Park et al., Implementing the Six PartyJoint Statement and the Korean Peninsula, The Korea Institute for National Uni-fication, Seoul 2005, pp. 16–21.

109 “NK appears willing to drop nuclear programs, Ban says,” The Korea Herald,August 23 2005.

110 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korean Draft Pact Suggests Big Shift By US,” Interna-tional Herald Tribune, September 21 2005.

111 Remarks by Derek Mitchell of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,Washington DC, “S. Korea Pushed US to Give Into NK,” The Korea Times,September 29 2005.

112 Joseph Kahn, “North Korea says it will abandon Nuclear efforts,” The New YorkTimes, September 19 2005.

113 “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks Beijing,” September19 2005, US Department of State, September 19 2005. Also: Full Text of JointStatement of 6-Way Nuke Talks,” Nikkei, September 19 2005.

114 “North Korea Agrees to Abandon its nuclear Weapons Program,” US Depart-ment of State, September 19 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/utils/printpage.html.

115 N Korea backtracks on nuke deal,” The Japan Times, September 21 2005.116 Lee Joo-hee, U.S. holds contacts with North Korea; For discussions about Nov.

six-way talks The Korea Herald October 6 2005.117 Annie I. Bang, “Two Koreas make substantial progress,” The Korea Herald,

December 26 2005.118 Editorial, “Real task begins now” The Korea Herald, September 21 2005.119 “NK Demand for Reactor Is Nonstarter,” The Korea Times September 16 2005.120 Larry A. Niksch “The Six Party Statement,” pp. 16, 18, 21.121 “US Prepared to Discuss Light-Water Reactor: Rice,” The Korea Times, Sep-

tember 22 2005.122 Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, “US-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key

Points Open,” The New York Times, September 20 2005.123 “North Korea Agrees to Abandon its nuclear Weapons Program,” US Depart-

ment of State, September 19 2005 http://usinfo.state.gov/utils/printpage.html.124 N Korea backtracks on nuke deal,” The Japan Times, September 21 2005.125 “Japan gives Guarded welcome to Joint 6-Party Statement,” Nikkei, September

19 2005; “North’s Demand for reactors before disarmament unacceptable:Japan,” Nikkei, September 20 2005.

126 “US Prepared to Discuss Light-Water Reactor: Rice,” The Korea Times, Sep-tember 22 2005.

127 Lee Joo-hee, “US, NK hold different stances on light water reactor issue,” TheKorea Herald, September 21 2005.

128 “US Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill on the Six Party Talks on NorthKorea’s nuclear programme, October 6, 2005,” Disarmament Documentation, TheAcronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/docs/0510/doc07.htm.

129 ‘The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of itsnuclear deterrent before providing LWRs’, North Korea on the Six Party Talks,September 20, 2005,” Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK, The AcronymInstitute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0509/doc05.htm.

130 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” CongressionalResearch Service, October 5 2006, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf.

131 Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, “US-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves KeyPoints Open,” The New York Times, September 20 2005.

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132 “The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of itsnuclear deterrent before providing the LWRs?” See “North Korea on the SixParty Talks, September 20, 2005,” Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK,The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0509/doc05.htm.

133 “US Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill on the Six Party Talks on NorthKorea’s nuclear programme, October 6, 2005,” Disarmament Documentation, TheAcronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/docs/0510/doc07.htm.

134 James Brooke, “North Korea Ready for Talks, U.S. Envoy Says,” The New YorkTimes October 21 2005.

135 Cameron McLauchlan, ‘DPRK won’t set conditions on 6-way talks’ The DailyYomiuri, October 22, 2005.

136 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Upbeat After Talks With North Korea,” The New YorkTimes, October 31 2005.

137 “NK, China fortify economic ties,” The Korea Times, October 30 2005.138 Lee Joo-hee, “U.S. holds contacts with North Korea; For discussions about Nov.

six-way talks,” The Korea Herald October 6 2005.139 Lee Joo-hee, “U.S. holds contacts with North Korea; For discussions about Nov.

six-way talks,” The Korea Herald October 6 2005.140 Choe Sang-hun, “N. Korea talks to end of US sanctions,” International Herald

Tribune, December 6 2005.141 “Disappointment in Beijing,” The Japan Times November 17 2005.142 June Victor Cha and Chris Hoffmeister, “North Korea’s Drug Habit,” The New

York Times, June 3 2004.143 Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” The New York Times, July 23 2006.144 Dianne E. Rennack “North Korea Economic Sanctions,” CRS Report for Con-

gress, updated October 17 2006 http://wayback.archive-it.org/1078/20080605213010/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf.

145 “Macau Bank tied to DPRK WMD projects/Funds sent from accounts to Japanin ‘02,” The Daily Yomiuri, November 4 2006.

146 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tests Said To Tie Deal On Uranium ToNorth Korea,” The New York Times, February 2 2005.

147 Dianne E. Rennack “North Korea Economic Sanctions,” CRS Report for Con-gress, updated October 17 2006 http://wayback.archive-it.org/1078/20080605213010/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf.

148 “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concernunder the US Patriot Act,” US Department of the Treasury, September 15 2005,www.treasury.gov/press-centre/press-releases/Pages/js2720.aspx.

149 Ryu Jin “Seoul, Beijing Worry Over US Sanctions,” The Korea Times, December13 2005.

150 Seo Dong-shin, “No ROK-US Discord Over NK Counterfeiting,” The KoreaTimes, December 28 2005.

151 Reuben Staines “NK, US Feuding Over Sanctions,” The Korea Times, December5, 2005.

152 Reuben Staines “NK, US Feuding Over Sanctions.”153 “Ruling Party Leaders Resigns,” The Korea Times, October 29 2005.154 Bush and Roh agreed that a nuclear armed North would not be tolerated and

that it should eliminate its nuclear program “promptly and verifiably,” Bushinsisted that LWRs would be given at the appropriate time, after the Northhad verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons program. Lee Joo-hee, “Roh,Bush press North Korea for prompt nuke dismantlement,” The Korea Herald,November 18 2005; also Ryu-jin, “Allies Agree on Korea Peace Regime,” TheKorea Times, November 17 2005; Peter Baker, Anthony Faiola, “U.S., S.Korea Find Unity Against North’s Nuclear Arms Program; President Roh,

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With China’s Leader, Had Earlier Taken Softer Line,” The Washington Post,November 17 2005.

155 David E. Sanger, “Bush and Roh Agree to Differ,” International Herald Tribune,November 17 2005.

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5 The nuclear test and the February2007 agreement

Introduction

Regarded as a triumph for Chinese mediation the September 2005 agreementseemed to portend a resolution of the nuclear issue. The details of the agree-ment were left for later negotiations which were not held because of theAmerican imposition of financial sanctions on the North. The North with-drew from the Six Party Talks and in the following year resorted to missileand nuclear tests to demonstrate that it had the capability to be treated ser-iously. The nuclear test revealed that the nuclear program was not just a bar-gaining chip for negotiations, but a step in the development of nuclearweapons that had been long planned. Because the North went ahead with thetest despite Chinese warnings it also revealed that China’s ability and will-ingness to influence the North was constrained by its relationship with it. Thenuclear test changed the situation in many ways as the US realized that itcould not rely upon China to press the North into eliminating its nuclearprogram. The US agreed to conduct direct negotiations with the North in amajor change of policy for the Bush Administration. The result was thedowngrading of the Six Party Talks as they became less important for thenegotiation of the nuclear issue.

After the September 2005 agreement

After the September 2005 agreement the North refused to return to the SixParty Talks unless the US lifted the sanctions imposed on Banco Delta Asia.Much hope was attached to Kim Jong-il’s visit to China in January 2006 inthe expectation that the Chinese would press him into returning to the talks.South Korean Vice Unification Minister Rhee Bong-jo thought that the out-look for the resumption of the talks was “very bright” and that there was adeveloping consensus among the parties involved.1 It seemed that the NorthKorean leader was seeking a way out of his economic difficulties and that theChinese would link their economic support to the North’s return to the talks.The logic was that economic reform would never succeed in the North unlessthe country was opened up to the outside world and attracted support from

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international institutions, for which a breakthrough in the Six Party Talks wasrequired. The South Koreans noted that when Kim visited China in 2002economic reforms in the North were announced in July of that year, and itseemed likely to them that the same would occur this time.2 Vice UnificationMinister Rhee thought that ‘Kim had “strongly indicated” his commitment toopening up the economy and had “reaffirmed continuous cooperation withChina to make progress in the Six Party Talks.”3

A second reason for optimism was that the Chinese had arranged a meet-ing between Chris Hill and Kim Kye-kwan in Beijing in an effort to break thedeadlock.4 This was the first time that US and North Korean representativesmet directly outside the context of the Six Party Talks, which meant that theprospects for the resumption of the talks looked encouraging. China proposedthat the talks be resumed in the second week of February otherwise themomentum for the negotiations would be lost.5 The problem was that theNorth refused to comply while the US continued with its financial sanctionswhich were creating a “sharpening divide” between China, the South and theUS.6 President Roh again attacked the US for its inflexibility over theissue, particularly as the Americans pressed for wider support from withinthe region over financial sanctions. US Treasury officials called on the Southto take punitive measures against the North which Seoul resisted.7 On Jan-uary 23 US Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for Terrorist Financing andFinancial Crimes Daniel L. Glaser called upon Korean officials in Seoul. TheUS Embassy subsequently issued a press release indicating a proximity ofpositions, which the South Koreans denied. According to The Korean Heraldthe “distrust between Seoul and Washington seems to have reached a dan-gerous level.”8 In exasperation Roh declared that the US had wrecked the2005 agreement by imposing financial sanctions on the North at the mostinopportune time in the negotiations in what he thought was a “prearrangedgame.”9 He blamed the neoconservatives in the Bush administration anddeclared that if the US were to continue in this way “there will be frictionand disagreement between South Korea and the US.”10 Indeed, to the othermembers of the talks it seemed that American intransigence was againblocking progress and that the US had to be diverted from its destructivecourse. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing in March 2006 andwith his host Hu Jintao he called for greater flexibility over the financialsanctions issue. In their joint statement, they called upon the members of theSix Party Talks to engage in negotiations with a “constructive” attitude for apeaceful resolution of the dispute and for the denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula.11

The US, however, had other ideas. The Bush Administration expectedChina to assume a greater role in pressing the North to return to the talksand to use its influence to resolve the nuclear issue. Before Hu Jintao’s firstvisit to Washington over April 18–21 2006, Deputy US Secretary of StateRobert Zoellick told the press that China should play a “more assertive role”in breaking the deadlock in the Six Party Talks. He declared that China

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should be more than a mediator and should become a participant in theprocess of reaching a resolution of the issue. “They need to be a participantthat recognizes that they have an interest in trying to solve this problem andthis relates to the nuclear issue.”12 President Bush once again expected Chinato use its leverage over the North as the chief supplier of food and energy tothe regime. The Chinese President, however, reiterated his call for greaterflexibility from both the U.S. and the North.13 American officials had variousinterpretations of Chinese behavior and why Beijing would not press theNorth over the nuclear issue in the way they wanted. One view, which wasevident in US intelligence circles, was that China was indulging in duplicity,saying one thing to the North and another to the US to be on the best termswith both. According to this view China promoted the North against the USas part of its strategy of meeting the American military threat in NortheastAsia while remaining on good terms with the US which it could not afford toalienate. The Bush Administration acted, however, on the basis that it was notin China’s interest to have the nuclear issue unresolved, and that it had acommon interest with the US.14 Nonetheless, this left open the question as towhy the Chinese could not use their leverage on the North. Time and timeagain, the Bush Administration had appealed to the Chinese to use theirinfluence with the North to bring about a more favorable outcome to thetalks and on every occasion the Chinese response was much the same—it istoo difficult, pressure on the North will not work, and patience is required todeal with it. Two events occurred in 2006 which provided a clearer insightinto the Chinese relationship with the North and why it could not influencethe regime.

Ballistic missile tests

On July 5 2006 the North launched seven missiles, two Nodong-2 missileswith a maximum range up to 2,000 kilometers, one Scud C with a range upto 550 kilometers and one three-stage Taepodong-2 (known in North Koreaas Paektusan-2) intercontinental missile with an estimated range up to 6,000kilometers; it was unclear whether the other three missiles were Scuds orNodongs. Two Taepodong-2 missiles were transported and assembled at thesite which gave rise to reports that two were launched; in fact the second wasnot launched.15 Preparations had been detected by the US since late May asthe liquid fueled Nodongs and the Taepodong were transported to the sites,loaded onto their launch pads and fueled from large tanks; the launches wereinitially predicted for 18–19 June but were delayed, apparently for technicalreasons.16 Six missiles were launched from the Kitaeryong missile base over afour hour period while the Taepodong was launched from another site inMusudan-ri in North Hamkyong province.17 The Nodongs and Scuds fellinto a designated sea zone 300–400 kilometers northeast from Kitaeryongwhich is on the northeastern coast. Less than 500 kilometers from the launchsite the Taepodong exploded 40 seconds after launching.18 The US claimed

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that the launching was detected by American early warning satellites withinseconds and that all seven missiles were tracked.19 Some Americans wereimpressed with the progress the North had made in developing its missilecapability. Commander of US troops in the South, General Burwell Bell toldthe US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that the North’ssolid fueled short range missiles had improved and were a “quantum leapforward’ from its previous capabilities. He thought that the North was devel-oping the technological capacity to develop ballistic missiles that could reachthe US mainland.20 The July test of the Taepodong, however, was regarded as“inept” and revealed that the North had not been able to overcome the tech-nical problems in constructing a long-range missile. To increase the range ofthe Taepodong, North Korean engineers had weakened its structure andreduced its weight which made it liable to break up in flight.21

The North declared that the missile tests were intended to test its capacityfor self defense, and were an “exercise of a legitimate right as a sovereignstate.” After the test of the Taepodong-1 on August 31 1998, the North hadagreed to a moratorium on missile tests in negotiations with the Americans inSeptember 1999. It now announced that it was not bound by past morator-iums because the US and Japan had broken their agreements with theNorth.22 What was the North’s motive? One view was that the North wantedto signal to the US that it would repudiate the Six Party Talks unless itchanged its “hostile policy” toward it. Another was that Kim Jong-il wantedto demonstrate “xenophobic defiance” to show that would not yield to pres-sure or persuasion.23 The North Korean leader was adept at resorting tounpredictability as a tactic to shock his adversaries and supporters alike intogreater indulgence of his behavior. To some, it revealed a “frightening suicidalmentality” which would not hesitate to resort to WMD in order to create thedesired shock effect.24 Others saw a more practical purpose in that the Northwanted to press the Americans into bilateral talks over the nuclear issue.25

President Bush rejected the idea of bilateral talks with the North and declaredthat if that was Kim Jong-il’s aim “he blew it.”26 Governor of New Mexicoand a former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson, who had visitedPyongyang the previous October, claimed that missile tests were a protestagainst the American crackdown on BDA. This was, he claimed, a “majorfactor” contributing to Kim Jong-il’s posturing.27 Most likely the shock effectof the action was intended to knock off balance not only the US, but Chinawhich had been pressing the North to return to the talks.

China suffered the embarrassment of seeing the North ignore it whichraised questions about the nature of their relationship. US Deputy AssistantSecretary of State Thomas Christensen claimed that China had taken“unprecedented” actions to convey its apprehensions to the North over themissile tests.28 Earlier on 28 June, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had calledupon the North to stop the test launch, an appeal which was “unprece-dented” for the Chinese leadership since it had never before reacted in thisway, even when the North withdrew from the NPT. Chinese scholar Zhu

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Feng wrote that China was “deeply frustrated” by the North which had dis-played contempt for China’s security interests in Northeast Asia. Of mostconcern to China was the impact of the missile launch upon both Japan andthe US. The test launch of the Taepodong 1 in August 1998 resulted inJapan’s development of anti-missile defenses with close US support andencouragement. This new action by the North promised to bring Japan andthe US even closer in terms of security cooperation in the Western Pacific.Japan would accelerate its military modernization program with the resultthat China’s position in Northeast Asia would become more difficult.29

It is commonly assumed that a great power is able to influence and whennecessary control its smaller ally, and it was expected that China would bringNorth Korea into line. However, the North’s relationship with China was acase of small power manipulation of a great power. North Korea understoodthat Beijing would not be willing to resort to punitive measures against it, andthat it was effectively prevented from acting against it by its own interestson the Korean Peninsula. While the North was seen as China’s strategicbuffer against the US and Japan in Northeast Asia, Beijing would be mostloath to take action against it. Kim Jong-il had tested the relationship withChina in various ways by refusing to join the Six Party Talks, withdrawingfrom the NPT and acting obstructively in general, while China had held itshand. China resisted American entreaties to press the North and continued tosupport it with fuel and grain deliveries. China had used pressure against theNorth in February 2003 to get it to join the Three Party Talks but this wasdone ambiguously. An oil pipeline to the North was turned off for three dayswith the Chinese citing technical reasons and denying that this was intendedas pressure. Since that time there were no similar instances pointing to Chi-nese reluctance to resort to open pressure against the North. Kim Jong-il haddiscovered in this way that the North had leverage over China because of itsstrategic value, and also because of the Chinese fear that the collapse of hisregime would have unpredictable consequences for the Korean Peninsula. TheChinese feared that in the event of a regime collapse not only would therebe a flood of refugees from the North but that they could lose their positionon the Peninsula to South Korea and the US, which would move in rapidly torestore order. Paradoxically, the greater the economic difficulties and the moredire the predictions about the future of the regime, the more the Chinese wereobliged to support the North.

China was also constrained by another factor in its relationship with theNorth. The Chinese were wary about the North’s ultimate objective in thenegotiations in the Six Party Talks, and although they wanted the US andthe North to resolve their differences in a way which would stabilize theKorean Peninsula, they did not want that relationship to go too far. Onoccasion, the North Koreans presented themselves to the Americans as ameans of counterbalancing China. This was their supposed attraction to theUS and an incentive for the Americans to agree to a special deal with Pyongyangover the nuclear issue. American tolerance of India’s nuclear weapons

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program was illustrative. The Bush Administration had ignored India’s refu-sal to sign the NPT when it concluded the Civil Nuclear Agreement with it inJuly 2005 because of its geopolitical value to the US, particularly in relationto China. Similarly, the North characterized itself in terms of geopoliticalvalue and an asset for the US in Northeast Asia. When Kim Kye-kwan metHenry Kissinger in March 2007, he asked him whether the US was interestedin “strategic relations” with North Korea to counterbalance China.30 TheNorth Koreans had intimated to the Chinese that they could embrace theUnited States if China were to exert pressure against it. Zhu Feng wrote thatPyongyang probably believed it held a ‘trump card’ over Beijing for thisreason.31 For the Americans, a close relationship with Pyongyang was absurd.The Chinese, however, would recall how close Clinton came to visiting Pyon-gyang in late 2000, and there was no way of knowing what would happen inthe fluid and unpredictable world of Washington politics.

If ever there was an opportunity for China to vent its anger against theNorth, it was after the missile tests when it could have joined the US in con-demnation. Thomas Christensen thought that China had now realized that itsown interests were aligned with the stakeholders meaning the US, but therewas always a good deal of wishful thinking in American public statementsabout China.32 Beijing avoided siding with the US over the issue and con-tinued to maintain a balance in its policy between the North and the US. Theimmediate effect of the missile launchings was that Japan and the US turnedtowards the UN to seek a toughly worded resolution against the North. TheJapanese Ambassador to the UN, Kenzo Oshima, submitted a draft resolu-tion to the Security Council, sponsored by Britain, France and the US.Drawn up under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which dealt with threats tointernational peace and security, it included a number of contentious mea-sures calling for an end to all ballistic missile development and the prohibi-tion of all financial support relating to ballistic missile development andpurchases of ballistic missiles from the North.33 The US representative JohnBolton declared that the North’s provocative missile tests demanded a Chap-ter VII resolution under articles 41 and 42 which would entail a number offorceful options including economic sanctions, sea blockade and armed force.President Bush telephoned Hu Jintao and Putin and called on SecurityCouncil members to send a unified message to the North.34 The North,however, insisted that it had a sovereign right to test ballistic missiles and thatthere was no international law or international agreement against it. Accord-ing to strict legality, the North was correct but the circumstances of thesituation and the fears of the neighboring states overrode a concern for legalliteralism.

The Security Council spent two days in emergency session. The Chineserepresentative, Wang Guangya, opposed the Japanese draft claiming that itmight have “negative reactions in the region.” Behind closed doors Wang wasquite forceful on the issue and told reporters afterward that “If this resolutionis put to vote, there will be no unity in the Security Council.” Wang explained

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that he had instructions from his government to veto the Japanese draft ifnecessary because it would prevent a Chinese diplomatic mission in Pyon-gyang from negotiating the revival of the Six Party Talks.35 The Russianrepresentative Vitaly Churkin, was very subdued over the issue, and left it tothe Chinese to argue for a non binding statement from the President of theSecurity Council instead of a resolution. Such a statement would urgecountries voluntarily to impose a ban on trade in ballistic missiles and relatedtechnology to North Korea.36 The South Koreans were similarly disturbed bythe Japanese draft which included measures that would be taken againstcountries committing serious terrorist or illegal military activities. They werealso alarmed by the discussion in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency for pre-emptive action against the North, as Japan struggled with a way to respond tothe North’s missile threat.37

In a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement the Japanese draft was called an“overreaction” to the North’s missile tests. It said that reviving the Six PartyTalks was more important than punishing the North and that this should bethe main objective. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yi said that “wethink the response should not be an overreaction that would furtherintensify the problem. We think all measures should be conducive to resolu-tion of the situation through dialogue.”38 China and Russia withdrew thedemand for a non binding statement and circulated their own draft resolutionin the Security Council to head off the Japanese draft which was gatheringsupport. The China–Russia draft expressed “serious concern” over the missilelaunches and said that they had “a negative effect on the peace and stability”of East Asia; it avoided mention of Chapter VII and called upon UN mem-bers voluntarily to ban the trade in ballistic missiles and related technology toNorth Korea; it also urged the North to return to the Six Party Talks withoutpreconditions.39 China also demanded that US Treasury financial sanctionsbe lifted if the talks were to resume but the US, at this stage, had no suchinclination. Chris Hill declared that the sanctions would not be eased until theNorth dismantled its nuclear weapons program and ended its and long-rangeballistic missile program, a demand not raised by the US before.40

UN Security Council Resolution 8778 of July 15 2006 was the result ofthese discussions. The resolution adopted exhortatory language and nothingwas binding or mandatory for UN member states. It condemned the missilelaunches, demanded that all related activities be suspended, and stronglyurged the North to return to the Six Party Talks. Member states wererequired to “exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items”from being transferred to the North.41 Both China and Russia praised theoutcome. Wang Guangya said that that China had adopted a “responsibleattitude” and “firmly opposed” a draft resolution that would have aggravatedthe situation and “created enormous obstacles for the Six Party Talks andother important diplomatic endeavours.” Vitaly Churkin noted that the reso-lution was a “compromise” and “confirmed that the Council was able to reacteffectively and in a spirit of unity to complex international challenges.”42 But

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what kind of compromise was it? Mandatory language was different fromhortative appeals for cooperation that could be safely ignored, and the crossover from one to the other is not a compromise but a fundamental change.The Korea Times thought that the international community had acted prop-erly by condemning the North’s “adventurism” and opined that sanctionswere sure to follow.43 John Bolton said that the resolution included “firm,clear unambiguous action” when it was anything but that.44 Bolton was beinguncharacteristically diplomatic about an issue he felt passionate about for aparticular reason. The Americans were caught in their habitual dilemma inmanaging relations with China. They had to praise and encourage the Chi-nese to act out their role as mediator in the Six Party Talks because only theChinese had access to the North, and only they could cajole or otherwisepress the North back into the talks. Chinese involvement in this way ensuredthat the US did not have to engage the North in bilateral negotiations whichthe Bush Administration had opposed. American public statements masked adeep frustration with the Chinese and their unwillingness to use their leveragewith the North. They were intended to encourage China to continue with itsmediation efforts in the talks and to push them along. The Resolution fellshort of what the Americans had wanted but they expected the Chinese tomove rapidly to the next step and convene the Six Party Talks.

Nuclear test

After the ballistic missile tests it became clearer that the North was preparingfor a nuclear test. It declared that it had nuclear weapons on February 102005, and on May 11 the North claimed it had removed 8,000 spent fuel rodsfrom the Yongbyon reactor to bolster its nuclear arsenal. Satellite photosindicated that the North had removed and repacked earth in an undergroundtunnel in a remote location at Kilju which could have been preparation for anuclear test. On the other hand it could have been bluff. According to nuclearspecialists, storing, cooling and reprocessing the fuel rods would take at least18 months so that the North would not be ready for a test until later in 2006.In this they were correct.45 The Japanese were disturbed by the North’s pre-parations and two leading politicians from the Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ) Yoshito Sengoku and Seiji Maehara, travelled to Beijing to obtainChinese assurances against a North Korean nuclear test. They met WangJiarui, who was head of the Party’s International Department, and who toldthem that “If such a thing happens, China will react strongly through diplo-matic routes,” and that “there is no country that does not oppose NorthKorea’s nuclear tests.”46

Speculation about the prospect of a North Korean nuclear test continued inthat month when on 19 May the US Senate Republican Policy Committeepublished a short paper entitled “Anticipating a North Korean Nuclear Test:What’s to Be Done to Avert a Further Crisis.” The Republican Committeewas concerned about the impact upon Japan and the pressure on that country

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to go nuclear in response. The policy paper advised Washington to persuadethe Chinese to press the North to desist. Dan Fata, the Republican Partypolicy director for national security and trade, declared that “the key to pre-venting a nuclear test lies primarily with China,” and indeed many hopeswere pinned on the Chinese.47 According to Japanese reports, the Chinesenotified the North that a nuclear test would be a “diplomatic red line” andwould not be tolerated, which raised the prospect of China’s acceptance ofsanctions.48 In September 2006, prominent Japanese politician and LiberalDemocratic Party elder Taku Yamasaki met Xiong Guangkai, president ofthe Institute of Strategic Studies and a former deputy head of the PLA gen-eral staff. Xiong told him that China was “absolutely” against a nuclear testby the North which would, he claimed, destroy the Six Party Talks.49 WangGuangya warned the North Koreans that if they went ahead with a nucleartest “they have to realize that they will face serious consequences.”50

At 10:36 p.m. local time on October 9 2006 the North conducted its firstnuclear test in Hamgyong province. North Korea gave China one hoursnotice of the test, though some Russian reports say the Chinese only hadtwenty minutes notice. The Chinese then contacted the US Embassy in Beij-ing which quickly informed Washington.51 Most reports indicated a subkiloton test with a yield considerably less than the 22-kiloton yield of theatomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The Korean Earthquake ResearchCentre in Seoul reported a 3.58 magnitude tremor from the test area or ayield of 0.8 of a kiloton of TNT: American reports from the Los AlamosNational Laboratory and Columbia University estimated a yield between of0.4 and 2 kilotons, with a 90–95 percent chance that it was below 1 kiloton.52

Only the Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov estimated a higher yield of5–15 kilotons.53 Initially US intelligence agencies thought that the North wasengaged in a bluff since low seismic readings indicated the possibility of a nonnuclear test.54 Several hundred tons of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil(ANFO), a high explosive mixture used in the Oklahoma city bombing in1995, could have had the same effect when exploded in a mountain tunnel.Later, however, US military WC-135 aircraft flying off the coast of NorthKorea detected signs of radiation, and confirmed that it was a nuclear test,and that the fuel was plutonium.55 The question was why was the yield sosmall? One persuasive explanation was that the test was a fizzle or a plutoniumdevice that failed to detonate correctly. After all North Korea had told theChinese that a 4-kiloton test was on the way but it only achieved a sub-kilotonblast.56

US intelligence agencies later claimed that the test was a result of a partialimplosion of plutonium, which was not compressed sufficiently and instanta-neously to trigger the required explosion. They also thought that the test hadbeen conducted in a horizontal tunnel with a vertical drop at the end, whichwould reduce the chance of radiation leaking into the air.57 This wouldexplain why the initial reports doubted that the test was nuclear. A secondexplanation was that the North had deliberately tested a low yield or

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miniaturized device which could be used as a warhead on its ballistic missiles.If the North aimed for a yield of considerably less than the Hiroshima bombthis may have been the intention.58 US officials were concerned that theNorth may have obtained small warhead designs from the A.Q. Khan net-work, and that Iran and Libya may have obtained similar designs.59 None-theless, it was unlikely that the North had developed the technology tominiaturize a nuclear device or that it could leap to the stage of testing aminiature device with its existing nuclear technology.

