@TechReport{LaevenValencia2012, author={Fabian Valencia and Luc Laeven}, title={{Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update}}, year=2012, month=Jun, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/12-163.html}, number={12/163}, abstract={We update the widely used banking crises database by Laeven andValencia (2008, 2010) with new information on recent and ongoing crises, includingupdated information on policy responses and outcomes (i.e. fiscal costs, output losses,and increases in public debt). We also update our dating of sovereign debt andcurrency crises. The database includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereigndebt crises during the period 1970-2011. The data show some striking differences inpolicy responses between advanced and emerging economies as well as manysimilarities between past and ongoing crises.}, keywords={Banking crisis; Financial crisis; Bank restructuring; Databases; Depositinsurance; Developed countr},}

@TechReport{LaevenValencia2010, author={Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia}, title={{Resolution of Banking Crises; The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly}}, year=2010, month=Jun, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/10-146.html}, number={10/146}, abstract={This paper presents a new database of systemic banking crises for theperiod 1970-2009. While there are many commonalities between recent and pastcrises, both in terms of underlying causes and policy responses, there are someimportant differences in terms of the scale and scope of interventions. Direct fiscalcosts to support the financial sector were smaller this time as a consequence of swiftpolicy action and significant indirect support from expansionary monetary and fiscalpolicy, the widespread use of guarantees on liabilities, and direct purchases of assets.While these policies have reduced the real impact of the current crisis, they haveincreased the burden of public debt and the size of government contingent liabilities,raising concerns about fiscal sustainability in some countries.}, keywords={Banking crisis; Debt burden; Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009; Grossdomestic product; Fiscal susta},}

@TechReport{LaevenValencia2008, author={Fabian Valencia and Luc Laeven}, title={{Systemic Banking Crises; A New Database}}, year=2008,

1

month=Sep, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/08-224.html}, number={08/224}, abstract={This paper presents a new database on the timing of systemic bankingcrises and policy responses to resolve them. The database covers the universe ofsystemic banking crises for the period 1970-2007, with detailed data on crisiscontainment and resolution policies for 42 crisis episodes, and also includes data onthe timing of currency crises and sovereign debt crises. The database extends andbuilds on the Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005) banking crisis database,and is the most complete and detailed database on banking crises to date.}, keywords={Banking crisis; Banking sector; Sovereign debt; Databases; Spillovers;Economic recovery; Fiscal sus},}

@Article{LaevenValencia2013, author={Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia}, title={{Systemic Banking Crises Database}}, journal={IMF Economic Review}, year=2013, volume={61}, number={2}, pages={225-270}, month={June}, keywords={}, abstract={The paper presents a comprehensive database on systemic banking crisesduring 19702011. It proposes a methodology to date banking crises based on policyindices, and examines the robustness of this approach. The paper also presentsinformation on the costs and policy responses associated with banking crises. Thedatabase on banking crises episodes is further complemented with dates for sovereigndebt and currency crises during the same period. The paper contrasts output lossesacross different crises and finds that sovereign debt crises tend to be more costly thanbanking crises, and these in turn tend to be more costly than currency crises. The dataalso point to significant differences in policy responses between advanced andemerging economies.}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/imfecr/v61y2013i2p225-270.html}}

@article {acharyaetal2014JF,author = {Acharya, Viral and Drechsler, Itamar and Schnabl, Philipp},title = {A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk},journal = {The Journal of Finance},volume = {69},number = {6},issn = {1540-6261},url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12206},doi = {10.1111/jofi.12206},

2

pages = {2689--2739},year = {2014},}

@TechReport{GMR2014data, author={Nicola Gennaioli and Alberto Martin and Stefano Rossi}, title={{Banks, Government Bonds, and Default: What do the Data Say?}}, year=2014, month=Jul, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/14-120.html}, number={14/120}, abstract={We analyze holdings of public bonds by over 20,000 banks in 191countries, and the role of these bonds in 20 sovereign defaults over 1998-2012. Bankshold many public bonds (on average 9\% of their assets), particularly in lessfinancially-developed countries. During sovereign defaults, banks increase theirexposure to public bonds, especially large banks and when expected bond returns arehigh. At the bank level, bondholdings correlate negatively with subsequent lendingduring sovereign defaults. This correlation is mostly due to bonds acquired in pre-default years. These findings shed light on alternative theories of the sovereigndefault-banking crisis nexus.}, keywords={Banks; Government securities; Bonds; Sovereign risk; Return oninvestment; Sovereign debt defaults; },}

