Documents from the US Espionage Den Vol. 16

IN THE NANE OF GOD,THE #ERCIFUL

AND THE COMPASSIONATE . TELEGRAMS NO. TEHRAN 1 0 7 5 2 ,TEHRAN 10.3 4 2 ,!10Sr3W

I

2 2 1 56 ,TEHRAN 0 9 5 0 3 ,TEHRAN 9891 6 ,USICA 5 0 2 5 3 AN0

TEHRAN 58831 WERE THE LAST C O P I E S OF T H E I R O R I -

G I N A L TEXTS AND,THUS,VERY DULL I N COLORPTHEREF-

ORE THEIR PRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN BOOKS

WERE NOT FAYDRABLY P O S S I B L E . F O R T H I S REASON,THJ

ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE R&-TYPED. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

SUBJECT: Alternative Views from the Provinces

SUMMARY

Nine letters, written in both Farsi and Erfglish, re- c~ived during the past two months from as many Iranian friends -- former students, colleagues (high school teachers), and close friends -- living in Shiraz and Khorasan portray post-Pahlavi Iran in a somewhat different light than American Em- bassy and American press reporting. Shiraz and certain remote areas of Khorasan appear calm and peaceful, generally free of violent incidents. Inhabitants of these two areas have welcomed the demise of the Pahlavis and the establishment of an Islamic Republic, and yet criticize freely and fearlessly their new leaders, including Khomeini. Al- though high school students throughout Iran, even those in the remotest towns, were greatly politi- cized, schools were running normally by Now Ruz. Although a sense of betrayal and hyprocrisy of Carter's human rights policy led most to lividly condemn the USG, affection and respect remained for individual Americans. While the Correspondents recognized the great problems confronting post- Pahlavi Iran, few desire to flee. On the contrary, most of these nine correspondents, inspired by the undreamed of quick success of the Revolution in toppling the Shah, seek to participate actively in the transformation of their society. In short, these predominantly young, lower-to-middle class "provincials" remain optimistic six months after the Shah's departure.

The diversity In correspondents is great: in education, from eleventh graders in high school to two masters degree holders; in age, from sixteen to about fifty-five; in experience, from an isolated villager who has only traveled to Mashhad once or twice in his life to an urbane Shirazi who has traveled widely in Europe (but not the US); in social class, from tribal lower class to urban upper middle class.

In only two respects can the correspondence of such a varied group be generalized. First, all now approve wholeheartedly of the overthrow of the Shah. Several students participated

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actively in street demonstrations during the Revolution, while others (Shirazi teachers) waited on the sidelines ti1 the outcome was certain. Several are vociferous in their criticism of the dyarchy; i.e., Khomeini and the PGOI, replacing the Shah -- but none feel the present leaders begin to compare in venality, tyranny, and corruption with those of the ancien regime.

Second, with the exception of one unsigned letter vehe- mently critical of ~hotbzadeh's management of NIRT and Yazdi's stewardship of MFA, all wrote openly and fearlessly, oblivious to any supposed new reign of censorship. The tone in the letters was strikingly different from ones received from the same corespondents under the Shah: Then, never a direct criticism of HIM was,penned and only the most convoluted indirect ones. Now, Khomeini, Bazargan, Ministers and government policies are unabashedly and directly criticized.

The degree of politicization of the youth is remarkable, encompassing not only the previously politically aware students of Tribal High School (THS) in Shiraz, but also those of a small isolated town near the Afghan border who prior to the Revolution concerned themselves with little more than football, family chores and ardesh One Khorasani student writes simply, " W h e n b i t youth of Iran were being killed, I was only thinking about volley- ball. Funny, isn't it? During the Revolution many things changed, and so did I. I'm not the same Ali anymore."

Students at Tribal H.S. write of the confrontations between Islamic and leftist student groups for control of the curriculum and administration. One week English, "the language of the imperialists", was voted out of the THS curriculum, only to be reinstated the following week. By Now Ruz, however, passing year-end exams vied with political consciousness-raising sessions for students' attentions. Even at Shiraz University (the old Pahlavi U), a considerable number of students had opted to attend classes, although they could participate in "political activities* and not attend classes one semester without losing their "registered" student status.

Nearly all strongly condemned the USG's human rights policy, perceived to be applied hypocritically in Iran. One student drew the analogy between US support of the Shah and Somoza; several drew parallels to American intervention in Vietnam.

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While bitterly attacking the USG (frequently citing Carter by name) for its last ditch support of the Shah and sale of 'murderous" weapons to HIM, most correspondents were careful to distinguish between USG policies and individual Americans. Respect and fondness for individual Americans remained as that for the USG plummeted to new depths.

Although ethnic battles among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turko- mans were mentioned,' no disturbances i~ Shiraz or Khorasan were cited. Incidentally, several correspondents (themselves of Qashqai or Sunni Persian origin, and possibly harboring autonomy sentiments) criticized the severity of the PGOI's actions to squelch ethnic demands.

Former Shirazi colleagues, admitting the slow pace followed by PGOI's implementing its socio-economic policies, generally praised the nationalization of undeveloped lots within the city and plans for construction of housing for the poor on them. They pleaded for time for the well- intentioned Bezargan government.

Khorasani friends noted little material difference in their small town but a profound change in inhabitants' "minds".

Several correspondents, while criticizing NIRT's ~atpntly pro-Khomeini and pro-"republic of the akhunds~f~&m"e'n)ted on the remarkable freedom of the press. One former Shirazi colleague noted he was spending much of his time reading all the books, from Shari~ti to Marx, now easily available, that he could not legally obtain during the past twenty-six years.

Finally, among the nine correspondents, only two expressed any. desire to leave Iran. One, a retiring teacher, would like to visit his son studying in Texas for a few months. The other, a student from a well-educated upper-middle class Shirazi family, wishes to study economics in England upon completion of high school next year. All the others, both teachers and students who, before, had frequently confided their desire to go abroad for further education, now intended ,to remain in Iran and participate in the reconstruction of their society. Far from wallowing in dire predictions of national doom and catastrophe, they remained cautiously optimistic about Iran's future as well as their own.

NEA/IRN:BHanson July 31, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

3

IRAN: Communication Environment Problems, Prospects, Ideas

PREMISE:

U.S.-Iran relations are very problematical.

While we have been urged by the Tehran Government to give evidence of our intentions to normalize relations, the Qom faction, specifically Khomeini, the press, and others continue to rail against us as the nefarious, imperialistic hand behind Iran's problems.

Iran's domestic policies - executions, at tacks on the Kurds, expulsion of foreign correspondents, newspaper closures -- have exacerbated an already negative sense of the "new Iran" here in the U.S., and cause us serious difficulties in projecting any "warming" of relations. We should avoid any gestures which might be construed, either here or there, as supportive of these policies.

At the same time, our interests in Iran remain considerable, not the least of which is oil. Since an Islamic Government in some form or other (with religious leadership continuing t o play a pivotal role) i s likely for the foreseeable future, we must, in a measured way, convey our benign intentions and assure Iran that we both wish them well and intend not to involve ourselves in their domestic affairs.

ASSETS:

Large numbers of U.S. and western educated Iranians among whom we can expect a reservoir of essential good will and from whom we can expect Western oriented decision-making.

U.S. expertise in fields of concern t o Iran: business, technology, agriculture, education, defense.

U.S. position as a necessary counter to a perceived worse danger --the U.S.S.R.

An official government (as opposed to the Qom faction) which has given indications of being pragmatic, non-extremist, and interested in normalized U.S.-Iran relations.

Large numbers of Iranian students who are or wish to be in the U.S.

LIABILITIES:

Our minimal ability to influence kanian events.

Ayatollah Khomeini who, in addition to fathering Iran's extremist policies and pronouncements, seems heatedly anti-U.S.

Our minimal ability to communicate with the religious leadership and lower clam majority of Iranians.

The "secret hand" theory which is deep in the Iranian grain and blames the U.S. (among others) for ban's many problems.

The widely held determination to "root out foreign influence."

An officially sanctioned press which has been vitrlolically anti-U.S.

Heatedly anti-Zionist sentiment and the identification of U.S. policies a s supportive of Zionism against Islamic and Arab interests.

Identification of the U.S. with the Shah's government and all of i ts excesses.

OBJECTIVES:

Suggest that the U.S. will not involve itself in Iran's internal affairs, that we wish them well and that our interests are coterminous in our mutual desire for a peaceful, stable and independent Iran.

Promote a dialogue with Iran's new leadership.

Rebuild a meaningful and mutually beneficial long term relationship.

DANGERS:

To the extent that we move away from our current very low profile approach, we risk further assaults (verbal certainly and perhaps other). This IS

particularly true a t a time when Iran is facing massive internal problems and frustrations, all of which feed the "secret hand" theory of foreign meddling.

Without prudence, any "warming' of ow relations may appear to be an endorsement of those of Iran's current policies which are in violation of ow human rights positions.

Assuming an evolution of the present government to other forms and atyler in the future, too close an identification with a government inaeaaingly known for its excesses could leave w v&_51:able to the =me L i d of charges we faced with the fall of the Shah's government.

RECOMMENDATION:

Despite problems, and the potential for problemr, the significance of ow interests in Iran recommends that we explore opportunities to build a dia-

th an's new 1&ership. At the same time, thew efforts should, z " l " h e w term, be both measured and low key, emphasizing our long term relationship with Iran rather than s h a t term tactical gains.

USICA: WHAT ARE WE DOING? WHAT MIGHT WE DO?

CURRENT OPERATIONS:

- Support to the Binational Centers (Iran America Societies) in Tehran and Isfahan.

- Support to English language teaching through the BNCs in Tehran and Isfahan.

- USICA library in Tehran. - Student counseling through AMIDEAST, a t the BNC and at the USICA

library. - VOA Persian language broadcasting. - Press work. - (Limited) magazine distribution to institutions. - Giant assistance to the American Institute of Iranian Studies. - Fulbright program (grants to Iranians continue, Americans in Iran currently

in abeyance)

WHAT MIGHT WE DO?

- Expanded VOA Persian broadcasting (will be increased one how) - American participant visits. - Resumption of Iran America Society English teaching in Shiraz. - Film programs at the BNC. - A project to bring Iranian religious figures to the U.S. for the Hejira

anniversary ce1ebra:ions. A specid seminar? Travel around the U.S. in connection with the celebrations?

- A Branch PA0 in Isfahan next year?

OTHER IDEAS?

Suggest convening a special meeting to consider idea8 for restoring a dialogue with Iranians. This should include the private sector, Iranologiats, Ramsey Clark? Religious or theological figures? USICA and M R can co-sponmr. '

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NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/3

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/1

RUQMAR RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT

RUFMPS RUSNAAA

DE RUQmR #8831/01 219 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

R 0710042 AUG 79 CHRGE: STATE 8/7/79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGEN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3105 DRFTD: ADM:TESKUD:GO

INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0218 CLEAR: P0L:VLTOMSETH

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0210 DISTR: POL2 CHG ADM RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0222 ICA ECON

RPQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0193 RF

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0254 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0248

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0260 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0220

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0309

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0188

RtJEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0230

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0118 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0267

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08831

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/7/85 ( SKUD, TIMOTRY E.) OR-?

TAGS: PINS, ECON, PORS, MILI, SCUL,ELAB, IR

SUBJECT: ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ

1. ( C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY SPENT ABOUT TWO WEEKS IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. HE FOUND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

RELATIVELY GERAT BUT UNEMPLOYMENT HIGH. REVOLUTIONARY

COMMITTEES IN BOTH CITIES REMAIN ACTIVE. THE TRIBES

OF FARS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE U.S.

IS STILL WIDELY BLAMED FOR IRAN'S TROUBLES. TNCLUDING

THE REVOLUTION ITSELF. SKUD FOUND GROWING UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS DISSATISFACTION BUT THE LOWFR CLASS REMAINS

GENERALLY LOYAL TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN SITUATION OF THE END SUMMARY.

MILITARY.

3. EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY PAID VISITS TWO CONSULATES IN

SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. THE FIRST IMPRESSION OF SHIRAZ WAS

THAT THE CITY HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE BAZAAR WAS

ACTIVE, MOST RESTAURANTS AND THEATRES HAVE REOPENEB

AND THE STREETS ARE BUSY UNTIL LATE AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, MOSS FACTORIES AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REMAIN INACTIVE OR WORK HALF-DAYS ( WHICH ARE CONSUMED BY TEA-DRINKING

AND CONVERSATION). LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED COULD BE SEEN ON STREET COWERS OR AT PUBLIC OFFICES BRINGING

THEIR PLIGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,

THE LABOR OFFICE, OR THE KOMITEH. ANOTHER SIGN OF THE

REVOLUTION IS TVE PROLIFERATION OF KIOSKS AND SIDEWALK VENDFRB , WHO FORMERLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MOVE ON.

-- 4. THE CITY WAS RESPLENDENT FOR THE CELEBRATION

ORDERED BY KHOMEINI OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE HIDDEN IMAM. CITY STREETS AND SHOPS WERE LAVISHLY DECORATED. A

LARGE BALLOON INSCRIBED WITH THE NAME OF THE PROPHET

DIOATED OVER A DOWNTOWN MOSQUE. FESTIVITIES WERE MARKED BY DEMONSTR4TORS SHOUTIN9 " DEATH TO THE COMMUNISTS AND

SPEECHES BY NIRT HEAD QOTB-ZADEH (WHO DID NOT CONVI CING-

LY DENY PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS). THERE WAS SCATTERED

SHOOTING AT NIGHT AND A BUILDING ON AN ARMY COMPOUND

WAS SET AFIRE.

5. WHILE EMBOFF WAS IN SHIRAZ CONSULATE WAS VISITED BY

TEMBERS OF LOCAL COMMITTEE-WHO WHISHED TO LIBERATE/PROTECT THE CONSULATE VEHICLES. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED WITH A

PHONE CALL TO THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL. CONSULATE

EMPLOYEE WITH NATIONAL POLICE CONNECTIONS RECONGNIZED

ONE KOMITEII RUNNER, ENGINEER ABDULLAHI, AS A FORMER

HA~~GER-ON AT SAVAK AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE. HE HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO HITCH HIS WAGON TO ANOTHER STAR.

6. IN SHIRAZ (AS IN ISFAHAN) THE CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL HAS

BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE COMMITTEE. THE SHIRAZ CHRISTIAN

HOSPITAL WAS MORE OF A PRIVATE INSTITUTION THAN A MISSION, AND RUN BY A LOCAL CHRISTIAN. OTHFR PRIVATE HOSPITALS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN OVER.

7. ALTHOUGH SHIRAZ HAS ONLY ONF KOMITER, IT IS

CONTROLLED BY SEVERAL AYATOLLAHS WHO VIE FOR POWER WITHIN

THE STRIJCTURE. A LOCAL RFSTAURANT OWNFR EXPLAINED THAT

ONE WAY A MULLAH COULD STRFNGTHFN HTS POWER BASE WAS BY

RFCRUTTING GREATER NUMBERS OF PASDARANS INTO HIS CAMP. THF OllALITY OF THE RECRIITT IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE

ADDITTON OF ONE MORE BODY TO TOTE A GllN. CONSEQUENTLY, ANY YOUTH WHO TTHES OF CLASSES OR lrlORKTNO IN DAD'$ SHOP OR 1,OOKTNG FOR WnRK CAN AFCOMF A PROTECTOR OF GOD AND CnllNTRY. THE WITIjI~TN(: 01' CTVTI, AIITAORTTY BY THESE ('ALLOW YOIITHS PRESFNTS A MAJOR ORSTACLE TO THE EXTENSION OF CENTRAI, OOVFRNMFNT AIITHORITY AND NORMALIZATION.

ClIRRFNTLY THE LEADTNn MIILLAH IN FHIRA7 IS AYATOLLAH

RAlU3ANT-FtlIRA7T WHO TS RAID TO RE PERSONALLY DEPUTED

PY KIIOMEINT .

R . THF THTRER TN PhPS PROVINCE HAVF REMAINED FAIRLY

Q11TET . THE LARQFST AND MOST POlv'FRFIlL TRIBE, THE

RT

# 8831

CONFIDENTIAI, TEHRAN 8831/1

la


QASHQAIS, IS LED BY NASSER KHAN AND KHOSROW KHAN, BOTH RECENTLY RETURNED FROM FOREION EXILE. THEY ARE SAID TO BE STICKING WITH THE NEW ORDER AS LONG AS IT APPEARS TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO, BUT HAVE NO DEEP SEATED COMMITMENT TO KHOMEINI ET AL. THE LURS ARE SAID TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISAPPOINTED, UNHAPPY WITH UNEMPLOY- MENT,RISING PRICES AND THE HARASSMENT OF SOME OF THEIR LEADERS. ONE MEMBER OF A LEADINQ LUR FAMILY TOLD EMBOFF THAT ALL THEY NEED IS FOR THE U.S. TO GIVE THEM GUNS AND THE GO AHEAD.

9. THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE IRANIAN DRAMA REMAINS. NEARLY ALL IRANIANS WHO ARE DISSATISFIED WITH CURRENT CONDITIONS BELIEVE IT KHOHEINI IS BACKED BY AMERICA. THIS BELIEF IS FOUND ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND HELD BY DOCTORS, RUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND SO ON.

10. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT REGIME IS STRONGEST BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES. ISSUES INCLUDE UNEMPLOYMENT, RISING PRICES, FEAR OF THE COMMITTEES, AND THE BAN ON ALCOHOL AND MOST ENTERTAINMENT. AMONG THE BAZAARIS AND LOWER CLASSES, HOWEVER, KHOMEINI STILL COMMANDS UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT. THIS SUPPORT IS PERHAPS BEST CHARACTERIZED AS RELIGIOUS DEVOTION AND IS NOT CONCERNED WITH ISSUES OTHER THAN ISLAM AND FREEDOM-- TIE, W N I N O S OF WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO IWTERPRETATION. 00 ONN, NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY IS ISLAMIC, TO ANOTHER, OPENING A FOOD STAND IN A PUBLIC PARK IS FREEDOM. THE SUPPORT FOR THE AYATOLLAH COMES CHIEFLY PROM THE MAINLY ILLITERATE, AT BEST POORLY EDUCATED, BULK-OF, THE IRANIAN OPULACE WHO REMAIN POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED AND LARGELY IGNORANT OF MANY ISSUES AFFECTING THEIR LIVES. ONE BAZAAR1 WAS ADAMANT THAT THE UNEMPLOYED FILLING THE STREETS OF SHIRAZ WERE OUT-OF-WORK SAVAK AGENTS.

11- EMBOFF LUNCHED WITH ARMORED CENTER OFFICER LT. KAMAL KHAKSAR ( PROTECT) AND HIS FAMILY AT W E I R HOME IN THE MARRIED OFFICERS QUARTERS. THE LIEUTENANT WAS IN

UNIFORM WHEN HE CALLED FOR EMBOFF AT CONSULATE. THIS WAS IN MARKED CONVMST TO HIS BEHAVIOR TWO MONTHS AGO. AT THAT TIME WHEN EMBOFF RAN INTO HIM ON THE STREET HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS AND ARRANGED TO MEET AT A RESTAURANT, WHERE HE APPEARED IN MUFTI.

12. KHAKSAR REPORTED THAT ROUTINE CHIEFTAIN TANK MAINTENANCE IS NOW BEING PERFORMED. HE SAID THAT AS LONG AS HE AND OTHER OFFICERS WOULD START TO DO THE WORK THE ENLISTED MEN WOULD THEN JOIN IN, BUT A MERE ORDER TO DO THE WORK WOULD NOT SUFFICE. HE CLAIHED THAT A ROUTINE ENGINE OVERHAUL THEY HAD DONE HAD TAKEN ONLY FIVE DAYS, WHEREAS BEFORE, EVEN WITH BRITISH ADVISORS, IT HAD TAKEN TWENTY. HOWEVER, KHAKSAR SAID THAT HE A N D

OTHER OFFICERS FELT THAT THE RETURN OF A LIMITED BRITISH TEAM WAS NEEDED. RUSSIAN ADVISORS HAD REMAINED IN SHIRAZ UNTIL ABOUT MID-MAY . THEY HAD SCHEDULED TO RETVRN IN EARLY JUNE BUT WERE ABOUT TWO WEEKS OVERDUE WHEN SKUD WAS IN SHIRAZ. IN GENERAL. KHAKSAR WAS MOST PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY. HE CITED LACK OF DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE RANKS AND THE LOW HORALE OF THE OFFICER CORPS.

13. NO F-14's WERE SEEN IN THE AIR AT SHIRAZ OR ISFAHAN, ALTHOUGH EMBOFF DID SEE A TEENAGE BOY ON ISFAHAN'S MAIN STREET READING A BLUE PAPERBACK BOOK WITH "QRUMMAN F-14" IN WHITE LETTERS ON THE COVER. ( IT COULD HAVE BEEN ANYTHING FROM TECHNICAL TO PROMOTIONAL MATERIAL. BUT IT DOES RAISE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE.) SOME OF THE ARMY AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN ISPAHAN WERE SEEN AIRBORNE BUT MOST WERE IDLE.

14. POLICE OFFICERS IN SHIRAZ ARE STILL REGULARLY PAID ALTHOUGH FEW ARE ACTUALLY ON DUTY . TRAFFIC POLICE ARE THE ONES MOST COMMONLY SEEN. SOME PATROLMEN ARE WORKING. BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE 0FFICER.EXPLAINED THAT THERE ARE TWO REASONS TO BE A POLICEMAN: (1) TO COLLECT ONE'S PAY, AND, (2) TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT BT IY 8831 NNNN



IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN THE PEOPLE DO NOT WANT PRO- TECTION FROM THE POLICE, SO THE POLICE JUST COLLECT THEIR PAY.

15. ALONG THE SHIRAZ-ISFAHAN-TEHRAN ROAD LITTLE SEEMED CHANGED BY THE REVOLUTION. A FEW STATUES HAD TOPPLED. BUT THE TOWN OF SHAHREZA WAS STILL CALLED SHAHREZA.

16. IN ISFAHAN TOURISTS WERE WELCOME AT THE SHOPS AND ATTRACTIONS AMNQ MEIDAN-E-KHOMEINI ( FORMERLY MEIDAN-E- SHAII, BUT THE ETMOSPHERE REMAINS MORE HIGHLY CHARGED FHAN THAT OF SHIRAZ. HOSTILITY TOWARD FOREIGNERS WAS EVIDENT. PASDARANS WERE MORE COMMON, AND ?'HE LOCAL COMMITTEES SHOWED MORE OF AN INTEREST IN THE CONSULATE.

17. ISFAHAN IS CONTROLLED BY FOUR REGIONAL COMMITTEES AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE CONSULATE IS LOCATED IN THE PRECINCT CONTROLLED BY AYATOLLAH KHADEMI BUT NEAR TO THE DOMAIN OF AYATOLLAH TAHERI, WHO ALSO WEARS THE FOREIGN PROBLEMS HAT. TO AVOID PROBLEMS DURING A TRANSFER OF FURNITURE TO TEHRAN, BOTH GROUPS WERE CONTACTED AND SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROPERTY SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED AND A TWO-HOUR JOB BEGUN IN THE EARLY MORNING LASTED UNTIL MIDNIGHT. THE COMMITTEE INSISTED ON READING ALL OF THE TRASH DISPOSED OF BY THE CONSULATE (SENSITIVE MATERIAL HAD LONG SINCE BEEN DESTROYED), AND GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO OLP CALENDARS-- PERHAPS LONGING FOR THE GOOD OLD DAY.

18. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE IN ISFAHAN. A REQUEST FOR HIS AID RESULTED IN THE COMMITTEE BEING BERATED FOR BOTHERING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WITH A PROBLEM THAT WAS CLEARLY A COMMITTEE PROBLEM.

19. AN TSFAHAN BAZAARI, AND A DEVOTED FOLLOWER OF THE AYATOLLAH TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE THOUGHT AMERICA AND IRAN SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS AND THAT SOME AMERICAN ENGINEERS SHOULD RETURN. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT AMERICANS WERE UNLIKELY TO RETURN AFTER THE WAY THEY

WERE THROWN OUT. HE REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE PAID FOUR TIMES WHAT IRANIANS WERE PAID. EMBOFF SUQGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD FOUR TIMES THE EXPERIENCE. BAZAARI SAID MAYBE, THEN SAID IRAN HAS A PROBLEM, NOBODY WORKS VERYHARD.