Banners were unveiled in Pyongyang and crowds gathered to celebrateNorth Korea’s arrival as a nuclear state-a matter of great pride for the regime.The nuclear test was proclaimed as a symbol of juche, the regime’s ideology ofself reliance, which would be used to strengthen regime credibility againstdomestic discontent that had surfaced as a result of economic failures.60 TheChinese, however, after assuring troubled neighbors that the nuclear testwould not occur, were disturbed. Zhang Liangui of the Party School of theParty’s Central Committee, who was one of Beijing’s top North Koreaexperts, said that the North was China’s biggest foreign policy failure in thelast 50 years.61 Zhang argued that China was the “biggest loser” from the testafter having repeatedly promised to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclearweapons and that its image as a responsible power had clearly suffered. Anuclear North Korea would impact upon the Northeast Asian security situa-tion in two possible ways, both to China’s detriment. It could have the effectof stimulating Japan and possibly South Korea and Taiwan to go nuclearthemselves, or alternatively it could prompt these countries and Japan inparticular to move closer to the US to seek American nuclear protectionagainst the North. If China had regarded the American military presence andthe alliances with Japan and the South as a threat then the North Koreannuclear test would make that threat more real.62 Zhu Feng wrote that theNorth was genuinely indifferent to China’s continuous opposition and warn-ings against its nuclear program. Beijing, he claimed, had become “fully dis-illusioned” about the North and that its policy of “nuclear appeasement” ofPyongyang should be ended.63

Chinese leaders and intelligence agencies held several crisis meetings afterthe test to assess options. Some officials called for a reduction of criticalsupplies of oil and food to the North, a policy option long advocated bycritics of China’s policy towards the North.64 Li Wen of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences advocated thisresponse but there was little support for this move amongst decision makers.65

Party conservatives, however, thought that China would benefit from anuclear North which would counterbalance the American military presence inNortheast and the US alliance with Japan.66 External observers of Chinathought that the test strengthened the position of the reformers and criticswho called for a tougher line against the North, and that China would, as aconsequence, line up with the US as a result. South Koreans noted what theyregarded as a shift of opinion in China in that the critics who were a minority

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in the past became a majority with a stronger voice after the test.67 None-theless, Zhang Liangui observed that a nuclear North Korea would demand tobe treated as a nuclear power and would adopt a tougher position in relationto China.68 China may have become critical of the North but at the same timeits influence over Pyongyang and its ability to influence the leadership hadweakened. Chinese policy towards the North was characterized by an essen-tial inertia and not even a significant event such as a nuclear test could joltthe country out of it. Zhang Liangui thought that China had to make a clear standagainst the test but he admitted that China was “cornered diplomatically.”69

It did not want to take action against the North which would strengthen theUS and Japan, nor could it simply accept the situation which would detri-mentally affect China in the way outlined above. China’s inertia before theNorth led some US officials like John Bolton to believe that the Chinese weresecretly protecting the North while claiming to cooperate with the US.70

Japanese officials had similar feelings, and some thought that the Chinesewere not averse to a nuclear North which would be an ally against Japan.

South Korea faced a similar predicament. The Roh administration hadinsisted that trade and economics would change the North, and would weanits leaders away from adventurism into a more responsible relationship withtheir brothers in the South. The test raised doubts about the wisdom of thispolicy. The South Korean reaction was one of outrage. The South KoreanNational Assembly on 12 October passed a resolution condemning thenuclear test and urged the North to return to the Six Party Talks, by a mas-sive 150 to 18 vote with 16 abstentions.71 Roh convened an emergency secur-ity meeting and afterwards the president’s office issued the followingstatement; “North Korea’s action unilaterally annulled and destroyed theinter-Korean joint statement of denuclearization of the Korean peninsulaagreed between the two Koreas in 1991.”72 Reactions from the press weresimilar and Hankyorae commented that the North’s test was not aimed at theSouth but rather was a response to American financial sanctions. None-theless, it would contribute to the deterioration of the situation on the KoreanPeninsula which would directly affect the South, and could lead to a largercrisis which could be “our worst nightmare.”73 The test intensified the polar-ization of South Korean politics between the supporters of the Roh Admin-istration and its GNP critics. The father of the Sunshine Policy Kim Dae-jungsimilarly condemned the test but said that the Bush Administration wasresponsible because of its annulment of the 1994 Agreed Framework and itsrefusal to conduct bilateral negotiations with the North. The Six Party Talks,he declared, had become “futile.”74

Critical commentaries blamed the Roh Administration for its naiveté inattempting to build better relations with the North in a way which couldjeopardize the alliance with the US. Dong-A Ilbo said that the test “drove usinto the worst emergency ever since the Korean war.” The Sunshine Policypromoted by the Roh administration was seen to have “failed completely”and was pursued out of “ignorance” of the North. The September 2005

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statement issued by the Six Party Talks intended to encourage the North togive up its nuclear program “ended up in vapor.”75 Some commented that theRoh administration’s “propaganda campaign” had successfully improved theNorth’s image in South Korea to the extent that popular opinion felt that aKorean nuclear weapon would make the country strong against Japan.76

Various courses of action were discussed to deal with the new situation.Supporters of the Roh administration thought that South Korea should workwith China and Russia to ensure that that the US and Japan would not con-sider an attack on the North. Critics from the GNP demanded that SouthKorea strengthen the alliance with the US and cease attacking the Americansover their policy towards the North.

The Korea Herald predicted that China and Russia would veto a toughSecurity Council resolution so it was up to South Korea, the US and Japan to“explore individual and collective measures against the North.”77 Americanneoconservatives, however saw the test as a “clarifying event” that would endthe debate within the Bush administration and crystallize support for toughaction against the North.78 They thought it could also shock both China andRussia into supporting the American and the Japanese call for sanctions inthe Security Council. Certainly there was hope that this time, both China andRussia would come on board. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso told thepress that he expected the Security Council to reach a “unanimous decision”over the issue, and that their response would be “far more severe” than it wasin the case of the missile launchings. Japan, he said, had a Chapter VIIresponse in mind.79 President Bush contacted the other parties in the SixParty Talks and claimed that all agreed that the North’s test was a “provo-cative act” and deserved an “immediate response.” John Bolton told the pressthat Security Council members were unanimous in their disapproval of NorthKorea’s actions, and said that “no one’s defending it,” and that “no one cameeven close to defending it” in the preliminary meetings.80

Security Council Resolution

For the US the time seemed propitious to press for a Chapter VII response.The Chinese indicated their willingness to support a punitive approach if notsanctions as they were outraged by North Korea’s actions. China’s critic ofthe North Zhang Liankui declared the Six Party Talks were a colossal failureand opined that “If peaceful means can’t stop North Korea from conductinga nuclear test, then there should be other means.” The means were discussedin the Security Council with Japan proposing that trade with the Northshould be banned, and its vessels and aircraft prohibited from arriving inforeign countries. The US was initially in support of the Japanese proposalbut John Bolton wanted to exempt food, medicine and other humanitariangoods for civilians. The Chinese had a very different approach and WangGuangya insisted that sanctions should target North Korea’s ballistic missileand nuclear weapons programs, a proposal which reduced the scope of the

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discussions considerably. The Chinese also insisted that the resolution shouldexclude any possibility of force against the North, which prompted StateDepartment spokesman Sean McCormack to declare that the US had nointention of attacking North Korea, or of forcing a change of regime there.81

The US draft resolution called for a total embargo on North Korea’s armstrade including materials or technology that could be used for its nuclearprogram, financial controls as well as a ban on luxury goods. The USdemanded mandatory searches on the high seas of vessels entering and leav-ing the North’s ports and the seizure of any weapons or goods that could beused to manufacture nuclear weapons.82 The US draft included a 30-daydeadline for the North to reverse course or face further penalties. China andRussia opposed such wide and extensive measures. The Chinese delegationcalled for a response under Article 41 which listed measures short of actualarmed force, and steered the discussion away from Article 42 which includedarmed force, blockade and similar operations.83

On October 14 the Security Council finally agreed to a resolution but onlyafter the US, UK and France accomodated last minute objections by Chinaand Russia which were apprehensive that the US may consider militaryaction. Resolution 1718 called on the North to “abandon all nuclear weaponsand existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversiblemanner.” In terms of sanctions, it imposed an embargo on the supply, sale ortransfer to the North of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artil-lery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missilesystems. The US wanted a wider ban on the sale of conventional weapons tothe North, while both China and Russia wanted to limit it to specific weaponssystems.84 Also prohibited was the provision of large-scale arms, nucleartechnology and related equipment to North Korea as well as luxury goods.All UN member states were requested to take cooperative action to inspectcargo to and from the North in accordance with their respective nationallaws. States were also required to freeze funds, financial assets and economicresources which provide support for the North’s ballistic missile and nuclearprograms.85

The Americans were pleased that the Security Council agreed on sanctions.John Bolton said that “today we are sending a strong and clear message toNorth Korea,” that the consequences of pursuing WMD would be serious.86

The Americans also were very concerned about the impact the resolutionwould have upon other potential proliferators, in particular Iran. John Boltonstressed the point when he said that “I’m sure they’re watching in Tehranwhat we do on this North Korea resolution and I hope they watch closely.”87

Russia’s Vitaly Churkin said that Moscow was pleased with a “strong” reso-lution which would prevent the further escalation of tensions.88 The Resolu-tion had great publicity value in showing that the Security Council couldexpress an opinion in a critical situation which Bolton described as one of thegravest threats to international peace and security that the Council had toface. The Resolution prohibited the supply or sale of goods or technology

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which could enhance the North’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs butthe means to do so were left voluntary and dependent upon the laws of eachcountry. Unless the resolution was made mandatory and binding it would beobserved by some states, circumvented and ignored by others and there wouldbe no end of difficulty. Wang Guangya added his comment to the SecurityCouncil resolution that China “did not approve” of the practice of inspectingcargo to and from the North and urged the countries concerned to refrainfrom taking any provocative steps.89 Subsequent reports of Wang Guangya’scomments on inspections were more assertive: The New York Times claimedthat he said that China would not conduct searches at sea, would not stop shipsand board them for ballistic missiles or bomb making equipment.90 TheWashington Times reported that Wang had said that the inspections of cargoand the boarding of vessels remained unacceptable to Beijing and Chinawould not carry out inspections.91 Nikkei also reported and that Chinarefused to agree to inspections on the high seas of cargos entering NorthKorean ports.92 Moreover, the Chinese regarded the ban on luxury goods asunenforceable because the Resolution did not provide a definition of whatwas meant.93 The Japanese were disappointed by the Resolution as they sawdifferences emerge over its implementation. Kenzo Oshima declared thatJapan would impose its own sanctions on the North which included a prohi-bition on North Korean vessels from entering Japanese ports, the banning ofimports from the North and entry by North Korean nationals into Japan.94

Would it have been possible to prevent the nuclear test? One argument wasthat the test represented a failure of the Bush Administration’s policy and thatif it had not imposed financial sanctions, the September 2005 agreement couldhave served as a basis for a resolution of the issue. However, the North’spreparations for a test began well before that date as its nuclear program hadbeen under development for over two decades. An agreement in 2005 wouldnot have settled the issue since details and schedules had to be negotiated insubsequent meetings. In the meantime, the nuclear program would have beendeveloping and the North would have had time to confront the world with anuclear fait accompli. Another question is whether China facilitated thedevelopment of the North’s nuclear program and made the test possible bybeing exceptionally tolerant of Pyongyang’s behavior. Had the Chinese agreedto a tougher resolution in July in response to the North’s missile tests, perhapsit would have hesitated to go ahead with the nuclear test in October. Whilethe Chinese had made it one of their objectives on the Korean Peninsula toprevent the development of nuclear weapons by the North, their refusal toconsider tough action against it defeated their purpose. The test was indeed afailure of Chinese diplomacy which Beijing was loath to admit. The Northlearned that it could exploit Beijing’s tolerance and that it could rely onChina’s veto in the Security Council to protect it against the US and Japan.In any case the end result was a change in the game plan of the Six PartyTalks as the North would now demand that it be treated as a nuclear powerand an equal of the US. The Chinese claimed that they had wrested a pledge

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from the North not to conduct a second nuclear test and intimated to othersthat the North had expressed regret for the first test, but did not apologize.95

Since the first nuclear test was only a partial success, it was very likely that theNorth would conduct another test to overcome the technical problems. TheNorth could readily rely upon Chinese support and the two UN resolutionsshowed in any case that there were no real penalties for defying Beijing.

Condoleezza Rice and John Bolton said that China should shoulder themain responsibility of enforcing sanctions and without China’s cooperationsanctions would be ineffective.96 What could be expected of China when itsviews on sanctions were well known? The Americans thought that as thenuclear test was a humiliation for China, it would be prompted to side withthe US, and that the UN resolution would be a convenient cover for China toact against the North by enforcing sanctions. The four state-owned Chinesebanks froze their North Korean accounts and financial transactions. TheChinese Central Bank regulator Liu Lianke affirmed that China was coop-erating with the UN sanctions to block illicit bank transactions with theNorth.97 Nonetheless, trade continued as normal across the Chinese–NorthKorean border without inspections of cargo entering or leaving the North,although there were reports of inspections by the Chinese at the Border townof Dandong.98 Condoleezza Rice met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovto obtain Russia’s cooperation in this task but found the Russians reluctant.Russia had an 18-kilometer border with the North and goods were trans-ported through the border town of Hasan where inspections of cargo were notimplemented.99 The Americans had hoped to deal with the North through theProliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which was created by the US in May2003 to stop the trafficking of technology and materials related to WMD. Inthe American view the PSI could be a more effective mechanism than UNsanctions for interdicting shipments of WMD material if its membership wereexpanded. The problem was that any effort to enforce sanctions againstNorth Korea would require China’s cooperation and China was opposed tothe PSI. Even South Korea dithered over joining the PSI and did so onlyunder a GNP president in May 2009.

The Roh Administration was caught in a difficult dilemma again as the USexpected South Korea to enforce the UN Resolution as an ally, while its ownpolicies demanded that it make every effort to reach out to the North. TheSouth’s economic projects with the North came under fire as Chris Hill, withsome irritation, declared on October 18 that they were designed to fund theNorth’s nuclear weapons development.100 In response, the South Koreangovernment countered that there was no evidence that these funds went intothe nuclear program but the suspicions were strong. GNP lawmaker ChoiKyoung-hwan had the figures and he declared that $3.7 billion had been sentto North Korea since 1998 as income from the Gaesong industrial and Mt.Geumgang projects; in addition there was the $480 million payment for the2000 summit and $7.22 million in payment as salaries to North Koreanworkers between 2003 and August 2005.101 The Korea Herald supported the

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GNP and argued that there was no sense in continuing humanitarian andeconomic aid to the North after the nuclear test.102 Despite the attacks on theprojects, they were in no danger of being terminated as they were the South’sonly major connection with the North and if anything, the hope was that theywould be expanded in future years. They were supported by the Uri partychairman Kim Geun-tae and both the MOFA and the Unification Ministryinsisted that the economic projects were not specifically covered by the UNresolution and would continue.103 Powerful business interests were involved asHyundai took advantage of cheap North Korean labor for the production ofgoods that were becoming too expensive to produce in the South. The Rohadministration could not just ignore the UN resolution so it announced thateconomic projects would continue, but with “improvements” that were notexplained. The National Security Advisor Song Min-soon said that Seoul wasstill reviewing the appropriate level of participation in the UN resolution, andthat adjustments to the projects would be made at the operational level.104

Soon afterwards on 1 November, in a move interpreted as rejection of USpressure, President Roh reshuffled his cabinet and appointed new foreign,defense unification and intelligence chiefs. All but the defense chief weresupporters his North Korea policy. Most controversial was the appointmentof Song Ming-soon as Foreign Minister since he was an outspoken critic ofthe Bush Administration and its approach to North Korea.105 Roh declaredthat despite the nuclear test, South Korea would be on friendly terms with theNorth and that “we won’t put anything above peace.”106

The Americans had seen China and Russia dilute the force of two UNresolutions relating to the North’s ballistic missile launches and its nucleartest. Resolution 8778 was simply an expression of collective outrage that theNorth could brush off. Resolution 1718 was somewhat more serious but itsimplementation was left to states that had no intention of complying, mindfulas they were about the North’s reactions. It was disingenuous of the Amer-icans to rejoice over a toothless resolution, and then to claim that the mainresponsibility for its implementation lay with China when they knew very wellthat the Chinese had no such interest. Condoleezza Rice said that she expec-ted most searches to take place at ports, and that the US would not rush tointerdict vessels on the high seas going to North Korea.107 The Americansexpected the Chinese, Russians and the South Koreans to enforce sanctionswhile they themselves were unwilling. If the hope was that others woulddo their job for them, even though they had shown no disposition to doso themselves, then the Americans were greatly mistaken. If the hope was thatthe US could somehow press the other parties to comply with the resolu-tion on the basis of its supposed legal status then they were misled yetagain by their own expectations. A former State Department official Joel Witthought that sanctions would not force the North to change course and itwould simply weather the storm. In his view the Six Party Talks hadfailed to deal with the situation and the US had to devise a “new diplomaticstrategy.”108

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America’s options

What new diplomatic strategy could the Americans adopt? China had failedthem yet it had been the fulcrum of US policy in relation to the NorthKorean nuclear program. The Americans continually assumed that the Chi-nese shared their interest in this issue and that they would prioritize theobjective of denuclearization of the North above all else. They failed torecognize that the main Chinese priority was to prevent the Americans fromdestabilizing the situation by resorting to sanctions or force. The Six PartyTalks were an arena for this veiled contest between the US and China overwhich objective had priority in the collective deliberations. Both Americansand Chinese agreed that they had to maintain the momentum of the talkswhich became a goal in itself as no one wanted to accept responsibility fortheir failure. While the US attempted to swing the Chinese to their side andto press the North into compliance, the Chinese sought to involve the US inbilateral talks with the North, which was for them a solution to their dilemmain dealing with the North. If the US could be induced to accept bilateraltalks, the only feasible outcome would be a return to the Agreed Frameworkwhich would allow the US to proclaim victory while preserving Chineseinterests on the Peninsula and the relationship with the North. China wouldenjoy the benefits of a negotiated solution without the need to pressure theNorth which could give rise to resentment and difficulty in the relationship.Basically, the Chinese wanted the Americans to save the situation for themand their careful maneuvering was intended to put the US into a positionwhere it saw no other option.

When Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met Condoleezza Rice on 20October in the aftermath of the test, the differences in their positions becameclearer as they were moving in different directions. The Chinese wanted toappease the US by showing that they were genuinely working for the denu-clearization of the Korean Peninsula.109 State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan visitedPyongyang to press the North Koreans over the nuclear issue and told theSecretary of State that his visit was “not in vain.”110 After Rice met HuJintao, Wen Jiabao and Tang, she then declared that China had given a“strong message” to North Korea. Press reports of the meeting indicated thatthe US and China spoke in a “unified voice” to call for the resumption of SixParty Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and that China had adopted atougher approach over the issue. The Chinese intimated that they would beprepared to impose their own sanctions on the North if it continued todevelop its nuclear program, or if it refused to return to the talks. The raft ofsanctions mentioned included the reduction of oil supplies in the way theAmericans had earlier insisted.111 Why did the Chinese not consider thisbefore the nuclear test was conducted? If indeed they had resorted to atougher position over the issue well before these events had occurred, perhapsthere would have been a different outcome. Chinese intimations of toughersanctions after the event were unconvincing.

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The Chinese motive was to prevent a breakdown in the relationship withthe US over the Six Party Talks and to keep the Americans in a position ofdependency on Beijing over the Korean Peninsula. To reach their objective ofa negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue they had to keep the Americansinvolved in the talks and to restore American belief in their ability to bringabout results. Moreover, the fear that the Americans would resort to forcenever left the Chinese and they had every incentive to prevent this. Rice saidthat she intended to allay fears that the US would regard the situation asanother “Cuban missile crisis,” where the US would resort to a naval block-ade of the North.112 Despite Rice’s efforts to soothe fears the Chinese weredisturbed by reports that the Pentagon had stepped up contingency planningfor a military strike on the North after the nuclear test, which would include atomahawk cruise missile or B-2 attack on Yongbyon. US Special Forceswould conduct a joint operation with their South Korean equivalent todestroy the nuclear facilities hidden in underground facilities in the moun-tains, including the HEU program.113 The South Korean military was alsoworking on its own plans for a surgical strike on the North which wouldinvolve F-15K fighters dropping JDAM satellite guided-bombs on the nuclearfacilities, or the use of short range missiles and Cheonryong land attack cruisemissiles.114 The military option was a risky one as there was no assurance thatall targets could be located let alone destroyed. Whether the US command orthe South Koreans had accurate knowledge of the location of these nuclearfacilities including the HEU program was an open question, yet in theabsence of such intelligence, the US could only achieve the destruction ofvisible targets such as the Yongbyon reactor. Hidden nuclear facilities aboutwhich little was known would still permit the revival of a nuclear weaponsprogram. Any such plans for a military strike on the North were nonethelessconstrained by the ever present fear that the North would retaliate against theSouth in a barrage of artillery and missile firings, which would devastateSeoul and trigger another Korean war.

US concessions and moves to bilateral talks

When Rice met Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Tang Jiaxuan the Chinesedemanded that the Americans lift the financial sanctions to allow the SixParty Talks to resume, and that they conduct bilateral negotiations with the North.Rice reiterated that the North should return unconditionally to the talks andthat financial restrictions would not be lifted just to entice the North back tothe negotiations.115 Chinese demands placed the Americans in a difficultposition. The test had given the North the confidence to behave as a nuclearpower, in which case the talks would no longer focus on the termination ofthe nuclear program but on mutual nuclear reductions with the US. If the SixParty Talks resumed the North would predictably stand its ground and rejectall the demands that had been raised in previous rounds. It had tested notonly a nuclear weapon but the Chinese response and had found that China

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was unwilling to join the Americans in joint condemnation, and indeed hadprotected it against stiff sanctions in the Security Council. For the US, themove to bilateral talks with the North was fraught with grave political risksas not only had the Bush Administration consistently rejected the notion butit would be tantamount to a reward to the North. It would signal to theNorth that it obtained what it had wanted for so long by staging the provo-cative act of a nuclear test. It would confirm for the North that provocationwas a tactic by which a relatively small power could manage both China andthe US and embarrass their leaders into getting what it wanted. In this waythe North would learn that provocative acts would succeed and the necessarymeans to stage those acts in the form of ballistic missiles and nuclear weaponswould not be negotiated.

On November 1 the North agreed to return to the Six Party Talks despitethe fact that the US had not lifted the financial sanctions that it had deman-ded. The North Korean Foreign Ministry declared that it would re-join thetalks on the basis that the resolution of the financial sanctions issue would beon the agenda.116 The North had made a concession over the financial sanc-tions issue for various reasons. One was that the US had shown flexibilityover the issue as demanded by the Chinese. The US ambassador to SouthKorea Alexander Vershbow had said that the US would create a workinggroup to examine the issue of financial sanctions within the Six Party Talkswhich held out the prospect that they would in time be lifted.117 There werereports that Macau’s monetary authority was lifting the freeze on the North’saccounts which was regarded by the North as an American concession toentice it back into the talks, although this was fiercely denied at the time.118 Asecond explanation was that Chinese pressure on the North had worked andthat Pyongyang wanted to repair the relationship with Beijing by at leastacceding to its demand to return to the talks. A third explanation was raisedby Takashi Ohizumi, the Director General of Japan’s the Public SecurityIntelligence Agency, who claimed that sanctions were having a considerableimpact upon the North Korean economy and compelled it to return to thetalks.119 A fourth explanation was that the North wanted to return in triumphto the Six Party Talks as a nuclear power equal to the US and wanted toconvert them into negotiations over US nuclear protection of the South andJapan.120

The most likely explanation and one that was borne out by subsequentevents was that the North wanted the US to lift the financial sanctions andhad to return to the negotiations for this purpose. The North may have hadambitions to be recognized as a nuclear power and to transform the Six PartyTalks in the way suggested but financial sanctions were a pressing urgencywhich had to be addressed and removed. Trilateral meetings between ChrisHill, Kim Kye-kwan and Chinese officials were held in Beijing over Novem-ber 28–29 in preparation for the Six Party Talks. The Americans had shiftedfrom their previous demand for up front disablement of the North’s nuclearprogram to a freeze which was a considerable concession to the North and

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recognition of its new status. They also offered to work towards the lifting offinancial sanctions but they were unwilling to do that until the counterfeitingissue was resolved.121 The Americans were also willing to offer a writtensecurity guarantee and a detailed package of economic, food and energyassistance for the North as an incentive for it to surrender its nuclear weaponsprogram. These were to be staged so that if the North accepted the freeze andallowed inspections by the IAEA, it would be rewarded with energy, food,and economic aid. However, the Americans expected the North to demon-strate good faith by dismantling some facilities even before joining the talks.These concessions were of some embarrassment to the Bush Administrationafter it had insisted on the elimination of the nuclear program as a precondi-tion before anything else could be negotiated. Chris Hill told the press thatnegotiations were reaching a “fork in the road” but there was little to justifythis optimism.122 After a hiatus of 13 months, the Six Party Talks were heldover December 18–22 2006. The North demanded that the US lift financialsanctions before it would discuss the freeze of the nuclear weapons program.Kim Kye-kwan said that US wanted “too much” in exchange for the lifting offinancial sanctions and told the press that even this would not automaticallyresult in a freeze of the nuclear program.123 The North insisted that when“circumstances matured,” it would abandon its nuclear weapons program andalso freeze the Yongbyon reactor when “certain conditions are met.”124 Againthere were no results and resolution of the nuclear issue remained distant.

Hankyorae reported that the North’s attitude was unchanged, and that itsnegotiating strategy was based on sheer obstructionism in the expectation thatothers would give way. This time, however, the US was seen to be flexible.125

The difficulty for the Americans was that the North had achieved its ambitionand had become a nuclear power of a kind, and it was hardly motivated toaccept the proposals which were being offered which were, in any case, over-taken by events. South Korean commentaries noted that the North expectedto be recognized as a nuclear power during the Six Party Talks, and wanted totransform them into a nuclear disarmament conference involving the US.126

The North Koreans could simply hold out with Chinese tolerance and waitfor the Americans to come around to their position. The Americans hadalready indicated that they would conduct bilateral talks with the North andwere under pressure to do so from both China and South Korea.127 Chris Hillhad been meeting with Kim Kye-kwan regularly so this was not a radicalproposal. Informal meetings intended to set the agenda for the Six PartyTalks would give way to more formal bilateral meetings, the results of whichwould be endorsed by the Six Party Talks. Despite the determination of theBush administration to resist this outcome and to have the Six Party Talks asthe main negotiation forum with the North, the Americans had little alter-native. China had failed the Americans as they had misjudged its position,thinking that there was a greater commonality with Beijing than there was inreality. The Americans discovered to their chagrin that the other members ofthe Six Party Talks would line up with China fearing as they did that the

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Bush Administration would destabilize the Korean Peninsula. Their one ally,Japan, was under the leadership of the neoconservative Shinzo Abe who hadchampioned the abduction issue and already dismissed the Six Party Talks.The Daily Yomiuri declared that the Six Party Talks “served only as a tool forNorth Korea to buy time so that it could carry out a nuclear test,” and they“went round in circles and got nowhere.”128 Nonetheless, some JapaneseForeign Ministry officials persisted in seeking dialogue with the North in theway Koizumi had attempted in his visit to Pyongyang in 2002. One suchofficial was Deputy Foreign Minister Tsuneo Nishida who was, however,removed from his position and sent to Canada as Ambassador.129

The Berlin talks

By the time the US met North Korea in bilateral talks in Berlin over 16–18January 2007 the Bush Administration’s position had changed considerably.Not only could the US not rely upon China or South Korea to deal with theNorth, but heavy involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan had limitedAmerican options severely. The neoconservative tide which was so trium-phant at the initial stages of the Bush Administration was waning as thedismal results of over commitment in the war against terrorism becamemanifest. Public dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration’s wars wasexpressed in the November Congressional elections with a landmark victoryfor the Democratic Party which won both the House of Representatives andthe Senate. On December 9 2006 John Bolton resigned as US representativeto the UN and he was followed by Donald Rumsfeld on December 18.Robert Joseph, who was the last remaining neoconservative who shapedpolicy towards North Korea on a day to day basis, held out until January 242007. The way was clear for the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, whohad been previously marginalized by the neoconservatives, to follow up onthe informal talks that Chris Hill had been having with the North Koreansduring and on the side of the Six Party Talks in Beijing. Instead of accom-panying the Six Party Talks and resolving deadlocks arising from them,bilateral talks could now actually be conducted before the Six Party Talks.Direct talks between the US and North Korea would set the agenda whichwould be subsequently affirmed by the Six Party Talks, a significant develop-ment. The change of venue to Berlin was propitious, as the US and the Northhad conducted negotiations there over the ballistic missile program in 1999.This was the first occasion that the talks would include the nuclear issue onthe agenda.