@Article{GMR2014JF, author={Nicola Gennaioli and Alberto Martin and Stefano Rossi}, title={{Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions}}, journal={Journal of Finance}, year=2014, volume={69}, number={2}, pages={819-866}, month={04}, keywords={}, abstract={ type=\"main\"> We present a model of sovereign debt inwhich, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because theydestroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financialinstitutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerableto sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines inprivate credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financialinstitutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In thesesame countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel ofcountries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v69y2014i2p819-866.html}}

3

@Article{BronerMartinVentuar2010, author={Fernando Broner and Alberto Martin and Jaume Ventura}, title={{Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets}}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=2010, volume={100}, number={4}, pages={1523-55}, month={September}, keywords={}, abstract={Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties,sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdomrests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets.Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of defaultpenalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereignrisk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penaltiesare insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one caneither increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets. (JELF34, G12, G15)}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v100y2010i4p1523-55.html}}

@TechReport{SosaPadilla2014, author={Cesar Sosa-Padilla}, title={{Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises}}, year=2012, month=Sep, institution={McMaster University}, type={Department of Economics Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/2012-09.html}, number={2012-09}, abstract={Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities inconnection with the banking systems of the countries where they occur: (i) sovereigndefaults and banking crises tend to happen together, (ii) commercial banks havesubstantial holdings of government debt, and (iii) sovereign defaults result in majorcontractions in bank credit and production. This paper provides a rationale for thesephenomena by extending the traditional sovereign default framework to incorporatebankers who lend to both the government and the corporate sector. When thesebankers are highly exposed to government debt, a default triggers a banking crisis,which leads to a corporate credit collapse and subsequently to an output decline.When calibrated to the 2001-02 Argentine default episode, the model is able toproduce default in equilibrium at observed frequencies, and when defaults occur creditcontracts sharply, generating output drops of 6\% below trend, on average. Moreover,the model matches several moments of the data on macroeconomic aggregates,

4

sovereign borrowing, and scal policy. The framework presented can also be useful forstudying the optimality of fractional defaults and the political economy of domesticdebt repudiation.}, keywords={sovereign default; banking crisis; credit crunch; optimal fiscal policy;Markov perfect equilibrium;},}

@TechReport{CaprioKlingebiel2003, author={Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel}, title={{Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises}}, year=2003, institution={World Bank}, type={mimeo},}

@Article{DellAricciaetal2008, author={Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni and Detragiache, Enrica and Rajan, Raghuram}, title={{The real effect of banking crises}}, journal={Journal of Financial Intermediation}, year=2008, volume={17}, number={1}, pages={89-112}, month={January}, keywords={}, abstract={Banking crises are usually followed by a decline in credit and growth. Isthis because crises tend to take place during economic downturns, or do bankingsector problems have independent negative effects on the economy? To answer thisquestion we examine industrial sectors with differing needs for financing. If bankingcrises have an exogenous detrimental effect on real activity, then sectors moredependent on external finance should perform relatively worse during banking crises.The evidence in this paper supports this view. Additional support comes from the factthat sectors that predominantly have small firms, and thus are typically bankdependent, also perform relatively worse during banking crises. The differential effectsacross sectors are stronger in developing countries, in countries with less access toforeign finance, and where banking crises were more severe.(This abstract wasborrowed from another version of this item.)}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinin/v17y2008i1p89-112.html}}

@InCollection{GlickHutcheson2001, author={Glick, Rueven and Michael Hutchison}, editor={Glick, Rueven and Ramon Moreno and Mark Spiegel}, title={Banking Crises and Currency Crises: How Common are the Twins?}, booktitle={Financial Crises in Emerging Markets}, publisher={Cambridge University Press}, year=2001,

5

}@TechReport{KumhofTanner2005, author={Michael Kumhof and Evan Tanner}, title={{Government Debt: A Key Role in Financial Intermediation}}, year=2005, month=Mar, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/05-57.html}, number={05/57}, abstract={The literature on optimal fiscal policy finds that highly volatile real returnson government debt, for example through surprise inflation, have very low costs.However, policymakers are almost always very apprehensive of this option. The paperdiscusses evidence concerning features of developing country financial markets thatare missing in existing models, and that may suggest why this policy is considered socostly in practice. Most importantly, domestic banks choose to be highly exposed togovernment debt because the alternative, private lending, is more risky under existinglegal and institutional imperfections. This exposure makes banks and their borrowersvulnerable to the government''s debt policy.}, keywords={Public debt; government debt; bond; financial institutions; bond markets;financial markets; bond ma},}

