DEPART Off I c e

IFFICE i ~ l ~ l a n nJ. D-64/36 Date: S e ~ t e m b e r 3. 1964

'0 Lonal Secur i ona l Secur

- - - ~ r l t y Off ic-- -

i t y Superv: i t y Office1 arm (Tsrhnl

H : Depr ~ t y A s s i s t

: ac t s w i th

a n t Sec re t ;

S o v i e t and

Lsors cs 1r.ll ----,

ary f o r Sec

Cornrnuni st Bloc Nstiol

CA-1471 o f August 6, 1964, e n t i t l e d k t --., ..,,.. S o v i e t end otimluniet Bloc Na t iona l s , s e t s f o r t h s p e c i f i c b r i e f i n g r e q u i r e - c n t s f o r KSOs and PSOs concerning c l e r l c a l pe r sonne l1

RSOs shot 71 and a t

11d i n s u r e .e complyin

F u t u r e S e c u r i t y S u r D r t l n ~ o f Con tac t s Po i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n t a i n

t h a t PSOs f g wtch t he

veys shoulc m, e c t i c ed i n CA-14

IMTED OFF1

in t h e i r a r b r i e f i n g r

I i n c l u d e u >n t aken by ~ 7 1 .

o au toma t i c

:CCAL USE

e a s a r e awl qquirementl

nde r Sect ic t he p o s t I

>" A" - ", to implement

l!!

l!!

INTEUIGEWCE OPI TAUATIONS ABRO IAD

This aucumor~t contams uuvrrnation afl re nationc defense of the United States, within the meaning of Tit1 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amendec Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or n ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

INTEUIGEWCE OPI TAUATIONS ABRO IAD

This aucumor~t contams uuvrrnation afl re nationc defense of the United States, within the meaning of Tit1 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amendec Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or n ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

KGB leadership directive cited in me quotation at 111e head of this study rdects a Soviet policy-level nlncision to further increase the scope of the opera- l111nal effort. ClassPed Soviet material of consid- ~rnbly more recent date is also available which doe l~ments the enlargement of the Soviet threat and tE 111rreased operational sophistication which is toda lming brought to bear against Americans abroad.

In recent years all KGB "trusted contacts" an agents, whatever their nationality or activity, SI L~~uwn to have been reappraised for possible d Ii(~n against the American target. There is a sl~le much reliable information to con6rm that 1 111r KGB and GRU are working with intense 8 cntration against Americans and U.S. installa1 -1,road

iduence policies and actions of foreign govern- ments. The Foreign Directorate also has the IS

sponsibility for counterintelligence abroad, in- cluding penetration of all foreign security and intelligence services. KGB staff o5cers assigned

.oad under diplomatic, hade and other fa ~fficial cover are under the immediate di n of appropriate gengraphic department! : Foreign Duectorate. It has been nota ent years that officers with American Der nt expexiena st$ remote fro ~ r y (more a micans there my of the Kbn s merlcan speclallstr

served tours in the United States, speak English fluently, are familiar with many aspects of official and private Amencan life, and concentrate their operational efforts on the American target wher- .yer they are stationed.

-A >e o f the leadership of the en Again tasks to KGB residencies. It brects lwearea en- w rw- mvawr-rw W---

ing in aU types of U.S. Government installations d basks, in milituy units and on the stcrffs o f mil* the scope of the directive are AmeitcMc mgned to if o v e r s e ~ r representatives of scientific institutfm and ?el dents, etc:

: Committee : st Amedcuna.

J .n.,. ,

for StotG Sea W a s s t g . . -____:a A-"

WUy [KGB] M important

-....A

1959 directit titled 'On Intc . --

irec- me vail- PO1 both the con- h"

Ms

? are being : m the United a this. later) 3 is easier ar: .--. . .

gent inaeasin States on the that work 8

id more rewi . ..

lgiy to tested

%gainst uding. i have

woad; Am& blocs. Also

lterncrtiOnol0 bu(ineSJ firm

UIRI in em- included in

rganizllNDRI. 8, news cor-

(Top . k m T h a Ro United !

and that the :y have score

viet Serviar

h e points 01 &.- . L - ~ ~

It is ~.anlzahoniu ana recnxucal -man Deween

to go into 1 t . . 3. .. : or-

at - 1 rna -" e ju- 1 lajor SO. tions di, Un- Ch

senior rations Uy the :eneral

it is p ~ l t of Soviet Intelligenca doctrine and will emerge throughout this study in direct quotatiom from KGB documents. The actual case exampler cited, some in detail, will show the doctrine in prac- tice. There will be particular emphasis on a paral- lel Soviet concept that certain categories of Ameri- cans, such as enlisted military personnel, juniqem. bassy employees, and students are, in effect, sec- ond class citizens" and thus particularly worth- while targets for aggressive Soviet intelligena? &- cers and their agents.

The Soviet program, as it has been observed a world-wide basis, parallels and supplemenol viet espionage operations within the United Sta One of its principal aims is to acquire a b m American agents who have the potential an be directed to serve Soviet espionage in the United Stat- in various branches of

sonnel outside the USSR to step up already ing operational activity against Americans. instructions were repeated in the spring of and again in December of the same year. The

'.81vlet intelligence SI leu respectivl I ~iclictional spheres, ltion of the n m-l~nponents most a1 global opera1 1-11'gram against Amencans abroad is basic to ~I~rstanding of the program itself

a. First and foremost of the the KGB's Foreign Diectoratt the First Chief Directorate) v lmrders of the USSR has ~rimarv reswnslt

:rvices .1 tl hot bri .oer :tive . ill the .

b. While the KGB as the larger and v ie t senice, plays the major role in ope ,cussed in this paper, the CRU (actua uef Intelligence Directorate of the C IE of the Minishy of Defense) works actively d with equal professionalism to collect stra- $c military intelligence abroad and is there- ,e I~rimarily pitted against American military rsorlnel and installations. It is also eneaeed

To the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet in- lligence services in particular. the United States the -main enemy: a term appearing in numerous

~viet documents. Against this "main enemy," the 3viet intelligence services have developed over he years and are today conducting concerted, ,odd-wide programs to probe, seek out and re- uit Amexicans-official and private, civilian and lilitary-in order to penetrate our agencil rr cryptographic systems, intercept 01 nnmunications, discover our military-I d and development, etc. In this

soviets bring to bear the conviction that Nnencws are essentially materialistic, motivated principally by monetary need or greed, and can therefore be "bought" to serve Soviet interests.

t.

s e co rnpen : (also know vhich, outside

lsitive intellig eCwOmic 6

specialized c

, . Fence collectii md sdenti6c overt activitia

operations ag, al personnel ? field of s p

ainst America in the West,

dalization 11

n scientific an, , particularly as a military

a';&- where appli-

lor clandestine pc political, military, wull as for highly

es, acquire ur courier dated re- dart, the . -. .- - -

This study describes and illustrates by examples an important threat to the security of the United States---the systematic and intensive program by the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) to recruit ' d e a n s abroad and penetrate U.S. installations.

It also pictures the average Am,.rican overseas as le is seen through the eyes of So. t InteUigen- ~rirnarily interested in money all.. making more of t, typically indifferent to the means and often to

the risks, a person with his guard down, talkative by nature, easier to approach abroad than he is at home:,, This provocative portrait is not imaginary;

..... . a .

FIGURE 1. KGB MOSCOW HEADQUARTERS i, KNOWN AS

L r

'THE CENTEK

CONFIDENTIAL I

CONFIDENTIAL

KGB leadership directive cited in me quotation at 111e head of this study rdects a Soviet policy-level nlncision to further increase the scope of the opera- l111nal effort. ClassPed Soviet material of consid- ~rnbly more recent date is also available which doe l~ments the enlargement of the Soviet threat and tE 111rreased operational sophistication which is toda lming brought to bear against Americans abroad.

In recent years all KGB "trusted contacts" an agents, whatever their nationality or activity, SI L~~uwn to have been reappraised for possible d Ii(~n against the American target. There is a sl~le much reliable information to con6rm that 1 111r KGB and GRU are working with intense 8 cntration against Americans and U.S. installa1 -1,road

iduence policies and actions of foreign govern- ments. The Foreign Directorate also has the IS

sponsibility for counterintelligence abroad, in- cluding penetration of all foreign security and intelligence services. KGB staff o5cers assigned

.oad under diplomatic, hade and other fa ~fficial cover are under the immediate di n of appropriate gengraphic department! : Foreign Duectorate. It has been nota ent years that officers with American Der nt expexiena st$ remote fro ~ r y (more a micans there my of the Kbn s merlcan speclallstr

served tours in the United States, speak English fluently, are familiar with many aspects of official and private Amencan life, and concentrate their operational efforts on the American target wher- .yer they are stationed.

-A >e o f the leadership of the en Again tasks to KGB residencies. It brects lwearea en- w rw- mvawr-rw W---

ing in aU types of U.S. Government installations d basks, in milituy units and on the stcrffs o f mil* the scope of the directive are AmeitcMc mgned to if o v e r s e ~ r representatives of scientific institutfm and ?el dents, etc:

: Committee : st Amedcuna.

J .n.,. ,

for StotG Sea W a s s t g . . -____:a A-"

WUy [KGB] M important

-....A

1959 directit titled 'On Intc . --

irec- me vail- PO1 both the con- h"

Ms

? are being : m the United a this. later) 3 is easier ar: .--. . .

gent inaeasin States on the that work 8

id more rewi . ..

lgiy to tested

%gainst uding. i have

woad; Am& blocs. Also

lterncrtiOnol0 bu(ineSJ firm

UIRI in em- included in

rganizllNDRI. 8, news cor-

(Top . k m T h a Ro United !

and that the :y have score

viet Serviar

h e points 01 &.- . L - ~ ~

It is ~.anlzahoniu ana recnxucal -man Deween

to go into 1 t . . 3. .. : or-

at - 1 rna -" e ju- 1 lajor SO. tions di, Un- Ch

senior rations Uy the :eneral

it is p ~ l t of Soviet Intelligenca doctrine and will emerge throughout this study in direct quotatiom from KGB documents. The actual case exampler cited, some in detail, will show the doctrine in prac- tice. There will be particular emphasis on a paral- lel Soviet concept that certain categories of Ameri- cans, such as enlisted military personnel, juniqem. bassy employees, and students are, in effect, sec- ond class citizens" and thus particularly worth- while targets for aggressive Soviet intelligena? &- cers and their agents.

The Soviet program, as it has been observed a world-wide basis, parallels and supplemenol viet espionage operations within the United Sta One of its principal aims is to acquire a b m American agents who have the potential an be directed to serve Soviet espionage in the United Stat- in various branches of

sonnel outside the USSR to step up already ing operational activity against Americans. instructions were repeated in the spring of and again in December of the same year. The

'.81vlet intelligence SI leu respectivl I ~iclictional spheres, ltion of the n m-l~nponents most a1 global opera1 1-11'gram against Amencans abroad is basic to ~I~rstanding of the program itself

a. First and foremost of the the KGB's Foreign Diectoratt the First Chief Directorate) v lmrders of the USSR has ~rimarv reswnslt

:rvices .1 tl hot bri .oer :tive . ill the .

b. While the KGB as the larger and v ie t senice, plays the major role in ope ,cussed in this paper, the CRU (actua uef Intelligence Directorate of the C IE of the Minishy of Defense) works actively d with equal professionalism to collect stra- $c military intelligence abroad and is there- ,e I~rimarily pitted against American military rsorlnel and installations. It is also eneaeed

To the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet in- lligence services in particular. the United States the -main enemy: a term appearing in numerous

~viet documents. Against this "main enemy," the 3viet intelligence services have developed over he years and are today conducting concerted, ,odd-wide programs to probe, seek out and re- uit Amexicans-official and private, civilian and lilitary-in order to penetrate our agencil rr cryptographic systems, intercept 01 nnmunications, discover our military-I d and development, etc. In this

soviets bring to bear the conviction that Nnencws are essentially materialistic, motivated principally by monetary need or greed, and can therefore be "bought" to serve Soviet interests.

t.

s e co rnpen : (also know vhich, outside

lsitive intellig eCwOmic 6

specialized c

, . Fence collectii md sdenti6c overt activitia

operations ag, al personnel ? field of s p

ainst America in the West,

dalization 11

n scientific an, , particularly as a military

a';&- where appli-

lor clandestine pc political, military, wull as for highly

es, acquire ur courier dated re- dart, the . -. .- - -

This study describes and illustrates by examples an important threat to the security of the United States---the systematic and intensive program by the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) to recruit ' d e a n s abroad and penetrate U.S. installations.

It also pictures the average Am,.rican overseas as le is seen through the eyes of So. t InteUigen- ~rirnarily interested in money all.. making more of t, typically indifferent to the means and often to

the risks, a person with his guard down, talkative by nature, easier to approach abroad than he is at home:,, This provocative portrait is not imaginary;

..... . a .

FIGURE 1. KGB MOSCOW HEADQUARTERS i, KNOWN AS

L r

'THE CENTEK

CONFIDENTIAL I

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

However, the GRU lacks exclusive & now bas w visible millby &hation. wica r- be may q, or, perb B deputy !mid represez

tion.

h o v m deployment of Soviet intelligesla, the intelligence ot tas East European Cam- rrrr, whether located within or outside offlcial mudst Bloc have given support in the Wart to n ~allations, comes reasonably close to saturating Soviet Intelligence operation against an American. available amedited cover positions. The ma- This is an outgrowth of the close working relation-

U""".

main, e able m isamu

7 intelligence 1 even rivalry

I, and mnside with the KG

be a k t sea chiefof the:

etmy of emb~ Soviet armme

Opeau.>,- uIwK-w UU- d KGB and (: ty of Soviet news media personnel abroad are ship which is known to exist between t h e - ~ G ~ and Deploymaat d KGB and --.-

nsiderlc

I 1-lllgence officers. Overall, more than 60% have the dvilian East European Communist sesvicea

Few Americam a b d in diplomatic, militnry out rd ~ , " ~ ~ ~ ~ ! f ~ ~ , " $ ~ . - ~ I I so identified nnd this is considered a minimal which share the Soviet concept of the United States or other official and private capacities fully appred- miosion. , hction on 1 .91m. Included in this categoly are camspond- as the main enemy.' (For purposes of this paper, ate the overwhelming overseas deployment of .S+

prut-tim diplomatic seaeMes of - '11 for the newspapen Rnvda and hes t i a and these are the senices of East Germany,. Poland. viet Intelligence which can and is being brought mPh as Pollom and . C U ~ d and ScieaaC ,.. ~rrsentatives of the TASS and Novosti news Czechoslova!da, Hungary and to a limited degrea, to bem against them as well as a w t non-Ameri- .ncies. A d o t , the world-wide and still ex- Rumania.) Laszlo Sznbo, a senior intellieence offi-

3, a b m d a Mmponents a

They have le basis-as

~ ~ ~.... 1 Lches. tion of8 indicate number Foreien

as 61DSUIS. vi8 Ian, foreign d, in almost the legithat .,.. .

oecoDSUIS, pr eDde r e p m every counb

e diplomats o . . ...

esc and infon mtatives and, ry they far C

f the Minis&) . ..

can targ&. The fact is that agout BO% of the approrimately 7,000 Soviets abroad in ofacial in- stallations are intelligence d o e r s of the two m-

)<ling Soviet civillan &line, provides both cover cer who defected from the Hungarian %H. r e I support to Soviet Intelligence, particularly the ferred to this collaboration in the following terms in (1, and surveys in recent years have established testimonv before a mmmittee of the House of Rep

ices in n ratio of rouihlY two to one in favor of the KGB. Among Soviets with diplomatic rank the percentage of intelligence of8oers is even higher; the world-wide average is about 75% and in some countn'es it tops 80%. These statistics are based on identifiations mads by Soviet intelligence om- cers who have defected to the West and are in a position to point out their former colleagues and on analyses by Western security and counterintelli- gence servim, including American, which have been able to detect and observe the Soviets in o p ~ t i o n a l intelligence activity.

t 70% of itd oversea rep-tatives are st& resentatiks of the Eigbty-ninth Congress: ,.en of that service. "TdodhUy, tba Snvlt& all mnfsraoar wlth the .'ram numerous publicized eqionage cases in the Bloc so* La the USSR fa d-n of tnt.rngam 1 1 1 4 States, Americans have beoome generally Oblstlva pmblsmr. work bowam Swbt am that the United Nations in New York, in- ''''',"'; :","zZ: E: E,"; #ling the internationally staffed Secretariat and ,,i, pnd ths ~ u t y of the sovfst

permanent Soviet U. N. Mission, is used W a Vnfon. . . . Each Bloc amvim bnr agreed 4th the r r base by the Soviet intelli~ence services. The So* m l e o to &b*s b m d objst im i.

NIPUS ana non-mreu~eenm revresenran of &er Soviet mt some ofsces, intellig wmplete monopoly. example, have been And it is bv now a weu-vennea tact tner nu p s ~

~ffices, includ lployees, are and mesr ml frequently gi

nse to some curious evolumns m cover and re

nistries G a ;enm personr

Certpin con wholly st&c .. .A . -

12 mnv haw sulpr dffices, d by the K( . .. . ..

nel of Iow-rmi ~ U ~ ' J Y P b m of

Soh& milik king ortealsib uofesional mi the GRU. 'I

rry attache (

le civilian en ilitnry 05cers rhis situation . . . .

q * is tru; of U. N. offices &d specialized sub- Ib own in- and tn the lntsrsl~ of 0th- ~ l o c

,*ry organizations in ~urope. One example is -' Ir to bo I'nris headquarters of the U.N. Economic and

mJn ensmy." - To illus

I ) chauffa A from l! el 1 W a s D asistan

itrate, Pavel I n of the mi 5 4 to tom. a full-fledget ...

[vanovich La litary attache next a P F

1 Lt Colonel . -. ..

makin, a dvi oface in RC d in Crpy with the htlc . - . .

1 , 111~1ral OrE&tton (UNESCO) where over @I The periodic conferences mentioned bv SzDbo Intelligence units (known as legal ddende:

of both KGB and GRU exist independently of eac other in Soviet missions abroad, and stall pasono of hoth services are protected by diplomatic ir munity or have other official status. The o p - tions chief of each residency (ref& to ss the resident) normally has a senior cover position. In the case of the KGB, the resident may be coun- selor of embassy or at a minimum a k t smetary. Since 1961 the GRU resident has been d i d from the bxwbviou mle of military attache and

me in

3 of t military attacne. amarly, noDerpler N.

Filatov, a lowly civilian driver/interpreter for the military attache in Ottawa from 1857 to. 1880, war posted to Rio de Janeiro in 1963 with diplomatic rank as seoond seaetary. Filatov, it is known, was Pctually n lieutenant senlor grade of the Soviet nrmy wbile in Canada; Lomakin wm pmbnbly n major while in Rome

~~ctm are ukployed in the ~ ~ c r e t h i a t or attached 111s Soviet UNESCO Mission. Approximately

. "., are IdentiEd or suspect intelligence o 5 m . , I the true percentage ir believed to be much .Ivr. Another exampla is the International

' , tv~lc Energy Agency ( i,. 1 3 ) with headquarters Vs~nna. Out of 55 Soviets working in the multi-

-@i,,11a1 IAEA Secretariat ss technical erperto, .,,-lators, etc., or attached to the permanent So-

3 IAEA Mission, nearly half an, identified or .- .81uJy suspect intelligence off im with the mar-

, # , I orror believed to be on the conservative side. - picture is much the same in Geneva with a

teke pl&e annually and the inter-senice n~eementr made are followed up with day-to-day coordination and guidance by a small group of KGB officers as- signed to the headquarters of each counterpart Bloc senice. ~lthdirgh much of the emphasis is on operations against American and other Western per- sonnel and installations within the Bloc area (a subject outside the scope of this paper), there is evidence that the Bloc services, where they are r e p resented abroad in the West, cooperate closely with the KGB, occasionally to the extent of making th* ,IWII personnel and local agents available to the latter.

-1, foncenbation of KGB and GRU 05- in tbe In the of military apentlOIU, ' I European a c e (EOUN), the permanent So- particularly those involving American military per- * hflsslon to EOUN; the Economic Commission

and wnnected with NATO, =* , I.'~~rope (ECE), the World Health Organiza- ,, ( WHO I , the world ~&eoroloeical Orcaniza- lationships are b o close between the GRU and the .s , WMOj: he ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a l &Ation East European military intelligence services. Inter-

I c I ) , the ~ ~ t ~ ~ t i ~ ~ l Telerommounictionr service agreements on intelligence requirements are .n (.ITV) and others. reached at annual meetings of the Wanaw Pact

powers. There is evidence that the GRU and the ud 'Ioc 'Imud B1, military Intelligence services regularly share

\I n v m l points there will bs n reference to views, experiences, technial knowledge and opera- . q . t w u In which agents or personnel of one of tional task not only at the headquprtm level within

HGURE 2. GRU OFFICERS LOMAKIN (LEFO AND FllATOV

~* CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

However, the GRU lacks exclusive & now bas w visible millby &hation. wica r- be may q, or, perb B deputy !mid represez

tion.

h o v m deployment of Soviet intelligesla, the intelligence ot tas East European Cam- rrrr, whether located within or outside offlcial mudst Bloc have given support in the Wart to n ~allations, comes reasonably close to saturating Soviet Intelligence operation against an American. available amedited cover positions. The ma- This is an outgrowth of the close working relation-

U""".

main, e able m isamu

7 intelligence 1 even rivalry

I, and mnside with the KG

be a k t sea chiefof the:

etmy of emb~ Soviet armme

Opeau.>,- uIwK-w UU- d KGB and (: ty of Soviet news media personnel abroad are ship which is known to exist between t h e - ~ G ~ and Deploymaat d KGB and --.-

nsiderlc

I 1-lllgence officers. Overall, more than 60% have the dvilian East European Communist sesvicea

Few Americam a b d in diplomatic, militnry out rd ~ , " ~ ~ ~ ~ ! f ~ ~ , " $ ~ . - ~ I I so identified nnd this is considered a minimal which share the Soviet concept of the United States or other official and private capacities fully appred- miosion. , hction on 1 .91m. Included in this categoly are camspond- as the main enemy.' (For purposes of this paper, ate the overwhelming overseas deployment of .S+

prut-tim diplomatic seaeMes of - '11 for the newspapen Rnvda and hes t i a and these are the senices of East Germany,. Poland. viet Intelligence which can and is being brought mPh as Pollom and . C U ~ d and ScieaaC ,.. ~rrsentatives of the TASS and Novosti news Czechoslova!da, Hungary and to a limited degrea, to bem against them as well as a w t non-Ameri- .ncies. A d o t , the world-wide and still ex- Rumania.) Laszlo Sznbo, a senior intellieence offi-

3, a b m d a Mmponents a

They have le basis-as

~ ~ ~.... 1 Lches. tion of8 indicate number Foreien

as 61DSUIS. vi8 Ian, foreign d, in almost the legithat .,.. .

oecoDSUIS, pr eDde r e p m every counb

e diplomats o . . ...

esc and infon mtatives and, ry they far C

f the Minis&) . ..

can targ&. The fact is that agout BO% of the approrimately 7,000 Soviets abroad in ofacial in- stallations are intelligence d o e r s of the two m-

)<ling Soviet civillan &line, provides both cover cer who defected from the Hungarian %H. r e I support to Soviet Intelligence, particularly the ferred to this collaboration in the following terms in (1, and surveys in recent years have established testimonv before a mmmittee of the House of Rep

ices in n ratio of rouihlY two to one in favor of the KGB. Among Soviets with diplomatic rank the percentage of intelligence of8oers is even higher; the world-wide average is about 75% and in some countn'es it tops 80%. These statistics are based on identifiations mads by Soviet intelligence om- cers who have defected to the West and are in a position to point out their former colleagues and on analyses by Western security and counterintelli- gence servim, including American, which have been able to detect and observe the Soviets in o p ~ t i o n a l intelligence activity.

t 70% of itd oversea rep-tatives are st& resentatiks of the Eigbty-ninth Congress: ,.en of that service. "TdodhUy, tba Snvlt& all mnfsraoar wlth the .'ram numerous publicized eqionage cases in the Bloc so* La the USSR fa d-n of tnt.rngam 1 1 1 4 States, Americans have beoome generally Oblstlva pmblsmr. work bowam Swbt am that the United Nations in New York, in- ''''',"'; :","zZ: E: E,"; #ling the internationally staffed Secretariat and ,,i, pnd ths ~ u t y of the sovfst

permanent Soviet U. N. Mission, is used W a Vnfon. . . . Each Bloc amvim bnr agreed 4th the r r base by the Soviet intelli~ence services. The So* m l e o to &b*s b m d objst im i.

NIPUS ana non-mreu~eenm revresenran of &er Soviet mt some ofsces, intellig wmplete monopoly. example, have been And it is bv now a weu-vennea tact tner nu p s ~

~ffices, includ lployees, are and mesr ml frequently gi

nse to some curious evolumns m cover and re

nistries G a ;enm personr

Certpin con wholly st&c .. .A . -

12 mnv haw sulpr dffices, d by the K( . .. . ..

nel of Iow-rmi ~ U ~ ' J Y P b m of

Soh& milik king ortealsib uofesional mi the GRU. 'I

rry attache (

le civilian en ilitnry 05cers rhis situation . . . .

q * is tru; of U. N. offices &d specialized sub- Ib own in- and tn the lntsrsl~ of 0th- ~ l o c

,*ry organizations in ~urope. One example is -' Ir to bo I'nris headquarters of the U.N. Economic and

mJn ensmy." - To illus

I ) chauffa A from l! el 1 W a s D asistan

itrate, Pavel I n of the mi 5 4 to tom. a full-fledget ...

[vanovich La litary attache next a P F

1 Lt Colonel . -. ..

makin, a dvi oface in RC d in Crpy with the htlc . - . .

1 , 111~1ral OrE&tton (UNESCO) where over @I The periodic conferences mentioned bv SzDbo Intelligence units (known as legal ddende:

of both KGB and GRU exist independently of eac other in Soviet missions abroad, and stall pasono of hoth services are protected by diplomatic ir munity or have other official status. The o p - tions chief of each residency (ref& to ss the resident) normally has a senior cover position. In the case of the KGB, the resident may be coun- selor of embassy or at a minimum a k t smetary. Since 1961 the GRU resident has been d i d from the bxwbviou mle of military attache and

me in

3 of t military attacne. amarly, noDerpler N.

Filatov, a lowly civilian driver/interpreter for the military attache in Ottawa from 1857 to. 1880, war posted to Rio de Janeiro in 1963 with diplomatic rank as seoond seaetary. Filatov, it is known, was Pctually n lieutenant senlor grade of the Soviet nrmy wbile in Canada; Lomakin wm pmbnbly n major while in Rome

~~ctm are ukployed in the ~ ~ c r e t h i a t or attached 111s Soviet UNESCO Mission. Approximately

. "., are IdentiEd or suspect intelligence o 5 m . , I the true percentage ir believed to be much .Ivr. Another exampla is the International

' , tv~lc Energy Agency ( i,. 1 3 ) with headquarters Vs~nna. Out of 55 Soviets working in the multi-

-@i,,11a1 IAEA Secretariat ss technical erperto, .,,-lators, etc., or attached to the permanent So-

3 IAEA Mission, nearly half an, identified or .- .81uJy suspect intelligence off im with the mar-

, # , I orror believed to be on the conservative side. - picture is much the same in Geneva with a

teke pl&e annually and the inter-senice n~eementr made are followed up with day-to-day coordination and guidance by a small group of KGB officers as- signed to the headquarters of each counterpart Bloc senice. ~lthdirgh much of the emphasis is on operations against American and other Western per- sonnel and installations within the Bloc area (a subject outside the scope of this paper), there is evidence that the Bloc services, where they are r e p resented abroad in the West, cooperate closely with the KGB, occasionally to the extent of making th* ,IWII personnel and local agents available to the latter.