20. ON THE ISSUE OP GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. EMBOFF POINTED TO THE ATTACKS UPON AMERICA IN SPEECHES AND IN THE PRESS. THE BAZAARI REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE U.S. COMPLAINED ABOUT THE EXECUTION OF ELGHANIAN WHO WAS CLEARLY AN ISRAELI AGENT. HE SAID ELGHANIAN MADE MONEY IN IRAN AND THEN SENT IT TO ISRAEL WHICH WAS STEALING 3ROM THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. AN ANTI-SEMITIC TIRADE FOLLOWED,JEWS DO NOT DO ANY WORK, THEY ARE MONEY LENDERS WHO CHARGE USURIOUS RATES, AND ONLY HELP THEIR OWN PEOPLE. HE CONTRASTED THIS WITH ISLAM WHERE MONEY IS GIVEN TO THE NEEDY FREE OF CHARGE, AND NO ONE HAS MORE THAN ONE HOME. LAINGEN BT #8831 NNNN


, . N N N N T ~ XSE8288RA677 PPBUQMHR - DE RUtHfA #a233 2212128 ZNT ceccc

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NNNNW ESB028BRA677 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHIA I0253 2212120 ZNY CCCCC P 0921182 AUG 79 FM USICA WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L USICA 50253

USICA

IC A CHG

CHROW

FOR GRAVES PROM NEA

EO 12065 GDS 8/8/85

SUBJECT: PROGRAM .POSSIBILITIES REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3109 CLASSIFIED BY R. T. CURRAN,DIRECTOR, NEA

1. INTERESTED IN YOUR REPORT CONVEYED TEHRAN REPTEL.

2. REZA'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF IAS, ENGLISH TEACHING, AND USICA LIBRARY OPERATIONS ENCOURAGING.

3 . CONCUR WITH EXPLORATION OF LOCAL SPEAKER POSSIBILITIES FOR IAS (PRESUME THIS ALSO INCLUDES BOARD MEMBERS ). HOWEVER, WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANYTHING WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY USG OR IAS WITH THE RELIGIOUS FZGHT OR ANY OTHER GROUPING.

4. ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR INTENTION TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR LOW-KEY VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT. WE TEND TO BELIEVE, AS BETWEEN AN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS OR PHILISOPHY FIGURE, PHILOSOPHY LESS LIKELY TO BE MISINTERPRETED. AGAIN, WE ENDORSE VERY CAREFUL EXPLORATION (AMONG OTHERS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE VIEWS OF MININFO MINATCHI) ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HOW SUCH A VISITOR MIGHT BE USED, WITH WHOM, IN WHAT CONTEXT, AND WHERE.

5. IF YOU ASCERTAIN TO YOUR AND MISSION'S FULL SATISFACTION THAT AN AMPART VISIT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, PRODUCTIVE AND DESIRABLE, WE WILL LEND FULL SUPPORT THIS END IN SEEKING OUT APPROPRIATE NAMES FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

6. DO NOT WISH BY FOREGOING TO APPEAR NEGATIVE. HOWEVER. AS YOU FULLY AWARE AND APPRECIATE, THESE ARE SENSITIVE. DIFFICULT TIMES FOR U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE ANY PROGRAM DECISIONS, HOWEVER LOW-KEY, MUST CAREFULLY WEIGH LONG TERM ADVANTAGE AGAINST SHORT TERM TACTICAL GAINS (OR LOSSES).

RFINHARDT BT I0256

I E.O. 12Ce5: G D S 8/g/a5 (LAIN3EK. L. P.: 03-M

ANALYTICAL hEPOBTIh'3 SXBEYSE I .

i 3F i 'K: FC,O:;:ALEL::S CLTbT! : : OK? - , ? - , . .~.k: i:a&-3 ca: PO;

I.: P:ROh'

fl. ( C - EhTIRI: TEXT)

ACCOST : - T3B &ISINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN - GUIDANCE FOR - BLrSINLSSMCh' SZPTEYBER: -- BEVISY OF TZE P03R PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION - ATTITUCLS OF IRAU'S OIL FIELC WCRGBS

I KTCBEE: - OIL -0LICY DEVELOPMENTS - 1RAE;IAB AID TO TEE LDC'S - POLICY bNr FFOj?: KOVEEXER :

1-- M ~ N L G X K G IRAN'S I I N I X C I I L SJaPLVS 1-- BLECTRIC 30ZER PROSPECTS I K IPCN ILECZKBEP : /-- A6 ECONOYJC ASSESSYENT

U . S .

-:Tf

3. -h'z WILL UPDATE THIS SCEEI>ULI. APPSOXIMP.:TLY EVZ;,Y YQHTXS UNLESS WB DEFABTUEVT PP.IFER3 4 h A L T Z B K ~ T I ~ F ABRLICmEN:. LhINCENlY

IllT

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8916

DE RUQMHR #a916 221..

ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 0908202 AUG 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3151 BT

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08916

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CHRGE: PROG 8/9/79 APPRV: CHG: L. UNGEN

DRFTD: EC0N:ADSENS CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: ECON-3 CHG POL

RF CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/9/85 (LAINGEN, L. B.) OR-M

TAGS: EGEN, IR

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC AYALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE

2. THE FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TEHRAN'S PROPOSED ECONOMIC COMMERCIAL ANALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE THROUGH DECEMBER

1979.

AUGUST :

-- THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN-GUIDANCE FOR U,S. - BUSINESSMEN SEPTEMBER:

-- REVIEW OF THE POOR PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION -- ATTITUDES OF IRAN'S OIL FIELD WORKERS OCTOBER :

-- OIL-OLICY DEVELOPMENTS -- IRANIAN AID TO THE LDC'S- POLICY AND PROSPECTS NOVEMBER :

-- MANAGING IRAN'S FINANCIAL SURPLUS

-- BLECTRIC POWER PROSPECTS IN IRAN DECEMBER : -- AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

3. WE WILL UPDATE THIS SCHEDULE APPROXIMATELY EVERY SIX

FONTHS UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PREFERS AN ALTERNATIVE

ARRANGEMENT. LAINGENll BT

18916

NNNN


LE KTOHHC #693B/01 225 ** ZAY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL R 15134562 AT? 79 CAR3E: SUAUE 8/12/73 TV AWEMEASST TFBRAN APPRV: CHARCE:LBLAIL d 0 SECSUAUE hASUBC 31E2 DRPUD: P0L:VLUOMSEUB: F T CLEAR: 1 . R O N :BSCliELI i b N P I C E N U I A L SECUION 0 1 OF UYBRAN 0 3 9 3 0 2.CONS .RYOREJ

DISTR: POL3 CBG ICA ECON DAO CONS

9 .0 . 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS 3/12/95 (TOMSET?. VICTOR L . ) OW-P TAGS: PEPR. IR . .. -.

EUFCT: N E C O T I A T I ~ V S

1. (C - EYTIRE TEXT).

2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NFCOTIATTOYS IY YFICS THE SMBASSY BAS BEEN INVOLVED BERE, RANGING PROM COMPOTND SPCURITY TO VISA OPERATIOVS TO STP TO TPS SHERRY CASE. FIGRLIGHI SEVERAL SPECIAL FEAUTRES OF CONDTCUING PUSINFSS IN THE PERSIAN FNVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES UBE DIFFICTLUIES # S HAVE ENCOTNUESED ARE A PARUIAL QFFLECTION ON TAB EFFECTS OF T l F IRANIAN RTVOLUTION. BTU r E BELIEVE USY TNDERLYIN? CTLUTRAL AND PSYC90LOGICAL QLALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR TQE NATURI OF TPESE DIPFICUL- UIES ARE ANC d I L L RSMAIN RSLAUIVELY CONSUANU. UHSREPORE. YE SUGGEST THAT TEE FOLLOWING AEALTSIS BE USED TO E R I F F BOUH T S J PERSONNTL AND PRIVAUX SECUOR REPRESENUAUIVES WBO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS YITH AND IN THIS COTNURY. END I NURODTCUION . 3. PERHAPS THE SINCL3 DOMINANU ASPECU OF UE3 PERSIAN PSPCBE I S AN OVERRIDING EGOISI*. I T S ANTECEDENTS L I B IN THE LONG IRANIAN 91STOHY OF INSUASILIUY ANr INSECTRIUY WFICH PUT A PREKICM ON SELF-PRESERV4TION. THE PRACTICAL EPFECT OF I T I S AN ALMOST TOTAL P m S I 4 N PQEOCCUPAUION W I T H SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR ~ N D E R S T A N D I N G POINTS OF VIFW OTHER TAAN ONE'S OWY. TRUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IU I S INCOMPEEHENSIBLE TO AN IRAhIAN TEAT U.S. IMMIGRATION L A Y MAT P R O A I E I T ISSUING u I n A TOURIST VISA WREN FE HAS JETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA. SIMILARLY, THT IBANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY IN CLAIMING FORCE HAJEURE TO 4VOID PENALTIES POB LATE PPYMEYT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILP TAE GOVERHHENU OF VRICH IU I S A PARU I S DENYING THE VAILIDITY OP TBE V E R Y GROUYDS UPOY V A I C Y THE CLAIM IS FADE WFEN CONFRONUED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM POREIGN FIRMS FORCED 'I0 CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. 4. UHE BEVERSE OF UXIS PARUICTLAR PSYCBOLOOICAL COIN. AND HAVING THE SAPE AISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM. I S A PERVASIVE TNSASE ABOTU UTE NAUTRE OF UHE WORLD IN WGICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE AAS BgEN TAAT NOUaING I S PERMANENU AND IU I S COMMONLY PERCEIVED UBAU HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCE AN ENVIRONMENT EACR IhDIVITTAL MTSU BE CONSUANULY ALERU FOR OPPORUTNIUIES 10 PROTECT BIMSELF 4GAINST THE MALEVOLEIT FORCES TEAT YOTLD OUHERUISE BE RIS TNDQING. RB I S OBVIOTSLT JSSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANT MEhNS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT

CON?IDENUIET. UEHB

2 4

CONPIESHUIAL USABAN 8980/1

SOC9 OPPORTUNITIES. T F I q APPROACP UVDERLIFS TPE SO- CALLED .BAZAAR M E ~ U A L X T Y " SO COMMON AMON3 PERSI I N S , A f i f N b S E l ' TPAT OFT'Y IGYORFS LONCFR, TrRM NTFR S S 1 EAVOR OP IMREDIAUELY OSUIINABLE ADJANTAGES hH% E O U N ~ E Y - ANCBS PRlCTLCES TPAT ARB 9TGARCED AS 1INFTBICAL PY OTRFR NORMS. AN EXAMPLE I S UEE SFEYIYCLY SHORUSIOEUED 4ND BARESSING TACTICS FVPLOYED PY THE PGOI IN I T S Y F X T I A - TIONS WITH GTE.

5 . COTPLED CIUK UHESE PSYCIOL0:ICAL LIYIUSUIONS I S A GFLFBAL INCOflPPEHENSION OF CASUALITT. ISLAM, WITH I T S EMPYASIS ON UHI OMYIPOUBNC? OF GOE, APPTARS UO ACCOTNU A1 LEAST I N MAJOR PART FO3 T Q I S F9YN3PYYON. SOMBWPAT STRPRISINJLY, EV3N U90SE IBAYIANS EDTCAUEr IN U9E YPSTERN STYLE IND PPRpdPS YITF LONG FXP:RIENCF 3UTSIDP IRAN IUSELF F3EQTXNULY BAY9 DIVTICTLUY =FASPIN', UYE IhTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVFNTS. YITNBSS A YEZCI RESISTING UHE IDEA UHAU IRANIAN BEPAVIOQ 9AS COYSJCTENCES ON LIBE FiRCEPTION OF IRAN IN TEE S.S. OR TBhT T 4 I S PFRCFPTION I S SOME30U RELAUEC ?O AMFRICAN POLICIES RSSARDIN; IRAN. TBIS SAME QUALITY ALSO EELPS EXPLAIN PEaSIAN AVERSION UO ACCEPUINO RESPONS~AILIDY FOR OYS'S OVY A C I I O N S . THE DEUS EX MACHINA I S ALW4YS RT V O X .

6 - THE PERSILN PROCLIVITY TOR ASSUVING THAT TO SAY SOMBTFINS I S TO DO IT PURTSY? COMPLICATES HATTSRS. AGAIN. YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISF WTEN INFORMED TF4T TPE ISREGULPR SLCUPITY FORCES ASSIGNEE TO TH9 EMBASSY REflAIY I h PLACE. BUT Tl?EnCENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME TREY WOULD GO PY MONDAY, HS SAYS. A4 YFA OPFICiAL RFPORTS LtAU UBE SHERSY CASP I S "90 PERCEZT SOLVED. BUT YASN A CONSULAR OFFICFR INVFSTI5ATFS EX PISCOVERS TPPT NOTRINC EAS CSANGED. UHBRE I S NO RECOCYIUION UYAT INSTRUCTIOhS NUST !E FOLLOVVD C P . TPAT COMYITRFYTS MVST 9 3 JCCOMPANIEP by ACUION ANC RTSTLUS.

6. FINALLY, USERF ARY UBE PERSIAN CONCSP'JS O* IN?LTENCE hHD OPIIGATION. PVERYONE PAYS !J?FISAYCF T 3 TPP FORn?9 ANC UBE SAUUEB I S TSTALLY RONOREP IN USE EbEACS. FEBSIANS A R ~ CONSUNED W I T R DEVfLOPING P A ~ T I FAZI--TAT INFLTINCE UBAU YILL SELF 3SU U?INSS CONE--iBIfE PAYORS APE ONLY GRLDGINGLY BFSTOIEO AND TPEN JCST TO TFF brj ReQF0

CONFIDENUIAL

CONFIDENTIAL TEERAN 89@/2

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 0@9P0 DISTR: POL3 CEO 1CA

BCON DAO CONS AWXN NAAG R l

LXUENU UHAU A UANGIBLE QTID PRO QTO I S IMMEDIAUELT PRTCEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST YEAR OR EVEN LbSU WEEK; WHAT CAN BZ OFFERED TODAY?

7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR TBOSE YBO WOULD NEGOT- IAUE r I U 9 PERSIANS IN ALL UHIS:

- --FIRST, ONE SBOVLD NEWER ASSUME THAT F I S S I D E OF UBE I S S T E WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LEU ALONE UHAU I U WILL B i CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION MITE SLLF TION

PRECLUDES THIS . A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNI- OF B I S POSIUION TPON H I S PERSIAN OPPOSIUE NTMBER.

- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY 10 PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP PSED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT P I S OPPOSITE NTMSER I S ESSENUIAtLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WIUR BIK BE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE TBE BENEFITS TO RIMSELF TEAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OSTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED UO GO UO GREAU LENBUSS UO ACHIEVE URIS G3hL. INCLTDING PUNNING TEE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WUOFVFP RE I S DEALING YIUB UAAU FTUTRE BTSINSSS WOTLD BE TNUSINKABLE, AU LLAST TO THE LATTER.

- --UHIRG. INU3RLOCKfNB EELAUIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECUS 02 ilk ISSLE MUST BE PAINSTATINGLY, FORECEFULLT AND REFEA?TSTLY DEVFLOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY LOPIPREHEEDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS. - --FOUSTP, ONE SHOULD I N S I S T ON PERF3RMANCE AS TRF SINE OTA NON AU EACB S U A X OF NECUOUIA'JIONS. SUAUBMSNUS Lb INTENTIOh COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

- --FIFU3. CTLUIVAUI3N OF 'GOODYILL FOR SOODWILL'S SbKE I S A rASTE OF PFPORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE 4T ALL UIKES SSOTLE BZ IYPRESSIY: TPON UHE PPRSIAN ACROSS TFE IAbLE TSE-MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAPINGS, HE YUST F F MADE TO KYOk T9AT A OUID PRO QUO 1" IYVOLVFD o h zoua srrss. - --FIYALLY, OY! SAOCLD Fr FREDARE: FOR TFF TEREAT C ? bREASfJLY I \ VX<OUIAUICNS AU ANY sIYEY YOMENU 4ND NOW E F COwZD f Y TB.?F'PSSIPLITY. GIYZN T 8 9 F'YRSIEN hSGOUIAUOP'S CTLUTRAL AYD PSYCH3LO:ICAL LIYIUAUIOYS. 43 1 5 GCING TO RESIST TEF VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL (YRSM Y E YFSTSBN POINT OF VISY) NEGOTIATTYO PROCTSS. LBIEU31N 2 1 *;.9bz

RU2MRA RUSSLi RUOYiW RUDTC ROQ3AY RUBBY0 RUFNPS SUSNAAA DE RUQt'HR #9Z75 227 ** ZNY CCCCC Z Z H C 1509572 4UG 79 FM PMEKBASSP TEHRhN TO RUESC/SECSTATF JdSHCC IMMECILTE 3?55 IEFO RUGVaI /AHFYSASSY ABTJ DIiAaI 1224 RUCM$U/A?4ZMhASSY bYt:ARh C22P RUPHAE/OSINT EAGHTAT 9232

CLASS: C3NFIDFNT IAL C??GE: STATE 3/15/65 4FPQI : :H%iLBLAIhlE+i D9FT9. P0L:VLTOPSITH; CLF4R: CNB 3 I 3 3 ! POL 3 GH: CbO

F"OY

RGFNPS /Ab&MBbS SY PAR I S :281 PUSNAAA/US:INCETJ?, VAIAINGF'K GE

X F I u ? N T 1 A L TEBRAN P9@7i

9 . 0 . 12@6E: ;CS c/15/85 (TOMSYTS. V.L.) OR-? TAGS: PINS. P IYT, SOPN, IH SUBJ: VIOLFYCE I h TEHBbk

!REF: USINFO: 1501142 AUG 79

I. (C - ENTIRE TEXT. )

2. PFFTEL I S A REASONABLY ACCURhTS ACCOUVT EY 4 JO:?UbL- -. -~ ----- - I Y T YITH CONSICFAABLE EXPERIENCE I N I R ~ ov C L P . S ~ E S RE- TYEBN SECULARIST POLITICAL GROUPS AND YEZai~LLh'I!IS {:I--- ERALLY, ADSERENTS OF THF PARTY OF 3 0 D ) LOYAL T 3 AIAPGL- LAE YHOHbINI ON AUGUST 12 ANC 13. ALLOYbY'S RPPPB'! IS COLOREL SO#EYAAT BY H I S SYMPATBT FOR THI S?GULh?ISTS C!ir HIS OWN BRUSH WIT3 ISLAMIC FANATICISM. BUT T%F ;ROJIN3 POLITICAL ANC SCCIAL DIVISIONS HE CESCRIBZS P9134 UivLZR- L I E TBESE CLASPES ARE VY91 REAL.

3. HAVING SAII: THAT, AOWZVER, WF ARF VOT I i Je r IuET: 'I0 CONCLUDE THAT wRAT BAS HAPPENED TEIS L 3 E K SIGkhLS fY2 IMMINENT APPROACd OF ARMA3P3DON IN IRaN. WE IBI"Y I i VORF J I I E L Y TEAT TfiE CURRENT CONFROYTATION E:.TkBEN mu" SECULAR LEFT AND TEE ISLAPIC BARnLINERS WILL SUBSIDT (INLEEC, THE LEVEL CF TENSION W9S NOTICGABLY LOWER YFSTEK- DAY, AUGUST 1 4 , " N P T0l )Al . AU*IUST 15, TtiF CITY I S YI9- IUlLLY CLOSEC UP BECAUSF OF T9E SOMMEY'ORATION 'IF THF D E ~ T K OF IHAq A L I ) . SUCH h PATTERN tiAS BEEX TYFlCAL OF OTHER POLITICAL CRISFS SINCE THE FEBRUARP REYOLUTIO~, AN^ YE wGuLr NOT EXPECT TAIS O N E TO az A N Y CIFFFEZYT.

A LF3aCY OP BITTFRNFSS k:IiL R444IU TO FISTCR JYST A T4E SURFACE 3F TH9 VODT POLI"1:. T B I S , i9 S-EVS

I S T9E 9Eb.L SISNIFICANCE Of TAF FOLITIGAI PROCFiS THE ISLAMIC FORCES REr?AlN PBICOMINENT. NO OTY-P

C O : F I ~ F ~ C : I A ~ *-.--~.i , ,,. ,... ., : ,7n 2 1

POLITICAL GROUP HAS EMERGED THkT HAS A C A P E I I L I T ? OF 51'C- CESSFULLY CHALLENGING TKFY. PUT THE ISL4MIC F.-NCP,ME'.TAS,- I S T S RhVE SEOWY b SIbGVLAR I N A B I L I T P TO COY9 TO > ? I F z NIT!! IBPN'S PL i jQALISTIC SOCIETY YHITH CDNTAIYS II LPB:: MCCTRNIZEC. SEC'JLAR COYPC,V'NNT. T -RING T l F I R S I X '?O"I?:iS IN PO'dER TREY EA'J1 4LIFNkTE.' ONF >ROUP A.'TEE Ah3T:iC:. TYIS PROCESS CAlNOT SO OK INDEFINITELY. IT YbY VEVLK COME TO CIV.IL WAR, h S dLLCYdY SJGGESTC, 1U"' N71'PEER ?A!% TUE ISLP.lrIC'.FOR ES EXPECT TO 3 E ABLE COVTIti3b.LIV TC P I T * R O U C H S 3 b O V E R ALL TH3SF irBO CC N3T AR'I'PX .r'~'.,i: T%EY WITHOUT EVEkTUALLY EVCOUNTERIL: A MOR: S P P E S E ;?- ACTION TEAN TBZY qAQE TO DITP. LAINSEN P T

~ P L JOHN A. WESTBERG & ASSOCIATES. INC.

S U I T E 960 1333 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE.N. W.

WASHINOTON, 0. C. 20036 I E W ~ A N . lma* WSI orrlcc BOX 11-1313

TCLCCMONCS mS2UI #4007*

eSPU3 S.4381 TCLCZ ZlS303

C A ~ L ~ RANJAW

August 15, 1979

Mr. Henry Precht Iran ~ e s k Room 5246 M er, J L-S& U.S. KJeDaitment of State

Dear Renry:

I am sending herewith my notes from the AWA Iran Update program on July 25-26 in New York City, together with a copy of the attendance list, per our telephone conversation last night. w*

John A. Westberg

Enclosures

AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION'S IWLN UPDATE

Notes July 25-26, 1979 New York City

1. The first and by far the most significant

speaker was professor James Bill of the University of Texas.

He is perhaps the best known writer on Iranian affairs in

the English language. His discipline is political seience

wlth an emphasis on social and political change. Re began

by describin? 5 6 Iranian rev~lutisn +s the m s t renarkable

in history, noting that the breadth and depth of the opposition

to the Shah's regime was extraordinary. Here follows other

points that he made.

1.1. The main forces behind the revolution

were grinding poverty (which I question) and corruption. Bill

noted there were also other factors, namely oppression, the

letting up of 3ressure 52 the Shah without eoing anything

constructive to deal 1~1th the disgruntlement with his govezn-

ment, the fact that popular religious leaders decided to

fight the monarchy, and the decision arbitrarily by the

government In early 1978 to cool off the economy.

1.2. The present political system in Iran is

dominated by the Mujtahids, who are older, revered religious

leaders. There are perhaps 200 of these religious leaders

in Iran today. They are not to be confused with the Mullahs,

who are farther down the hierarchial ladder of Shiite Islam.

Bill feels these Mujtahids are the most important people in

Iran today and that we must therefore get to know who they

are, how they think, and what their vision is for the Iran

of the future. There are many indications that the younger

Mujtahids and also other older Mujtahids do not agree with

Khomeini. Bill also feels that we must count on the Mujtahids,

such as Ta1eghar.i. to bridge the nap between the Passes of

the people and the intelligen~ia. However, we cannot expect

the Mujtahids to provide governmental leadership, or political

leadership, since their traditional role in society has been

the protection of the people's rights vis-a-vis the go\-ernment.

They do not think positively enough to be political or

governmental leaders.

1.3. Bill was very critical of the inter-

nat~onal ne&ia, referring to their f o b as "fourth-raze"

several times during his talk. He particularly objected to

the way Khoneini has been presented, arguing he is not nearly

as bad as the press has made him out. Query, however, the

pronouncements this week that music is evil.