@Article{ReinhartRogoffSavastano2003, author={Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff and Miguel A. Savastano}, title={{Debt Intolerance}}, journal={Brookings Papers on Economic Activity}, year=2003, volume={34}, number={1}, pages={1-74}, month={}, keywords={macroeconomics; Debt Intolerance}, abstract={This paper introduces the concept of \"debt intolerance,\"which manifests itself in the extreme duress many emerging market economiesexperience at levels of indebtedness that would seem manageable by advancedcountry standards. The paper argues that \"safe\" external debt-to-GNPthresholds for debt-intolerant countries depend on the country's default and inflationhistory and may be as low as 15 percent in some cases. Debt intolerance is linked tothe phenomenon of serial default that has plagued many countries over the past twocenturies. Understanding and measuring debt intolerance is fundamental to assessingthe problems of debt sustainability, debt restructuring, capital market integration, andthe scope for international lending to ameliorate crises. The paper makes a first passat quantifying debt intolerance, including delineating debtors' \"clubs\" andregions of vulnerability, based on a history of credit events for a large number ofcountries going back to the 1820s.}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/bin/bpeajo/v34y2003i2003-1p1-74.html}

6

}%-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------%-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------%% SOVDEBT.BIB%%-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------%-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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7

@Article{CuadraSapriza2008, author={Cuadra, Gabriel and Sapriza, Horacio}, title={{Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emergingmarkets}}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2008, volume={76}, number={1}, pages={78-88}, month={September}}

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@TechReport{DErasmo2011, author={Pablo D'Erasmo}, title={Government Reputation and Debt Repayment}, year=2011, institution={University of Maryland}, type={Working Paper},}

@TechReport{ArellanoBai2013, author={Cristina Arellano and Yan Bai}, title={{Linkages Across Sovereign Debt Markets}}, year=2013, institution={University of Rochester}, type={Working Paper},}

@Article{KimZhang2012, author={Kim, Yun Jung and Zhang, Jing}, title={{Decentralized borrowing and centralized default}}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2012, volume={88}, number={1}, pages={121-133}}

8

@Article{AguiarAmador2011, author={Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador}, title={{Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation}}, journal={The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year=2011, volume={126}, number={2}, pages={651-697}}

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@TechReport{Bianchi2012reserves, author={Javier Bianchi and Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez}, title={{International Reserves and Rollover Risk}}, year=2012, month=Dec, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, number={18628}}

@Article{MendozaYueQJE2012, author={Enrique G. Mendoza and Vivian Z. Yue}, title={{A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles}}, journal={The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year=2012, volume={127}, number={2},

9

pages={889-946}}

@Article{BaiZhangJIE2012, author={Bai, Yan and Zhang, Jing}, title={{Duration of sovereign debt renegotiation}}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2012, volume={86}, number={2}, pages={252-268}}

@incollection{aguiar2014handbook, title = {Sovereign Debt}, booktitle = {Handbook of International Economics Vol 4},editor = {Elhanan Helpman and Kenneth Rogoff and Gita Gopniath},publisher = "Elsevier",year = "2015",volume = "4",pages = "647 - 687", author = {Aguiar, Mark and Amador, Manuel} }

@Article{Chatterjeeetal2007, author={Satyajit Chatterjee and Dean Corbae and Makoto Nakajima and Jose-VictorRios-Rull}, title={{A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default}}, journal={Econometrica}, year=2007, volume={75}, number={6}, pages={1525-1589}, month={November}}

@Article{Chang1998, author={Chang, Roberto}, title={{Credible Monetary Policy in an Infinite Horizon Model: RecursiveApproaches}}, journal={Journal of Economic Theory}, year=1998, volume={81}, number={2}, pages={431-461}, month={August}}

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@Article{ChariKehoe1990, author={Chari, V V and Kehoe, Patrick J}, title={{Sustainable Plans}}, journal={Journal of Political Economy}, year=1990, volume={98}, number={4}, pages={783-802}, month={August}}

@TechReport{Dovis2013, author={Alessandro Dovis}, title={Efficient Sovereign Default}, year=2013, institution={University of Minnesota}, type={Working Paper},}

@TechReport{ArellanoKocherlakota2008, author={Cristina Arellano and Narayana R. Kocherlakota}, title={Internal Debt Crises and Sovereign Defaults}, year=2008, month=Feb, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/13794.html}, number={13794}}