In Berlin, Chris Hill told Kim Kye-kwan that if the North surrendered itsnuclear programs the US would engage in “a bilateral process” to establish “anormal relationship” with it.130 The details of the negotiations were notreleased until much later but Chris Hill raised hopes by saying that it was a“substantive discussion,” and that “the proof of the pudding will be when weall sit down together in the six-party negotiations.”131 On 17 January Condoleezza

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Rice joined Chris Hill who gave her a one page outline of the negotiations;the Secretary of State then briefed the President and the National SecurityAdvisor Steve Hadley. Bush agreed to proceed and urged her to continue withthe talks, which was official approval of the bilateral meeting with the North thathe had vowed to avoid.132 The Americans, however, insisted that this meetingdid not contradict the Administration’s refusal to hold bilateral talks with theNorth. The Secretary of State explained that “we’re not going outside the six-party framework to bilateralize our discussions with the North Koreans,” andthat “we will use bilateral contacts with the North Koreans when they are usefulto prepare for the six-party talks and we’ve done that several times before.”133

Despite its frustration with the process the US was still bound to the SixParty Talks and had to continue with them. The Americans had to be willingto reconsider their position on financial sanctions to make an agreementpossible and reports of the Berlin Talks indicated flexibility over the issue.134

After the talks US Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser methis North Korean counterpart in Beijing on January 30. The US began toreview the North’s accounts with BDA to determine which accounts werelinked to legitimate businesses and could be unfrozen. Details of the talkswere not released. But it was later revealed that the US had accepted a freezeof the Yongbyon reactor at the Berlin Talks and in exchange, would providethe North with energy and humanitarian assistance.135

The North Korean reaction was positive as the Foreign Ministry stated thatthere was “certain agreement” with the US at Berlin.136 The South was simi-larly optimistic as ForeignMinister SongMin-soon thought that the North wasshowing flexibility in response to the US proposal.137 South Korea was alsoheartened by the talks which had been conducted by US Treasury officials withthe North, and indicated that “a major hurdle” in negotiating with the Northover the nuclear program was being removed.138 The Japanese remained skep-tical however, The Yomiuri noting that while the North may obtain a partiallifting of US financial sanctions it would “flimflam” on the key issue ofdenuclearization, and would find reasons to prolong the process as it haddone in the past. According to The Yomiuri it was “obvious that Pyongyangis buying time to become a nuclear nation by fait accompli.”139 The Japaneseattempted to obtain Chinese and South Korean support to place the abduc-tion issue in the agenda for negotiations with the North, but this was rejectedby both. The outlines of the North’s negotiating position became clearer inearly February after Joel Wit had visited Pyongyang. He met Kim Kye-kwanand others and in an interview with The Yomiuri revealed that the North wasprepared to freeze activity at the Yongbyon reactor and it would acceptinspections from the IAEA. In exchange, it demanded more than 500,000tons of fuel oil annually, an American written promise to lift financial sanc-tions and its removal from the list of countries supporting international ter-rorism. It also demanded LWRs as a condition for the final surrender of thenuclear program.140 The Chinese had set February 8 as the date for the con-vening of the Six Party Talks to discuss the agreement reached between the US

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and the North. To many it seemed that the critical breakthrough had beenmade at last.

Conclusion

The North’s nuclear test revealed the limits of China’s influence over theregime. Since the talks began in 2003, it had been assumed by the Americansthat China was the pivotal player in the negotiations. They had expected thatthe Chinese would press the North into nuclear disarmament and deliverthe desired results. China’s experience with the North revealed howdependent regimes may actually entrap their supporting great powers intopositions from which they cannot escape. The North was too important forChina as an ally against the US and Japan for the relationship to be jeo-pardised and though the Chinese may have reacted in anger to the North’stests, they ensured that UN Security Council resolutions would be dilutedover the issue. The North could get away with the missile and nuclear testsbecause it understood that the Chinese were hamstrung by their need for anally and ensnared by their own strategic interests. Conspiracy theorists in theWest believed that China was deliberately encouraging the North against theUS which is why it was unwilling to take action against it. It would bemore accurate, however, to characterize the Chinese position more in termsof helplessness. In their unbounded optimism the Americans believed that theChina would come around, and in time rise to the occasion bringing a reso-lution of the kind they wanted. China’s helplessness before the North’s testswas a revelation in many senses and indicated to the Americans that if theywanted any kind of resolution of the issue, they had to deal with theNorth directly. Embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a public swingagainst the Republicans in the Congressional elections of November 2006, theBush Administration had no alternative but to do what it had sworn not to.With the resignation of several major neoconservatives in the administrationthe way was open for the moderates in the Administration to push for bilat-eral talks with the North. The alignment between Condoleezza Rice andChris Hill was most important in bringing the Administration out of a policydead-end and to open up other opportunities. This was attempted in theBerlin talks of January 2007. The significance of the move could not bemissed. The shift to bilateral talks demanded that the US drop its previousinsistence on disablement of the nuclear program before a resolution could benegotiated which was a concession of major proportions. To entice the Northinto the negotiations, the US was obliged to promise the North that thefinancial sanctions that it had imposed earlier would be lifted. Although theAmericans would not admit it this shift of position was an admission ofweakness before a North which held the trump cards. Not only did the Northhave a protector in China that could be relied upon to fend off pressureagainst it, but it had achieved nuclear status in the face of American efforts toprevent it.

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Could the September 2005 agreement have prevented the North from goingahead with the nuclear test? President Roh gave vent to the feeling that theSeptember 2005 agreement was undermined because of American financialsanctions, and that an agreement was on hand which was destroyed by theUS Treasury Department. American financial sanctions did not prevent anagreement over the nuclear program since the North’s lunge towards nuclearweapons had started much earlier. The ballistic missile and nuclear tests wereset to a long-term schedule in the North and were not tied to the fleeting andephemeral results of negotiating rounds in the Six Party Talks. It is doubtfulthat the development of the nuclear program would have been interrupted byan agreement that promised fewer benefits to the North than nuclear powerstatus. Moreover, the details of the September 2005 agreement were to benegotiated in subsequent rounds and at any stage the North could have raiseddifficulties and problems which would have held up the negotiations, providingtime for the completion of its nuclear program.

Notes1 Ryu Jin, “Seoul Upbeat Over NK Nuclear Talks,” The Korea Times, January 212006.

2 Editorial “Kim Jong-il’s China visit,” The Korea Herald January 20 2006.3 Seo Dong-shin, “Seoul Eyes Reform in North After Trip,” The Korea Times,January 20 2006.

4 Ryu Jin, “Seoul Upbeat Over NK Nuclear Talks,” The Korea Times, January 212006.

5 Ryu Jin, “China Offers Nuke Talks Next Month,” The Korea Times, January 212006.

6 Choe Sang-hun, “Roe warns US over N. Korea,” International Herald Tribune,January 25 2006.

7 Lee Tee Jong, “Roh warns of brewing conflict with US over North Korea,” TheStraits Times, January 26 2006.

8 Editorial “Seoul-Washington Rift,” The Korea Herald, January 27 2006.9 “US wrecked previous agreement with N Korea, says Roh,” The Straits Times,December 23 2006.

10 Editorial “Seoul-Washington Rift,” The Korea Herald, January 27 2006.11 “China, Russia urge flexibility on N.K. nuke: Joint statement calls for ‘con-

structive’ attitude for denuclearized Korean Peninsula,” The Korea Herald, March23 2006.

12 “N. Korea on agenda at Bush-Hu summit,” The Korea Herald, April 19 2006.13 Joseph Kahn and Christine Hauser, “China’s Leader Makes First White House

Visit,” The New York Times, April 20 2006; “A less than satisfying visit,” TheJapan Times, April 25 2006.

14 Tom Plate, “China unlikely to double-deal over Korea,” The Japan Times, May 82006.

15 “N Korea may have removed Taepodong-2 Missile from Launch site,” Nikkei,August 4 2006.

16 “N Korea may be preparing for Taeopoding-2 launch,” Nikkei, May 19 2006.“North Prepare to fire missiles,” The Japan Times, June 19 2006.

17 Bill Gertz “North Korea launches missiles,” The Washington Times, July 5 2006.18 “Taepodong Missile Exploded in Midair,” The Korea Times, July 31 2006.

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19 Bill Gertz “Missile defence tested briefly in rockets failure,” The WashingtonTimes, July 6 2006.

20 “North Korea missiles take ‘leap forward,’” The Japan Times, March 12 2006.21 Thomas Ricks and Anthony Faiola. “Inept N Korea is shown up by ‘ridiculous’

test,” The Washington Post, August 7 2006.22 Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea matches tough US stance on tests,” Interna-

tional Herald Tribune, July 7 2006.23 Tong Kim “Missiles: Kim Jong-il’s Calculation,” The Korea Times, August 5

2006.24 Tong Kim “Missiles: Kim Jong-il’s Calculation.”25 Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea matches tough US stance on tests,” Interna-

tional Herald Tribune, July 7 2006.26 Joseph Curl, “Bush hits direct N. Korea Talks,” The Washington Times, July 6

2006.27 Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” The New York Times, July 23 2006.28 Christopher Carpenter, “China walks a fine line with North,” The Korea Times,

August 4 2006.29 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four,

Autumn 2006.30 “China pursues global role in six-party talks,” The Korea Herald, May 28 2008.31 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea.”32 Christopher Carpenter, “China walks a fine line with North.”33 “Pyongyang must join informal six party talks,” Hankyorae, July 11 2006; Warren

Hoge and Norimitsu Onishi, “China Fights Sanctions To Punish North Korea,”The New York Times, July 8 2006.

34 Joseph Curl, “Bush urges N. Korea Restraint,” The Washington Times, July 72006.

35 Warren Hoge and Joseph Kahn, “U.N. Asked to Consider New North KoreaResolution,” The New York Times, July 12 2006.

36 Warren Hoge and Norimitsu Onishi, “China Fights Sanctions To Punish NorthKorea,” The New York Times, July 8 2006.

37 “Pyongyang must join informal six party talks,” Hankyorae, July 11 2006.38 Edward Cody, “China Critical of U.N. Draft on N. Korea,” The Washington

Post, July 12 2006.39 Edward Cody, “China Critical of U.N. Draft on N. Korea.”40 Warren Hoge and Joseph Kahn, “ U.N. Asked to Consider New North Korea

Resolution,” The New York Times, July 12 2006.41 Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Missile

Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006) Security Council SC8778, July 15 2006, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm.

42 Ibid.43 Editorial “Deeper into Isolation,” The Korea Times, July 30 2006.44 Betsy Pisik, “UN Council condemns North Korea,” The Washington Times, July

16 2006.45 James Brooke, “North Koreans Claim to Extract Fuel for Nuclear Weapons.” The

New York Times, May 12 2005.46 “China to ‘React Strongly’ to N Korea Nuke Test: Lawmaker,” Nikkei, May 13

2005.47 “U.S warns of Asian nuclear arms race,” The New York Times, June 4 2005.48 “China Views N Korea Nuke Test as Crossing ‘diplomatic Red Line,” Nikkei,

June 5 2005.49 “China ‘Absolutely Against’ N Korean Nuke Test: Japan Lawmaker,” Nikkei,

September 2 2006.

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50 David Lague, “China Joins with Critics of N Korea,” International Herald Tri-bune, October 6 2006.

51 David E. Sanger, “Test follows warning from UN,” International Herald Tribune,October 9 2006.

52 Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel, “A Technical Analysis: Decon-structing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Association www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/tech.

53 “Scientists hold fire over whether it’s blast or bluff,” Business Times (Singapore),October 10 2006.

54 Bill Gertz, “US doubts Korean Test was nuclear,” The Washington Times, Octo-ber 10 2006.

55 Bill Gertz and Betsy Pisik, “US Finding indicates Nuclear Test,” The WashingtonTimes, 14 October 2006; Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, “North Korean Fuelidentified as Plutonium,” The New York Times, October 17 2006.

56 Bill Gertz and Betsy Pisik, “US Finding indicates Nuclear Test,” The WashingtonTimes, October 14 2006.

57 Dafna Linzer, Walter Pincus, “US Detects Signs of Radiation Consistent withTest,” The Washington Post, October 14 2006.

58 Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel, “A Technical Analysis: Decon-structing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Association www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/tech.

59 Bill Gertz, “US doubts Korean Test was nuclear,” The Washington Times, Octo-ber 10 2006.

60 Cheon Seong-whun, “N.K. nuke policy aims to withdraw U.S. forces: The Northis highly likely to conduct a second test to demonstrate its nuclear bomb cap-ability,” The Korea Herald, January 31 2007.

61 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea,” The Japan Times,October 23 2006.

62 Zhang Liangui, “Coping with a Nuclear North Korea,” China Security, issue 4,2006.

63 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four,2006.

64 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea,” The Japan Times,October 23 2006.

65 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea.”66 Zhu Feng, “Shifting Tides: China and North Korea,” China Security, issue four,

2006.67 “China Envoy Meets with N.K. Leader,” The Korea Herald, 20 October 2006.68 Zhang Liangui, “Coping with a Nuclear North Korea,” China Security, issue 4,

2006.69 Zhang Liangui, “Coping with a Nuclear North Korea.”70 David Lague, “China Joins with Critics of N Korea,” International Herald Tri-

bune, October 6 2006.71 Kim Ji-hyun, “Policy rift deepens over North Korea,” The Korea Herald, October

13 2006.72 Lee Joo-hee “North Korea defies the world,” The Korea Herald, October 10 2011.73 “From the North: Shock and poor judgment,” Hankyorae, October 10 2006,

http://english.hani.co.kr/art/english_edition/e_editorial/163208.html.74 Ryu Jin, “Kim Dae jung blames US for Nuke crisis,” The Korea Times, October

11 2006.75 “State of Emergency,” Dong-A Ilbo, October 10 2006. http://english.donga.com/

srv/service.php3?biid=2006101048748&path_dir=20061010.76 Choe Won-jin and Jack Kim, “The Logic behind South Korea’s big embrace of

North Korea Nukes,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 10 2005.

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77 Editorial “What NK can Expect,” The Korea Herald, October 10 2006.78 Glenn Kessler, “Reported test ‘fundamentally changes the landscape’ for US offi-

cials,” Washington Post, October 9 2006.79 “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Aso”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Japan, October 9, 2006. www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2006/10/1009.html.80 David Stout and John O’Neil, “North Korea’s Claim Is Met With Doubt and

Anger,” The New York Times, October 11 2006.81 Colum Lynch and Maureen Fan, “China Says It Will Back Sanctions On N.

Korea,” The Washington Post, October 11 2006.82 “China weighs cutting food, oil supplies to North Korea,” The Japan Times,

October 23 2006.83 Yochi J. Dreazen, Evan Ramstad, “WSJ: Powers are split over how to punish

Pyongyang,” Nikkei, October 12 2006.84 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Imposes trade embargo on N. Korea,” The Washington

Times, October 15 2006.85 Security Council condemns nuclear test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

unanimously adopting Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council, October 14 2006,www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm; “UN Sec Council MullsTrade, Financial Sanctions against N Korea,” Nikkei, October 14 2006.

86 “UN imposes sanctions on NK,” The Korea Herald, October 16 2006.87 “UN imposes sanctions on NK.”88 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Imposes trade embargo on N. Korea,” The Washington

Times, October 15 2006.89 Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council, October 14 2006.90 Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, “North Korean Fuel identified as Plutonium,”

The New York Times, October 17 2006.91 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Imposes trade embargo on N. Korea,” The Washington

Times, October 15 2006.92 Yochi J. Dreazen, Evan Ramstad, “WSJ: Powers are split over how to punish

Pyongyang,” Nikkei, October 12 2006.93 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “China-North Korea relations,” in Suk Hi

Kim, Terence Roehrig and Bernhard Seliger (eds) The Survival of North Korea:Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations, McFarland & Co.,Jefferson, North Carolina, 2011, p. 134.

94 Resolution 1718 (2006), Security Council, October 14 2006.95 Nicholas Kralev, “China Wrests N. Korea Pledge,” The Washington Times,

October 21 2006; “N Korea leader says sorry to China over nuke test,” Nikkei,October 20 2006.

96 Brian DeBose, “US expects China to lead on Sanctions,” The Washington Times,October 16 2006.

97 “China moves to stem N Korea money flows,” The Japan Times, November 32006.

98 Jim Yardley, “China’s Border stays open,” International Herald Tribune, October27 2006: “China on NK Bomb,” The Korea Herald, October 18 2006.

99 Kenichi Ogata, “Russia treads softly, softly over sanctions,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 23October 2006.

100 “US needs to back off from inter-Korean projects,” Hankyorae, October 19 2006,http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/165656.html.

101 Jin Hyun-joo, “GNP attacks N Korea exchanges,” The Korea Herald, October 182006.

102 Editorial “What NK can Expect,” The Korea Herald, October 10 2006.103 Norimitsu Onishi, “Questions Grow over UN Curbs on North Korea,” Interna-

tional Herald Tribune, October 16 2006.

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104 Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul urged to get tough on N. Korea,” The Korea Herald, October19 2006.

105 Jung Sung ki, “Roh defies Bush on North Korea policy,” The Korea Times,November 4 2006.

106 “US to rethink financial curbs on North: envoy,” The Japan Times November 42006.

107 Norimitsu Onishi, “Questions Grow over UN Curbs on North Korea,” Interna-tional Herald Tribune, October 16 2006.

108 Joel Wit, “Pyongyang regime could collapse under international pressure,” TheKorea Herald, October 31 2006.

109 China wants to pull strings in N-crisis,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 22 2006.110 Takashi Sakamoto and Tetsuya Suetsugu, “DPRK urged to return to talks Tang

tells Rice meeting in Pyongyang was ‘not in vain’,” The Daily Yomiuri, October21 2006.

111 Thom Shanker and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and China Call for North Korea toRejoin 6-Nation Talks on Nuclear Program, “ The New York Times, October 212006.

112 Glenn Kessler, “China Gave ‘Strong Message’ To North Koreans, Rice Says, “TheWashington Post, October 21 2006.

113 “US Speeds N. Korea attack contingency plan: report,” Reuters, November 32006. http://today.reuters.com/misc/PrinterFriendlyPopup.aspx?type=topNews&storyID-2006–1: also Bill Gertz “US speeds attack plans for North Korea,” TheWashington Times, November 3 2006.

114 Jin Dae-woong, “Military works on nuclear defense plans,” The Korea Herald,October 28 2006.

115 “China wants to pull strings in N-crisis,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 22 2006;Takashi Sakamoto and Tetsuya Suetsugu, “DPRK urged to return to talks Tangtells Rice meeting in Pyongyang was ‘not in vain’,” The Daily Yomiuri, October21 2006; Thom Shanker and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and China Call for North Koreato Rejoin 6-Nation Talks on Nuclear Program, “ The New York Times October21 2006.

116 Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul optimistic of early resolution to US financial sanctions onNK,” The Korea Herald, November 2 2006.

117 “US to rethink financial curbs on North: envoy,” The Japan Times November 42006: Reiji Yoshida, “Sanctions pain or nuclear confidence?” The Japan Times,November 12 2006.

118 “Macau denies lifting freeze on N. Korea cash,” The Japan Times, November 232006.

119 Teruaki Ueno, “North Korean Regime feeling some sanctions heat,” The JapanTimes, November 4 2006.

120 Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul optimistic of early resolution to US financial sanctions onNK,” The Korea Herald, November 2 2006.

121 Helen Cooper, David E. Sanger, “US offers N. Korea aid, with restrictions,”International herald Tribune, December 6 2006.

122 “N. Korea arms talks ‘at fork in road’: Washington, Tokyo,” The Japan Times,December 19 2006.

123 “Japan, US plan hard line/Will demand North Korea scrap N-Program,” TheKorea Herald, December 26 2006.

124 Lee Joo-hee, “US, N Korea Lay groundwork for further talks,” The KoreaHerald, December 22 2006.

125 ‘North’s strategy of failure at the 6 party talks,” Hankyorae, December 23 2006.126 “Choice of the North,” The Korea Herald, 3 January 2007 Nam Sung-wook,

“‘South-North relations will be more turbulent’: Expert says N.K. nuclear issue

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and South’s presidential election will affect bilateral relations,” The Korea Herald,January 13 2007.

127 ‘North’s strategy of failure at the 6 party talks,” Hankyorae, December 23 2006.128 “Remove taboo from debates over Japan’s national security,” The Daily Yomiuri

January 1 2007.129 Takashi Oda “Abe over focused on abduction issue,” The Daily Yomiuri, January

26 2007.130 Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Open to Bilateral Talks on Ties With N. Korea,” The

Washington Post January 18 2007.131 Mark Landler and Thom Shanker, “North Korea and U.S. Envoys Meet in

Berlin,” The New York Times, January 18 2007.132 Helene Cooper and Jim Yardley, “Pact with North Korea draws fire from a wide

range of critics in the US,” The New York Times, February 14 2007.133 “U.S. denies Berlin talks are policy shift,” The Korea Herald, January 20 2007.134 “US Mulls easing on NK funds,” The Korea Herald, January 23 2007.135 Donald G. Gross, “Unexpected Progress on All Fronts,” Comparative Connec-

tions; A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations The AtlanticCouncil of the United States, April 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0701qus_korea.pdf.

136 Lee Joo-hee, “Six-party talks to resume soon: North Korea claims agreementreached with U.S. in Berlin,” The Korea Herald, January 20 2007.

137 Lee Joo-hee, “Song says N. Korea shows flexibility,” The Korea Herald, January25 2007.

138 “Cautious optimism,” The Korea Herald, February 2 2007.139 “North Korea must agree to scrap N-program,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 31

2007.140 “North Korea may offer trade-off at 6-party talks,” The Daily Yomiuri February

5 2007.

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6 From the February agreement to theend of the Six Party Talks

Introduction

The Berlin talks led to the February 2007 agreement and seemed to portendan end to the nuclear issue based on a freeze of the existing nuclear program,and a promise to dismantle all nuclear facilities in return for energy, economicaid, security guarantees, and the normalization of diplomatic relations withthe US and Japan. The agreement was similar to the Agreed Framework,which the Bush Administration had severely criticized, the essence of whichwas a freeze and the later surrender of the nuclear weapons program. Anyagreement between the US and the North could only be a variation of theearlier Agreed Framework since other possibilities were closed off by theNorth’s opposition. At no other time was there greater optimism that the endwas in sight. Nonetheless, subsequent negotiations would revive the sameissues that were raised earlier in relation to verification, inspection and theirscheduling with the benefits that the North was supposed to receive, whichdeflated the high hopes that had been raised earlier. Though it was preparedto freeze the existing program the North would not include in the agreementits stock of plutonium or its HEU program, and it refused to accept standardverification procedures which it regarded as intrusive. Verification was thecritical issue which prevented final agreement. The result was eventual dead-lock and the Six Party Talks met for the last time in December 2008 leavingthe nuclear issue hanging. Despite its promises the North was not prepared tosurrender its nuclear program entirely and created difficulties when theAmericans insisted that it follow up on their agreement.

The February 13 agreement: America concedes

Prospects looked bright when Kim Kye-kwan declared on arrival in Beijingthat the North was prepared to discuss the first steps towards the denuclear-ization of the Korean Peninsula, based on whether the US would renounce its“hostile policy” and accept “peaceful coexistence” with the North. Chris Hillin an optimistic mood told the press that he had sensed a “real desire” forprogress by the North Koreans at the talks.1 South Korean delegate to the

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talks Chun Yung-woo thought that one of the most difficult issues would bedeciding who would provide the aid to the North in view of Japan’s openopposition. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared before the talksthat without progress on the abduction issue Japan would not be involved inany multinational plan to help North Korea economically. Foreign MinisterTaro Aso said that “We have our own special situation. We have repeatedlysaid so both to the United States and China.” Nonetheless, Japanese officialsappeared to temper this hard line stance by de-linking the abduction issuefrom the nuclear quandary. Some called for the return of one or two abduc-tees as a pre-condition before Japan would become involved in an aid pro-gram for the North; others wanted to de-link the issues entirely reducing theirdemand to substantial progress on the nuclear issue.2 This indeed was a pro-blem. If the Japanese would refuse to get involved because of the abductionissue, then the economic burden would fall on the others. China would arguethat it was already assisting the North, Russia would plead poverty while theUS would be most reluctant to provide aid on a large scale to a country thathad confronted it; that would leave South Korea.

China had drafted a written agreement based on the results of the BerlinTalks, and was ready to circulate this at the Six Party Talks which had beenscheduled for 8 February 2007. That draft contained the key point that theNorth would close its Yongbyon reactor, freeze its nuclear program and allowthe return of IAEA inspectors within 60 days, in return for energy assistanceand diplomatic relations with the US and Japan.3 In that draft, China alsoproposed the establishment of five working groups to oversee various facets ofthe issue; one group would deal with the denuclearization process, the secondwould deal with normalization of ties between the US and North Korea, thethird would examine the normalization of relations between North Korea andJapan, the fourth would cover economic issues and energy cooperation, whilethe fifth would examine the prospects for the negotiation of Northeast AsiaPeace and security mechanism. Chun Yung-woo told the press that he wasoptimistic and that the draft was “good as a basis for negotiations.”4 TheChinese had hoped that the talks would end with an agreement based on theirdraft on February 9, an event for which they had planned a press conference.They were dismayed when the negotiations were prolonged by the North’sdemand for huge shipments of fuel oil and electricity in advance before itwould agree to surrender its nuclear weapons program. The Chinese draftsaid that “conventional energy assistance will be determined by the workinggroups and will be commensurate with the steps” the North would take tofulfill its commitments. The North demanded an annual energy package of 2million tons of fuel oil, 2,000 MW of electricity, and an immediate shipmentof fuel oil as a reward for shutting down the Yongbyon reactor, which wasconsiderably more than it received under the Agreed Framework. Under thatagreement it was allowed 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for heating purposesannually as well as two LWRs. Given that Japan had declared that it wouldnot be involved in economic or energy assistance, the burden would have to

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be shared by the others, who were not particularly enthusiastic. The initialoptimism was deflated somewhat as the negotiations reached an impasse, forwhich Chun Yung-woo blamed the North and its inflated demands for energyassistance.5 President Bush had to cancel a congratulatory telephone call toSouth Korean President Roh which was to come with the expected conclusionof the talks. It was obvious that the North was resorting to its usual diplo-matic tactic of throwing up obstacles at the last minute to extract maximumconcessions from those clamoring for an agreement. At this stage, rare unitywas found amongst the other five members of the talks who pressed theNorth to accept the draft document and to drop its exorbitant demands. Theythen countered the North’s tactic by signaling disinterest in the outcome; ChrisHill visited the national museum in Beijing and some Russian delegates wentshopping. The American, Russian and Japanese delegations declared thatFebruary 12 would be the final day for the talks. The North held out for aslong as possible and after a 16-hour negotiating session, agreement waseventually reached in the early morning of February 13.6

The agreement basically followed the outlines of the Chinese draft that hadbeen circulated during the Talks. It stated that the purpose was to implementthe September 19 2005 agreement and that “the parties agreed to takecoordinated steps to implement the joint statement in a phased manner inline with the principle of ‘action for action.’” The US was concerned thatunlike the Agreed Framework the benefits for the North should not be “front-loaded,” and that they would commence as the North carried out its share ofthe agreement. For this reason the agreement covered only the initial phasewith other steps to follow. In the first or “initial actions” phase the Northwould shut down and seal the Yongbyon reactor and invite IAEA inspec-tors back to monitor and verify the shutdown within 60 days (that is byApril 14). The North would receive an initial shipment of 50,000 tons ofheavy oil from a total of 1 million tons promised to it, more than the AgreedFramework but less than the North demanded. Five working groups wereestablished according to the Chinese proposal above and they were to meetwithin 30 days and report to the Six Party Talks. In the second phase, theNorth would prepare and submit a list of all its nuclear programs andaccount for the plutonium extracted from its used fuel rods. It would alsoirreversibly disable and seal the Yongbyon reactor and receive the rest of thepromised 950,000 tons of fuel oil. The US and the North would initiatebilateral talks and move towards full diplomatic relations while the USwould begin the process of removing the North from the list of countriessupporting terrorism. The next or sixth round of the Six Party talks wasscheduled for March 19 2007.7

The operative part of the first step was the North’s commitment to shutdown the Yongbyon reactor and to accept inspectors within a certain timeframe, and for that it would be rewarded with shipments of heavy oil. TheNorth’s concession to make the deal possible was to drop the demand forLWRs but otherwise it did not concede much else. The agreement mentioned

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but did not deal with the remaining issues which were left for the second stagewhen negotiations would be renewed. When would the North submit a list ofall its nuclear programs and when would they be dismantled? When wouldthe North clarify the amount of plutonium it had produced and stockpiled?What about the HEU program which was not mentioned in the agreement?The Americans had been downplaying the HEU issue and some had thoughtthat they may have overstated their case or misread the intelligence and it wasleft to the second phase of the process.8 The creation of the working groupswas intended to speed up the negotiation process so that the issues would beclarified and even agreed beforehand. But the North’s delegations had nopower to decide, however, which would render these groups redundant in anycase.

