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This article was downloaded by: [Aston University]On: 27 August 2014, At: 07:31Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office:Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
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Domestic climate policy for the Indian steelsectorUMASHANKAR SREENIVASAMURTHY aa Electricity Policy Research Group, Faculty of Economics , University ofCambridge , Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge , CB39DD , UKPublished online: 15 Jun 2011.
To cite this article: UMASHANKAR SREENIVASAMURTHY (2009) Domestic climate policy for the Indian steelsector, Climate Policy, 9:5, 517-528, DOI: 10.3763/cpol.2009.0640
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India country study 517
CLIMATE POLICY
■ country study
Domestic climate policy for the Indian steel sectorUMASHANKAR SREENIVASAMURTHY*
Electricity Policy Research Group, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Austin Robinson Building, SidgwickAvenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, UK
■ *E-mail: [email protected]
CLIMATE POLICY 9 (2009) 517–528
The problem of creating an appropriate domestic sectoral climate policy by emerging economy governments isexamined through the case study of India’s iron and steel sector. Unique circumstances and patterns exist in differentsectors of emerging economies so a single international policy may be unable to reconcile subtle yet important country-specific drivers. Shortcomings in the form of distortions could arise if policies are designed with a short time horizon. Afully integrated, long-term and well-planned domestic policy is required. The emergence of a strong domestic carbonprice to guide sector expansion is identified as a key feature for such a framework. Additional support throughinternational cooperation would help to gain the necessary political support while stabilizing the policy environment andfacilitating substantial sectoral abatement.
Policy relevance: Fuel savings and emissions reductions in India’s steel sector can be delivered firstly by improvingenergy efficiency in existing and new plants, secondly by shifting to efficient production processes, and thirdly by usingsteel more efficiently as a component or by substituting low-carbon alternatives. The CDM only supports energy savingsand emissions reductions from efficiency improvements in the production process, but cannot target the other twoopportunities. Domestic policies, including improved product standards and carbon pricing, can create broaderbenefits for the Indian economy and global climate. However, to achieve domestic support for these measures,international cooperation and coordination are necessary. A key question is how support can be structured withoutproviding subsidies for the production of a carbon-intensive commodity.
Keywords: CO2 reductions; domestic policy options; India; iron and steel; sectoral approach
La notion que les gouvernements de pays émergents créent une politique climatique intérieure sectorielle appropriéeest examinée à travers l’étude de cas du secteur de l’acier et du fer de l’Inde. Les circonstances et tendances des paysémergents sont uniques et de ce fait une politique internationale unique pourrait difficilement réconcilier des forcesintérieures subtiles mais proéminentes. Une conception des politiques à court terme pourrait donner lieu à descarences en matière de distorsions. Une politique intérieure entièrement intégrée, à long terme et bien planifiée estrequise. L’émergence d’un prix intérieur du carbone fort est identifié en tant que caractéristique clé pour guider lacroissance du secteur, dans le cadre d’une telle structure. Un soutien supplémentaire issu de la coopérationinternationale apporterait un appui politique indispensable, tout en stabilisant le contexte d’élaboration des politiques etfacilitant une réduction considérable des émissions du secteur.
Pertinence politique: Des réductions de carburant et des reductions d’emissions dans le secteur de l’acier en Indepeuvent être réalisées, en améliorant l’efficacité énergétique dans les centrales existantes et neuves, en substituant desprocédés de production efficaces, et en utilisant l’acier de manière plus efficace dans les assemblages ou bien en leremplaçant par des matériaux à moindre teneur en carbone. Le MDP soutient les procédés d’économies d’énergie et deréduction d’émissions obtenus par des gains d’efficacité, uniquement dans les procédés de production, et n’est pasapplicable aux deux autres opportunités citées. Les bienfaits des politiques intérieures, y compris les normes pourproduits améliorées et l’établissement du prix du carbone, peuvent s’appliquer plus généralement à l’économieindienne et au climat planétaire. Cependant, pour soutenir ces mesures au niveau national, une coopération et
doi:10.3763/cpol.2009.0640 © 2009 Earthscan ISSN: 1469-3062 (print), 1752-7457 (online) www.climatepolicy.com
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coordination internationales sont nécessaires. Une question essentielle est de régler la structurer du soutien demanière à éviter les subventions à la production d’un produit à forte teneur en carbone.