@Article{EasterlyLevine1997, author={Easterly, William and Levine, Ross}, title={{Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions}}, journal={The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year=1997, volume={112}, number={4}, pages={1203-50}, month={November}, keywords={}}

@Article{ColePKehoe1998, author={Cole, Harold L and Kehoe, Patrick J}, title={{Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations}}, journal={International Economic Review}, year=1998, volume={39},

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number={1}, pages={55-70}, month={February}, keywords={}}

@Article{ArtetaHale2008, author={Arteta, Carlos and Hale, Galina}, title={{Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector}}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2008, volume={74}, number={1}, pages={53-69}, month={January}}

@Article{TomzWright2013, author={Michael Tomz and Mark L.J. Wright}, title={{Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default}}, journal={Annual Review of Economics}, year=2013, volume={5}, number={1}, pages={247-272}, month={05}}

@Article{BorenszteinPanizza2006, author={Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza}, title={{Do Sovereign Defaults Hurt Exporters?}}, journal={Open Economies Review}, year=2010, volume={21}, number={3}, pages={393-412}, month={July}}

@Article{Rose2005, author={Rose, Andrew K.}, title={{One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade}}, journal={Journal of Development Economics}, year=2005, volume={77}, number={1}, pages={189-206}, month={June},

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keywords={}}

@TechReport{BorenszteinPanizza2008, author={Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza}, title={{The Costs of Sovereign Default}}, year=2008, month=Oct, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, number={08/238}}

@TechReport{DiasRichmondWang2013, author={Daniel Dias and Christine Richmond and }, title={{Sovereign Theft: Theory And Evidence About Sovereign Default AndExpropriation}}, year=2008, month=Mar, institution={Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of PublicPolicy, The Australian National University}, type={CAMA Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/een/camaaa/2008-07.html}, number={2008-07}}

@Book{SturzeneggerZettelmeyer2007, author={Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer}, title={{Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises}}, publisher={The MIT Press}, year=2007, month={January}, volume={1}, number={0262195534}, series={MIT Press Books}}

@book{ReinhartRogoff2009,author = {Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff},title = {This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly},publisher = {Princeton University Press},address = {Princeton},year = {2009}}

@TechReport{DePaolietal2009, author={De Paoli, Bianca and Hoggarth, Glenn and Saporta, Victoria}, title={{Output costs of sovereign crises: some empirical estimates}},

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year=2009, month=Feb, institution={Bank of England}, type={Bank of England working papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/boe/boeewp/0362.html}, number={362}}

@TechReport{ArellanoRiosRull2013, author={Cristina Arellano and Xavier Mateos-Planas and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull}, title={{Partial Default}}, year=2013, month= , institution={Society for Economic Dynamics}, type={2013 Meeting Papers}, number={765}}

@TechReport{BenczurIlut2011, author={Peter Benczur and Cosmin Ilut}, title={{Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending}}, year=2011, institution={Duke University, Department of Economics}, type={Working Papers}, number={11-06}}

@book{Tomz2007,author = {Michael Tomz},title = {Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across ThreeCenturies},publisher = {Princeton University Press},address = {Princeton},year = {2007}}

@TechReport{TomzWright2008, author={Michael Tomz and Mark L. J. Wright}, title={{Sovereign Theft: Theory And Evidence About Sovereign Default AndExpropriation}}, year=2008, month=Mar, institution={Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of PublicPolicy, The Australian National University}, type={CAMA Working Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/een/camaaa/2008-07.html}, number={2008-07}}

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@Article{LevyYeyatiPanizza2011, author={Yeyati, Eduardo Levy and Panizza, Ugo}, title={{The elusive costs of sovereign defaults}}, journal={Journal of Development Economics}, year=2011, volume={94}, number={1}, pages={95-105}, month={January}}

@TechReport{DiasRichmondWrightWP2013, author={Mark Wright and Christine Richmond and Daniel Dias}, title={{In for a Penny, In for a 100 Billion Pounds: Quantifying the Welfare Benefitsfrom Debt Relief}}, year=2013, month= , institution={Society for Economic Dynamics}, type={2013 Meeting Papers}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed013/646.html}, number={646}}

@Article{Gelosetal2011, author={Gelos, R. Gaston and Sahay, Ratna and Sandleris, Guido}, title={{Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines marketaccess?}}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2011, volume={83}, number={2}, pages={243-254}, month={March}}