The agreement was an astonishing reversal of policy for the Bush Admin-istration which had vowed not to negotiate with the North or to be involvedin another Agreed Framework, which it had attacked so virulently. Thisreversal was only possible because Secretary of State Condoleezza Riceworked with Chris Hill and NSC advisor Stephen Hadley to reach the Pre-sident directly. The Secretary of State sidestepped decision-making proceduresthat would have engaged the neoconservatives in the administration. Nor-mally there would have been an interagency process to decide upon a nego-tiating position and that would have included Vice President Dick Cheney’soffice, the Defense Department and other agencies which had resisted anyproposal to reward North Korea before the US committed itself to anyagreement.9 As it was, they had little opportunity to block the agreement. USofficials told the press that Bush, who was preoccupied with the situation inIraq and the Middle East, wanted an agreement with the North which wouldallow him to say that it would no longer produce nuclear fuel and was on theway to disarmament.10 Bush explained that the deal was possible because hehad obtained full Chinese cooperation after he told Hu Jintao that a nuclearNorth Korea was a greater problem for China than the US.11

Savage attacks on the agreement were unleashed by the neoconservativesand their allies within the Administration for what they regarded as betrayalof a cause. Officials in the Administration objected to removing the Northfrom the list of countries sponsoring terrorism without evidence that it hadceased this activity. Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams wasone of those officials who demanded to know why North Korea should berewarded before it was removed from this list. Abrams was involved inAmerica’s promotion of democracy abroad and not only was he alarmed bythis provision, but he was angered by the way in which it had been reached,without interagency vetting as a standard procedure. Robert Joseph wassimilarly vehement in his opposition to the agreement but he had in any caseannounced his resignation from the Administration in January. John Boltonwho had resigned from the Administration in December 2006 called it a baddeal that “violated the principles that were closely held in the beginning of theBush administration.” This policy said Bolton was “exactly right” as it

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brought North Korea to the negotiating table and should not be changed.12

The neoconservative journal The National Review asked “when exactly didKim Jong-il become trustworthy?” It argued that if agreement had requiredthe North to shut down the reactor and destroy its existing nuclear arsenalbefore receiving the benefits “it would have been worth signing.” As it was theUS “won a promise from a liar.”13 John O’Sullivan in the same journalexpressed the fear that if the agreement were successful, it would be a “pow-erful incentive to nuclear proliferation worldwide.” He complained that anypotential proliferator could initiate a nuclear program and be rewarded with“bribes” to close it down.14

On the other side of the political spectrum, Clinton Administration sup-porters demanded to know how this agreement differed from the AgreedFramework, and why the Bush Administration wasted so many years when itcould have had a similar deal earlier. This question was most troubling for theBush Administration because the answer would be an admission of the futi-lity of the approach the neoconservatives had adopted towards security andforeign policy. The Bush Administration claimed that this agreement wasdifferent from the Agreed Framework in three ways; first there was no men-tion of LWRs which was the most important incentive offered to the North inthe Agreed Framework, and secondly this agreement was not just a freeze ofexisting nuclear programs which was the North’s most important obligationunder the Agreed Framework since it aimed at their removal entirely. Thirdly,this agreement would be endorsed and approved by the Six Party Talks andwould become a multilateral agreement while the Agreed Framework was abilateral agreement between the US and the North.15 Chris Hill told the pressthat this agreement went “well beyond” the Agreed Framework,” and he was“not too worried whether something might look like the Agreed Frameworkbecause we are only looking at part of what we are aiming at.”16 In one way,this agreement achieved less than the Agreed Framework because it did notcover all of the North’s nuclear programs or its nuclear fuel. The Yongbyonreactor could be shut down but still there was the HEU program and otherinstallations. When the Agreed Framework was signed there was only theYongbyon reactor and related installations to monitor and inspect and itcould be effectively covered in the agreement. In another way, the agreementachieved more than the Agreed Framework by having the Six Party Talkssupport it. The anomaly of Chinese, South Korean and Japanese exclusionwas rectified in this agreement and these countries would take greaterresponsibility for the outcome.

The most important issues were left to the second phase when troublesomedetails would have to be negotiated. The Yongbyon reactor could be shutdown quickly but its dismantling would take at least a decade and in themeantime there was the possibility of reversal. Moreover, what would happento the spent nuclear fuel which would have to be kept in storage somewhere,either sealed in dry cask containers or placed in fuel rod storage pools? TheNorth would expect to sacrifice the Yongbyon reactor, which was outdated

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anyway, and receive the agreed benefits without accounting for the HEUprogram, its stockpile of plutonium and the other nuclear facilities. For PresidentBush, a deal with the North was required to get this festering issue off hisback and if it postponed the most difficult part, it allowed him to focus uponthe more immediate issues of the time: Iraq and Afghanistan. The way inwhich the deal was reached revealed that Bush had realized that his policieshad been highjacked by the neoconservatives and had led him into a dead-end.He had been buoyed along by the neoconservative movement which hadboosted his popularity initially, but the realization eventually dawned that itsappeal to an American audience could not be translated into diplomaticresults in the case of North Korea.

The Americans indeed were torn between upholding non proliferationnorms and a pragmatic compromise that would defuse the current nuclearissue with the North. The Bush Administration and its neoconservative sup-porters had stressed that policy towards the North should be guided by thenon-proliferation regime and that agreements should be assessed according towhether or not they weakened or strengthened this regime. The idea ofadjusting demands to obtain the North’s agreement was anathema to them asit would set a precedent to potential proliferators such as Iran. If it weakenedbefore North Korea, the US would never be able to hold the line againstother aspirants for nuclear weapons and every case of compromise woulddetract from the non-proliferation regime and render it useless. While thesewere valid concerns there was little else the US could do under the circum-stances. The North had become a de facto nuclear power and there was norolling back the program short of a devastating military strike which wasplainly not on the cards. The US could not resort to the UN Security Councilwhere both China and Russia would veto any aggressive action, and hemmedin by these powers in the Six Party Talks the US had few alternatives open toit. The American neoconservatives had reached their moment of triumph inthe Bush administration in a unipolar world when it seemed that there wereno limits to what the US could do. The realization that they could not enforcetheir will on North Korea and that they were obliged to scale back theirdemands brought considerable anguish as the limits to American power werereached.

In South Korea there was a similar polarization of opinion but with lessintensity. Diplomats from the South claimed that they had made the agree-ment possible when they modified the Chinese draft to allow for a two-stepapproach, the first being the closing of the Yongbyon reactor and the secondthe elimination of all nuclear programs. They claimed that they had proposedthat the North be granted 1 million tons of heavy oil with an initial shipmentof 50,000 tons which would be made by the South.17 According to The KoreaHerald the agreement was “no small achievement” since the possibility ofmilitary action against the North had “dramatically diminished.”18 OneSouth Korean concern was how to finance the deal since the Japanese hadopted out. The heavy oil shipments would cost the South at least $55 million

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and 2,000 MW of electricity annually would add another $900 million to thebill. In addition, the South was committed to provide LWRs under the Sep-tember 2005 agreement. This was a heavy burden on the country. None-theless, President Roh was ecstatic and declared that the agreement wouldpave the way for permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and help raiseKorea’s economic credit rating because of the reduced security threat.19 Forthe South Korean President and his supporters, the agreement would revivetheir efforts to engage the North as a step towards their aim of a multilateralsecurity regime on the Peninsula. Roh had opened secret contacts with theNorth in an attempt to arrange a second summit but he was prevented frommoving ahead by the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests in 2009. For-eign Affairs and Trade Minister Song Min-soon, said that this agreement hadmet some of the preconditions for an inter-Korean summit which the Pre-sident so dearly wanted.20 The opposition GNP was less than impressed. Itschairwoman Park Guen-hye sided with the American critics who said that theagreement would only create the same conditions which discredited theAgreed Framework.21 GNP member Park Jin claimed that the US govern-ment now viewed the North as a nuclear power and was discussing ways oflimiting its nuclear arsenal and not necessarily removing it entirely.22 Pre-sidential elections were scheduled for December 2007 and with the GNP gal-loping ahead in opinion polls it looked as though it would take thepresidency. Koreans, it seemed, were tired of an engagement policy that wasnot reciprocated by the North.

The Japanese reaction was critical. Nikkei regarded the agreement as“deeply flawed and full of loopholes.” It feared that the US was making“costly concessions” without the assurance that the North would disarm, andthat changes in US policy would “undermine the credibility of the Bushadministration toward North Korea, and only serve to help North KoreanLeader Kim Jong-il achieve his goals.”23 Japanese officials had specific criti-cisms of the provisions of the agreement as well. It had no timetable for theabandonment of the nuclear program and, since it did not address this issue,the North could use it as a bargaining chip to gain even more concessions.24

Others thought that the interpretation of key phrases may become a key issue.The term “disablement” which was mentioned in the agreement could beinterpreted by the North to mean a temporary or emergency stoppage ofoperations at the nuclear facility.25 The North’s record of observing agree-ments did not create much confidence and there were doubts about how farthis agreement could be implemented. Moreover, Prime Minister Shinzo Abereiterated that Japan would not normalize relations with the North until allabductees were returned, and that the abduction issue would not be sidelinedby the denuclearization agreement.26 Given that the normalization of diplo-matic relations between Japan and the North was one of the provisions of theagreement, this was a veto of an important part. Nonetheless, there wereother voices in Japan that stressed the importance of normalizing relationswith the North and sought to ensure that the momentum generated by

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Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang would not be lost. Former Vice President of theLiberal Democratic Party Taku Yamasaki visited Pyongyang in January2007, with the aim of paving the way for a third visit to the North by Koi-zumi. Both Shinzo Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki con-demned Yamasaki’s visit as undesirable for a Diet member and a breach ofthe sanctions imposed on the North since its nuclear test.27 The Japanesewere also concerned that the US would remove the North from the terrorism listbefore it resolved the abduction issue. Bush telephoned Abe after the agree-ment was concluded to mollify him and to obtain his support but the Japanesewere resentful that their concern was not included.28 Indeed, the Japanesefeared that as the Americans edged towards the North to resolve the nuclearissue, they would ignore the abduction issue. When Chris Hill visited Pyon-gyang for bilateral talks later in June, he did not inform the Japanese of hisplans though he stopped off in Tokyo.29 Japanese anxiety was stimulated.

Implementing the agreement

A negotiating sequence had been established that would continue with theefforts to implement the agreement. Bilateral US negotiations with the Northwhich were intended to resolve the outstanding issues would precede meetingsof the Six Party Talks. The American public position was that bilateral talkswere necessary to establish contact with the North and to draw up an agenda,and that the Six Party Talks would retain their importance. In reality as thesebilateral negotiations dealt with the key issues, the Six Party Talks were stea-dily marginalized. They were convened when it was necessary to obtain theapproval of the other parties to a bilateral agreement and they became ameans for the Bush Administration to deflect criticism from its supportersover its turnaround in policy. If the Six Party Talks endorsed the agreementthen the Administration’s actions were justified, even if they had not satisfiedits critics. Moreover, the Chinese had always insisted that the nuclear issuewas an American problem and had nudged the US towards bilateral talks.The Roh Administration saw US bilateral negotiations with the North asfurthering the engagement policy and encouraged them as long as the resultswere tabled at the Six Party Talks. This in itself created a certain tension forthe Americans. They could not forego bilateral negotiations because withoutthem there would be no progress, but the deeper they become involved, thegreater the risk of an embarrassing breakdown which would be yet anotherhumiliation for them.

The most immediate issue after the February agreement was the shutdownof the Yongbyon reactor, which was the subject of the next phase of the SixParty Talks which were held over 19 to 22 March 2007. The talks broke downwhen the North refused to continue until the disputed $25 million was trans-ferred from the BDA in Macau. The US on 19 March announced that thefunds would be released prompting Bush to remark that it was similar toreturning money to a thief.30 The problem was that no bank wanted to receive

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the funds as it would be subject to US sanctions for handling tainted funds, andwhile this issue was being resolved, the April 14 deadline passed. Conflictbetween the State Department and Treasury over the release of the funds delayedthe matter; the State Department wanted an American bank to transfer thefunds to a third bank but the Treasury baulked. Eventually the StateDepartment requested Wachovia bank to transfer the funds to its branch inHong Kong since it had often dealt with BDA. To do this, Treasury had toissue a written assurance that would exempt it from sanctions under US lawfor handling the funds.31 A Russian bank in the Far East called Dalkombank,which had dealt with the North, was selected as the receiver of the funds forfinal transfer to the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea.32 On June 21, theRussians announced that the transfer had been made.

For the first time since the September 2005 agreement, it seemed that pro-gress was possible. The Japanese were guarded and thought that the ease withwhich the North could use the financial sanctions issue to delay the conveningof the Six Party Talks indicated that it could derail that progress at any timeand over any technical issue. Nonetheless, the surprise was that matters wentsmoothly without any sudden change of heart from the North. On June 20,the North invited the IAEA to send inspectors to the Yongbyon site tomonitor the shutdown of the reactor and related facilities. The South on July12 arranged for the first shipment of 6,200 tons heavy oil to the North withlater shipments to be spread out over a month. On July 18 the IAEA con-firmed that all five nuclear facilities at Yongbyon had indeed been closed, anevent which was marked by the dramatic demolition of the reactor’s coolingtower. On that day, of the Six Party Talks were convened in Beijing to discussways of implementing the second and more difficult part of the Februaryagreement. The talks decided that when the North completed the disable-ment of its nuclear complex in Yongbyon, the parties would deliver theremaining 950,000 tons of heavy oil. They also discussed ways of verifying theNorth’s nuclear programs including its stock of plutonium, anticipatingthat the North would produce a declaration of all its nuclear programs bythe end of October. The five working groups were to meet by the end ofAugust and was to report at the next round of talks which was scheduled forSeptember.33

One issue which had disturbed the Americans was the HEU program, thediscovery of which in 2002 triggered convulsions within the Bush Adminis-tration and resulted in the termination of the Agreed Framework. The BushAdministration had promised that never again would the US conclude asimilar agreement with a country that had cheated so blatantly. By the time ofthe February agreement five years later doubts emerged amongst the Amer-icans about the existence of the program and the original intelligence whichrevealed it. If US intelligence was at fault then what could be trusted? If theUS downplayed the HEU program to encourage the North into an agreementthen did it deliberately sensationalize the original report in 2002? Chris Hillsaid it was unclear if the North had mastered the technology to enrich

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uranium and that a committee should be set up to examine this issue. Chiefintelligence officer for North Korea in the Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence, Joseph DeTrani, told Congress that there was only limited con-fidence that a HEU program existed because procurement of relevant mate-rial and equipment had ceased over the past two years.34 Joel Wit thoughtthat the program was beset by “uncertainties and controversy” and called fora “detailed intelligence assessment” of the status of the program.35 Despitethe shift in the American assessment, the South Korean intelligence chief KimMan-bok thought that a secret HEU program did exist which should beraised at the Six Party Talks.36 US officials discussed the merits of actuallypurchasing the centrifuges obtained from A. Q. Khan network by the Northin a deal similar to the Nunn–Lugar program according to which nuclearequipment was purchased from the former Soviet Union.37 A deal of thiskind would work if the North had forgone the desire to develop the HEUprogram and was stuck with centrifuges that it could not use, but there wasuncertainty about this as well. The Americans decided that instead of aHEU program they would refer to it as a uranium enrichment program(UEP) to encourage the North to admit to it without losing face.38 TheNorth might refuse to own up to the HEU program but might grudginglyadmit to a UEP.

Bilateral talks and the move to a resolution

It seemed that the end was approaching as the main obstacles in the first partof the agreement had been removed, one way or another. The observableprogress had created a sense of euphoria that the North would come aroundto comply with the process of denuclearization and that the worst would beleft behind. The Bush Administration was close to the triumph it sought overthe North Korean issue, now that it was released from the constraintsimposed by the neoconservatives, and could devise a more flexible approach.To stimulate progress over the second part of the agreement, Chris Hill metagain with the North Koreans when the working group on US–North Koreanormalization of diplomatic relations was convened in Geneva over Septem-ber 1–2. Chris Hill declared that the North Koreans would provide “a fulldeclaration of all of their nuclear programs and will disable their nuclearprograms by the end of this year 2007,” which would include the HEU pro-gram as well.39 This was the first deadline that the North had accepted andthe relief was tempered by the uneasiness that something unexpected mayhappen yet again. The North signaled a qualification when Kim Kye-kwan ina press conference affirmed the North’s commitment to the process, butomitted mention of the end of year deadline.40

The results of the US–North Korea bilateral meeting in Geneva were tabledat the Six Party Talks from September 27 to October 3 2007. Israel hadattacked and destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor on September 6 which wasconstructed with North Korean assistance. The Israeli attack confirmed the

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North’s worst fears about the US and the danger that it could suddenly resortto an airstrike.41 The Chinese draft for the meeting included all the pointsmentioned in the Geneva meeting with the addition of an American intentionto remove the North from the list of terrorism sponsoring states. The draftdid not deal with the plutonium the North had produced, nor did it specifythe steps required for the disablement of the nuclear facilities.42 The jointstatement from the talks which was issued on October 3 said that the Northwas to disable all existing nuclear facilities including the 5-MW experimentalreactor, the reprocessing plant and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication facility, allat Yongbyon, by December 31 2007. The US was to lead the disablementactivities and provide the initial funding. The North agreed to provide a“complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” also byDecember 31 2007. The US agreed to begin the process of removing the Northfrom the list of state sponsors of terrorism “in parallel with” North Korea’sdenuclearization actions.43 Gordon Johndroe who was Deputy Press Secretaryand a spokesman for the NSC told the press that the action for actionapproach was working and that “we feel like the North Koreans are takingthe right steps in living up to their obligations under the agreements.”44 Pre-sident Bush encouraged the North to continue in this direction and ordered ashipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil to the North which was worth $25 mil-lion; this was the first American shipment of fuel to the North since 2002when supplies were terminated because of the HEU program.

The North was also expected to declare the amount of plutonium it hadaccumulated from the Yongbyon reactor which Chris Hill had estimated at 50kilograms. This point, however, was not included in the joint statement andindicated a loophole that the North could later exploit. Neither was therespecific mention of the HEU program though the Americans did insist that itwas covered by the agreement which mentioned “all” nuclear programs.During the talks the North demanded that the US commit itself to a deadlineto remove it from the list of terrorism sponsoring states, which the Americanswere reluctant to do at that stage because of the anticipated reactions ofCongress. The North was placed on that list on January 20 1988 because ofthe bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 on November 29 1987 in which 125passengers and crew perished as result. It was subject to the restrictions of theExport Administration Act of 1979 the main one being that the North wasprevented from applying for membership in the World Bank and the Inter-national Monetary Fund.45 The North had consistently pressed for itsremoval from the list in bilateral meetings with the Americans. It was raisedwhen Chris Hill met Kim Kye-kwan on November 28–29 2006, and duringthe Berlin Talks of January 2007. Chris Hill told the North Koreans duringthe February 2007 and September 2007 talks that the US would indeedremove the North Korea from the terrorism sponsorship list if it dismantledits nuclear programs.46 Joining these two international financial agencies wasimportant for the North’s effort at economic reform, as promoted by theForeign Ministry and the reformers. It made sense while the North was

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introducing economic reforms under Chinese pressure after July 2002. Sincethen they had been halted, and many private markets had been closed as theparty conservatives initiated a crackdown on free market activity. One expla-nation was that the Foreign Ministry and the reformers had hoped thatmembership of these bodies would act as a lever to promote internal eco-nomic reform despite the crackdown. Another explanation was that that theNorth’s leaders had expected that the economic benefits of membership inthese bodies would compensate for the economic losses arising from theircrackdown, and that they would receive economic support from these inter-national agencies without the need of reform. With nuclear weapons theycould draw attention to themselves and expect priority treatment.

Nonetheless, getting the North off the terrorism sponsors list was not easy. TheState Department claimed that North Korea “was not known to have spon-sored any terrorist acts since 1987.” Chris Hill declared that the North had“come clean” about its proliferation activities and deserved to be removed fromthe list. Four Republican senators, Sam Brownback, Chuck Grassley, JonKyl, and independent Joseph Liberman submitted a draft resolution imposingvarious conditions. They argued that the North had engaged in other terroristactivities since 1987, contrary to what the State Department claimed, byproviding arms to Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers. They demanded that theNorth resolve the Japanese abduction issue, and shut down Central Commit-tee Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers Party which was responsible for print-ing counterfeit money. They also demanded that the North fully disclose itsassistance to Syria’s nuclear reactor before it was bombed by Israel.47 Con-gress was not prepared to move on this issue just yet, which meant that theNorth was not ready to meet the end of year deadline to close down theYongbyon reactor, and to declare a full list of all nuclear facilities. PresidentBush sent a letter to Kim Jong-il dated December 1 promising normalizedrelations with the North if it disclosed all its nuclear programs and dismantledthe Yongbyon nuclear reactor. It was an extraordinary change of heart for apresident who had called the North Korean leader a “tyrant” and a “pygmy,”demonstrating the length he would go to reach an agreement with the man hehad loathed. The letter was addressed “Dear Mr. Chairman” and was deliv-ered to Kim Kye-kwan in Beijing by Chris Hill.48 As the deadline approachedChris Hill and Condoleezza Rice said that it was not rigid, but an indicationonly.49 The North indeed missed the deadline and on January 4 issued adeclaration claiming that it had already disclosed everything that was neces-sary in November, which the US had said was incomplete anyway.

Within the Bush Administration the conflict between the neoconservativesand the State Department erupted again. While Dick Cheney’s office deman-ded a tougher response to the North’s obvious stalling tactics after its role indeveloping the Syrian nuclear reactor became known, Chris Hill and Con-doleezza Rice defended their approach and urged that the Six Party Talks beallowed to continue. Both neoconservatives and liberal human rights advocateslined up on the same side in relation to the North which was another

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embarrassment for the Bush Administration. The US envoy for NorthKorean human rights Jay Lefkowitz sounded like John Bolton when hedeclared that the North was not “serious” about nuclear disarmament andthat a new approach was required.50 Short of repudiating the Six Party Talksand confronting the North, no one could identify what that new approachcould be.

The dispute over verification

It was not until June 26 2008 that the North submitted a 60-page declarationof its nuclear facilities to China, a delay of half a year. It listed 15 nuclearfacilities, including the Yongbyon facilities and various universities, which theState Department prematurely declared as complete and without gaps. StateDepartment Spokesman Sean McCormack said that the declaration covered boththe plutonium and HEU programs and included information on the North’snuclear proliferation to Syria.51 However, IAEA director Mohamed Elbar-adei wrote that the North’s nuclear declaration was incomplete as it did notinclude all past or present nuclear activity and did not mention the HEU.52

The North did at least it declare that it had produced 30 kilograms of pluto-nium on three occasions, in the 1990s, 2003 and 2005 and had used 2 kilo-grams in its nuclear test in October 2006. From this document, the Americansestimated that the North had about 44 kilograms of plutonium which wouldbe sufficient for quite a number of nuclear devices if the report was correct.53

On the same day Bush announced that he was notifying Congress of hisintent to “rescind North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terror in 45days,” that is by August 10. With this submission, China arranged for thenext round of the Six Party Talks to be held over July 10–12 2008 to completethe process of denuclearization. On the agenda was an examination of theNorth’s declaration, the verification and monitoring regime for the North’sdeclared nuclear facilities and the disablement of Yongbyon.54

The US submitted a four page draft of procedures for the verification of theNorth’s nuclear program, which was largely crafted by the State Department’sarms control and verification experts who had based their approach on theirexperience of Iraq and Libya. It included the demand for “full access to allmaterials” to any “site, facility or location” that was relevant to the nuclearprogram, including military facilities. It also would allow inspectors to takephotographs and make videos, to remain on site as long as necessary, and tomake repeated visits as well as to collect and remove samples of nuclearmaterial for testing. IAEA sampling in 1992 revealed major discrepanciesbetween the North’s declarations and its actual plutonium production. ChrisHill thought that it was asking too much of the North Koreans but he wasoverruled by arms control experts who regarded it as a test of the North’sintentions. When the draft was tabled at the talks the North’s response waspredictable; the North accepted some of the American demands but drew theline at visits to undeclared facilities and the taking of samples, which the

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American experts regarded as crucial for any effective verification regime.55 TheAmerican draft also demanded that the North clarify its role in nuclear pro-liferation and its assistance to the nuclear programs of other countries. Itwanted detailed information on the North’s production of plutonium, its exportsand imports of nuclear materials and nuclear-related equipment, the transferof personnel involved in Pyongyang’s nuclear programs, the storage contain-ers and vehicles used.56 The Americans insisted that the removal of the Northfrom the terrorism sponsors list would depend upon an acceptable agreementon verification of its nuclear programs.

Verification, once again, was at the heart of the dispute between the USand the North. The Chinese and the South Koreans pressed the US into aresolution of the issue that would, one way or another, suspend verification asdid the Agreed Framework. In their approach, verification would come insome vague way as a product of tension reduction on the Korean Peninsulaand tied to the promised incentives in an action by action plan. The US couldnot make allowances in the case of North Korea without undermining theglobal non-proliferation regime, which was so critical for international secur-ity. Nonetheless, the verification procedures spelled out in the US-IAEA“Additional Protocol,” which served as guidelines for the US in dealing withNorth Korea and Iran, allowed for flexibility in responding to a state’sdeclaration of nuclear facilities. The Protocol was not to be applied“mechanistically or systematically” and would allow access to nuclear sitesdeclared by a state “on a selective basis.” At undeclared sites, however, theIAEA would have “circumscribed access rights” and only in the event of“inconsistency related to the state’s declarations” would it have the right todemand access to a site. The protocol mentions that the “range of activitiesthat the IAEA may carry out at undeclared locations is narrowly restric-ted.”57 The IAEA’s role was preventive in nature and not created for the dis-mantlement of an existing weapons system, which demanded much moreintrusive inspections than its own guidelines would permit.58 What theAmericans wanted in the North Korean case was a verification regime thatwent beyond these guidelines. This may have been necessary in view of theNorth’s record of not keeping to agreements but it was infeasible politically.Verification agreements had to be negotiated with states jealously defendingtheir sovereignty and their agreement was required for some of the mostchallenging provisions. Ideally, the IAEA should have the right of access toall suspected nuclear sites and the power to resort to challenge inspectionswhen required, but state sovereignty would not allow that.

The Six Party Talks did agree on a verification mechanism but it fell farshort of what the Americans had demanded. There was a great discrepancybetween what was required for the task of effective verification that wouldleave no doubts about the North’s nuclear program, and what the partiescould actually agree upon. For a start, verification was to be conducted withinthe framework of the Six Party Talks which meant that teams of experts fromthe parties would be involved. Thus the conflicts which inhibited progress

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during the talks would impede and endlessly delay the verification process,and little would be decided. The North rejected the involvement of the IAEAand its role was limited to “consultancy and assistance” when required, whichreflected the North’s effort to keep it at arm’s length. Verification wouldinclude “visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technicalpersonnel and other measures unanimously agreed upon among the six par-ties.” The parties did not decide which sites to visit and when to visit them, orhow samples of nuclear material would be collected and when and to whatextent the IAEA would become involved. These details were left to theworking group on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that wasestablished under the February agreement.59 The parties also agreed toestablish a monitoring system, but at the North’s request this also was limitedto the Six Party Talks framework and was to consist of the heads of delega-tion of the six parties. Director of the IAEA Mohamed Elbaradei rejected thisproposal since it would compromise the IAEA’s authority and simply wouldnot be credible.60 The idea of verification by the Six Parties indicated how farthe resolution of the nuclear issue was departing from international andtherefore credible standards to accommodate the North. The talks set a newdeadline for the North’s disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by theend of October 2008. They also agreed to supply the North with heavy fueloil to the North in parallel with the disablement of Yongbyon. The North hadreceived 150,000 tons already and another 850,000 tons were to be shipped byChina and South Korea by the end of August, and by the US and Russia bythe end of October.61 With an agreement seemingly close at hand Japan hadno intention of blocking progress which would have provoked resentmentfrom the others; it indicated its willingness to take part without a resolutionof the abduction issue.62

The details of the verification regime had been consigned to the workinggroup on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula where the North stal-led. The deadline of August 10 passed as the talks were deadlocked. The USexpected the North to accept a modified draft of its demands while the Northawaited its removal from the terrorist sponsors list. The North accused theUS of violating their agreement but the Americans insisted that there was nowritten document linking North Korea’s acceptance of verification to itsremoval from the terrorist sponsor list.63 On August 14 Kim Jong-il suffered aserious stroke which partially incapacitated him. As a result, North Koreandecision-making was suspended. Chris Hill later told the press that the USwas ready to be flexible “on format,” but not over what was required forverification of the nuclear issue. What Hill had in mind was removingexpressions that the North would object to, and eliminating some items ifNorth Korea gave its verbal consent to the implementation of the finalagreement.64 How the US could be flexible in a way that would break thedeadlock without undermining the verification regime is difficult to imagine.The impression created was one of an administration that was abruptly cavingin for the sake of an agreement with the North. Former CIA officer Art

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Brown was highly critical of the direction of the negotiations as they weregoing against what the Administration had previously thought necessary indealing with the North. The North, he argued, was “getting exactly what itwants” because the HEU program was not included, nor was there any men-tion of the North’s proliferation of nuclear technology to countries like Syria. Henoted that the North would be removed from the list of state sponsors ofterrorism and would receive one million tons of heavy fuel oil. America’salliance ties with Japan would be weakened because the abduction issue wasexcluded. For this, all the North had to do was to demolish the cooling towerat the Yongbyon nuclear reactor which was a “publicity stunt” as the reactorwas dilapidated anyway.65

Nonetheless, the Americans accepted the result of the talks and the inef-fective verification provisions as they knew that little more was realisticallypossible. The Bush Administration was pressing for an agreement over theissue and was obliged to work within the parameters of the Six Party Talksgiven that it resisted the call to resolve the issue bilaterally. The Japanese weredisturbed. They believed that they had a commitment from the US that itwould not remove North Korea from the terrorism sponsors list until therewas progress over the abduction issue. They were alarmed by the BushAdministration’s excessive eagerness to come to an agreement with the North.The Yomiuri Shinbun opined that the Bush Administration had taken a 180-degree change from the time when Bush included North Korea in the “axis ofevil” along with Iran and Iraq and refused to deal with it bilaterally. TheNorth “accurately read the state of U.S. impatience to achieve results” andexploited Chris Hill’s weak diplomatic position by stalling. Prime MinisterYasuo Fukuda reiterated the Japanese government’s position when he insistedthat the nuclear issue had to be resolved simultaneously with the abductionproblem.66

North Korea resorted to its usual tactics to prod the Americans. In lateSeptember 2008, the North demanded that the IAEA remove cameras andseals from the Yongbyon reactor, which had been placed there in June 2007,and expelled the agency’s inspectors. It also publicly declared that it hadbegun to restore the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon as a way of indicating itsdispleasure at the American tardiness in removing it from the terrorismsponsors list.67 The US responded by dispatching Chris Hill to Pyongyangover October 1–3 to seek the North’s cooperation over the verification issue.The pattern was repeated. If the US dug its heels over an important issue, theNorth would move to activate its nuclear reactor and the Americans wouldthen arrange bilateral talks to defuse the issue, usually with the obligatoryconcessions. As a result, on October 11 the Bush administration announcedthat the North had been removed from the terrorism sponsors list withoutsignificant progress over the verification issue, a diplomatic victory for theNorth. What had been achieved? Chris Hill obtained the North’s tentativeagreement for access to registered nuclear facilities only, leaving the issue ofunregistered sites open. The State Department said by way of explanation

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that inspectors would be allowed access to sites where nuclear activity wassuspected on the basis of “mutual consent.”68 State Department officials didnot make the agreement public and claimed that the North had made threeconcessions. It allowed “potential access” to undeclared nuclear facilities andaccepted the need for sample taking, it had also agreed that Japanese andSouth Korean inspectors could be included in the verification team.69

The agreement revealed the extent to which the Bush Administration waswilling to surrender key positions that were sacred to its neoconservatives. Itwas strongly criticized by officials in the State Department’s Verification,Compliance and Implementation Bureau (VCI) who had drafted the Amer-ican submission to the July Six Party Talks, and who regarded the verificationprocedures subsequently agreed as unacceptable. This Bureau was notinformed of the details of the agreement until one day before the North wasremoved from the state sponsors of terrorism list on October 10 when ameeting with Chris Hill and Condoleezza Rice was convened. On that nightthe President approved it and went ahead with the de-listing.70 The mainconcession was that access to undeclared sites required “mutual consent”which allowed the North ample room to cover its tracks. Moreover, theagreement did not specially mention sample taking but resorted to vaguelanguage calling for “the use of scientific procedures, including sampling andforensic activities.”71 The State Department claimed that it had an “oralunderstanding” with the North about this issue which was unlikely to inspireconfidence. There was also a concern as to whether American inspectorswould be allowed to take samples of nuclear material laboratories outside theNorth for analysis.72 US officials admitted that inspectors would not havepermission to visit the site of the 2006 nuclear test or any military facilitiesinvolved in the nuclear program, but only to Yongbyon and some academicinstitutions.73 This raised another problem. What good was sample testing ifthe inspectors were barred from visiting suspected nuclear sites? The right tosample testing which the State Department claimed to have obtained wasnullified by the “mutual consent” requirement to visit nuclear sites.