-1, foncenbation of KGB and GRU 05- in tbe In the of military apentlOIU, ' I European a c e (EOUN), the permanent So- particularly those involving American military per- * hflsslon to EOUN; the Economic Commission

and wnnected with NATO, =* , I.'~~rope (ECE), the World Health Organiza- ,, ( WHO I , the world ~&eoroloeical Orcaniza- lationships are b o close between the GRU and the .s , WMOj: he ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a l &Ation East European military intelligence services. Inter-

I c I ) , the ~ ~ t ~ ~ t i ~ ~ l Telerommounictionr service agreements on intelligence requirements are .n (.ITV) and others. reached at annual meetings of the Wanaw Pact

powers. There is evidence that the GRU and the ud 'Ioc 'Imud B1, military Intelligence services regularly share

\I n v m l points there will bs n reference to views, experiences, technial knowledge and opera- . q . t w u In which agents or personnel of one of tional task not only at the headquprtm level within

HGURE 2. GRU OFFICERS LOMAKIN (LEFO AND FllATOV

~* CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the Bloc area but also in the West through coUabo- mtive relationships between residencies through their respective military attaches.

In summe, this introduction bas sought to iden- tlfy the existence and steady intensification of the Soviet Intelligence threat to Americans and U.S. imtdhtions abroad and brirll! describe the So- viet components involved ar~tl . IOC variety of w e r wsitions from which t h y ooerate on a truly massive

scale. The d o n s which follow win be prtnprl concened with the goals of Soviet Intelligence opc ations against Americana a h 4 the target cat gories of highest priority (and th& vulnmbilitia the Sovi* approach to t h e targ- frontally a~ i n M y and, by illustratior~, Soviet techniqu both d e and subtle which, ns we will see, fi quently fail but too often hove succeeded wi serious security damage to tbs United States.

rLS AND I ABROAD I ENCE

'The mn 1

r KGB ~ m ] m ~ a e w wuh official dooumentx from Anrcncrm irrna~urnmo. rru

d other remet mexponde J% chkr and nmetmlu n dsocloplng p e r d con broad who mn obtaln wa

m U . S . overmu tnstauat~11 or wuh u . S . 5 . e n f and rcbnl$c orgm- zuflon, <n the United Statea. Similar mn$dmthl reloHonrhlp are a h &tired with Amerlmn, abroad who m k ln Amerlcun d l b h m e n t r ln any mpacity. auch a, tronrkltorr. dr iwx or cucn domattlcx . . . m h agent wtumka rhmld be wed to obtain a complete plchrre of the atatfing and work shedder wUh9 A-rtfCM fdaUaHonr in order to obtain renet documents and to maplam audb

ml to agents 1

Mi6 clerk$, dl rcts our @e denttar relath . -.-

witi acccsd to pher machlne TX to be morc d i p s with . ....

nc i )UJI . . . . It tact8 and wk &her

p Servlm oBcer, or any 0 t h sedor U.S. &dad - r m b i t is clew from Soviet InteUgenm doc- frine and from scorns of reported and often ob- served KGB and GRU developmental opemtiom and recruitment approaches that the most aggres- sive Soviet operational activity is directed against junior employees of American diplomatic and other -'%id establisl ed u peesonnel It oad categoy i, B ards, etc., wl P .ly vulnerable since (in tne worm ot one d v e ) 'they do not bslong to the e s and are worse off Bnancidy.'

b

, 'r primary goals of Soviet Intelligenm opm- .- -4 aplnst Americans a b m d are to obtain crypt* ,. , mderiak so as to be able to mad mdpbered -. ,ss-anIcations. and to acquire, preferably in doc- . -. ~.ry fonn, o5cial secrets through recruitment

1 tt-dcans--civilian and military and of d ,. . I.. -who themselves have access to the b . .t.18rrmntion.

lvrn ue, of course, other objectives: to . --. ,. an rcientisc and technological info1

i .t.8ally every field, industrinl as well as n

. - 3 ., wrll ns clnsi8ed; to work t o w d u -.. .tlzrn nnd manipulation of American F

~mentc and I

of the militw of code clerl hich the Sovi

. ,. .

sgainst enlist ry servicer. cr, secretarler etc regard as . .

over- is thia vlnrine srticu- ! KGB

bn collect

mation "litpry. &, ~ltimate ch mlitical %¶lent 1 action

dvileged

1 111-

. , 1 . 1 4 1 . life throu& identification nnd ass: Ins with the potential tobe politico . .lid, in ac

I . -. 01 non-ofE .*I,, whoca . ...lql to seek

.. 8 .~(rnclar, mcluctmg me mnlugenc - . IIV trrvias. All of these, however, are.

a - . tltn basic goal of getting secret info1 -.. Antrrlcnn overseas installations by eve - erran:.

Code and conr- Pnronnsl In 1881, a g a d diredive sent to KGB cr abmd, signed by AldLIMdr Nikolnyevich Shel- bin, then Chairman of tlm KGB, emphnsizad force- lly that the %st priority task of every residency es -to recruit cipher clerks.' It noted tersely at "the most fruitful rrpuld w m obtained in is manner. KGB residendes were instructed to ~ncentrate on 'the identification of American code ~b in p q ~ ~ ~ ~ t i o n for appmhtng and recruit- ): th,.ln.- It is known that at least one KGB resi-

port from Sbelepin

p d list

idition, to cu lcinl Am1 :I n be b n ~ pbs everrt;ral . . .. ..

Idtivat' variw ns abroad, s t under wnb Uy with U.S. ( . . ...

IS cate- uch PI

rol and hm- a and :'

I " p d (..leg& 1 11. the KGB would not I

, * . ~ r r l n n target--an ~ m b 'y~loolr any : - dc

pmmis- M er For- di

:ncy m the W oscow headq~ rective. Tbi!

bllow-up sup] 3 heels of the 'om of a pre

CONFIDENTIAL

the Bloc area but also in the West through coUabo- mtive relationships between residencies through their respective military attaches.

In summe, this introduction bas sought to iden- tlfy the existence and steady intensification of the Soviet Intelligence threat to Americans and U.S. imtdhtions abroad and brirll! describe the So- viet components involved ar~tl . IOC variety of w e r wsitions from which t h y ooerate on a truly massive

scale. The d o n s which follow win be prtnprl concened with the goals of Soviet Intelligence opc ations against Americana a h 4 the target cat gories of highest priority (and th& vulnmbilitia the Sovi* approach to t h e targ- frontally a~ i n M y and, by illustratior~, Soviet techniqu both d e and subtle which, ns we will see, fi quently fail but too often hove succeeded wi serious security damage to tbs United States.

rLS AND I ABROAD I ENCE

'The mn 1

r KGB ~ m ] m ~ a e w wuh official dooumentx from Anrcncrm irrna~urnmo. rru

d other remet mexponde J% chkr and nmetmlu n dsocloplng p e r d con broad who mn obtaln wa

m U . S . overmu tnstauat~11 or wuh u . S . 5 . e n f and rcbnl$c orgm- zuflon, <n the United Statea. Similar mn$dmthl reloHonrhlp are a h &tired with Amerlmn, abroad who m k ln Amerlcun d l b h m e n t r ln any mpacity. auch a, tronrkltorr. dr iwx or cucn domattlcx . . . m h agent wtumka rhmld be wed to obtain a complete plchrre of the atatfing and work shedder wUh9 A-rtfCM fdaUaHonr in order to obtain renet documents and to maplam audb

ml to agents 1

Mi6 clerk$, dl rcts our @e denttar relath . -.-

witi acccsd to pher machlne TX to be morc d i p s with . ....

nc i )UJI . . . . It tact8 and wk &her

p Servlm oBcer, or any 0 t h sedor U.S. &dad - r m b i t is clew from Soviet InteUgenm doc- frine and from scorns of reported and often ob- served KGB and GRU developmental opemtiom and recruitment approaches that the most aggres- sive Soviet operational activity is directed against junior employees of American diplomatic and other -'%id establisl ed u peesonnel It oad categoy i, B ards, etc., wl P .ly vulnerable since (in tne worm ot one d v e ) 'they do not bslong to the e s and are worse off Bnancidy.'

b

, 'r primary goals of Soviet Intelligenm opm- .- -4 aplnst Americans a b m d are to obtain crypt* ,. , mderiak so as to be able to mad mdpbered -. ,ss-anIcations. and to acquire, preferably in doc- . -. ~.ry fonn, o5cial secrets through recruitment

1 tt-dcans--civilian and military and of d ,. . I.. -who themselves have access to the b . .t.18rrmntion.

lvrn ue, of course, other objectives: to . --. ,. an rcientisc and technological info1

i .t.8ally every field, industrinl as well as n

. - 3 ., wrll ns clnsi8ed; to work t o w d u -.. .tlzrn nnd manipulation of American F

~mentc and I

of the militw of code clerl hich the Sovi

. ,. .

sgainst enlist ry servicer. cr, secretarler etc regard as . .

over- is thia vlnrine srticu- ! KGB

bn collect

mation "litpry. &, ~ltimate ch mlitical %¶lent 1 action

dvileged

1 111-

. , 1 . 1 4 1 . life throu& identification nnd ass: Ins with the potential tobe politico . .lid, in ac

I . -. 01 non-ofE .*I,, whoca . ...lql to seek

.. 8 .~(rnclar, mcluctmg me mnlugenc - . IIV trrvias. All of these, however, are.

a - . tltn basic goal of getting secret info1 -.. Antrrlcnn overseas installations by eve - erran:.

Code and conr- Pnronnsl In 1881, a g a d diredive sent to KGB cr abmd, signed by AldLIMdr Nikolnyevich Shel- bin, then Chairman of tlm KGB, emphnsizad force- lly that the %st priority task of every residency es -to recruit cipher clerks.' It noted tersely at "the most fruitful rrpuld w m obtained in is manner. KGB residendes were instructed to ~ncentrate on 'the identification of American code ~b in p q ~ ~ ~ ~ t i o n for appmhtng and recruit- ): th,.ln.- It is known that at least one KGB resi-

port from Sbelepin

p d list

idition, to cu lcinl Am1 :I n be b n ~ pbs everrt;ral . . .. ..

Idtivat' variw ns abroad, s t under wnb Uy with U.S. ( . . ...

IS cate- uch PI

rol and hm- a and :'

I " p d (..leg& 1 11. the KGB would not I

, * . ~ r r l n n target--an ~ m b 'y~loolr any : - dc

pmmis- M er For- di

:ncy m the W oscow headq~ rective. Tbi!

bllow-up sup] 3 heels of the 'om of a pre

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

of code clerks, cornpleto with namw and biographi- cal data, who were at that time assigned to the Weturn country and aguimt whom residency ef- forts were to b concentrat~d.

n o d than nlYmsd by PutyaWa pmhaw, tb Amerlcaar, even with polnted I ~ u , wom not able to m& the GHU oglcer leave them h. They were flnolly m d by m o t h Soviet ( a Imcm KCB 0 5 ~ ) who cpme ovor to the table m d hls staggering mllssgue away. Pulyatov, h ever, rbmnlned p l s t e n t evm when lob. A weeh later he rhowed up uoindted at a dk puty given by an AID amploybe for aevsnl Amun- CPN, including the urns oode clerk. ThL time, md without drinking, Putptov again mncankated hlr nttentlon on tha code Jerk. The latter, bow- ever h11.1 been keeping the smbpuy lscvrlty ace informed of Putyatov'r aggrcsdve actionr and th Soviet h n y abandoned bL efforts.

I

1q.a mince been the object of two developmental .whe in di5erent parts of the world, followed sllbsequent recruitment attempt at a third

.-TI post. In this particular case, the KGB con- m "accidental" encounter in the Far East Soviet citizen (coached by the KGB for the r if not a regular s M o5cer) whom the an had last hown and Last seen 16 years

< us a young and friendly electricianhan~' the USSR. This time the Soviet posed

I81mt civilian TV factory director from L I. temporarily in the Far East on burinc ,ally, travel remrds showed the Soviet v

t in the area with a diplomatic passport on ( d r y duty from the Ministry of Foreign Af-

The second Soviet approach, this time in P, came hvo years later and involved a KCB Rn operations specialist under diplomatic xho presented himself to the American bear- rtings and a letter from the original Soviet

The new Soviet attempted to follow up 8 1 approach with renewed efforts at cultiva-

. , M I rapport. A third-and crucial-approach ~,lrce three years later in a difterent West . ,111 country. The American unsuspectiogly . , ,4 made friends with a p e ~ o who passed ' 1 nff as a naturalized South American busi- ~ I I of the samt !an origin as the an himself. re in occasional v mntact for a eight months be- ,"thing bapper le completely un- . I recruitment proposal wns made--and re- it was ostensibly on behalf of the foreign

C , I I C ~ service of the East European country unted information on "all types of American

.,.aphic equipment.' in return for which the 1 American was offered financial security for I 11f his life. The circumstances of the un- tu1 recruitment bid indicated strongly that ..ndble naturalized Soutlt merican was ac- .I Soviet "Illegal," i.e., :L Soviet intellige llving and working in the West carnodal - umented with a false, non-Soviet national

lollowing caw, although not new and giro. mvuntion in the press at the time, is m u n t e d .t l~rllw detail than befora Although there *M inexplicable aspects which are not likely . In resolved the Soviet attempt to -recruit '-.k Donald Ultan is a clarslc example of a .t~tud, devious operation in which the Sc-

viet ha ~t i l the las

don^.. ,.,. ..& 30, BmkIy~-- - - ~ ~ , j e e of the American Embury in Vienna, graduate of the University of California, npplioant for career status in the Foreign S e h and accustomed to European life from previous residenm in Paris, was of soecial interest to Soviet Intelligence for a variety

I foremost, he was a mde clerk ly in the top priority category ~ondly, his father was an Russia to the United States,

anu arrnougn me son had been brought up to speak only English at home, from the somewhat myopic viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence there war a bars chance that he might harbor some'elements of sympathy for the homeland of his father. Thirdly, he was Jewish with apparently strong feelings about Nazi pmecutions and an interest in the Resistam movements of World War U. And, finally, he was fluent in French, liked to converse in it, and was interested in languages in general. All of t h m factors, plus undoubtedly others, had come to Soviet attenhon in Vienna through their excellent local capability to monitor closely the job status, pasonal characteristics and social pattern of the young Am- group in Vienna, including embassy code clerk and secretaries, graduate stu- dents at the University ot Vienna and some expabi- ate types with vague means of support. Inter- woven with this group were others of various na- tionalities, including Austrian employees of the American Embassy. Although this gmup was by no means a single, clubby unit in the relaxed charm of Vienna's coffee house, concert and cocktail party circuit, the Soviets had within it an agent, exc- sively directed against the Americans in the p r who had long since spotted Ultan, knew him a hk friends, shared some of their social life and w wiUine and able to assist the KGB in mountina

". completely concealed UI

.La".- -4-

The majorlty of cldo 1:k:l.l .md other Americm communicationr pirso~s~cl : ,ad tend to fall in the 'junior etnployrrr" cutrgtrly in terms of grade and salary. For the most part, they u s relatively young, often u~~nttached (both male and female), often L s politically sophiiticatrd t h ~ smior per- sonnd, and tend to spend the& 05-duty social Ume in compmy with each othrr and with other junior employees. Unlika their Soviet mun tepub abroad, who are reqitired to live within Soviet 05-

cis1 installations and are not allowed on the sheas without a prowtive escort, American smbDuy code Jerks live where they please and are free to cir- culate socially, to associate with l d citlzena and non-oEicial Americans at their foreign pasts. Under these conditions their specialized and ~ensltiw oc- cupations tend to become widely known and, in fact, it is relativelv easy for an a g g r d v e and a- pbk genm residency, especially one whicl ive use of a local agent network, to id, nd develop means of direct a indin Lssessment purposes and, in some

, ror rml tmen t attempts.

)ns. First anc IS automatical Wtment. Se from Czarist

L -9 .,

-- . for ra

EfT,

Not infrequently, an indire method Involvbq use of local (non-Swlet) agents m d mmpromlm a the tnrget individual through m a l i n v o l m w * . is a favorite Soviet Bnt step. A few para ago In I

North Africnn country, a Soviet inteU1gcmca d8ca told one of his agents. a Eum- burinarman an( h l mident, that bll prlnclpnl objective w u b penetrate the Arnsrlcan Embaaay c o m m u n l m h satlon. He p h e d to achleve thh by 4 cam- promise of a female embassy cluk whom he i d s ~ fled to the agent. The latter, at that tlme only sllghtly acquainted Wth the American glrl, wu 08 dered to seduce her and waa pmrnlrad a larp b a n dal mward if s u d In thh CPU), he wu no1 Similnrly, in a Near Eastern county, a local go- ment o5dal who bad been recruited nr an agem

I by the Soviets, waa instructed to meat and culti- vate two American @Is who were c l w frimds- one of them an embassy code clerk, the other. r CIA employee. The Soviet ofewr darcribed both girls ns athactive, single. and Pecond class citlzemD In telling the agent to bearme s a d l y involved with either one of the glrls. the Soviet ofecer dL- played a diamond ring which be promised would be available for pmsentation as a (pH if the agent waa able to carry out hL assignment. I

: Soviet intelli h makes e5ect entify them a r t access for s

clerks takes ah ; f m m t h e w ~d highly corn L--> :. .--..

? East Europ The hvo we: lpproximately led. When tt

Th "T crude

e Soviet effort against oode < mat imaginable form, ranging ildly

! to subtle, well-planned ax ~plex Itions in which the Soviet bmu rr -waled the last moment and the I rn is ~t completely by surprise.

intended victi

n particularly n"- - 0-1,

example of Soviet md i ty i bla- -. form d in 1888 in , - ,- Tanzania V l a d W T. Putyatov, Soviet second secretary and CRU deer known to specialize in operations against communications pe~mnnel, a p proached an American Embasay cods clerk who wpr enten esort mta l m.

h tya few week betore and unquestionably was aware of his occupation The Soviet invited himself to dinner with the American couple, p d e d to get drunlc, them offered to make both of the Americana rich if they would give him embassy documents for which he would pay in Amuican dollan. He kept insist- ing the code clerk meet him privately. Mom an-

taining an em1 rant. An ass ~tov had met . -

b n s q secret9 :iduous d t i v r the code d e . .

r at a beach n tor of Amerk rk sodally a

hat bizarre op

sidewalk cafe a pleasant spc

t the m i e cG Onca havtng aet its dgbb on a code or caamtr-

nications target believed even remotely awcaptibb on a long-range ba& to Soviet inducements OI

threats, the KGB is both relentless m d p a t i a t One Department of State communications techni- dan who, althougb America0 by birth, bad m Eut European ethnic and educational background and once served in a very junior capadty in an Amsr' dipbmotic mirdon in the USSR durtrg World '

:ed ity. The

HoteL of the old an1 *fmanaper i -

d famous Sac1 itif in May 19 . ... - . was me openmg scene. ~ n e agent ot me m t .

a natumlized citizen of a friendly Wetem country and a trillimt mathematician, had invited an un- employad American teacher, a close friend of Ultan and, like him, a fluent French-apeaker, to join him for a drink. The plan was quite simple; merely to bring about a ' c h m d meeting betwan the

CONFIDENTIAL

14

CONFIDENTIAL

1 5

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

of code clerks, cornpleto with namw and biographi- cal data, who were at that time assigned to the Weturn country and aguimt whom residency ef- forts were to b concentrat~d.

n o d than nlYmsd by PutyaWa pmhaw, tb Amerlcaar, even with polnted I ~ u , wom not able to m& the GHU oglcer leave them h. They were flnolly m d by m o t h Soviet ( a Imcm KCB 0 5 ~ ) who cpme ovor to the table m d hls staggering mllssgue away. Pulyatov, h ever, rbmnlned p l s t e n t evm when lob. A weeh later he rhowed up uoindted at a dk puty given by an AID amploybe for aevsnl Amun- CPN, including the urns oode clerk. ThL time, md without drinking, Putptov again mncankated hlr nttentlon on tha code Jerk. The latter, bow- ever h11.1 been keeping the smbpuy lscvrlty ace informed of Putyatov'r aggrcsdve actionr and th Soviet h n y abandoned bL efforts.

I

1q.a mince been the object of two developmental .whe in di5erent parts of the world, followed sllbsequent recruitment attempt at a third

.-TI post. In this particular case, the KGB con- m "accidental" encounter in the Far East Soviet citizen (coached by the KGB for the r if not a regular s M o5cer) whom the an had last hown and Last seen 16 years

< us a young and friendly electricianhan~' the USSR. This time the Soviet posed

I81mt civilian TV factory director from L I. temporarily in the Far East on burinc ,ally, travel remrds showed the Soviet v

t in the area with a diplomatic passport on ( d r y duty from the Ministry of Foreign Af-

The second Soviet approach, this time in P, came hvo years later and involved a KCB Rn operations specialist under diplomatic xho presented himself to the American bear- rtings and a letter from the original Soviet

The new Soviet attempted to follow up 8 1 approach with renewed efforts at cultiva-

. , M I rapport. A third-and crucial-approach ~,lrce three years later in a difterent West . ,111 country. The American unsuspectiogly . , ,4 made friends with a p e ~ o who passed ' 1 nff as a naturalized South American busi- ~ I I of the samt !an origin as the an himself. re in occasional v mntact for a eight months be- ,"thing bapper le completely un- . I recruitment proposal wns made--and re- it was ostensibly on behalf of the foreign

C , I I C ~ service of the East European country unted information on "all types of American

.,.aphic equipment.' in return for which the 1 American was offered financial security for I 11f his life. The circumstances of the un- tu1 recruitment bid indicated strongly that ..ndble naturalized Soutlt merican was ac- .I Soviet "Illegal," i.e., :L Soviet intellige llving and working in the West carnodal - umented with a false, non-Soviet national

lollowing caw, although not new and giro. mvuntion in the press at the time, is m u n t e d .t l~rllw detail than befora Although there *M inexplicable aspects which are not likely . In resolved the Soviet attempt to -recruit '-.k Donald Ultan is a clarslc example of a .t~tud, devious operation in which the Sc-

viet ha ~t i l the las

don^.. ,.,. ..& 30, BmkIy~-- - - ~ ~ , j e e of the American Embury in Vienna, graduate of the University of California, npplioant for career status in the Foreign S e h and accustomed to European life from previous residenm in Paris, was of soecial interest to Soviet Intelligence for a variety

I foremost, he was a mde clerk ly in the top priority category ~ondly, his father was an Russia to the United States,

anu arrnougn me son had been brought up to speak only English at home, from the somewhat myopic viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence there war a bars chance that he might harbor some'elements of sympathy for the homeland of his father. Thirdly, he was Jewish with apparently strong feelings about Nazi pmecutions and an interest in the Resistam movements of World War U. And, finally, he was fluent in French, liked to converse in it, and was interested in languages in general. All of t h m factors, plus undoubtedly others, had come to Soviet attenhon in Vienna through their excellent local capability to monitor closely the job status, pasonal characteristics and social pattern of the young Am- group in Vienna, including embassy code clerk and secretaries, graduate stu- dents at the University ot Vienna and some expabi- ate types with vague means of support. Inter- woven with this group were others of various na- tionalities, including Austrian employees of the American Embassy. Although this gmup was by no means a single, clubby unit in the relaxed charm of Vienna's coffee house, concert and cocktail party circuit, the Soviets had within it an agent, exc- sively directed against the Americans in the p r who had long since spotted Ultan, knew him a hk friends, shared some of their social life and w wiUine and able to assist the KGB in mountina

". completely concealed UI

.La".- -4-

The majorlty of cldo 1:k:l.l .md other Americm communicationr pirso~s~cl : ,ad tend to fall in the 'junior etnployrrr" cutrgtrly in terms of grade and salary. For the most part, they u s relatively young, often u~~nttached (both male and female), often L s politically sophiiticatrd t h ~ smior per- sonnd, and tend to spend the& 05-duty social Ume in compmy with each othrr and with other junior employees. Unlika their Soviet mun tepub abroad, who are reqitired to live within Soviet 05-

cis1 installations and are not allowed on the sheas without a prowtive escort, American smbDuy code Jerks live where they please and are free to cir- culate socially, to associate with l d citlzena and non-oEicial Americans at their foreign pasts. Under these conditions their specialized and ~ensltiw oc- cupations tend to become widely known and, in fact, it is relativelv easy for an a g g r d v e and a- pbk genm residency, especially one whicl ive use of a local agent network, to id, nd develop means of direct a indin Lssessment purposes and, in some

, ror rml tmen t attempts.

)ns. First anc IS automatical Wtment. Se from Czarist

L -9 .,

-- . for ra

EfT,

Not infrequently, an indire method Involvbq use of local (non-Swlet) agents m d mmpromlm a the tnrget individual through m a l i n v o l m w * . is a favorite Soviet Bnt step. A few para ago In I

North Africnn country, a Soviet inteU1gcmca d8ca told one of his agents. a Eum- burinarman an( h l mident, that bll prlnclpnl objective w u b penetrate the Arnsrlcan Embaaay c o m m u n l m h satlon. He p h e d to achleve thh by 4 cam- promise of a female embassy cluk whom he i d s ~ fled to the agent. The latter, at that tlme only sllghtly acquainted Wth the American glrl, wu 08 dered to seduce her and waa pmrnlrad a larp b a n dal mward if s u d In thh CPU), he wu no1 Similnrly, in a Near Eastern county, a local go- ment o5dal who bad been recruited nr an agem

I by the Soviets, waa instructed to meat and culti- vate two American @Is who were c l w frimds- one of them an embassy code clerk, the other. r CIA employee. The Soviet ofewr darcribed both girls ns athactive, single. and Pecond class citlzemD In telling the agent to bearme s a d l y involved with either one of the glrls. the Soviet ofecer dL- played a diamond ring which be promised would be available for pmsentation as a (pH if the agent waa able to carry out hL assignment. I

: Soviet intelli h makes e5ect entify them a r t access for s

clerks takes ah ; f m m t h e w ~d highly corn L--> :. .--..