@TechReport{HopenhaynWerning2008, author={Hopenhayn, Hugo and Werning, Ivan}, title={Equilibrium Default}, year=2008, institution={MIT}, type={Working paper}}

@Article{AguiarGopinathJIE2006, author={Aguiar, Mark and Gopinath, Gita}, title={{Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account}}, journal={Journal of International Economics},

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year=2006, volume={69}, number={1}, pages={64-83}, month={June}}

@Article{ZameAER1993, author={Zame, William R}, title={{Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets Are Incomplete}}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1993, volume={83}, number={5}, pages={1142-64}, month={December}}

@Article{KehoeLevineReStud1993, author={Kehoe, Timothy J and Levine, David K}, title={{Debt-Constrained Asset Markets}}, journal={Review of Economic Studies}, year=1993, volume={60}, number={4}, pages={865-88}, month={October}}

@Article{BulowRogoffAER1989, author={Bulow, Jeremy and Rogoff, Kenneth}, title={{Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?}}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1989, volume={79}, number={1}, pages={43-50}, month={March}}

@Article{GrossmanvHuyckAER1988, author={Grossman, Herschel I and Van Huyck, John B}, title={{Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, andReputation}}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1988, volume={78}, number={5},

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pages={1088-97}, month={December}}

@Article{Cukierman2008, author={Cukierman, Alex}, title={Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past,present and future}, journal={European Journal of Political Economy}, year=2008, volume={24}, number={4}, pages={722-736}, month={December}}

@Article{Missale1997, author={ Missale, Alessandro}, title={ Managing the Public Debt: The Optimal Taxation Approach}, journal={Journal of Economic Surveys}, year=1997, volume={11}, number={3}, pages={235-65}, month={September}}

@TechReport{Barro1997, author={Robert J. Barro}, title={Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt}, year=1997, month=Sep, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, number={6197}}

@InCollection{ChariKehoeHandbook1999, author={Chari, V.V. and Kehoe, Patrick J.}, editor={J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford}, title={Optimal fiscal and monetary policy}, booktitle={Handbook of Macroeconomics}, publisher={Elsevier}, year=1999, volume={1}, series={Handbook of Macroeconomics}, chapter={26},

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pages={1671-1745}}

@Article{AlfaroKanczuk2010, author={Alfaro, Laura and Kanczuk, Fabio}, title={Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race}, journal={Journal of International Money and Finance}, year=2010, volume={29}, number={8}, pages={1706-1726}, month={December}}

@Article{Gumus2013, author={Gumus, Inci}, title={Debt Denomination And Default Risk In Emerging Markets}, journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year=2013, volume={17}, number={05}, pages={1070-1095}, month={July}}

@Article{Calvo1988, author={Calvo, Guillermo A}, title={Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1988, volume={78}, number={4}, pages={647-61}, month={September}}

@Article{ColeKehoe2000, author={Cole, Harold L and Kehoe, Timothy J}, title={Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises}, journal={Review of Economic Studies}, year=2000, volume={67}, number={1}, pages={91-116}, month={January}}

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@TechReport{BordoMeissnerRedish2003, author={Michael D. Bordo and Christopher Meissner and Angela Redish}, title={How Original Sin was Overcome: The Evolution of External Debt Denominatedin Domestic Currencies in the United States and the British Dominions}, year=2003, month=Jul, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, number={9841}}

@Article{Araujoetal2013, author={Araujo, Aloisio and Leon, Marcia and Santos, Rafael}, title={Welfare analysis of currency regimes with defaultable debts}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2013, volume={89}, number={1}, pages={143-153}}

@Article{ArellanoHeathcote2010, author={Arellano, Cristina and Heathcote, Jonathan}, title={Dollarization and financial integration}, journal={Journal of Economic Theory}, year=2010, volume={145}, number={3}, pages={944-973}, month={May}}

@Article{Bohn1990, author={Bohn, Henning}, title={Tax Smoothing with Financial Instruments}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1990, volume={80}, number={5}, pages={1217-30}, month={December}}

@TechReport{EichengreenHausmann1999, author={Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann}, title={Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility}, year=1999, month=Nov,

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institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, number={7418}}

@Article{Martin2009, author={Fernando Martin}, title={A Positive Theory of Government Debt}, journal={Review of Economic Dynamics}, year=2009, volume={12}, number={4}, pages={608-631}, month={October}}

@Article{DiazGimenezetal2008, author={Javier Diaz-Gimenez and Giorgia Giovannetti and Ramon Marimon and PedroTeles}, title={Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy}, journal={Review of Economic Dynamics}, year=2008, volume={11}, number={3}, pages={493-514}, month={July}}