Victor Cha has claimed that despite all its shortcomings and weaknesses,the Bush Administration would leave his successor “the remnants of a work-able nuclear disablement process rather than a full-blown crisis.” He wrotethat US and international nuclear experts would be “on the ground in NorthKorea learning more about Kim Jong-il’s nuclear secrets while slowly dis-abling and degrading his nuclear capabilities.”74 However, it is difficult to seehow these nuclear secrets could be uncovered if the verification regime did notallow it, or if the “mutual consent” requirement prevented it. Could the UShave done better? Probably not. The verification experts could legitimatelypoint to the North’s chicanery and its record of deceit as a reason for a strictverification regime according to their draft submitted to the Six Party Talks.However, Chris Hill and Condoleezza Rice felt that the US was in no posi-tion to impose an extensive verification regime on the North, nor could itappeal to the Six Party Talks or to the UN to enforce a regime that was

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opposed by the North. The UN had imposed a strict verification regime onIraq but this was after its defeat in the 1991 Gulf War which left the countryprostrate before the victors. In this case the North, however, was already anuclear power and could claim sovereignty rights to protect itself against themost intrusive inspections. Moreover, the Bush Administration was workingto prevent another crisis with the North which could push it to resort to athird nuclear test before its term of office expired.75 As the Bush Adminis-tration worked to avert another crisis with the North, it left an unworkablenuclear disablement process for its successor.

The South Korean government praised the agreement; chief envoy to theSix PartyTalks Kim Sook thought that it would help put the talks back on trackand eventually lead to the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear pro-grams.”76 The agreement was seen to pave the way for the normalization ofinter-Korean relations which had deteriorated since the GNP leader LeeMyung-bak became president.77 Inter-Korean projects had been suspendedsince 11 July 2008 when a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by aNorth Korean soldier at the Mt. Geumgang resort. The North reduced con-tacts with the South and imposed new restrictions on travel and access to theGaesong Industrial Complex. In this situation GNP members criticized theAmerican de-listing of the North without accounting for the bombing ofKorean Airlines flight 858 in November 1987.78 South Korean liberals andsupporters of Roh Moo-hyun thought that the South had lost its mediator’sposition to bridge the gap between the US and the North Korea and hadcome too close to Japan.79

The impact upon the Japanese was predictable as the removal of the Northfrom the terrorism sponsors list was seen as an example of American indif-ference to the abductions issue that had captivated the Japanese public. TheJapan Times opined that the delisting of the North was an American con-cession and the agreement with the North contained “worrisome elements.”80

The Japanese were concerned also by the way the Americans went about theagreement. In the October 11 agreement with the North, the US placed theverification issue in an appendix to the main document which had less bind-ing power. This gave rise to fears on the Japanese side that the US was lettingthe verification issue slide for the sake of an agreement with the North. TheJapanese were also concerned that their linkage of the abduction issue witheconomic assistance to the North reduced their options in dealing with theNorth. Japan had earlier refused to provide its share of the promised heavy oilshipments to the North for this reason. Should the Six Party Talks come toagreement, the US would turn to other countries such as Australia to fill thegap. Japan would lose its position in the negotiations and the opportunity ofinfluencing the North over the abduction issue.81 There was concern thatJapan had taken the abduction issue too far but could not override it becauseof its emotional appeal for the Japanese public. Chris Hill met Kim Sook andJapanese chief negotiator Akitaka Saiki in another trilateral meeting tocoordinate positions between the allies before the Six Party Talks. They

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agreed that sample testing of specific nuclear facilities should be included in awritten document to avoid misunderstanding over the verification procedures.The Japanese representative Saiki was particularly insistent that there shouldbe a clear commitment in writing to allow sample testing.82

The final meeting of the Six Party Talks was convened over December 8–112008 to endorse the agreement over verification made bilaterally between theUS and the North. North Korean officials had earlier indicated that theywanted to keep the verification process off the agenda of the talks and focuson the disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, the removal of nuclear fuel rodsfrom the reactor, and the delivery of the promised heavy fuel oil.83 The talksquickly came to a standstill as verification was the main issue for the otherparties. The Chinese circulated a four page draft proposal of the verificationprotocol which made mention of the contentious issue of the sampling ofnuclear material. The oral agreement to sample testing which the Americansclaimed to have reached with the North was refuted by Kim Kye-kwan whosaid that the North had a different view of the issue.84 This time, five partiesincluding China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the US lined up against theNorth over sample testing.85 Kim Sook said that they agreed upon a schedulefor the second phase of the denuclearization process by March 2009. The US,the South, and Japan wanted to link verification with the economic andenergy incentives, a proposal which the North rejected.86 The five partiesagreed that energy assistance, which was to be provided in parallel with thedisablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and a schedule for the deliveryof the remainder of the promised heavy oil, would be determined later.87 Thechairman’s statement said that South Korea agreed to convene a meeting ofthe Working Group on the Economy and Energy Cooperation to “coordinatethe relevant issues concerning assistance to the DPRK.”88 The Parties agreedto hold the next Six Party Talks at an early date but they failed to meet.Condoleezza Rice told the press afterwards that the Bush Administration’sefforts were not wasted as the Yongbyon reactor had been shut down and nofurther plutonium had been produced since the September 2005 agreement.89

These were temporary achievements that could easily be reversed, however, asthe North had avoided a commitment to anything that would tie its handsover the nuclear issue.

Conclusion

Why did the North allow the Six Party talks to collapse? The Bush Admin-istration had given the North the best possible deal under the circumstancesand had made concessions for the sake of an agreement that no one wouldhave predicted. The North drew back at the final step and would not accept averification regime that would have satisfied the parties at the talks. Thesample testing of nuclear material was not the most critical issue as the US, inits desire for agreement, had allowed the North a veto over inspections ofnuclear sites when it accepted that “mutual consent” was required. Inspectors

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could not take samples of nuclear material if their visits to suspected siteswere blocked. The North was hoping that the incoming Administration in theUS would be easier to deal with, and that a President Obama would return tothe policies promoted by the Clinton Administration. The Obama Adminis-tration could not improve on the deal unless the North fantasized about apresidential visit, immediate diplomatic recognition and massive amounts ofaid, which were unlikely. The reasons for the North’s behavior go deeper asthe North had achieved what it had aimed for in its first nuclear test. It wasobliged to continue with the Six Party Talks to entice the Americans to liftfinancial sanctions and to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terror-ism, but when that had been achieved it could let the talks lapse. Moreover,the party conservatives, who had reasserted control over policy since KimJong-il was incapacitated by a stroke, had little interest in negotiations andsought to strengthen their nuclear and ballistic missile capability. The eco-nomic reforms of July 2002 were rolled back by 2007 under Kim Jong-il’sbrother in law, Jang Song-taek who was elevated to First Vice Director of theKorean Workers’ Party with responsibility for the police, the judiciary, andinternal security.90 Under the party conservatives and military, the North waspreparing for a second nuclear test to rectify the technical problems of theOctober 2006 test. As a nuclear power, the North had outgrown the Six PartyTalks.

What did the Bush Administration expect by repudiating its previousnegotiating position and making a series of concessions to the North? Afterthe October 2006 test the North had become a de facto nuclear power andthere was no rolling back the program short of a devastating military strikeagainst the North, which was plainly not on the cards. The Americans hadexpected Chinese support in pressing the North over the nuclear issue butChina had worked to its own agenda and had urged the US to accept prag-matic compromise. The US could not resort to the UN Security Councilwhere both China and Russia would use their veto and it was constrained bythese powers in the Six Party Talks, the US had few alternatives left. Bushcould have avoided the issue and left it for the incoming Obama Adminis-tration to resolve while maintaining the neoconservative principles of hisadministration but that could have worsened the situation. A refusal tonegotiate with the North could have prompted it to engage in more ballisticand nuclear tests that would threaten its allies, Japan and South Korea, withthe consequent deterioration of security in Northeast Asia. Bush was thenobliged to repudiate his previous position over the issue in recognition of newrealities that his policies had failed to prevent. He allowed his Secretary ofState and chief negotiator for North Korea to devise a negotiating strategy indealing with the North that required a series of concessions from a positionthat could not be defended anyway. The Americans had hoped that if themomentum of the Six Party Talks could be maintained, and if the right eco-nomic incentives were offered, the North might be enticed into a continuingprocess of negotiation that would give it no reason to go ahead with the

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development of its nuclear program. Further ballistic missile and nuclear testscould be prevented. However, the party conservatives who had reassertedcontrol over the North had other plans.

Notes1 Lee Joo-hee, “N.K. shows flexibility at talks,” The Korea Herald, February 9 2007.2 Reiji Yoshida, “Japan talking tough over abduction issue,” The Japan Times,February 7 2007.

3 Park Song-wu, “Pyongyang wants diplomatic ties with Washington,” The KoreaTimes, February 9 2007.

4 “China proposal boosts optimism at nuclear talks,” The Korea Herald, February10 2007.

5 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, “North Korea talks near collapse over Pyon-gyang energy demands,” International Herald Tribune, February 11 2007.

6 Park Song-wu, “Nuke drama opens ‘2nd Act’s 1st Scene,’” The Korea Times,February 13 2007.

7 “North Korea-Denuclearization Plan,” Office of the Spokesman, US StateDepartment, Washington DC, February 13 2007, www.State.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/February/80479.html: “Text of the Agreement,” International Herald Tribune, 13February 2007.

8 ‘North Korean uranium recedes as issue for US,” The Japan Times, February 142007.

9 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North KoreaDeal,” The New York Times February 16 2007.

10 David E. Sanger, “Outside Pressures broke Korean Deadlock” The New YorkTimes, February 13 2007.

11 David E. Sanger, “Outside Pressures broke Korean Deadlock.”12 Glenn Kessler, “Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord,” The Washington

Post February 15 2007.13 “Agreeing to the Same Framework,” The National Review, February 14 2007,

www.nationalreview.com/articles/219974/agreeing-same-framework/editors.14 John O’Sullivan “North Korea Comes Back for Some More: The deal just keeps get-

ting better for Kim Jong-il.” The National Review, February 23 2007, www.nationalreview.com/articles/220069/north-korea-comes-back-some-more/john-osullivan.

15 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, “Tentative nuclear deal is set with NorthKorea,” International Herald Tribune, February 12 2007.

16 Lee Joo-hee, “Nuke talks to resume Feb. 8,” The Korea Herald, January 31 2007.17 Park Song wu, “6 way talks make breakthrough,” The Korea Times February 13 2007.18 Editorial “No small achievement,” The Korea Herald, February 15 2007.19 Lee Joo-hee, “Nuke pact will pave way to peace: Roh,” The Korea Herald, Feb-

ruary 15 2007.20 Ryu Jin, “Roh open to Inter-Korean Summit,” The Korea Times, January 23

2007; Ryu Jin, “Stepping stone laid for inter-Korean Summit,” The Korea Times,February 13 2007.

21 David R. Sands, “S. Korean dissenter warns of nuke deal,” The WashingtonTimes, February 16 2007.

22 Lee Joo-hee, “100 days and nothing to show for Six Party Breakthrough,” TheKorea Herald May 23 2007.

23 Editorial: “Don’t Allow N Korea to take lead in Six Party Talks,” Nikkei, 20March 2007.

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24 Motohiro Ikeda, “N Korean Deal only 1st step in long path to denuclearisation,”Nikkei, February 14 2007.

25 “Interpretation of N Korean Nuclear pact could affect compliance,” Nikkei,February 14 2007.

26 “Abe reassures abductees’ kin: No ties with N Korea Until all return,” Nikkei,February 20 2007.

27 Hiroko Nakata, “Yamasaki’s Pyongyang trip draws flak,” The Japan Times, Jan-uary 10 2007.

28 Glenn Kessler, “Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord,” The WashingtonPost, 15 February 2007.

29 David E. Sanger, “US to hold direct talks in North Korea on arms,” InternationalHerald Tribune, June 21 2007.

30 “US-NK, feud over BDA ‘fully resolved,’” The Korea Herald, 19 March 2007;“Mission Accomplished on NK fund release: White House,” The Korea Times, 20March 2007; Maureen Fan, “Six Party Talks Break Down as N. Korea Balks onFunds,” The Washington Post, March 23 2007.

31 Lee Joo-hee, “100 days and nothing to show for Six Party Breakthrough,” TheKorea Herald, May 23 2007.

32 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Receives Funds and Says It Will Shut Down ItsMain Nuclear Reactor,” The New York Times, June 26 2007.

33 “North Korea’s nuclear programs,” The Japan Times, July 16 2008.34 Glenn Kessler, “New Doubts on Nuclear efforts by North Korea,” The

Washington Post, March 1 2007.35 Joel S. Wit, “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” The Washington

Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 2, Spring 2007.36 “North has ‘secret nuclear program,’” The Japan Times, February 22 2007.

“Seoul believes N. Korea has Uranium Program,” The Chosun Ilbo, February 202007; Jung Sung-ki, “Nuke Talks to address Uranium Program,” The KoreaTimes, February 16 2007.

37 David E. Sanger, “US to hold direct talks in North Korea on arms,” InternationalHerald Tribune, June 21 2007; “US may consider N. Korea nuclear equipmentbuyback,” The Japan Times, June 25 2007.

38 Lee Joo-hee, “getting N. Korea to admit to its HEU program,” The KoreaHerald, June 27 2007.

39 “N. Korea to disable nuke programs,” The Associated Press, September 2 2007.40 David E. Sanger, “Nuclear Pact Broadening, North Korea and US say,” The New

York Times, September 3 2007.41 “Bush rewards N. Korea with fuel oil, lauds progressive steps,” The Japan Times,

October 1 2007.42 Lee Joo-hee, “Nuke envoys reach common agreement,” The Korea Herald,

October 1 2007.43 “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 3 2007 www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/action0710.html; “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementationof the Joint Statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic ofChina, 3 October 2007, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm.

44 “N. Korea to disable Yongbyon,” The Japan Times, October 5 2007.45 Dianne E. Rennack, “North Korea: Economic Sanctions,” Congressional

Research Service Report for Congress, October 17 2006, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf.

46 Larry Niksch, Raphael Perl, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal? CRS Report forCongress, December 11 2007, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA474951

47 Lee Joo-hee, “US not ready for broad NK engagement,” The Korea Herald,December 14 2007.

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48 Helene Cooper, “A New Bush Tack on North Korea,” The New York Times,December 7 2007.

49 Ibid.50 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Sees Stalling by North Korea on Nuclear Pact,” The New

York Times, January 19 2008.51 “NK Nuclear Declaration Is Completed,” The Korea Times, July 3 2008.52 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception, Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous

Times, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2011, p. 107.53 The estimate of 44 kilograms included the 30 kilograms extracted previously, 8

kilograms in spent nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon, 4 kilograms of residual pluto-nium inside the nuclear facilities and 2 kilograms of nuclear waste stored at thefacilities. Yoshiharu Asano, “2 kg of plutonium used in N-test, N. Korea’s report toChina shows that 30 kilograms were extracted,” The Daily Yomiuri, July 3 2008.

54 Lee Joo-hee “China proposes 6-way nuke talks on July 10,” The Korea HeraldJuly 2 2008.

55 Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal; DemandsBegan to Undo Nuclear Accord,” The Washington Post, September 26 2008.

56 Takeo Miyazaki, “N-probe also eyes DPRK’s help to others; Inspection disputemay delay delisting,” The Daily Yomiuri August 7 2008.

57 Susan F. Burk, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, “U.S.-IAEAAdditional Protocol” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.Washington, DC, Department of State Archive. January 29 2004, http://2001–9.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/29249.htm.

58 Philip D. Neill Jr. Verification in an age of insecurity: the future of Arms ControlCompliance, Oxford, 2010, p. 75.

59 “North Korea’s nuclear programs,” The Japan Times, July 16 2008; Takeo Miya-zaki, “N-probe also eyes DPRK’s help to others; Inspection dispute may delaydelisting,” The Daily Yomiuri, August 7 2008.

60 Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception, p 106.61 “Press Communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of

the Six Party Talks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan July 12 2008 www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/press0807.html.

62 “North Korea’s nuclear programs,” The Japan Times, July 16 2008.63 “Nothing new, really,” The Korea Herald, September 27 2008.64 Takeo Miyazaki, “U.S. ‘flexible’ on N. Korea N-report verification,” The Daily

Yomiuri, September 12 2008.65 Art Brown, “North Korea’s Stacked Deck,” The New York Times, July 15 2008.

Art Brown was the head of the Asia division of the CIA’s clandestine service from2003 to 2005.

66 “North Korea’s nuclear threat; North Korea exploits impatience of lame-duckBush administration,” The Daily Yomiuri, July 2 2008.

67 Jin Dae-woong “N.K. asks IAEA to remove seals,” The Korea Herald, September23 2008.

68 Choe Sang-hun and Helene Cooper, “North Koreans Confirm Pledge to DisablePlant,” The New York Times, October 13 2008.

69 Glenn Kessler; “U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List,” The WashingtonPost, October 12 2008.

70 “Delisting concerns U.S. officials,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 22 2008.71 Ibid.72 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List,” The New York

Times October 12 2008.73 Glenn Kessler; “U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List,” The Washington

Post, October 12 2008.

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74 Victor Cha, “Gaining A Yard on Pyongyang,” The Washington Post, October 132008.

75 Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal; DemandsBegan to Undo Nuclear Accord,” The Washington Post, September 26 2008.

76 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List,” The New YorkTimes, October 12 2008; Kim Tae-woo, “North Korea wins another round ofnuke diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, October 30 2008.

77 “Seoul hopes for thaw in inter-Korea ties,” The Korea Herald October 13 2008.78 Choe Sang-hun and Helene Cooper, “North Koreans Confirm Pledge to Disable

Plant,” The New York Times, October 13 2008.79 Jin Dae-woong, “Nuclear talks stuck on verification as Bush term ends,” The

Korea Herald December 15 2008.80 “U.S. ‘gave ground’ to North Korea,” The Daily Yomiuri November 2 2008.81 Satoshi Ogawa, “U.S. eyes oil aid sources for N. Korea Replacements sought for

Japan assistance,” The Daily Yomiuri October 22 2008.82 Jun Hongo, “North nuke verification must be in writing: Saiki,” The Japan Times,

December 4 2008.83 “N. Korea ‘cool toward written verification’,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 30

2008.84 “Action for Action,” The Korea Times, December 12 2008.85 “Failure of latest round,” The Japan Times, December 13 2008.86 Jin Dae-woong, “Nuke talks zero in on China’s draft protocol: Beijing circulates

proposal for verification details,” The Korea Herald, December 10 2008.87 “Failure of latest round,” The Japan Times, December 13 2008.88 “Chairman’s Statement of the Six Party Talks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Japan, 11 December 2008, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/state0812.html.

89 “Rice diplomacy,” The Korea Herald, December 24 2008.90 “Conservatives are reasserting in N.K.,” The Korea Herald, December 18 2008.

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7 Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks

Introduction

Understanding the psychology of power in North Korea is important toexplain why the North’s behavior deviated so often from what the other par-ties in the talks had expected of it. It was often assumed that the North couldbargain away its nuclear program for economic aid, and that it would thenreform itself and become integrated with the economies of Northeast Asia ina way which would remove the problem of its existence. Those that made suchjudgments had little understanding of the dynamics of a system that was sodifferent from their own, and simply projected their own reasonable and well-meaning expectations onto a regime that operated on different, if not perverseprinciples. The final round of the Six Party Talks ended in December 2008with few prospects for their revival in the near future. The North was nolonger interested in them and could let them lapse quietly. After his stroke inSeptember 2008 Kim Jong-il moved to strengthen his dynastic hold overpower by having his third son Kim Jong-un recognized as successor by themilitary. Critical for the succession was the demonstration of the dynasty’spower to the outside world to boost the new and inexperienced leader’s cred-ibility before the military and security apparatus which ruled the country.Regime survival demanded the reaffirmation of the founding myths of theKim dynasty and continual demonstrations of power since there were noother sources of legitimacy. Near economic collapse and the desperate plightof the people propelled the regime not to open up to the world as expected bywell meaning foreign observers, but to stage another round of ballistic missilelaunchings and a second nuclear test in 2009. The dynamics of regime survi-val dictated major provocations against the South which shattered any hopethat the parties had for a renewal of the Six Party Talks.

The psychology of power and the succession issue

Kim Jong-il was not expected to last very long after his stroke so the searchfor a successor became an urgent preoccupation. French neurosurgeon Dr.Francois-Xavier Roux revealed to the press that he had been flown urgently to

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North Korea to examine Kim Jong-il after he had collapsed of a stroke onAugust 14 2008. He reported that the North Korean leader was in a “life-threatening situation.”1 His left side was partially paralyzed and he couldmove his arm or leg only with difficulty; he also suffered from diabetes, highblood pressure and kidney failure that required regular dialysis.2 On January15 2009 the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported that Kim Jong-il’sthird son Kim Jong-un had been nominated as successor which was totallyunexpected for party officials in the North. Kim Jong-il had reportedly issueda directive to this effect to the Party around 8 January.3 His eldest son KimJong-nam was disqualified after his bizarre attempt to visit Tokyo Disneylandon a forged passport in May 2001, while second son Kim Jong-chull wasdescribed as too feminine. In view of his health problems it was critical forKim Jong-il to arrange a smooth succession and to ensure the loyalty of theparty which would regard the inexperienced youth, who was 25 at the time, asan upstart. Rites of passage for an aspiring leader in the North demanddemonstrations of power to justify the regime’s mythology of omnipotencedespite the economic disasters into which it had led the country. North Koreahas been described as a “family state” in which Stalinism has been engraftedupon Confucian familialism, but its moral failure in providing for its peopleblatantly contradicts this self image and threatens the regimes legitimacy.4

Open displays of power against the external world and provocations againstthe South impose an enforced unanimity around the regime intended to arrestany tendencies that would question the regime’s role and performance. Pro-vocations would trigger hostile reactions and anger from the world whichwould reinforce the country’s isolation as a condition of regime survival.Elaborate and oppressive controls instituted over the population are justifiedby what is portrayed as external hostility which in turn confirms the regime’sposition as supreme protector of the nation, demanding absolute obediencefrom it. Rational minded diplomats in the West, South Korea, and China whoattempted to engineer a soft landing for the North through a program ofeconomic aid and assistance seemed not to understand the terrible dilemmathat it would pose for the regime. What the regime feared most of all was lossof control and the opening up of the economy and society to the outsideworld which would threaten its survival. The regime was a product of brutalcontrol intended to impose a siege mentality upon the population, the para-meters of possible change were severely restricted. It was normal and rationalto expect that a country would want economic progress and prosperity for itspeople and would surrender the nuclear program for the sake of economicassistance and aid. This understanding of rationality often appeared in newsreports which latched on to the North’s demand that the problem wasAmerican hostility, and if that were ended, rapid progress in negotiationswould follow. It was never understood that the North needed that hostilityand could never part with it because it validated the regime’s isolation andensured its continued survival. This would provide a justification for thenuclear weapons program.

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The North lost interest in the Six Party Talks which were originally limitedto denuclearization whereas one way or another it wanted recognition of itsnuclear status. The North intended to remove what it had regarded as theanomaly of the Six Party Talks which placed it in the position of target state,subject to the demands of others. Nuclear weapons, in the North’s view, gaveit the right to be seated with the US and China as an equal, in which case thetenor of the negotiations would change accordingly.5 After a visit to Pyon-gyang Selig Harrison noted how the North’s bargaining position had har-dened during this period. Because of his ill health Kim Jong-il had allowedhis brother in law Jang Song-taek to manage the country on a day-to-daybasis and had conceded control over security to the National Defense Com-mission which was made up of hardline generals. He reported that the Northexpected that the US would deal with it as a nuclear power like Russia orChina, in which case negotiations would be about arms limitations and notdenuclearization. The North also demanded inspection rights of US bases inthe South if it was to agree to inspections of its nuclear facilities as part of averification regime.6 The North was also preparing for another display ofpower to assert its new relationship with the outside world in the knowledgethat there were few penalties that could be levied against it. On previousoccasions China and Russia softened the impact of UN resolutions against itand there was no reason to believe that they would do otherwise this time.

In early 2009 the North began to issue belligerent statements which seemedto presage dramatic events. On January 17 it threatened “all out confronta-tion” against the South and on 30 January announced that it would repudiateall agreements with the South, including those over the northern line limitreached in the past. US and South Korean intelligence noted that the Northwas constructing a new launch site at Dongchang-ri, which was larger thanthe main missile base in Musudan-ri, and was to be used for launching longerrange ballistic missiles.7 On April 5 the North launched a long range ballisticmissile which it called an Unha-2. It was basically a Taepodong-2 missileused to launch what the North called communications satellites. The distinc-tion was important since the North maintained that it had launched a“communications satellite” which was acceptable internationally, and not aballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead which would be con-demned by the international community. The test was once more a failurewhich again revealed that the North had not overcome the technical problemsof constructing long range ballistic missiles. The missile’s third stage failed toseparate and fell into the sea with its payload some 3,850 kilometers from thelaunch site.8 The test contravened UN Resolution 1718 of October 12 2006which demanded that the North “not conduct any further nuclear test orlaunch of a ballistic missile.” However, both China and Russia again pro-tected the North and claimed that it was a legitimate attempt to launch acommunications satellite which would not be a violation of Resolution 1718.The US and Japan insisted that the launch violated the resolution becauseballistic missile technology was used. China’s draft resolution condemned the

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launch without reference to whether it was a missile or a satellite launch.9

The US and Japan called for stricter measures to implement Resolution 1718.Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso demanded a new UN resolution on theNorth which China and Russia opposed.10 Instead, China pressed for a nonbinding statement to be issued by the President of the Security Council whowas then the French Ambassador.11 On this occasion, because of Chinese andRussian insistence, no resolution resulted but only a president’s statement whichgave even less cause for Northern anger. The President’s statement of April 13noted that the launch was in contravention of Security Council Resolution1718 (2006) and demanded that the North “not conduct any furtherlaunch.”12 The statement was a very weak response to the North’s act whichsimply added nothing to Resolution 1718, nor did it call for penalties for thebreach of the resolution.

The US, British, and French delegations claimed that a Security Councilpresidential statement was binding and had the legal force of a resolution,while others argued that that it was declaratory and only a resolution underChapter VII would be binding on all members. The South Koreans wereworried because if the North directed further provocations against them, the UNwould be prevented from responding by China and Russia. As The KoreanHerald stated “It was sheer nonsense for Beijing and Moscow, while acquies-cing to Pyongyang’s lies about launching a non existent space vehicle, to callfor restraint from Seoul.” It called for “unreserved cooperation” between theSouth and the US in relation to the North.13 The Japanese were similarlydisturbed. Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura called the missile launcha “grave provocative action,” and declared that Japan would extend sanctions onthe North for one year and would discuss the imposition of new sanctions. Japanwas ready to test its ballistic missile defense system (BMD) against the North.Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada announced that aegis-equipped destroyersKongo and Choukai would be sent to the test area and PAC-3missile systemswould be alerted to intercept North Korean missiles if they threatenedJapan.14 It would be interesting to speculate who would make the decision torespond to a North Korean missile launching in view of the well knownJapanese penchant for avoiding such decisions. The North had declared thatif Japan did so it would be an act of war.