Mots clés: approche sectorielle; fer et acier; Inde; options de politique intérieure; réductions de CO2
1. Introduction
Indian steel production is expected to triple by 2020, with significant implications for coalconsumption and carbon emissions. The opportunities are being explored to enhance energyefficiency and reduce carbon emissions by: (1) increasing the efficiency of existing and new plants,(2) the shifting of investment from the inefficient coal-based direct reduced iron (DRI) process tothe blast furnace basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) process, and (3) creating incentives for efficientsteel use. Different policy instruments are available to realize these opportunities, including CleanDevelopment Mechanism (CDM) credits, carbon taxes, incremental carbon emission taxes, andadministered standards. This article analyses the implications of these policies on the sector’sefficiency improvement and carbon emission reduction. The ultimate challenge is to gather politicalsupport for the implementation – linking domestic benefits such as reduced coal consumptionand upgrading of technology with potential support from international cooperation.
The Indian iron and steel sector grew at over 7% per annum in 2005–2007 (MoS, 2008) andaccounts for nearly 10% of country’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Garg et al., 2006). Growthhas been driven primarily due to a surge in demand for steel from the rapidly expandinginfrastructure, housing and manufacturing segments. The country exported 10% of its steel output,but was essentially a net importer during this period. The nominal import tariff for crude steelhas been fixed at 5% (MoS, 2009).1
The analysis of primary steel production in India shows that energy efficiency and CO2 emissionintensity levels are still 50–75% behind the OECD average (IEA, 2007). The major reasons aresmall plant size, the emergence of small-scale coal-based DRI units, and a large contributionfrom old public-sector units (see Figure 1). A unique feature of the Indian scenario is that the
`
CoalBF-BOF
(+1 Corex)Privatesector17%
EAF/EIFusingscrap
Private14%
EAF/EIFusingscrap
Private14%
CoalBF-BOF
(+1 Corex)Privatesector17%
CoalBF-BOF
(+1 Corex)Privatesector17%
Gas DRIPrivate
11%
Gas DRIPrivate
11%
CoalDRI+EFPrivate
26%
CoalDRI+EFPrivate
26%
CoalBF-BOFPublicsector32%
CoalBF-BOFPublicsector32%
FIGURE 1 Steel industry structure, India: output 53.9 million tonnes of crude steel
(tcs) for the year 2007/08 (MoS, 2008); BF-BOF = blast furnace/basic oxygen
furnace, DRI = direct reduced iron, EF = EAF/EIF = electric arc/induction furnace
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coal-based DRI process requires a significantly lower capital investment and exploits the localadvantage of cheaper low-grade raw materials while employing unskilled labour. It accountedfor 26% of country’s crude steel production in 2007, with over 350 small units, and the outputwas growing at 15% per annum (MoS, 2008). The other uncommon route, natural-gas-basedDRI, is not expected to increase its share in India due to fuel availability and price constraints(MoS, 2008).
Despite significant performance differences between different primary crude steel-making routes(see Figure 2), firms in India continue to invest in the inefficient coal-based DRI process and areaverse to taking up many of the potential energy efficiency measures. An industry survey(Sreenivasamurthy, 2008b) suggests that this is due to the high rate of return required by investors,which energy efficiency and modernization measures may not always deliver. While existing CDMschemes encourage some project-based efficiency improvements that result in reduced CO2
emissions, they do not guide the sector towards low-carbon production processes. It was alsofound that limited data are available on the performance of the sector, which hinders themainstreaming of climate mitigation into periodic planning guidelines for sector expansion.