@Article{DaRochaetal2013, author={Jose-Maria Da-Rocha and Eduardo-Luis Gimenez and Francisco-XavierLores}, title={Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation}, journal={Economic Theory}, year=2013, volume={53}, number={3}, pages={499-535}, month={August}}

@Article{Calvo1988, author={Calvo, Guillermo A}, title={Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1988, volume={78}, number={4}, pages={647-61},

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month={September}}

@TechReport{LorenzoniWerning2013, author={Guido Lorenzoni and Ivan Werning}, title={Slow Moving Debt Crises}, year=2013, month=Jul, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, number={19228}}

@Article{LucasStokey1987, author={Lucas, Robert E, Jr and Stokey, Nancy L}, title={Money and Interest in a Cash-in-Advance Economy}, journal={Econometrica}, year=1987, volume={55}, number={3}, pages={491-513}, month={May}}

@Article{KleinKrusellRiosRull2008, author={Paul Klein and Per Krusell and Jos-VIctor RIos-Rull}, title={Time-Consistent Public Policy}, journal={Review of Economic Studies}, year=2008, volume={75}, number={3}, pages={789-808}}

@Article{CooleyHansen1991, author={Cooley, Thomas F and Hansen, Gary D}, title={The Welfare Costs of Moderate Inflations}, journal={Journal of Money, Credit and Banking}, year=1991, volume={23}, number={3}, pages={483-503}, month={August}}

@Article{ReinhartRogoff2011, author={Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff}, title={From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis},

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journal={American Economic Review}, year=2011, volume={101}, number={5}, pages={1676-1706}, month={August}}

@Article{ClaessensKlingebielSchmukler2007, author={Stijn Claessens and Daniela Klingebiel and Sergio L. Schmukler}, title={Government Bonds in Domestic and Foreign Currency: the Role of Institutionaland Macroeconomic Factors}, journal={Review of International Economics}, year=2007, volume={15}, number={2}, pages={370-413}, month={05}}

@TechReport{GuscinaJeanne2006, author={Anastasia Guscina and Olivier Jeanne}, title={Government Debt in Emerging Market Countries: A New Data Set}, year=2006, month=Apr, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, number={06/98}}

@TechReport{CLYPS2006, author={Kevin Cowan and Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Ugo Panizza and FedericoSturzenegger}, title={Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts}, year=2006, month=Oct, institution={Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department}, type={Research Department Publications}, number={4480}}

@Article{SchmittGroheUribe2007, author={Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie and Uribe, Martin}, title={Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules}, journal={Journal of Monetary Economics}, year=2007, volume={54}, number={6},

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pages={1702-1725}, month={September}}

@Article{Lucas1980, author={Lucas, Robert E, Jr}, title={Equilibrium in a Pure Currency Economy}, journal={Economic Inquiry}, year=1980, volume={18}, number={2}, pages={203-20}, month={April}}

@Article{Svensson1983, author={Svensson, Lars E O}, title={Money and Asset Prices in a Cash-in-Advance Economy}, journal={Journal of Political Economy}, year=1985, volume={93}, number={5}, pages={919-44}, month={October}}

@TechReport{MendozaYue2011_IMFWP, author={Vivian Z. Yue and Enrique G. Mendoza}, title={A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles}, year=2011, month=Jul, institution={International Monetary Fund}, type={IMF Working Papers}, number={11/166}}

@Article{Nicolini1998, author={Nicolini, Juan Pablo}, title={More on the time consistency of monetary policy}, journal={Journal of Monetary Economics}, year=1998, volume={41}, number={2}, pages={333-350}, month={April}}

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@Article{ReinhartRogoff2004, author={Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff}, title={The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation}, journal={The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year=2004, volume={119}, number={1}, pages={1-48}, month={February}}

@TechReport{Aguiaretal2013, author={Aguiar, Mark and Amador, Manuel and Farhi, Emmanuel and Gopinath, Gita}, title={Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to SovereignDebt Crises}, year=2013, type={Mimeo}, institution={Stanford University}}

@TechReport{EichengreenHausmannPanizza2003, author={Eichengreen, Barry, and Hausmann, Ricardo and Ugo Panizza}, title={Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance and Original Sin: Why They Are Notthe Same and Why it Matters}, year=2003, month=Oct, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc}, type={NBER Working Papers}, number={10036}}