The North reacted angrily to the Security Council President’s statement butsome kind of criticism, if not condemnation, was foreseeable. The Northcould not be surprised at the Security Council’s reaction in view of Resolution1718 and the unanimous condemnation of the previous round of missile tests.On April 14, the North’s Foreign Ministry denounced the UN President’sstatement despite its anodyne content, and said it would boycott the Six PartyTalks and activate the Yongbyon reactor. The North announced that it wouldexpel IAEA inspectors from the reactor, who had been stationed there sinceNovember 2007, and demanded that all surveillance equipment be removed.The statement added that the Six Party Talks had become “useless” and thatthe North “would never participate in the talks any longer nor would it be

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bound by any agreement of the Six Party Talks.”15 This supercilious declara-tion was the North’s practiced way of dealing with condemnation as it placedthe onus on the others to come bearing gifts if they wanted dialogue andengagement to continue. On April 29 the North declared that it would start auranium enrichment program if the UN did not lift sanctions. A ForeignMinistry spokesman called the UN Security Council “a tool for the U.S.highhanded and arbitrary practices,” and that the North would “take addi-tional self-defensive measures” unless the Security Council apologized imme-diately.”16

The second nuclear test followed on May 25. The North declared that thetest was safely conducted “on a new higher level in terms of its explosivepower and technology of its control.”17 It was more powerful than the firsttest in October 2006, the tremor measuring 4.4 to 4.7 whereas the 2006 testmeasured around 3.6. The North also launched three short range ballisticmissiles after the test which was regarded as an attempt to keep US surveil-lance aircraft at bay.18 The test had three purposes. The first was to overcomethe technical difficulties of the October 2006 test, which was only a partialsuccess, and by all accounts this goal was achieved. The second purpose wasto demonstrate the North’s status as a nuclear power, once and for all, and toput the world on alert that it should be treated as one. North Korean officialstold Chris Hill that they wanted the status of a nuclear power, like India orPakistan, and that talks between North and the US should focus on mutualnuclear arms reductions between two nuclear powers, as was the case with theUS and the Soviet Union.19 They refused to subject themselves to inspectionsor verification which meant that negotiations with the North could not bebased on the Six Party Talks, where it was the target of collective pressure todenuclearize. They had to be based on equality with the US and the otherparties. The third purpose was to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s position as theheir and to ensure that the military would pledge loyalty to him.20 This initself indicated the nature of the system; if the leader of the North had toresort to forceful displays of power before he would be accepted by the mili-tary, it revealed the extent to which violence had been built into a militarizedsystem. As a long-term objective, the North was working towards a “hostagestrategy” which required miniaturized nuclear warheads and long-range bal-listic missiles capable of striking the west coast of the US. If North Koreawere able to do this, it would hold the US hostage and would be treated withmore respect as a nuclear power in its own right. The North, however, had along way to go to overcome the technical problems involved.

The clear violation of UN Resolution 1718 should have provoked strongcondemnation from the international community but the North had becomeinured to watered-down resolutions that carried little force. Chinese ForeignMinister Yang Jiechi contacted his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov andboth agreed that they wanted a “convincing response” to the North’s latestnuclear test. Lavrov stated that ignoring previous UN resolutions was inad-missible. They also emphasized that the issue had to be resolved

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diplomatically through the resumption of the Six Party Talks, and bymeeting the North’s justified security concerns.21 This meant that despite theoutrage experienced by both the Chinese and Russians, their approachtowards the North would not fundamentally change. Chinese and Russianprotection had shielded the North from the ire of the international commu-nity and from the US and Japan in particular. Unfortunately it revealed theineffectiveness of international institutions in disciplining miscreant regimeswhich had great and powerful patrons. The North indeed could rely upon itsgreat and powerful patrons in China and Russia for protection against UNsanctions, and could proceed with ballistic missile and nuclear tests with someimpunity.

The dilemma for China had become acute, particularly after it was under-stood that the North intended to become a nuclear power and had littleintention of giving up its nuclear program. Hu Jintao reportedly was con-sidering a tougher response to the second test and indicated that a “thoroughrevaluation” of policy towards the North was in the offing. Korean expertZhang Liangui said that the North’s objective of becoming a nuclear statewould threaten China and undermine the security of Northeast Asia. TheChinese were concerned that the test would push Japan’s neoconservatives torevise the 1947 constitution resulting in Japanese rearmament on a largescale. Critical Chinese demanded that China teach the North a lesson, abro-gate the 1961 treaty with it and reduce trade and aid with the regime.22 Thesense of outrage that was expressed by these scholars was balanced somewhatby commentaries that followed the party line. They stressed that while theNorth may be a burden for China it was also “an important strategicresource” against US attempts to contain China, and also against the US–Japanese alliance, which the Chinese saw as a threat.,23 China did at leastsuspend government exchanges with the North and Chen Zhili, who was ViceChairman of the National People’s Congress, had his visit to Pyongyangpostponed.24 The North had brazenly ignored China in its conduct of twonuclear tests and two rounds of ballistic missile launchings, yet the Chinesecould not bring themselves to do anything which could harm the relationship.While China claimed that it had attempted to prevent the North frombecoming a nuclear power, its opposition to sanctions and its unwillingness toadopt harsher measures against the North had made this possible. The Northwas able yet again to exploit the Chinese position and took advantage of itstolerant policies towards it in its drive to nuclear power status. Without Chi-nese protection in this way, it is doubtful it the North would have gone veryfar in its nuclear program.

The US response was predictable. The Obama Administration wanted toorganize a stronger response to the second test than had been the case inOctober 2006 but, once again, it was hamstrung by Chinese and Russianresistance. The Bush Administration had reversed policy towards the Northbut had little to show for it and the North had continued as though nothinghad changed on the American side. After the second test, the US and Japan

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drafted a new U.N. Security Council resolution which was intended tostrengthen Resolution 1718. This draft included five American demands; atotal arms embargo on North Korea, mandatory cargo inspections of NorthKorean vessels, mandatory reporting by UN members on the results of cargoinspections, a ban on banking transactions with North Korea, and a ban onloans or grants to the North except for humanitarian reasons. At the behest ofJapan and France, it also included the targeting of specific North Korean organi-zations and individuals engaged in proliferation. The Chinese insisted that theresolution should contain a provision suspending sanctions if the North began tocomply with UN resolutions. Compliance was then understood as a pledge byNorth Korea that it would not conduct another nuclear test, accept IAEAinspectors, and return to the Six Party Talks and the NPT.25 The UN SecurityCouncil passed Resolution 1874 on June 12 2009 which tightened existingsanctions against the North, blocked funding for nuclear, missile and pro-liferation activities by adopting “targeted sanctions on additional goods, per-sons and entities, widening the ban on arms imports-exports, and calling onMember States to inspect and destroy all banned cargo to and from thatcountry – on the high seas, at seaports and airports.”26

The provision for inspections built on Resolution 1718 but they werevoluntary, the resolution included the words “if they (the member states) havereasonable grounds to suspect a violation.” The difficulty was that theinspection of shipping had not been enforced since it was included in Reso-lution 1718 in October 2006 and few member states were willing to risk aconfrontation with the North to do so.27 If a Northern vessel refused inspec-tion there was no provision for the use of force. Moreover, at Chinese insis-tence, Article 32 was inserted in the resolution which allowed for acontinuous review of the North’s behavior. If necessary the measures adoptedby the resolution could be suspended or lifted if the North demonstratedcompliance which was not defined in the resolution. Financial sanctions wereincluded in Resolution 1874 which were intended to target banking transac-tions relating to the weapons trade.28 These transactions were managed byBureau 39 inside the Korean Workers’ Party building in Pyongyang whichcontrolled 120 foreign trade companies and obtained foreign currency for theregime through foreign business ventures. Funds obtained by Bureau 39 wereused by Kim Jong-il to purchase gifts such as luxury cars, expensive cognacand electronic goods for high ranking officials and military personnel.29 Thedifficulty with the financial sanctions was obtaining the information necessaryto trace the complicated and sometimes deliberately deceptive trail of links.This required a major intelligence effort for which not all members wereequipped, and some were plainly not interested. In a demonstration of sup-port, the South gave the US information about 10–20 foreign accounts heldby the North in China and Switzerland that could be used for money trans-fers and counterfeiting.30

Sanctions did not deter the North from its course and it continued to findways of evading them. Although the sanctions made it more difficult for the

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North to make money from arms exports, they could not eliminate the tradealtogether. The Security Council established a Panel of Experts to examineUN members’ compliance with UN sanctions in resolutions 1718 and 1874.It issued its report in May 2010 but, because of Chinese opposition, it was notmade public until the following November. The report revealed the difficultiesof applying sanctions on the North which depended upon the voluntarycompliance of UN members. As of April 30 2010, 73 states submitted theirnational implementation reports as required by Resolution 1718, and 48members had done so under Resolution 1874; this left 112 out of a total of192 states that had either not submitted their reports or were late in doing so.The Panel noted that North Korea had trade relations with many of thosestates that had not yet reported. It also highlighted the North’s continuinginvolvement in “nuclear and ballistic missile related activities” in Iran, Syria,and Myanmar. It noted that the North “continued to provide missiles, com-ponents, and technology to certain countries including Iran and Syria” sincethe resolutions were passed. The North circumvented sanctions by resortingto direct cargo flights which carried arms exports to Iran. It also engaged inelaborate ways of concealing cargo shipped by sea by-using false descriptionand mislabeling the contents of containers, including the use of “multiplelayers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions.”31 In thefirst seizure of a North Korean shipment under the sanctions, the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) notified the Security Council in August 2009 that ithad interdicted a vessel carrying North Korean munitions, detonators, explo-sives and rocket-propelled grenades destined for Iran. The vessel was ownedby an Australian subsidiary of a French company and sailed under a Baha-mian flag. It was carrying 10 containers of arms disguised as oil equipment.32

The North also shipped “knock-down kits” which could be assembled bylocal staff or by North Korean technicians. The report estimated that theNorth’s arms and missile exports amounted to $100 million annually.33 Pre-vious estimates of the North’s earnings from arms and missile sales werebetween $500 million to $1 billion, which may have been considerably infla-ted. Defectors from the North claimed that some of the revenue from thistrade went to Kim Jong-il’s personal account while the rest was directed tothe military.34

While going though its leadership succession the North had little interest inthe reactions of the outside world to its ballistic and missile tests, and theoutrage and anger they provoked served the regime well in terms of demon-strating and consolidating its power. Reports indicate that the tests were ori-ginally scheduled for September but were rescheduled earlier in the yearbecause of concerns about Kim Jong-il’s health, and also to strengthen theinternal authority of his successor.35 On April 26 Yonhap reported that KimJong-un had been assigned to the National Defense Commission in Marchwhen Kim Jong-il visited the State Security Department and told officials toregard his son as their leader.36 After the nuclear test on May 25 the South’sintelligence agency had intercepted messages to the North’s missions abroad

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which demanded that diplomats pledge loyalty to Kim Jong-un.37 In JuneKim Jong-un was reportedly appointed as acting chairman of the NationalDefense Committee. His rise was accompanied by what Japanese intelligencesources described as a purge of people close to his eldest brother Kim Jong-num including schoolmates and close aides.38 Reports circulated that therewas a plot to assassinate Kim Jong-num in Macau and when the Chineseheard about it, they placed him under police protection.39 The purge resultedin the removal of senior officials who had been involved in negotiations withthe Roh Administration, which was interpreted as an effort to isolate theNorth from southern influences. Officials in the United Front Departmentand Asia Pacific Peace committees which supervised the Gaesong and Mt.Geumgang projects were also targeted. Unpardonable admiration for theSouth was discovered amongst these officials who had dealt with the South inthese projects, and who had negotiated the receipt of food and fertilizer aid.According to Yonhap the North’s chief negotiator with the South, ChoeSung-chol, president of the National Economic Cooperation Committee JongUn-op, and Cabinet Secretary for inter-Korean dialogue Kwon Ho-gyongwere removed.40 After the purge, military hardliners moved in to control bothprojects and seized the South’s assets at the Mt. Geumgang tourist site andexpelled officials from the South.41 The Gaesong industrial venture wasallowed to continue, however, as a source of revenue for the North. OnJune 2 Southern intelligence confirmed that Kim Jong-un was made the heirapparent.

Thereafter, the North assumed a belligerent posture as it threatened reta-liation against UN sanctions, declaring that it would weaponize all availableplutonium in its stocks and develop more nuclear weapons. After denying itsexistence for so long the North also admitted to the existence of the HEUprogram. During the September 2008 meeting in Geneva, Kim Kye-kwantold Chris Hill that North Korea had indeed procured material for cen-trifuges.42 In response to the Security Council resolution of June 12, theNorth issued a statement on the following day, declaring that it could indeedenrich uranium and that it would start doing so henceforth.43 The North laterrevealed the extent of the HEU program to Siegfried Hecker when he visitedthe Yongbyon complex on November 12 2010, he was shown a small recentlycompleted uranium enrichment facility and an experimental LWR underconstruction. Hecker wrote that he was “stunned” by the sight of 2,000 cen-trifuges and “amazed by the scale and sophistication” of the HEU program.44

Clearly, the program had excited a sense of pride in the North not onlybecause of the technical achievement involved but because of the artful way itmanaged to deceive all who had believed that its existence was just anAmerican fabrication. The Americans themselves doubted their earlier intel-ligence reports about the program’s existence and debated whether to ignore itfor the sake of an agreement over the nuclear issue. The North’s pride indeceit was revealed on this occasion which showed the extent to whichdeception was a natural part of the North’s bargaining strategy. The incident

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raised serious questions about whether the North would have adhered to anagreement over the nuclear program without strict verification provisions. Italso challenged the wisdom of obtaining an agreement first and postponingverification until much later as advocated by the South Koreans and Chinese.

The North had learned from the last tests in 2006 that displays of powerwould provoke international outrage, but there would be a diplomaticscramble to negotiate and to restart dialogue. This time, however, the North’sactions pushed the South closer to the US. The Lee Myung-bak administra-tion in the South came to office largely because of an electoral backlashagainst Roh Moo-hyun’s policy of engagement of the North which hadremained unreciprocated. Under President Lee the South finally joined thePSI as a full member on May 25 2009. The South dithered after the April 5missile test because of differences between the Foreign and Unification min-istries but the nuclear test decided the matter.45 The North declared that thiswas a “declaration of war” and that it would “immediately and effectivelyrespond with military strikes against any attempts-including inspections andcrackdowns-to inspect our ships.”46 President Lee visited Washington in Juneto affirm the alliance with the US, which demonstrated the extent to whichpositions against the North had hardened both in the South and the US.President Obama condemned the nuclear test as a “grave threat to the peaceand security of the world” and pledged that the new sanctions would beaggressively enforced. At the Lee-Obama summit on June 16 a “joint visionfor the ROK-US alliance” was declared which included the extension of theAmerican nuclear umbrella to the South. The Obama Administration wasobliged to accede to the South’s demands for nuclear protection and to fore-stall the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the region which could includeJapan. The joint vision also allocated the leading role for the defense of theKorean Peninsula to the South, which would allow the US to focus on abroader regional strategy.47

Attempts to restart the Six Party Talks

The Obama Administration wanted to restart negotiations with the North butin what form? The North had withdrawn from the Six Party Talks and directtalks with the North would have exacerbated relations with allies who werelooking for a strong lead from the Americans in response to the North’sprovocations. The Japanese had been disturbed by the Bush Administration’sunexpected shift into direct talks with the North and feared that a bilateraldeal between the US and the North would leave it high and dry. The ObamaAdministration had to decide how to proceed in dealing with the Northwithout repeating the errors of the past. On 20 February, Obama hadappointed Stephen Bosworth as his Special Representative for North Korea.Bosworth was ambassador to the South from 1997 to 2000 and as the formerdirector of KEDO was familiar with Korean affairs. He saw that his task wasto open contacts with the North and to renew the dialogue after the collapse

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of the Six Party Talks in December 2008.48 On April 25 Obama nominatedKurt Campbell to replace Chris Hill as Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsia and Pacific affairs; Campbell opted for the revival of the Six Party Talks.Gary Samore, who was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Directorfor Counterproliferation strategy at the White House, regarded the Six PartyTalks as ineffective and supported direct negotiations with the North as longas they took place within the Six Party framework. Direct negotiations withthe North could not be separate from the Six Party Talks as Bosworth dis-covered when he visited Japan and South Korea in May. Both allies wereapprehensive about his intention to engage the North in direct talks, andinsisted that the US maintain the Six Party framework and consult with thembefore and after the talks.49 For America’s allies, the Six Party Talks offeredsome insurance against an American bilateral deal with the North, one thatcould come at their expense.

The Chinese, however, engaged in top level mediation to bring the Northback to the Six Party Talks. While simply bringing the North back to the SixParty Talks would be no immediate solution to the problem, the Chineselooked at the long-term and hoped that the talks would agree on economicincentives for the North which would make denuclearization possible later.The North, however, had other ideas. It had demonstrated that it was anuclear power and was not interested in negotiations that called for its owndenuclearization, and demanded recognition of its own nuclear status. Afterthe tests on July 26 the North returned to its demand for direct talks with theUS. The North’s Foreign Ministry stated that it would agree to bilateralnegotiations with the US over the nuclear weapons program as “a specific andreserved form of dialogue that can address the current situation.” The state-ment stressed that the North was not interested in the resumption of the SixParty Talks. In response, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated the ObamaAdministration’s position that it would accept direct talks with the North onlyif it agreed to revive the Six Party Talks.50

Hu Jintao’s right handman for foreign policyDai Bingguo visited Pyongyang topersuade the North to rejoin the Six Party Talks. On September 18 he metKim Jong-il and handed him a letter from Hu reiterating China’s positionthat the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized. Kim told Dai Bingguothat the North Korean leader would be willing to discuss its nuclear programin “bilateral or multilateral” meetings.51 On October 5 when Chinese PremierWen Jiabao met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, the North Korean leader said thathe was ready to discuss the nuclear program at the Six Party Talks, “depend-ing on the outcome” of bilateral talks with the United States. He also said that thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the “dying instruction” of hisfather Kim Il-sung.52 In Beijing the Chinese Premier said that the North waseager to improve relations with the US, Japan, and South Korea, and that hewas optimistic about the early resumption of the Six Party Talks.53

What could the North achieve through direct negotiations with the US? Itdemanded an end to the “hostile relationship” with the US and nuclear arms

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reduction talks with the US and other regional powers.54 South Korean For-eign Minister Yu Myung-hwan affirmed that the North wanted respect as anuclear state and expected nuclear arms reduction talks to include the with-drawal of American troops from South Korea.55 The Obama Administrationwas as insistent as its predecessor that it would not accept the North as anuclear power, and no American administration would consider the with-drawal of forces from the South under pressure from the North. One plausibleexplanation for the North’s demand for direct negotiations was that it con-tinued to hope that the US would regard it as a nuclear counter to China andwould support the regime by lifting or not enforcing the UN sanctionsimposed on it. This would require that the US surrender its alliances with theSouth and Japan and backtrack on its non proliferation and human rightspolicies, a very unlikely prospect. A deal with the US was Kim Il-sung’s wishand as the founder of the regime and eternal President, his wishes were to beimplemented by his son Kim Jong-il as a demonstration of filial piety to thegreat leader. In repressive regimes the top leadership works in isolation fromthe external world and is fed information that conforms to its assumptions. Aclosed political system that has created a personality cult and a regimemythology that glorifies the father-son dynasty would not permit contra-dictory views or uncomfortable information from the external world to cir-culate. It remains imprisoned in a self-created mindset that bears littleresemblance to reality and which requires continual isolation for its suste-nance. From this perspective, the North’s demand for direct talks with the USwas simply repeated again and again because the key decision makers did notsee the situation clearly and had little understanding of the US. The North’sdiplomats may have had no such illusions but theirs was not to reason why,and they simply carried out instructions given to them by their leadership.There was much delusion in the North’s desire for direct negotiations withthis US.

The most significant step made by the Obama Administration towards theresumption of talks with the North was Stephen Bosworth’s visit to Pyon-gyang over December 8–10 2009. According to the media the visit “signalleda new phase” in US diplomacy towards the North but it also provoked criti-cism from the Lee Myung-bak government in Seoul which called for sanc-tions to take effect to weaken the North, to make it more amenable tonegotiation.56 Positions had indeed been reversed since the previous adminis-tration in the South had been urging the US to approach the North directly.In Pyongyang, Bosworth met Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju who raisedthe issue of “permanent peace arrangements” to replace the 1953 armisticeand called for discussions on normalizing relations with the US. The NorthKoreans told Bosworth that the absence of a peace treaty was a reflection ofUS hostile policies and that they would not pursue denuclearization unless theUS dropped its hostile policy towards it.57 Bosworth, however, insisted thatthe Six Party Talks should be convened first and when the parties had gained“significant traction” on denuclearization, the issue of a peace treaty would

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be discussed.58 Bosworth claimed that he had reached a “common under-standing” with the North on the necessity but not the timing of the Six PartyTalks but said that “it remains to be seen when and how” North Korea willreturn to talks.”59 Expectations had been elevated by the visit said that therewere no concrete results. The North raised demands that had not been heardsince the early rounds of the Six Party talks relating to the replacement of thearmistice, the normalization of relations with the US and the termination ofthe “hostile policy” of the US. All this had been said before and indicatedthat the top leaders in the North, meaning Kim Jong-il, had not decided how toproceed and as a result the Foreign Ministry repeated its old demands. TheNorth was going nowhere in its demand for direct talks with the US but itwould not accept a revival of the Six Party Talks.

Lee Myung-bak proposed Five Party Talks without the North when he metObama in Washington in June 2009. The Americans, who had become skep-tical that any progress could be possible in the Six Party Talks, were inter-ested.60 Five party Talks without the North would turn the negotiating foruminto strong pressure group in which the US and its allies, South Korea andJapan, would have a majority. Nonetheless, there was no assurance of Chinesesupport and every indication that they would insist on the inclusion of theNorth in any negotiations affecting it. South Korea raised the proposal withthe Russians who expressed curiosity but soon after dropped the idea.61 TheSouth Korean President then called for a “grand bargain” with the Northwhich would include economic aid and a security guarantee from members ofthe Six Party Talks if the North surrendered its nuclear weapons program inexchange. He also proposed a third summit with the North in 2010.62 Offi-cials from both the North and the South met in Singapore to discuss the thirdsummit in October 2009 so it seemed possible. The South Korean ForeignMinistry declared that it wanted to revive the Six Party Talks together withinter-Korean negotiations so that the nuclear issue would be raised in bothdialogues.63 Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan thought that the Six PartyTalks could resume as early as mid-February 2010.64 In this, however, theSouth Koreans were disappointed as the North refused.

North Korea’s provocations

The attempts to reconvene the Six Party Talks had reached a dead end forvarious reasons. The North failed to obtain the recognition as a nuclearpower it sought from the US. It wanted direct negotiations with the Amer-icans to signify its new found status and sought to change the purpose of thenegotiations from its own nuclear disarmament to mutual nuclear reductions.The return to the Six Party Talks would have been a significant climb downfor the North in view of the effort expended to develop a nuclear capability toachieve that status. The North repeated that it would not return to the Talksunless the US agreed to a peace treaty and lifted UN sanctions, which theAmericans were not disposed to do under the circumstances. US sanctions

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had been lifted anyway by the Bush Administration but UN sanctions weremultilateral and subject to specific procedures that required a demonstrationof compliance from the North before they could be eased. At that stage KimJong-il was engrossed in the succession and staged new provocations againstthe South to ensure its success. On November 10 2009, just as the USannounced the Bosworth visit to Pyongyang two Northern patrol vesselscrossed the contested northern line in the West Sea and in an exchange of firewith Southern naval vessels one was hit and set alight.65 Since the 2002 naval clashin the same area the South had changed the rules of engagement to allow thelocal commander to retaliate without obtaining approval from Seoul, whichmade the northern line much more conflict prone.66 More incidents werereported in January 2010 as artillery shots were exchanged over the northernline indicating that the North was becoming more aggressive in the area.67

On March 26 2010 the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonanoccurred with the loss of 46 sailors. The North initially denied involvement buta multilateral investigation team comprising South Korea, the US, Australia,and Sweden concluded that a Northern Korean midget submarine fired thesonar tracking torpedo that had sunk it. Fragments of the torpedo’s propulsionsystem and steering gear were found which confirmed its North Korean ori-gins.68 South Korean and US intelligence agencies determined that theNorth’s reconnaissance bureau, which conducts espionage activities against theSouth and was headed by hard liner General Kim Yong-chol, was respon-sible.69 A Japanese view was that the sinking was an attempt to strengthenunity in the regime which showed signs of fragmenting as Kim Jong-il’s healthdeteriorated.70 The transfer of power to a young and inexperienced leadercould be a perilous affair in a regime that was built on power and violenceand demonstrations of power were required to affirm leadership credentials inthis system. Kim Jong-il himself was associated with terrorist attacks over twodecades in an effort to obtain his father’s approval and the support of themilitary, an unfortunate rite of passage for a new leader in the North.71

Chinese support was also necessary for the continuation of the rulingdynasty and despite pressure brought to bear upon them, the Chinese refusedto condemn the North. South Korea’s director of National Intelligence WonSei-hoon reported that Kim Jong-il visited Beijing and asked for Chineseprotection in the UN Security Council against the fallout from the sinking.72

That visit took place over May 3–7 ostensibly to obtain Chinese economicsupport for the regime. The Chinese wanted to build good relations with thenew leader and defended the North and, in spite of the evidence, theydeclared that the North had nothing to do with the sinking. The South Kor-eans wanted to take the issue to the UN Security Council. In this they hadJapanese support but it was clear that the Chinese would not cooperate.73 Atthe third annual trilateral summit held in Cheju Island, the Prime Ministersof South Korea and Japan, Chung Un-chan and Yukio Hatoyama, pressedtheir Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao over the sinking but he avoided anycondemnation of the North.74 Wen Jiabao visited Tokyo in June when the

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Japanese wanted joint condemnation of the sinking but the Chinese leaderagain refused.75 Once assured of Chinese protection, the elevation of the rawand callow Kim Jong-un to the leadership could take place. On September 21a Workers Party meeting was convened, the largest in 30 years. It reappointedKim Jong-il as leader who then made his son a four star general andappointed him as a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Hewas also made a member of the party’s Central Committee.76 Kim Jong-il’syoungest sister Kim Kyong-hui who was head of the party’s light industrydepartment was also made a four star general. She was the wife of Jang Song-taek, who as director of the party’s administration department, was under-stood to be the power behind the scenes.77 These appointments were greeted withdisbelief by outside observers. The Japanese Mainichi newspaper exclaimedthat it was “an absurd idea from a common sense point of view” and that theinternational community was taken by surprise at these “apparent nonsensicalappointments.”78 There may have been logic behind these appointments butto the outside world they seemed like a desperate attempt to strengthen thelegitimacy of the ruling dynasty that could easily unravel and leave chaos inits wake.

On November 23 2010 there was a second major provocation. Northernartillery shelled the South’s Yeongpyong Island which is very close to theNorthern line limit and 12 kilometers from the North. Four people were killed:two marines, and two civilians. KCNA carried a statement from the North’smilitary that the shelling was a response to the joint South Korean–USannual Hoguk exercise that was being conducted in the area at the time.79 Ifthe North wanted to punish the Lee Myung-bak government for refusing tocontinue the dialogue that its predecessor had developed, the result was anexplosion of anger in the South that would put off any thought of dialogue.The shelling showed that the North was willing to sacrifice the prospect of animprovement in relations with the South for the sake of a demonstration of powernecessary to consolidate domestic succession.80 President Lee called the pro-vocation an “inhumane crime” and said that the military would strike theNorth’s missile base if it engaged in another provocation.81 In December theSouth staged live fire exercises on Yeongpyong and other islands to demon-strate its resolve. This prompted the North’s Minister of the People’s ArmedForces Kim Young-chun to declare that the North was ready to launch a“sacred war based on our nuclear deterrent.” Despite this truculence, how-ever, KCNA later issued a statement that it was “not worth reacting” to theexercise.82

China’s role over the Yeongpyong island shelling showed once again that itsrelationship with the North carried greater weight than relations with theSouth, and that despite the hopes vested in it by the US, it would not restrainthe North. Rather than condemn the North for its provocations, the Chinesecalled for a special meeting of the Six Party Talks, which was proposed byChina’s delegate Wu Dawei on November 28. Dai Bingguo visited Seoul overNovember 27–28 and in a supercilious manner urged that a new round of Six

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Party Talks be held.83 Dai also phoned Hillary Clinton for the same purposebut was told that China had to show that it would not tolerate provocationsfrom the North.84 The US, South Korea, and Japan saw no point in conveningthe Six Party Talks unless the North was willing to drop its confrontationalposture, and expected the Chinese to use their influence with the North toprevent further provocations. Within China, however, the generals withinthe PLA reportedly had attained greater influence over policy towards the USand were “adamant” supporters of North Korea. “Growing dissonance” wasnoted in the Chinese system between the PLA conservatives and civiliansincluding the reformists who had struggled to maintain a balance in policy.85

Zhu Feng in a poignant comment pointed to this dissonance when he warnedthat China’s “coddling” of a dangerous, nuclear-armed state was creating aJapan–South Korean–US axis against Beijing. China’s policy towards NorthKorea, he claimed, was shaped by an “obsolete ideology” and bureaucraticinertia to the point where Beijing could not see its own interests clearly.86

China, indeed, had swung behind the North which put paid to its role asmediator in any negotiations with the North. Without the Chinese in the roleas mediator the Six Party Talks made no sense.