1.4. There is a preoccupation within the

revolutionary gover-nent today with a perceived danger of

interference by the United States. Paranoid. Bill says this

stems from a number of things, including the fact that

right-wing assassination squads have been knocking off eight

to ten revolutionary people every night since the revolution

took place. If this is true, it certainly would help to

explain this matter.

1.5. There are four main forces threatening

stability in Iran today. The first is the right-wing bands

of assasins, which Bill feels will continue their activities

for another year and a half at least until they are brought

-~r.Aer ccntrol. Zacxc?:y, zhce hre =he etnnic separatist

novements, which Bill feels is the most dangerous force.

Thirdly, there is the alienation of the secular, modern-educated - intelligencia, who, Eill says, is absolutely essential to

the long-tern future of Iran. Finally, there are the left-

wing, marxist groups, the most prominent of which is known as

the Fedayeen Khalq.

1.6. There are three groups which hold the

key to the retam of skability to Iran: The military, the

professional middle Class and the progressive religious leaders,

the Mujtahids mentiones above. In this latter group Bill

feels Taleghani is the most important. He said he did not

think Shariat nadari is a significant force i2 this.

1.7. Bill noted that every U.S. President since

Jack Kennedy has supported the Shah. Nixcn and Kissinger went,

in Bill's opinion, way beyond the bonds Of acceptability

in the deal they made with the Shah. Other reasons why

Iranian attitude towards the United States today is negative

are the supportive statements by Carter right up to the end,

including the famous telephone call from Carter to the Shah

on bloody Friday-(September 8 1978) which was made from

Camp David and, of course, received wide publicity both within

Iran and without. Bill feels there will continue to be dif-

ficulties between Iran and the United States at the political

level for the next year or so, but that ttey will pass.

He says Iranians like Americans and the idea of-America very

much and there is a large reservoir of good will despite

the universal animosity of Iranians towards our government.

(There is a thought here that if Ted Kennedy should become

our next President, relations with Iran would greatly improve

overnight. Query whether I could interest Ted in making a

trip to Iran at the eppropriate time?)

1.8. Eill is milaly criticai of our govern-

ment's present posture toward Iran, which is that of a very,

very low profile. Bill feels our government should be doing

something positive, perhaps offering aid of some kind.

(I disagree with this at the present time because of the

paranoia referred to above by Bill himself on the part of the

Iranian government leaders today regarding interference

by the U.S.) Bill stated other embassies in Teheran are

building up rapidly. He specifically mentioned Korea and

Japan.

1.9. There was only a passing reference to

corruption in Iran today. Bill noted that the social patterns

remain the same and that only a political revolution is in

process so far. Iie seemed to feel that the customary laying

on of gifts is an acceptable thing. (I should query him on

?.:w he squares this with his identi5ying corruption as one

of the forces which caused the revolution.) 1 1.10. There was also only brief reference

to the labor problem. Bill said it was rather encouraging

that the oil workers had stayed on. He also said, however

that the students were running the universities, the workers

were running the factories, and the privates were running

the army. Ee felt all of this would burn itself out fairly

quickly.

1.11. Brief reference was made to the need

for expatriates in Iran. Bill stated the Koreans were no longer

welcome in Iran or the Gulf area for a variety of reasons,

including a reported propensity to the colmnission of robbery,

burglaries, etc.

2. There were over 50 well-known American companies

represented at the conference. Among these were a number of

investor companies who have had expatriates back in Teheran

recently. The reports of these representatives were very

favorable. The companies include du Pont, Carrier, Foremost-

McKesson-Robbins, General Electric Technical Services (Repair-

shop) and Harza.

3. Bud Menaker is General Counsel for Martin

Marietta Aerospace. He worked in Iran for a couple of years

for the PM3 represe-t:ns tile Irar~ian goverrment in tele-

communications procurement. In his talk he attempted to be

more critical of the present situation in Iran and less

optimistic about the future. He noted the danger of the

clergy fouling the government up for many more months to

come, and the oft-reported oppression of the new regime,

specifically mentioning the banning of movies and music and

the cutti-g into press freedom.

C. Dan Burt, an American lawyer with offices in

Saudi Arabia, flatly disagreed with the view that the

situation in Iran was going to improve. He based his position

on opinion in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area to the effect

that Khomeini will not remain in power much longer but will

be replaced by a left-wing government. Burt said the Saudis

are terribly concerned about what is going on in Iran, by

which he presumably meant the instability caused by the

revolution.

John A. Westberg

AMA ATTENDANCE LIST July 25-26, 1979

George T. Lee, Jr. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld 2800 Republic National Bank Bldg. Dallas, Texas 75201

Robert G. Bihum VP & General Manager ARES, Inc. Box 459 Port Clinton, Ohio 43452

Lee Adams, V.P. Ralph S. Newman, Jr., Executive VP & CEO American Rice, Inc. Box 2587 Houston, Texas 77001

Thomas Carney Ashland Oil, Inc. Box 391 Ashland, Kentucky 41101

William Beard, Managing Director Carrier International P.O. Box 4806 Syracuse, New York 13221

Raymond Ewing, Mgr.-Treasury Combustion Engineering, Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Rd. Windsor, Connecticut 06095

W.O. Faith, VP Continental Mechanical of Middle East Ltd P.O. Box 633 Addison, Texas 75001

~d Kazem, Dir., Finance & Administration CBS Records Intl 51 West 52nd Street New York, New York 10019

J. Parker Lapp, Intl. Banking Assoc. Continental Bank-Chicago Africa/Middle East 231 S. LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60693

J.E. Ryan, Sales Manager Celanese Corporation 1211 Avenue of'the Americas New York, New York 10036

Carl Borden, Director Paul Newhart, Manager E.I. du Pont 1007 Market Street Wilmington, Delaware 19898

C.A. Keen, VP & Treasurer Fedders Corp. Woodbridge Avenue 'Edison, New Jersey 08817

Alfred Marden Mgr., Intl. Bus. Dev. Prog. General Electric Co. Bldg. 2-707 1 River Road Schenectady, New York 12345

Paul Lehning Mgr., Middle East Gas Turbine Service General Electric Technical Services Co. Bldg. 513 W 1 River Road Schenectady, New York 12345

Gulf Oil Corp. Room 1915, Gulf Bldg. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Richard Macken, Sr. Analyst, Mid-East Affairs

Michael J. Figel General Electric Co. 570 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022

Linda C. Baroody, Esq. International Hotels Corp. Pan Am Building New York, New York 10017

IBM Europe 8 Cite Retiro 75008 Paris, France T.F. Cadigan, Manager

Aloysius F. Ring, Jr., Group Contr. Norman St. Landau, International Counsel Johnson & Johnson Intl. 501 George Street New Brunswick, New Jersey 08930

Charles E. Duffy, VP.-Intl. Mellon Bank Mellon Square Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

Niel K. Friedman, Administration Dept. Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc. 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10017

Phillips Petroleum Company 508 Frank Phillips Building Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74004 B.L. Bates, Strategic Planner W.W. Dunn, V.P. - Latin America-Asia K.E. Rogers, Esq.

Donald D. Montgomery, V.P. & 1ntl.Const. Procon International Algonquin L Mt. Prospect Roads Des Plaines, Illinois 60016

John Wilson, Director, Middle East & Africa Ben Cole, Director-Financial Analysis Rockwell International 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Walter Cardwell, Esq. Derek S.L. Bostock, Esq. John Milem, V.P.-Finance Sedco, Inc. 1901 N Akard Dallas, Texas 75201

John J. Doherty, Controller Sylvania Tech. Sys. Box 9003 Sunnyvale, California 94086

Philip A. Gaita, Dir. Contracts Cliff Wright, Project Mgr. Singer Co., Link Division Kirkwood Industrial Park Bingharnton, New York 13902

Ray J. Hope, Sr. V.P. Tidewater, Inc. 1440 Canal Street, Suite 2100 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Robert Angus, Prog. Mgr., Iran Programs Westinghouse Electric Corp. 1111 schilling Road, MS 7600 Hunt Valley, Maryland 21030

NNNNVV ESA95 6BRA456 00 RUaMHR be RUEHC H912 230Et232 ZNY S S S S S ZZH 0 1 7 e 2 3 Q AUG 7 9 n ~ECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4 129 BT S E C R E T STATE 2 1 5 9 7 2

E.0. 1 2 0 6 5 8 GDS, 8 / 1 7 / 7 9 (UEMENT, CARL)

TAGS* APER, PEPR, I R

SUBJECT 8 POLITICAL REPORTING: NEEDED RESOURCES

1. < S - EWIIRE TEXT)

2. A S PART OF HIGH-LEVEL PROGRAM REVIEW OF PERSONNEL AND RESOURCE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL REPORTING FROM S n E C T E D CRITICAL WUNTRIES, WE HAVE BEEN ASKED T 0 MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING IRAN. FOLLOWING I S A FIRST DRAFf WRITTEN ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED FORMAT AND WITH DEMANDED BREVITY. WE ARE AWAITING SRF COMMENT HERE ON THE 'GAPS I N COVERAGE- PART, BUT SINCE OUR SUBMISSION IS DIE COB AUGUS 21 THERE MAY NOT BE TIME TO VET THAT WITH YOU. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS, PARTICLLARLY ON THE 'RECOMMENDED ACTIONS' PART, AND WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY CARE T 0 MAKE.

3. QUOTE. IRAN.

-- MAJOR PROBLEMS/DEVELOPMENTSr REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION WITH CONTINUED INSTABILITY AND COMPETING POWER CENTERS. GOVERIWENIAL PROCESS IN TRANSITIONAL SIAOE. POLITICAL PROCESS MARKED WITH SERIOUS COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AND LEFT AND RIGHT, WITHIN

ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. SECURITY SITUATION UNSTABLE. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ANXIOUS. MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY UNEMROYMENT AND R I S I N G INFLATION, WITH SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. NEW LABOR MILITANCY. MILITARY AND POLICE STILL LARGELY DISORGANIZED AND DISCREDITED. OIL PRODUCTION STEADY AT 4M B/D SINCE APRIL BUT VLLNERABLE TO DISRUPTIONS. A B I L I T Y TO DEFEND BORDERS AND GULF AREA QUESIIONABLE. FEARS OF COUNTER- REVOLUTIONARY AND/OR OUTSIDE PLOTTING. CONCERN ABOUT MARXIST/COMMUNISI ACTIVIT Y AND CAPABILITY FOR DESTABILIZING ACTION. .z n

C N 719

POL

CHG

R F

CHRON

-- G A P S I N COVERAGEr LACK O F INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF: WHO THE KEY MOVERS ARE AND HOW THE CURRENTLY

FRAGMENTED POWER SYSTEM OPERATES; R E L A T I O N S H I P S BETWEEN R E L I G I O U S LEADERS, T H E I R FOLLOWERS AND SECULAR L E A D E R S AND GROUPS; COMPOSITION AND STRENGTHS O F VARIED GROUPS MAKING U P L E F T I S T FORCES$ L E A D E R S H I P AND ORGANIZATION O F GUERILLA GROUPS, T R I B E S , AND ETHNIC M I N O R I T I E S ( K l R D S , ARABS, ETC.); STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION O F REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AN0 PARA-MILITARY GROUPS; L E A D E R S H I P AND ORGANIZATION O F 'KOMITEHS" I N GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, M I L I T A R Y , AND 1M)USTRY; L E A D E R S H I P AND STRENGTH O F NEW MIL ITANT WORKER GROUPS. E S P E C I A L L Y I N O I L SECTOR: MILITARY COMMAND S T R ~ VRE, OPERATIONAL PREPAREDUESS, AND WILL T O FIGHTS P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S O F CONTINUED MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUCH AS LOW PRODUCTIVITY. SHORTAGES OF MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL, TECHNICIANS, SPARE PARTS, RAW MATERIALS, F I N A N C I N G , AND MARKETS; BAZAAR POL IT ICS.

-- RECOMMENDED A C T I O N S ¶ F I L L VACANT ECONOMIC AND commf~cw- OFFICER POSITIONSIMMEDIATELY. R E V I E W NEED FOR R E E S T A B L I S H I N G P O L / f l I L P O S I T I O N . ENSURE POL S E C T I O N HAS A PERMANENTLY-ASSIGNED SECRETARY. CONSIDER E S T A B L I S H - INQ ROTATIONAL J U N I O R OFFICER POSITION I N POL SECTION. REOPEN T H E THREE CONSULATES A S SOON AS C O N D I T I O N S PERMIT. A S S I G N O F F I C E R S T O THEM W I T H P O L I T I C A L R E P O R T I N G E X P E R I - ENCE. F I L L SENIOR FOREIGN S E R V I C E NATIONAL P O L I T I C A L ADVISOR P O S I T I O N QUICKLY. CONSIDER ADDING ONE FSN P O S I - T I O N I N POL S E C T I O N T O A S S I S T W I T H MEDIA COVERAGE. MAKE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR I N D I V I D U A L LANGUAGE I N Y P ' J C T ION AT POST T O HELP P O L I T I C A L AND ECONOMIC O F F I C E k f MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE T H E I R LANGUAGE C A P A B I L I T Y . ASSURE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL IN-COUNTRY AND START TRAVEL A S QUICKLY AS CONDI- T I O N S PERMIT. I N C R E A S E P U B L I C A T I O N S PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. T O MAXIMVM EXTENT P O S S I B L E , E S T A B L I S H AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ALL MAJOR P O L I T I C A L GROUPS, INCLUDING O P P O S I T I O N ,

AND KNOWLEDGEABLE INDEPENDENT P O L I T I C A L OBSERVERS. CHRISTOPHER 91 115972

C O N F I D E N T I A L

E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : G D S 8 / 2 0 / 8 5 (LASNGEN, L . B R U C E ) OR-M

TAGS! I R P I N T

SUBJECT: I R A N : P O L I C Y O V E R V I E W - 1. ( C - E N T I R E T E X T ) .

2 . SUMMARY O F I N T R O D U C T I O N : T H E R E FOLLOWS A N O V E R V I E W

O F T H E CURRENT S I T U A T I O N I N I R A N W I T H I N W H I C H WE P U R S U E

OUR I N T E R E S T S , F O L L O W E D B Y SOME G E N E R A L COMMENTS ON T H E

CONDUCT O F U.S. P O L I C Y OVER T H E N E A R - T E R M ( 1 2 - 1 8 MONTHS)

FUTURE. ( C O M P L E T E B A L A N C E O F T H I S P A R A L A T E R ) . E N D

SUMMARY.

2 . C L A R I T Y I S N O H A L L M A R K O F T O D A Y ' S I R A N . OUR V I S I B I L I T Y

( A N D T H A T O F M O S T O T H E R O B S E R V E R S ) I S S T I L L L I M I T E D . T H E

I R A N I A N R E V O L U T I O N , U N P R E P A R E D FOR I T S Q U I C K SUCCESS,

R E M A I N S I L L - A R T I C U L A T E D AND E V E N MORE P O O R L Y I M P L E M E N T E D .

F L O U N D E R I N G WOULD B E T O 0 STRONG A WORD* B U T I R A N I S

M l F A R FROM F I N D I N G I T S B E A R I N G S P O L I T I C A L L Y , A N D I T WOULD

E Q U A L L Y A T S E A E C O N O M I C A L L Y WERE I T N O T FOR O I L R E V E N U E S

U N D I M I N I S H E D FROM P R E - R E V O L U T I O N F I G U R E S .

4. ONE T H I N G I S CLEAR. I S L A M R E M A I N S P R E D O M I N A N T .

K H O M E I N I AND H I S ENTROURAGE A T QUM C A L L A L L T H E SHOTS.

THERE I S MUCH T A L K O F U N I T Y I N T H E S P I R I T O F I S L A M , D E S C R I B E D

AS E S S E N T I L A L T O THWART T H E C O U N T E R - R E V O L U T I O N A R I E S AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L ,. 2

AND A R E S I A D T O B E B E H I N D T H E R E V O L U T I O N ' S

D I F F I C U L T I E S I N K U R D I S T A N AND K H U Z I S T A N AND I N D E E D

R E S P O N S I B L E FOR T H E R E G I M E S P R O B L E M S I N WHATEVER F I E L D .

K H O R E I N I R E N I A N S T H E S I N G L E I D O R I N A N T M O T I V A T I N G FORCE,

UNCHALLENGED P O L I T I C A L L Y FROM ANY QUARTER, THOUGH N O

LONGER A S S A C R O S A N C T A S S I X MONTHS AGO; A CASE I N P O I N T ,

P R O B A B L Y * I S A Y A T O L L A H S H A R I A T - M A D A R I D I S T A N C I N G H I M S E L F

I N MESHED D U R I N G T H E E L E C T I O N S T O T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L

R E V I E W C O U N C I L J U S T COMPLETED.

5. T H E N A T U R E O F T H O S E E L E C T I O N S , R E S U L T I N G P R E D I C T A B L Y

I N A C O U N C I L W I T H A S O L I D M A J O R I T Y O F P R O - K H O M E I N I C L E R I C S ,

S Y M P O L I Z E D T H E E S S E N T I A L R I G I D I T Y O F T H E I S L A M I C FORCES

A T QUM. FOR T H E R E G I M E S O P P O N E N T S * I T I S I N D E E D A J O Y L E S S

R E V O L U T I O N . T H E RESULT, AS WE H A V E R E P O R T E D S E P A R A T E L Y ,

HAS B E E N A GROWING F R U S T R A T I O N ON T H E P A R T O F T H E MORE

S E C U L A R * I N T E L L E C T U A L , M O D E R N I S T FORCES I N T H E A L L I A N C E

T H A T T O P P L E D T H E SHAH, W I T H GROWING I N S T A B I L I T Y I N T H E

SHORT TERM AND>%%$ P O L A R I Z A T I O N I N T H E L O N G 7121. r\

I R A N I S N O T T H U S P O L A R l Z E D YET, B U T T H E V I O L E N C E ON T H E

S T R E E T S O F T E H R A N T H I S P A S T WEEK B E T W E E N T H E S E C U L A R

AND T H E I S L A M I C P O L I T I C A L GROUPS I S S U G G E S T I V E O F D I F F I C U L T Y

TO COME I F T H E R E I S NOT A L A R G E R C A P A C I T Y FOR C O M P R O M I S E

ON THE P A R T O F T H E NOW-DOMINANT I S L A M I C FORCES.

6. THOSE FORCES R E M A I N S U F F I C I E N T L Y I N COMMAND, HOWEVER,

TO ENSURE T H E C A R R Y I N G THROUGH O F A C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O C E S S

T H A T I S S C H E D U L E D TO P U T A N E L E C T E D GOVERNMENT I N P L A C E

CONFIDENTIAL 3

BY LATE FALL. NEITHER A D ISTANT BAKTIAR I N P A R I S NOR THE

S T I L L DENORALIZED M I I L I T A R Y I S ANY OBSTACLE TO THAT.

THE NEXT GOVERNMENT I S L I K E L Y TO BE DRAWN E S S E N T I A L L Y FROM

THE PRESENT W T OF CHARACTERS I N THE PGOl AND T H E REVOLUTIONA

COUNCILI WITH A S U F F I C I E N T NAJORITY I N AN ELECTED PARLIAMENT

57- TO GIVE WE REASONABLE LONGEVITY FOR THE F I R S T 12-18 MONTHS

AT LEAST. BUT THERE I S L I T T L E REASON TO THINK THAT SUCH A

NAJORITY W I L L HAVE MUCH SUBSTANTIVE COHESION BEYOND WHAT

I S L A M CAN PROVIDE. NOR I S THERE MUCH L I K E L I H O O D THAT I T

OR I T S LEADERS W I L L BE S U F F I C I E N T L Y F L E X I B L E TO STEM WHAT

COULD B E A GROWING A L I E N A T I O N AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS, THE

TECHNOCRATS* AND THE SECULAR FORCES GENERALLY WHO ARE NEEDED

TO RUN AN ALREADY SUBSTANTIALLY MODERNIZED IRAN.

7. KHOMEINI H IMSELF REMAINS A MAJOR-DETERMINANT OF THE

P O L I T I C A L FUTURE. WERE HE TO STEP BACK, AFTER THE

I N S T A L L A T I O N OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND G I V E

BREATHING SPACE TO MORE MODERATE CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH AS

TALEGHANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI, I T I S POSSIBLE THAT AN I S L A M I C

P O L I T I C A L BLOC COULD SHOW . PRESENT A L I E N T A T I O N OF THE

THERE I S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT, WITNESS THE EDICTS FROM PUN

PRODUCING HARS.HLY RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS ON THE PRESS AND ENCOURAGING I S L A M I C EXTREMISTS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO

DENOUNCE SO-CALLED U.S.-INSPIRED, LEFT-LEANING

INTELLECTUALS OUT TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION.

8. S I M I L A R R I G I D I T Y I S STARKLEY APPARENT I N QUM'S REACTION

TO ISSUES OF P R O V I N C I A L AUTONOMY. BRUTE FORCE, I N C L U D I N G

LIBERAL USE OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS, APPEARS TO B E THE REGIME 'S

ONLY UAY OF RESPONDING. THAT P O L I C Y MAY HAVE UORKED FOR

THE MOMENT I N KHUZISTAN. I T I S NOW B E I N G RUTHLESSLY

A P P L I E D I H KURDISTAN - AN AREA UHERE FORCE OF THE K I N D NOW

B E I N 6 A P P L I E D WOULD APPEAR ALMOST C E R T A I N TO A L I E N A T E

P O L I T I C A L FORCES AVOWEDLY OPEN TO COMPROMISE ON THE B A S I S

OF AUTONOMY.

9. ECONOMICALLY, THERE I S UIDESPREAD D I S I L L U S I O N M E N T

THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS NOT PRODUCED RESULTS - INDEFD THAT

I T HAS MADE THIHGS WORSE FOR MANY, I N C L U D I N G THE VERY

LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED. BUT T H I S HAS HARDLY DAMPENED

THE ENTHUSIASM FOR K H O M E I N I AMONG THOSE SEEMINGLY HARDEST

H I T b HE CAN S T I L L F I L L THE STREETS WITH SUPPORTERS FROH

SOUTH TEHRAN. SO LONG AS O I L REVENUES CONTINUE AT T H E I R

PRESENTLY H I G H L E V E L S THE REVDLUTION I S NOT CHALLENGED

ECONOMICALLY. BUT THERE COULD BE GROUINS P O L I T I C A L FALLOUT

I F P A R A L Y S I S CONTINUES I N THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, WITH

I T S HEAVY EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL, AND I F THE S T I L L GENERALLY

STALEMATED I N D U S T R I A L SECTOR DOES NOT PICK-U$j AN AREA WHERE

THE F L I G H T OF NANAGERIAL PERSONNEL AND ~NT&'PERNIAL S K I L L S

HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES SERIOUS AND WHERE ATT ITUDES TOWARD-

THE RETURN OF FOREIGN P R I V A T E ENTERPRISE I S S T I L L UNCERTAIN

AT BEST.

10. A REGIME WITH T H I S RANGE OF PROBLEMS AT HOME MIGHT B E

ADVISED TO PLAY DOWN I T S INVOLVEMENT ABROAD. BUT THE

I R A N I A N REVOLUTION INVOLVES THREE MAJOR TENETS I N I T S I J

FOREIGN OUTLOOK AND THESE REMAIN POWERFULLY DETERHING ON r-

CONFIDENTIBL

A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES; THESE TENETS INCLUDE THE

A P P L I C A B I L I T Y OF THE I R A N I A N REVOLUTION W I T H I N THE

UNIVERSALITY OF ISLAM; THE REJECTION OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE,

BE I T GODLESS COMMUNISM OR WESTERN CAPITALISM; AHD THE

PARTICULAR MENACE OF INTERNATIONAL Z I O N I S M TO THE INTERESTS

OF ISLAM. THE RESULT I S AN A C T I V I S T FOREIGN POLICY, ABRASIVE

TO MANY OF OUR INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY V I S - A - V I S ISRAEL,

BUT - BECAUSE OF AN INNATE SUSPICION OF THE SOVIETS

POSSIBLY EVEN GREATER THAN THAT OF THE SHAH'S RE61ME - CAPABLE

OF A REASONABLE F I D E L I T Y TO CENUINE NON-ALIGNRENfr

11. I N T H I S SETTING, WE SEE OUR INTERESTS I N I R A N AS

ESSENTIALLY THREEFOLD, FIRST, THE PRESERVATION OF I R A N ' S

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE; SECOND, THE HEALTH OF I T S

O I L INDUSTRY, WITH A CAPACITY FOR CONTINUED NORMAL MARKETING

I N THE WEST; THIRD, AN I R A N I A N FOREIGN POLICY THAT L I M I T S

THE DEGREE TO WHICH I T I D E N T I F I E S I R A N U I T H THE MORE RADICAL

OF THE NON-ALIGNED ELEMENTS. I N LARGE PART, THESE ARE

INTERESTS THAT WE SHARE WITH MUCH OF THE P O L I T I C A L SPECTRUM

OF I R A N EXCEPT THE FAR LEFT.