@Article{ReinhartRogoff2008, author={Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff}, title={The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt}, journal={Economic Journal}, year=2011, volume={121}, number={552}, pages={319-350}, month={05}}

@TechReport{DuSchreger2013, author={Wenxin Du and Jesse Schreger}, title={Local Currency Sovereign Risk}, year=2013,

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institution={Harvard University}, type={Mimeo}}

@TechReport{Peiris2010, author={Shanaka Peiris}, title={Foreign Participation in Emerging Markets' Local Currency Bond Markets}, year=2010, type={IMF Working Papers}, number={10/88}}

@TechReport{RochUhlig2012, author={Francisco Roch and Harald Uhlig}, title={The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts}, year=2012, institution={University of Chicago}, type={Mimeo}}

@Article{AdamBilli2008, author={Adam, Klaus and Billi, Roberto M.}, title={Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy}, journal={Journal of Monetary Economics}, year=2008, volume={55}, number={8}, pages={1376-1388}, month={November}}

@Article{CrucesTrebesch2013, author={Juan J. Cruces and Christoph Trebesch}, title={{Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts}}, journal={American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics}, year=2013, volume={5}, number={3}, pages={85-117}, month={July},}

@Article{EatonGersovitz1981, author={Eaton, Jonathan and Gersovitz, Mark}, title={Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis}, journal={Review of Economic Studies}, year=1981, volume={48},

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number={2}, pages={289-309}, month={April}}

@Article{BeersChambersSP2006, author={David T. Beers and John Chambers}, title={Default Study: Sovereign Defaults At 26- Year Low, To Show Little Change In2007}, journal={Standard \& Poor's CreditWeek}, year=2006, month={September 18}}

@Article{ArellanoAER2008, author={Cristina Arellano}, title={Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=2008, volume={98}, number={3}, pages={690-712}, month={June}}

@TechReport{ArellanoRamanarayananSR2008, author={Cristina Arellano and Ananth Ramanarayanan}, title={Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds}, year=2008, institution={Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis}, type={Staff Report}, number={410}}

@Article{ArellanoRamanarayananJPE2012, author={Cristina Arellano and Ananth Ramanarayanan}, title={{Default and the Maturity Structure in Sovereign Bonds}}, journal={Journal of Political Economy}, year=2012, volume={120}, number={2}, pages={187 - 232}}

@Article{ChatterjeeEyigungorAER2012, author={Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor}, title={Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk},

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journal={American Economic Review}, year=2012, volume={102}, number={6}, pages={2674-99}, month={October}}

@TechReport{ChatterjeeEyigungor_2013_seniority, author={Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor}, title={Debt dilution and seniority in a model of defaultable sovereign debt}, year=2013, institution={Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia}, type={Working Papers}, number={13-30},}

@Article{YueJIE2010, author={Yue, Vivian Z.}, title={Sovereign default and debt renegotiation}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2010, volume={80}, number={2}, pages={176-187}, month={March}}

@TechReport{BenjaminWright2009, author={David Benjamin and Mark L. J. Wright}, title={Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory Of Delays In Sovereign DebtRenegotiations}, year=2009, institution={Australian National University}, type={CAMA Working Papers}, number={2009-15}}

@TechReport{Bi2006, author={Ran Bi}, title={Debt Dilution and Maturity Structure of Sovereign Bonds}, year=2006, month=Dec, institution={Society for Economic Dynamics}, type={2006 Meeting Papers}, number={652}}

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@TechReport{HatchondoWP2012dilution, author={Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez}, title={Debt dilution and sovereign default risk}, year=2012, institution={Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond}, type={Working Paper}, number={10-08}}

@Article{HatchondoRED2010quantprops, author={Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez and Horacio Sapriza}, title={Quantitative properties of sovereign default models: solution methods}, journal={Review of Economic Dynamics}, year=2010, volume={13}, number={4}, pages={919-933}, month={October}}

@Article{HatchondoJIE2009longdur, author={Hatchondo, Juan Carlos and Martinez, Leonardo}, title={Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, year=2009, volume={79}, number={1}, pages={117-125}, month={September}}

@Article{SturzeneggerZettelmeyer2008, author={Sturzenegger, Federico and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin}, title={{Haircuts: Estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings,1998-2005}}, journal={Journal of International Money and Finance}, year=2008, volume={27}, number={5}, pages={780-805}, month={September},}

@Article{BronerLorenzoniSchmukler2013, author={Fernando A. Broner and Guido Lorenzoni and Sergio L. Schmukler},