? East Europ The hvo we: lpproximately led. When tt

Th "T crude

e Soviet effort against oode < mat imaginable form, ranging ildly

! to subtle, well-planned ax ~plex Itions in which the Soviet bmu rr -waled the last moment and the I rn is ~t completely by surprise.

intended victi

n particularly n"- - 0-1,

example of Soviet md i ty i bla- -. form d in 1888 in , - ,- Tanzania V l a d W T. Putyatov, Soviet second secretary and CRU deer known to specialize in operations against communications pe~mnnel, a p proached an American Embasay cods clerk who wpr enten esort mta l m.

h tya few week betore and unquestionably was aware of his occupation The Soviet invited himself to dinner with the American couple, p d e d to get drunlc, them offered to make both of the Americana rich if they would give him embassy documents for which he would pay in Amuican dollan. He kept insist- ing the code clerk meet him privately. Mom an-

taining an em1 rant. An ass ~tov had met . -

b n s q secret9 :iduous d t i v r the code d e . .

r at a beach n tor of Amerk rk sodally a

hat bizarre op

sidewalk cafe a pleasant spc

t the m i e cG Onca havtng aet its dgbb on a code or caamtr-

nications target believed even remotely awcaptibb on a long-range ba& to Soviet inducements OI

threats, the KGB is both relentless m d p a t i a t One Department of State communications techni- dan who, althougb America0 by birth, bad m Eut European ethnic and educational background and once served in a very junior capadty in an Amsr' dipbmotic mirdon in the USSR durtrg World '

:ed ity. The

HoteL of the old an1 *fmanaper i -

d famous Sac1 itif in May 19 . ... - . was me openmg scene. ~ n e agent ot me m t .

a natumlized citizen of a friendly Wetem country and a trillimt mathematician, had invited an un- employad American teacher, a close friend of Ultan and, like him, a fluent French-apeaker, to join him for a drink. The plan was quite simple; merely to bring about a ' c h m d meeting betwan the

CONFIDENTIAL

14

CONFIDENTIAL

1 5

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

Although foreign diplomatic personnel r d t e d in Moskow may have immediate value as sources of intelligence information, t111.i. ~lsefulness to the KGB is often greater atter thr leave the USSR. Normally, control of them is p:~ised to the KGB's Foreign Directorate and their long-range exploita- tion continues as Soviet agents in subsequent as- signments at home or elsewhere abroad. In addi- tion to serving as Soviet Intelligence penetrations of t he i~ own governments, they frequently play a hard to detect role in Soviet operations against Americans in their own countries and in other coun-

I i hies. As neutral or Western diplomats they are able to establish official and often close personal relationships with American counterparts mop easily than Soviet representatives in the same area. Thus, their most important contribution to Soviet Intelligence operations against Americans is their capability, under normal-appearing circumstances, to cultivate and thoroughly assess American officials on Soviet behalf. They also serve as convenient channels for the introduction of Americans to Soviet Intelligence officers at times and places of Soviet choosing. Diplomatic "collaborators" fmm neutral countries, whether recruited in Moscow or brought under Soviet influence elsewhere, are favorite inter- mediaries for Soviet approaches to Americans, as the followhg quotation from a KGB document il- luslrates:

known for having betrayed to the Soviets the entb Swedish air defense system, an incalculable l m i his country. Also well awered has been that pa of his career (195257) when he was Swedish A Attache in the United States and systematically d e c t e d or microfhed literally tens of thousands of American technical publications and military , documents, many of them highly classi6ed, for his 1 Soviet masters, meanwhile cutting an elegant swath 1 in Washineon diplomatic and official societ Published \tudies have dwelt on the absorbu psychological makeup of the man himself, an ab and impeccable career officer of a Yrtendly" nel m l counhy with a calm facade behind which L a Walter Mitty world of fantasy, an unsatis6t ego of fantastic proportions, a hunger for person recognition and for involvement in worldhapir events. These were fatal personality wealmess, which the GRU m e c t l y analyzed in the late 1940 if not even earlier, and thereafter faultlessly e ploited and financially rewarded.

Most pa'hmt to the subject matter of d study, however, is the clear "Americans abroac aspect of the Wennerstmem case which nu thmugh it from beginning to end. At the time his formal recruitment in 1849 by the GRU in Mo cow, where he was serving as Swedish Air Attach Wennerstmem was told it was not Sweden tl Soviets w States, ag be emplq reer he v Mormw

. - - -. -. . 'No matter the I m t h , o m . . . effective way to a h b l h b mntsd wlth Americans h indirectly vln mllab- onton from nsutrAl munkiw, perti&ly embassy pnonnel of nuutrnl muntries which nevertheless main- tdll gmd l'Gltlri0~ with ~ ~ & ~ I I S . EXUnpleS of Such mbPuks would ba thow of India, Bwma, the Arab atntor md the Lstln American munhiw. In ordsr to mme In mntact wlth Americans in thk way, our in- tslligsnos officers reek to establish cMpaativa reb- d o d i p with mpresentntlves of such neutral munhh."

The case summary which follows is a vivid ex- ample of Soviet Intelligence use against Americans of a high-level third-national agent who was re- cruited in Moscow-in this instance by the GRU since it had already handled the preparatory phase of the recruitment operation outside the USSR

Many readen are probably familiar with the web- publicized highlights of the espionage career of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroern, secretly a highly s u d l agent of the GRU for nearly 15 years until his arrest in 1983 and subse- quent sentence to life imprisonment. He is best

ere W e d about, but rather the United ainst which all possible resources had to yed. F m the &st day of his GRU ca- vas dhxted against Americans-first in then in Stockholm, Germany and Spain

(and, of course, in the United States).

Wennerstmem's 5& mission was to obtain, a h all, the closest possible contacts within the Amel can Embassy in Moscow which the Soviets in 1% regarded as the key ou

s asked to a details and

positions, bi, mcteristics t

.~ . .

He wa! graphic . I

embassy personnel, an assignment he could full easily since he h d y knew many American dip18 mats and military officers, some of whom had pr viously served in Stoclcholm. As Wennmtroe himself said after his arrest: "I very quickly g in at the Ameriqn Embassy. This embassy had , distinctly dominating position among the diplomat- ic corps in Moscow, a d if one secured en& there, the rest (id-tion of interest to the

CONFIDENTIAL

38

~viets) came almost by itself.' It uppears to be anks chiefly to tlle "confid<:nccs' of Americun Ileagu~3, who accepted l1i111 witl~out yuestion for Ilut he uppeamd to I*, tllut Wennerstmcln col-

I0.1.tcd isfonnalion not only on prsonnel. but also slvms of infor~niilion on the ltawly fornled Strategic 41r Cummaud (almut wllicll the Soviets deslwrntely wuntrd intelligc~~cc) incltltli~~g likely SAC t q e t 41cas within the USSR in the event of wu.

I\rtunling ~ I U I I I o Stockllol~n I Ile U.S. assignal u noted, wus rcsceli bonus n Soviets wer , m ~ d ) , Wenncrs ~stcd to the S. o*lcn.sc Comn~slrl ullrll rnur~-n~cnt from acti!

v du

rccluiremcnts continued to be important. On GHU i n s t ~ c l i o ~ u he wus to muintuin inlimnto connections with ~nilitury personnel of tha Americun Embnssy. Onw uguin, he found this eusy since he was p p u - Iar with Americum and regulurly invite r~nl;~ssy ?kiul ullnirs. In his Defense C office he wus ublc to obtain nnd microfilr Soviets voluminous publicatiow on Amcd tury uireruft and equipment

In I857 un 1111- en e con- of wedish y ...

act time for I

--

lerstrwm wa! iesbudcn, Gel nd, a promir a U.S. Air .. . .

In 1051) Wen1 pnd nw- 11 duys in W. use gusst u close fria at head-

urtcrs of thc ~p. The viets insisted tnat ne accept MU even set tho

his visit the month of ]

I invited to a] nnany, as ho~ lent general Forces, Eum

. .

npost of the I

names, pemnal chr

FIGURE 1 While An

ID. SWEDISH ~srican colleag

a

AIR FORCE C luas trusted hi1 nd fed his hide

:OL. STlG WI m, his GRU mc

len ago

ENNERSTROW asters paid hin

CONFIDEN:

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

Although foreign diplomatic personnel r d t e d in Moskow may have immediate value as sources of intelligence information, t111.i. ~lsefulness to the KGB is often greater atter thr leave the USSR. Normally, control of them is p:~ised to the KGB's Foreign Directorate and their long-range exploita- tion continues as Soviet agents in subsequent as- signments at home or elsewhere abroad. In addi- tion to serving as Soviet Intelligence penetrations of t he i~ own governments, they frequently play a hard to detect role in Soviet operations against Americans in their own countries and in other coun-

I i hies. As neutral or Western diplomats they are able to establish official and often close personal relationships with American counterparts mop easily than Soviet representatives in the same area. Thus, their most important contribution to Soviet Intelligence operations against Americans is their capability, under normal-appearing circumstances, to cultivate and thoroughly assess American officials on Soviet behalf. They also serve as convenient channels for the introduction of Americans to Soviet Intelligence officers at times and places of Soviet choosing. Diplomatic "collaborators" fmm neutral countries, whether recruited in Moscow or brought under Soviet influence elsewhere, are favorite inter- mediaries for Soviet approaches to Americans, as the followhg quotation from a KGB document il- luslrates:

known for having betrayed to the Soviets the entb Swedish air defense system, an incalculable l m i his country. Also well awered has been that pa of his career (195257) when he was Swedish A Attache in the United States and systematically d e c t e d or microfhed literally tens of thousands of American technical publications and military , documents, many of them highly classi6ed, for his 1 Soviet masters, meanwhile cutting an elegant swath 1 in Washineon diplomatic and official societ Published \tudies have dwelt on the absorbu psychological makeup of the man himself, an ab and impeccable career officer of a Yrtendly" nel m l counhy with a calm facade behind which L a Walter Mitty world of fantasy, an unsatis6t ego of fantastic proportions, a hunger for person recognition and for involvement in worldhapir events. These were fatal personality wealmess, which the GRU m e c t l y analyzed in the late 1940 if not even earlier, and thereafter faultlessly e ploited and financially rewarded.

Most pa'hmt to the subject matter of d study, however, is the clear "Americans abroac aspect of the Wennerstmem case which nu thmugh it from beginning to end. At the time his formal recruitment in 1849 by the GRU in Mo cow, where he was serving as Swedish Air Attach Wennerstmem was told it was not Sweden tl Soviets w States, ag be emplq reer he v Mormw

. - - -. -. . 'No matter the I m t h , o m . . . effective way to a h b l h b mntsd wlth Americans h indirectly vln mllab- onton from nsutrAl munkiw, perti&ly embassy pnonnel of nuutrnl muntries which nevertheless main- tdll gmd l'Gltlri0~ with ~ ~ & ~ I I S . EXUnpleS of Such mbPuks would ba thow of India, Bwma, the Arab atntor md the Lstln American munhiw. In ordsr to mme In mntact wlth Americans in thk way, our in- tslligsnos officers reek to establish cMpaativa reb- d o d i p with mpresentntlves of such neutral munhh."

The case summary which follows is a vivid ex- ample of Soviet Intelligence use against Americans of a high-level third-national agent who was re- cruited in Moscow-in this instance by the GRU since it had already handled the preparatory phase of the recruitment operation outside the USSR

Many readen are probably familiar with the web- publicized highlights of the espionage career of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroern, secretly a highly s u d l agent of the GRU for nearly 15 years until his arrest in 1983 and subse- quent sentence to life imprisonment. He is best

ere W e d about, but rather the United ainst which all possible resources had to yed. F m the &st day of his GRU ca- vas dhxted against Americans-first in then in Stockholm, Germany and Spain

(and, of course, in the United States).

Wennerstmem's 5& mission was to obtain, a h all, the closest possible contacts within the Amel can Embassy in Moscow which the Soviets in 1% regarded as the key ou

s asked to a details and

positions, bi, mcteristics t

.~ . .

He wa! graphic . I

embassy personnel, an assignment he could full easily since he h d y knew many American dip18 mats and military officers, some of whom had pr viously served in Stoclcholm. As Wennmtroe himself said after his arrest: "I very quickly g in at the Ameriqn Embassy. This embassy had , distinctly dominating position among the diplomat- ic corps in Moscow, a d if one secured en& there, the rest (id-tion of interest to the

CONFIDENTIAL

38

~viets) came almost by itself.' It uppears to be anks chiefly to tlle "confid<:nccs' of Americun Ileagu~3, who accepted l1i111 witl~out yuestion for Ilut he uppeamd to I*, tllut Wennerstmcln col-

I0.1.tcd isfonnalion not only on prsonnel. but also slvms of infor~niilion on the ltawly fornled Strategic 41r Cummaud (almut wllicll the Soviets deslwrntely wuntrd intelligc~~cc) incltltli~~g likely SAC t q e t 41cas within the USSR in the event of wu.

I\rtunling ~ I U I I I o Stockllol~n I Ile U.S. assignal u noted, wus rcsceli bonus n Soviets wer , m ~ d ) , Wenncrs ~stcd to the S. o*lcn.sc Comn~slrl ullrll rnur~-n~cnt from acti!

v du

rccluiremcnts continued to be important. On GHU i n s t ~ c l i o ~ u he wus to muintuin inlimnto connections with ~nilitury personnel of tha Americun Embnssy. Onw uguin, he found this eusy since he was p p u - Iar with Americum and regulurly invite r~nl;~ssy ?kiul ullnirs. In his Defense C office he wus ublc to obtain nnd microfilr Soviets voluminous publicatiow on Amcd tury uireruft and equipment

In I857 un 1111- en e con- of wedish y ...

act time for I

--

lerstrwm wa! iesbudcn, Gel nd, a promir a U.S. Air .. . .

In 1051) Wen1 pnd nw- 11 duys in W. use gusst u close fria at head-

urtcrs of thc ~p. The viets insisted tnat ne accept MU even set tho

his visit the month of ]

I invited to a] nnany, as ho~ lent general Forces, Eum

. .

npost of the I

names, pemnal chr

FIGURE 1 While An

ID. SWEDISH ~srican colleag

a

AIR FORCE C luas trusted hi1 nd fed his hide

:OL. STlG WI m, his GRU mc

len ago

ENNERSTROW asters paid hin

CONFIDEN:

~sq, Xq q b! 'pm- p m? mrgo pus qwqd!p-uou a pue (aq arg ae udau ]an 1- Xauom jo am1 arg panqddns 03 lahat auamnpq aqs dqsuoge1ai 1.'' - ~q Sujlap m papamns =a ,+.

pv X[-wd 8 ahq avos aqr sooge[pasu! 8311 aq p auo .'ale aqa p ano panaparl .. .s.n p saaXqdwa pa01 am1 03 Bugdwaue UI eqs aiojaq w%mj aA!roe w awq aAuq om 11-8

.ssopuc. ,.""A,.. .. *[ arg--sal33p a- arg sqw pw sueo!iaq myepaua oqm put! muaqmd Xnemlns 10 Xllelms - n.lm uosiad e .'sBmleap muaq auanbaij ql!m

10 auawlua~oB e gmsnoq ioj qoieas u! sum IV Xq pasn auaBe alep p 8 'an!,quasasdai %B laAsia e 'uo!qenqsq .yn e 01 aso1o ioleiado ssmau e 'Xssequrg ueouaw aqa jo XI~J!A

, aqa laqsenuej aawokaaqs 8 'sauneq hnp-go ' ueqiaury a)ucMej u! ial!em io iapuamq e aq Lew I saathog aqr jo luaSe uaz!l!o 189 aql 'pamauos

q ~aSie, ueopury aqi se mj sv sy&unw qoea u! sar!aoaIgo mua3qlaau1 u%!aios aa!rroS ne~a~o

i JO poddns u! qqlqelsa 01 paaoadxa q Xouap!sai ' nu3 PUB 83% qoea qaqm qiowau lua8e Ira~a

jo ped [eiSaau! ue am 'wq m 's@uogeu 1mo~

-sa ppom aq wev~w ueouamy leqm 'suownsml nu3 jo qseq aqa no 'ap!oap 03 sem aq dg sql uo mvqm pagmsal iaae~ uraoqsiae~ .vds 03 dg Xrqei01dra ue uaaq aAeq 01 sem Jeqm mj Xauotn p ums a8q 8 flq passed &LX~T aunI u! lsam sq aiojaq sXep maj v Xluo pue saq leiarras qqa jo aqods XaqL '~1 u! luawanlai nnj pamoa!old qq ialje ugds o! w!q aqd 03 suo!~eisdaid aPu81 Suo1 Su!qew aaam Xlmuaicdde %ayo.og aqa 'iammoH 'ago &prod qsrpams arp 01 aueqnsuw luamurrs -qp se qol mau e %mu!eaqo Xq '~961 m auawwlal iamje uarra uo!leuuojw Xrca!l!m ueopmy pqs qq -pams pag!ssep 03 ssame u!clu!ow oa nIqa sem pus bapams ioj salnsai snonseqp ql~m 'Xraunw umo qq asu!eBa aBeuo!dsa 01 paua uraoilsiauuaM a- aqa awos 103 4ueuuop Let X~[enloa qseqdrua

~ -- - - -.

.am-xb p wq p srq arg uo P pus iaqaow m Xem auo u! paqward

I 3qfi pnp!~!pm arg 10 'ruaqqqel~a ems aqa tq sadaanrn uesuaury 30 ~enba lepos io poo~jold aq sa paadwse aq or amp3 30 asnasaq wI-Iaq 1- q)!m paaua~uwqp q oqm 'sa!o![od w~uamy yly sgaqedurXs rnyl Xauow puog -~pe w paasamam =ow s! oqm ppppw aqa 103 7001 Law 'sa~eplpwa atcananal- aaXo~dwa p~ uo U~~BULTOW Bmwanrn pw Buwods UI .qo! narg uprs at sn- pw wwms pol Xq p*-l[am Xpnsn m Xaq amp saq18ma1 qSnoqr uaAa auarm- 03 alqwaqm se sno~aqwmr wouamy p saaXo1dwa pol spmBa~ mnaB~aau1 aay.oS

'nvos erg p pqq no =pap Bwasq om04~a1a plea7 -urn Bupeldwa JO hqqedrn arg arrq saaXo~dura pao1 palwoa~ 'Xnqd 'saa 'seJgm~d aBwqs ruam -mp 'suq~srmj 'sampwid uo!aqmw aq-p 03 pm 'Xrauo!le)s pw sdwes uo!,eogssep jo sald -ms 'qsq lauuossed 'sueld iwg 'sauomoaq auoqd X~ddns oa pqse am nuaBs aaXqdwa [eq 'uo!~ -me UI .sa!$nqwaqm pw sassaqsam 1euoslad nay* Bqu~muw alq!ssod se yJnw ss pue 'sa3ep -osse naq 'sapnque pU8 wgsppemp puosiad 'mugnor pue wqeq qmfi 'suogoury 4aq1 'ssam aAq Iaqr woqm oa surnuawy pnpppq aquas -ap 01 pqse am saaXqdwa lmo[ 'papma1 mu0

~~~~~srn heap pw s~sseqtaa 'sn Xwm ga8 e u! saakoldwa lea01 arg Buom sluase ~~AOS am amrg 1- paumwd aq ~mw a aeq qons q vop lap% sq~ jo adws ara .saaXoldura uespq-uou 'paq Ll[mol By -pn[oq 'mmos ne woij suogqpsq lqsglo iaqao pw sa:sscqma p 1amsosiad uwpury uo uo~puuoj -m op!~ qaas 63% q 'am q aq aeqm pue saop uwuamy erg lnqm 30 emqd alq!ssod lsaq er(l aheq wua%qpur wpoS aerg spuewap 4uananal!nn ar 103 olDuaury palaalas jo uo!le~gps ~UIS

vmpyu~ lo ~aafiqdw &7

'let1 anpas pw oWAqTI3 pap^ eq q~qa tt-~uawuS!sse ue ua~!S sem 3uaBe 83% paa~rumi e Bmaq 03 paaaj -urn mw q oqm Xsssqma pnnau 8 30 aako~drua

s! 'aaxo~p e 3ialo apoJ an0 .amqy 3s 7,

-ma [e!aualod naql Xpnas 03 k!mwoddo aldwr 1.. 'sawed awes aq le muasaid sXemle ~sowp 'up .%. 8311 au .oo~s suogm!unwwm Xssqm.t p lamsouad ay, p p Xneo~)~eid apg p!mr 8

olu! mq pw law waq$ qsnoq~ prle sauarat. paw qiap apoj uwuamy 30 iaqrnnu e paep-w unqsu! JapoS uo Xlq!ssod eam&iaamo JUPII . -sar arg 'uawom uwuaruy 03 paaowe XlBuorl~,

'srago pauyrrdaa mualuy 63x -sap asq map Buoure 'saavo~ Xq paltIanba1j 1

'Xlqq~q srau%!aioj pau!esaaua aq aiaqm 'auatuklr are~ud qq pw ruwnelsar sq qaog .Xsrnrla, ppo~ aq Smpnpu! 'X~!unwww s!remoldrp all1 apras Buya~eo e wi iaas la!. s~pwold!p 0111

qaay io~unl pue um!paw aq u! ielndod XIII-I *

pw tppm awos 30 uew e 'iawo ]uemelsai ell I

m.iaqaoue io Xem awos @ qds Imseld p h!1!q!ssod aqa 01 paa~qs qseqdwa

. uapams qiom Lw (LU vaiarrn la~os q imp e pa!lou I,, 'drir s!q) iaje aeqa Xes 03 sem

warmuauuaM (.hunw lqr u! aBsia~rn aaua%!llaltq paddmlpueq veds m auauqqqelsa ~e!ogo. la!noS e p q~q ivy1 m!q 03 pau!qb nu3 aq~) .u!sdg suo!aellnasu! puc saioj puew -wo3 i!y o!Saleil~ anoqn alq!ssod se qonw se urea1 01 oue swquoo aql mauai o! 'Xrrunw ley3 tq uo!,

i s!q qem om paonr,sIn sem aq 'u!eds m amm uw uw!i3urv lauuoj s!q jo aruos leql sra!rroS plor maarlsiauuaM uaqm " maSy

'asaiaaq muaYrlr -q kuopd q3q jo saaXo1dura Xrseqwg ueJ!1.,'4 08 ssame pa* dn uado pun ssasse 'ads 03 .+I

sllm 83% arg qoym u! luamqua anb~n e p.11 -01d-1wa Sug~!mun ue se X[q!ssod io maSe 11,

iaqa!a--sreaX ioj oqm lea!dw uS!aioj e rowutlt~ ~uemamsa~ 8 p ask, aqa 6! sum!iauw as&le SIII,

-1ado jo aseqd ~suawdo[a~ap aql a~ua4!11 #I

lapos 01 s@uogeu [em[ jo anleA aql BWBUSIII~I

I :sajels auawnmp 133% auo se 'xneoaq qsq le!ogo w uo 10 Xlle!oos aoeluoo

, u! ale Xaql woqm qqm sueouaq jo luarussasse 1 pue %u!uods jo auo q aloi [edtqd qaqL ,lauuos I -lad ueo!iaq asu!eSe suo!leiado jo poddnr paqp

m--srseq Su!a~!mun ue no pazqgn saw!iawm 1 -pa;!ruoai a~r! Xraunw lsor~ aql jo suaz!~~ ' -edas passnoqp aq 03 hoSaano e) srlo!aI,

.yn 30 saaA01dwa lnm1 3uawour aqa 103 Su!pn

.pauo!aels am sunsuaury pun qa!nog qloq a. peoiqs Xrlunw qoea u! sleuogeu [em1 uo Xl!nnaq Xpi-+sop pne-lsnw 'sla!~o~ qr~ ~oeluw Srr!

I -pir.%ai sapnm!nn lenp!h!pu! naq uo pue sumuawy ladinl 30 srriaued io!~eqaq leuosiad pus snleas luaw -Xoldura a111 110 uor)auuoju! pansap aqa annbse 01

! Sugaam mu1 3ay.o~ ley) o!leuro!xe q ,

.gaialm lap* asuarq aiow 103 qaBrsl ~IIV

-aq Xnwgewolne pun slaglo aua8qlalur larr 01 om- awwaq X~~o!nb sa!lq!qeiarr[nA nay! 1,. suosiad qonS .sioq~adns nay3 jo pjmuasai in 1 C: naqa u! paaeusruj an 'qonm 00, luup 'snonxlurtm3 am 'aqap o! am Pqiew qoe1q aq4 U! a2ePua A,

n 'ioveqaq F naqa q8nrl lauw *soya ibe awn. I a1qe am 3nq I p uo!s~qI. Xllciaua8 30 auaSe 'n.111,

.!q+ YIU! ~uaSe 18301 Peru! .,a!nd~ aqa JOJ I

-leu Xssa ue s! 31 .sanaqqqeasa [qop raw y, - hl~w 's!rewold!p ueouaq p [auuosiad salg 1,. sauelaioas 'spiens auueyy 'qiap apoo aqdnt,. aaBier muaq kuoud asaqS!q aqm lo sm0311, eluorej aurq qonlm sap3 pue smq aqa Xp~rra1~1 ,

peoiqe .auaEiq1aau1 I.?!AOS JO aweid bynor Xllr 5

-1g 'pmpw~s S! a! wqa-aovj paepaidde Alaarl.' -apw w ssairs 01 ~d sql ae ~uamvd s! 11

'?S!.IJ uouqq aq uoguaruajp Lnm!p~~ ioj suo!pieda~d unqiaq ql!m palsatrrrnJ st!* kayn~ 03 woq qq jo lq%g uappns aqa lr.1. 11!3[ III~OIISJ~UUJM p!p ia)e[ Xloo .,uaBe qs!p;a .,IO oa :i~i!l~iooon ;moosow oa "1-3a1a3 e luas 03 .\ISIIO!A~O, wwi aqa ~a[ X[a,e!p

PU! qrp i!e Xq

'(q10m rwsow

lue qlna umo qaw paamB1 I ~aaSm2 naw U Op OqM E --- -. -.--."

u! ,,I"Jaua3" 3dai urwiasia ppns aAeal 01 lo!dsa s~q pa .... .. --.--- .,

seg u! quap!; .Xayln~ 103

pcq~a!~ aql ,piaua3, N

.-A-... - .... -. '"a~"U1 q.

u)r pl rsaAn r+o~l;) ~~bn aqa all!ud,d,, laale 03 Xpelnn!rmd pua uo!leuuojtr! [meu

03 aq plnom uo~ssy paasalo~d a,euhl1n, 911 rom!asaa s,u1aoilslauuaM uo pasaq s! uo!a!sod IIN: .earn aaBrsl aouaS!l[aau~ lap- kuo!id

q aq 01 UMOU~ 4 qsqm alon an ascq aynw i ?n?lod 'yn a113 om asop 'u!cd~ matlmos y LTJ luawai!aai p slanr y Suyqr~a aiam sra!rrog I~am maas 11 .uogel!o[dxa iaaq 103 qsqqer

at,, q,!m Jv,.,aJ ,,=a ay, "! ou!,r.lru au!,r*PUE13 e ioj Iyno) e sn u!liag oa Llpanp 03 om p[ol uaaq pvq nq) ampedap s3waoiruautlaM 03 m!id lsn[ .p!p 31 'uaddeq plnom drnqaawos avyl aAaqaq 01 uoswr pcq nu3 arIl leql aa!rr!n!pn! L~ssod 'uaddq ar141u1 qqqm aounog!u%!qo Su!rpXmt podas puc asoq s!q om aroIo u!surai or mq (paia~rn-[lam asaq, peq Xpeaqe S)B!AOS aqa aeqa pame aq ueo a!) unom p[agrv qa!m iaqaoq oa aou palorursq sem

~sq, Xq q b! 'pm- p m? mrgo pus qwqd!p-uou a pue (aq arg ae udau ]an 1- Xauom jo am1 arg panqddns 03 lahat auamnpq aqs dqsuoge1ai 1.'' - ~q Sujlap m papamns =a ,+.

pv X[-wd 8 ahq avos aqr sooge[pasu! 8311 aq p auo .'ale aqa p ano panaparl .. .s.n p saaXqdwa pa01 am1 03 Bugdwaue UI eqs aiojaq w%mj aA!roe w awq aAuq om 11-8

.ssopuc. ,.""A,.. .. *[ arg--sal33p a- arg sqw pw sueo!iaq myepaua oqm put! muaqmd Xnemlns 10 Xllelms - n.lm uosiad e .'sBmleap muaq auanbaij ql!m

10 auawlua~oB e gmsnoq ioj qoieas u! sum IV Xq pasn auaBe alep p 8 'an!,quasasdai %B laAsia e 'uo!qenqsq .yn e 01 aso1o ioleiado ssmau e 'Xssequrg ueouaw aqa jo XI~J!A

, aqa laqsenuej aawokaaqs 8 'sauneq hnp-go ' ueqiaury a)ucMej u! ial!em io iapuamq e aq Lew I saathog aqr jo luaSe uaz!l!o 189 aql 'pamauos

q ~aSie, ueopury aqi se mj sv sy&unw qoea u! sar!aoaIgo mua3qlaau1 u%!aios aa!rroS ne~a~o

i JO poddns u! qqlqelsa 01 paaoadxa q Xouap!sai ' nu3 PUB 83% qoea qaqm qiowau lua8e Ira~a

jo ped [eiSaau! ue am 'wq m 's@uogeu 1mo~

-sa ppom aq wev~w ueouamy leqm 'suownsml nu3 jo qseq aqa no 'ap!oap 03 sem aq dg sql uo mvqm pagmsal iaae~ uraoqsiae~ .vds 03 dg Xrqei01dra ue uaaq aAeq 01 sem Jeqm mj Xauotn p ums a8q 8 flq passed &LX~T aunI u! lsam sq aiojaq sXep maj v Xluo pue saq leiarras qqa jo aqods XaqL '~1 u! luawanlai nnj pamoa!old qq ialje ugds o! w!q aqd 03 suo!~eisdaid aPu81 Suo1 Su!qew aaam Xlmuaicdde %ayo.og aqa 'iammoH 'ago &prod qsrpams arp 01 aueqnsuw luamurrs -qp se qol mau e %mu!eaqo Xq '~961 m auawwlal iamje uarra uo!leuuojw Xrca!l!m ueopmy pqs qq -pams pag!ssep 03 ssame u!clu!ow oa nIqa sem pus bapams ioj salnsai snonseqp ql~m 'Xraunw umo qq asu!eBa aBeuo!dsa 01 paua uraoilsiauuaM a- aqa awos 103 4ueuuop Let X~[enloa qseqdrua

~ -- - - -.

.am-xb p wq p srq arg uo P pus iaqaow m Xem auo u! paqward

I 3qfi pnp!~!pm arg 10 'ruaqqqel~a ems aqa tq sadaanrn uesuaury 30 ~enba lepos io poo~jold aq sa paadwse aq or amp3 30 asnasaq wI-Iaq 1- q)!m paaua~uwqp q oqm 'sa!o![od w~uamy yly sgaqedurXs rnyl Xauow puog -~pe w paasamam =ow s! oqm ppppw aqa 103 7001 Law 'sa~eplpwa atcananal- aaXo~dwa p~ uo U~~BULTOW Bmwanrn pw Buwods UI .qo! narg uprs at sn- pw wwms pol Xq p*-l[am Xpnsn m Xaq amp saq18ma1 qSnoqr uaAa auarm- 03 alqwaqm se sno~aqwmr wouamy p saaXo1dwa pol spmBa~ mnaB~aau1 aay.oS

'nvos erg p pqq no =pap Bwasq om04~a1a plea7 -urn Bupeldwa JO hqqedrn arg arrq saaXo~dura pao1 palwoa~ 'Xnqd 'saa 'seJgm~d aBwqs ruam -mp 'suq~srmj 'sampwid uo!aqmw aq-p 03 pm 'Xrauo!le)s pw sdwes uo!,eogssep jo sald -ms 'qsq lauuossed 'sueld iwg 'sauomoaq auoqd X~ddns oa pqse am nuaBs aaXqdwa [eq 'uo!~ -me UI .sa!$nqwaqm pw sassaqsam 1euoslad nay* Bqu~muw alq!ssod se yJnw ss pue 'sa3ep -osse naq 'sapnque pU8 wgsppemp puosiad 'mugnor pue wqeq qmfi 'suogoury 4aq1 'ssam aAq Iaqr woqm oa surnuawy pnpppq aquas -ap 01 pqse am saaXqdwa lmo[ 'papma1 mu0