The Bali Roadmap (UNFCCC, 2008) makes reference to ‘consideration of cooperative sectoralapproaches and sector-specific actions’ and ‘various approaches, including opportunities for usingmarkets to enhance the cost effectiveness to promote nationally appropriate mitigation actions(NAMAs)’ in order to enhance implementation of the Convention’s objectives. In line with theserecommendations, this article evaluates various domestic policy options for intervention to lowerthe rising GHG emissions trajectory of the Indian steel sector.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
BF-BOF, OECD
BF- BOF, India
Coal DRI-EF with waste
heat power, India
Coal DRI-EF without waste heat power,
India
Spe
cific
ene
rgy
GJ/
tcs
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Car
bon
inte
nsity
tCO
2/tc
s
Specific Energy Carbon Intensity
FIGURE 2 Primary steel-making performance comparison with OECD countries
(Source: Planning Commission, 2006; IEA, 2007)
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2. Existing policy ideas
In the post-2012 international climate cooperation talks, a number of schemes have been suggestedto support specific actions in developing countries. While some researchers are investigatingtransnational technical cooperation (Baron, 2006; APP, 2008a), others propose a no-lose sectoralcrediting mechanism (Schmidt et al., 2008) and best practice adoption (Japan, 2008). However,given the particular dynamics of a fast-growing sector in a free market with numerous players,these approaches may not be able to address the most fundamental concern: lack of factoringCO2 externality costs into decisions at the levels of every firm (including small units) and ofgovernment. If initiatives by firms and governments continue to be voluntary, without specificobjectives and time-lines for abatement, climate benefits will remain an afterthought in investmentdecisions.
A submission to the UNFCCC by South Africa (2008) points to the importance of sustainabledevelopment policies and measures (SD-PAMs) (see also Winkler et al., 2007). Their application tothe Indian steel sector from the policy context is explored in this article. The analysis points tothe importance of such bottom-up policies, which are able to influence every relevant decisionmade and are ambitious and long term.
3. What should the sectoral policy objective be?
The manufacture and use of steel is a resource-intensive and socio-economically complex activity,creating a deeply entrenched supply chain system in India. This implies that a holistic considerationof both production and consumption is required when proposing any climate policy for thesector. The broader policy objective should clearly be to help integrate climate mitigation into thedecision-making stage and enable energy efficiency improvement of all production units.
Figure 3 illustrates three mechanisms that can contribute to reduced energy demand and carbonemissions relative to the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario for 2020. First, policies focusing onefficient technologies alone, such as waste energy recovery under CDM, typically help promotespecific abatement projects while leaving the key drivers of emissions growth unchecked.
Second, an additional effort of ‘process shift’ could help divert new investments from theintrinsically less efficient coal-based DRI process to the large BF-BOF process. This is because climateprotection effort eventually calls for progressively greater abatement from the steel sector, and policiesshould evolve to enable step-changes towards the most efficient metallurgical processes. The project-based mechanism fails to limit proliferation of inefficient processes and does not promotemodernization of entire industrial units, both of which could deliver maximum climate benefits.
Third, the end-user requirement could also be partly met by more efficient material use (Worrell,2007) and by substituting steel with other less carbon-intensive materials. Acknowledging thatsteel is inherently a carbon-intensive material, policies in the long term should promote materialefficiency and substitution.
In summary, an energy efficiency improvement policy could deliver noteworthy emissionsreductions by 2020. However, the inefficient coal-based DRI process would continue to contributea disproportionately higher share of sectoral emissions (39%) than output (30%; tonnes of crudesteel). Looking forward to 2030 and beyond, achieving additional sectoral abatement could welllead to tougher bargaining positions due to lock-in effects from the coal-based DRI process. Onthe other hand, shifting the structure to the most efficient large BF-BOF units would allow theindustry to meet the same market demand and yet achieve further emissions reductions by 2020.
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FIG
UR
E 3
Diff
eren
t ou
tcom
es p
ossi
ble
(re
pre
sent
ed p
rog
ress
ivel
y) f
rom
clim
ate
pol
icie
s in
the
Ind
ian
stee
l sec
tor
(ass
umin
g t
hat
stee
l sub
stitu
tes
have
limite
d e
mis
sion
s an
d a
con
serv
ativ
e p
rod
uctio
n fo
reca
st fr
om M
oS,
2008
) (f
or d
etai
led
ass
ump
tions
, se
e th
e or
igin
al s
ourc
e, S
reen
ivas
amur
thy,
200
8a)
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Finally, any additional efforts through material efficiency and substitution could help achievesubstantive emissions reductions.
The costs involved for such a transition could be high. Capital expenditure for establishing acoal-based DRI induction furnace unit is around $200 per tonne crude steel (tcs) per annum, whichis one-quarter of the expenditure for a large BF-BOF unit (Sreenivasamurthy, 2008b). However, thehigher investment costs for the BF-BOF units result in subsequent savings in operating costs, andare thus profitable in the long term. Furthermore, large BF-BOF units require imported high-gradecoking coal, making those units less competitive during periods of high global demand for the fuel(Sreenivasamurthy, 2008a) but, conversely, improve the competitive situation in times of decliningcommodity prices, as witnessed in early 2009. For detailed information on the latest steel technologiesand their abatement costs see the APP handbook (APP, 2008b), IEA (2007) and Oda et al. (2007).