12. OUR CURRENT POLICY STANCE TOWARD I R A N I S ONE OF

LOU PROFILE, 'STRICT NON-INVOLVEMENT, OPEN TO OPPORTU~~ITIES

TO ENHANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP WHERE POSSIBLE BUT LEAVING

I T LARGELY UP TO THE PGOI AS TO THE PACE BY WHICH WE MOVE

TO B U I L D A NEW RELATIONSHIP. WE B E L I E V E T H I S POLICY

HAS BEEN THE RIGHT ONE TO DATE, BUT UE ALSO B E L I E V E A

SOMEWHAT MORE FORWARD POLICY COMMANDS I T S E L F AS I R A N

C O N F I D E N T I A L 6

MOVES I N T O I T S P O S T - R E V O L U T I O N A R Y PHASE. WE N E E D NOT,

AND SHOULD NOT, EMBRACE T H E CURRENT REGIME; K H O M E I N I

I S NO F R I E N D OF T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S . B U T OTHERS I W T H E

I S L A M I C CAMP ARE MORE O P E N T O US, OVER T I M E .

13. OUR W A T I O N S W I T H T H E P G O I AND T H E F I R S T C O N S T I T U T I O N A L

.t;;;; R E G I M E W I L L R E F L E C T OUR R E S P E C T I V E -S TOWARD E A C H

OTHER. AN U N D E R L Y I N G P R O B L E M FOR US I N I R A N H A S B E E N T H E

F A C T T H A T MUCH O F T H E NEW L E A D E R S H I P DOES N O T Y E T P R E C E I V E

T H A T WE H A V E A C C E P T E D T H E CHANGE I N I R A N O R X X M E X Y I K I X X I

(THOUGH SOME OF T H I S I S T A C T I C A L - A R E F L E C T I O N OF T H E N E E D

TO K E E P R E V O L U T I O N A R Y C R E D E N T I A L S I N TACT. ) E V E N MORE

FUNDAMENTAL T H A N T H A T H A S B E E N T H E D E T E R M I N A T I O N OF T H E NEW

L E A D E R S H I P TO DEMONSTRATE I T S T O T A L I N D E P E N D E N C E FROM

F O R E I G N ( R E A D U.S.) I N F L U E N C E . WE W I L L N E E D TO B E

UNDERSTANDING O F THPS. ANY EMBARACE F R O M US RISKS BEING

SUSPECT. B U T T H E R E I S , NONETHELESS, ROOM FOR U S TO

DEMONSTRATE A GREATER DEGREE O F A C C E P T A N C E AND U N D E R S T A N D I N G ,

P A R T I C U L A R L Y AS T H E R E V O L U T I O N MOVES FROM T H E I M M E D I A T E

K H O M E I N I - D O M I N A T E D C L E R I C I S M TO S O M E T H I N G H O P E F U L L Y MORE

It. RE.FLECTIVE OF S O C I O L O G I C A L AND P O L I T I C A L R E A L I T I E S OF I R A N .

11

1 4 . I N T H E I M M E D I A T E FUTURE, c-bC N O T H I N G M A T T E R S MORE I N T H A T

R E S P E C T THAN T H E T I M I N G AND P E R S O N OF A NEW AMBASSADOR.

T I M E AND C I R C U M S T A N C E S H A V E C O M B I N E D TO G I V E T H I S I S S U E

AN U N U S U A L IMPORTANCE, ONE FOR W H I C H T H E P G O I D E C L I N E S ANY

R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y B a T I N W H I C H THEY S E E US TO D A T E W I T H H O L D I N G

OUR VOTE OF C O N F I D E N C E I N T H E P R E S E N T L E A D E R S H I P AND-


I N T H E R E V O L U T I O N I T S E L F .

15. O F ONLY S L I G H T L Y L E S S I M P O R T A N C E I S T H E AREA O F P U B L I C

D I P L O M A C Y . T H E P G O I H A S WELCOMED OUR P R I V A T E E X P R E S S I O N S

O F GOOD W I L L AND O F W I L L I N G N E S S TO C O O P E R A T E I N A M U T U A L

P R O C E S S O F B U I L D I N G A NEW R E L A T I O N S H I P . B U T T H E Y S E E I N T H E

V I R T U A L A B S E N C E ON OUR P A R T OF ANY P U B L I C S T A T E M E N T S T O T H E

SAME E F F E C T A R E F L E C T I O N O F L E S S T H A N F U L L ENDORSEMENT.

T H A T MAY N O T B E A L L B A D L O N G E V I T Y FOR T H E R E V O L U T I O N I S

S T I L L F A R FROM C E R T A I N B U T SOME P O S I T I V E E X P R E S S L O N ON

OUR P A R T O f U N D E R S T A N D I N G FOR T H E D I F F I C U L T T R A N S I T I O N T H A T

I R A N I S G O I N G THROUGH COULD S T R E N G T H E N T H E H A N D O F T H E

MODERATES WHO WANT GOOD T I E S W I T H US. AND W H I L E T H E I

I S P R I M A R I L Y ON T H E P G O I T O A C T I N WAYS T H A T

ENHANCE I T S I M A G E I N T H E CONGRESS AND AMONG T H E A M E R I C A N

P U B L I C , AN O C C A S I O N A L P O S I T I V E AND P U B L I C S T A T E M E N T B Y

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S P O K E S M E N ABOUT OUR I N T E R E S T AND HOPES I N

T H E NEW I R A N CAN H E L P REDUCE SOME O F T H E C H I P ON T H E

SHOULDER, DAMN YOU FOR OUR GAS L I N E S , A T T I T U D E S TOWARD

I R A N I N T H E U.S. P U B L I C T H A T DO NOT H E L P U S I N P U R S U I N G

W --RANGE I N T E R E S T S I N I R A N .

16. I N M I L I T A R Y S U P P L Y , WE ARE NOW I N P O S I T I O N I N TH-E

A F T E R M A T H O F T H E DOD SUPPLEMENTAL, TO ACT I N WAYS T H A T

R E F U T E P G O I S U S P I C I O N S T H A T WE H A V E H E L D B A C K ON S w S p a

D E L I V E R I E S FOR P O L I T I C A L REASONS. MORE I M P O R T A N T L Y WE CAN

USE, MORE A C T I V E L Y T H A N WE HAVE TO DATE, WHAT W I L L B E A

N E C E S S A R I L Y REDUCED B U T S T I L L S U B S T A N T I A L M I L I T A R Y S U P P L Y


DEPENDENCE ON U S FOR OUR OWN I N T E R E S T S , I N C L U D I N G

R E B U I L D I N G A L I A I S O N W I T H A M I L I T A R Y E S T A B L I S H M E N T T H A T

R E M A I N S STRONGLY W E S T E R N AND E S S E N T I A L L Y MODERATE I N I T S

P O L I T I C A L OUTLOOK.

THOSE N O N - L E F T I S T S E C U L A R FORCES I N T H E P O L I T I C A L F I E L D WHO

ARE OUR N A T U R A L A L L I E S ARE A L S O T H O S E WHO R E C O G N I Z E I R A N ' S

C O N T I N U I N G N E E D S FOR WESTERN C O N T A C T S I N B U S I N E S S AND

TECHNOLOGY. WE S H O U L D C O N T I N U E TO C O U N S E L A N E R I C R N B U S I N E S S

W I T H U N R E S O L V E D I N V E S T M E N T I S S U E S I N I R A N T O S T I C K W I T H

I T - W I T H P A T I E N C E , P E R S I S T E N C E , AND A GOOD D E A L OF

S Y P M P A T H E T I C U N D E R S T A N D I N G FOR A && N A T I O N A L I S T I C

ATMOSPHERE T H A T D I C T A T E S A M I N I M U M OF F O R E I G N M A N A G E R I A L

AND T E C H N I C A L L E V E L PRESENCE.

18. I N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y , WE SHARE W I T H T H E P G O I A

FUNDAMENTAL S T R A T E G I C I N T E R E S T I N I R A N ' S I N T E G R I T Y AND

I N D E P E N D E N C E . I T I S A P O L I C Y A S S E T T H E S O V I E T S CANNOT

C L A I M , W I T H T H I S OR V I R T U A L L Y ANY C O N C E I V A B L E SUCCESSOR

R E G I M E . T H I S I S N O T A F G H A N I S T A N . U N D E R L Y I N G T H I S F A C T

I S B O T H T H E F U N D A M E N T A L A V E R S I O N T B COMMUNISM AMONG T H E

I S L A M I C FORCES AND T H E H I S T O R I C DISTRVP OF T H E S O V I E T

U N I O N AMONG MOST I R A N I A N S . T H E S E ARE POWERFUL REASONS

WHY WE CAN A F F O R P T O L E T T H E NEW I R A N I A N L E A D E R S H I P

B A S I C A L L Y S E T T H E I R OWN P A C E I N B U I L D I N G A R E L A T I O N S H I P

W I T H U S * W H I L E E X P L O I T I N G O P P O R T U N I T I E S TO G A I N P O L I C Y

C O N F I D E N T I A L 9

GROUND U H E N S Y M P A T H E T I C U N D E R S T A N D I N G ON OUR P A R T I S C A L L E D

FOR. T H A T W I L L I N C L U D E T O L E R A T I N G T H E I R N O N - A L I G N M E N T

AND I N D E E D C O M P L I M E N T I N G T H E M FOR I T U H E N I T I N V O L V E S ,

AS WE B E L I E V E I T U I C L I A R E F U S A L TO GO A L O N G W I T H T H E

CUBANS ON T H E I R V E R S I O N O F N O N - A L I G N M E N T . WE S H O U L D B E

A L E R T TO S U C H O P P O R T U N I T I E S T H I S F A L L , E S P E C I A L L Y I F

ANY OF T H E P G O I L E A D E R S H I P A T T E N D T H E UNGA.

19. F I N A L L Y T H E R E R E M A I N S , HOWEVER, T H E F A C T O F A

S U B S T A N T I A L C O M M U N I C A T I O N S GAP BETWEEN U S A N D T H E ' I S L A M I C

FORCES I N I R A N . T H A T G A P I S G R E A T E S T I N A L E A D E R L I K E

K H O M L I N I , WHERE I T I N V O L V E S B O T H R I G I D R E L I G I O U S ORTHODOXY

AND AN E N G R A I N E D D I S T A S T E AND S U S P I C I O N OF T H E U.S. I T

I S L E S S AMONG MORE M O D E R A T E F I G U R E S SUCH AS A Y A T O L L A H S

T A L E G H A N I AND S H A R I A T - M A D A R I . B U T I T I S A S E R I O U S O B S T A C L E

TO U N D E R S T A N D I N G W I T H V I R T U A L L Y A L L OF T H E C L E R I C A L

L E A D E R S H I P , A GROUP D E S T I N E D TO P L A Y A M A J O R R O L E I N I R A N

OVER T H E N E X T FEW YEARS. I T I S I M P O R T A N T T H A T WE S E E K

I M A G i N A T I V E WAYS TO B E G I N TO BRIDGE T H I S GAP, I N C L U D I N G

.EXCHANGE V I S I T S B Y ACKNOWLEDGED E X P E R T S I N T H E F I E L D S OF

R E L I G I O N AND P H I L O S O P H Y AND LONGER T F R M E X C H A N G E PROGRAMS

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DE RUQMHR # 9503 239 "

ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

R 271147 2; AUG 79 CHRGE: STATE 8/27/79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3468 DEFTD: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH:EM

BT CLEAR: C0NS:RMOREFIELD

c O N F I D E N T I A LTEHRAN 09503 DISTR: CHARGE CONS RF POL2

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/27/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-M

TAGS: CVIS, PEPR, SHUM, IR

SUBJECT: NIV APPLICATIONS IN "POST-CRISIS" IRAN

REF: STATE 35557

2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IRAN CAN NO LONGER BE

CHARACTERIZED AS BEING IN "CRISIS, AND, ACCORDINGLY. RECOMMENDS THAT REFTEL BE RESCINDED. END SUMMARY.

3. THE IMMEDIATE TRAUMA OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS

PASSED. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS FAR DIFFERENT IN

CERTAIN RESPECTS THAN UNDER THE PAHLAVI REGIME, IN THE

SIX MONTHS SINCE FEBRUARY IRAN HAS SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE,

THE MAIN FEATURES OF WHICH WILL PROBABLY PERTAIN FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. THESE INCLUDE POLITICAL DOMINANCE BY

THE ISLAMIC CLERGY, A HIGH LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS-C'JM-

NATIONALIST RHETORIC NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT THAN THAT

FOUND IN MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND AN ECONOMY SHAPED

MORE BY POLITICAL PEHCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THAN RATIONAL CRITEHIA FOR SOUND MANAGEMENT.

4. THERE ARE MANY IN IRAN WHO FIND THESE CONDITIONS

PERSONALLY UPSETTING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE

SUSPICIOUS OF THE EMPHASIS ON PERSIAN SHIA ISLAM. MODERNIST

AND SECULAR ELEMENTS RESENT THEIR OWN DIMINISHED ROLE IN

90TH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SPHERES. AND MANY OTHERS LAMENT THE GENERAL INEFFICIENCY AND ARBITRARINESS OF THE

CURRENT SYSTEM.

5. MUCH OF THE CRITICISM IS VALID. HOWEVER, THE CONDI-

TIONS WHICH IT IS BASED CANNOT BE TERMED A "CRISIS".

RATHER, THEY ARE WHAT HAS COME TO PASS FOR NORMALITY I N

THIS COUNTRY. ACCORDINGLY, WE FIND IT NO LONGER

APPROPRIATE TO SPEAK OF A " POST-CRISIS" IRAN IN DEALING WITH NON-IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS. THAT MANY IRANIANS WOULD

PREFER TO HAVE THPIR COUNTRY BE SOMETHING OTHER THAN WHAT

IT ACTUALLY IS. DOES NOT, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR CONTINUED BENDING OF OUR IMMIGRATION LAW. IN SHORT,

THE SITUATION HERE IS ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR TO A NUMBER OF

OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHERE LOCAL CONDITIONS PROVIDE

STRONG INCENTIVES FOR MANY IRANIANS TO EMIGRATE. WE SHOULD

DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION EXACTLY AS WE DO IN THOSE

COUNTRIES WHERE " PUSH" FACTORS ARE ALSO STRONG.

6. TREATMENT OF VARIOUS IRANIAN MINORITIES IN POST-

REVOLUTIONARY IRAN DESERVES SPECIAL COMMENT. DESPITE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF HARASSMENTS DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUAL MEMBER

0 , THR EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO DOCUMENT INSTANCE OF OFFICIAL PERSECUTION DIRECTED EITHER

AT INDIVIDUALS OR AT CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE. SENIOR GOVERN-

MENT OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP HAVE

REPEATEDLY ASSURED ALL MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS THAT THEIR

RIGHTS WILL BE RESPECTED IN THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.

PREJUDICE AND BIGOTRY MOST CERTAINLY DO SXIST. BUT THERE IS NO QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRAN UNDER THE SHAH

AND IRAN UNDER KHOMEINI IN THIS REGARD. ALMOST INVARIABLY WHEN INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS

ARE QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT THEIR MOTIVATIONS FOR

WANTING TO LEAVE IRAN, INCHOATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE

RATHER THAN SPECIFIC ACTS OF PERSECUTION IN THE PAST ARE

GIVEN .

7. IN RIGHT OF THE ABOVE, WE RECOMMEND THAT REFTEL BE

RESCINDED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT ALL IRANIAN NIV APPLICANTS HENCEFORWARD BE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE BINDING TIED AS STIPULATED IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.

TOMSETH

BT

#9503 NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

EUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT BUFNPS RUSNAM DE RUQMHR #9653/B1 2 4 2 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 3 0 1 1 5 1 2 AUG 7 9 FM AMEMBASSI TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3 5 5 0 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASST ABU DHABI 0249 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSI ANTARA 0 2 3 9 RUEEACAJSINT BAGHDAD 0 2 5 4 RUQMOD/AMEYBASSI DCEA 0 2 2 0 RUSBQD/AMEflBASSY ISLAMABAD 0 2 8 7 RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY J I r D A 0 2 8 2

TEHRAN 9 6 5 3 / 1

CLASS : CONFIDENTIAL CHRGE: STATE 8/31/79 APPRV : CHARGE:VLTOMSETB DRFTD: POL: JL1HBERT:GO CLEAR: TL:EASWIFT DISTR: POL2 CEG DAO

MAAG ICA RF CHRN

RU~'BLK/AMEUBASS~ KABUL 0 2 9 1 RUOMKW/AMEMBASSI KUWAIT 0 2 5 2

RUQMA~/AMEMBASSI MANAMA 0 2 1 8 BUEEMO/AME'lBASSI MOSCOU P 2 7 2 ~ U Q M ~ T ~ A ~ E M B A S S T nusclr 8146 RUFNPS/AMEHBASST PARIS 0 3 0 7 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 81 OP TEHRAN 0 9 6 5 3

E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS e/3a/e5 (LINBERT, JOHN) OR-P TAGS: PINT, P I N S , POOV, IR SUBJECT: MOVES TOWARD GOVERNMENT UNIFICATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS INDICATE TEAT IRAN'S DUAL SISTEM OF OFlrICIAL AND UNORICIAL GOVERNMENT I S EVOLVING TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED STSTEM DOMINATZD BY THE UNOPPICIAL, OR REVOLUTIONARY, SECTOR. THE OFFICIAL, PROVISIONAL GOVERNMPNT OF IRAN (PGOI) HEADED BY P B I n r MINISTER BAZARGAN I S BEING INCREASINGLY OVERSHADOWED BY THE CLERICAL ESTABLISHNENT WHICH I S S M D I N G ITS AUTHORITY INTO N N AREAS AND WHICH I S INC &SINGLY GIVING DIRECT ORDERS TO GOVERNMENT MINISTRI&OMINALLY UNDER PGOI CONTROL. THIS SITUATION MAY BE RECOGNITION OF KHOMEINI'S PRP-EMINENCE AND OP ?ACT THAT ONLY HE AND HIS ALLIES CAN COMMAND RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE OF BOTH SIDES OF THE DUAL AUTHORITY SYSTEM. COUNCIL OF EXPERTS DELIBERATION MAY SANCTIPT CLERICAL PBEDOMINANCE AND OFFICIALLY PUT PC01 LEADERS NOT CLOSELY IDENTITILD WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OUT O r PUBLIC LIFE. END SUMMARY. 3. SOME ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN P B I S TEXT OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S AUGUST 2 8 STATEMENT ON THE ARMEC WRCES. KURDESTAN, PRESS FREEDOM, AND OTHER MATTERS ( F B I S 2 8 2 0 1 4 2 LONDON). DURING THE PAST WEEKS THE IMAM AND HIS ALLIES IN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN TAKING INCREAS- 11617 DIiUCT CONTROL OVER AREAS NOWINALLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. I T APPEARS THAT THE SYSTEM OF DUAL AUTHOBITY DIVIDED BITWEEN QOM AND TEHR HAS NOT WORKED WELL EVEN AS A TEMPORARY ARBANGE-

QOM I S NOW MAKING DECISIONS ON ALMOST ALL MATTERS OF I ORTANCE, INCLUDING PUBLIC SECURITI, THE PRESS. corm CE, A N D THE MILITART. MENTQ

CONPI DENTIAL 5 5

TEHRAN 9653/1

CONIIDENTIAL TEBRAN 9653/1

4 . LEOHEIN1 HAS OPENLY ASSERTED E I S AUTHORITY OVER THF PAST FPY WEEES. FOR PIAMPLE, THE "INTEGRATION" OF TBE EXVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE CABINETPUT FIVE MINISTZRS ON TEE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS IIGURES INTO UNDER-SECRETARY POSITIONS IN THE MINISTRIES. APPARENTLY THE PRESENCE OF MINISTERS ON THE COUNCIL HAS NOT AIIECTPD THE WORKINGS 01 THAT BODY, BUT THE NEW uNIIZ%SECFSTARIES ARE WIELDING CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER MINISTBY OPERATIONS. AYATOLLAE KEAMENE'I TEE NEW UNDEBSPCRPTARY OF TEE MINISTBY 0 1 DEFENSE. I S BELIEVED TO BE CLOSELY INVOLVED IN DELIBERATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF TEE 1-14 AIRCRAFT. ( C I . TEHRAN 9467).

6. KEOMEINI'S ASSUMING TEE POST OP SUPREME COMMANDER THE ARHED PORCES. H I S ORDERS TO MdYE AGAINST THE KURC IRSIIWENTS AND HIS CALLS FOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE HAV

-PIRECTLT A ~ S E R T E D QOM'S POWER OVER THE IRANIAN YILITA ,APMED FORCES COMANDERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO COMMAND ~ O B B D I S N C ~ ~ WHBN THEIR ORDERS ARE BACKED BY IHOMEINI'S "3311~193 THAN BY THE DUBIOUS AUTHORITY OP THE PSOI-- IAUWOPITY WEICH CAN BP EASILY RfVSRSSD. TEE NEW ~COWANDER 01 TEE AIR FORCE MAJ GEN BA3HSR1,BACYED BY

CHOMEINI 'S AUTHORITY BAS B ~ X N WORKING TO RE-INSTILL '$DISCIPLINP AND ORDER IN E I S COMMAND. BY CONTRAST, Prl

BAZABGAN'S AUGUST 27 MESSAGE TO THX ARMY EXPHESSING pBBATITUDE FOR ITS VALOR IN SAQQEZ, RECEIVED LITTLE : LTTENTION. \I

8. TES CLOSURE 0 1 A NUMBER 01 PUBLICATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN -SING THE POLICIES 0 1 THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WAS UNDBETAKEN AT TEE INITIATIVE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT AUTEOBITIB (CF. TEHRAN 9 4 4 6 ) . THE POOI, SPECIIICALLY THE MINISTRY O I NATIONAL GUIDANCE. HAD LITTLE ROLE IN TEE EVENTS EXCEPT CATCH UP WITH MEASURE> LLBUDT TAKPN BY THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR.