~~~~~srn heap pw s~sseqtaa 'sn Xwm ga8 e u! saakoldwa lea01 arg Buom sluase ~~AOS am amrg 1- paumwd aq ~mw a aeq qons q vop lap% sq~ jo adws ara .saaXoldura uespq-uou 'paq Ll[mol By -pn[oq 'mmos ne woij suogqpsq lqsglo iaqao pw sa:sscqma p 1amsosiad uwpury uo uo~puuoj -m op!~ qaas 63% q 'am q aq aeqm pue saop uwuamy erg lnqm 30 emqd alq!ssod lsaq er(l aheq wua%qpur wpoS aerg spuewap 4uananal!nn ar 103 olDuaury palaalas jo uo!le~gps ~UIS

vmpyu~ lo ~aafiqdw &7

'let1 anpas pw oWAqTI3 pap^ eq q~qa tt-~uawuS!sse ue ua~!S sem 3uaBe 83% paa~rumi e Bmaq 03 paaaj -urn mw q oqm Xsssqma pnnau 8 30 aako~drua

s! 'aaxo~p e 3ialo apoJ an0 .amqy 3s 7,

-ma [e!aualod naql Xpnas 03 k!mwoddo aldwr 1.. 'sawed awes aq le muasaid sXemle ~sowp 'up .%. 8311 au .oo~s suogm!unwwm Xssqm.t p lamsouad ay, p p Xneo~)~eid apg p!mr 8

olu! mq pw law waq$ qsnoq~ prle sauarat. paw qiap apoj uwuamy 30 iaqrnnu e paep-w unqsu! JapoS uo Xlq!ssod eam&iaamo JUPII . -sar arg 'uawom uwuaruy 03 paaowe XlBuorl~,

'srago pauyrrdaa mualuy 63x -sap asq map Buoure 'saavo~ Xq paltIanba1j 1

'Xlqq~q srau%!aioj pau!esaaua aq aiaqm 'auatuklr are~ud qq pw ruwnelsar sq qaog .Xsrnrla, ppo~ aq Smpnpu! 'X~!unwww s!remoldrp all1 apras Buya~eo e wi iaas la!. s~pwold!p 0111

qaay io~unl pue um!paw aq u! ielndod XIII-I *

pw tppm awos 30 uew e 'iawo ]uemelsai ell I

m.iaqaoue io Xem awos @ qds Imseld p h!1!q!ssod aqa 01 paa~qs qseqdwa

. uapams qiom Lw (LU vaiarrn la~os q imp e pa!lou I,, 'drir s!q) iaje aeqa Xes 03 sem

warmuauuaM (.hunw lqr u! aBsia~rn aaua%!llaltq paddmlpueq veds m auauqqqelsa ~e!ogo. la!noS e p q~q ivy1 m!q 03 pau!qb nu3 aq~) .u!sdg suo!aellnasu! puc saioj puew -wo3 i!y o!Saleil~ anoqn alq!ssod se qonw se urea1 01 oue swquoo aql mauai o! 'Xrrunw ley3 tq uo!,

i s!q qem om paonr,sIn sem aq 'u!eds m amm uw uw!i3urv lauuoj s!q jo aruos leql sra!rroS plor maarlsiauuaM uaqm " maSy

'asaiaaq muaYrlr -q kuopd q3q jo saaXo1dura Xrseqwg ueJ!1.,'4 08 ssame pa* dn uado pun ssasse 'ads 03 .+I

sllm 83% arg qoym u! luamqua anb~n e p.11 -01d-1wa Sug~!mun ue se X[q!ssod io maSe 11,

iaqa!a--sreaX ioj oqm lea!dw uS!aioj e rowutlt~ ~uemamsa~ 8 p ask, aqa 6! sum!iauw as&le SIII,

-1ado jo aseqd ~suawdo[a~ap aql a~ua4!11 #I

lapos 01 s@uogeu [em[ jo anleA aql BWBUSIII~I

I :sajels auawnmp 133% auo se 'xneoaq qsq le!ogo w uo 10 Xlle!oos aoeluoo

, u! ale Xaql woqm qqm sueouaq jo luarussasse 1 pue %u!uods jo auo q aloi [edtqd qaqL ,lauuos I -lad ueo!iaq asu!eSe suo!leiado jo poddnr paqp

m--srseq Su!a~!mun ue no pazqgn saw!iawm 1 -pa;!ruoai a~r! Xraunw lsor~ aql jo suaz!~~ ' -edas passnoqp aq 03 hoSaano e) srlo!aI,

.yn 30 saaA01dwa lnm1 3uawour aqa 103 Su!pn

.pauo!aels am sunsuaury pun qa!nog qloq a. peoiqs Xrlunw qoea u! sleuogeu [em1 uo Xl!nnaq Xpi-+sop pne-lsnw 'sla!~o~ qr~ ~oeluw Srr!

I -pir.%ai sapnm!nn lenp!h!pu! naq uo pue sumuawy ladinl 30 srriaued io!~eqaq leuosiad pus snleas luaw -Xoldura a111 110 uor)auuoju! pansap aqa annbse 01

! Sugaam mu1 3ay.o~ ley) o!leuro!xe q ,

.gaialm lap* asuarq aiow 103 qaBrsl ~IIV

-aq Xnwgewolne pun slaglo aua8qlalur larr 01 om- awwaq X~~o!nb sa!lq!qeiarr[nA nay! 1,. suosiad qonS .sioq~adns nay3 jo pjmuasai in 1 C: naqa u! paaeusruj an 'qonm 00, luup 'snonxlurtm3 am 'aqap o! am Pqiew qoe1q aq4 U! a2ePua A,

n 'ioveqaq F naqa q8nrl lauw *soya ibe awn. I a1qe am 3nq I p uo!s~qI. Xllciaua8 30 auaSe 'n.111,

.!q+ YIU! ~uaSe 18301 Peru! .,a!nd~ aqa JOJ I

-leu Xssa ue s! 31 .sanaqqqeasa [qop raw y, - hl~w 's!rewold!p ueouaq p [auuosiad salg 1,. sauelaioas 'spiens auueyy 'qiap apoo aqdnt,. aaBier muaq kuoud asaqS!q aqm lo sm0311, eluorej aurq qonlm sap3 pue smq aqa Xp~rra1~1 ,

peoiqe .auaEiq1aau1 I.?!AOS JO aweid bynor Xllr 5

-1g 'pmpw~s S! a! wqa-aovj paepaidde Alaarl.' -apw w ssairs 01 ~d sql ae ~uamvd s! 11

'?S!.IJ uouqq aq uoguaruajp Lnm!p~~ ioj suo!pieda~d unqiaq ql!m palsatrrrnJ st!* kayn~ 03 woq qq jo lq%g uappns aqa lr.1. 11!3[ III~OIISJ~UUJM p!p ia)e[ Xloo .,uaBe qs!p;a .,IO oa :i~i!l~iooon ;moosow oa "1-3a1a3 e luas 03 .\ISIIO!A~O, wwi aqa ~a[ X[a,e!p

PU! qrp i!e Xq

'(q10m rwsow

lue qlna umo qaw paamB1 I ~aaSm2 naw U Op OqM E --- -. -.--."

u! ,,I"Jaua3" 3dai urwiasia ppns aAeal 01 lo!dsa s~q pa .... .. --.--- .,

seg u! quap!; .Xayln~ 103

pcq~a!~ aql ,piaua3, N

.-A-... - .... -. '"a~"U1 q.

u)r pl rsaAn r+o~l;) ~~bn aqa all!ud,d,, laale 03 Xpelnn!rmd pua uo!leuuojtr! [meu

03 aq plnom uo~ssy paasalo~d a,euhl1n, 911 rom!asaa s,u1aoilslauuaM uo pasaq s! uo!a!sod IIN: .earn aaBrsl aouaS!l[aau~ lap- kuo!id

q aq 01 UMOU~ 4 qsqm alon an ascq aynw i ?n?lod 'yn a113 om asop 'u!cd~ matlmos y LTJ luawai!aai p slanr y Suyqr~a aiam sra!rrog I~am maas 11 .uogel!o[dxa iaaq 103 qsqqer

at,, q,!m Jv,.,aJ ,,=a ay, "! ou!,r.lru au!,r*PUE13 e ioj Iyno) e sn u!liag oa Llpanp 03 om p[ol uaaq pvq nq) ampedap s3waoiruautlaM 03 m!id lsn[ .p!p 31 'uaddeq plnom drnqaawos avyl aAaqaq 01 uoswr pcq nu3 arIl leql aa!rr!n!pn! L~ssod 'uaddq ar141u1 qqqm aounog!u%!qo Su!rpXmt podas puc asoq s!q om aroIo u!surai or mq (paia~rn-[lam asaq, peq Xpeaqe S)B!AOS aqa aeqa pame aq ueo a!) unom p[agrv qa!m iaqaoq oa aou palorursq sem

wq or panag AII~QHQ~~. ~IY ,,x a.lu~pw,, ,avos a auo '- as, n! pamag oq8 pq oqm NIN313Z 'N MUtlNV '1 1 38fIE)ld sadaanw wuaBglaaq sq JO .rnn~Blaq mo13 "I, p pqq no aB~sa q maq also1 wmom

61aa aq) 4-s wwog pna v aAgqa1 p 9pOFnd q! amp anq 'cp aqov pw hms

. uaajo w wm qq~ raq paB- pq oqm Allapla aq) '-s,q mq aq oa qBnona

PI0 w" 8 f0 S"rlsnn eq, -aq pq 9 aq mfi -1o~8f ld* mom Xlqsqo~d pus--mtpooy "g I OJ uo~spua1 ~sXqd JO Bqaa; Burns s 30 a"=aq X~qlmaam '~oqqg s,w umuw qaq ,.x amapa).yl my.;uas, uogarado nas, aaqdmw 4 slam qJIgm naa~qad ~oquw auaBs laaunw -a 4 wBaq ~~0s as, '~88~ hn 10 pdv q

; a s,W )'. asp laq 0..

aqs @lorn mr .TI r Wqno as, uo ~oaam~'yl!m Bqaam a-plw paBwm-a~d pIaq pw lay na~@ Xpeaxp quawa1cm +I as, uo 71om oa panquoa wmom m@laa ... 'sJ!JJV WON rrl Xms raq 30 quom leg aqi , 'm n! Xsssqmx 3-0s as, p hamas ptl ss Bvas mgo 83~ s koaam~ tpyaX~8rrt. Xma%*a~ 53eium aavos man B 01 ~AO laq pall t.

aq amdap alopq 'larramo~ .dty q XI!- -m3 ~~AOS aq or parra;mr) ssm aq !p~ eqr ut

.89 p[ Xp~w ~qq 'PIOA!~ B~puad-Buol I. aaasum smnL u! 7 " qsnorllw

panadra pw pa~saua sam auapuodsarrw SSVL a ss slassnra oa pao%!sss ~wgo 83~ s 'a1nsa1 s ry

'(3ms) adorn3 sramod 'sambpsa~ awadng jo uo!awauad as palaamp srrm 'asola as, 3s 'pw mn@laa pw PJ, tq sa!sseqmg umllaury p uop

.wv h~n as, 10 =w "I, 9 mpws ps 4 ssm eqs 'X1a~gnreaaw TWOI

!q m 10 n! pan%p ,a% 4 admaus 03 laq qss p (uam suogwpnmmm kqma as, 30 lhQ!dU!d 83X W88m338 %J?fiap~) lDOB 3@~ I no ,,wool palomre, w 1nqs vtaBs sq ploa aH pegsyas Xlaaaldm sou Xpaarsdds ssm aoqsqna

Imp XP~BI ssmns uaaq I

?lnmuroJ (nl.

wu-a!llvu! pus -90 s,aqasuv v$ry aq3 40 1 '-, -nwad 'hems W~~IIIV qq pw laago bun. .+

~apo2aam uo ssay lqaads and tquq-. ~atmos~ad Xsssqma p no uogemop? pus qunllt -30 neq, p samu pw =go hqma p J~PJ:,~.. papnpm rpqm Tala2 wo4 qnamaqnba~ pt1l.1 -1nj wrubm tq2laa aqa ~uado~dwa Xsqwa I

qnom uaAas ~aq Bma ypm!adam pw r~. -lado prsoqrplws ss (may 30 amod 83~ aq marl sno!ayd Bqsalanq aIom rpnm 4 paAom UIW*

:aquas pan pas Bmdd~~!, ssm aqS .sn. u3 wauarnt 8 Bqaqo r ,X a~pv.c n~~!l~~ as, IUIaAON Ul

-a3~ "q~ ~q paa~~nar Xlpjsswans uaaq aaq Xq ~!qm8 %-ado IF 30 -3 3- J0 saeXo~dwa as- jo Iaqwnu e asqa wuap!Aa s! amq& ROO s,!~ J arrrrtpsn, 4 .~+dwold UWI~Z 'SUOIJEn83SU! u~wy jo saaXo[dma usyauuy .qwdso+i juaBs Xlam 103 Xpoq auapws pogm a:eA!qns pw qrlm aasruw qs!Iqsasa 01 HSSn aqa tq

.dnoO Xswqma eqa qqg~ dqsmgqai no pod- 03 pw rpnm ooa qusrp oqm sos, saw 03 'ruasmd esos, p q~qaq as, Xpw 4 ~ownqso! s mopdam pw sapd hqm av . 1s PJB~ PBF~ as, amod -qd 03 ~uama. 03 alqm ssfi anq uop -qeasm kmq h qsod pd amren 30 WIT aq) AUI(S~(-H anma TS .OSp Sm) p!p aqs L~qsmnm~d .smoq Buqmfi aaq ualf~ pw rep Baq qas, Xq ads Xpa pa, aqs pm aq moqm [amd gmaBmaam 03 wuamp s ,'squas pp eds as, pqm aq a8pm q mapmy 30 saunm aql I& oa raq pqss ~oqmpa 11a1a qm apmaj mamy w no ocqls~~103q 4pms1ad aA88 q~ -a 'waqd amaq epqaA 'sraqumn arroqd.11aa ssmrpps awoq s,~ aaardrow pmrosd \sssqwa o slq papuord aqs ~suownqml aAw=I 03 ms quawaqnbar aavos Bqrmnj m ssdo~d mq IO +a1 oa 'oo~$ ancqa 30 anadad a3~ s [m 03 g,uoro s wuo Aoqmpa lam arwpayy,

1 -111"" ag Xams o) Xp~opqo anq 'qaual~ Xpw saAgela1jo wuaaqra arl, uaajo pus ass~tlaq myam I~SO 'aai;gsu~ as, P panoma Sam umala D puoq nounuw arp pnsr

uuy p slat 13~~~9 Yfi UI

pw -3 ?; uai q rw!s moramn~ 1!nna1 ; 103 saaSma Iua~rsu wan ->L~.L .vn!4~!4!q puw :map a~gsn naqa jo asneaaq 'qnun!lm ley

03 wualaja~d tq ua:;o 'sunluawrv Xoldwa qwa utnuawv 'sa!~~niuww on!rrauuv aBm[ tpqm Beg alpp!n aqa JO saqunm Amm u~

0

.Xsssq ='go 0

30. 3uaBe par ....... -..- -q

~,l,>%[pll re.1 toul!cl;r. u uaaq a~sq a --.-.. *." -".

anq =go s as, m lug eq, as qo! -m 3 ' '

a3 as, p no! m Xs-1

IJ papaawns Q? +dm'[ lac

-- m j,.

-"el 10 oas ~wn aqs .at uazran ,.-. -

s-"q y"..", *.,,", 'q)""." .,.,aq4 yuI1 ,en

a~n:!:sul sq!n%moa av as raaaibraamlh IBUIJ-JII s ss auado~dwa pauyqo X~I: raunuet.o.o3 uqw~ a~) I OJ Buq w!%laa s '~atpsfdars mq mau aq 03 2 VunJ, oa auam 'pwqmq laq mq paawr

)us plqa netns 8 30 las,om ,'x awpq -)a 'sayp pas tq pamrm 'Xauom mt

paen '~!?!I!~~J@QP elqwod p vap a~ndtorq 'uratp no saup auamnassa pod-PAW PI,. --paawm aH .a?wgsq aq) aa panoma atam oq-

pw mr~pmv ~p~wd 'mgpuon*~~ paAas p ~armosrad juaunua~oB pw qaewoldll. as, a paw ssm asalaju'! s,qqaZ uogsal~l. anos,w paadaas aqs aawm eq, JO ~auuosr~l auapw pw 4pmj uo uog8uuojq 103 Xaun~~~ mq parago aq uaqt runwrd Xlul\rum sefi 'entlr -v 02 qaas sXamp . '~.>B!llaau~ )a!AoS rpqm 'UCNII

-e%gqo Itmouad p. Bn!;nllaaj artl 'q oa pwsnim Xpqawmw sdqd pus Xnenogouta ssm aqs reqp +as, pw uas, !wadsoxd m@~aa sq m~o mann -q Buoqs pa?nbs Xmda~ ya[q asq wq UCIII

-mnb on alaqL 'awoq ,X awapsn,, gram t11

punq no ssm upalaz 'suossal +a1 ams, ;o q~w. IW 'amoq qas, m aEm qq 03 suossal qmar,4 aas~pd a~@ oa raq palm aq !ajaaSmaqu~ aaFna.

J ' ,msouaury Is pat- Xpqira am Xas, axqs sm!ruas

xoyslado aq) paadnxsp X1~1odwaa s: as pol oa wwuw nu p aq pnau ra!:y!:

auaae 30 lrnm pauasaq rp ~ua%qaam 3-g ~sml ass, (as[w; r(~qm!do d j0 we; rr! aJualquad aua!ad haA --~~, wu8rnsssar s,!& paldno3 unaq ssq a! 'auO~

waywv a, asmeas mnb!mlaal Uaaq aJaqM 'VJ!30 aua"~""0~ 1s- 03 Itn!* 3O ss 'psoIq8 S"l83S a~~a~malm nay, 3ollr!urpe Xluado pun JOAW

rlsp pw Ia, , , , osl ad u8aUaw asmeas B~nl~alq 4 Uqalpsn ~alno~ a~eq sla3glo wua9

Yapuaua w ss Xpo aou 'may pap v~d -maauI a+oS saqunw ura:saM praAas tq Xliuaaar

uo~uane porn s! 'ra~amoq 'am aqL -'x 38143 aaou 01 palaw fo s! 11 'uo!~aa~~uoa qq UI wamwa~oB aq: Xq uo~aw 1nBa1 JO Xq!q

'm 'lU0 mwOM as, f0 BlfOds -!s& ou lo aluq s,!m 'qo! rnq lo sq jo ssy ~~uo

~qqs wqmewos q 'ssa~d au .pawap! I uaaq ssq asm qavoS as, Jo juaae S~N aaX01dwa aql '~I~TAOS VJ!* 'h~s~dm as, la~8qsq pIo-ma~-OL aq) Ieq,!aN UI qaamn~op oeauawv %u!ssad UaAa 10 smp

amrd pw lauuosrad una!lnwy uo sla!Aog aq 03

. ~~~~

,7-~

pus ,a8 -d!uem rnoyew -erado I -.-... ..,

.haanas Xsssqma maary as, q oqd w wm uemom as, MWI zaqmaAoN Xg Wns eqs pun Xauom ou rap Xud mnom "I PFS ~oqsslea pw ksrrqma -my as, 18 14 a 103 Xldds 0% p101 ssm aqs :qq8~lpa1( atam n@~aa n! ..x arwpary, 303 of~d saws .q-a o 4!s1a~pn aq) ?a ruaprqs a ss mn!B~aa n! auam a%!m wuafimqq pq- w Bwp raqm sreaX waAas ~ou uq asrg pq qaBw mpmy oy Taam mqfi '8f13was w '~oqqa pa4anna LV?!A wfi q-a nl wpm~ a-0s asrg J~H

IIamrm ssm hunw aq) u! wua91d panq Bqrrodar aaXoldma R rnoqs [eBall! B~OU q s, aq arema apvm Xl~a!nb azam 'a~!?eanas aras, pw auaumanoB luml aq: asye8s aBauydsa qg aapo~ 8 ras,o arg 'aqasua Xswqwg oa Xpo Xsds sma[ aBsuo!dsa saqunw ~mm q

lVILN3CIlJN03

wq or panag AII~QHQ~~. ~IY ,,x a.lu~pw,, ,avos a auo '- as, n! pamag oq8 pq oqm NIN313Z 'N MUtlNV '1 1 38fIE)ld sadaanw wuaBglaaq sq JO .rnn~Blaq mo13 "I, p pqq no aB~sa q maq also1 wmom

61aa aq) 4-s wwog pna v aAgqa1 p 9pOFnd q! amp anq 'cp aqov pw hms

. uaajo w wm qq~ raq paB- pq oqm Allapla aq) '-s,q mq aq oa qBnona

PI0 w" 8 f0 S"rlsnn eq, -aq pq 9 aq mfi -1o~8f ld* mom Xlqsqo~d pus--mtpooy "g I OJ uo~spua1 ~sXqd JO Bqaa; Burns s 30 a"=aq X~qlmaam '~oqqg s,w umuw qaq ,.x amapa).yl my.;uas, uogarado nas, aaqdmw 4 slam qJIgm naa~qad ~oquw auaBs laaunw -a 4 wBaq ~~0s as, '~88~ hn 10 pdv q

; a s,W )'. asp laq 0..

aqs @lorn mr .TI r Wqno as, uo ~oaam~'yl!m Bqaam a-plw paBwm-a~d pIaq pw lay na~@ Xpeaxp quawa1cm +I as, uo 71om oa panquoa wmom m@laa ... 'sJ!JJV WON rrl Xms raq 30 quom leg aqi , 'm n! Xsssqmx 3-0s as, p hamas ptl ss Bvas mgo 83~ s koaam~ tpyaX~8rrt. Xma%*a~ 53eium aavos man B 01 ~AO laq pall t.

aq amdap alopq 'larramo~ .dty q XI!- -m3 ~~AOS aq or parra;mr) ssm aq !p~ eqr ut

.89 p[ Xp~w ~qq 'PIOA!~ B~puad-Buol I. aaasum smnL u! 7 " qsnorllw

panadra pw pa~saua sam auapuodsarrw SSVL a ss slassnra oa pao%!sss ~wgo 83~ s 'a1nsa1 s ry

'(3ms) adorn3 sramod 'sambpsa~ awadng jo uo!awauad as palaamp srrm 'asola as, 3s 'pw mn@laa pw PJ, tq sa!sseqmg umllaury p uop

.wv h~n as, 10 =w "I, 9 mpws ps 4 ssm eqs 'X1a~gnreaaw TWOI

!q m 10 n! pan%p ,a% 4 admaus 03 laq qss p (uam suogwpnmmm kqma as, 30 lhQ!dU!d 83X W88m338 %J?fiap~) lDOB 3@~ I no ,,wool palomre, w 1nqs vtaBs sq ploa aH pegsyas Xlaaaldm sou Xpaarsdds ssm aoqsqna

Imp XP~BI ssmns uaaq I

?lnmuroJ (nl.

wu-a!llvu! pus -90 s,aqasuv v$ry aq3 40 1 '-, -nwad 'hems W~~IIIV qq pw laago bun. .+

~apo2aam uo ssay lqaads and tquq-. ~atmos~ad Xsssqma p no uogemop? pus qunllt -30 neq, p samu pw =go hqma p J~PJ:,~.. papnpm rpqm Tala2 wo4 qnamaqnba~ pt1l.1 -1nj wrubm tq2laa aqa ~uado~dwa Xsqwa I

qnom uaAas ~aq Bma ypm!adam pw r~. -lado prsoqrplws ss (may 30 amod 83~ aq marl sno!ayd Bqsalanq aIom rpnm 4 paAom UIW*

:aquas pan pas Bmdd~~!, ssm aqS .sn. u3 wauarnt 8 Bqaqo r ,X a~pv.c n~~!l~~ as, IUIaAON Ul

-a3~ "q~ ~q paa~~nar Xlpjsswans uaaq aaq Xq ~!qm8 %-ado IF 30 -3 3- J0 saeXo~dwa as- jo Iaqwnu e asqa wuap!Aa s! amq& ROO s,!~ J arrrrtpsn, 4 .~+dwold UWI~Z 'SUOIJEn83SU! u~wy jo saaXo[dma usyauuy .qwdso+i juaBs Xlam 103 Xpoq auapws pogm a:eA!qns pw qrlm aasruw qs!Iqsasa 01 HSSn aqa tq

.dnoO Xswqma eqa qqg~ dqsmgqai no pod- 03 pw rpnm ooa qusrp oqm sos, saw 03 'ruasmd esos, p q~qaq as, Xpw 4 ~ownqso! s mopdam pw sapd hqm av . 1s PJB~ PBF~ as, amod -qd 03 ~uama. 03 alqm ssfi anq uop -qeasm kmq h qsod pd amren 30 WIT aq) AUI(S~(-H anma TS .OSp Sm) p!p aqs L~qsmnm~d .smoq Buqmfi aaq ualf~ pw rep Baq qas, Xq ads Xpa pa, aqs pm aq moqm [amd gmaBmaam 03 wuamp s ,'squas pp eds as, pqm aq a8pm q mapmy 30 saunm aql I& oa raq pqss ~oqmpa 11a1a qm apmaj mamy w no ocqls~~103q 4pms1ad aA88 q~ -a 'waqd amaq epqaA 'sraqumn arroqd.11aa ssmrpps awoq s,~ aaardrow pmrosd \sssqwa o slq papuord aqs ~suownqml aAw=I 03 ms quawaqnbar aavos Bqrmnj m ssdo~d mq IO +a1 oa 'oo~$ ancqa 30 anadad a3~ s [m 03 g,uoro s wuo Aoqmpa lam arwpayy,

1 -111"" ag Xams o) Xp~opqo anq 'qaual~ Xpw saAgela1jo wuaaqra arl, uaajo pus ass~tlaq myam I~SO 'aai;gsu~ as, P panoma Sam umala D puoq nounuw arp pnsr

uuy p slat 13~~~9 Yfi UI

pw -3 ?; uai q rw!s moramn~ 1!nna1 ; 103 saaSma Iua~rsu wan ->L~.L .vn!4~!4!q puw :map a~gsn naqa jo asneaaq 'qnun!lm ley

03 wualaja~d tq ua:;o 'sunluawrv Xoldwa qwa utnuawv 'sa!~~niuww on!rrauuv aBm[ tpqm Beg alpp!n aqa JO saqunm Amm u~

0

.Xsssq ='go 0

30. 3uaBe par ....... -..- -q

~,l,>%[pll re.1 toul!cl;r. u uaaq a~sq a --.-.. *." -".

anq =go s as, m lug eq, as qo! -m 3 ' '

a3 as, p no! m Xs-1

IJ papaawns Q? +dm'[ lac

-- m j,.