Nonetheless, certain co-benefits from such long-term integrated planning can be expected.These include reduced demand for coal (a primary energy source in India); lower local pollutionlevels, especially from coal DRI units; increased firm competitiveness; and the stimulus for localresearch and development activities in the steel supply chain.
4. How can this objective be met?
The broader policy objective should clearly be to help integrate climate mitigation into the decision-making stage for all production units. An important feature of the Indian business system is thatprivate companies, and an increasing number of public firms, are largely dynamic andentrepreneurial in nature. If policies are enforced with clear guidelines, then firms tend to innovateand maximize individual benefits; as the example of the success of CDM in India illustrates (CII,2008). This article now discusses how tailored domestic policies could help address domestic climateactions by creating appropriate economic incentives.
Existing Clean Development MechanismAlthough CDM incentivizes project-based initiatives, due to the inherent complexities ofdetermining a baseline, satisfying additionality criteria, extensive monitoring and verificationrequirements and high transaction costs, most industrial firms are not motivated enough toapply for this scheme, especially when considering new builds or modernization (Hayashi andMichaelowa, 2007; Parthan and Bachhiesl, 2007). Thus, while CDM promotes easy-to-monitorproject activities, it does not encourage abatement through complex modernization activities,choice of plant size, or the type of process adopted. Developing new sector-wide baselinemethodologies under CDM would require redefining the existing guidelines and procedures.
Conversely, providing project-based incentives makes climate policies politically acceptable whilegenerating minimum opposition from governments and industrial lobbies. This play-it-safe positionis further reinforced by the urge to meet end-user demand through a metallurgical process whichrequires a short lead time and low capital costs. A lack of comprehensive technology cost curves toguide policy design for sectoral mitigation also adds to this complexity. Despite its political convenience,policies that achieve marginal abatement through energy efficiency improvement alone will have tobe re-evaluated in order to avoid incentivizing suboptimal processes or plant sizes.
Proposed Policy 1: Harmonized carbon taxUnder this scheme, the government levies a charge to the firm for every unit of carbon emission(tonne of CO2). In response to the tax imposed, firms then seek opportunities to minimize their
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overall current and future tax liabilities by investing in cleaner technologies or extensivemodernization plans. For new builds, firms would evaluate their carbon tax liability during thedesign stage itself on process type, plant size and choice of technology.
Proposed Policy 2: Incremental emissions carbon tax or intensity-based rewardsFirms prefer to avoid the imposition of taxes in the political process and subsequent implementation(Smith and Vos, 1997; Wallart, 1999). To reduce this opposition, another policy option is tocharge for the incremental emissions alone, i.e. the tax is only levied on emissions over andabove a specific emissions limit (see Figure 4). A corollary would be intensity-based rewards, asdiscussed by Schmidt et al. (2008), advocating a no-lose crediting policy. The proposed schemeunder India’s national action plan (NAP) for climate change also has a similar intensity-based design whereby energy efficiency levels are to be benchmarked and subsequent tradingof certificates permitted (NAP, 2008).
The benchmarks can be determined based on ambitious targets agreed by stakeholders. Thebenchmarks could also be seen as providing a new technical guideline for technology providers,new entrants and plant designers.
However, such a scheme has some drawbacks. Defining benchmarks is quite complex, givendifferent process types, plant vintage and size, type of raw materials, scrap volume used, andchoice of system boundaries (Eichhammer et al., 2002; Tanaka et al., 2006). Setting of standardsalso has an arbitrary nature and can be influenced by stakeholders. As a result, there may be a riskof two or more process-wise or vintage-wise standards emerging from the political process, thusundermining a shift towards the most efficient production process.