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title={{Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?}}, journal={Journal of the European Economic Association}, year=2013, volume={11}, number={}, pages={67-100}, month={01},}

@Article{TomzWrightJEEA2007, author={Michael Tomz and Mark L. J. Wright}, title={Do Countries Default in \"Bad Times\" ?}, journal={Journal of the European Economic Association}, year=2007, volume={5}, number={2-3}, pages={352-360}, month={04-05}}

@Article{NeumeyerPerriJME2005, author={Neumeyer, Pablo A. and Perri, Fabrizio}, title={Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates}, journal={Journal of Monetary Economics}, year=2005, volume={52}, number={2}, pages={345-380}, month={March}}

@Article{KaminskyReinhart1999, author={Carmen M. Reinhart and Graciela L. Kaminsky}, title={{The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-PaymentsProblems}}, journal={American Economic Review}, year=1999, volume={89}, number={3}, pages={473-500}, month={June}, keywords={}, abstract={In the wake of the Mexican and Asian currency turmoil, the subject offinancial crises have come to the forefront of academic and policy discussions. Thispaper analyzes the links between banking and currency crises. The authors find that

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problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis--the currency crisisdeepens the banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral; financial liberalization oftenprecedes banking crises. The anatomy of these episodes suggests that crises occur asthe economy enters a recession, following a prolonged boom in economic activity thatwas fueled by credit, capital inflows, and accompanied by an overvalued currency.}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v89y1999i3p473-500.html}}

@TechReport{Bocola2014, author={Luigi Bocola}, title={{The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk}}, year=2014, institution={Northwestern University}, type={mimeo},}

@InCollection{GertlerKiyotaki2010, author={Gertler, Mark and Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro}, editor={Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford}, title={{Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis}}, booktitle={{Handbook of Monetary Economics}}, publisher={Elsevier}, year=2010, month={}, volume={3}, number={}, series={Handbook of Monetary Economics}, edition={}, chapter={11}, pages={547-599}, keywords={Asset Prices; Credit Policy; Financial Intermediation; Moral Hazard; NetWorth; Spreads}, abstract={We develop a canonical framework to think about credit market frictionsand aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis. We use theframework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in financialintermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how variouscredit market interventions by the central bank and the Treasury of the type we haveseen recently, might work to mitigate the crisis. We make use of earlier literature todevelop our framework and characterize how very recent literature is incorporatinginsights from the crisis.}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/monchp/3-11.html}}

@Article{DemirgucKuntDetriagache1998, author={Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache}, title={{The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and DevelopedCountries}}, journal={IMF Staff Papers},

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year=1998, volume={45}, number={1}, pages={81-109}, month={March}, keywords={}, abstract={The paper studies the factors associated with the emergence of systemicbanking crises in a large sample of developed and developing countries in 1980-94using a multivariate logit econometric model. The results suggest that crises tend toerupt when the macroeconomic environment is weak, particularly when growth is lowand inflation is high. Also, high real interest rates are clearly associated with systemicbanking sector problems, and there is some evidence that vulnerability to balance ofpayments crises has played a role. Countries with an explicit deposit insurance schemewere particularly at risk, as were countries with weak law enforcement.}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/imfstp/v45y1998i1p81-109.html}}

@TechReport{HonohanKlingebiel2000, author={Honohan, Patrick and Klingebiel, Daniela}, title={{Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises}}, year=2000, month=Sep, institution={The World Bank}, type={Policy Research Working Paper Series}, url={http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2441.html}, number={2441}, abstract={In recent decades, a majority of countries have experienced a systemicbanking crisis requiring a major-and expensive-overhaul of their banking system. Notonly do banking crises hit the budget with outlays that must be absorbed by highertaxes (or spending cuts), but they are costly in terms of forgone economic output.Many different policy recommendations have been made for limiting the cost of crises,but there has been little systematic effort to see which recommendations work inpractice. The authors try to quantify the extent to which fiscal outlays incurred inresolving banking distress can be attributed to crisis management measures of aparticular kind adopted by the government in the early years of the crisis. They findevidence that certain crisis management strategies appear to add greatly to fiscalcosts: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeatedrecapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. Their findings clearly tiltthe balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisisresolution. At the very least, regulatory authorities who choose an accommodating orgradualist approach to an emerging crisis must be sure they have some other way tocontrol risk-taking.}, keywords={Economic Theory\&Research; Banks\&Banking Reform; Financial CrisisManagement\&Restructuring; Payment S},}

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