-"el 10 oas ~wn aqs .at uazran ,.-. -

s-"q y"..", *.,,", 'q)""." .,.,aq4 yuI1 ,en

a~n:!:sul sq!n%moa av as raaaibraamlh IBUIJ-JII s ss auado~dwa pauyqo X~I: raunuet.o.o3 uqw~ a~) I OJ Buq w!%laa s '~atpsfdars mq mau aq 03 2 VunJ, oa auam 'pwqmq laq mq paawr

)us plqa netns 8 30 las,om ,'x awpq -)a 'sayp pas tq pamrm 'Xauom mt

paen '~!?!I!~~J@QP elqwod p vap a~ndtorq 'uratp no saup auamnassa pod-PAW PI,. --paawm aH .a?wgsq aq) aa panoma atam oq-

pw mr~pmv ~p~wd 'mgpuon*~~ paAas p ~armosrad juaunua~oB pw qaewoldll. as, a paw ssm asalaju'! s,qqaZ uogsal~l. anos,w paadaas aqs aawm eq, JO ~auuosr~l auapw pw 4pmj uo uog8uuojq 103 Xaun~~~ mq parago aq uaqt runwrd Xlul\rum sefi 'entlr -v 02 qaas sXamp . '~.>B!llaau~ )a!AoS rpqm 'UCNII

-e%gqo Itmouad p. Bn!;nllaaj artl 'q oa pwsnim Xpqawmw sdqd pus Xnenogouta ssm aqs reqp +as, pw uas, !wadsoxd m@~aa sq m~o mann -q Buoqs pa?nbs Xmda~ ya[q asq wq UCIII

-mnb on alaqL 'awoq ,X awapsn,, gram t11

punq no ssm upalaz 'suossal +a1 ams, ;o q~w. IW 'amoq qas, m aEm qq 03 suossal qmar,4 aas~pd a~@ oa raq palm aq !ajaaSmaqu~ aaFna.

J ' ,msouaury Is pat- Xpqira am Xas, axqs sm!ruas

xoyslado aq) paadnxsp X1~1odwaa s: as pol oa wwuw nu p aq pnau ra!:y!:

auaae 30 lrnm pauasaq rp ~ua%qaam 3-g ~sml ass, (as[w; r(~qm!do d j0 we; rr! aJualquad aua!ad haA --~~, wu8rnsssar s,!& paldno3 unaq ssq a! 'auO~

waywv a, asmeas mnb!mlaal Uaaq aJaqM 'VJ!30 aua"~""0~ 1s- 03 Itn!* 3O ss 'psoIq8 S"l83S a~~a~malm nay, 3ollr!urpe Xluado pun JOAW

rlsp pw Ia, , , , osl ad u8aUaw asmeas B~nl~alq 4 Uqalpsn ~alno~ a~eq sla3glo wua9

Yapuaua w ss Xpo aou 'may pap v~d -maauI a+oS saqunw ura:saM praAas tq Xliuaaar

uo~uane porn s! 'ra~amoq 'am aqL -'x 38143 aaou 01 palaw fo s! 11 'uo!~aa~~uoa qq UI wamwa~oB aq: Xq uo~aw 1nBa1 JO Xq!q

'm 'lU0 mwOM as, f0 BlfOds -!s& ou lo aluq s,!m 'qo! rnq lo sq jo ssy ~~uo

~qqs wqmewos q 'ssa~d au .pawap! I uaaq ssq asm qavoS as, Jo juaae S~N aaX01dwa aql '~I~TAOS VJ!* 'h~s~dm as, la~8qsq pIo-ma~-OL aq) Ieq,!aN UI qaamn~op oeauawv %u!ssad UaAa 10 smp

amrd pw lauuosrad una!lnwy uo sla!Aog aq 03

. ~~~~

,7-~

pus ,a8 -d!uem rnoyew -erado I -.-... ..,

.haanas Xsssqma maary as, q oqd w wm uemom as, MWI zaqmaAoN Xg Wns eqs pun Xauom ou rap Xud mnom "I PFS ~oqsslea pw ksrrqma -my as, 18 14 a 103 Xldds 0% p101 ssm aqs :qq8~lpa1( atam n@~aa n! ..x arwpary, 303 of~d saws .q-a o 4!s1a~pn aq) ?a ruaprqs a ss mn!B~aa n! auam a%!m wuafimqq pq- w Bwp raqm sreaX waAas ~ou uq asrg pq qaBw mpmy oy Taam mqfi '8f13was w '~oqqa pa4anna LV?!A wfi q-a nl wpm~ a-0s asrg J~H

IIamrm ssm hunw aq) u! wua91d panq Bqrrodar aaXoldma R rnoqs [eBall! B~OU q s, aq arema apvm Xl~a!nb azam 'a~!?eanas aras, pw auaumanoB luml aq: asye8s aBauydsa qg aapo~ 8 ras,o arg 'aqasua Xswqwg oa Xpo Xsds sma[ aBsuo!dsa saqunw ~mm q

lVILN3CIlJN03

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

-7- with Ogorodnikm, and one day in the late spring or early summer, when she happened to meet him on the street, she told the Soviet that she was preg- nant ( h e ) , expected to be married soon, and .....-I..> no further contact She followed this - -

mg a letter to his colleagut

4 dnikov's reac * ere no threats. as tnere coula nave be

tive in Belgium since 1864. Ogorodnikov told h a that for the sake of security she would not see him again and her next meeting with Semikov would not take place until July 1987. If, however, she was able to eet into SHAF'E at Casteau before

IIIUIIC"

by writi hail told

UP she 1

u

that time (it was to move there in March l W ) , she was instructed to give the appropriate signal for an imergency meeting to inform Semikov. To keep her content, Ogorodnikov then paid her a sum in advance equivalent to five months' salaxy.

'Madame X war 81~e.sted by Belgian security authorities in April 1967. She did not know it at the time, hut more than six months earlier her frus- trated lover had betrayed her to several Belgian

ficials on the basis of diary notes he had seen garding her contacts with Soviets, and the allega- )n of her espionage work had been under investi- tio on by both American and Belgian authorities. gorodnikov's arrest and expulsion came shortly ter the confession of his agent, and, as previously )ted, Balashov and Semikov were quietly and Fectively discouraged from remaining longer in dgium.

Zelenin, conf inning what :

Ogoro There w ..

!tion was 01 Ice. ) en. 1

:ly said he w ed meeting :hange her m

1 a year went .....-.- ... L:-L i

rould-continu, place month ind

n e mert establish should c

Nearl) !nf but the evcta- wtuul ruuuwcu augxcsr ular UIL. hCB

watchful eye ate 3, the Belgian lile ced a misa :en I, had an un pith

her lawyer-lover. When the latter actually at- tempted to strangle her, the romance broke up

by without : '-11- ... ̂.I

further inddt .. ..L_. .L. V .

of re tic

E

kept a July 1% experiens married) . .

: on '~ada; woman (whc trriage and usually viole . .

ne X." In 1 ) had meanwi had not bt nt quarrel w

-

4LIY D. BALA found him "rc

SURE 12. VITJ Belgion agent

completely. It most likely was no coincidence that Ogomdnikov suddenly reappeared on the scene, I handed her a gratuitous payment of several hun- I dred dollars in Belgian francs and asked her apply for a job at SHAPE Headquarters which \ scheduled to be moved from Paris to Caste south of Brussels, within less than a year and WOI

be in need of many new employees with her qua!

FIGURE l? iOLlY I This KGB . was patiri..

Sovlets. She also lost interest in American employ- ment and, in facf left her embassy job in August 1864.

Until January 1985 the KGB left her alone. In that month, Zelenin, the Soviet who had recruited her in Tunis and to whom she clearly felt a stronl sense of personal attachment, huned up briefly h Brussels to bring her back under Soviet control He came at the right time since her affair with thc lawyer was by then in a period of estrangemen, and she was ripe for renewed involvement Zelenin urged her strongly to re-apply for work at the American Embassy and introduced her to a new Soviet who would handle her, TASS corres- pondent Anatoliy Trifonovich Ogorodnikov. Per- haps to make the new Soviet more palatable to her than his predecessor had been, Zelenin played him up as a Ymyhood friend." Zelenin then re- turned to his post in Algiers, believing his mission accomplished.

It did not quite turn . t that way-again due to her love affair. "Mau~me X" did, in facf re- apply for American Embassy employment but was turned down on the basis of an undistinguished job performance record in the -past. Having patched up her on-again off-again romance with the lawyer, she failed to keep several appointments

to V B I

au, uld li6-

, cations. made an

I. mately $

New rehlru ~d at each of 120 in francs

g the period . . . .. r

- . r meeting arr these she wi

angements w as paid appn

:d, Ogorodnil 0 ..

ere )xi.

(OV which followc . . . oegan ro ualn NS remale agent m some or me m complicated techniques of espionage tradecraf obviously anticipating need for more professio agent management after she should obtain t

ployment with SHAPE and again become opt tionally active for the KGB.

e for docum e and submit - ...

She obtained a camera suitabl photography, was trained in its us, test films to her Soviet handler. Vgorodnikov up a complicated system of clandestine meeting _ rangements which included the use of danger sig. nals and provision for. emergency contacts. Fi. nally, after personally reviewing her SHAPE a p plication forms, Ogorodnikov in December lW told her he would be going home in the suml-- of 1887 and introduced her to the Soviet who wo handle her after he was g o n d vich Semikov, a Soviet f i b &hi

ted set 81.

..v.

uld lro. ItP.

)leg Aleksanc ution represe~

CONFIDENTIAL

4 4

CONFIDEN

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

-7- with Ogorodnikm, and one day in the late spring or early summer, when she happened to meet him on the street, she told the Soviet that she was preg- nant ( h e ) , expected to be married soon, and .....-I..> no further contact She followed this - -

mg a letter to his colleagut

4 dnikov's reac * ere no threats. as tnere coula nave be

tive in Belgium since 1864. Ogorodnikov told h a that for the sake of security she would not see him again and her next meeting with Semikov would not take place until July 1987. If, however, she was able to eet into SHAF'E at Casteau before

IIIUIIC"

by writi hail told

UP she 1

u

that time (it was to move there in March l W ) , she was instructed to give the appropriate signal for an imergency meeting to inform Semikov. To keep her content, Ogorodnikov then paid her a sum in advance equivalent to five months' salaxy.

'Madame X war 81~e.sted by Belgian security authorities in April 1967. She did not know it at the time, hut more than six months earlier her frus- trated lover had betrayed her to several Belgian

ficials on the basis of diary notes he had seen garding her contacts with Soviets, and the allega- )n of her espionage work had been under investi- tio on by both American and Belgian authorities. gorodnikov's arrest and expulsion came shortly ter the confession of his agent, and, as previously )ted, Balashov and Semikov were quietly and Fectively discouraged from remaining longer in dgium.

Zelenin, conf inning what :

Ogoro There w ..

!tion was 01 Ice. ) en. 1

:ly said he w ed meeting :hange her m

1 a year went .....-.- ... L:-L i

rould-continu, place month ind

n e mert establish should c

Nearl) !nf but the evcta- wtuul ruuuwcu augxcsr ular UIL. hCB

watchful eye ate 3, the Belgian lile ced a misa :en I, had an un pith

her lawyer-lover. When the latter actually at- tempted to strangle her, the romance broke up

by without : '-11- ... ̂.I

further inddt .. ..L_. .L. V .

of re tic

E

kept a July 1% experiens married) . .

: on '~ada; woman (whc trriage and usually viole . .

ne X." In 1 ) had meanwi had not bt nt quarrel w

-

4LIY D. BALA found him "rc

SURE 12. VITJ Belgion agent

completely. It most likely was no coincidence that Ogomdnikov suddenly reappeared on the scene, I handed her a gratuitous payment of several hun- I dred dollars in Belgian francs and asked her apply for a job at SHAPE Headquarters which \ scheduled to be moved from Paris to Caste south of Brussels, within less than a year and WOI

be in need of many new employees with her qua!

FIGURE l? iOLlY I This KGB . was patiri..

Sovlets. She also lost interest in American employ- ment and, in facf left her embassy job in August 1864.

Until January 1985 the KGB left her alone. In that month, Zelenin, the Soviet who had recruited her in Tunis and to whom she clearly felt a stronl sense of personal attachment, huned up briefly h Brussels to bring her back under Soviet control He came at the right time since her affair with thc lawyer was by then in a period of estrangemen, and she was ripe for renewed involvement Zelenin urged her strongly to re-apply for work at the American Embassy and introduced her to a new Soviet who would handle her, TASS corres- pondent Anatoliy Trifonovich Ogorodnikov. Per- haps to make the new Soviet more palatable to her than his predecessor had been, Zelenin played him up as a Ymyhood friend." Zelenin then re- turned to his post in Algiers, believing his mission accomplished.

It did not quite turn . t that way-again due to her love affair. "Mau~me X" did, in facf re- apply for American Embassy employment but was turned down on the basis of an undistinguished job performance record in the -past. Having patched up her on-again off-again romance with the lawyer, she failed to keep several appointments

to V B I

au, uld li6-

, cations. made an

I. mately $

New rehlru ~d at each of 120 in francs

g the period . . . .. r

- . r meeting arr these she wi

angements w as paid appn

:d, Ogorodnil 0 ..

ere )xi.

(OV which followc . . . oegan ro ualn NS remale agent m some or me m complicated techniques of espionage tradecraf obviously anticipating need for more professio agent management after she should obtain t

ployment with SHAPE and again become opt tionally active for the KGB.

e for docum e and submit - ...

She obtained a camera suitabl photography, was trained in its us, test films to her Soviet handler. Vgorodnikov up a complicated system of clandestine meeting _ rangements which included the use of danger sig. nals and provision for. emergency contacts. Fi. nally, after personally reviewing her SHAPE a p plication forms, Ogorodnikov in December lW told her he would be going home in the suml-- of 1887 and introduced her to the Soviet who wo handle her after he was g o n d vich Semikov, a Soviet f i b &hi

ted set 81.

..v.

uld lro. ItP.

)leg Aleksanc ution represe~

CONFIDENTIAL

4 4

CONFIDEN

YnP UOllq[F opaaq peq s --.. ..- -..-

'S.

81 !lw arg ~norl%noql luau ur :nXoldwa lea01 'uoyvpe

ioj aaioj pren3 au!leN e 3uqnel sew '4u!pl!nq )uawliede pue le!arawww aZie1 e jo uo!pas auo u! palea01 'uo!~sanb u! Xsseqwa aql 'aseo ea!qv aql UI 'saaXoldma 1eml Bulpnlav lauuosiad Xssequra lie 01 alq!ssaaoe uaaq peq heiq!~ aq, 'pa[ripayos wm aouaiajuoo e uaqm qdaoxa 'X~~euuo~ .hnp uo sew aaXolJwa Ieml e 'smoq Suq~om Bu!inp 'alaqm earn uo~danai ayl Zu!u!oIpe ioog pun08 aq, uo mm woo1 aouanjuoa/heiqq Xssaqwa aq, 'aseo 1sea alpp!n ayl 01 padai ql!~ ~swooi ~aZre1 palaalas aq, 03 ssaoae Xpeai pue X~!~!loe Xssequn jo u~alled arg 30 a3pa~moq 11nj Zu!~!oldxa UOIJ

-endo zua%e .*ap!su!,, ue jo q~morS1no aq, sem ssao ons $a!AoS aiaq pauoyuaw sasea ~961 qloq u1

.paaaldwa-ar uayl 'samqeq jo ,uawaae[dai soj X~qeqoid 'paAowai X[lr!o!pnuad uaaq pet1 pue sqluour jo po!rad e raho w39p OMJ aqj U! aaeld O~II!

~nd Xl[npsaoans uaaq peq adXl awes aql jo saalnap ope OM^ ,seal le leq) aauap!na a~e% ropesseq -we rauuoj aql p aaglo Jueaen arg [I! aseoqooq iel -:qs e iapun purr aseqooq ams aql mpun slot1 ~a~j mo1awnN .uo!le)uasaidai g3~ Suoas e SI

araq; aiaqm a![qndai uea!~jy Iei1uas r! u1 sai!am,p a3req3 ueopamy aql jo aago aql u! asrrqnoq e jo ap!siapun at() ol paqaens paraAoos!p sem 'ahoqe paq!iasap 1eql 03 leaquap! Xlle~luassa 'aslnap ran!ur -suca-auoydoia!~ la!AoS iargoue LNI jsn3n~ u1

.pus qnea ae q.el 7-lpnq 'd~eqs Xq aoeld q plaq uaq1 s! 11 .aoejins poom e ISUI~SB X~wig 41 ssilrd 01 XIUO setl zua% aqL ,spuooas 01 ueql ssal sai!nbai 'laV!q1 qanw 1ou pue ialru uowuroa e ueq) iauoqs 'aagn.

dns mmod h ar[l ap!ulno

110 lllqs 10 u

-ap e qnns Xtdde OJ, 'Xld alleq patlrrt -uoa-j[as e pua (Xsseq11m uroij .[e~t%* o!uoi~oala on Xq [I!, . . o paw ."I p~noa myap aq3 qa! . XI^) J;ln!a.>ai qol!ms [orjt~, e 'auoqdoraw pue ra,l!wsueil q!nq-lo!~o~ e palttvl -003 11 .~961 iIi& u! st?^ 'a@ph ag, u! Xs~l -wa uea!iawy ue jo wool ~mn~ov~5G$~ ;at11

u! aseoTooq e jo lea1 aq~ 01 paqnrrlle punoj rv* %uo[ saqou! 51 ueq) ssa[ poom pal[!w jo ~m~q IIII(*

e 'alclmexa iod qsaraju! jo sango 01 ssaaae qitr lua3e ua Xq paoeldura Xlp!dei pue Xl!saa aq tlr 1

aAoqe 01 paua3a.l asoql se Vans saqAap aiaqm ~tttrwl

aq1 01 padola~ap aau!s %IO~ aAeq uo!jeo!qs!t1rlrs* oNoilaa1a pue uo!jezpnle!u!w jo nnb!tnpa.l.

'saqaea~e ow aql uaawaq uo!lesraAuoa aq) pio.>.~a 0% qsap ro alqel aq) npun paaeld aq 01 aa!n.nlr paleiado-haueq e 3uaSe aq) ah@ uaq1 plnom .HI

p!es ralpueq 63)1 S!H .ro!radns s,)uaSe aq1 J!SIA (81

pa~npaqos sew atpeuy asuojaa ueo!raW aql rn* 8

-uaqm aauehpe u! lrodai or pqlonilsrl! unaq 3rr!nny 03 pue wa%e g3)1 e Su!nq o; passiyuw 'hlun~n ~eq) 30 aqoeuy I(-re)![!~ arll jo aoglo aq) u! YIII -yiom 'Xrlunoa OLVN c jo Xssequra ue jo aaXo1tl111 I

[eao[ y .am11 awes aq) lnoqe 1s Xr~unoa iarllollr u! parrnano uo!)e!reA ?t1Z![s y 'alqnl ruooi %UIIII~.

s~ropessaqura atla iaprtn ra~~!wmr.t~-atroqdor.~~~~~ laws e aneld w!q 3u!~eq jo asoclind nql ioj lop*.. -snqure ur!a!mury UP jo rd[Jnq at() 11a3!1i~aar r(: )Y aql uaqm '~961 u! pannaoo aldwex.~ JuaaaI airtlnl v ,ahoqe pnuo!quaw uo!lerado rol~ue! bl;f$~,~

aql u! se suo!jc~[c)su! olpni! 01 ~([IPIIIJ!U~~ sanl -may2 pua[ saoglo seasiann ur!o!raitly jo waXr110l -ura snouaS!pu! ~str!i!3r s~~o!leindo In!nng 'pnpnlnr 8

sueaul ou Xq s! ran!Aap o!pna Ilejstt! 01 st~ea!iat~~k aaqeu pa)!ruoai jo asn nu3 pue 838 q3noyl1~

Baa erl) plddol )on dnca oyl pwq 'ua!aw 3- 'SUO!SS!Ul qJWJIo[dlp WlmM )SU!E% p uaaq aAsy Xlawwqn plnbm 'nsamlu! 831 {aq uo pue a3qa)w )avos iapun 'j!un ayl iq lqnop oo aq m amp, 'iaAamo[l .siaqlo J qo! am ap, op 01 anoqe sum pus sla)oq om1 ga2%nq,, Xpeaqe peq iwglo 83~ iaylo la ~aXa'puy p uogedp&vd aq, yl!m '9wj u! !)uawruaho% r@rrmq~ aq) jo &!in3as I! ugupw pue dn aioqs 01 papualu! Xlq~sua~ n 'ppyda~s 83X B '&gwej ue!meq3 Xl1sm Ieioqela aa .suogq[e~stq olpne ioj sauoqd pus sia1l!tusmq pw 'sra&!wsueq wue[[!aA

ea3 suo!leo!ununuca aua%e augsapuep la!AoS 'u! (,,ia;oleioqs? qonrasag wua!oS [euoy ~q se pa3egnom) siamnbpeaq C-nL alald !-lp ayl jo sdoqqiom o~uoqaa~a paddtnba

H aq) u! punoj ~uawd!nba leuo!~eiado/lm!u 9) pa~~ddns-jayo~ jo qm~s a%q ay~, iaq uq 02 aunf woij 813~~ U! WM oqa ~aXalpuv ~ale~o?!~ Xa'puy p!uq=l 831

.., jlas)! eueq3 u! rapu!8mai aq) 'uo!un layos ayl v palnea uaaq psy m!sq=~ aqa p mod .laquosrad [euo!llppe lo; palp Xlpn~oe uogez -!ue%io jo alqe, aq, pue dnw aq) jo awy ayl 1e J! 03 par8!m suep~q~a~ o!pne ue!eueq3 i~i: ~noqe --'I rr! pasaro wm aawaS X;F~J~S

D!WN uslraueq3 ayl $0 (c-n~) c 1!Un P!T=L ural )Fun aauel[!ams olpne ue 'siosupe ,a!ho~ iogepuaunuo~af ayl og aqj u! um Lay, aiaqm suo!)erado oTpne %qmd am slayos aq1

-ouap!Aa oyeula'p paIaAcaun 'ge61 hemqad $a1 qaunq~ lapopid ap, pasno rp!qm ay, p aqem ap, tg '-3 sauaAms!a

- uawp

paqwqo Xp~eadaa uaaq q Dvgoe a2 jo ppg ql u! ~o!~u~o!~m!~~ jo uoqeuu

'spogp 80uamAo pue him OLVN 30 =auapw 10 =go

saJ!Aap pa~ue~d X[[njssawns mq pus ;sah suog~~do olpne a~!ssame u! sa%e8ua n ley) uogeuuop! alqegai q s! anrU. -mqa 10 io,ye! pa- Alp[ e Xq Xsseqwa : ,. . . qq8norq lod ramog e u! palwaoooa sem a! 'suoqeiado asap, p auo u~ .sls:!dtn do -1sa~ om, sarswqwa urnptq ow! smu -auoqdm~ pnpoa? X~yssamns 'p

WI w XI^ w '638 ayl aeq; uog-oju! alq- q, amu .suoqellelsu! um!nurgr isu!e%e paljaq asoq) X[qno~md 'isa~ aq) @ suo!~erado nap, 03 iado sanbpqoal aaq) pa!- aAeq qa!AoS ayl 'X18yqidins ION .sanZeallw m1g naql jo sows aaua8!l[a~u! ayl yl~m pamqs aAeq Xaq) qo~m suog -8iado o!pne u! aoua!ndxa pannboe 'sinaX Xuem n~o uoymqdde q%noqq 'a~eq put a~qen~ea pm [npsaans X[qZ!q se suo!)eiado lm!uqaal fiwsopq nayl iap!suoo 03 UMOUJ arn SS)~!AOS aa 'sa!~) -unw m1g aq1 p (U~UBUIV %uppig) sauap -!sai [e!ogto pun sa!swqwa tualsaM raqJo punoj uaaq amq qoqm spalpunq aq? pue mmm~ pm mmsoyy m sapseqwa m!raurgr v sreaX loam1 m punoj sauoqdoiqw jo saiws aq1 Sulpnlatq '..--.- [lam 'asmw jo 'a ayl ap!su! su~ auoqdoia!yy .pes ~muawy ayl weBoid leuoyei: ~aqoaae hue! aql (Z) P" MO: squra r%!aioj saapap olpne pacaa!rs!r(uu> nlleo!uqoa) 30 ;1,n yua )uamdo[a~ap wql (I) :X)!r\!lae X~unoas pus aoua8 -!lla)u! ja!aoS jo saq om, jo ylmodlano a1qelya

'rn warn 3018 oiqe 1a%ie, u >do nayl 03 p ISOM u! sa!ssr

J-- /-

arrg )d aql y LIT& -u! Pae lwflol s! laM 9'4) rr! suo!lel[elsu! ma

klaJq amyl Jnq toae sm~ uq -!law U! "uoqdonnu vqd 01 qua%e jo am a%

~q8q 01 aww 01 ueBaq ~sq pv? vp jo suoy .saopap %~ualsq ia~al,ysueq pue auoqd ! alq@ua& .qqourolne uaAa pue aouap +n!m ammu!w paleaouw %u!oeldwa jo 's%q saoglo mawM mylo pue muaw y saoy saylo Buoun: 'pue "ap!su! arp moij,, Zqodai jo 3neldura ioj suqd oua%e -141 qly pasma alqedm 'peoiqe suo~lqle,~v uenawy 03 .ssaooe meq smgo wua8~aq JayoS .sa~qmioo paq rp!m qiowau ~ua%e p ~uawdo~anap ----= e )seal. le suogeiado lua 'now 'nmoqs Xpeaq~ se 'awmp :

YnP UOllq[F opaaq peq s --.. ..- -..-

'S.