FIGURE 4 Incremental carbon tax: in this scheme, tax is levied only above the
specified emissions level (‘X’ tCO2/tcs). This policy is similar in design to other intensity-
based approaches, where producers below the specific emission level are rewarded
NO CARBON TAX
CARBON TAX
Production
Specific Emission
levels
‘X’ t CO2/tcsD
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Proposed Policy 3: Administered standardsRegardless of imposing any of the above market-based policies, highly inefficient processes suchas coal-based DRI and old and/or small BF units may still continue to operate, given the domesticdemand for iron and steel products. These units have inherent advantages such as being flexible,requiring low capital investment, and using low-quality raw materials. Providing market-basedincentives for such units to improve energy efficiency may only help to achieve minor abatementresults and may not be adequate to guide the sector to an overall lower carbon production pathin the medium to long term. Hence, it may be necessary to incorporate and enforce certainstandards for plant sizes and limits on capacity addition in inefficient processes. Norms can bestipulated and revised over time, making firms aware of the minimum plant performance levelsrequired for sectoral expansion. The Asia–Pacific Partnership Steel Task Force (APP, 2008a) and theWorld Steel Association (WSA, 2008) discuss such an approach, where inefficient plants areidentified through benchmarking and are eventually phased out.
5. Criteria for policy selection
The major criteria for suitable policy choice would be effectiveness and governance. Effectivenesscan be understood as the ability of a policy to limit the growth of sectoral GHG emissions belowa BAU scenario, not only in the short term, but also in the long term.
Governance relates to simplicity and transparency in administration and interpretation byvarious stakeholders. Governance requires periodic monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)systems to be put in place, which are lacking at present. In particular, since there is a significantpresence of public-sector units in the Indian steel industry, private firms may be concerned aboutdistortions created by climate policy. Hence, the policy should be designed to create a level playingfield for both private- and public-sector players.
Existing CDM policy is least likely to encourage process shift, as it continues to provide project-based incentives to inefficient processes such as waste energy recovery projects. Furthermore, creatingprocess-wise intensity-based incentives may allow the continuation of inefficient processes. Aharmonized tax, on the other hand, targets the total emissions of all units, including thosewhich are below standard emission intensity levels, and hence can help in enhanced efficiency.On governance, it is expected that an intensity-based policy is likely to involve more complexitythan other options. A summary of policy evaluation criteria is presented in Table 1.
The analysis in this table shows that, although schemes such as CDM and Policy 2 (incrementalemissions tax, or the proposed NAP scheme) can deliver marginal emissions reductions in theshort term, they do not tend to strongly promote the move to more efficient plant configurationsin the longer term. Policy 3 (administered standards) would, on the other hand, allow the gradualincorporation of the goal into national planning mechanisms. Policy 1 (harmonized tax) appearsto be a good option to tackle sectoral emissions with varying advantages at all stages and alsogoes well with the free market nature of the Indian business environment. Enhanced abatementcould further be achieved by combining Policies 1 (harmonized tax) and 3 (administered standards),which could provide the dual effect of price-based incentives and minimum performance standardsfor existing and planned capacities.
Although the above policy analysis is not complete in itself, it highlights the kind of distortionsthat different policies could deliver by considering a short time horizon (such as 2020). Climatechange concerns require urgent action; however, it is crucial that these policies evolve in the rightdirection and avoid the locking-in of carbon-intensive processes and technologies. Therefore, it is
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vital to have a fully integrated, long-term and well-planned domestic policy approach which cantake into account the aforementioned implications.
6. Barriers for policy implementation
The major difficulty for implementation of the policy framework in India is the fundamentalissue of accepting mitigation responsibility by both government and industry. It can be arguedthat in line with this national position, the policies discussed above do not require any nationalor sectoral emission caps (or reductions in steel output), but would nevertheless show the country’scommitment to act earnestly on climate mitigation.
Some concerns may arise that the implementation of such policies would affect the operationalviability of many steel units and reduce supply during periods of higher demand for steel. Thegovernment could also be concerned about inflationary pressures from carbon prices. However, adetailed analysis of the sector’s operating costs (Sreenivasamurthy, 2008a) shows that carbonemission liability costs are insignificant compared with production costs. Furthermore, it can beargued that as long as steel prices are determined by free market principles, an increase in productioncost due to carbon pricing would not completely feed through to product prices.