7 . TEE CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF BT 19653

NNNN CONFIDERTIAL TEHRAN 9653/1

C O N P I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 9653/2

RUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT RUTNPS RUSNAAA D E RUQMHR #9653/02 242 ** ZNY ccccc ZZH B 3 0 1 1 5 1 Z AUG 79 F n - i i i t i i ~ i s s i - ~ m ~ ~ ~ T O P m H C / S E C S T A T E WASHDC 3551 IN^ a u a n n l / A n s n a A s s r ABU DHABI RUQMW /AMENBASST ANKARA 8248-- R U E H A D h J S I N T BAGHDAD 0255 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 8221

CLASS: CONF J E N T I A L CBRGE: S T A T E 9/38/79 APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSET DRFTD: P 0 L : J L I M B E R T : G O CLEAR: T L : E A S Y I F T D I S T R : P O L 2 CHG DAO

." MAAG M A A ~ - ~ C A CERON R F

R u ~ Q D / A M E M B A S S Y ISLAMABAD 0 2 9 8 RUOMEA/AMEMBASSY J I D D A 0283 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0 2 9 2

*RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY XUWAIT 0 2 5 3 ? RUDTC/AMEHBASSY LONCON 0359 " RUQMAH/APlEPlBASSY MANAMA 0219 4 RUEBW/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0273 , R U Q ~ ~ T / A M ~ B A ~ ~ Y MUSCAT 0147

RUPNPS/AMEMBASSY P A R I S 0 3 0 8 . RVSNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I H I N G E N G E 5 nt - -- Z C 0 N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 02 O F TEHRAN 09653

:WEAPONS I S NOW CLEARLY I N T H E HANDS O F T H E REVOLUTIONARY L U T H O R I T I E S . TEHRAN REVOLUTIONART PROSECTOR AYATOLLAH

;AHMAD AZARI-QOMI TOLD BAMDAD NEWSPAPER O N AUGUST 27 .THAT ANYONE FOUND POSSESSING ILLEGAL ARMS WOULD BE :CONSIDERED CORRUPT O N EARTH A N D SHOT. A C C O R L I N G TO

AZARI-QOMI, NO GRACE P E R I O D WOULD BE ALLOWED AND TXZ ORDER VOULC COME I N T O E F F E C T IMMEDIATELY. FOLLOWING H I S STATEMENT, T H E REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTORS I N MASEEIID , I S F A E A N . N A J I V A B A D , PERDOWS, BANDAR ABBAS. AND OTHER P R O V I N C I A L TOWNS I S S U E D S I M I L A R ORDERS WITH T E E C O N C I T I O N THAT THOSE CARRYING WEAPONS, E X C E P T FOR T H E P O L I C E , T E E M I L I T A R Y , T H E GENDARMERIE, AND T E E REVOLUTIONARY GUARES ( P A S D A R A N I . WOULD HAVS ONE WEEX'S T I M E T O TURN TEEM I N . ORDERS ~ ~ i i BEEN ISSUED TO- TEE PASDARAN TO S E A ~ C H VEHICLFS LND HOUSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS.

8. T H E R E V O L U T I O N I R Y COURT'S CAMPAIGN A G A I N S T WEAPONS ROLLOWS THE S E I Z U R E O F T H E TEHRAN HEADQUARTERS O F T I E MOJAHIDIN-E-KHALQ BY T E E PASDABAN. COMMENTINS ON THAT S E J Z W E . A Z A R I - Q O M I QUOTEC THE IMAN AS S A Y I N G THAT " N O ONE HAD THE R I G H T T O M I S A P P R O P R I h T E GOYERNMEhT P R O P Z P P I . T H E M O J A H I D I N THEMSELVES I S S U E D d STATEMENT THAT TIIEY WOULD A C C E P T T E E ORDERS O F THR IMAM ANC T H E GOVERNMENT. D E S P I T E RUMORS O F DISCOVERY ON AN ARMS CACHE AT M O J h H I D I N HEADQUARTERS. AZARI-QOMI NOTED THAT ONLY S E V E N 6-3 R I P L X S WERE FOUND AT T H E B U I L D I N S . 9 THE MEMBERSHIP O F THE ASSEMBLY OF E X P E B T S M E E T I N J TO DRAW U P A NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N FOR IXAK HAS A E I S T I N C T L Y R E L I G I O U S C A S T . T H E S O C I A I . I D E A L S O F MOST 07 T E E MEMBERS ARE S I M I L A R T O , I F NOT I L E N T I C A L WITH T?OS O r

N I . WHATEVER P B I L O S O P R I C A L D I F F E R E N C E S :HE YZfl3EnS V E , MOST ARE L I K E L Y TO AGREE THAT THE MUSLIM C L F F G "

HAVE A PRECOMINANT ROLE I N THE NEW S T A T E . FYI: BATES O F T H E ASSEMBLY HAVE NOVFC O F F T B T F R O d T

C O N F I C E N T I A L 57

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9 6 5 3 / 2

PACE AND HAVE TAKEN ON TEE ASPECTS OF A SIDESHOW TO TEE EVENTS BEING SHAPED BY KHOMEINI ANC THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. THE MOST RECENT REPORT ABOUT THE ASSEMBLY WAS A DEBATE ABOUT VHETHER JEWS SHOULD BE REFERRRED TO AS TAHUDI OR KALIMI . END FYI .

18. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SUGCESTEC THAT ALL OF THESE EVENTS ARE A N OPEN SEIZUBE.OF POVER BY THE UNOFFICIAL. REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITICS AT THE EXPENSE OF TEE P 0 0 1 . ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, TEE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE PASDARAN INTO KURDESTAN WAS MOTIVATED NOT BY EVENTS IN KURDESTAN BUT BY KHoMEINI'S DESIRE TO TIGHTEN HIS CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION.

HOWEVER, THERE I S NO NECESSITY TO SEE A PLOT IN THESE EVENTS. WHAT MAY BE EAPPENING I S THAT THOSE

~ v E O ALREADY HOLD REAL POWER ARE BEING FORCED TO USE I T S T 0 IMPOSE ORDER LND STbBILITY ON THE NATION. LEAVIN3 AN ,IMPOTENT PGOI TO TRY AN6 DEAL WITH ARMED BANDS, ECONOMIC :CONFUSION. UNRULY TRIBESMEN, AND OTHERS SEEN AS COVNTER- RREVOLUTIONARIES BAS NOT WORKED. VHETHER THE REVOLUTIONARY

NNNN d CONPICENTIAL TEHRAN 9653/2

c , & . k r ~ ~ : . k . ' '4"" +" W r n r n f l ? S *.*" C 0 N P I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 13 TEHRAN 09653

HOWEVER. STABILITY I S AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR CONTROLLING IRAN AND I T TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMICS, RELIGION, OR FOREIGN POLICY. SUCH A PROCEDURE HAS DEEP ROOTS IN IRANIAN HISTORY, WHICH CONTAINS NUMPROUS EXAMPLES OF RULERS TAKING EXTREME STEPS TO ENSURE TEE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THIS HETEROGENEOUS NATION.

12. I T I S LIKELY THAT KHOMEINI'S OPENLY EXERCISING DIRECT RULE OVER I R A N I A N DOMESTIC POLITICS COMBINED WITH THE LIKELT OUTCOME OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OP EXPERTS WILL RESULT IN A CENTRALIZED STATE I N WHICH

$TEE INFLUENCE OF KHOMEINI AND HIS ALLIES (BOTH CLERICbL 2AND SECULAR) WILL PREDOMINATE. I N SUCH A STATE, THE 3 ROLE OF OPPONENTS OF CLERICAL DOMINATION. OF WHATEVER !POLITICAL AND SOCIAL S T R I P E , I S LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE ,LIMITEC THAN I T I S TODAY WKEN AT LEAST SOME SECULARISTS :ARE ALLOWED TO SERVE AS FIGUREHEADS IN THE PGOI. WHILE :SUCH A PROSPECT MAY NOT FLEASE MANY WHO ORISINALLY :SUPPORTED THE REVOLUTION. THE INSTITUTION OF SUCH A 'GOVERNMENT MAT BE ONLY THE FORMAL RECOGNITION OF AN : LLREADY EXISTING SITUATION. TOPTSETH .I B!l $ W6is

; UNNK 4 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 0965313

September 2. 1979

Regional Security Officer memorandum

American Embassy. Tehran Iran

Monthly Status Report f o r August 1979

Chief. A/SY/FO Department of State

I. Threat Assessment

A. The potential fo r violence in Iran remains hioh. There are increasina sipns of disenchantnent with tlie resul ts of the revolution a t many levels of society. Hinh unemployment is a problem and ideological. sociological, and ethnological differences abound. Although i t c w l d be argued tha t many of these problem are not new t o Iran, the lack of any effect ive central authori ty to deal with them i s a cause fo r concern.

The PGOI, headed by P r i m Minister Bazaroan, has y e t t o so- l id i fy i t s administrative control over the country and is con- t inual ly upstacred by the shadow government headed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah ~homeini, often making i t d i f f i cu l t . i f not impossible. to deal with the problems tha t have .manifested themselves a s a result of the revolution. Cabinet members of the PGOI have repeatedly offered the i r resjgnations in protest of interference by the revolutionary council and c m i t t e e s . and the resul t ing in- ab i l i ty t o do the i r job.

Traditional security and law enforcement organizations ( i .e.. National Police and Gendarmerie) do not ex i s t as viable uni ts . The military, which t radi t ional ly has not had an internal securi ty role. i s inactive. These forces a re extremely reluctant t o take part in any act ivi ty which miaht involve the use of force against other Iranjans. Trials and executions (over 400 t o date) a r e continuing against police, gendarmerie and mil i tary personnel who were involved in securi ty functions prior t o the revolution, a factor which weakens morale i n these organizations and makes their personnel reluctant t o ge t involved i n law enforcement and in te r - nal security functions. A good example of these fears i s a conversation that recently took place between an Emboff and a hlgh- ranking Iranian police o f f i c ia l (subsequently related t o RSO). The pollce o f f i c ia l s ta ted tha t he had standinn orders t o quell any major disturbance i n Tehran, usina force i f necessary. The

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan ,,,,,, .. I"=". ,-n', CSL mYI <4(L1 *I--* ~ I P I I I

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police o f f i c ia l comnented tha t i f he were foolish enough t o carry out these orders, his men would not obey. and, secondly. he was not about t o give these orders because of the possibil- i ty of future reprisals . Until such time as there i s a strong central povernment. possessing clear cut authority and the public support. i t i s unltkely tha t these forces will take an active role in the internal security of the country.

k'ith the National Police, Gendarrerie. and the military inactive, the security vacuum has been f i l l e d by an irregular revolutionary guard organized in to Revolutionary Komi tehs (comnittees]. Anyone encounterino them i s subject t o a r res t and detention f o r l i t t l e i f any. reason. The numher of road- blocks appears t o have decreased in recent days, but they can reappear a t any time. Although not as a matter of course, sum- macy just ice, both capital and corporal. has been exercised by those groups. The revolutionary guards are a law unto themselves and operate from the Mao Tse-tuna dictum that "poker stems from the barrel of a gun."

mother group, the Pasdaran, appear t o be f i l l i n q the void left by the mil i tary 's inaction. The Pasdaran are also known as revolutionary guards but are separate'from those serving in the Khomitehs. Significant i s the fac t tha t they too are enpaoed in internal securi ty functions; a role that the military t radi t ion- a l ly has not played. Their leader i s an Iranian named RAFSANJANI, a HojjatolesSan (one step down from an Ayatollah). A t Dresent there are approximately 10-12.000 Pasdaran who have been screened and selected f r m young, untrained Iranian Revolutionary volun- teers. They are only a m d with l igh t weapons and have been receiving the f r training i n ground force instal la t ions in Tehran-- primarily Lavizan (the larger ground force base in Tehran). The guard i s brbken in to three main Froups: a major c i t i e s group; c i t i e s up t o 5000 people group. and a VIP protection grouo. The Pasdaran are a separate para-military uni t which has thus f a r been active in internal security functions as well as sustaining the revolution. They have been particularly active in Turkoman Sahra area and Khoramshar. I t i s believed tha t RAFSANJANI reports direct ly t o the revolutionary council with an unknown degree of coordination with the Defense and Inter ior Ministries. To what degree the Komitehs and the Pasdaran will be willing t o cooperate i s unknown. They are independent of each other, but do represent the only viable security forces in Iran a t th i s time.

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Demonstrations

A1 though improving somewhat, U.S.-Iranian diplomatic re- la t ions remain i n a s t a t e of flux. Anti-Americanism has sub- sided over the pas t few weeks (from i t s previous high i n l a t e May), but i s s t i l l jus t beneath the surface. Hardly a day goes by without a newspaper a r t i c l e or public denouncement by a religious f igure o r member of the PGOI, linking the USG/ICA t o a current problem in Iran. The U.S. continues t o be a very con- venient scapegoat fo r the everyday problems confronting the Iranian leadership. There i s l i t t l e doubt tha t any decisions or actions taken by the USG that are perceived to be disadvan- tageous or offensive t o the Iranians would resu l t in demonstrations, possibly of a violent nature. In t h i s reaard, anti-Shah feelings remain extremely stronq. Any decision t o allow him or h i s family t o v i s i t the U.S. wobld almost cer tainly resu l t i n an imnediate and violent reaction. The a b i l i t y and/or desire of the PC01 t o contain such actions i s questionable.

Terrori sm

Terrorism. i n the form of assassinations, harassment. and kidnappings, i s a l s o a very real threat . Due t o the l a c k o f central authority. there i s l i t t l e t h a t can be done t o contain any group or groups wishing t o fur ther the i r own interests through the use of violence. Two of the more prominent inde- genous pre-revolution t e r r o r i s t groups, the Mujeheddin and the Fedayeen, have achieved a degree of legitimacy and are now ac- t ive pol i t ical ly . Neither group has claimed responsibility fo r any t e r r o r i s t acts since the overthrow of the Shah. Forghan (a grwp opposed t o the ro le of the clergy i n the government), on the other hand, has been qu i te act ive since the revolution. I t has claimed responsibi l i ty f o i the assassination of several religious figures. We have no. infomation indicating tha t any of these groups have tarpeted U.S. personnel In Iran. but we must appear t o be a t t r ac t ive targets. Aw of these groups might be tempted t o carry out an operation e i the r i n reaction to'developments perceived t o be antl-Iranian or i n order t o induce a c r i s i s in already shaky PGOI/USG relations. Pales- tanian re jec t ion i s t groups, which have pledged t o seek revenge f o r the USG's part i n the Israeli-Egyptian peace t reaty, must a lso be considered. This threat may be tempered somewhat by the fac t tha t the PLO is seekina t o develop the PGOI as an a l ly and may not wish t o endanger the relationship by placfng the PGOI in the awkward position of havina t o deal with a t e r r o r i s t action against the USG i n Iran.

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Page 4

B. Specific Acts Directed Against the U.S. Enbass2

On August 17 a t approximately 2255 hours the M a s s y Compound was the object o f a grenade attack. Two separate exp~oSlons, one .at the n m Consulate Building and one a t the bu i ld ing housing the s a t e l l i t e dune d i r e c t l y behind the Chancery, wen registCred. There were no in jur ies, hweyer, property damage. including labor costs, to ta l led appro xi mat el^ RMH) dollars. According t o the Farsi language paper "Kayhan (August 18) three groups have claimed c red i t f o r the explosions. These are:

- The Iranian Muslim Revolutionary Resistance Movement

- The 17th o f Sharlvar (September 8) Group

- The Tel Zatar Group

here has been no con f imat ion t h a t a w o f these groups was responsible. See Theran 9175 and 9153 f o r deta i led Information o f th i s incident.

I n the early morning h w r s o f August 12 a group o f about 35- 50 armed irregulars (Pasdaran) arr ived a t the Embassy f o r the. purpose o f removing Mashallah Kashanl and h i s forces froln the compound. While t h i s act was not directed a t the U.S. Ettbassy. the method used (e.9. v i r t u a l armed takeover of the compound) d i d have the potential f o r violence I nvolvlng American personnel. Fortunately, cooler heads prevai led and the s i tua t ion sorted it- s e l f out a f t e r approximately f i v e t o s i x hours nesotiatlons w i th the i r regular force. See Tehran 8973 f o r &dditi&al detai ls.

11. Operations . A. V is i to r Consulat ion/Brief in~s

N) Co. "0'. J e f f Ronald v l s l ted post from A U ~ U S ~ 7 t o August 16 - i n order t o conduct an inspection o f the MSG Detachmnt.

S/A Foucht o f the Naval In te l l igence Service v i s i t e d post f r o n August 14 t o August 17 i n order t o Investigate al legations against the f o m r NCOIC 6ySgt Main.

Seabee Mike Houseman arrived on August 26 i n order t o per fom technical security work on new Consulate bui lding.

B. Support Ac t i v i t i es

RSfJ centlnucd t o work c losely with 6SO. FBO pro ject super- v isor and Consul General i n order to incorporate secur l ty re- q v l - m t s . i n t o construction o f nen Consulate bui lding.

CORF IOtWT!hL Page 5

.C. Siqni f icant Ac t i v i t i es

- The period of August 1 through August 12 required that almost a11 o f the Security Of f icers time and resources be devoted to dealing w i th Hrshallrh Kashani and h l s foKeJ.

- On August 12 Kashani was ousted frm the Embassy compound b y a force of a m i d irregulars.

- On August 15 S/A Dan XcCarthy arr ived f o r a three-week TDY.

- On August 17 the Embassy compound was the object o f a combiaed RPG and hand grenade attack. Approximately 8000 dol lars I n property darnap was incurred. There w e n no personal in jur ies.

- On August 18 ARSO Harland departed post on v is i ta t ion.

- Annex J. Internal Destruction Plan, was rewr i t ten and w i l l soon be forwarded t o the Departmeht.

- Detailed security br ie f ings were conducted f o r a l l new TOY and PCS arrivals.

- Considerable tin was devoted t o w o r k i y w i th the National Pol ice i n an e f f o r t t o obtsln a reaular uniformed security force f o r Edassy protection. ~ h u i far, only the body- guard de ta i l canposed o f plainclothes National Police have r e p o r t d f o r duty on 8 continuing basis. Manning Of perimeter security parts has been sporadic.

111. Plans f o c Cmino Month

- TW secretary. Li l lan. Johnson.. w i l l a r r i v e frm Kinshasa i n order t o ass is t RSO's w i th re-establishment o f records and wnage- merit systclnr destroyed as a resu l t o f February 14, 1979 attack.

- TSO Chuck Soper w i l l a r r i v e i n order t o continue work on physical Security inprovements;

- Continue t o negotiate f o r a regular security force f o r the Embassy.

- It I s expected tha t the new Consulate bui ld ing w i l l open during the month o f September.

- RSS w i l l v i s i t post sometime during the month o f September

- ARSO Harland w i l l re turn from v i s i t a t i o n on September 3.

- S/A FkCartb w i l l depart f ~ r U.S. on Septenber 3.

LIMITED OTTICIAL USE

DE RUQMHR #9739 247 ** ZNT CCCCC ZZH - . - . . . - - - 0 0407072 SEP 79 M AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RllEEIA/USICA WASEDC IMMEDIATE -. - - - - . . . . - - - - - -

TE WASECC 3600

LIMITED OF?ICIAL USE TEHRAN 09733

CLASS: L I l I W D O?PICIAL 'J CEBOL: ICA 9/4/79 i5m : i c i t r i o i J ~ R A V B S DRFTD: 1CA:PAOtJGRAVIS :L' CLIIP: ROME m s n r IOA-2 CURCE POL

ECON CRU

E.O. 12065: N/A 2SUBJ: A MAJOR PUBLIC APTAIRS CONCERN ?, 3 WITH A' VIEV TO IDENTIfYING "CO~MUNICATION TENSIONS " I "AVE, IN TALKING WITH IRANIANS, SOUGHT VATS TO ASK' pDISCREETLT: WHAT ABOUT AMERICA AND AMERICANS MOST BUGS *IRANIANS? THE ANSWERS VART CONSIDERABLY, BUT ONE

THREAD RUNS THROVGE MOST OP TAE ANSWERS TO MY QUESTION:

e 1. TO0 MANY AMERICANS HAVE BEEN T B V I S I B L E TOO LONG i IN TOO MANY ASPECTS OF L I F E IN IRAN. z g2.' I RECALL WHEN I VISITOD TEHRAN IN 1973, BEING P STRUCK BY T E ~ PSRCEPTION THAT s o n S or WHAT I WAS :SEEING IN TEBRAN WAS REMINISCENT 0 1 WHAT I HAD SEEN IN *SAIGON IN 1967: AMERICAN TECENICIANS AND OPERATIOPS

WERE HAVING A VISIBLE IMPACT ON THE LOCAL SCLNE.

3. I SUBMIT THAT, WHEREVER THE AMXRICAN PRESENCE I S SO PERVASIVE THAT I T IMPACTS WIDELY ON TEE INDIGENOUS POPULATION, THERE I S LIKELY TO BE A SERIOUS "COP~WUNICATION TENSION" BUILDING. A PROBLEM FOR ICA IN THE FIELD AND PERHAPS ?OR OUR RESEARCH O??ICERS IN WASA1N:TON. BUT nosr OF ALL A PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSICERATION WHICH THE AGENCY MIGHT USETULLT CALL TO TEE ATTBNTION Of POLICY MAZERS -AT NSC, DOD AND STATE.

4. ONE MIGHT, BT Why OF ILLUSTRATING THE DANGSR. CITE PRE-CASTRO CUBA, GREECG UNDER TH6 JUNTA OR THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT AND A?GANISTAN. AN EVEN MORE ILLUMINATING EXAYPLE C3ULD. HOWEVER, BE CONJURED UP ?OR AMERICANS BY EVOKING AN ENTIEtLY EYPOTHETICAL CASE: 50,000 JAPANESE TECHNICIANS LIVING AND WORKING AROUND JACKSON MISSISSIPPI OR A SIf4ILAR NUMBER OF GERM4NS VHEELINE A N D DEALING IN DULUTH. MINNESOTA. HOV WOULD AMERICANS COME TO VIEW THESE VISITORS AND TELIB COUNTRIES?

5. GENERAL AMIB RAAIMI 'S STATEMENTS ABOUT BRINGING BACK FOREIGN ADVISORS AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE EPPECTS OF SUCH ADVISORS ON THE IRANIAN MILITARl IN THE PAST REVEAL THE KIND OF FRUSTRATIONS AND RESENTMENTS AMERICANS IN L GE NUMBERS EWOENDELED HERE. LT OUR EAGERNESS TO PROMOTE OUR SHORT-TERM POLIST, SECU TT, OR BUSINESS INTERESTS, WE HAVE SOMETIMES PROCUCED LONG-TERM HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION. AMERICAN

55 TEHRAN 9739

LIMITED O??ICIAL USE TEERAN 9759

PLURALISM AND rat w m o m ; r r c E N T ~ P R I S E 01 UYRIAC AMERIC INTXLEST GRO8?I DOES, 0 1 COURSE, RAKE I T DIFFICULT TO CONTEOL TEE W ( m l 01 AUEIICAMS OPERATINO IN ANY E W I I I O N ~ ~ ~ ANY~PEII IN r E r UOILD nrn~ AMP~ICANS SEE O F F O ~ T B N I T ~ . NOIIRIELESS, IT snns CLEAR TEAT r a E EONO-VLII OUHIkl AMERICAN INTIRPST REQUIRIS ?BAT S T r r m f o u s r m l ~ s BE nor TO IIDUCE, FOP E u n P L E , WE TISIB~I WERICAN PRESENCE (AND xurrcr or T a r c u L r u n r ) EM SUCH COUNTRIES AS SAUDI ARABIA, !lTXICO, AND XGTPT. ORAIBS 1 T 19739

TEHRAN 9739

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL

September 4, 1979

NOTE FOR POL - Mr. FROM: ECON - A. D. Sans

The implications as I read them of your recent cable on the political structure here correctly seem to be right on the mark. I think you should have gone further to say what the implications are of the demise of -the "dual government" construct for US interests. Vic suggested that I give you my thoughts in case they might be useful for a follow-up cable at some point. Here goes:

It seems to me that if there ever was a dual govern- fsent, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly became * source of power. )(I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on the Kurds, attacks on the left public contempt for the critical ihtelligentsia. and aiparently temporagy restrictions on the press in recent,weeks,,rather than as a panicky reaction to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of conveniece who would seize the movement for their own ends.

I think there is a question of timirrg here, too. Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional assembly completing the constitution he wants for the Isalmic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the revolution will in effect be declared a success and the new permanent goverment will be launched. It seems to me Khomeini couldn't givetit a better Ehristening present (pun intended) than an opposition that has been disarmed and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement for order made transparently clear. Besides, at this point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the streets on a few hours notice: his revolutionary guards will throw themselves joyously on any qroup, defenseless or not. In six months or a year, the inevitable disenchantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics

CONFIDENTIAL GDS 9/4/85

CONFIDENTIAL

will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom-- from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line.