81 !lw arg ~norl%noql luau ur :nXoldwa lea01 'uoyvpe

ioj aaioj pren3 au!leN e 3uqnel sew '4u!pl!nq )uawliede pue le!arawww aZie1 e jo uo!pas auo u! palea01 'uo!~sanb u! Xsseqwa aql 'aseo ea!qv aql UI 'saaXoldma 1eml Bulpnlav lauuosiad Xssequra lie 01 alq!ssaaoe uaaq peq heiq!~ aq, 'pa[ripayos wm aouaiajuoo e uaqm qdaoxa 'X~~euuo~ .hnp uo sew aaXolJwa Ieml e 'smoq Suq~om Bu!inp 'alaqm earn uo~danai ayl Zu!u!oIpe ioog pun08 aq, uo mm woo1 aouanjuoa/heiqq Xssaqwa aq, 'aseo 1sea alpp!n ayl 01 padai ql!~ ~swooi ~aZre1 palaalas aq, 03 ssaoae Xpeai pue X~!~!loe Xssequn jo u~alled arg 30 a3pa~moq 11nj Zu!~!oldxa UOIJ

-endo zua%e .*ap!su!,, ue jo q~morS1no aq, sem ssao ons $a!AoS aiaq pauoyuaw sasea ~961 qloq u1

.paaaldwa-ar uayl 'samqeq jo ,uawaae[dai soj X~qeqoid 'paAowai X[lr!o!pnuad uaaq pet1 pue sqluour jo po!rad e raho w39p OMJ aqj U! aaeld O~II!

~nd Xl[npsaoans uaaq peq adXl awes aql jo saalnap ope OM^ ,seal le leq) aauap!na a~e% ropesseq -we rauuoj aql p aaglo Jueaen arg [I! aseoqooq iel -:qs e iapun purr aseqooq ams aql mpun slot1 ~a~j mo1awnN .uo!le)uasaidai g3~ Suoas e SI

araq; aiaqm a![qndai uea!~jy Iei1uas r! u1 sai!am,p a3req3 ueopamy aql jo aago aql u! asrrqnoq e jo ap!siapun at() ol paqaens paraAoos!p sem 'ahoqe paq!iasap 1eql 03 leaquap! Xlle~luassa 'aslnap ran!ur -suca-auoydoia!~ la!AoS iargoue LNI jsn3n~ u1

.pus qnea ae q.el 7-lpnq 'd~eqs Xq aoeld q plaq uaq1 s! 11 .aoejins poom e ISUI~SB X~wig 41 ssilrd 01 XIUO setl zua% aqL ,spuooas 01 ueql ssal sai!nbai 'laV!q1 qanw 1ou pue ialru uowuroa e ueq) iauoqs 'aagn.

dns mmod h ar[l ap!ulno

110 lllqs 10 u

-ap e qnns Xtdde OJ, 'Xld alleq patlrrt -uoa-j[as e pua (Xsseq11m uroij .[e~t%* o!uoi~oala on Xq [I!, . . o paw ."I p~noa myap aq3 qa! . XI^) J;ln!a.>ai qol!ms [orjt~, e 'auoqdoraw pue ra,l!wsueil q!nq-lo!~o~ e palttvl -003 11 .~961 iIi& u! st?^ 'a@ph ag, u! Xs~l -wa uea!iawy ue jo wool ~mn~ov~5G$~ ;at11

u! aseoTooq e jo lea1 aq~ 01 paqnrrlle punoj rv* %uo[ saqou! 51 ueq) ssa[ poom pal[!w jo ~m~q IIII(*

e 'alclmexa iod qsaraju! jo sango 01 ssaaae qitr lua3e ua Xq paoeldura Xlp!dei pue Xl!saa aq tlr 1

aAoqe 01 paua3a.l asoql se Vans saqAap aiaqm ~tttrwl

aq1 01 padola~ap aau!s %IO~ aAeq uo!jeo!qs!t1rlrs* oNoilaa1a pue uo!jezpnle!u!w jo nnb!tnpa.l.

'saqaea~e ow aql uaawaq uo!lesraAuoa aq) pio.>.~a 0% qsap ro alqel aq) npun paaeld aq 01 aa!n.nlr paleiado-haueq e 3uaSe aq) ah@ uaq1 plnom .HI

p!es ralpueq 63)1 S!H .ro!radns s,)uaSe aq1 J!SIA (81

pa~npaqos sew atpeuy asuojaa ueo!raW aql rn* 8

-uaqm aauehpe u! lrodai or pqlonilsrl! unaq 3rr!nny 03 pue wa%e g3)1 e Su!nq o; passiyuw 'hlun~n ~eq) 30 aqoeuy I(-re)![!~ arll jo aoglo aq) u! YIII -yiom 'Xrlunoa OLVN c jo Xssequra ue jo aaXo1tl111 I

[eao[ y .am11 awes aq) lnoqe 1s Xr~unoa iarllollr u! parrnano uo!)e!reA ?t1Z![s y 'alqnl ruooi %UIIII~.

s~ropessaqura atla iaprtn ra~~!wmr.t~-atroqdor.~~~~~ laws e aneld w!q 3u!~eq jo asoclind nql ioj lop*.. -snqure ur!a!mury UP jo rd[Jnq at() 11a3!1i~aar r(: )Y aql uaqm '~961 u! pannaoo aldwex.~ JuaaaI airtlnl v ,ahoqe pnuo!quaw uo!lerado rol~ue! bl;f$~,~

aql u! se suo!jc~[c)su! olpni! 01 ~([IPIIIJ!U~~ sanl -may2 pua[ saoglo seasiann ur!o!raitly jo waXr110l -ura snouaS!pu! ~str!i!3r s~~o!leindo In!nng 'pnpnlnr 8

sueaul ou Xq s! ran!Aap o!pna Ilejstt! 01 st~ea!iat~~k aaqeu pa)!ruoai jo asn nu3 pue 838 q3noyl1~

Baa erl) plddol )on dnca oyl pwq 'ua!aw 3- 'SUO!SS!Ul qJWJIo[dlp WlmM )SU!E% p uaaq aAsy Xlawwqn plnbm 'nsamlu! 831 {aq uo pue a3qa)w )avos iapun 'j!un ayl iq lqnop oo aq m amp, 'iaAamo[l .siaqlo J qo! am ap, op 01 anoqe sum pus sla)oq om1 ga2%nq,, Xpeaqe peq iwglo 83~ iaylo la ~aXa'puy p uogedp&vd aq, yl!m '9wj u! !)uawruaho% r@rrmq~ aq) jo &!in3as I! ugupw pue dn aioqs 01 papualu! Xlq~sua~ n 'ppyda~s 83X B '&gwej ue!meq3 Xl1sm Ieioqela aa .suogq[e~stq olpne ioj sauoqd pus sia1l!tusmq pw 'sra&!wsueq wue[[!aA

ea3 suo!leo!ununuca aua%e augsapuep la!AoS 'u! (,,ia;oleioqs? qonrasag wua!oS [euoy ~q se pa3egnom) siamnbpeaq C-nL alald !-lp ayl jo sdoqqiom o~uoqaa~a paddtnba

H aq) u! punoj ~uawd!nba leuo!~eiado/lm!u 9) pa~~ddns-jayo~ jo qm~s a%q ay~, iaq uq 02 aunf woij 813~~ U! WM oqa ~aXalpuv ~ale~o?!~ Xa'puy p!uq=l 831

.., jlas)! eueq3 u! rapu!8mai aq) 'uo!un layos ayl v palnea uaaq psy m!sq=~ aqa p mod .laquosrad [euo!llppe lo; palp Xlpn~oe uogez -!ue%io jo alqe, aq, pue dnw aq) jo awy ayl 1e J! 03 par8!m suep~q~a~ o!pne ue!eueq3 i~i: ~noqe --'I rr! pasaro wm aawaS X;F~J~S

D!WN uslraueq3 ayl $0 (c-n~) c 1!Un P!T=L ural )Fun aauel[!ams olpne ue 'siosupe ,a!ho~ iogepuaunuo~af ayl og aqj u! um Lay, aiaqm suo!)erado oTpne %qmd am slayos aq1

-ouap!Aa oyeula'p paIaAcaun 'ge61 hemqad $a1 qaunq~ lapopid ap, pasno rp!qm ay, p aqem ap, tg '-3 sauaAms!a

- uawp

paqwqo Xp~eadaa uaaq q Dvgoe a2 jo ppg ql u! ~o!~u~o!~m!~~ jo uoqeuu

'spogp 80uamAo pue him OLVN 30 =auapw 10 =go

saJ!Aap pa~ue~d X[[njssawns mq pus ;sah suog~~do olpne a~!ssame u! sa%e8ua n ley) uogeuuop! alqegai q s! anrU. -mqa 10 io,ye! pa- Alp[ e Xq Xsseqwa : ,. . . qq8norq lod ramog e u! palwaoooa sem a! 'suoqeiado asap, p auo u~ .sls:!dtn do -1sa~ om, sarswqwa urnptq ow! smu -auoqdm~ pnpoa? X~yssamns 'p

WI w XI^ w '638 ayl aeq; uog-oju! alq- q, amu .suoqellelsu! um!nurgr isu!e%e paljaq asoq) X[qno~md 'isa~ aq) @ suo!~erado nap, 03 iado sanbpqoal aaq) pa!- aAeq qa!AoS ayl 'X18yqidins ION .sanZeallw m1g naql jo sows aaua8!l[a~u! ayl yl~m pamqs aAeq Xaq) qo~m suog -8iado o!pne u! aoua!ndxa pannboe 'sinaX Xuem n~o uoymqdde q%noqq 'a~eq put a~qen~ea pm [npsaans X[qZ!q se suo!)eiado lm!uqaal fiwsopq nayl iap!suoo 03 UMOUJ arn SS)~!AOS aa 'sa!~) -unw m1g aq1 p (U~UBUIV %uppig) sauap -!sai [e!ogto pun sa!swqwa tualsaM raqJo punoj uaaq amq qoqm spalpunq aq? pue mmm~ pm mmsoyy m sapseqwa m!raurgr v sreaX loam1 m punoj sauoqdoiqw jo saiws aq1 Sulpnlatq '..--.- [lam 'asmw jo 'a ayl ap!su! su~ auoqdoia!yy .pes ~muawy ayl weBoid leuoyei: ~aqoaae hue! aql (Z) P" MO: squra r%!aioj saapap olpne pacaa!rs!r(uu> nlleo!uqoa) 30 ;1,n yua )uamdo[a~ap wql (I) :X)!r\!lae X~unoas pus aoua8 -!lla)u! ja!aoS jo saq om, jo ylmodlano a1qelya

'rn warn 3018 oiqe 1a%ie, u >do nayl 03 p ISOM u! sa!ssr

J-- /-

arrg )d aql y LIT& -u! Pae lwflol s! laM 9'4) rr! suo!lel[elsu! ma

klaJq amyl Jnq toae sm~ uq -!law U! "uoqdonnu vqd 01 qua%e jo am a%

~q8q 01 aww 01 ueBaq ~sq pv? vp jo suoy .saopap %~ualsq ia~al,ysueq pue auoqd ! alq@ua& .qqourolne uaAa pue aouap +n!m ammu!w paleaouw %u!oeldwa jo 's%q saoglo mawM mylo pue muaw y saoy saylo Buoun: 'pue "ap!su! arp moij,, Zqodai jo 3neldura ioj suqd oua%e -141 qly pasma alqedm 'peoiqe suo~lqle,~v uenawy 03 .ssaooe meq smgo wua8~aq JayoS .sa~qmioo paq rp!m qiowau ~ua%e p ~uawdo~anap ----= e )seal. le suogeiado lua 'now 'nmoqs Xpeaq~ se 'awmp :

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL " ..-

V. REVIEW OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ,TECHNIQUES AND GAMBITS

hd perinds h as higher I l l ~ e case examples cited so far to illustrate KGB ike to remain PI

le various mate, broad for extent rial benefits suc . . , .. . I GRU use of staff and agent personnel against

~trricans abroad have reflected various opera- ~ u l techniques and gambits employed by the 18-t intelligence officer to spot his targets, to

..,I direct or indirect access to them, and to assess ~ I I in the unceasing search for vulnerability or

.svptibility. This section will review some of ,,. technique-and refer to others not yet men-

wrl-and seek to put them into focus on a rail-r basis without reference to individual types

1 .drjiets.

f l ; ~ k l I""' wanes, a ro save money aue ca lower overwar living caots, certain tax exemptions, rent-free quarters, longer vacstionr, and the opportunity to engap in profiiabls foreign cumncy exchange."

Whatever the accuracy of the above observation, it is a known and recognized Soviet cor---- - - questionably drawn from oprational e. that Americans away from home tend tc guard down, to talk more freely, and to e freely into contact with foreigners, inch viets. There is recognition, of course, I are exceptions to the general rule, that areas Americans refuse to have contact w nationals and are increasingly prone to rc tacts when they do 'take place. However, in prin- ciple and practice, the KGB and GRU work on the theory that overseas Americans in general, by their open conduct, talkative nature, and freedom of movement and associations, are relatively ap- proachable--directly and indirectly-and that the

tire operatio from spottint ?velopment t~ t is less diffi the United S

Wood block with cover removed. Note built-in tacks ot each end. I luept, urr-

xperience, ) let t he i~ nter more uding So- , . .,

QUICK I ACK

:nar rnere itt some

,ith Soviet ?port con-

. .

+lthough various Soviet Intelligence doctrinal epts about Americans abroad have already be-

,,- clear (i.e., that junior employees are, in ef- "tecond class citizens" and thus more vulner- n~ld that students are good targets because of

1 rrlative immaturity and lack of funds), there (81l1rr practical as well as doctrinal considera-

lhat have much to do with the inten:'.*---- br Soviet effort against ove twhniques employed.

omponents as i ray photo dentified by X-

S..L..W.,

er ms and df

nal process 1 3 remitmenl itates.

; through cult than rseas Americ;

Abroad Tar1 rc View of the American An additiona 1 factor (mer . " . rerent context) also anecrs the intensity or me ao- viet program against Americans and permits the often free-wheeling, shotgun approach techniques frequently employed abroad. This is Soviet knowledge that in working aggressively against Americans outside the United States, including re- cruitment and use of local agents against them, they are violating, in most cases, no local laws since the activity is not directed against the host country. Thus the Soviets, as well as their local agents, are not normally punishable in the event an operation against Americans fails and is exposed.

%ton the Soviet viewpoint, operations against tt1.11ns in overseas assignments outside the Bloc arc, generally speaking, easier and more r e

1~11ji than the same operations would be in the , . I States. Obviously, one factor in this con- ..*lion is the severity of FBI counterintelligence v a ~ n which inhibits, if it does not entirely pre-

hCB and GRU efTorts to recruit Americans mnr.. But there are other mnsiderations as well 113~-e largely relate to the Soviet image, based .p-ricnce, of the indivi.' 11 American outside '

, , ~ ~ n s l enyironment.

.- fiverage Arn&can, as the Soviets see bim, of Incentives ( n lo serve abroad for basically materialistic Soviet Intelligence literally believes that Ameri- s--lflrh reasons. The KGB summarizes this cans will do almost anything for money, and the

- .&111t in the following words. factor of material incentive is somewhere present

Quickly t

,. SOVIET MI(

rmplaced by pressing to underside of bookco Ise

FOUND I N FIGURE 14 :ROPHONE AND TRANSMITTER DEVICE AMERICAN EMBASSY. 1967

CON FlDENTIAL

4 8

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL " ..-

V. REVIEW OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ,TECHNIQUES AND GAMBITS

hd perinds h as higher I l l ~ e case examples cited so far to illustrate KGB ike to remain PI

le various mate, broad for extent rial benefits suc . . , .. . I GRU use of staff and agent personnel against

~trricans abroad have reflected various opera- ~ u l techniques and gambits employed by the 18-t intelligence officer to spot his targets, to

..,I direct or indirect access to them, and to assess ~ I I in the unceasing search for vulnerability or

.svptibility. This section will review some of ,,. technique-and refer to others not yet men-

wrl-and seek to put them into focus on a rail-r basis without reference to individual types

1 .drjiets.

f l ; ~ k l I""' wanes, a ro save money aue ca lower overwar living caots, certain tax exemptions, rent-free quarters, longer vacstionr, and the opportunity to engap in profiiabls foreign cumncy exchange."

Whatever the accuracy of the above observation, it is a known and recognized Soviet cor---- - - questionably drawn from oprational e. that Americans away from home tend tc guard down, to talk more freely, and to e freely into contact with foreigners, inch viets. There is recognition, of course, I are exceptions to the general rule, that areas Americans refuse to have contact w nationals and are increasingly prone to rc tacts when they do 'take place. However, in prin- ciple and practice, the KGB and GRU work on the theory that overseas Americans in general, by their open conduct, talkative nature, and freedom of movement and associations, are relatively ap- proachable--directly and indirectly-and that the

tire operatio from spottint ?velopment t~ t is less diffi the United S

Wood block with cover removed. Note built-in tacks ot each end. I luept, urr-

xperience, ) let t he i~ nter more uding So- , . .,

QUICK I ACK

:nar rnere itt some

,ith Soviet ?port con-

. .

+lthough various Soviet Intelligence doctrinal epts about Americans abroad have already be-

,,- clear (i.e., that junior employees are, in ef- "tecond class citizens" and thus more vulner- n~ld that students are good targets because of

1 rrlative immaturity and lack of funds), there (81l1rr practical as well as doctrinal considera-

lhat have much to do with the inten:'.*---- br Soviet effort against ove twhniques employed.

omponents as i ray photo dentified by X-

S..L..W.,

er ms and df

nal process 1 3 remitmenl itates.

; through cult than rseas Americ;

Abroad Tar1 rc View of the American An additiona 1 factor (mer . " . rerent context) also anecrs the intensity or me ao- viet program against Americans and permits the often free-wheeling, shotgun approach techniques frequently employed abroad. This is Soviet knowledge that in working aggressively against Americans outside the United States, including re- cruitment and use of local agents against them, they are violating, in most cases, no local laws since the activity is not directed against the host country. Thus the Soviets, as well as their local agents, are not normally punishable in the event an operation against Americans fails and is exposed.

%ton the Soviet viewpoint, operations against tt1.11ns in overseas assignments outside the Bloc arc, generally speaking, easier and more r e

1~11ji than the same operations would be in the , . I States. Obviously, one factor in this con- ..*lion is the severity of FBI counterintelligence v a ~ n which inhibits, if it does not entirely pre-

hCB and GRU efTorts to recruit Americans mnr.. But there are other mnsiderations as well 113~-e largely relate to the Soviet image, based .p-ricnce, of the indivi.' 11 American outside '

, , ~ ~ n s l enyironment.

.- fiverage Arn&can, as the Soviets see bim, of Incentives ( n lo serve abroad for basically materialistic Soviet Intelligence literally believes that Ameri- s--lflrh reasons. The KGB summarizes this cans will do almost anything for money, and the

- .&111t in the following words. factor of material incentive is somewhere present

Quickly t

,. SOVIET MI(

rmplaced by pressing to underside of bookco Ise

FOUND I N FIGURE 14 :ROPHONE AND TRANSMITTER DEVICE AMERICAN EMBASSY. 1967

CON FlDENTIAL

4 8

~m~sawy Xuem p Bo~otpXsd ap) p Bqmlsraprm poo% e smoqs 3!q~% 3-0s sq~ .aZuanerp pagdurr ay, adawe 4 pw Bu~yodat jo paau Xw Xuap 03 'mopaaq lw~SJad +aq uo mls e se u~sa%ins a tpns aai&a? -m 4 umoq uaaq aAeq 5o83uaV .lago hun3 4s (laq XI) sq oa a! uo Bwodar anoqvm Jarnos a q~m ~aam oa amp \nsaop m!laru\l aq wnw p qwq 'Xp~)aBas sdeqiad 'wsa%cdns W!AOS eqj .dqsuorplai mau ayl %ug.todai moij ueauawy eq dm? 03 pa&tsap Zaggeq ~[~uB!JJ JO WOJ w 03 uoga~gp JO saPels Xlma ay, ~auuosrad [a~al-iop 'qmp apm B~A~UAV X1m1 \

ay, u! vosm 11 raqao pue [n~gmd 'saw

p was wejamas

I Xuem u1

,. wrq Wfi dnnonq qqrrsod n(am 01 paPUQ1

-at Xlpal inq uo!sn.m oyl 01 alqel!ns uonssxaauw o! uq mS118uo pun um!~sroy 308~~1 s!q mrpeaidds IW!~O

ma uo!muualm 8qma ~muul ei!nh sa mm!~suty Iq popmla am rarmsa8 rpns .swusmwnba lq4!1s uirm m II%IB 10 ium BI. (qua- enq) m staq=!J..

uaaq mq uogmgdde wuaS!l[aau! sl! p ~eqol% mou pua4 aqL .sayunoa paluu uaaq paq slaAal [v!aso %%!&A 3P 1 pamy ql!~ )aeluoa le!ms )a!AoS alesaq!] apgap e '~~61 X$J 'pamlai uaaq peq iaqao pm muamv yl!m suo!aelas le!q -ad pus uo!snpas a~~as m HSSn aql ap!~.. I. -als aram oqm lauuosiad naql Ida? qnym v.11

lapos Jagsea aeql Juappa mm J! '1931 Xfl X1aleunxosdde wms pauasqo umq mq 11r

swJuamy 01 qaeordds la!ms aa!aoS pai!p .~OI 8

leAgln3 rapun Tenp!A!pu! ay, 01 p.lt*, qaea tq asaqL .cInmollo~ jo

7 'al~qns Xpwa~~xa saunlaruos 'nlot!, , . nmq It?lmS Xllr?ll!~! (IF UO PUW I '

UO!l rn 'asm -Fa* aql u Xuew ql!m ..?.- ee.. .

:paloo ssq ff3X eq sy '3- '1~lmq? eq 01 'qua~a )suds 01-monoj siay,o 'pa~du~8 q uogelvu! auo wng .qsg.~o la!aos %upno) Xq a3ueuuopad lux11 s so %u~aoys mlg la!rros 8 'uo!a -dasi Xsssqma Japes u 01 uo!anl!Au! ua JO uuoj nrll eTs1 Xem qaym Z~laam iaqmj a slra%ins pue 'my uaueg Xlq~ssd 'a3una~nnba-a Mau sq U! ISRIDJII!

puouad smoqs 'a1qmmw q a~ 'aA!$ma!u! e1[3 salnl X13uanbarj I~AOS aqa '91113 8u!mm!ms n le 10 lonlas ey, uo lo mq s p uo!pnpoiau! m jo alnsar aqa lo ialunwua "wwqa. e 'uo!nunj qqnd so a!~~ruolrI!p s 30 qmm8,no eq q ueJuawv oqz 08 la!Aos aql Xq rpsmdds [elms eyl iaqlaqm jo ssalpmZn~

'UMOqS U

eaw ou Xq 10 spoq~~,~~ la

rF

. ... .. ,- ...., .peosddr! all3 sassn pnporlx lo XI!I~,'

anq Xpnas~e seq sv 'q~

arc peosqr? suvauaulv !A~S )nas!pu! prre mo!A ~r I

-nsado n\l s~llnw~~l11.x ay, 'laAaM ~ou s! a3a~

.~nuoss~(I unql iaq1111 (MII

eap nm san!lorn snql put 's)un2n 11

anuaZ![p~u! nia op oqm asoqj !<I\ Ins snlun slj!Y iajjo in srIno1 a~olil I

op ~sn~ aql u! saa!.\og .a~!)awcl pivpuels :I!,,

-aq aAsq srltol pun sy!4 jo ssnljo Xqm pun S:III~

-$!p ~n!nueug PUB SBUW~CS ino(1e pqsn am VI

-snnl) %uun:~clcIs-~un~)u~~! snmn ~r?l~l:~~udolnnn[n X,juanh>sj os XI~M s~~!ol~lxa p11v '4u!1111vlrl III~V.

3 Pllr? (f:)x S"JU"llIIU! )I 'SUI?J!IRUIV I

Inu JO pnlw~ jrre~~odur! ,. arlL 'prrl~s,

pun Ieuo!l!ppe un sppn un!anlonl> moqn nq.1 up~~ q ~~lelq umo moX a~ JO~ pm~d n ~IS q pu. urly ytlm aonwawntlrn Bmmp ~sa~ol!n ql qnl

,~.,rm-ts!ruxu all 01 Ilrnln~nnrf

lmndlnl .dl,ln,o,l Ml", I~~,,~,, a pfl' ~u*uwlop~ap nq ni mnfPinxl~m sttmmira p n n~lfrn

DJunpeum I,unnnoury n,p u,m ol .n,,,,lw,,f, -U! S:."m~!lDllW JO t~~tI~fl!~I!l.~I.W ' ' ' 'pnA1OAl!! o;lnd!llqsl Blnv XlnlnlVsrN~ Iq ru!ll tumll, ol ~ll'!l*lt~~~~ s! ~l~*~~~*ll s1:pA9 '~~a!l!rlt~f~ q 11 ~~3111*

Illwml,,n x~~~ sl ,ln,,,,,, nr,,s ,,,,.n,, ,,,v 4 (r(nln;ntr alp 01 ;r~~~:u~~~!lrr! rlienl:, Ii~u(>nu l)lwm01 npnl

am yip mwu!anlrm ~mpntn ua dn SII!~JI. IR.~IIM,, -!lln ann!~allty ~ntclKl s!q,!, .cpm*,ln pnl!~!ds pun 1ntja1

-~III nr( 1pjlnj 1x#n am8.>1>t1:~1qsr! pun n1m1>m~~ pum _.mqtu~~rq pw ~.mm a," adma JO xm7gn'n>ud -1r1 sou nxnsrla un:, +IJI~I~ Y~IUI~ II~ nu11 SD latlout FD

JO~~DI~ 94 U! P4D $0 iGBunq Aeuolu pun 314S!lD!JelDw SD

V j0 rd83lIm 8%I88!jl84~l W!A- 8e4 jD pedr~ 8UO pep1 S~~OJ~DJ~ elpp!lu eql

*@~u~BF arm) 6 ~egds~ol .~Qs amsr onmd nhnzopsdenp ba -'snpooou aasmn 'I1RIII.B 'Wa '41 B0jBtfl0U O[)Otr OPORlj reu)ap*003 ym3 r \ xndfl&l)h eu ur-o3 BI! nPanlisn I(IPR~oz**~~~ (aJ Oa6T ou) nwr rue& or a .h~ ~al! a aodsurou &s~ emga rgedro;

znrorumr mnruuo B 6'(~~o~e~~ mn~war~o(in) YM~~N c EO~~V

101 W9 ZPUUBBL300 arJr~~d~~li 'BZB~OPUII~.OJWWH~~BH BIBPL! lee vsnr~rnuu~ 'arn:~mr~fhL xuliurazo6slUnm e xilhmsopej

'nnlenndPlle nrenu@n iod*ead 3 uonznnakeneo o~eedpac;au-n )~uOU ZOis R'?Z~OUJM WZOnWB lPDOZh 'HIBPcLo ImH9UPJUhBaS

I ~on-auuh~h~o 1~oyUm~8d. HOWSIRBO~ 3 OUJ~R~RRP~~~ZOD ?Z6E ~odunlree znqm ~m3 nn?~-~~rdhL oaonane&~qy~r~aedu o~.-

Ozh l~~~a~n~~ runsuunsd~nu sp amp tn~~mll .HR~ZJ xw

*ngnsad a van -neewaD W~JOUR 'unnn~xJpomau xu xeb3uad3 I najoarmdo~eoden ~llsUWn8~me o~~anrja L a-earodou meJqnar w lomoc @oRO(PI 'R:

-.>dues errsroxk!? I QUW~,~H~-~RII PLY~OE:O~UOU~ LIW amwzoaEor

'~GoR~~B;>w I R!?ODfJBr 'IOlihRI @J' "IRg??D3090 0820rd0 ?OR -RCDSORIWP XBI'IRPU .e J.187qdz~wtA' oee?dr ~~QSJR 'BRR~w~~~"~

. .