TABLE 1 Policy evaluation criteria
Criteria for policy evaluation Existing Proposed Policy 1: Proposed Policy 2: Proposed Policy
CDM Harmonized tax Incremental 3: Administered
emissions tax or standards
intensity-based
rewardsa
1. Short term: Improve + + + + + +
efficiency and CO2 intensity
of coal DRI and BF-BOF
units against business-as-
usual (BAU)
2. Medium term: Encourage ––– + –– + +
shift from coal DRI and small
BF to large efficient BF units
3. Long term: Encourage –– + – NA
substitution of steel with
low-carbon-intensive
materials
4. Overall effectiveness –– + + – + +
5. Ease of implementation + + + –– +
6. Ease of monitoring and + + + –– +
verification
Notes:a The intensity-based rewards proposed in India’s NAP (2008) have a similar policy design.+++ = very good; ––– = worst; NA = not applicable.
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Finally, because the medium- and small-scale firms in the steel sector employ a large semi-skilledand unskilled workforce in India, any threat to their survival could have serious politicalrepercussions, thus directly forcing the government to reconsider any ambitious policies. Onesolution could be the provision of capacity building in order to enhance the skills of unskilled andsemi-skilled workers to enable their employment at larger, more efficient plants. However, giventhe entrenched socio-economic implications, further detailed research is required in this area.
7. How can this be anchored through international cooperation?
Even though the policy would essentially be nationally driven, close international cooperationfrom Annex I Parties will be required to support policy implementation and deliver enhancedemissions reductions. One such area is technology transfer and cooperation, where domesticpolicies need to be complemented by increased access to technology. Examples of the latesttechnologies include larger-volume blast furnace units, enhanced coal injection, thin slab casting,and improved coal washeries. The APP (2008b) handbook provides detailed information on thetechnology solutions required. Financing these efforts can be linked to input-based metrics (suchas carbon price, choice of process in new build) and outcomes (such as sector-wide emissions).Furthermore, capacity-building programmes for low-skilled workers can help to increase theiremployability in larger and more efficient steel-making units. Nevertheless, further research isrequired on how international financing and technology support could balance the social concernswhile implementing ambitious domestic climate policies.
If future international mitigation commitments require India to enhance its contribution,then the domestic sectoral policy can progressively be ramped up to raise the domestic carbonprice, tighten new-build design norms, and further encourage low-carbon alternative materials.
8. Conclusions
This article analysed the feasibility of a domestic climate policy framework for the Indian steelsector. It shows that distinct circumstances prevail in emerging economy sectors and a singleinternational policy may not be able to address subtle yet important country-specific drivers. Thearticle therefore discussed the need to set up a domestic regulatory framework with a suitableclimate policy to target the specific drivers. Based on the analysis of different policy outcomescenarios for the steel sector, it is concluded that an effective policy should be consistent inlimiting emissions at all stages of its implementation.
The recent economic downturn of late 2008 showed that, at times of lower steel demand, thecoal DRI process is largely uneconomic. In the longer term, promoting such inefficient steel makingcould therefore prove costly for the economy as well as for the climate, thereby reinforcing theargument for a shift towards more efficient routes. Implementing such policies is also likely todeliver significant co-benefits such as lower pollution levels to the surrounding communities, areduced demand for coal, and stimulation of local research and development in low-carbontechnologies.
As emerging economies continue to expand, a key criterion to measure policy effectivenesswould be the emergence of a domestic carbon price to guide future sector investments. Ultimately,policies should seek to achieve the twin objectives of enhanced abatement and sustainableproduction. Further research is required on policy implications and the international cooperationmechanisms required to support an appropriate domestic policy. To conclude, it is possible to
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carefully design an ambitious domestic sectoral policy that lowers emissions and costs, deliversbenefits to the economy and the community, while addressing the larger global objective ofclimate mitigation.
Note
1. Although a slowdown in the Indian steel sector was seen from October 2008 onwards due to the global financialcrisis and the associated fall in international steel demand, this article looks at long-term demand and capacityaddition scenarios in India, where the policy analysis could be an important consideration.
References
APP (Asia–Pacific Partnership), 2008a, Our Challenge for Clean Development and Climate: APP Steel Task Force, Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [available at http://2050.nies.go.jp/3rdLCSWS/presentation/ppt_TeruoOkazaki.pdf].
APP (Asia–Pacific Partnership), 2008b, The State-of-the-Art Clean Technologies (SOACT) for Steelmaking Handbook, Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [available at www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/Projects/Steel/SOACT-1-7-08.pdf].
Baron, R., 2006, Sectoral Approaches for Greenhouse Gas Reductions: Climate Policy and Competitiveness in the Iron and SteelSector, Energy Efficiency and Environment Division, IEA [available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/17/37897024.pdf].
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