What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to cotltain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people b$ck to work to ensure a decent--and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, our interest in continued access to Iran's oil sh uld be safeguarded by the new government's ability to ma$tain order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs throuoh either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force we will have to reckon with.

cc: CHG:VTomseth

CONFIDENTI-

/- I-

SEC&(E"/SEE;SITIVE

THROUGH : F - M r . Newsom

FROM :

SUBJECT: P o l i c y Towards I r h n ,

- Assessment:

The Khomeini/Bazarqan revolutio-:??;. l c33crst i : f e e l s i n c r e a s i n g l y beleagucred by t:!e f;.:r2s ar.e o t 2 c r [. t' '-

e t h n i c s , t h e L e f t , Center s c c u l u r i s r r ; , f o r e i g n pz;i.^:rs ,,', , . ( I s r a e l , USSR, I r a q , U.S. " inper i . a l i s t -5") and "pro- Shah f o r c e s (ex-Savak and n i i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ) . Khomeini's uncor.i;roir,isino r e a c t i o n i s 13 l z s n o 3 t

> \:.+ . .:I\ . -.

v i o l e n t l y : t h e Bazargan moderates s h a r e some of t h a t * 4' h a r s h approach b u t a l s o seek compronrises, b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s abroad, and a r e working t o r e - s t a r t t h e economy. Although t h e r e i s i n c r e a s i n g diser6chantne:;t

---with Khomfini even w i t h i n t h e c l e r g y (Ayato l lahs Shar ia tmadar i and T e l e g h ~ r i ) , he c o n t i n u e s t o co~.?anc? a s t r o n y n a j o r i t y of t h e lower c l a s s e s , and few p o l i t i c i a n s a r e w i l l i n g t o c o n f r o n t him d i r e c t l y .

The d u a l l e a d e r s h i p p l a c e s its hopes i n t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s l e a d i n y t o a new government t o g i v e I r a n a u n i f i e d , s t r o n g , c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . Each s i d e ( i . e . , I s l a m i c and l i b e r a l n a t i o n a l i s t ) hopes t o dominate. The c o n s t i t u t i o n is now be ing reviewed by exp@rts (mainly c l e r i c s ) . A referendum w i l l r a t i f y t h e d r a f t and e l e ~ c i o n s f o r a par l iament and p r e s i d e n t should come t h i s year . Bazargan i s a f a i r b e t f o r p r e s i d e n t . C l e r i c a l influen,ces w i l l be s t r o n g f o r a t l e a s t t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s and c l e r + c s w i l l c e r t a i n l y be numerous i n t h e new parlia,;-.es:,. but we doubt t h e hard- l i n e mullahs w i l l d e c i s i v e and l a s t i n g

v i c t o r y over t h e s e c u l a r elements. The c l e r i c s cannot themselves run a complex count ry and w i l l be forced t o seek h e l p from Westernized o f f i c i a l s and t o compromise I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s t o meet popular needs. The main modernizing t h r u s t of I r a n ' s d e v e l o r r e n t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y over t i m e weaken Khomeini and t h e c l e r i c s . I f KhoneFni d i e s , c l e r i c a l i n f l u e n c e w i l l be weakened somewhat bu t n o t e l imina ted . There w i l l be l e s s u n i t y i n t h e i r r a n k s and a l l i a n c e s w i l l be formed w i t h t h e s e c u l z r i s t s . As t h e I s l a m i c i s t s l o s e t h e i r ho ld , t h e q u e s t i o n w i l l be whether t h e L e f t o r t h e Center i n h e r i t s power.

' I n t h e s h o r t run we b e l i e v e the.governmsnt, can driage i t s 'problems 'with t h e ~ u r d s , a l though cont inu ing s p o r s ' d i c ~ v i o l d ~ i ? e h%'ll ' be a legacy of t h e harsh c a i t o d s employed by t h c r e v o l u t i o n a r y guards. I r a n ' s a b i l i t y t o cap t h e Kurdish r e v o l t t n d avoid prcblems wi th t h r * e t h n i c Arabs depends i n l a r g e p a r t on t h i a t t i t u d e o f I r a q . S u p e r f i c i a l l y good r e l a t i o n s e x i s t a t t h e mment, f o r I r a q is v u l n e r a b l e w i t h i t s Shia m a j o r i t y . For t h e same reason , however, I r a q w'ill n o t want t o s e e a stroncj, s e c u r e Shia government i n I r a n and may be motivated t o h e l p s t i r up t r o u b l e s . In f a c t , I r a q nay now be q u i e t l y h e l p i n g t h e Kurds. The S o v i e t s may s h a r e t h i s a t t i t u d e b u t w i l l proceed c a u t i o u s l y , f e a r f u l of chaos on t h e i r b o r d e r s and t h e i m p l i c a t i s n s f o r spreading i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e rey ion .

U . S . Policy:

I n t h e s e confused and u n c e r t a i n c i rcumstances our p o s t u r e h a s been t o l i e low, responding t o o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o s t r e n g t h e n our c r e d e n t i a l s wi th t h e GPO1 b u t n o t pushing o u r s e l v e s forward. We began a more a c t i v e r o l e l a s t s p r i n g , b u t wzre s e t back by I r a n i a n r e a c t i o n t o t h e Sena te Resolu t ion i n May.

Our o b j e c t i v e s i n Iran--access to o i l , d e n i a l of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , promotion of a f r ie i .d ly , non-al ioned, ~?d,er.qt$. +!~y$r ; ! y?~~ ,$z :~Q.~ . . haye. ..tp,:.bc :p"u,yeued,. d-xinj. ... b. Mriths'when the Irari ihns w i l l no t h+ve s o r t e d a c t x i t h p r e c i s i o n t h e i r p o l i c y o r i e a t a t i o n and when t h e c l e r i c a l t endenc ies towards a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s l r %ill be only weakly r e s i s t e d - - i n t h e near tern--by s e c u l a r i s t s . We w i l l want t o p o s i t i o n o u r s e l v e s s o t h a t we can main ta in a w ~ r k l n q

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h whatever group holds d e c i s i v e power whi le main ta in ing t i e s .to o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l e lements , i n c l u d i n g t h e oppos i t ion . We w i l l want t h e I r a n i a n s t o understand our f i rmness on our p r i n c i p l e s - - e.?., human rights--and t o b u i l d r e s p e c t f o r those p r i n c i p l e s . We.will a l s o want equa l and f a i r t rea tment f o r e r i v a f e U.S. i n t e r b s t s : i n . Iran. : Out: .at t i tw2€.to~ards f r a n .should b e .cha,racter.ized by py rnpa'khe ti.c.. undeys tand.inq vf ' t he crif'pibul t i e s ," p a t i e h c e .in r = s o l v i n g them, b u t a l s o r e g u l a r , f i r in and c l e a r reminders of our i n t e r e s t i n an I r a n L h a t i s f r i e n d l y to- . the West-and - s t a b l e , r e s ~ f r c t f u l of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and progres.sive.in meeting t h e needs o f i ts c i t i z e n s .

'we geed to ' keep a c l e a r perspective on t h e . ~ u r 3 i i t and e t h n i q Arab. p r o b 1 . n ~ . These :are o l d problems, .an3 th&; w i 1 l " p e i i ' i s t f o r a l 6 i i ~ t lme t o come. To e n c x r a g e t h e i r ambi t ions f o r autonomy cotild have d e s t a b i l i z i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r tlje e n t i r e rgqlon

Xn t h e s h o r t . t e r m ( i . e . , u n t i l a new grJernr?:-t i s formed) we want t o c l e a r away a s many of t h e problems of t h e p a s t a s poss'ible and.avoid new i.ssues of co7ten- t i o n . During t h e s e months we a r e l a y i n g t h e b a c i s f o r d e a l i n g wi th t h e new government t h a t we hope w i l l have more e f f e c t i v e powers. During t h i s per iod and beyond we w i l l want t o a l l a y t h e s u s p i c i o n s o f t h e re l ig r 'ous l e a d e r s and, where p o s s i b l e , c u l t i v a t e t h e i r . fr ie , idship. Our handling of Arab- Is rae l i s s u e s w i l l have a d i r e c t impact on I r a n i a n a t t i t u d e s . The I r a n i a n s a r e becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y s u s p i c i o u s of r a d i c a l P a l e s t i n i a n i n f l u e n c e e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e o i l f i e l d s , b u t ' t h e r e is s t i l l among t h e c l e r i c s and men l i k e Yazdi a s t r o n g a t tachment t o t h e PLO and t h e .."Palestiriian c.aus,+. "

Over t h e longer term we w i l l want t o work f o r an I r a n i n which t h e moderate, s e c u l a r n a t i 0 ~ 1 3 l i s t s a r e predominant i n managing t h e count ry . But before we can e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n , we must develDp a p o s i t i o n of t r u s t and r e s p e c t .

bel.i,eye .w9. sh~uldibegtn 'nov to raavir out range of b i l a t e r a l problems. and o f f e r thcrtal:cr.4ing auggas t ions : (We w l l l be developznq a t a Septenbcr 7 in te rageycy meeting d e t a i l e d approaches on t h e l s s u e s marked by an asterisk.)

SECRET -

3Ef I.::

-4-

I -- Bazargan and. ~ u s s c i a t e s hose we w i l l do s o promptly, naming a person sympathetic t o t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n .

.. .e...%herq.is.;nc+ inc?ic:jt,ion- the..PGQZ:qIanw 'i3ObII . t o :."ye a n . A m p ~ s q ? Q ~ .in. :iaalainat.on a?~..pur..: M .$Fei.r;.. .. .ai)pb'iri€&&ts 'df i n .&iisahif h&e never %.e& l inked .

We e5pec t t h e I r a n i a n s .::aj. w a i t u n t i l a new! government is e l e c t e d bcfcrs . sondir.? us an envoy.

~ e c o . ~ n o n d a t tbn: ~ t t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s wr th key ---- Congressnen, nonln t e a? L->$ssa3ol' t o ts i n p l a c e i n October. P o s s l b l y in -orm t h e I r a n i a n s Q: o u r p i a n s i n advance through a p r + v a t e rntermcdlary.

'2 . Should we .qend.,c mcssage o r emlosary p ameiril?

-- He have had p o d l r e c t c o n t a c t wi th t h e man who r e m a l n s . t h e $ t r ~ n g e s t ' ~ o i l t l c a l leacTermin Iran'. H i s h o s t i l i t y towards u s i s u n l i k e l y t o a b a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y , a l though t h e r e have been fewer venomous s ta tements a g a i n s t us r e c e n t l y . C l e a r l y , a f l r s t meeting could be -- a b r u i s i n g a f f a i r .

-- A meeting w i t m i n i w i l l s i g n a l o u r d e f i n i t e acceptance of t h e r e \ on and 'could ease somewhat h i s s u s p i c i o n s o f u s . .auld a l s o enable u s t o approach him mare r e a d i l y on . .; i s s u e s once we have made t h e f i r s t c a J l .

.-- Oh ' t h e o t n e r , . w&ld r i s k . appeari'ng' tO cave i n t o a man who !: . -t-: .is and who i s stror.?',;, depreca ted h e r e and by i .; . .ztcrcized I r z n i a n s . T:?:J;, we would want t o be c a r e f u l r o t t o appear t o esibra-e Khomeini and t h e c l e r i c s a t t h e ei:?e?s? of .c.i: 12z1s1ar f 'kiends. We should avoid d i r e c t ?inkage w i t h s-y s p e c i f i c Iran,ran groups.

-- ~ % a ' s ~ r b o l i s i r , o f a c , a l l , o n !:Lc&ern~ v::ll not a t t a c h t o v i s i t s t o t h e o t h e r r e l 1 7 l o u s leaeer; , 3 2 ~ t h e y w i l l n o t s e e u s u n t i l we have seen him. We badly nehd c o n t a c t s wi th Ta leghani , Shar ia tmadar i , and o t h e r ' . moderate c l e r i c s . We want t o r e a s s u i e them o f o u r acceptance of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a s t h e i r i n f l u e n c e may r i s e i n t h e months ahead.

Recomendatlon: Have Bruce La.ngen pass t h e vcrd r

t h a t - h e l a l i k e ti - ce t l o r r l n l a f t e r t.ls r e t u r z -3 ., .--- Tehran when he could Jcl 1 :cr ? mes:..ge from : i a s h l n : t ~ - . - Laingen could t h e n prose& c with meerlngs wl th o t h e r ,L *"' '",; r e l l g l o u s l e a d e r s . A l t e r r a t r v e l y , make a c a l l on Khomelnl p p r l o r l t y f o r a rew k m l d ~ ~ a d o r .

ci'

;3. Row do, we ' s t r imqthari be n i i l i t d r y rk ' l a t ionkhip?

--..The..J.rgnL:ng . a ' r e . s ! ; s ~ i c i ~ ~ s of. ouq h?::Slinc c f ' t% ~F'Ms. t t a s t fund, naed s p a r e s al;d $ech?ical . s"ppn! -, . from us , bu't f e a r f o r p .o l i t i ca1 , reasons t o ask f o r t h e . l a t t e r ; . " ' '

.. .

. .' .... -,:we w a n t . t o be r a s . p o h s i v e . o ~ . m i l i t a r y i s s u e s i n . o'i-der td' s t r e n g i h e h ~oiar51; . : ' s au t . i .~ r , i ty znZ t o rr.s .:re

,we have f r i e n d s i n t h e m i l i t a r y who might be key to t h e f u t u r e , p o l i t i $ a l o r i e n t a t i o ~ of the count ry . . . .

a . I n c r e a s e d u r exchanges o? info'rmatlri on t h e t r u s t fund t o b u i l d I r a n i a n confidence.

I /

b. Examine t h e r e l e a s e of s e n s i t i v e r tems on a 66 c a s e b -case b a s i s an4 '3e prepared t o . r e l e a s e i o w T e v e l c l & a ~ t e m s wher s e r v e s o u r purposes.

c. Be prepared e t I r d n i a n r e q u e s t s f o r s p a r e s and s u p p o r t somewhat ? t h e $5 m i l l i o n l e v e l p re - 1 v i o u s l y s e t . Permit ,ed a n d . f r i e n d l y t h l r d coun- ' Ic- tries (e .g . , I t a l y c . 2 - h e l i c o p t e r s ) . t o he:? p e t m i l j t a r y npe?s -: :nians ~ a ? t $0 dlve;?&fy ' s&F;drt:

'4 . Bow d o we head o f f d i s p u t e r botwo?n 'i :. - * ? private companies?

-- I r a n has begun i n a 1 i c i t e l . w s y t o pay Sills e-d : , .. . r ~ y . . . p p e r ~ c ~ ~ ! & a c . c : 8 ..,,.~pAy,on~.qqgqt:~s.5.O .mil l- ion. arb..: i.s

f i n r s h l n g , t h e I s f a h a n r e f i n e r y : A!.!,: g o t S;G : -:..:.I :? . . r e s t a r t J e e p o p e r a t i o n s . Many d i - g u t e s persi;: a:.: :r2 a t tachment of I r a n i a n a s s e t s is a c o n t i n u i n ? t h r s e t . GTE and American B e l l a r e n e g o t i a t i n g d i s p u t e s w;th o x a c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . .

SECRET

a . Encourage t h e p r i v a t e Iran-American Chamber o f Commerce t o a s s i s t u s i n working t o r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s . Perhaps a b u s i n e s s miss ion t o Tehran could be organized .

b ~~~~~~e o u r . l n f o r m a t i 0 ~ e f f o r t s -to make'kure" U..S husixle6.s kaons of OW readineg&..to ysaks* the^ wr th t h e I ranxans ana o u r s u c c e s s sto;les t o d a t e .

b. r + t can we do t e . r e a c t i \ i a t b t h e 'hcknmn intelligence s i t e s ?

-- The Iranians have n o t for6!closed t h e p o s s i b i l r t y of re0pening:the si ' t res ' i n the Y n d e f i n i t e ~ ' f i t u r e , :but' it w r l l be a hard p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . I r a n i a n management and c o n t r o l and p o s s i b l y S o v i e t acquiescence c o u l d * t e p r e c o n d i t i 0 . n ~ .

-- We a r e working w l t h c o n t r a c t o r s t o r e s t a r t t h e IBF,K intelligence m o n i t o r i n g . p r o j q c t on a regqcqd s c a l e w i t h ' t h * i&a. th i ' t ' th& ~ a k k s m a h f u n b t i b i might' d l t i m d t e l y b e lnc luded i n t h a t o p e r a t i o n .

Recommendation: Continue t o fo l low t h e IBEX .approach and make d i s c r e e t . soundings. w i t h t h e PGOI

(e.g. , Secretary-Yazdi a t UNGA) but make no r e q u e s t s ~ n t i l a newly-elected government is i n p l a c e

-- There ~ s - & o ' i ~ d i c h t f o n ' t 6 a f : t h 6 PGOI b i l l .di$- c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t u s when 1980 c o n t r a c t s a r e s igned i n December--but d e c i s i o n s c o u l d be a f f e c t e d by n e g a t i v e p o l l t i c a l developments. W e a r e now g e t t i n g a l m s t a s much c rude a s l a s t y e a r (750,000 now vs. 900,000 l a s t year ) a l though t o t a l I r a n i a n e x p o r t s a r e down one- th i rd

p w a e n w 2 t . ??-,~r ilnur z r w ~ b f ~ * f ~ ~ ~ + &t w i t h ey I r a n l a n s ur rng t h e f a l l on energy. Dick Cooper could v i s i t a t an e a r l y s t a g e .

SECRET

SECRET

-7-

7. lbould wi rosou vim ope ta t ions 'urd parm~t t h e w-pt.-rchool dependents a s recommenced

-- We lave t o l d t h e I r an i ans adequate s ecu r i t y f o r the compo\md.is a p re requ i s i t e f o r v i sa s .

n d a t i n;:.. A. iwm +.irQpua$e;p~.~sec.t io~ at, thd =is . a s k r e d ; we should move ahead on n%rrral' f' o o n ~ u l a r p p c r A t i o n s and r e tu rn of dependents on a 8 m ~ ~ r i i d ~ i 4

--.*I&. kn+ l i t f l e about I r an i an .grou@ .and few ( inups ~ e e m ' t o have any r e a l coheslon o r s t rength . we n*.d to knov m r e

-- A CIA b r i e f i n g o f f i c e r gave a well-receivea i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g t o Baiargan, Y a z d ~ , and Entez?!r on 4ugurt 21. :.The I r an i ans were .=t interefi ted i a .try;. q a i r s t i n i a n s ;.A? gh&, . ind 'Sobie t dange$s ' t o t ne P001. They asked f g r a r epea t b r i e f i n g i n two montbs

Recgmwndationr ~ o n t i n u e to develop an in t e l l i gence ucchdnge'with t h e fradkans: When .fecnkble, .reek tt i n c l u d e . l r a n i m n i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n an examinatio~. of t!Wbi2m*t&bh%.

9 lhould WO @henwe our 8pproach.aa i y U n r ~ g h t s

-- u thoug t l executions- and hatah tteatm&nk-'iif 'lturds. w n t i n u e a t a deplorable l e v e l , s i nce t h e J u l y amnesty sol. p o l i t i a a l of fenders have been re leased from pr ison and t h s r e a r e some s l i g h t s igns t h e J u s t i c e Ministry is rm&sserting its au tho r i ty .

-- C r i t i c a l newpapers have been closed and.several 20- jw3n3JlM+a%w&+ob+; Mshua,. r$.iaed.. aS1 ppf t he se i s s u e s repeatedly wlth t h e FGOI.

Raco~mnda t ion : Continue t o work on human r i g h t s o/-< prob lem a s they a r i s e and involve prominent outs iders ' and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s t o use t h e i r inf luence a s wel l .

.lo. Sow Can we improve Iranian public percepttoas '%f'thB.LI:s. and U.S. attitudeb towards Iran?

-- Anti-Americanism continues a strong, inhibiting force in our relationship.

---. 'l'he lrahiane .are bitterly resentful of the 'ger- ae~v.e@..~s~i~~~i~ti~~~:e$.::e~.:f~e~&:'~s8.p:s&ai ng;. a::. ' "Zionist-imp,erlalrst.consp~racy.

~.~"+:c~sa+ir: . ; . sy~g ~ F ~ ~ ~ ~ g ~ e ~ , + ~ 3 ; ~ ( . : d ~ . ~ ~ a ; .??: . i -concrete actions on bQth sldes--sxqns that they are improving on hunan rights and, that w e accept the

, pevoluticn.

: 'Recommendation':. .

a. ICA develop a plan of more assertive actlons to cnhancb . U .S. -1Fani.m t.ies, ?+I,. , distinguished American visitors wllo can meet with reliqjous and secular leaders, use of VOA to send political mrssaqos,

. ,i~creasad .English 1angu.aae. &eachjng an& magazine dis-.... tribution. ' ' . ..

Q b. Occasional public statements by senior U.S. y& a£ficials on the i~portance of Iran and p t good U.8.- &J\$

, Iranian relations.. &-b - same lines.

d. Quiet work with the Iranians to relax the ban 6 I<. on foreign newsmen.

e.' At an early date holii'a meeting of private and academic U.S. and Iranian experts on Iran to discuss (C. ways to bridge the communications gap.

Drafted:. :lEA/IRN:HPrecht:bdf ext. 20313:9/5/79 .-

Clearance: NEA/IRN': ~ ~ ~ a i n ~ e A ' (draft) NEA: PDConstable r p S/P:PKreisburg ;I!

h t RUQlRR l O e 5 l 249 ** NT CCCCC ZZH

IP ooiiibi Sip 79 N1 AUtMBASSY TIBPAN 'TO S N S T A T t WASHDC 3658

h.0. l Z l 6 5 r GDS 9/6/85 (TOUSRH, V.L. 1' TAG9 r PINS, I R SUBJtCTr EUIGRt PLOTTtRS

1. (C-ENTIRE TtXT.)

CLASS 1 C M I P B W U L C l l W t STATX 9/8/99 wnv: C I I M I : l L f O l l O I t I mmr CHAMZ: nmama: CLEm: NOYt

2. TEE RtSURTACINB 01 SHAPUR BAKHTIAR I N PARIS AND PERSISTENT Runons ABOUT VABIOUS IRANIAN EUIQRIW B ~ I N Q dCTIVtLY INVOLVID IN PLOTS TO OVERTHROW T H t ISLAMIC R ~ O I M OT AYATOLLAH montIs1 POSES A T ~ P T A T I O N 2 0 SEE IN t H 1 S t POLITICAL P I I L E S THP SOLUTION TO A SITUATION IN

I RAN T H t U.S. FINDS DISTASTtFUL. U T t R ALL, AMERICANS AN IDtNTITY WITH BAKHTIAP W I N H t SPEAKS (TLUPNTLY IN

WtSTtEN LANGUAGt) 01 INDIVIDUAL WLtDOU AND t I B t R T Y H n a s m t ~ ~ r a DISGUSTID AND I N C O ~ P R L H ~ ~ D I N G VHEN YATOLLAH IHALQIALI (IMftEDIATlLT A R L P DISPATCHINO ANOTBfa

e AQOLE OT KURDS TO T B I R TATS) PROUDLY DSSCPIBtS HIMSliLT S TE8 IPANIAN ADOLT EICEHANY. MOUOVEE. TEE ARGUWLUT

!BAT IRAN CANNOT FUNCTION AS A ~ ~ O D P N UTIOU nmom !HE TtCHNICAL SKILLS ~ O N O P O t I Z ~ D BY T E t IRANIAN tDVCATtD ELITE STRIKES THESE SAME AMtRICANS AS tHlRtNTLY LOGICAL. L I N C I MANY ntnarns or THIS nrrr H A r t nm INTO ~ X I L E UTHIB THAN PUT UP W I ~ A GOVERNMENT INCREASI~~OLY r n n r r A n n BY NARBOV-~IIDED ISLAMIC FANATICS IT IS A SIMPLI STLO- GISTIC STEP TO ?HZ CONCLUSION TEA# THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC I S BOUND TO PAIL THROUGH A SHORTAOL 01 THE TECHNICAL SKILLS NtCESSART TO OPERATL THE NATIONAL BURLAUCRACT AND ECONOMY.

3. IT YOOLD. IN OUR VIEV, BE A GUVE p a n o n TO susscaIsr TO THE PPOPOSITION PUT FORWARD BY VMIOUS EMIGRZS THEM- StLVICS ?EAT THEY HOLE THE KtY TO SETTING THINGS RIGHT IN IRAN. OUTSIDE THPIB OWN RILATIVELY MINISCULt CLASS. THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT HERE. TURTHER, THEY HAVE NO

F OBRCIVE HEANS OF OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT OREER READILY T THEIR DISPOSAL. THE ZMLRCENCE 0 1 NOSTALGIA WITHIN THE

RMED FORCES FOR THE "GOOD OLD DAYS," VITH A CONCOMITANT ESTORATION OF THE MILITART'S COERCIVE CAPABILITT, COULD

ALTER THE SITUATION, BUT AS OF THIS MOUENT NEITHER OP THESE PRECONDITIONS EXISTS. TINALLT, THERE I S NO REASON TO B E L I t V t THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WILL NOT BE ABLE TO

0 CO-OPT SUPFICIENT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WITH THE

VERNMENT OFFICES ON AT LEAST A SCALE WHICA TBE ISLAMIC

EFPIMENTLY, BUT C A T C H I N G - U P WITH WEST GERMANY WAS THE SHAH'S DREAM, NOT KHOMEINI'S.