LYWXIOU ~&BII~~OU~O~~BR ~~X~IU'OCHIIO~O~~ lltoo~w~aoo~.J~:

-Hues uarrqldnsau dorwsb ?zeunns!rou3n ow¶rUdu' NDoSi

~m~sawy Xuem p Bo~otpXsd ap) p Bqmlsraprm poo% e smoqs 3!q~% 3-0s sq~ .aZuanerp pagdurr ay, adawe 4 pw Bu~yodat jo paau Xw Xuap 03 'mopaaq lw~SJad +aq uo mls e se u~sa%ins a tpns aai&a? -m 4 umoq uaaq aAeq 5o83uaV .lago hun3 4s (laq XI) sq oa a! uo Bwodar anoqvm Jarnos a q~m ~aam oa amp \nsaop m!laru\l aq wnw p qwq 'Xp~)aBas sdeqiad 'wsa%cdns W!AOS eqj .dqsuorplai mau ayl %ug.todai moij ueauawy eq dm? 03 pa&tsap Zaggeq ~[~uB!JJ JO WOJ w 03 uoga~gp JO saPels Xlma ay, ~auuosrad [a~al-iop 'qmp apm B~A~UAV X1m1 \

ay, u! vosm 11 raqao pue [n~gmd 'saw

p was wejamas

I Xuem u1

,. wrq Wfi dnnonq qqrrsod n(am 01 paPUQ1

-at Xlpal inq uo!sn.m oyl 01 alqel!ns uonssxaauw o! uq mS118uo pun um!~sroy 308~~1 s!q mrpeaidds IW!~O

ma uo!muualm 8qma ~muul ei!nh sa mm!~suty Iq popmla am rarmsa8 rpns .swusmwnba lq4!1s uirm m II%IB 10 ium BI. (qua- enq) m staq=!J..

uaaq mq uogmgdde wuaS!l[aau! sl! p ~eqol% mou pua4 aqL .sayunoa paluu uaaq paq slaAal [v!aso %%!&A 3P 1 pamy ql!~ )aeluoa le!ms )a!AoS alesaq!] apgap e '~~61 X$J 'pamlai uaaq peq iaqao pm muamv yl!m suo!aelas le!q -ad pus uo!snpas a~~as m HSSn aql ap!~.. I. -als aram oqm lauuosiad naql Ida? qnym v.11

lapos Jagsea aeql Juappa mm J! '1931 Xfl X1aleunxosdde wms pauasqo umq mq 11r

swJuamy 01 qaeordds la!ms aa!aoS pai!p .~OI 8

leAgln3 rapun Tenp!A!pu! ay, 01 p.lt*, qaea tq asaqL .cInmollo~ jo

7 'al~qns Xpwa~~xa saunlaruos 'nlot!, , . nmq It?lmS Xllr?ll!~! (IF UO PUW I '

UO!l rn 'asm -Fa* aql u Xuew ql!m ..?.- ee.. .

:paloo ssq ff3X eq sy '3- '1~lmq? eq 01 'qua~a )suds 01-monoj siay,o 'pa~du~8 q uogelvu! auo wng .qsg.~o la!aos %upno) Xq a3ueuuopad lux11 s so %u~aoys mlg la!rros 8 'uo!a -dasi Xsssqma Japes u 01 uo!anl!Au! ua JO uuoj nrll eTs1 Xem qaym Z~laam iaqmj a slra%ins pue 'my uaueg Xlq~ssd 'a3una~nnba-a Mau sq U! ISRIDJII!

puouad smoqs 'a1qmmw q a~ 'aA!$ma!u! e1[3 salnl X13uanbarj I~AOS aqa '91113 8u!mm!ms n le 10 lonlas ey, uo lo mq s p uo!pnpoiau! m jo alnsar aqa lo ialunwua "wwqa. e 'uo!nunj qqnd so a!~~ruolrI!p s 30 qmm8,no eq q ueJuawv oqz 08 la!Aos aql Xq rpsmdds [elms eyl iaqlaqm jo ssalpmZn~

'UMOqS U

eaw ou Xq 10 spoq~~,~~ la

rF

. ... .. ,- ...., .peosddr! all3 sassn pnporlx lo XI!I~,'

anq Xpnas~e seq sv 'q~

arc peosqr? suvauaulv !A~S )nas!pu! prre mo!A ~r I

-nsado n\l s~llnw~~l11.x ay, 'laAaM ~ou s! a3a~

.~nuoss~(I unql iaq1111 (MII

eap nm san!lorn snql put 's)un2n 11

anuaZ![p~u! nia op oqm asoqj !<I\ Ins snlun slj!Y iajjo in srIno1 a~olil I

op ~sn~ aql u! saa!.\og .a~!)awcl pivpuels :I!,,

-aq aAsq srltol pun sy!4 jo ssnljo Xqm pun S:III~

-$!p ~n!nueug PUB SBUW~CS ino(1e pqsn am VI

-snnl) %uun:~clcIs-~un~)u~~! snmn ~r?l~l:~~udolnnn[n X,juanh>sj os XI~M s~~!ol~lxa p11v '4u!1111vlrl III~V.

3 Pllr? (f:)x S"JU"llIIU! )I 'SUI?J!IRUIV I

Inu JO pnlw~ jrre~~odur! ,. arlL 'prrl~s,

pun Ieuo!l!ppe un sppn un!anlonl> moqn nq.1 up~~ q ~~lelq umo moX a~ JO~ pm~d n ~IS q pu. urly ytlm aonwawntlrn Bmmp ~sa~ol!n ql qnl

,~.,rm-ts!ruxu all 01 Ilrnln~nnrf

lmndlnl .dl,ln,o,l Ml", I~~,,~,, a pfl' ~u*uwlop~ap nq ni mnfPinxl~m sttmmira p n n~lfrn

DJunpeum I,unnnoury n,p u,m ol .n,,,,lw,,f, -U! S:."m~!lDllW JO t~~tI~fl!~I!l.~I.W ' ' ' 'pnA1OAl!! o;lnd!llqsl Blnv XlnlnlVsrN~ Iq ru!ll tumll, ol ~ll'!l*lt~~~~ s! ~l~*~~~*ll s1:pA9 '~~a!l!rlt~f~ q 11 ~~3111*

Illwml,,n x~~~ sl ,ln,,,,,, nr,,s ,,,,.n,, ,,,v 4 (r(nln;ntr alp 01 ;r~~~:u~~~!lrr! rlienl:, Ii~u(>nu l)lwm01 npnl

am yip mwu!anlrm ~mpntn ua dn SII!~JI. IR.~IIM,, -!lln ann!~allty ~ntclKl s!q,!, .cpm*,ln pnl!~!ds pun 1ntja1

-~III nr( 1pjlnj 1x#n am8.>1>t1:~1qsr! pun n1m1>m~~ pum _.mqtu~~rq pw ~.mm a," adma JO xm7gn'n>ud -1r1 sou nxnsrla un:, +IJI~I~ Y~IUI~ II~ nu11 SD latlout FD

JO~~DI~ 94 U! P4D $0 iGBunq Aeuolu pun 314S!lD!JelDw SD

V j0 rd83lIm 8%I88!jl84~l W!A- 8e4 jD pedr~ 8UO pep1 S~~OJ~DJ~ elpp!lu eql

*@~u~BF arm) 6 ~egds~ol .~Qs amsr onmd nhnzopsdenp ba -'snpooou aasmn 'I1RIII.B 'Wa '41 B0jBtfl0U O[)Otr OPORlj reu)ap*003 ym3 r \ xndfl&l)h eu ur-o3 BI! nPanlisn I(IPR~oz**~~~ (aJ Oa6T ou) nwr rue& or a .h~ ~al! a aodsurou &s~ emga rgedro;

znrorumr mnruuo B 6'(~~o~e~~ mn~war~o(in) YM~~N c EO~~V

101 W9 ZPUUBBL300 arJr~~d~~li 'BZB~OPUII~.OJWWH~~BH BIBPL! lee vsnr~rnuu~ 'arn:~mr~fhL xuliurazo6slUnm e xilhmsopej

'nnlenndPlle nrenu@n iod*ead 3 uonznnakeneo o~eedpac;au-n )~uOU ZOis R'?Z~OUJM WZOnWB lPDOZh 'HIBPcLo ImH9UPJUhBaS

I ~on-auuh~h~o 1~oyUm~8d. HOWSIRBO~ 3 OUJ~R~RRP~~~ZOD ?Z6E ~odunlree znqm ~m3 nn?~-~~rdhL oaonane&~qy~r~aedu o~.-

Ozh l~~~a~n~~ runsuunsd~nu sp amp tn~~mll .HR~ZJ xw

*ngnsad a van -neewaD W~JOUR 'unnn~xJpomau xu xeb3uad3 I najoarmdo~eoden ~llsUWn8~me o~~anrja L a-earodou meJqnar w lomoc @oRO(PI 'R:

-.>dues errsroxk!? I QUW~,~H~-~RII PLY~OE:O~UOU~ LIW amwzoaEor

'~GoR~~B;>w I R!?ODfJBr 'IOlihRI @J' "IRg??D3090 0820rd0 ?OR -RCDSORIWP XBI'IRPU .e J.187qdz~wtA' oee?dr ~~QSJR 'BRR~w~~~"~

. .

LYWXIOU ~&BII~~OU~O~~BR ~~X~IU'OCHIIO~O~~ lltoo~w~aoo~.J~:

-Hues uarrqldnsau dorwsb ?zeunns!rou3n ow¶rUdu' NDoSi

CONFIDENTIAL

The KCB rds:

is, .I

at 111 ..I I ,

rt of the COI

mess over a I n into a "cor L? American I .. .

:t of this le ~m Ameri- which

: that he -. . . - -

American target's wile and c~ltildwn. covers this aspect in thc follou~iltg wo

"In urdcr lo nnli<lrfy ca.crtly ;tcl~icvrd f r An~sricsnn, our olli~r.ra urider Sovwt LIIIVUJJ). U Y V V ~

wuully Ilrrsrrh gifts 01, New Yc.,rr' 1hy ax ulllcr up- pro~lrl~il~ I)UC~S~OIIS. l.hU intclllgt:ncr: ol[iwr will de. liver Itis gtft ro parsml at the Alneric~n's IIOIIIL. at u tlms wheu the Isttor is ~>r>n>,idly tlrere. Thc purlwse is to itqrct iw u~~ollic:iinl, frietally H;tvur illto tht relit- tia11r111p. 111 retun), thc An~cnciln USUOIIY resl)otds by visitillg the Soviel's ltozlle to prwmt u gift."

Sooner or later in the developmental prowl assu~tling tll;~t the Soviets have concluded th they have it11 intemsting prospect on the lir~e, smil nspectsof clandcrtirrity will IJC gradu;llly insert< into the relationship. Less p111,lic and more u! us~li~l;neetir~g places will be sl~ggated. Tho ta get will be rc~1uested not to call the Soviet at 11 oUicial number "to avoid e~nbarrassment Ior yo1 and meetings may bc suggest~xl at pre-arrangt limes ;~nd places. All unditioning f, what may follow.

Eve-ntoally-pcrl~nps :s. perhaps nj for months-tl~e Sovi-, l,ulr"3= will begin

t it may not 1) Vienna studc (ill ask his A rmation of an

. . or a journa~~st friend, poss~n~y tor a r scitrch paper or article which the Soviet himse claims he is writing, perhaps even for an inform public opinion poll. The Vienna student was askr for character assessments of his fellow Amcrical and saw nothing disturbing ahout the request. Eoropc:an national in the Middle East, under Sm viet cultivation because of his access to American was dealt with somewhat more frankly by l k Ss viet officer. The request went somt:thing like thi "You know many people here. They will tell yt what they won't tell m frankly to you than to I

and represent a count not find much favor v personal favor, will you ask MI. Blank. whom vt know, what. . . ."

Requests of this kind, even for I

information, may be coupled with an ofier ot pa ment. If payment is accepted, a receipt will us- ally be requested under some plausible pretext. The process of gradual involvement is by this time well under way and elements of clandestinity and po:, lble potential compromise factors already pres :nt.

Finally, n an atmosp friendship trust, the re< ess will b a head wit1 information or a servlce that is clearly ot an I

telligence nature. Typically, generous financial re- wards will be promised. If the American becomes frightened or refuses, he will be met at first with reasoned argument and renewed professions

friendship. Depending on the course of the ~viet assessment and softening-up process, a ~rrler Line may follow: threats and warning to 811k matters over-particularly if the American nr already slipped over the line and exposed him- If to compromise. Whatevcr the American's ini- .I reaction, the Soviet, as in the case of code clerk $n~ald Ultan, will press for one or more additional ,.stings.

I lsdaneous Dc r rhniques

No hypothetica I vrtual cases, ca.. ---.-., ..... strate the tul ! Soviet operational practice employed tc , vr-lop and recruit Americans abroad. 1811.h have not yet been mentioned or arc Iblilional clarification and emphasis by wing are briefly discussed L-'----

I :ompromise

Although the E ra.~t~cial ioduccm 5 \~~ccessfuI recruitment of Amerlcans aDr< . lttcnt of contpromise is also an essential .* 11 such operation. It is brought into 8v.r which are often not fully appreciate

From the viewpoint of Soviet 1ntelliger.--, -.., ~.nr.rican who agrees to an unofficial and personal I ttionship with a Soviet and conceals the 'fact t~n his (or her) superiors has already taken a ..I compromising step. As the relationship deep

~lnd becomes more intimate along typical lines, It as described above, each Soviet move is in- led to increase the degree of compromise. By ,.ping the small aspects of clandestinity which I:radually introduced, such as not calling the

.vwt at his official number or agreeing to meet- z4r nt unorthodox times and places, the American etpounds his original compromise. The initially

tats.unt sm;tll "favors" which the Soviet asks on I,nsis of friendship are a calculated part of the

~npromise process. So is the offer of payment

I the seemingly plausible request for a signed vipt. Meanwhile, the Soviet through probing I other means uncovers indications of personal

. dkness and vulnerability (the presence of debt, -%rive drinking, promiscuous sexual habits, etc.),

..WII are treated as "secrets" between the Ameri- 6 - t end his Soviet "friend and thus also become

Pa npromise web. The effec Pr )eriod of time is to draw tl ca ~fidential" relationship, frc thc yadually coma to rea1i.n cannot wltharaw excent at the cost of o barrassrpent-a qucncesLby c superiors.

Actually, the build-up and use ot comp , )viet Intelligence is largely for psychological effect )th during the period of development and at the ne of recruitment is attempted. In operations in le West, the Soviets normally have no serious in- ntion of using compromising informatior +" hl*-k- ail an American into doing their biddint )ercive threats to destroy an America y exposure of compromising informatio uitment technique only rarely employe

the Sovit I Bloc area. This is because in wesreru countries the Soviets lack total conhol of the en- vironment, such as they enjoy in the USSR, in their operations against Americam. It is thus difficult for them to acquire truly damaging evidence in a

.n be effectively exploited ' '

LCULd dl',-

la1 conse- e to his

nd perhaps !

lisclosing t h ~

- ..

severe persor ;. compromis

As in the case of the American data processing technician in a Moslem country, language lessons are often 1)rought into the picture at about this point. And it is here that the wife of the Soviet intelligence officer has been seen on many oc- casions to play a supporting operational role. Without specific referencv to lanbwage lessons which am by now a standard develonmental gambit, the KGB outlines in these words:

"It is often helpful if tl~, wife with him when vi under drvclopmrot. Wi... .... ,..,. ,.., .,..,,, ..., officer ciln clarify ~~:rtdin points of infurtniltlon or arsesmunt wnct*ming tllc turgct individual and thereby dstmnine huw h i t to stmngthm h with him."

In the early stages of direct culti .-..-.., --.. venation is on harmless topics, sport, art, life in each other's country, etc. The Soviet may say he is bored with life in a foreign country, perhaps bored with his own countrymen, lonely for new and stimulating companionship. Controvisial sub- jects are avoided or glos.>,, ' over. This whole preparatory process 1 1 . c ~ a I .hose; assessment of the American's potential 11 i c t~lness for espionage and assessment of him from the standpoint of the possibility of recruitment. This requires knowl- edge of the American's personal history, his family situation, his 6nancial standing (most important, as already indicated), his unfulfilled ambitions and possible weaknesses for women. During this assess- ment stage, the Soviet seeks to cement the friend- ship and at the same time--usually through gifts- create a sense of obligation for hospitality. Given the Soviet concept that money is the all-important American motivation, tactics may sometimes be ludicrously crude and include direct and very per- sonal questioning about the American's income and debts, how much he pays for rent, the amount of his taxes, etc.

within week . . . - . . - . - -. ,

emerge, it1

as in the scribed. to help hi1 nerhens f~

itl~ough at firs case of the The Soviet u n collect irtfo~ . 3 .

,e recogai.zabl nt already d merican trier overt nature- .*. ,

.. -. -- D- 18

) meet, Several cc r worth

b: way of CI

. .- -.--.. ;. Use of n s career n is a re- rd outside ... .L.-

the role of thl o Soviet wife

regards e factor

1 .. e intelligcn~v o siting the hutnc ,.h hi. ... ir....

Rimr takes his r of a person ....<... . ..... ". .I...

:GB, by its o cnt as normal . .

wn doctrine, Ily the decisiv . 1

)nn which ca tail.

for black.

st European ldard operatis

tlce agalnst wesrerners, ~ncluding Amen erating on their own grounds, the KG1 cooperating Bloc services can work u trolled conditions to secure disasterousl mising evidence (usually photographic corded on tape) which is then used as a means or recruitment. The well-publicized case of Irwin Scarbeck, the Foreign Service officer stationed in Warsaw who became involved with a female Polish agent and was blackmailed into accepting recruit- r mus example? nf nnera- t

and the Ea kmail is stan

c o d e s , onal prac-

n..

In Moscow owever, hlac . . ...

L-a"". vy B and the lnder con- y compro- and/or re-

e . . . they u me because I ry that, unfo vith them. 'I . .. -.

till speak i o am a* diplom rtunately, do rherefore, as . .

nenf is only ions of this 1

Sexuul and

one of nume] dnd.

A number of actual ana lnclplenr sexual ap- proaches overseas to Americans outside the Com- munist Bloc have been mentioned both in detail and in passing reference in this study. Although the KGB attempt to recruit Eleanor, the Bonn embassy file clerk, was based on shock tactics and threats against her own safety and the life of he1 supposed American fiance, the operation against her was, in its opening stages, a clear-cut case of seduo

one day, u I and mutual le brought to

there of war :mitment pm 1 a request f

. * .

NTIAL

i

48 CONFID

CONFIDENTIAL

The KCB rds:

is, .I

at 111 ..I I ,

rt of the COI

mess over a I n into a "cor L? American I .. .

:t of this le ~m Ameri- which

: that he -. . . - -

American target's wile and c~ltildwn. covers this aspect in thc follou~iltg wo

"In urdcr lo nnli<lrfy ca.crtly ;tcl~icvrd f r An~sricsnn, our olli~r.ra urider Sovwt LIIIVUJJ). U Y V V ~

wuully Ilrrsrrh gifts 01, New Yc.,rr' 1hy ax ulllcr up- pro~lrl~il~ I)UC~S~OIIS. l.hU intclllgt:ncr: ol[iwr will de. liver Itis gtft ro parsml at the Alneric~n's IIOIIIL. at u tlms wheu the Isttor is ~>r>n>,idly tlrere. Thc purlwse is to itqrct iw u~~ollic:iinl, frietally H;tvur illto tht relit- tia11r111p. 111 retun), thc An~cnciln USUOIIY resl)otds by visitillg the Soviel's ltozlle to prwmt u gift."

Sooner or later in the developmental prowl assu~tling tll;~t the Soviets have concluded th they have it11 intemsting prospect on the lir~e, smil nspectsof clandcrtirrity will IJC gradu;llly insert< into the relationship. Less p111,lic and more u! us~li~l;neetir~g places will be sl~ggated. Tho ta get will be rc~1uested not to call the Soviet at 11 oUicial number "to avoid e~nbarrassment Ior yo1 and meetings may bc suggest~xl at pre-arrangt limes ;~nd places. All unditioning f, what may follow.

Eve-ntoally-pcrl~nps :s. perhaps nj for months-tl~e Sovi-, l,ulr"3= will begin

t it may not 1) Vienna studc (ill ask his A rmation of an

. . or a journa~~st friend, poss~n~y tor a r scitrch paper or article which the Soviet himse claims he is writing, perhaps even for an inform public opinion poll. The Vienna student was askr for character assessments of his fellow Amcrical and saw nothing disturbing ahout the request. Eoropc:an national in the Middle East, under Sm viet cultivation because of his access to American was dealt with somewhat more frankly by l k Ss viet officer. The request went somt:thing like thi "You know many people here. They will tell yt what they won't tell m frankly to you than to I

and represent a count not find much favor v personal favor, will you ask MI. Blank. whom vt know, what. . . ."

Requests of this kind, even for I

information, may be coupled with an ofier ot pa ment. If payment is accepted, a receipt will us- ally be requested under some plausible pretext. The process of gradual involvement is by this time well under way and elements of clandestinity and po:, lble potential compromise factors already pres :nt.

Finally, n an atmosp friendship trust, the re< ess will b a head wit1 information or a servlce that is clearly ot an I

telligence nature. Typically, generous financial re- wards will be promised. If the American becomes frightened or refuses, he will be met at first with reasoned argument and renewed professions

friendship. Depending on the course of the ~viet assessment and softening-up process, a ~rrler Line may follow: threats and warning to 811k matters over-particularly if the American nr already slipped over the line and exposed him- If to compromise. Whatevcr the American's ini- .I reaction, the Soviet, as in the case of code clerk $n~ald Ultan, will press for one or more additional ,.stings.

I lsdaneous Dc r rhniques

No hypothetica I vrtual cases, ca.. ---.-., ..... strate the tul ! Soviet operational practice employed tc , vr-lop and recruit Americans abroad. 1811.h have not yet been mentioned or arc Iblilional clarification and emphasis by wing are briefly discussed L-'----

I :ompromise

Although the E ra.~t~cial ioduccm 5 \~~ccessfuI recruitment of Amerlcans aDr< . lttcnt of contpromise is also an essential .* 11 such operation. It is brought into 8v.r which are often not fully appreciate

From the viewpoint of Soviet 1ntelliger.--, -.., ~.nr.rican who agrees to an unofficial and personal I ttionship with a Soviet and conceals the 'fact t~n his (or her) superiors has already taken a ..I compromising step. As the relationship deep

~lnd becomes more intimate along typical lines, It as described above, each Soviet move is in- led to increase the degree of compromise. By ,.ping the small aspects of clandestinity which I:radually introduced, such as not calling the

.vwt at his official number or agreeing to meet- z4r nt unorthodox times and places, the American etpounds his original compromise. The initially

tats.unt sm;tll "favors" which the Soviet asks on I,nsis of friendship are a calculated part of the

~npromise process. So is the offer of payment

I the seemingly plausible request for a signed vipt. Meanwhile, the Soviet through probing I other means uncovers indications of personal

. dkness and vulnerability (the presence of debt, -%rive drinking, promiscuous sexual habits, etc.),

..WII are treated as "secrets" between the Ameri- 6 - t end his Soviet "friend and thus also become

Pa npromise web. The effec Pr )eriod of time is to draw tl ca ~fidential" relationship, frc thc yadually coma to rea1i.n cannot wltharaw excent at the cost of o barrassrpent-a qucncesLby c superiors.

Actually, the build-up and use ot comp , )viet Intelligence is largely for psychological effect )th during the period of development and at the ne of recruitment is attempted. In operations in le West, the Soviets normally have no serious in- ntion of using compromising informatior +" hl*-k- ail an American into doing their biddint )ercive threats to destroy an America y exposure of compromising informatio uitment technique only rarely employe

the Sovit I Bloc area. This is because in wesreru countries the Soviets lack total conhol of the en- vironment, such as they enjoy in the USSR, in their operations against Americam. It is thus difficult for them to acquire truly damaging evidence in a

.n be effectively exploited ' '

LCULd dl',-

la1 conse- e to his

nd perhaps !

lisclosing t h ~

- ..

severe persor ;. compromis

As in the case of the American data processing technician in a Moslem country, language lessons are often 1)rought into the picture at about this point. And it is here that the wife of the Soviet intelligence officer has been seen on many oc- casions to play a supporting operational role. Without specific referencv to lanbwage lessons which am by now a standard develonmental gambit, the KGB outlines in these words:

"It is often helpful if tl~, wife with him when vi under drvclopmrot. Wi... .... ,..,. ,.., .,..,,, ..., officer ciln clarify ~~:rtdin points of infurtniltlon or arsesmunt wnct*ming tllc turgct individual and thereby dstmnine huw h i t to stmngthm h with him."

In the early stages of direct culti .-..-.., --.. venation is on harmless topics, sport, art, life in each other's country, etc. The Soviet may say he is bored with life in a foreign country, perhaps bored with his own countrymen, lonely for new and stimulating companionship. Controvisial sub- jects are avoided or glos.>,, ' over. This whole preparatory process 1 1 . c ~ a I .hose; assessment of the American's potential 11 i c t~lness for espionage and assessment of him from the standpoint of the possibility of recruitment. This requires knowl- edge of the American's personal history, his family situation, his 6nancial standing (most important, as already indicated), his unfulfilled ambitions and possible weaknesses for women. During this assess- ment stage, the Soviet seeks to cement the friend- ship and at the same time--usually through gifts- create a sense of obligation for hospitality. Given the Soviet concept that money is the all-important American motivation, tactics may sometimes be ludicrously crude and include direct and very per- sonal questioning about the American's income and debts, how much he pays for rent, the amount of his taxes, etc.

within week . . . - . . - . - -. ,

emerge, it1

as in the scribed. to help hi1 nerhens f~

itl~ough at firs case of the The Soviet u n collect irtfo~ . 3 .