Conclusion

After its second test in May 2009 the North had no need of the Six PartyTalks as it expected to be treated as a nuclear power. It demanded direct talkswith the US which would shift the negotiations away from its nuclear dis-armament to mutual nuclear reductions and an American withdrawal offorces from the Korean Peninsula. It was embarking on a transfer of leader-ship to a young and inexperienced son of Kim Jong-il which required asser-tions of power and staged provocations to obtain the loyalty of the militaryand party. What was striking about this period was the extent to which theChinese would go to support the North and to protect it from condemnation.The North ignored China when it engaged in its 2006 ballistic missile andnuclear tests, and continued to ignore China when it conducted a secondround of missile and nuclear tests in 2009. The North had learned that itcould get away with provocative acts and that it was too important to Chinato be subject to restraint. The North’s value to China had increased as theinfluence of hardliners in Beijing became more noticeable. A comparison ofChina’s attitude in the early and late Hu Jintao periods reveals an internalshift towards greater assertiveness in policy. A rising China, in which nation-alism had been kindled by economic success and a sense of frustrated enti-tlement, regarded the North as a strategic asset in its rivalry with the US andhad no intention to censure it. The American conviction, so often expressedduring the time of the Bush Administration, that China would press theNorth to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was dis-credited as it became clear that China, despite everything, could live with anuclear North and would maintain its relationship with it. As a result, China

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had lost its main qualification to act as mediator in any negotiations with theNorth and had undermined the viability of Six Party Talks. Without a med-iatory China, the Six Party Talks would simply reflect the divisions betweenthe US and its allies on one side, and China Russia and North Korea on theother, and would be deadlocked.

Notes1 “Doctor tells of secret stroke” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 20 2011.2 Jae Soon Chang, “Kim Jong-il Had Stroke, Brain Surgery, May Be Paralyzed,Reports Say,” The Huffington Post, September 11 2008, www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/11/kim-jong-il-had-stroke-br_n_125713.html “Chronic kidney failure pla-guing Kim: Think Tank,” The Japan Times, March 26 2010.

3 “Kim Jong-il picks successor: report,” The Japan Times, 17 January 2009.4 Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics.Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 2012, pp. 18–33, 177.

5 Han S. Park “Military-First (Songun) Politics: Implications for External Policies”Gilbert Rozman, “Multilateralism and Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy Strategy,”Victor D. Cha, “Challenges for North Korea’s Endgame,” in Kyung-Ae Park(editor) New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan,New York, 2010, pp. 106, 146–47, 188–91.

6 Selig Harrison “Living with a nuclear armed North Korea,” The Nautilus Institute,Policy Forum Online 09–015A: February 24 2009. http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/living-with-a-nuclear-north-korea/.

7 Jin Dae Woong, “NK preparing to test Taepodong-2,” The Korea Herald, 4February 2009.

8 North Korea has nuke warheads: analyst,” The Japan Times, April 2 2009;“North Korean rocket’s launch second, third stages separated in flight,” TheJapan Times, April 11 2009; William J. Broad, “North Korean missile launch wasa failure, experts say,” The New York Times, April 6 2009.

9 Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “UNSC to rap North Korea over missile; Statement to callfor end to launches The Daily Yomiuri, April 12 2009.

10 “Japan, US back down over North Sanctions,” The Japan Times, April 10 2009.11 “UNSC deadlocks on North Korea,” The Japan Times, April 11 2009.12 “Statement by the President of the Security Council,”United Nations Security Council,

S/PRST/2009/7, April 13 2009 www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2009.htm.13 “UNSC statement,” The Korea Herald, April 14 2009.14 Jun Hongo, Masami Ito, “North Korea fires rocket over Tohoku,” The Japan

Times, April 6 2009.15 “North Korea expels IAEA inspectors,” The Japan Times, 16 April 2009; NK

expels UN nuclear inspectors,” The Korea Herald, April 16 2009: “N Korea toQuit 6-Way Nuclear talks,” The Korea Times, April 14 2009.

16 Choe Sang Hun, “Citing U.N. Penalties, North Korea Threatens UraniumEnrichment and Missile Tests,” The New York Times 30 2009.

17 Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “Japan, U.S. compile draft U.N. resolution on DPRK,”The Daily Yomiuri May 29, 2009.

18 Hwang Jang-jin, “N Korea conducts second nuke test,” The Korea Herald, May26 2009.

19 Victor Cha, “Up close and personal, here’s what I learned,” The WashingtonPost, June 14 2009.

20 “Useless Exploit,” The Korea Herald, May 27 2009.

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21 “Russia and China back ‘convincing response’ to North,” The China Post, June 32009.

22 Willy Lam, “Beijing Mulling Tougher Tactics against Pyongyang,” China Brief,Vol IX, Issue 12, June 12 2009.

23 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Policy in the Wake of the Second DPRK NuclearTest,” China Security, issue 14 2009.

24 Heejin Koo and Kyung Bok Cho, “China suspends North Korea exchanges,Yonhap reports,” Bloomberg.com, June 1 2009.

25 Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “Japan, U.S. compile draft U.N. resolution on DPRK,”The Daily Yomiuri, May 29, 2009.

26 Security Council, acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions, UN Security Council,SC 9679, June 12 2009, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm.

27 David E. Sanger, “Tested Early by North Korea, Obama has few options,” TheNew York Times, May 26 2009.

28 Neil Macfaquhar, “UN Security Council pushes North Korea by passing sanc-tions,” The New York Times, June 13 2009.

29 Kelly Olsen, “New Sanctions could hit North Korea’s secretive fundraising arm,”The Japan Times, June 13 2009.

30 “Pyongyang empties accounts” The Japan Times, June 19 2009.31 Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Resolution 1874 May 2010, www.fas.org/irp/eprint/scr1874.pdf.32 Bill Varner “UAE Seizes North Korean Weapons Shipment to Iran (Update 2),”

Bloomberg, August 28, 2009, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ap9U2VfbfCBs.

33 Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established pursuant toResolution 1874 May 2010.

34 Blaine Harden, “In North Korea, the military now issues economic orders,” TheWashington Post, November 3 2009.

35 Alex Martin, “No. 3 son readied to succeed Kim,” The Japan Times, June 11 2009.36 “Kim Jong-il’s third son posted to top state body,” The Japan Times, April 28

2009.37 Alex Martin “Pyongyang purge seen speeding helm change,” The Japan Times,

June 5 2009; David E. Sanger, Mark Mazzetti, Choe Sang Hun, “North KoreanLeader is said to pick a son as heir,” The New York Times, June 3 2009.

38 “Pyongyang purge seen speeding helm change,” The Japan Times, June 5 2009.39 “Jong Un aide ‘plotted to kill brother,” The Japan Times, June 17 2006.40 “Purge in the North” The Korea Herald, May 20 2009.41 “N Korea ‘purged dovish officials,” The Japan Times, May 21 2009.42 “NK Admits procuring uranium-enrichment materials,” The Japan Times, Sep-

tember 19 2007.43 Kwang-Tae Kim, “Uranium gives N Korea second way to make bombs,” The

Washington Post, 28 June 2009; “Defiant North Korea ‘to weaponize’ Pluto-nium,” CNN.com, June 16 2009.

44 Siegfried Hecker, “What I found in North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, December 92010.

45 Hwang Jang jin, “Seoul caught in ‘PSI trap’” The Korea Herald, April 23 2009.46 “NK says not bound to armistice,” The Korea Herald, May 28 2009.47 “New Level of Alliance,” The Korea Herald, 18 June 2009; Jung Sung-ki,

“Obama pledges nuclear umbrella for S. Korea,” The Korea Times, June 17 2009.48 “Briefing by Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth on US policy regarding North

Korea,” State Department Press Release, April 3 2009 www.enewsspf.com/index.php?view=article$carid=88888983%3Alatest-national-n.

49 “Form of talks with DPRK unclear,” The Daily Yomiuri, May 28 2009.

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50 Choe Sang Hun, “N. Korea Says It’s Open to Dialogue,” The New York TimesJuly 28 2009.

51 “DPRK top leader meets Chinese presidential envoy,” Xinhua September 18.www.globaltimes.cn/china/diplomacy/2009–09/469387.html; Blaine Harden, “N.Korea Open to Talks, Kim Tells China; Statement Signals Reversal on NuclearIssue, Fits Familiar Bargaining Pattern,” The Washington Post September 192009.

52 “Pyongyang should return to talks,” The Japan Times October 10 2009.53 David Barboza, “Chinese Premier Calls for Dialogue Between U.S. and North

Korea,” The New York Times, October 11 2009.54 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Presses U.S. to Agree to Bilateral Talks,” The

New York Times, November 3 2009.55 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Is Said to Be Willing to Resume Talks on

Weapons,” The New York Times, September 19 2009.56 Choe Sang-hun, “US envoy makes rare visit to North Korea,” The New York

Times, December 9 2009.57 Kim Ji-hyun, “N Korea puts peace treaty before normal ties: sources,” The Korea

Herald, December 30 2009.58 Kim So-hyun, “US, NK agree on need for peace treaty,” The Korea Herald,

December 14 2009.59 Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Says Differences With U.S. Narrowed During

Visit by Obama’s Envoy,” The New York Times, 11 December 2009.60 Jung Sung-ki, “Obama pledges nuclear umbrella for S. Korea,” The Korea Times,

June 17 2009.61 Kim Sue young, “Five Way talks would give more options to N Korea,” The

Korea Times, June 25 2009.62 Na Jeong ju, “Is it time for South Korean Envoy to NK?” The Korea Times,

December 13 2009; Jung Sung ki, “President urges NK to accept ‘grand bar-gain,’” The Korea Times, January 31 2010.

63 Kim Ji-hyun, “Seoul pushes for 6-party talks, inter-Korean ties,” The KoreaHerald, December 31 2009.

64 Kim Ji hyun, “Yu expects nuclear talks mid February,” The Korea Herald, Jan-uary 23 2010.

65 “North Korean Boat ‘in flames’ after naval clash,” The Japan Times, November12 2009.

66 “Naval Skirmish,” The Korea Herald November 11 2009.67 “NK’s true intentions,” The Korea Herald, January 28 2010.68 “NK artillery strikes S. Korean Island,” The Korea Herald, November 23 2010;

“NK torpedo used on Cheonan,” The Korea Times, July 22 2010; “Int’l ExpertsAgree on Cheonan Findings,” The Chosun Ilbo, May 21 2010.

69 “Cheonan Evidence ‘Points to N. Korean Spy Agency’” The Chosun Ilbo, May 72010. “S Korea, US link N Korea’s spy agency to ship sinking: paper,” Nikkei,May 7 2010.

70 “Warship sinking shows Pyongyang frustration at waning power,” Nikkei, May 312010.

71 Choe Sang hun, “Succession issue may be behind N Korea’s new belligerence,”The New York Times, May 27 2010; Attacks linked to Kim Jong-il’s successioninclude the January 17 1968 “blue house raid” by a squad of 31 commandos onthe president’s house in Seoul, the seizing of the American surveillance vessel thePueblo January 23 in the same year, the axe murders of two US American officersin the DMZ on August 18 1976, the Rangoon bombing of October 9 1983 whichkilled 3 South Korean cabinet members, and the bombing of the Korean airwaysflight 858 on November 29 1987.

72 Yoshiro Makino “Kim asked China to guard his back” Asahi.com, June 26 2010.

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73 “Wen ducks plea for UN action on ship’s sinking,” The Japan Times, June 12010.

74 Yoshiro Makino “Kim asked China to guard his back” Asahi.com, June 26 2010.75 Masami Ito, “Hoped for Chinese stand against North not in cards,” The Japan

Times, June 2 2010.76 Kim Se-jeong, “N. Korea’s heir apparent given political posts,” The Korea

Herald, The Korea Times, September 38 2010.77 Mark McDonald, “Military’s Role Reinforced in N. Korea,” The New York

Times, September 28 2010.78 “Hereditary power transfer in authoritarian North Korea will only worsen situa-

tion,” Mainichi Daily September 29 2010.79 Song Sang Ho “NK artillery strikes S. Korean Island,” The Korea Herald,

November 23 2010.80 “NK upping tension to pressure S. Korea, US” The Korea Herald November 23

2010.81 “S. Korea may strike N. Korea’s missile base: President Lee,” The Korea Herald

November 23 2010.82 Kang Seung woo, “North Korea threatens nuclear war,” The Korea Times,

December 23 2010; Sharon LaFraniere, Martin Fackler, “North Withholds FireAfter South Korean Drills,” The New York Times, December 20 2010.

83 John Pomfret, “US steps up pressure on China to rein in North Korea,” TheWashington Post, December 6 2010.

84 “Allies cool to China’s 6-party talks gambit,” Asahi.com November 30 2010.85 Willy Lam, “Hawks vs. Doves: Beijing Debates ‘Core Interests’ and Sino US

Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 17, August 19 2010; Willy Lam, “Beijing’sStance on North Korea Challenged by Yeonpyeong Island Incident,” China Brief,Vol. 10, Issue 24, December 3, 2010.

86 Zhu Feng. “China’s contradictions about North Korea,” Taipei Times, December5 2010.

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Conclusion

Using the concept of structure in bargaining and negotiation, this studyexamined the Six Party Talks to analyze the reasons why they could not bringabout the denuclearization of North Korea. It began with the observationthat negotiation outcomes are not just a product of power, and that the mostpowerful party does always prevail in negotiations. Power as understoodaccording to military and economic indexes is not always translated intonegotiating strength. Structure is defined in terms of the number of partiesand the roles they assume, whether they act as dominant, pivotal, sup-porting, swing players, or target states during negotiations. Structure canmitigate the power of a dominant player and weaken its negotiating strengthto the point where it is obliged to shift its position. Should the US as thedominant player enter into negotiations with weaker states dependent upon itfor their security, the outcome would be more or less predictable. The struc-ture of negotiations would support the US position and not modify it. Oncethe US enters into complex multilateral negotiations, a different structure iscreated according to how the players interact amongst themselves, how theyperceive the positions of the other parties, the agendas they bring into thenegotiations and the negotiating coalitions or alignments they form. Thestructure of negotiations is shaped by interaction which is a process of testingpublic bargaining positions against those of the other parties. Negotiatingpositions can be influenced and shaped by interaction with others which mayresult in a reshuffling of priorities. Unrealizable negotiating positions mayhave to be adjusted, and a fallback position devised. What was previouslyunacceptable may now become tolerable.

The structure of the Six Party Talks prevented the US as the dominantplayer from utilizing its power advantage to achieve the immediate denu-clearization of North Korea. It required the cooperation of the pivotal party,China, to use its influence over North Korea to achieve this objective. Thepivotal player, however, had other aims besides the denuclearization of theNorth and used the negotiations to further its own objectives. Russia acted asa supporter for China and similarly resisted the dominant player’s efforts tosteer the negotiations towards its desired objective. South Korea acted as theswing state, even though it was an American ally. It swung behind both China

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and Russia in the negotiations and sought to deflect US pressure for a reso-lution of the issue on its terms. The result was a polarization of negotiatingpositions as the US became more assertive and as the others become evenmore resistant and obstructionist. The inclusion of North Korea as the targetstate complicated the negotiations for the US in the absence of any unity. Thesixth party Japan was an outsider. It had rendered itself ineffective as anAmerican ally because of its insistence on the resolution of the abductionissue which was of no concern to the others. It meant that the dominantplayer had no effective support for its objective as its allies, South Korea andJapan, which were expected to support it in the negotiations, pursued otherinterests. The alliance between the target state and the pivotal player Chinaprevented unity amongst the parties in relation to the American goal of denu-clearization which became a divisive issue for the talks. The target stateexploited this polarization and played upon the differences between the par-ties. It adopted a range of tactics to ensure that the parties would not uniteagainst it, including threats and capricious behavior which played upon theirfears. It also resorted to tacit bargaining and cultivated ambiguity whichrelied on hints and suggestions to stimulate favorable responses, and toencourage others to believe in its good intentions. Rather than preside overthe collapse of the negotiations the dominant player had to come to termswith the limitations on its ability to achieve its aims, it was obliged to modifyits bargaining position and adjust to the views of the negotiating coalitionwhich resisted it. This it did in the Berlin Talks in 2007.

The Six Party Talks were the result of the Bush administration’s rejection ofdirect talks with the North in the expectation that a multilateral forum wouldavoid the ignominy of dealing with a rogue state which it abhorred. Six Par-ties were a natural combination in that the two Koreans had to be there aswell as the major players on the Korean Peninsula. Negotiations over theKorean Peninsula had to include China because of its ties with the North.The US insisted that Japan be included as its ally and supporter. Russia wasan afterthought and was included at the behest of the North. This was thefirst time that the major players on the Korean Peninsula met together withthe two Koreas and it portended further steps towards regionalization andvisionary efforts to construct what in South Korea was called a peace regimefor the region. Due to its ideological abhorrence, however, the Bush adminis-tration triggered a polarization in the Six Party Talks when it attempted topush the other parties into an acceptance of its position. For the BushAdministration defending nuclear non proliferation policy, and sending amessage to other potential nuclear powers such as Iran and Syria that the linewould be consistently and firmly held, were its top priorities. The broadersignificance of non proliferation in terms of strengthening the defenses againstthe nuclear ambitions of these states justified the aggressive approach of theneoconservatives in the Bush Administration. They operated with the stronglyheld conviction that they acted in the name of international security fromwhich all would benefit. The Bush Administration’s failure to develop a

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structured process of decision-making that would have constrained the wildestimpulses of the neoconservatives in the Vice President’s Office compoundedthe problem. Under the influence of the neoconservatives the US imaginedthat the other parties would be equally concerned about the North’s nuclearambitions, and that they would join it in the effort to stop the North fromdeveloping its nuclear program. The unrestrained belligerence with whichthey pursued their agenda alarmed the other parties in the Six Party Talks,and prompted them into adopting balancing tactics to head off their pressure.

The Bush Administration did not appreciate that the other parties had theirown agendas and interests which did not match its own, and that its ownaggressiveness would propel them to a similar insistence on their own posi-tions. This misunderstanding was particularly pronounced in relation toChina. The Americans entered the Six Party Talks expecting that China asthe pivotal player would share the responsibility for nuclear proliferation andwould cooperate with its aims. US policy in the Six Party Talks was largely anextension of its China policy in that it had the purpose of co-opting China asresponsible stakeholder in international order. The Americans assumed thatcooperation over North Korea would facilitate cooperation over other issuessuch as Taiwan, Iran and the Global Financial Crisis. Indeed the Hu Jintaoleadership in assuming the role of mediator in the Six Party Talks encouragedthis thinking amongst the Americans who wanted to believe that a new era ofSino–US cooperation had dawned. Because China had offered to mediate inthe talks the Americans thought that the Chinese would follow their policy,and that a united front would be created which would press the North overthe nuclear issue. The misreading of China’s motives was a critical lapse.Suborned by the rhetoric of cooperation, the US did not understand theimportance Beijing placed on its relationship with the North and the extent towhich it would go to protect the regime against American pressure. Throughthe interaction in negotiations the Americans painfully discovered that therewere hidden depths in Chinese thinking that they had not grasped initially,and that reaffirming ties with North Korea became more important to theChinese than cooperation with US aims in the Six Party Talks.

It seems an elementary principle of diplomacy that policy should take intoaccount limits and constraints to action but the Bush Administration in itsfleeting sense of omnipotence ignored this. It assumed that as the dominantplayer, it would set the agenda for negotiations and that it could hustle otherparties into accepting the US position on nuclear proliferation. The US failedto distinguish between power and negotiating strength. It assumed thatbecause it was number one on the indexes of power it could prevail in nego-tiations. It certainly failed to understand that power can create coalitionsagainst it, and that other parties may have their own agendas and did notnecessarily share US views. The neoconservatives never understood that whilebrazen and unabashed aggressiveness might resonate amongst Americans itrepulsed non Americans, and alienated those whose support was requiredover the Korean nuclear issue and pushed them into an opposing alignment.

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The Bush Administration did not take into account the impact of its belli-gerence not only upon China, Russia, and the Roh government in the South,but also upon the North which after 2003 accelerated its efforts to create anuclear deterrent. The US confidently took the lead in the negotiations in theSix Party Talks without realizing that it had little control over them andwhatever it would propose could be undermined by China as the pivotalplayer. It suited the Chinese to place the US at the forefront, a position thatthe Americans could not resist, because it gave them the crucial advantage ofmaking or breaking any agreements reached in a way which would heightenAmerican dependence on Beijing. Not until later did the Bush Administrationunderstand that China would not or could not assume the expected task ofpushing the North into surrendering its nuclear program. It was then obligedto shift its position and deal with the North directly in complete repudiationof its previous refusal to do so.

What did the Chinese want? When Hu Jintao steered China into the role ofa mediator in the Six Party Talks in 2003 he publicly claimed that the denu-clearization of the North was its main objective. The Americans took thisclaim at face value. The denuclearization of the North, however, was a pathto a more important goal for China which was to strengthen the relationshipwith the North as a partner regime and ally on the Korean Peninsula. As longas the North’s nuclear program attracted American attention there was thefear of a military strike, a prospect which was real enough after the invasionof Iraq in March 2003. The Chinese feared that North Korea’s collapse as aresult of an American attack or economic disaster would result in reunifica-tion under the South. China would then lose its position on the KoreanPeninsula and the Americans would extend their military presence up to theChinese border in what would be an American triumph. For China the SixParty Talks were a means to avert that scenario and to head off Americanpressure against the North and the danger of an American military strike.The talks provided an opportunity to maneuver the US into an agreementover the nuclear issue which would defuse the crisis and give time for theNorth to implement economic reform following the Chinese path. Chinawould be assured of a stronger North Korean ally and one grateful for Chi-nese support in difficult times.

To this end the Chinese maintained the fiction that only the US couldresolve the problem, that China was just a facilitator and that concessions hadto come from the American side. This indeed was a fiction since the Chinesemaintained the regime in power and were in a position to decide the fate ofany agreement reached. The Chinese maneuvered to place the responsibilityfor negotiations on the American side and the Bush Administration willinglycomplied. The Americans would be loath to admit it but they fell into a dip-lomatic trap. They expected Chinese cooperation in pressing for the North’snuclear disarmament and heaped liberal praise on their Chinese counterpartsto encourage them in this objective. The Americans were no doubt grateful tothe Chinese for their efforts at meditation and to keep the Six Party Talks

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going during those difficult times when the North could have opted out. Onmany an occasion, Chinese pressure brought the North back into the talksand prevented them from collapsing. Keeping the talks going, however, andresolving the nuclear issue were two different things. The Chinese wereunwilling to press the regime over the nuclear issue and their continued sup-port for it prevented any progress during the talks. China’s constant supportfor the North excluded all prospect of a resolution of the nuclear issue in theSix Party Talks and gave the North time to bring its nuclear program tofruition. The North had learned to exploit Chinese support and conducted itsnuclear and ballistic missile tests despite Chinese warnings against them.

China’s position in relation to the North shifted during the course of theSix Party Talks. At their commencement in 2003, China stressed denuclear-ization and appeared willing to work with the US towards this aim but afterthe North’s nuclear tests China’s support of the North became clearer. ZhangLiangui noted that China was not too concerned about the North’s nuclearweapons program and assessed it initially as bluff, but after the tests thenuclear program was regarded as a convenient card to play against the US.Shen Ding argued that the North would eventually return to the internationalcommunity as a responsible nuclear power, one that would not threatenothers or engage in nuclear proliferation. The Chinese may have intendedotherwise but the North could not have succeeded in its nuclear weaponsprogram without their support. They continually sheltered the North againstpressure from the US and the international community and had they notdone so, the North would have been exposed to the full pressure of the US,Japan and the international community to give up its nuclear program.

China’s success in maintaining its ally on the Korean Peninsula wasachieved at a cost, however, which will be understood in time. China hadunwittingly encouraged the emergence of a nuclear power on its doorstepwhich could bring with it a potential instability and regional polarization.The Chinese have been concerned that a nuclear North would trigger Japan’snuclearization, and that a nuclear Japan would assume a key role in anAmerican effort to contain China. Zhang Liangui opined that the North’sballistic missile and nuclear tests played into the hands of the Japanese rightwing. He claimed that North Korea’s nuclear tests provided a justification forJapan’s military modernization and rearmament policies and strengthened thealliance with the US. If the Chinese complain about the strengthening ofsecurity ties between South Korea, Japan and the US, and about Japan’srearmament they have only their policies to blame. Moreover, the non-pro-liferation regime has been weakened by the failure of the Six Party Talks toprevent the North from developing nuclear weapons, which may come backto haunt China one day. The Chinese have always made light of nuclear nonproliferation regarding it as an American interest in the Korean Peninsulawhich was of secondary importance for them. Beijing did not consider that itssupport for Pakistan’s nuclear program would rebound to its detriment, thatIndiawould respondwith its own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program

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which would target China and put its cities under threat. In the same wayBeijing may not have carefully assessed the impact of its support for NorthKorea’s nuclear program upon Northeast Asia, and upon Japan in particular.

South Korea acted as the swing state in the negotiations. Though it was anally of the US, during the Six Party Talks it often swung to China’s side andattempted to moderate the US position. The Roh Administration followed upon Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement with the North anddeveloped a two track policy, one being bilateral and intended to open uptrade and economic ties with the North while the other was multilateral in theSix Party Talks. The South’s influence was seen in 2004–5 when, together withChina, it prevailed upon the US to include incentives in its bargaining posi-tion rather than repeatedly stressing punitive measures. Roh had grandioseambitions for the South to act as a bridge between the North and the US andto become a key actor in Northeast Asia, leading the way to what his sup-porters visualized as a peace regime. These ambitions were clearly beyond hisadministration and were exposed as fanciful by the South’s obvious depen-dence upon the US. The South’s role as a swing state in the talks ended whenthe conservative president Lee Myung-bak was elected. President Lee alignedhis policies more closely with the US.

For Russia a relationship with the North was a means of securing a posi-tion on the Korean peninsula for the long-term. Its voice in the talks wasseldom heard. It tabled few proposals of its own and had no need to do so asit acted with Beijing to head off American pressure upon the North andgenerally supported China. Russia joined China in the UN Security Councildeliberations and threatened to use its veto to prevent the imposition of harshsanctions on the North, and to ensure that they would be hortative ratherthan punitive. Japan had attempted its own engagement of the North toensure that it would not be excluded from the Korean Peninsula but this wasderailed by the abduction issue which locked the Japanese government into arejectionist position. At times, it even demanded that the abduction issue belinked with the nuclear problem and it was particularly alarmed by the BushAdministration’s’ about turn into direct talks with the North which wouldleave it isolated. From a supporter in the initial stages of the Six Party Talks,Japan later became a hindrance for the Americans.

What did the North want? The difficulty of identifying the North’s interestswas a problem shared by all in the Six Party Talks. Not only was the systemtightly controlled so that little information leaked out but deliberate mis-information was a way of dealing with the outside world. The diplomats whomade up the North’s negotiating team at the Six Party Talks were on a verytight leash and reported back to headquarters to obtain their instructions forevery session. From the beginning the North had little interest in the SixParty Talks and became involved only as a result of Chinese insistence, and attimes it revealed complete indifference to them. It had to be cajoled and evenbribed to return to the talks and when it did it made demands which wereundefined, emotive or changed according to the session. Demands were

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raised, then dropped, and sometimes reappeared again. The North wouldraise seemingly reasonable demands in response to American pressure duringthe talks which would bring the Chinese, the Russians, and, on occasion, theSouth to its side. Tacit bargaining gave the North an advantage over theothers since it never really disclosed its position and kept everyone guessing asto its strategy. The North’s behavior did not follow the regular process ofdiplomatic negotiation where parties are interested in agreement but disputethe terms, as for example the US and Soviet Union over strategic armsreduction negotiations. The absence of this identifiable and predictable pat-tern of negotiation indicated that the North operated to another agendawhich no one really understood. Rational minded Westerners, pragmaticChinese and hopeful South Koreans assumed that the North was interested inreaching an agreement and read into the North’s behavior their own hopes forone. They assumed that the North was bargaining for maximum benefitswhich if identified and included in a suitable package proposal, would lead toan agreement. They acted on the assumption of reasonability and that theNorth should be taken at face value, and when the North remained unre-sponsive, they blamed the US for its refusal to offer concessions that theAmericans were unprepared to give. Too often, as James Kelly said, in theirfrustration the other parties wanted the US, like some benign father, to makeproblems go away without understanding what was involved.