7 7

4. FOR TlfE MOMENT, KHOHIIUI'S I S M I C ?OlCLS RtRkIN FInnLT I U ?LACE urm NO I n r s o T I t r O P P O ~ I T I O N xu SIUET. DISA~~CTION-111s BLIN ~ R O V I ~ W ~ BUT r01 T n r o R r s r r n L B 1 U T U l l T I E RANKS O? TBB DISO&~NTLID DO NO2 SLLn LISSLT TO BE CAPABLE 01 TUUSIATINB TELIR I)ISlAZlSPAliOTION INTO T I E K I N D 0 1 ACTION THAT UODLb CBALIdIIOX TW RUM8 IN ANT SERIOUS MAINER. THAT IS I I X C I A L L ' I TlUL 01 MIORBS WHO EAIE LITTLE SUPPORT VBEBt I T l U L C I COWS - IS XRU ITSELF. TEE ISLI~YIC mrmxwvs c o H r m a zauxztrr W. COME TO GRIPS YITK TKB i s b b s n er rwkn n u u ~ r t n rur YET LEAD TO ITS ULTIRATI PAILUIL, ar IF IT serr wr ARE REASONABIT COW?ZDLN? TEAT Y l A t W J S RUMCllS f ? WILL 31: POME BROVN RATEER TIIANNURTURIID 1W PARIS OR NtV TOEX. :o+nsETn

DEPARTMENT O F STATE

The Honorable L. Bruce Laingen Charge d'hffaires, a.i. American Embassy Tehran

Dear Bruce:

personally.

The main nourishment I took from George was (1) a deep sense of inadeqacy in governing among the leadership, a desire for U.S. help, but an inability to ask for or even accept it; and (2) concern over the strength of clerical influence, optimism (like us) on that count for the long term but fear that the Majlis elections might produce only mullahs -- meaning that the long ternt might be that mufh.longer away. The interesting idea is that of these worries and is a- m. =, v o ~ can contribute to bxadarua kn- is thinkina what in the inner circle will be welcome.

Finally, here is a paper I did and for which DN added the sentence at the top of the second page.

Sincerely,

We-understand Secretary Brown may ask what you plan to

say to Yazdi when you sec him in Ncw York. (It is not yet

confirmed that Yazdi will attend the UNGA). We suggest the

following points:

- - Since the Revolution wc have sought to fashion a new relationship cith Iran's lenders, responding positivcly

to requests where possible. Wc hope thc actions wc have

taken have been helpful - - c.~., offer of spare parts, sale of heating oil and keroscnc, supportlvc public statcmcnts

and assistance in settling commercial disputes. .. - - We are prcpared to go further if Iran wishcs:

- - We wish to givc Yazdi thc iinmc of a ncw Ambassador;

- - We reaffirm our rcndincss to Itnvc our Charge or the new Ambassador mrct with Ayatollah Khomeini.

- - We are prepared to consider any ncw programs of cooperation - - e.g., in intelligence exchnngc,

agricultural developmcnt, narcotics control,

employment generation, oil field management - - that Iran might suggest.

- - We remain interested in the intelligence site? for SALT verification and the bencfits that would have for world

SECRBT/NODIS *.

peate. At n suitable time wc will br lircparcd to dis-s

cuss this issuu with the Iranian? and t o allow Iranians

to man the sites.

- - Wu hope thnt Iran will scc t11c.i~ moves as sincere gestures of good will. Wc hope that Iran's lenders, in-

cluding Ayatollah Khomeini, would join 11s in attempting

to combat the mistrust bctwecn our two cour~trics. A gooJ

step in that direction would be to remove the restrictions

on thc foreign and domestic press atid gct back to the

deals behind the revolution.

Clearance: ~ ~ ~ l p ~ ~ d h s t a b l c P - b~~kiirso~

SECRET/NODIS

81

L I M I T E D O f f I C I A L U S E TEHRAN 18888

DE R U Q W R #8988 258 ** 2NY CCCCC ZZH 0 1611132 S L P 79 Ftl AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO U S I C A VASBDC I M M E D I A T E

CLASS: L I I I T L D O I l I C I k L CHRGE: U S I C A 9/16/79 A P P I I : US1CA:PAO:JGRAl D R l T D : US1CA:PAO:JGRAVES CLEAR: NONE D I S T R : ICA-2 CRARGE PO'

l C 0 N CRU

U S I C A

?OR CURRAN FROM P A 0 S P E C D I S

t.0. 12865: N/A S U B J : CPAO WORK GOALS

REF: U S I C A 52725

I P B O P O S E THE ?OLLOWING GOALS ?OR MY OER "CONTRACT-:

1. (NO. 1 I N R L P T E L ) A S S E S S AND A D J U S T POST O R G A N I Z A T I O N , RESOURCES, AND S T A ~ m nnrr TEEM APPROPRIATE TO POST- REVOLUTIONART I R A N . S T A F F HAS ALRSADT BEEN G R 8 A T L Y R I D O C E D , AND I PLAN T O DEVELOP A NEW S T A F P T I Q PATTERN AND N t V J O B D E S C R I P T I O N S BY JANUABT. A S NEW O P P O R T U N I T Y DEVELOPS T O PROMOTE 0 . S . I N T I R ~ S T S . W I L L A L J U S T RESOURCE ALLOCATIOU AND S T U ? ASSIGNMENTS.

2. (NO. 2 11 R E ? T E L ) D I V R O P I N S T I M T I O I A L A N A L I S I S UHICII IICLUDB ISLAMIC R ~ V O L U T I O N A R Y STRUCTOR~S - - LXBBRAL AND E A D I C A L - L X l T R l l O L U T I O N A ~ Y S T ~ U C T ~ ~ S . - - - - - - - - - - , AID rai NN ooinnnm~-Ir IND U U ~ N TW P R O P O S ~ 1W C O N S T I T U T I O N IS I N ?ACT ADOPTED AND SPIWS A NEW W V P N M Z N T . R E B U I L D P H Y S I C A L DBS O P L I A T I O U WHICH WAS D s s r r o n D DURING R n o L o T r o r (ALL n c o ~ ~ s nrr c o n r r s c r T r n ) . B U I L D UP A P R A C T I C A L DRS U S I N G T I T L E S R A T R I B THAN ~NDII IWTAL NARIS, AND a r o r N usrno THIS LIST 02

P A R T I C ~ P A N T S - M R P U B L I C A T I O N D I S T R I B U T I O N AND S I I I L C T I O N 01 A u t I r n c E s 1011 PROGRAMS. I N CONJUWCTIOI WITH IAS, BEGIN ESTABLISHING " ~ L C I P I I N T " C A T ~ G O I Y WHICR n A r CONTAIN S P E C I f I C NAMES RATHER THAN J U S T T I T L E S . I WOULD A L S O HOPI! TEAT WE C W L D B t ? O R E T H I YEAR IS 001 I D l N T I R A NUMBER O? PROGRAM 1 N S T I T U T I O N S . B U T T H I S W I L L 0 1 COUllSE DEPEWD 01 T E E P O L I T I C A L C L I M A T E (NO I R A M I A N ORGANIZATION WOULD DARE WORK POBLICALT u r T a US AT P R I S E N T ) . 3. ( 1 0 9 IN RE?TEL) n O n o T E usr, BY L I a n A a r ' s NATURAL AUDIENCE AND O T l l t l l I N C I I I D U A L S IMPORTANT T O T E E M I S S I O N , 01 OUR LIBRARY'S RE?ERENCE S E R V I C E AND C O L L E C T I O N S - I W I L L A L S O ENCOURAGE T H E L I B R A R Y T O COOP1CRATS WITH T E E I A S I N D E I E L O P I N G VATS T O B U I L t U P T E E P Q C h T I O N TEAT T H E CULTURAL CENTER I S O F GlCWUINE S E R V I C I T O T E E C O M W N I T T * I E . . I M P R O I O RELLVANT B I I m E N C E M A T E l l A L S ~ C O O N S ~ L STUDENTS, A N D STRENGTBLN a o L D I N a s I N RLLIGION AND P H I L O S O P H Y .

LIWITSD OIYICIAL usr TMUN lornee 8 2

L I M I T E D O T T I C I A L U S E T E R A N llli98

r. (NO. l a I N R t T R L ) AS T E t S X C U I I T T AND P O L I T I C A L SITUATION P ~ U I T S , rssmr THAT r ~ r POST KSTABZISHKS m r c T r r t P n s o w r z conrcr WITH DRS I a y r m f r o n s .

5. I N C O O P P A T I O M Y I T B THE CONSUL Q S N l n A L , r 0 R t WITH 2111 PWS TO B r m s t rm D A W U ~ R W ~ L T r o L A T I t r VISA PROBLlMi COONSXI THE MlSStOW WITH RlGARD TO THB P U B L I C A Y Y A I I S I H P L I C A T I O Y S O P P R O I O S 2 D CONSULAl P O L I C I E S AND P R O C l D U R t 8 .

6. XMCOUIAGE I T P E C T I V S I A S O ~ l l A T I O N S AND m L B l I G H T C O W I S S I O N S IW TllH)AM AI(O r N TEt R O V I N C W AS Tllt S E c u R I n AND POLITICAL SITUATIOW PIRMITS. AS THINGS STAND NOV, H10LISH-LAWUUAUt T U C l I I N 0 I S MWCH I N DttlAND. BUT MANY O T B t B PIOURAM I l l I T I A T I V l S ARk I U L B P OUT.

7. P R O I I t f ANAITTICAL aROlTflSQ ON U t B Z A , COtTOltAL, AND A C A D W I C D r T l L O l l l t R T S .

8. PARTICIPATE rm&rnr~~ In nrssxow ronmrtr~~ow OP POLICI IMO~WNBATIOWS, WBXINO TO nut ca~rxw P ~ L I C ATPAIBS IN?LI CATIOHS U t DOLT COWSIDtRXD ID.

oo -RWEHIA DE EUQMHR #0087/01, 2591588 ZNT CCCCC ZZE 0 16lleBZ SEP 79 ZDK CITE RUEHIA SVC 000@ 2611843 FM AMEUBASSY TEHRAN TO USICA VASHDC IHMEDfATE BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 18087

E.O. 12065: ODs 9/16/05 tGRAVBS, JOHN E. ) SUBJECT; ABBBETIATED HIGHLIGHTS REPORT

FOR NEA

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATIOW -- KEOMEINI AND MULLAHS, STILL ENTHUSIASTICALL1 SUPPORTBD BY THX MASSES REMAIN ONLY EIPECTIIIG POWER IN iRAN. THEY, HOWEVER, ~ A V E NOT DlVISED MEANS OF GOVERNING EFFICIENTLY. NOR HAVE THEY YFf MANAGED TO REAtIZE ANYTHING LIKE THP ANACERO-

% NISTIC PAN-ISLAMIC WORLD THEY DBEAM OF RESUSCITATING a mon A N IDEALIZED PAST. KHWEINI C A N CERTAINLY VETO e NOVSS BY OTHER FACTIONS IN IRAN. BUT BE PROBABLY V A N N O T MAKE HIS PAN-ISLAMIC DREAM A REALITY. NOR CAN

BE QUELL RIGGIONAL, ETENIC, OR POLITICALLY INSPIRED a UPRISINGS WITHODT THE HELP OF ,E ARMY OR LEFTIST 1 PARA-MILITARY RLVOLUTIONART GROUPS. HE CANNOT REVIVE ?HE MODERN SECTOR OF TEE ECONOMY AND THUS REDUCE 1 UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT TEE EELP OP WESTBRN-TRAINED TECHNICIANS AND MANAGERS. HE CANNOT EVEN GET THE : SCHOOLS BACK IN OPERATION OR 0NSNAE.PL TRAFFIC IN

TEHRAN OR SKIRAZ. ON THE OTHER HAND I T SELMS CLEAQ TEAT KHOMEINI HAS NO REAL INTENTION b F GIVING THE PGOI THE UNSTINTING SUPPORT I T WOULD NEED TO BEGIN COPING WITH THE C O U N F ~ ~ Y ' S PROBLEMS. ~ E R B I S , TEERBPORE, LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE PRESENT DRIFT WILL T.URN INTO ANYTHING MORE DYNAMIC OMTIL TEE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS FINISHES I T S WORT AND A N E W CONSTITUTION SPAWNS A LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT -- A PROCESS WHICH I S GOING TO TAKE AT BEST MONTHS AND MAY BRING FORTH A N IMPRACTICALl ULTRA-ISLAMIC STRUCTURE NOW TEAT THE UNTINELY DEATR OF AYATOLLIB TALEGEANI HAS STILLET: THE VOICE OF THE MOST SENSIRLE RELI3IOUS LEADER I N TEE COUNCIL

2. IMPLICATIONS FOR USICA - I F IN FACT IRAN I S FATED TO DRIFT FOR MONTHS YET UNDER A PROVISIONAL dOVERNMENT WHICH I S HAMSTRUNG BY VARIOUS UNCOOltDINATED REVOLUTIONARY KOUITLHS AND SUPPOBTBD ONLY FITFULLY BY YHOMEINI AND OTHER POWERPUL CLERGY, USICA SROULD IN MY JUDGMENT:

A. AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH COULD BRING THE UNFAVORABLE ATTENTION OF ANY FACTION TO FOCUS ON US.

B. PUT OUR OUW REVOLUTION-WRECKED HOUSE IN ORDER WITH A VIEW TO HAVING READY TEE ORGANIZATION, STAFF, AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO TALE EFFECTIVE ACVANTAGE OF

UNITIES TO PROMOTE' U.S. IVTERESTS WHYN TREY PRESENT :;;lfJLvEs.

VZCZC 177

C . USE THE UtCZLLENT CONTACTS WHICH 1 0 ROSIN HAS DEVFLOPED TO BELP THE MISSION COPE vITH PRMsING AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITVATIONS SUCH AS OUR VISA- ISSUING OPERATION.

D. IMPROVE OUR NOW-CONTROI~SIAL MUC APPRECIATED LIBRARY AND ENGLISH TLACHING SEBI~CES $0 THE COWIINITT.

t. SEEK OPPORTUNITIIS TO DEHOWSTBITL AMERICAN STIIPATHETIC INTEREST IN ISLAM AND THE VEGL-BfING OP THf IRANIAN PEOPLE.

I. UNOBTRUSIVSLY ENCOURAGX AND SUPPORT SUCB INSTITU- TIONS AS THE IAS, FIILBRIGHT COHMISSION, AHIDBAST, AND AMERICAN INSTITUTE O r IRANIAN STODIES.

3. COMMUNICATION PROCISS -- I N ADDITION TO O W ONGOING ENGLISH-TIkCHING &ND LIBEABY ACTIVITIES, THE EXCELLENT VORX 09 10 R O S ~ HAS RESULTED IN AN C?IECTIVE, ONGOINQ COMMUNICATION PROCESS VIA TEE PRESS. ONLIKELY AS IT MAY ssm I N R ~ V ~ L U T I O N A R T IRAN, ROSEN'S WARM OUTGOING IIANNBR, FLUENCY IN PABSI, AND INSIGHTS INTO THE PERSIAN MENTALITY EAV1 ACTUALLY GIVEN THE POST EAST, CONTINUING OPPOBTUNXTY TO BOTH PLACE SPECIFIC RELEASES AND ENTER INTO PROGRESSIVELT WORE REWARDING DIALOG WITB nEHBERS OP THB WORKING PRESS. NOT ONLY DO THEY NOW CALL ON US REGULARLY ACCEPT OUR INVITATIONS, AND LISTEN STMPATHETICALLT WHEN WE TALK O? OUR CONCERNS, THEY OPTEN OF LATE TA3E PAINS TO CONTACT US WHEN TBET ARE WORKING ON STORIES OP IMHFIDIAT CONCERN TO US. VE COULD, rOR EXAMPLE, RAVE HAD SEVERELY DAMAGING REPORTS OW O W NEWLT REOPENED COhSULAR SERVICE. BUT PRESS REPORTS DID NOT DWELL ON THE EUGE CROWDS AH'OCCASIONAL DISORDER, TEE VIEWS OF DISGRUNTLED VISA SEEKERS, AND THP CONmSXOW AND OCCASIONAL INJUSTICES WHICH TBE SHAKE-DOWN PROCESS I S GRADUALLY ELIMINATING BUT WHICH NONETEELESS COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO MAXE US WOK VERY BAD INDEED. WE GOT, INSTEAD, IN hLL TBE MAJOR DAILIES STMPATHETIC, COMPRE- EENSIVE, SERVICE-ORIENTED REPORTING DESIGNED TO FELP IRANIANS UNDERSTAND AND EFFICIENTLY USB OUR CONSULAR BT a0007

N N N N VZCZC 177

4. PROBUHS -- OUR MOST TIHE-CONSUHING, ?RUSTBATING ACTIVIR 1 0 1 THE PIOHEN? I S VISA PUSHINQ. I T SEEMS TEAT AU OUR CONTACTS, WTB SELF-STYLED AND amuxNB, EAVE RELATIVBS AND ?BIPNDS WHO ARE DESPERATnY EAGIR TO ENTEll THE U.S. TEE PElSrAN HPYTALITT I S SUCH TEAT ANTONE nro SEES TEE Possxa rLxry or omxwrre SPrcrAL PRIVILEGE ?OR nxnstm Q EIS rmrn AND ~ I E N D S BAS N O QUALM ABOUT ATTXWTING TO USE ANT RELATIONSHIP BE I T EVER SO TXNUOUS OR ?AR?ETCEED. USICA OFFICERS ARE T H ~ I I O R S OBLIPED TO SPEND SOtlETHING LIKE TWO EOURS EIWY vorrxno DAY BITFCR D R A C E ~ L L T ~ P N D I N G 0 r r REOUESTS ?OR XELP OR WRESTLING VITE OUR VISA-ISSUING COLLEAGUIS IN A N A T ~ T TO BENDER S ~ V I C X TO GENUINELY USLmL EVEN ESSENTIAL CONTACTS IN TEE MINISTRIIS or I O R ~ I G N AITAIRS OX Q~IDANCE. A C A D ~ I C S . nmaxrs or TEE IAS, OR mrnmns or r n ~ WORKINO PRESS. THE COST Or DOING IIUSINESS IN IRAN TODAY! 01AVES BT

N N N N C O W F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 10187

'.UEI?I;'V ESB029BRAOl4

DD PUQMHR

DE RUEHMO #2156/01 2601621

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 1716002 SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1538

INFO RUFkRG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7066

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1036

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8221 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0865

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7866

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1077

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0602

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1557

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7308 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1801

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2218

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1143

RUEHADAISINT BAGHDAD 0382

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1461

RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0233 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2867 BT

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCO1.l 22156

001885

POL

CHRG' ECON

??

CHRN

E.O. 12065: 9/14/99 RDS-1 (TOON, MALC0LM)OR-M TAGS: PEPR, IR, UR

SUBJECT, (U) SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REF': (A) TEHRAN 9646 (B) MOSCOW 21766 (C) STATE 237685

(D) TEHRAN 8828

1.C- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. RECENT SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT JN SOVIET

POLICY TOWARD IRAN APPEARS TO BE PREMATURE. THE SOVIETS

ARE RAPIgLY BACKPEDALLING IN AN EFFORT TO DISASSOCIATE

OFFICIAL POLICY FROM CRITICAL PRESS COMMENTARY ON IRAN,

ESPECIALLY THE BOVIN ARTICLE IN NEDELYA. THE MFA IRAN DESK OFFICE FLATLY DENIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGFS

IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. THE KOSYGIN MESSAGES TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI WERE PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO DAMPEN SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ABANDONED

ITS POLICY OF VAINTA-INING FRlENDLY OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH

POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN HAVE NO

DOUBT JNCREASED SOVIET CONCERN AND IRRITATION WITH THE

SITUATION THERE, BUT WE SEE THIS AS A SHIFT IN THE ALWAYS AMBIVALENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, XATHFR THAN A SHIFT IN 'BASIC POLICY. THE SOVIET

UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT IRANIAN POLITICAL

ARRANGEMENT AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL WALK TO SEE WHAT FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. FND SUMMARY. %7

3. AS NOTED IN REF A, RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIEs

ON IRAN HAVE PROVIDED AMPLE GROUNDS FOR WONDERING IF A

REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET P\'LICY TOWARD IRAN MIGHT BE UNDER- WAY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF BOVIN'S NEDELYA ARTICLE

(REF B), WHICH BLASTED THE ISLAMIC REVOULTION AND PASNTED KHOMEINI( THROUGH QUOTATIONS FROM HIS OWN STATE-

MENTS) AS A DANGEROUS RELIGIOUS FANATIC. GOROVOY's

CONVERSATION WITH DEPTOFF (REF C) ALSO TENDS TO SUPPORT

THE IDEA OF A NEW SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, HOWEVER BELIE A

SHIFT IN OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN. PRAVDA ON

SEPTEMBER 11 PUBLISHED SEPARATE TELEGRAMS SENT BY KOSYGIN, WHILE OVERFLYING IRANIAN TERRITORY EN ROUTE TO ETHIOPIA, - TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI. BOTH TELEGRAMS EMPHASIZE THE

SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP GOOD-NELGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND--IN THE TEXEGRAM TO KHOMEINI--

ON BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL

AFFAIRS.

5. MFA COUNSELOR AND CHIEF OF THE IRAN SECTION STANISLAV

KONSTANTINOVICH KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 12 THAT THERE HAD BEEN,ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. HE SAID THE BASIC STATEMENTS OF SOVIET

POLICY CONTINUE TO BE BREZHNEV'S SPEECHES OF NOVEMBER 19, 1978. AND MARCH 2. 1979, AND ELABORATED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE BASED ON GOOD-REIDGHBORLINES,MUT-

UAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH

3THER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. KOVRIGIN ALSO TERMED

"AUTHORITATIVE" THE TASS DENIAL (PRINTED IN SEPTEMBER 5 PRAVDA) OF CHARGES OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN

BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND NEWSPAPERS.

6. ASKED ABOUT RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN IN THE SOVIET

PRESS, KOVRIGIN DENIED ?AT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CRITICISM, SAYING THE SOVIET PRESS WAS MERELY REPORTING THE NEWS

THERE AS WESTERN MEDIA DO. AS FOR THE BOVIN ARTICLE, KOVRIGIN INSISTED THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AND THAT NEDELYA, UNLIKE PRAVDA, IS NOT

AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLICATION.

7. BOVIN HIMSELF TOLD AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST (PROTEcT)

IN AN OFF-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW SEPTEMBER 12 THAT HIS WRITINGS REFLECT HIS OWN OPINIONS AN^ NOT NECESSARILY 'THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE DENIED THAT HIS NEDELYA

ARTICLE ON IRAN MEANT A REILSSESMENT OF SOVIET POLICY,

BT

12156 88

NNNNW ESB030BRA023 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHMO #2156/02 2601629 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 1716002 SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUgHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1539 INFO RUFHLGIAMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7067 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1037 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8222 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0866 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7867 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1078 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0603 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1558 RUFHNA/USMISSTON USNATO 7309 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1802 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2219 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1144 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0383 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1462 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0234 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2868 BT

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 22256

SAYING HE DOESN'T EVEN KNOW WHAT SOVIET POLICY IS. BOVIN DESCRIBED NEDELYA AS A "POPULAR" SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT (TO IZVESTIYA) WHICH IS NOT AT ALL AUTHORITATIVE.