,e recogai.zabl nt already d merican trier overt nature- .*. ,

.. -. -- D- 18

) meet, Several cc r worth

b: way of CI

. .- -.--.. ;. Use of n s career n is a re- rd outside ... .L.-

the role of thl o Soviet wife

regards e factor

1 .. e intelligcn~v o siting the hutnc ,.h hi. ... ir....

Rimr takes his r of a person ....<... . ..... ". .I...

:GB, by its o cnt as normal . .

wn doctrine, Ily the decisiv . 1

)nn which ca tail.

for black.

st European ldard operatis

tlce agalnst wesrerners, ~ncluding Amen erating on their own grounds, the KG1 cooperating Bloc services can work u trolled conditions to secure disasterousl mising evidence (usually photographic corded on tape) which is then used as a means or recruitment. The well-publicized case of Irwin Scarbeck, the Foreign Service officer stationed in Warsaw who became involved with a female Polish agent and was blackmailed into accepting recruit- r mus example? nf nnera- t

and the Ea kmail is stan

c o d e s , onal prac-

n..

In Moscow owever, hlac . . ...

L-a"". vy B and the lnder con- y compro- and/or re-

e . . . they u me because I ry that, unfo vith them. 'I . .. -.

till speak i o am a* diplom rtunately, do rherefore, as . .

nenf is only ions of this 1

Sexuul and

one of nume] dnd.

A number of actual ana lnclplenr sexual ap- proaches overseas to Americans outside the Com- munist Bloc have been mentioned both in detail and in passing reference in this study. Although the KGB attempt to recruit Eleanor, the Bonn embassy file clerk, was based on shock tactics and threats against her own safety and the life of he1 supposed American fiance, the operation against her was, in its opening stages, a clear-cut case of seduo

one day, u I and mutual le brought to

there of war :mitment pm 1 a request f

. * .

NTIAL

i

48 CONFID

ENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

~omoscxu~~l. ,asis of black ~f his homosr . .

tion which was accomplishrul In a matter of weeks. In the case of the c~nbu~sy src.rr.lltry in Africa whose local lover was in con1ut.l with u Soviet intelligence olcer, it seems likcly tl lnt 11t.r srxui~l involvement wns to Iiave In?on io<lirvctly c-xploited on Soviet behalf. '1'11~ AID Mirsir~n .icc.rctary in the Far E u t who scccptcd II lotlcr from a Soviet visitor and appur~:~~lly gi~ve in to his romuntic overtures prior to her Illrnovrr to :I I c r d KGB officer was almost c~.rt:tir~ly spotted in udvuncc as being sus- ceptible to this type of ~~ppronch.

In at lcast one n-ccnt instance outside the Com- munist Bloc, 1110 KCD is known to have recruited- 'hen clir~,ctrd agiiir~st Americans--a European

l'hc: recruitment itself was not on the mail (thc European made no secret xuulity and had no fear of exposure

In this scorc), but onru: the agent had been re- cruited, thr: Soviets sought to exploit the homo- sexuul aspec't. l'11r:y financed the agent's move to an apnrimcnt sl~itable lor entertaining and asked him to report on oEcial Americans of his acquaint- ance who might be active or latent homosexuals. The np?,ent W I I ~ unsuccessful in this assignment, but if he hnd Ina~:n able to identify and establish a compron>ising rclntionship with such a person, it is likcly tl~ut the KCB would have considered blackmi~il us a recruitment technique. The KGB is known to regnrd evidence of homos( particularly damaging information wh ploitable by blilckmail.

Trips to the Communist Bloc

The KGB is known to have instruct€ ,dencies, as part of the operational progr; Americans abroad, to "find opportunit ganize trips to the USSR and ; :he Peop cracies for targets under dr\ ,,)merit." .=.- son for this technique is ob\ i0 .s . It gives the Sc- viets an opportunity, on their own gmunds and at leisure, to assess an agent prospect in greater depth

1 . than is often possible in the West and to carry through the operation to recruitment under cir- cumstances overwhelmingly favorable to them.

: . (In some cases where recruitments have been made in the West, the new agent is taken to the USSR or to one of the Bloc countries for intensive training in his agent assignment. The KGB and GRU can arrange this without a Soviet visa showing in the American's passport.) Examples of such invita-

?xuality as ich is ex-

d its resi- am against ies to or- les' Demc-

TI.- -e..

I attempts to le local Peace :IS to cancel . . - .

ip to Moscow. ~fficer switch1 can to come

, When it ed to a ne to the USS teacher. ' . -

tions are numerous and one will s d c e to illustrate ~ how they usually come about. Several years ago, an AID o5cer in Pakistan was cultivated on a social relationship basis by Leonid Gavrilovich Kuimov, an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover as a first secretary. In the now familiar pattern, the Soviet drought small gifts to the American's family and the two men before long were in the habit of seeing each other several times a week, often dropping in on one another. The Soviet finally asked for an AID Mission pocket telephone direc- tory and was given an outdated and generally available copy. He then probed several times to see if the American might be interested in a 'spe- cial deal" on a vacation tr, lis was refused, the Soviet I 'w tack; he urged the Ameri iR for a period and accept work as a 'It would be a valuable experienm,' he said. -and you would be highly paid."

The Soviets are also interested in attracting to the USSR as tourists persons whom they have spotted as potential recruitment targets. For ex- ample, in 1966 three female Peace Corps volunteers in Turkey visited the Ankara office of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, to arrange a tourist trip to the USSR. While in the ofice, they met three So- viets (all of them intelligence officers) who were persistent ir cultivate them. A short time later, tl I Corps director persuaded the volunte~ their plans for the trip. When the local lntounst representative, a KGB agent, was told of the cancellation, he promptly lowered his previously set "minimum" price for the tour from $250 to $102. (The Peace Corps, of course, is an attractive target for Soviet Intelligence since many former volunteers have entered U.S. Government service and others can be expected to do so in future. Various types of Soviet efforts at cultivation of Peace Corps personnel have been reported from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.)

False Flog

The S~.\iet technique of 'false flap on or attempted recruitment has been ill 3v- era1 times and is mentioned again , sis because it is extremely hard td recognize or detect until the Soviet hand comes out in the open (if it ever does). In its purest form the Soviet hand should not show at all since the essence of this

cultivati ustrated sc for empha

.. l~nique involves the recruiter (Soviet national tii~t~-Soviet agent) pretending to represent a non-

.\lr.t intelligence service or commercial or indus- * I organization, in cases where the American

.g,:rt is considered unlikely to have any a5nity the Soviet cause. An American of German

.*raction might be asked to covertly help his coun- of origin or an American of Jewish faith might wked to serve the Israeli intelligence service.

Department of State communications tech- man, whose case has been described, was asked . ollsborate with the intelligence service of his

. $ I European country of ethnic origin-yet the rution was Soviet and involved a Soviet Illegal. - Ultan case was a variation ol uic Ibnique.

* :ombits for Conta

strike up an informal acquaintance. X few ago in Syria it was noted that Konstantin L a Soviet intelligenoe 05a?r, was in the ha1 spending the greater part of three days a weev at the diplomatic community swimming pool, engag- ing ,English-speaking wives in conversation while their h~~+~ands were at work,

In Tripoli the KGB instruction about stamp col- lecting was taken quite literally by Soviet intelli- gence personnel. Some of them were seen carry- ing folders of postage stamps about town and using them to strike up conversations in bars, cafes and other public places. If the person approached in this manner admitted an interest in stamps, the So- viet would hand over his packet, suggest that the potential target take it home to study and decide which exemplars he would like to have. This. of

Years doze], bit of . .

course, wouid open the door to another meeting I he variety of ways wnlcn lnrerugence at which stamps would indeed be &cussed, and . '' to 'pen up contact with Americans possibly exchanged, but the bulk of the time would atad and to ensure the prospect of follow-up

be spent by the Soviet officer in building rapport, ..clngs is impressive. In the case histories al- , ,ogaphic and employment information I v we have seen Soviet officers ap and la iing the groundwork for subsequent meetings. trh Americans on the street, in bars. at private

I W S and receptions, through the intermediary of , a dationals, e tc A KGB instructional docu-

41 makes further suggestions:

'-In order- to widcn the mpe of hir mVFr far meeting Anmwicnns . . . the intelligence officer may engage in ntnrtE, actively concern hir~urlf with certain aspeits of .. trnce or art, or take up a hobby. Examples include I~*lming,.tennir, stamp collecting and coin collecting."

ilen above instructions have been faithfully fol- . . < I in every part of the world and actually

ouved on. Soviets, as already shown, have or- ,,rd games such as the volley ball series played \'l~.nna, have sought out Americans to give uage lessons to themselves or their wives and taken to frequenting bowling alleys and even

nrln guard quarters abroad. Grigoriy Iosifovich I~arov, a GRU officer recently in Rabat, spent a

I part of his time on the beach looking for tlrnn military personnel with whom he could

The GRU showed considerable ingenuity in stag- ing an incident in Brussels in 1988 which was in- tended to bring one of their officers into contact with an American female employee of the M U G Mission. Returning home one day, the American woman found a Soviet female, apparently ill, lean- ing against the wall outside her door. Her agitated male companion, Vladimir I. Cheretun who posed as Aeroflot representative in Belgium, asked if he could bring his wife into the American home to rest. Once inside, the Soviet female (never identified) made a rapid recovery while Cheretun attempted to ingratiate himself with the American woman. He made a second-and unsuccessful-attempt at cultivation a few months later by approaching the American on the street. Cheretun was appre- hended by Belgian authorities in 1967 and forced to leave the country because of his intelligence activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 4

CONFIDENTIAL

5 5

ENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

~omoscxu~~l. ,asis of black ~f his homosr . .

tion which was accomplishrul In a matter of weeks. In the case of the c~nbu~sy src.rr.lltry in Africa whose local lover was in con1ut.l with u Soviet intelligence olcer, it seems likcly tl lnt 11t.r srxui~l involvement wns to Iiave In?on io<lirvctly c-xploited on Soviet behalf. '1'11~ AID Mirsir~n .icc.rctary in the Far E u t who scccptcd II lotlcr from a Soviet visitor and appur~:~~lly gi~ve in to his romuntic overtures prior to her Illrnovrr to :I I c r d KGB officer was almost c~.rt:tir~ly spotted in udvuncc as being sus- ceptible to this type of ~~ppronch.

In at lcast one n-ccnt instance outside the Com- munist Bloc, 1110 KCD is known to have recruited- 'hen clir~,ctrd agiiir~st Americans--a European

l'hc: recruitment itself was not on the mail (thc European made no secret xuulity and had no fear of exposure

In this scorc), but onru: the agent had been re- cruited, thr: Soviets sought to exploit the homo- sexuul aspec't. l'11r:y financed the agent's move to an apnrimcnt sl~itable lor entertaining and asked him to report on oEcial Americans of his acquaint- ance who might be active or latent homosexuals. The np?,ent W I I ~ unsuccessful in this assignment, but if he hnd Ina~:n able to identify and establish a compron>ising rclntionship with such a person, it is likcly tl~ut the KCB would have considered blackmi~il us a recruitment technique. The KGB is known to regnrd evidence of homos( particularly damaging information wh ploitable by blilckmail.

Trips to the Communist Bloc

The KGB is known to have instruct€ ,dencies, as part of the operational progr; Americans abroad, to "find opportunit ganize trips to the USSR and ; :he Peop cracies for targets under dr\ ,,)merit." .=.- son for this technique is ob\ i0 .s . It gives the Sc- viets an opportunity, on their own gmunds and at leisure, to assess an agent prospect in greater depth

1 . than is often possible in the West and to carry through the operation to recruitment under cir- cumstances overwhelmingly favorable to them.

: . (In some cases where recruitments have been made in the West, the new agent is taken to the USSR or to one of the Bloc countries for intensive training in his agent assignment. The KGB and GRU can arrange this without a Soviet visa showing in the American's passport.) Examples of such invita-

?xuality as ich is ex-

d its resi- am against ies to or- les' Demc-

TI.- -e..

I attempts to le local Peace :IS to cancel . . - .

ip to Moscow. ~fficer switch1 can to come

, When it ed to a ne to the USS teacher. ' . -

tions are numerous and one will s d c e to illustrate ~ how they usually come about. Several years ago, an AID o5cer in Pakistan was cultivated on a social relationship basis by Leonid Gavrilovich Kuimov, an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover as a first secretary. In the now familiar pattern, the Soviet drought small gifts to the American's family and the two men before long were in the habit of seeing each other several times a week, often dropping in on one another. The Soviet finally asked for an AID Mission pocket telephone direc- tory and was given an outdated and generally available copy. He then probed several times to see if the American might be interested in a 'spe- cial deal" on a vacation tr, lis was refused, the Soviet I 'w tack; he urged the Ameri iR for a period and accept work as a 'It would be a valuable experienm,' he said. -and you would be highly paid."

The Soviets are also interested in attracting to the USSR as tourists persons whom they have spotted as potential recruitment targets. For ex- ample, in 1966 three female Peace Corps volunteers in Turkey visited the Ankara office of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, to arrange a tourist trip to the USSR. While in the ofice, they met three So- viets (all of them intelligence officers) who were persistent ir cultivate them. A short time later, tl I Corps director persuaded the volunte~ their plans for the trip. When the local lntounst representative, a KGB agent, was told of the cancellation, he promptly lowered his previously set "minimum" price for the tour from $250 to $102. (The Peace Corps, of course, is an attractive target for Soviet Intelligence since many former volunteers have entered U.S. Government service and others can be expected to do so in future. Various types of Soviet efforts at cultivation of Peace Corps personnel have been reported from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.)

False Flog

The S~.\iet technique of 'false flap on or attempted recruitment has been ill 3v- era1 times and is mentioned again , sis because it is extremely hard td recognize or detect until the Soviet hand comes out in the open (if it ever does). In its purest form the Soviet hand should not show at all since the essence of this

cultivati ustrated sc for empha

.. l~nique involves the recruiter (Soviet national tii~t~-Soviet agent) pretending to represent a non-

.\lr.t intelligence service or commercial or indus- * I organization, in cases where the American

.g,:rt is considered unlikely to have any a5nity the Soviet cause. An American of German

.*raction might be asked to covertly help his coun- of origin or an American of Jewish faith might wked to serve the Israeli intelligence service.

Department of State communications tech- man, whose case has been described, was asked . ollsborate with the intelligence service of his

. $ I European country of ethnic origin-yet the rution was Soviet and involved a Soviet Illegal. - Ultan case was a variation ol uic Ibnique.

* :ombits for Conta

strike up an informal acquaintance. X few ago in Syria it was noted that Konstantin L a Soviet intelligenoe 05a?r, was in the ha1 spending the greater part of three days a weev at the diplomatic community swimming pool, engag- ing ,English-speaking wives in conversation while their h~~+~ands were at work,

In Tripoli the KGB instruction about stamp col- lecting was taken quite literally by Soviet intelli- gence personnel. Some of them were seen carry- ing folders of postage stamps about town and using them to strike up conversations in bars, cafes and other public places. If the person approached in this manner admitted an interest in stamps, the So- viet would hand over his packet, suggest that the potential target take it home to study and decide which exemplars he would like to have. This. of

Years doze], bit of . .

course, wouid open the door to another meeting I he variety of ways wnlcn lnrerugence at which stamps would indeed be &cussed, and . '' to 'pen up contact with Americans possibly exchanged, but the bulk of the time would atad and to ensure the prospect of follow-up

be spent by the Soviet officer in building rapport, ..clngs is impressive. In the case histories al- , ,ogaphic and employment information I v we have seen Soviet officers ap and la iing the groundwork for subsequent meetings. trh Americans on the street, in bars. at private

I W S and receptions, through the intermediary of , a dationals, e tc A KGB instructional docu-

41 makes further suggestions:

'-In order- to widcn the mpe of hir mVFr far meeting Anmwicnns . . . the intelligence officer may engage in ntnrtE, actively concern hir~urlf with certain aspeits of .. trnce or art, or take up a hobby. Examples include I~*lming,.tennir, stamp collecting and coin collecting."

ilen above instructions have been faithfully fol- . . < I in every part of the world and actually

ouved on. Soviets, as already shown, have or- ,,rd games such as the volley ball series played \'l~.nna, have sought out Americans to give uage lessons to themselves or their wives and taken to frequenting bowling alleys and even

nrln guard quarters abroad. Grigoriy Iosifovich I~arov, a GRU officer recently in Rabat, spent a

I part of his time on the beach looking for tlrnn military personnel with whom he could

The GRU showed considerable ingenuity in stag- ing an incident in Brussels in 1988 which was in- tended to bring one of their officers into contact with an American female employee of the M U G Mission. Returning home one day, the American woman found a Soviet female, apparently ill, lean- ing against the wall outside her door. Her agitated male companion, Vladimir I. Cheretun who posed as Aeroflot representative in Belgium, asked if he could bring his wife into the American home to rest. Once inside, the Soviet female (never identified) made a rapid recovery while Cheretun attempted to ingratiate himself with the American woman. He made a second-and unsuccessful-attempt at cultivation a few months later by approaching the American on the street. Cheretun was appre- hended by Belgian authorities in 1967 and forced to leave the country because of his intelligence activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 4

CONFIDENTIAL

5 5

CONFIUCN I 1 . u CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX OF NAMES

VI. CO ......................... Aodreyev, Andray N i l r o l a ~ c h ......................... Balashov, Vitaliy Dmitriyevich

Beck, Jd . . . . . . . . . . ............ Cheretuq Vladirnir I. ............ Drummond, Nelson C. ............ -Eleanor1 . . . . . . . . . . . ............ Fateyev, Albert Geoagl, ............ Filatov, Robespier N. ........... Goncharov, Grigoriy Iosifovich . . Ilyintsev, Valentin Ivanovich . . . . . Johnson, Robert L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Korotkikb, Nikolay Ckqiyevich . ............. a Kuimov, Leonid Gavrilovich ............................... 50

................................ Lomakiu, Pave1 Ivanovicb 3 Losev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ........................... 17 'Madame X ........................................... 33.37, Matzdorff, Emst . . . . . Mintkenbaugh, James 1 MozeS Konstanti~~ . . Muratov, Yevgeni, :eo . Ogorodnikov, Annroliy .-,..- .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prokhorov, Yevgeniy Mikhayhvich ........... Putyatov, Vladimir T. ........... Ranov, Nikolay Ivanov ........... Roganov, Aleksandr I. .................................. Runge, Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich . . . .......... Sakharovskiy, hleksahdr Mikhaylov Savelev, Mikhail Stepanovich ..... Scarbeck, Irwin .................. Semikov, .Oleg Aleksandrovich ............................. -* - Shchukin, Mikhail. ............... . . 11 Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikohyevich . .. 7 Sorokin, Vadirn Vladimirovich . . . . . . 15 Stein, George ........................................ 18,19,2C

................... szabo, Laszlo ............. 4

................... IJltan, Donald 9, lo, 11 ............. Volotskov, Viktor I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 17 Vyrodov, Ivan Yakovlavlch ....... ............. 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wennerstroem, Stig ............. 32.33.34 %ostrovtsev, Yevgeniy Aleltseyevicl Yrlenin, Andrey Nikohyevid ....

. . . yorln, Vderian Aleksandrovich

bad than in the United States, nor of ths ew that the American we~ear ten& to guard down, to talk freely about himself, ~ t e without suspicion +ith foreignm. The 1

soviets take fuU advantaee of the off-duty freedom , of movement and assoc A m e r i w have abroad. They find it asy to establish direct personal contac tion and assess. ment; they also manit ty of local non- Soviet agents and willing coUaaoratOrJ.

The efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain secret information through recruitment of Americans and penetration 01 U.S. installatio~ls abroad are, as this study has shown, world-wide in scope, massive in proportions, tenacious and persistent, and often highly imaginative. KGB and CRU targets are. varied and include privute as well as official Ameri- cans. But the most aggressive operational activity

I : is directed against junior employees of diplomatic and other official establisllments and against enlisted personnel a services. Priority is given to code a! :ations personnel, Marine guards, file iecretaries, a broad group- ing which ' ;ard as particularly vulner- able and relatively easy to approach

The KCB doctrinal concept of the a can, his psychological makeup, matel and primary interest in money and more of it, which this study has documenteo, IS a challenging one and may seem grossly distorted to most readers. Nevertheless, it has obviously proven to be true in many individual cases in which the Soviets have made successful and highly rewarding recruitments. As a sweeping generali- zation, the i been proven in error by many Sovi it failures, even after care- ful assessn aration. The record shows that Amer )up are loyal to their coun-

try and have proven harder for the Soviets to IC cruit than any other nationality. advantage is partially offset by the United States is "the main enemy" and CRU devote more time and effort to recrul

.ations against Americans than nationals ler co~~niTy.

9 no reason to doubt the validity of the ~erienw that it is easier to recruit hmeri-

cans abrc Soviet vim have his to associa - .

:iarion which relatively er

% for cultival )date a varie . . . .

tf the military nd cornmunil clerks and 1

the Soviet reg . . .

Examples of many Soviet operational t-91 have been shown in this study. Sometimes tl are apparent, even obvious. But they are of subtle and indirect. Soviet methods of spotti assessment, cultivation and recmihnent are ex. / tremely varied and limited only by local opem tional resources and by the imagination of thr Soviet intelligence officer. The effectiveness d these methods is conditioned by the degree d American appreciation of Soviet intentions, understanding of Soviet techniques and a const alertness to any possible manifestations of eitl

verage Ameri ialistic natun how to makl . . .

It is most important to remember that SOV in the West, as a general rule, are not permitt- to make unofficial, social contacts with American unless there are intelligence reasons for doing an Casual, seemingly non-contrived contact with 8 Soviet should be reported in all cases to approprialc

authorities. Abnormally inquisitive no / the part of non-Soviets, especially regard I

;raphic information, private and official .o and the personal financial status of Ameh :ials and employees abroad should be notd

.ity authoritie Pe position to ot ma ntelligence o I t provide appl ida

: concept ha: et recmitmer lent and prep icans as a grc

security is tions on

ing biog tivities,

!- can 06%

However, thi fact that th

and the KG

ment ope1 of any otl

and rep possess, identify agents a

~orted. ~ e c ; ~ or are in a ]

ing Soviet i! md are able tc

:s will frec ,tain, infor fficeI-9 and mpriate gui

There i! Soviet rxp

CONFIDENTIAL

5 6

CONFIUCN I 1 . u CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX OF NAMES

VI. CO ......................... Aodreyev, Andray N i l r o l a ~ c h ......................... Balashov, Vitaliy Dmitriyevich

Beck, Jd . . . . . . . . . . ............ Cheretuq Vladirnir I. ............ Drummond, Nelson C. ............ -Eleanor1 . . . . . . . . . . . ............ Fateyev, Albert Geoagl, ............ Filatov, Robespier N. ........... Goncharov, Grigoriy Iosifovich . . Ilyintsev, Valentin Ivanovich . . . . . Johnson, Robert L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Korotkikb, Nikolay Ckqiyevich . ............. a Kuimov, Leonid Gavrilovich ............................... 50

................................ Lomakiu, Pave1 Ivanovicb 3 Losev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ........................... 17 'Madame X ........................................... 33.37, Matzdorff, Emst . . . . . Mintkenbaugh, James 1 MozeS Konstanti~~ . . Muratov, Yevgeni, :eo . Ogorodnikov, Annroliy .-,..- .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prokhorov, Yevgeniy Mikhayhvich ........... Putyatov, Vladimir T. ........... Ranov, Nikolay Ivanov ........... Roganov, Aleksandr I. .................................. Runge, Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich . . . .......... Sakharovskiy, hleksahdr Mikhaylov Savelev, Mikhail Stepanovich ..... Scarbeck, Irwin .................. Semikov, .Oleg Aleksandrovich ............................. -* - Shchukin, Mikhail. ............... . . 11 Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikohyevich . .. 7 Sorokin, Vadirn Vladimirovich . . . . . . 15 Stein, George ........................................ 18,19,2C

................... szabo, Laszlo ............. 4

................... IJltan, Donald 9, lo, 11 ............. Volotskov, Viktor I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 17 Vyrodov, Ivan Yakovlavlch ....... ............. 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wennerstroem, Stig ............. 32.33.34 %ostrovtsev, Yevgeniy Aleltseyevicl Yrlenin, Andrey Nikohyevid ....

. . . yorln, Vderian Aleksandrovich

bad than in the United States, nor of ths ew that the American we~ear ten& to guard down, to talk freely about himself, ~ t e without suspicion +ith foreignm. The 1

soviets take fuU advantaee of the off-duty freedom , of movement and assoc A m e r i w have abroad. They find it asy to establish direct personal contac tion and assess. ment; they also manit ty of local non- Soviet agents and willing coUaaoratOrJ.

The efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain secret information through recruitment of Americans and penetration 01 U.S. installatio~ls abroad are, as this study has shown, world-wide in scope, massive in proportions, tenacious and persistent, and often highly imaginative. KGB and CRU targets are. varied and include privute as well as official Ameri- cans. But the most aggressive operational activity

I : is directed against junior employees of diplomatic and other official establisllments and against enlisted personnel a services. Priority is given to code a! :ations personnel, Marine guards, file iecretaries, a broad group- ing which ' ;ard as particularly vulner- able and relatively easy to approach

The KCB doctrinal concept of the a can, his psychological makeup, matel and primary interest in money and more of it, which this study has documenteo, IS a challenging one and may seem grossly distorted to most readers. Nevertheless, it has obviously proven to be true in many individual cases in which the Soviets have made successful and highly rewarding recruitments. As a sweeping generali- zation, the i been proven in error by many Sovi it failures, even after care- ful assessn aration. The record shows that Amer )up are loyal to their coun-

try and have proven harder for the Soviets to IC cruit than any other nationality. advantage is partially offset by the United States is "the main enemy" and CRU devote more time and effort to recrul

.ations against Americans than nationals ler co~~niTy.

9 no reason to doubt the validity of the ~erienw that it is easier to recruit hmeri-

cans abrc Soviet vim have his to associa - .

:iarion which relatively er

% for cultival )date a varie . . . .

tf the military nd cornmunil clerks and 1

the Soviet reg . . .

Examples of many Soviet operational t-91 have been shown in this study. Sometimes tl are apparent, even obvious. But they are of subtle and indirect. Soviet methods of spotti assessment, cultivation and recmihnent are ex. / tremely varied and limited only by local opem tional resources and by the imagination of thr Soviet intelligence officer. The effectiveness d these methods is conditioned by the degree d American appreciation of Soviet intentions, understanding of Soviet techniques and a const alertness to any possible manifestations of eitl

verage Ameri ialistic natun how to makl . . .

It is most important to remember that SOV in the West, as a general rule, are not permitt- to make unofficial, social contacts with American unless there are intelligence reasons for doing an Casual, seemingly non-contrived contact with 8 Soviet should be reported in all cases to approprialc

authorities. Abnormally inquisitive no / the part of non-Soviets, especially regard I

;raphic information, private and official .o and the personal financial status of Ameh :ials and employees abroad should be notd

.ity authoritie Pe position to ot ma ntelligence o I t provide appl ida

: concept ha: et recmitmer lent and prep icans as a grc

security is tions on

ing biog tivities,

!- can 06%

However, thi fact that th

and the KG

ment ope1 of any otl

and rep possess, identify agents a

~orted. ~ e c ; ~ or are in a ]

ing Soviet i! md are able tc

:s will frec ,tain, infor fficeI-9 and mpriate gui

There i! Soviet rxp

CONFIDENTIAL

5 6