The North would also resort to direct intimidation and threaten escalationto play upon fears and rouse China and Russia to protect it against the US. Itcould adjust its behavior to whip up fear to intensify the pressure on the US,or to raise hopes that a major change of policy was underway. The Chinesewould table drafts at the talks, which, after painstaking negotiations, wereturned into agreements including schedules, coordinated steps, rewards, andpenalties. Too often, after reaching an agreement, the North would demandmore concessions while threatening to bring the negotiations to an end. Theother parties would then expect additional concessions from the US and theresponsibility was thrown on the Americans to avert a complete collapse ofthe talks. At times, the North would demand economic benefits, or an LWR.On other occasions, it seemed that a security guarantee or a peace treaty with theUS, or a replacement for the 1953 armistice agreement was really what itwanted. It was as though the course of the negotiations depended solely onsatisfaction on a seemingly reasonable demand. Then it would demand theend of US “hostility” and have the Americans scrambling to offer assur-ances that they had no intention of attacking the North, and that they wouldoffer the required security assurances. It did not explain what it meantwhen it called for an end to US “hostility,” nor did it discuss economicassistance, howmuch was required and in what form, or the terms of diplomaticrecognition.

There were two tracks in the North’s strategy and an understanding of theirinteraction or separation is important to identify the North’s intentions. Onetrack was the nuclear program which had been slowly developing and after

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2003 lurched ahead according to a schedule of its own. The second track wasdiplomatic which in the Six Party Talks was initially intended to prevent anAmerican attack, and later to avoid international sanctions which could setback its nuclear program or destroy it altogether. The relationship betweenthese two tracks is important for our understanding of what could have beendone to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons. Some likeRichard Armitage assumed that the tracks were separate and that diplomacywas a just a means to buy time for the nuclear program. The Six Party Talkswere used by the North to prevent its enemies from resorting to aggressiveaction against it. The constantly shifting demands and the prolonged nego-tiating sessions served to delay matters until the nuclear program had beencompleted. By this time the Six Party Talks were no longer useful and theNorth could withdraw from them. The nuclear program required considerablelead time for its development and once resources were committed and thedecisions made, the momentum generated would carry it through to comple-tion. The development of the program took place in at least three stages. Thefirst nuclear crisis of 1993–94 revealed that the North had extracted andstored sufficient plutonium for several nuclear weapons but it did not have thetechnical capacity to produce those weapons. After the Agreed Frameworkthe plutonium project remained dormant but the North initiated the HEUprogram by obtaining centrifuges from the A. Q. Khan network. Then camethe US invasion of Iraq in 2003 which alarmed the North and prompted it toaccelerate the development of nuclear weapons resulting in the test of October2006. The nuclear program was under the direct control of the top leadershipand in the compartmentalized system of the North was out of bounds to thediplomats of the Foreign Ministry. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the diplo-mats in the North’s Foreign Ministry knew very much about the nuclearprogram and very likely they were kept in ignorance about it. These diplo-mats had no authority to negotiate the nuclear program and resorted to tacitbargaining to keep the negotiations going when needed. They dropped hintsand made suggestions which persuaded outside observers that a resolutionwould be possible, that the North would surrender the nuclear program forthe sake of tangible economic or other benefits.

It is possible, however, that the diplomatic track could have influenceddecisions on the nuclear track, and if the right moves were made at the righttime, the nuclear weapons program could have been headed off. In a topdown authoritarian system such as the North, when the leadership is decidedover a course of action or policy it will impose it on the system and marshalthe resources to implement it. Groups in that system favoring an alternativeare of course coerced to comply. However, should the leadership be undecidedfor various reasons, a more complicated picture of decision-making wouldarise when the system is more open to different influences, externally and alsointernally. At these points of indecision, external diplomatic influences maygather support from internal groups or agencies that may advocate an alter-native and may have some impact on the system. When the top leadership in

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North Korea was undecided about the value of the Six Party Talks, or unsureabout the technical feasibility of developing nuclear weapons, it could havebeen possible to influence them. After the July 2002 reforms North KoreanForeign Ministry negotiators raised the idea of a possible deal over thenuclear program which was repeated at various points in the Six Party Talks.For a while the top leadership may have been dubious about its ability todevelop nuclear weapons and it was at these times that the Foreign Ministrynegotiators and the economic ministries had greater leeway to put their caseat the Six Party Talks.

There were two occasions when the diplomatic track may have intersectedwith the nuclear track to bring about a resolution of the nuclear issue. Onewas in the late 1990s when the Clinton Administration was considering adiplomatic opening to the North to complete the Agreed Framework; thesecond was in 2002 when a return to the Agreed Framework was still possiblebefore the invasion of Iraq. At that point, if the Bush Administration hadnegotiated directly with the North and had continued with KEDO, if it hadallowed the North to receive the promised LWRs, and if it had offered theNorth a security guarantee and economic aid on a large scale conditional onit giving up its nuclear program, the North might have responded and agreedto a deal. At that stage, however, the Bush Administration was in no mood toconsider the idea and the North’s admission of a HEU program would havebeen too difficult for any administration to ignore. A resolution on either ofthese occasions, however, would not have led to the complete elimination ofthe nuclear program since the regime regarded it as necessary for its ultimatesurvival. The most that could have been realistically expected would havebeen an extended freeze with an indefinite postponement of verification ofboth the plutonium stockpile and the HEU program in a way that wouldallow the regime to maintain a nuclear reserve as insurance against changingtimes.

Some would argue that a freeze of the nuclear program would have beenbetter than no freeze but, this solution would have demanded American tol-erance of the North’s nuclear reserve based on the plutonium produced andstored as well as the HEU program. The problem would have been simplypostponed and not resolved. South Korean supporters of Roh Moon-hyunhave claimed that there was there a third opportunity to resolve the issuediplomatically in September 2005, if the US had not imposed financial sanc-tions on the North. By then, however, the nuclear track had streaked ahead ofthe diplomatic track as the leadership had greater confidence in its nuclearweapons program. Even if there had been no financial sanctions by 2005, theNorth was close to testing its nuclear device and would have found anynumber of difficulties to avoid agreement. Why would the North agree to afreeze of the nuclear program when it was so close to a nuclear test? After thetest, an agreement based on a freeze of the nuclear program made no sense tothe North which wanted to be treated as a nuclear power. The Bush Admin-istration had conducted a humiliating about turn and had accepted direct

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talks with the North. It had lifted financial and other sanctions which hadbeen imposed on the North for its terrorist activities. By 2008 it had gonefurther to make an agreement possible with the North than anyone hadanticipated. The North stalled over the critical issue of verification, however,and lost interest in the Six Party Talks and negotiations over the nuclear issue.

Ultimately, the issue for diplomatic negotiation was the willingness of theparties to the Six Party Talks to acquiesce to less than full verification as anecessary measure to bring some measure of stability to the Korean Penin-sula. Any agreement over the North’s nuclear program would have had toaccept this as the North would settle for nothing less. The Chinese, Russiansand the Roh administration in the South wanted American compromise withthe North. From their perspective the problem was the Bush Administrationand its fixation with nuclear non proliferation. They were prepared to beindifferent to the demand for full verification since as they saw it, any agree-ment with the North would be a temporary measure and a first step in aprocess of eventual denuclearization. As long as agreement to remove thethreatened instability on the Peninsula was reached, economic aid could bedispensed to the North, and trade and investment with the outside worldencouraged. On this basis if conditions were to stabilize, the North wouldbecome more receptive and the parties could eventually turn to the elimina-tion of the nuclear program. This outcome would have suited the Chinese andthe Russians but for the Americans it would have been unacceptable. The UScould not allow the North to get away without full verification while insistingelsewhere on the strict observance of the non proliferation regime in relationto Iran or Syria. Moreover, once agreed, the postponement of verificationuntil some unspecified future time could easily become permanent and wouldconstitute abandonment of the non proliferation regime, and implicit recog-nition of the North as a nuclear power. Despite everything, tensions on theKorean Peninsula would not be removed in a deal like this since a North withan unverified nuclear program would always be a source of tension on thePeninsula and a threat to its neighbors.

The North brushed off all efforts to entice it to surrender its nuclearweapons program and conducted two nuclear tests despite all the attempts toprevent it in the Six Party Talks. While the first may have been only a partialsuccess, the second indicated that some technical problems had been over-come. It has also tested long-range delivery systems in the attempt to deploy amissile that could reach American territory in Alaska or Hawaii. So far theseefforts have not been successful. Of the four long range missile tests two haveexploded after launching and the other two revealed technical problems thathave not yet been resolved. The North’s limited scientific and engineeringestablishment does not have the scale or supporting industries to resolve manyof the technical difficulties it has faced, nor does it allow open access to theinternational mainstream from which it could import knowledge and tech-nology that would assist it in its efforts. It has been reduced to furtive contactwith states such as Iran and Pakistan that have operated their own clandestine

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nuclear and ballistic missile programs and have been struggling to develop thetechnology. Still, the North has gone further than many had expected anddemonstrates what can be done by an isolated regime under a determineddictatorship. North Korean diplomats have on occasion referred to Americanacceptance of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers and intimated that theUS should similarly accept North Korea. The US may have grudginglyacquiesced to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear status, but North Korea stands outas a case to be rejected because of its dangerous unpredictability, the threat itposes to South Korea and Japan and its intention to target the US with bal-listic missiles.

The psychology of power in the North should be understood before anyconclusions can be reached about the Six Party Talks, or indeed any effort tonegotiate with the North. The Clinton Administration assumed that theNorth Korean regime would collapse and go the way of the Soviet Unionwhen it negotiated the Agreed Framework. However, despite predictions, theregime has survived. It pulled through a disastrous famine over 1994–98 whenan estimated 800,000 to 3,500,000 people died, which would have toppledmany other regimes. It continues to survive despite food shortages and diffi-culties that would in other countries trigger open revolt. The regime has sur-vived mainly because of the tight controls it has imposed on the populationunder conditions of stringent isolation from the outside world. The regime is ananomaly in that its survival depends on its isolation since the symbols ofregime legitimacy, which include the god-like status of the founder Kim Il-sung,are meaningful only in isolation where they cannot be challenged. Powerenforces the isolation of the country and ensures that contact with the outsideworld is reduced to a minimum, and what the populace knows about thatworld is fabricated or distorted by the official media. Power and its reverenceunderlies the operating code of the leadership which has sacrificed the eco-nomic well-being of its people for its own survival. Demonstrations of powersuch as nuclear and ballistic missile tests are required by the regime tounderpin the basis of its rule and to verify the credentials of its leadership.Well-intended proposals that assumed that the regime was simply bargainingwith the nuclear weapons program for economic assistance and aid missed themark.

While many thought that denuclearization could only take place only in acontext of economic growth in the North and integration with the economiesof Northeast Asia, the regime was beyond the economic reforms of the kindpromoted by China or Vietnam. When they were attempted, they werequickly repudiated and the familiar controls were re-imposed. Economicreforms and liberalization would bring closer contact with the outside worldand above all with the South, the regime’s bitter rival for the legitimacy of theKorean nation. This would threaten its ultimate ruin as the terrible deceptionconcocted by the regime to justify its isolation before its own people would beunmasked. Every effort by the South to develop closer human contacts withthe North triggered a backlash and in some cases provocations that were

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clearly intended to terminate them. The nuclear weapons program was its ulti-mate means of survival and provided the regime with the means of prolong-ing its anomalous existence. The North had no trust in paper agreements orassurances and American security guarantees were meaningless to it, exceptas a step towards the agreement with the US it sought. It wanted an agree-ment with the US which would require that it give up parts of the nuclearprogram and close the obsolete Yongbyon reactor, as long as the North couldget away with a nuclear reserve based on the plutonium already stored as wellas the HEU program. It wanted to be treated as a special exception in USpolicy, which would entail American concurrence in its own isolation and theregimes survival with a nuclear reserve. It wanted economic assistance on itsown terms, with trade and investment under strictly controlled conditions.

The curse of isolation is ignorance. If the intention was to use the nuclearprogram to maneuver the US into a special relationship with the North, onethat would entail tolerance of a nuclear reserve and support for the rulingKim dynasty, the North’s top leadership revealed little understanding of theUS and the principles that underlie its foreign policy. In a brutally enforcedtop-down decision-making system where information is carefully screenedbefore it is submitted to the leadership, and where stepping out of line can beharshly punished, misperceptions would be expected. The North Korean lea-dership, seemed not to understand that an American administration could notconsider such a relationship in view of the North’s human rights record andits repressive system. Nor did it understand the American commitment to thenon proliferation regime and that it could not fudge the issue of the North’snuclear program, and accept less than full verification in view of its seriousconcerns about the Iranian nuclear program. It showed little understanding ofAmerican commitments to its allies in the South and Japan which were moreimportant to the US than North Korea and that the US would not allow theNorth to come between them. Its nuclear tests and provocative behaviorwhich were products of its own siege mentality strengthened hard line viewsof the North within the US, South Korea, and Japan and the sidelining ofthose who had called for engagement with the North. Indeed, the North’sprovocations against the South in 2010 discredited the notion of the sympa-thetic engagement of the North that had flourished in Seoul in previous years.The North may have intended to reinforce its own isolation and to reduce therisk of contamination from the South but it has made the South more hostileand less willing to aid and assist it.

Several lessons for negotiation emerge from this study. One is that powerdoes not always decide outcomes in negotiations and the US should carefullyexamine the negotiating structure and the probable roles of the parties likelyto be involved before devising a bargaining position. The US should avoid asituation where it becomes dependent upon a pivotal player whose coopera-tion is required to achieve an outcome, but which pursues interests which maybe at variance with its own. Also, it cannot expect progress in negotiations ifthey include a target state which can expect support from major parties in the

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negotiations and is bound to them by alliance ties or common interests. Forthese reasons the Six Party Talks have had their day and despite the efforts byChina to revive them, they have been overtaken by events and are no longerrelevant. Six Party Talks only made sense while China was mediator andwhile it assumed the role of pivotal player to bring the North on board in thenegotiations. This indeed was the main attraction of the talks to the US.China has since lost its position as mediator and after the North’s nucleartests openly sided with the North, and protected it against international con-demnation. China resigned from its role as pivotal player and mediator tobecome the North’s patron and protector. Should the Six Party Talks bereconvened, deadlock would be expected as China, Russia and North Koreawould face the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan. They would beincapable of resolving the nuclear issue or any other troublesome problem onthe Korean Peninsula.

Critical issues will arise in the future which will require multilateral coop-eration for which the Six Party Talks are ill-suited. The North Korean regimeis exceptionally brittle and its need to resort to demonstrations of power is anindication of its essential weakness. It brutally enforces an isolation that pre-vents economic improvement and reform while consigning its people intoseemingly permanent poverty in great contrast with the South. A collapse ofthe regime as a result of economic breakdown, or an attempt at reform by aNorth Korean Gorbachev who unknowingly stimulates uncontrollable expec-tations, cannot be excluded. A mechanism is required which would allowrapid consultation and coordination of positions between the major players,the US and China above all. Of prime concern would be the safety of thenuclear facilities and the ballistic missiles in the North, control over the shortrange missile and artillery units as well as the special forces that have beendeployed along the DMZ. The US and the South have made plans for jointoperations in the event of regime collapse in the North to secure the nuclearfacilities and prevent civil unrest. This plan has already provoked fears inChina and Russia that a permanent occupation is being considered and aChinese counter response cannot be excluded should these events come topass. When and if this time comes, a multilateral body would be convenedagain to deal with the aftermath of regime collapse and to ensure that no oneparty would gain an advantage in the North that other external players wouldcontest. Talks on the Korean Peninsula should focus not just on the nuclearissue but on the broader topic of security, prevention of conflict and economicand emergency support for the North in the aftermath of regime breakdown.In this context the talks should be transformed into a consultative process toprevent conflict and chaos on the Korean Peninsula and to prepare for anortheast Asian multilateralism whose absence has been long felt. Six Partiesare inadequate to deal with the situation and a wider multilateralism whichwould involve ASEAN, the EU, Australia, the IAEA, and the UN would benecessary for a global resolution of the nuclear issue and to bring stability tothe Korean Peninsula.

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Index

Abe, Shinzo, Japanese Prime Minister,45, 62, 69, 131, 141, 146, 147

Abrams, Elliott, US Deputy NationalSecurity Adviser, 143

Agreed Framework, 1994, 20–21, 24, 26,30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43, 61, 91, 127, 141,142, 143, 144, 148, 191, 192End of 56–59

Albright, Madeleine, US Secretary ofState, 22, 23

Armitage, Richard, US DeputySecretary of State, 23, 60, 85

Aso, Taro, Japanese Prime Minister,122, 141, 167

Banco Delta Asia, 101, 102, 111, 114,132, 147

Ban Ki-moon, South Korean ForeignMinister, 7, 96, 98, 100

Bolton, John R. Undersecretary ofState, 19, 24, 89, 116, 121, 122, 123,125, 131, 143

Bosworth, Stephen, US SpecialRepresentative for North Korea, 173,175, 176, 177

Bush Administration, see United StatesBush, George W., 25, 62, 92, 101, 102,113, 116, 122, 142, 143, 151,152, 156

Campbell, Kurt, US Assistant Secretaryof State, 174

Carter, Jimmy, 20Cheney, Dick, Vice President, 19, 24, 59,62, 89, 143, 151

ChinaAs pivotal player, 27–30, 185Foreign Ministry, 27, 28, 95, 117Four Party Talks, 55

Mediator, 29, 70, 71, 89, 95, 98,101, 141, 142, 158, 174, 179, 186,187, 196North Korea, 19, 27, 63, 64, 65, 66,94, 97, 100, 111–12, 114–15, 119,120, 121, 124, 125, 127, 169, 170,174, 177, 178, 179, 185, 187, 188Party International LiaisonDepartment, 27, 28, 94Russia, 70, 168–69Six Party Talks, 28–29, 60–62, 70–72, 88, 95, 97, 100, 115, 117, 118,119, 122, 127, 141–42, 174, 179South Korea, 69, 80Three Party Talks April 2003, 63–66UN Sanctions, 124, 125United States, 26, 27, 28, 26, 27, 28,29, 60, 61, 87, 94, 96, 112–13, 118,126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 174, 179,186, 187, 192Verification, 153

Choe Su-hon, North Korean ViceForeign Minister, 91, 93

Chun Yung-woo, South Korean delegateto Six Party Talks, 141, 142

Chung Dong-young, South KoreanUnification Minister and NSCAdvisor, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103

Churkin, Vitaly, Russian delegate to SixParty Talks, 117, 123

Clinton Administration, see UnitedStates

Clinton, Bill, 20, 24, 31, 51Clinton, Hillary, 174, 179

Dai Bingguo, Chinese Vice ForeignMinister, 63, 70, 174, 179

Democratic Republic of Korea, seeKorea, North

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Elbaradei, Mohammed, Director IAEA93, 152, 154

Five Party Talks proposal, 176Four Party Talks, 1996–99, 36, 39,53–56

Fukuda, Yasuo, Japanese PrimeMinister 44, 155

Gallucci, Robert, US AssistantSecretary of State, 23, 90

Hadley, Stephen, US National SecurityAdvisor, 132, 143

Harrison, Selig S., US scholar, journalistand critic, 166

Hatoyama, Yukio, Japanese PrimeMinister, 178

Hecker, Siegfried, US nuclear scientist86, 87, 172

Hill, Christopher, US AssistantSecretary of State, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98,99, 112, 129, 130, 131, 132, 140, 142,144, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157,158, 168, 172

Hu Jintao, 64, 66, 70, 100, 112, 116,128, 143, 174, 179, 186, 187

Hwang Jang-yop, North Koreandefector, 32, 33

IAEA (International Atomic EnergyAgency), 19, 31, 58, 85, 93, 95, 97, 9899, 130, 132, 141, 142, 152, 153, 154,167

Ishiba Shigeru, Japanese DefenseMinister, 45, 69

Ivanov, Ivan, Russian Foreign Minister,37, 59

Jang Song-taek, North Korean SecurityChief, 92, 93, 159, 166, 178

JapanAbductions 15, 43, 44, 45, 57, 59,72, 88, 131, 132, 141, 147, 151, 154,155, 157, 158, 185, 189As peripheral player, 42–45BMD, 43, 45, 167Foreign Ministry, 43, 44, 45North Korea, 42, 43, 44, 69, 118,132, 147, 178Six Party Talks, 45, 56, 63South Korea, 69United States, 61, 146, 147, 155,157, 158, 173, 174

Jiang Zemin, 57, 61, 62, 66Joseph, Robert G., US Undersecretaryof State, 19, 95, 131, 143

Kang Sok-ju, North Korean DeputyForeign Minister 24, 56, 63, 100, 169

Kawaguchi, Yoriko, Japanese ForeignMinister, 59

KEDO (Korean EconomicDevelopment Organisation), 20, 22,24, 43, 68, 192

Kelly, James, US Assistant Secretary ofState, 23, 24, 37, 56, 60, 65, 67, 72,85, 88, 91

Khan, A. Q. network, 24, 30, 31, 88,120, 149, 191

Kim Dae-jung, 40, 41, 43, 56, 59, 81, 121Kim Il-sung, 20, 32, 174, 175, 194Kim Jong-il, 23, 32, 35, 41, 44, 45, 57,92, 97, 100, 101, 111, 115, 144, 152,156, 159, 164,166, 170, 171, 174, 177

Kim Jong-un, 165, 168, 171, 172, 178Kim Kye-kwan, North Korean ViceForeign Minister and delegate to SixParty Talks, 23, 89, 91, 93, 116, 124,130, 131, 132, 140, 149, 158, 172

Kim Sook, South Korean delegate toSix Party Talks, 157, 158

Kim Young-sam, 32, 38, 39, 54, 56Koizumi Junichiro, Japanese PrimeMinister, 44, 57

Korea, NorthArmistice agreement 1953, 54, 72,175, 190–91As target state, 30–36, 166, 185Ballistic missile tests, 113–14,166–67Bargaining tactics, 34–35, 86, 159,185, 190–93Berlin talks 2007, 131–32China, 19, 27, 63, 64, 65, 67, 92Economic reforms, 33, 92, 93,Energy aid, 20, 22, 24, 34, 35, 53,85, 90, 100, 141, 142, 148, 150, 154,155, 158, 157,Foreign Ministry, 99, 128, 132, 151,167, 168, 174, 176, 191,Four Party Talks, 55Hardliners, 32, 33, 91HEU program, 24, 30, 31, 33, 37,56–57, 86, 88, 95, 99, 143, 144, 145,148, 149, 172, 191, 192Japan, 42, 43, 44, 69

206 Index

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LWRs, 20, 34, 35, 58, 86, 98–99,100 101, 132, 141–43, 172, 190, 192Non-aggression pact, 32, 57, 58, 60,61, 70, 73, 85, 175NPT, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 58, 64, 70,97, 114, 115Nuclear tests, 118–20, 168Provocations against the South, 177,178Regime isolation, 177, 194–95Russia, 36–38, 189Six Party Talks, 15, 18, 25,34,70–72, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 100–101,157, 158, 174, 184, 185, 192–94.South Korea, 39, 40, 42, 57, 82, 97,157, 177, 178Succession, 165, 177Three Party Talks, 63–67United States, 19–27, 32, 33–35, 54,61, 65, 66, 85, 86, 91, 116, 149, 151,155, 158, 159, 175, 176Security guarantee, 35, 60, 61, 63,65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88,90, 96, 97, 130, 140, 176, 190, 192,195US financial sanctions, 101, 112,129, 130, 132, 147, 148, 159

Korea, South,Agreed framework, 54Armistice agreement 1953, 54As swing state, 58–42, 189China, 69, 80LWRs, 39, 103, 146North Korea, 40, 41, 42, 57, 82,94, 102–3, 121, 125–26, 157, 172,177, 178Peace regime, 68, 97Projects in North, 125, 126, 157,172United States, 38, 39, 41, 51, 60, 62,63, 68, 78–84, 174, 189Verification, 153

Lavrov, Sergei, Russian ForeignMinister, 125, 168, 169

Lee Myung-bak, 173, 175, 176, 178, 189Li Gun, North Korean delegate to SixParty Talks, 65, 66, 85

Obuchi, Keizo, Japanese Prime Minister,56, 63, 64

Non Proliferation Treaty, 11, 19, 20, 21,22, 27, 58, 64, 70, 73, 86, 96, 97, 98,99, 114, 115, 170

North Korea, see Korea, North

People’s Republic of China, see ChinaPowell, Colin, US Secretary of State, 23,25, 61, 62, 66, 71

Pritchard, Charles, 22, 23, 86Putin, Vladimir, 36, 37, 38, 70, 112, 116

Rice, Condoleezza, US NSC Advisorand Secretary of State, 23, 57, 94, 98,125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 143, 151,156, 157, 158

Richardson, Bill, Former USAmbassador and New Mexicogovernor, 100, 114

Roh Moon-hyun, 41, 42, 58, 62, 67, 68,78–84, 102, 121, 122, 126, 142, 146,157, 173, 192South as balancer, 83

Rumsfeld, Donald, 25, 59, 61, 62, 89,131

Russia1994 proposal, 36China, 70, 112, 117Exclusion from Agreed Framework,36North Korea, 36–38, 189Supporting player, 36–38Six Party Talks, 38United States, 36,

Six Party TalksDecember 2006, 130December 2008, 158February 2007 agreement, 141–47Fifth round, November 2005, 100,First round, August 2003, 71–73Formation 70–72, 185Fourth round, July–August 2005,95–100LWRs, 96–99Second round, February 2004,84–89September 2005 agreement, 96–100Sixth round, March 2007, 141–42,148Third round, June 2004, 90US financial sanctions, 101, 112Verification, 152–57

Song Min-soon, South Korean ForeignMinister, 98, 102, 126, 132, 146

South Korea, see Korea, SouthSunshine policy, 40–41, 43, 56, 57, 67,81, 121

Index 207

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Tanaka, Hitoshi, Japanese diplomat, 44,45

Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese Foreign Minister,61, 127, 128

Three Party Talks, April 2003, 63–66

United NationsSanctions compliance, 171Security Council Resolution 8778,15 July 2006, 117, 126Security Council Resolution 1718,14 October 2006, 123, 126, 166, 167,168, 170, 171,Security Council Resolution 1874,12 June 2009, 170

United StatesAgreed Framework 1994, 20–21, 22,23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43, 56–59,61, 91, 127, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148,191, 192As dominant player, 19–27Armistice agreement 1953, 54, 72, 175Berlin Talks 2007, 131–32Bush Administration, 23, 24, 25, 29,55, 59, 60, 72, 81, 90, 96, 99, 102,112, 113, 121, 129, 131, 144, 149,151, 155, 156, 159, 169, 185, 186,182, 193China, 26, 27, 28, 29, 60, 61, 87, 94,96, 112–13, 118, 126, 127, 128, 129,130, 174, 179, 186, 187, 192Clinton Administration, 21, 22, 23,24, 31, 36, 81, 144, 159, 192, 194Comprehensive deal, 60CVID, 67, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,Financial sanctions, 101, 112, 129,130, 132, 147, 148, 159First Korean nuclear crisis, 1993–94,20Four Party Talks, 54, 55, 56HEU program, 24, 30, 31, 33, 37,56–57, 86, 88, 95, 99, 143, 144, 145,148, 149, 172, 191, 192Japan, 61, 146, 147, 155, 157, 158,173, 174LWRs, 20, 58, 96–99, 100 101, 103,132, 142–43, 144, 190, 192Military strike, 20, 33, 58, 62, 65,68, 97, 123, 128, 187, 190, 191Neoconservatives, 19, 25, 59, 60, 89,99, 131, 143, 144, 145, 152, 159, 183

North Korea, 19–27, 32, 33–35, 54,61, 65, 66, 85, 86, 91, 116, 149, 151,155, 158, 159, 175, 176Security guarantee for, 35, 60, 61,63, 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 87,88, 90, 96, 97, 130, 140, 176, 190,192, 195NPT, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22–27, 58, 64,70, 73, 86, 96, 97, 98, 99, 114, 115,170Obama Administration, 159, 169,173, 174, 175, 176Russia, 36South Korea, 38, 39, 41, 51, 60, 62,63, 68, 78–84, 174, 189Terrorism sponsors list, 22, 24, 90,91, 132, 142, 143, 147, 150, 151,152, 153, 156, 157, 159Removal of North Korea from, 156Three Party Talks, 63–66Trilateral Security Dialogue withJapan and South Korea, 26, 67, 158Verification, 152–57

Wang Guangya, China’s PermanentRepresentative to the UN, 116, 117,119, 122, 124

Wang Jiarui, Party International LiaisonDepartment Head, 94, 118

Wang Yi, Chinese Vice ForeignMinister, 61, 72, 80, 87, 88, 89

Weinberger, Caspar, 21Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier, 102, 114,127, 128, 174, 178

Wit, Joel, Former US State Departmentofficial, 126, 132, 149

Wu Dawei, Chinese delegate to SixParty Talks, 95, 97, 179

Yabunaka, Mitoji, Japanese delegate toSix Party Talks, 72, 90

Yang Jiechi, Chinese Foreign Minister, 168Yongbyon nuclear reactor, 22, 62, 58,88, 100, 118, 128, 130, 132, 141, 142,144, 145, 148, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158,167, 172, 195,

Yoon Young-kwan, South KoreanForeign Minister, 63, 64, 71, 79, 83, 84

Zhang Liangui, Chinese Scholar, 120,121, 122, 169, 188

Zhu Feng, Chinese Scholar, 114, 120, 179

208 Index

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