8. IZVESTIYA SEPTEMBER 13 CAFRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY ITS TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT WHICH IIPLICITLY CONTRADICTED MANY OF THE POINTS Ill THE BOVIN ARTICLE. ENTITLED "IRAN: PROCESSES OF RENEWAL," THE IZVESTIYA ARTICLE

-- OFFERED EXCUSES FOR IRAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SAYING THEY WERE NATURAL FOR THE INITIAL ?ERIOD OF ANY REVOLUTION AND ALSO THE RESULT OF ABANDONMENT BY FORMER WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNERS;

-- SAID THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST DIRECTION OF THE IRANIAN SUPPOI?T WORLDWIDE;

-- CALLED THE SEVERING OF IRANIAN MILITARY AND INTEL- LIGENCE TIES WITH THE US A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR

GENERAL DETENTE AND PEACE;

-- SAID THE SOVIET UNION TOOK A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN NEVOLUTION AND IS READY TO COOPERATE ACTIVELY WITH THE NEW IRAN; AND, IN CONCLUSION

-- SAID THE SOVIET PEOPLE VIEW WITH UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING IRAN AND SINCERELY

WISH THE FRIENDLY IRANIAN PEOPLE A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBELEMS . 9 . COMMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE OBVIOUSLY BACKTRACING

QUICKLY FROM THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY THE BOVIN ARTICLE

THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS REASSESSING ITS IRAN POLICY. WE DO NOT TAKE AT FACE VALUE, HOWEVER, STATEMENTS THAT

BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS "PERSONAL OPINIONS." IT IS

TRUE THE NEDELYA IS LESS AUTHORITATII~ THAN PRAVDA AND THAT BOVIN IS A MAVERICK, BUT HE IS ALSO REGARDED AS WELL- CONNECTED WITH SOVIET LEADERS. HIS ARTICLE PROBABLY

ACCURATELY REFLECTS SOVIET IRRITATION OVER SOME RECENT

EVENTS IN IRAN: THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE KURDS, THE

SUPPRESSION OF LEFTLSTS, INCLUDDING THE TUDEH, IRANIAN

SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN, DEFAULT

ON GAS DELIVERY CONTRACTS, AN? ABOVE ALL, ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND PRESS.

10. WE ARE NOT READY TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS AMOUNTS TO A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY, HOWEVER. AS NOTED IN REF D,

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION HAS

ALWAYS BEEN AMBIVALENT. WE SEE THE RECENT MIXED SIGNALS

BEING EMITTED BY THE SOVIETS AS CONFIRMATION THAT THIS AMBIVALANCE STILL EXISTS, ALTHOUGH THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS

OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE MAY WEIGH SLIGHTLY MORE HEAVILY

NOW THAN EARLIER. THE BOVIN ARTICLE AND OTHER RECENT

CRITICISM OF IRAN PROBABLY SHOULD BE SEEN AS A WARNING THAT

BT

U 2156

PP RUQMHR DE RUEHMO #2156/03 2601635 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 171600Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1540 INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7068 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1038 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8223 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0867 R~FNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7868 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1079 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0604 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1559 RUFHNAAISMISSION USNATO 7310 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY M A N 1803 RUEHEG/AMEM~~ASSY CAIRO 2220 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1145 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0384 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1463 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0235 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2869 BT

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 22156

THE SOVIETS CAN HIT BACK, IF IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERS AND NEWSPAPERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNIOU. SUCH CRITICISM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN A TRIAL BALLOON TO TEST REACTIONS TO A POT!ENTIAL SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY; IF SO,

THE SOVIETS WERE ~PPARENTLY SURPRISED BY THE STRONG REACTION IT GENERATED IN WESTERN AND IRANIAN MEDIA AND ARE NOW TRYING TO DOWNPLAY ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

li. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL MOST LIKELY WAIT TO SEE WHAT FOPLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESMENT -OF SOVIET POLICY. NFA DESK OFFICER KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF THAT IRAN'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ON WHO WILL OCCUPY THE NEW ORGANS OF POLITICAL POWER. HE ADDED HIS "PERSONAL OPIN- ION: THAT ALL OF IRAN'S CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE

TO THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE PGOT. HE BELIEVED THAT

THE CLERGY WOULD STTLL CONSTITUTE THE MOST POWERFUL GROUP

IN THE COUNTRY AFTER THE NEW CONSIITUTION TOOK EFFEZT,

BUT EXPRESSED MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PENDING POLTICAL

STRUCTURE. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES

WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF A KHOMEINI OR

A TALEGHANI, KOVRIGIN SAID THERE WERE NONE IN VIEW. HE

CONCLUDED THIS DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT TRAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE IS FOR THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE

AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION STRICTLY ADHERES TO ITS POLICY

OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

12. IN SUM, WE RELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS STICKING TO ITS POLICY OF PURSUING GOOD STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH

IRAN FOR THE PRESENT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NO DOUBT PREFER

A STRONGER SECULAR GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN; BUT THEY

RECOGNIZE THAT KHOMEINT IS THE MOST POWERFUL IRANIAN

POLITICAL FIGIJRE BY FAR, AND THEY PROBABLY SEE LI~TLE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ALTERING THAT REALITY. THEY ALSO

KNOW THAT-KHOMEINI IS 79 YEARS OLD AND CANNOT LAST FOR EVER. AT LEAST AS LONG AS KHOMEINI DOMINATES IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE, WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE

TO MAKE KNONN ITS DISPLEASURE WITH IRANIAN POLICIES AND

STATEMENTS irARMFUL TO SOVIET INTERESTS AND WILL WATCH

FOR CPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE ITS INFLUENCE IN IRAN.

HOWEVER,WE FEEL THAT MOSCOW WILL STOP SHORT OF TAKING DIRECT ACTIONS TO INFLUENNCE EVENTS THERE. TOON BT

12156

V Z C Z C 150 00 Q U E E C 3 U E X J C S R'2EYJCS RUPMRA B U S 3 L V RUQMVW R U D T C R U Q M M RTITHRO 3lTQMMT RTJFNPS R V S N A A P RUQMBI RUQMGU 9 U E 9 A D RI IQHOD R l V R Q D DE' RUONER #0181/01 2611157 ZNY C C C C C ZZH 0 1611482 S E P 79 FM AMFMBASSY T E H R A N T O R U E H C / S E C S T A T E WASEDC I M M E D I A T E 3832 I h F O R L X K J C S / S E C D E F WASH DC RUEYJCS/JCS WASH DC 2 U Q M B I / A M E M B A S S Y A B U D A A B I 288 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 274 RUEHAD/USIYT BAGHDAD 295 R U Q Y O D / A R P M B A S S T DOHA 268 R U S B Q D / A M E M E A S S T I S L A M A B A D 324 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY J I D D A 0323 R~SBLL/AHEMBASSY :ABUL 8 3 2 ~ P U Q H T h / A M t V B A S S T L U V A I T 0292 RLDTC/AXEPBASSY LONDON a396 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY PANAMA azsg RUEHHO/AMSMBASSY Y~~~~~ 0285 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY K U S C ~ T 8177 RIIFNPS/AMZVBASSY PARIS 0391 R b S N A A A J U S C I N C E U d V C I H I N G F N G E 2 T C O N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 01 O F 02 T E H R A N 10181

2.0. 1 2 8 6 5 . : G D S ( L I M B E S T , JO11N) OR-P T A X : 12, P I k T , PGOV S U E J F C T : C O U N C I L O F E X P E R T S 4 P P R O V E S GOVERNMENT OF I H i O L O G I A N S

1. (C - X N T I h P T E X T ) .

2 . T3.E C C J N C I L 01 E X P E R T S F O R E X A M I N I N G T H E NEW I R b N I 4 N C O N S T I T U T I O N A P P R O V E D A R T I C L 3 V O F T H E NEW C O N S T I T U T I C N O h S E P T P Y B 3 P 2 1 BY A V O T E D F 5 E - 8 W I T f l F O U R A B S T E N T I O N S . T d I S A Z T I C L E , E S T A B L I S B E S T E E V I L I Y I T - E - P A Q I H . 09 GOVERNWENT O F T H E O L O G I A N S . T A X A R T I C L E S T I P U L A T E S T H A T I N T E E b B S E Y C F , O F T H E IMAM 01 T 9 E AGX ( T O WHOM A L L S Z C U L A 3 POVER R I G H T L Y E P L O N G S ) , T H E MAN4SEMENT O T P U B L I C A F F A I R S AND T B E L B A D E R S B I P O F T B E COMMUNITY I N T R E I S L A M I C R E P U B L I C O F I F A N I S V E S T E D I N A J U S T , V I R T J O U S VNO:.fLBDGEABLE, C O U R A G F O U S , AND SAGACIOTJS S P E C I A L I S T I N ' I S I A M I C J U R I S P R U D E N C E ( F A Q I H ) . 3. T B I S LEADE?. MUST BE A C C E P T E D AND R E C O G N I Z E D BY 4 M A J O R I T Y O F T B E P U B L I C . I F S U C R A P E Q S O N CANNOT B E E O U h D , C O U N C I L O F S I C H L Y Q r J L L I P I E D R E L I S I O U S LAW S C ~ O L A E S W I L L P S S U M E T E I S F O N C T I O N . T R E LA1# $ I L L S P E C I F Y TEE ZIORMATIOd P N C Cr lSAA' I IZATION O F T H I S COTINCIL .

4. V I L l Y h T - E - T A O I B I S I N F A C T T H E T I T L E O F O N E O F h Y A T O L L A P X R O M E I Y I ' S h O R R S O F P O L I T I C A L P H I L O S O P H P . NO

C E S T A I N O F T S E E X A C T MRANING O F T F E TERM OR O F YG-TERM P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S . POWEVER I T S O N DOES REPRESENT A S IGNIFICANT A L T E X A T I ~ N OF I G I N A L D R A F T C O N S T I T U T I O N , W H I C H E N V I S A G E D A

S E C U L A R PRESIDSNCY A N D A R E V I T A L I Z E D C O V N C I L OP RXLIGIOVS V X P T R T S TO A N S U P S T Y A F A L L L A d S Y T R F I N C O N F O U Y A N C F d I T P

VZCZC 150

ISLAM. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL 1906 CONSTITUTION BUT HAD NEVXR BCEN IMPLEHENTCD.

5. IN THL ShORT TERM, THE ADOPTION OF THIS ARTICLE APPEARS TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO T A U CHARGE OPENLT OF ALL SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY. AS LONG AS (QOMEINI IS ALIVE, THERE WILL BE FEW RIVAL CLNDIDATES PO3 TYF OPFICE'S OF FAQIH.

6. TYL APPROVED ARTICLE MACES NO MENTION OF THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENCY. h09 HAVE ANY OF THE ARTICLES APPROVED SO FAR DEFINED TEE PRESIDENCY OR DEFINED TBZ RELATION- SEIP SETbEEh TRE P2ESIDEdCY AND TEE TEEOCRATIC LEADER. IT APPEARS, BO'EIZVER, THAT TEE INTENTION OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO FORYALIZE A MERSIYG OF STATE AND RELIGION AND TO FN3UR9 THLT THE kEY CBITF OF STATE, WHATEVER HIS PORMAL TITLE. WILL BE DRAWN F30M AMONG THE LEADEBS OP TEE SEIA CLERGY. COUNCIL PRESIDENT MONTAZERI SAID ARTICLS WAS FORMAL ACCNOWLEDGEMENT THAT IN ISLAM RELIGION AND POLITICS ARE INSEPASABLE. PEQSIAN-LANGUAGE PAPER BAMDAD SF SEPTEMBEZ 15 REFERRED TO T31S OPINION WRITING FOP. SOME, NOT WELL-VERSED IN ISLAMIC SU~ISPRUDEWEE, TRP

QCESTIOX IS VHETBFR TH3 GOVEQYYTNT OF TEE THEOLOGIAN IS THF SAME AS TEE PFESIDENCY. IF IT IS NOT THEN WILL ~ O T THE EXISTENCE OF TWO AUTBORITIES CREATE EONFLICT AN& CONTRADICTIONS?"

7 . SINCE THE FNTIRE CONCEPT OF VILAYAT-E-FAOIB IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED VITB LSOM3'INI. PUBLIC COMMENT HAS BLEN CAUTIOUS. COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ABU At-BASAN BANI SADX IS QOUTED Z Y BAYDAC AS AS<IN% R6ETORICALLY VFIFTHXR IT kILL EE POSSIPLE TO FIhlD A SCHOLAR OF QFLIGIOES LAW kEO MEETS ALL OF THE CONDITIOYS DEFINED IN THF ARTICLE. AVOTR~R REPRESENTATIVE, POOLDCAM-HA~AGHF'I. EXPLAINED BIS VOTE AGdINST THE ABTICLP ?Y SAYING TEAT TFIS TFIEO- CFACY'S FUNCTIONING 'AS DEPENDENT ON THE D~ESENCT OF AYATOLLAH 3FOMEINI EV? WO3LD PROBABLY NOT WORK IN 41s ATISZNCX.

E. ACC293IhG TO \ REPORTEF WRITING IN TBE SEPT 11 LKGLISH-IPhCUPGP TFERAN TINFS, ONE OF ATATOLLAH TALEGQANI'S LAjT 4CTS IN THE: I ~ S E Y B L T ~ 9 T O VOTE B'I rile1

N h N h k i C Z C 150

VZCZC 151 00 RUEHC R U E < J C S RUQMSA RUSBLX RUQYCw RUDTC RUQPAH RUEHNO R'JQNHT RUTNPS RUSYAAA RUQMBI SUQNSU RUSHLD RUQMOD R U S B 3 r 25 flUQWER #0181/02 2611205 ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 1811492 S E P 79 FT ANENBASST TEBRAN T O R U E E C / S E C S T A T E VASBDC I M f l E D I INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC R U E K J C S / J C S WASH DC RUQNBI/AflEMBASST AEU D B A B I 290 RUQMGU/AMEUBASST ANKARA 275 B U E E A D b J S I N T BABBDAD 286 RFQMOD/AMENBASST DOHA 261 RUSBQC/AMEMBASST ISLAMABAD 325 R u Q n R A / r N E M B A s s T JIDDA 0324

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RLSNAAA/I)SCINCEUS VAIBIHGBW CE R T

b -- A C 0 N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 02 TEHRAN 101

A G A I N S T T R I S A R T I C L E . T H I S R E P O R T HAS R E C E I V B D V I D E ACCEPTANCF, IN TEHRAN. I F T H E R E I S T O B E ANY S I G N I P I C A N T O P P O S I T I O N 10 T H E A R T I C L B , TEEN T A L I G B A N I ' S O P I N I O N COULD BECOYE T H E FOCUS O F TAAT O P P O S I T I O N . EOWEVSR, APPROVAL 00 T T I S A R T I C L B I S AN I N D I C A T I O N T E A T T H E PROPONENTS O F C L E R I C A L GOVERNMENT ARE NOk I N T H E ASCENCAhT I N T H E C O U N C I L 09 E X P E R T S . AT T H S S A M S T I M E , VILAYAT-E-PAQIH, L I L E T H E I S 1 , A P I C R E P U B L I C , I S S T I L L AN UNYOYN QUANTITY FOR MOST I R A N I A N S . I F A RETEREIDUM WERE B 3 L D ON THE S U E J E C T TODAY. T R I S P O L I T I C A L CONCEPT WOULD UNDOURPEDLY R E C E I V E OVERWHELMIYG APPPOVAL AND T B E D Z T A I L S O F T H I S ARRANGFMENT WOULD 3E L E F T FOR T H E LEARNED THEOLOGIANS T O V 0 9 7 O U T . L A I N C E N R I #@I81

NNNN VZCZC 151

NNNNVV ESB020BRA199 PP ltUQflHR .@B RUSBC t6457 2622140 ZNY CCCCC 228 .P 1921022 SEP 79

Ei0 N I D P N T I A L STATE 246467

PAGS I PCOV. IR

Sm):ECTr CLBRICAL ILFLUENCE

1. (C - LNPIRS TEXT) 2. ?OR PURPOSSS OF ANALYSIS SERE. JP WOULD APPRECIATE lrOBTAIB PNBASST VIEWS AND INPORHATION ON PERCEIVED 329W- ING INTLUfNCS 01 CLERGY.

A. I? POSIrION OP CLERGY IS BECOHIN3 STRONGER, WFAT SPECIFIC POLICY EFFECTS \tAY 1P EXPECT? THAT IS. WBAT D ~ F Y S R ~ N C ~ S IN Pcor POLICIES (WEETBBR ENUNCIATED 02 DE ?ACTO) DO Y EXPECT IN FOBSION AFPAIRS, ECONO'IIC/ COMMSRCIAL %ISIOkS. OR MILITARY PROGRAHS?

B. WHICH RECENT PC01 DECISIONS DOPS TEE PMBASSY ATTRIBUTS TO PRESENTLY ENLARGED I~PLUEF(CE OF Tag CLERGY? IS THEBE EVIDENCE THAT NEW CLERICAL INFLOENCF IS BEING PXPRESSED T9ROPGH NIW PORnS OR INSTITTPIONS aAFHER ThAN PERCCrGE BIVOLOTIONARY COI'NCIL AND YOIITEFS -- AS GAS BZEh TSF CASE SINCI YCBRDARY? FOR EXhHPlE, ??F EYBASSY APPPARS TO BELIEVE ?PAT TEE BESITATION ON PESALE 3F F-14's CAN B1- ATTRIQOTRD TO CLERICAL INILUENCL. IS TSERE FIRM PVIDENCE ?OR T41S VIEW? IS IT LOT POSSIBLE TPAT THEitZ IS SPRONC DIPPJ?RSNCE OF 3PIEION BEl'#EEN IAF. YFA FACTIOYS IT0 CLERGY JOINING TEE SIDE POR BZl'ENTI3N OD P3SSIBLP nRCINC ANT IVPLKHENTING ACTION BE DELAYLD? ARS NOT TOPlITEES-WABRE CLERICAL INFLUENCE 64s EESN EXPRXSSED IN THE PAST--NOW YEAYER IN TRF MILITAaY TdAN LAST SPRING? DOES EMBASSY EAVE EVIDENCE TFAT CLERSY IS BEFIND RECEVT DECISIONS TO RESTART PAJOS POREIGN CONTRACTS AND YA<E LARGE PAYMENTS TO US FIR'lS?

C. THE ZMBASSY'S FINF CABLES ON EDUCA'IIOY PRCELEXS ST TFAF CLERICEL ILTLUENCI VIZFT BE SF09T 01 IVE IN TEAT SECP3rl. YOUR OZSCRIPSI3N SrrG>ISl'S TzLT

TFE CIXRICS MAY BX COMBATTED BOTE ON TBE P 3 0 1 LEVEL ANG AT T E 3 LEVEL 3 F IMPLEVENTATION WEERE MANY IRANIANS WILL s I n P L y 40 AS THEY PLEASE. HOW STRONG IS THE TBNDEYCY TO GIVE L I P SEBVICE TO CLXRICAL DIRECTIONS, BUT PRAGYLTICALLY TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOl PAST PRACTICES. E.G.. TBF PBACTICE OF PLAYING YFSIC ON BADIO/TV AFTE3 THE KKOMEINI "BAN*?

D. #E ARE T50ROUG9LY. CONFUSFD BY.TEE PRESS DESCBIPTIOH OF C ~ N S T I T U ~ I O N A L RPVISI3NS. TEE NEW ARTICLB F IVE, FOR EXAPPLE. DOES NOT MATCE WITH ARTICLE P I V r IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION. I S THE DOCUMENT BEING COMPLETLLP RE- WRITTEN? I T I S ESPECIALLY UNCLSAR BOW THE RELI3IOUS LEADER AHll COLJNCIL DKSCRIBED I N TEE NEW ARTICLE FIVE RELATE TO THE DRAFT DOCUqENT'S CO1NCIL OF GUARDIANS, THE PRESIDENT AYD THE MAJLIS.

MCRKY POLITICLL ENVIRONMENT I N TODAY'S IRAN AND COMHEND EMBASSY FOR EXCELLENCE OF I T S POLITICAL REPOSTING BNDER ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES. I T IS IMPORTANT TPAT WE TRY T O DEPICT TaXNDS UITH AS #UCE S P E C I F I C CETAIL AS POSSIBLE. WE APE ALSO DEEPLY INTERESTED I N THE INSIGHTS AND JUDGMENTS OF ASTUTE IRANIAN OPSERVERS WHO ARE CLOSE F 3 TEE ACTION; YEEP RINGING THE DOORBELLS. VANCE BT #64B7

SZC%C 266'. RR SUEHC RUE4JCS RUEKJCS RUQMBI SUQMGU RUEHAU RUQMOD RUSBOD BUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM riumno RUQMMT RUFNPS RUSNAAA DE RUGHER ua281/01 2631305 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 2012552 SEP 79 PM AMLVBASST TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHCC 3876 INFO RUE<JCS/SECDRF WASH DC RUESJCS/JCS WASH DC EUOMBI/AUEMBASSY ABU DAABI 0292 SUQMCD/ANPPBASST A N K A R A a278 EUEHAEAJSINT BAGHDAO 0289 RCQPOD/ANE"ASSY DOHA 0264

R!JOMRA/AME"$ASST JIDDA 0327 RI!SBL</AMF??BISSY PAPUL 0336 RUQNKW/AME~~EASST KUWAIT a296 RUDTC/AYBMBASSY LONDON 0404

5 RUQMAM/AMPMBASSY YANAMA 0263 P PI~EBRO/AMFPBASST WOSCOV 1290 : RUQ?!MT/AMFMBASSY MUSCAT 0181

RUFNPS/ANXMBASSr PAPIS 0357

{ C - 0 N F I D F N T I A L SECTION 01 O? 03 TEHRAN 18281

f E.O. 12065, GDS 4/19/85 (LIMBERT, J 0 8 N ) OR-P 8 TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR : SUBJECT: KBOMEINI MODERATES HIS ATTACKS ON INTELLECTUALS

REPS: (A) TEHRAN QSe8, ( B ) TEARAN 10191

1. ( C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUWAEY: AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SPEECHES POLLOVING THE DEATH OX TALECHANI CONTAINED A CHANCE I N EMPHASIS. HE SOPTENfD HIS ATTACKS ON THE IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS WHOM HE PREVIOUSLY ANATHEMATIZPD I S CHARBZADEH (INFATUATED WITB THE VEST). INSTEAD HIS SPEECHES CONTAINED CALLS ?OR UNITY-- UNITI WITHIN THE CLERGY, UWITT VITEIR THE UNIVERSITIES. AND UNITY BETWEEN CLERST AND INTELLECTUALS. ALTHOUGH VE CANNOT BE CFRTAIN O? KHOMEINI'S MOTIVES. HE HAS BBPN TRYING TO ENSURE THAT A LARGE PART OF FORMER TALBGHANI SUPPORTERS INCLUDING THE MODERATE CLERCT AND THE SECULAR I N ~ E L L E C T U A L S , ARE NOT IRREPARABLY ALIENATED FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN I? THE SHIFT IN KHOMEINI'S POBLIC STATEHENTS HAS ANY PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON THE REVOLUTIONART AUTHORITIES OR ON THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS.

3. I N REFTEL A EMBASSY DISCUSSED SOME O? THE IMPLICATIONS OP TALECHANI'S DEATH FOR THE IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADER- SHIP. ONE PROBLEn CREATED BT HIS DEATH I S TEkT ONE OF TALEGHAKI'S MAJOR CONSTITUENCIES, THE UNIYEBSITT-BASED

ECTUALSc HAS 3EEN L P T WITHOUT AN OBVIOUS LEADER OTECTOR. TALECHANI'S DEPARTURE HLS LEFT THIS WITBOUT A LEADER OF SUFFICIENT STATURE VHO CAN

VZCZC 265 sn

WORY TO PRESERVE UNITY BETWRlN MORE EXTREFIE CLERICAL SUPPORTERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MODERATE ANC SECULAR ELEMENTS VEO HAVE ?ZLT THEMSELVES UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THF ADVOCATES OF A PURELY ISLAMIC STATE. ALTEOUGH I T I S STILL TOO SOON TO # A l l A DEFINITS JUDGEMENT I T APPEARS TBAT ATATOLLAE KHOtileINI I S WKING AN EPIORT #'o ATTRACT THE MORE MODERATE CONSTITUENCT OF TALEGEANI AND TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUINQ LOTALTY TO THE REVOLUTION.

4. AS EMBASSY NOTED RE?TEL A, THE LOYALTY O? TALEGEANI'S FOLLOVING VAS INTENSELY PERSONAL AND BASED ON AN INSTINCTIVE TRUST AND RESPECT. I T VAS ALSO BASED ON A UNIQCE SST OF HUMAN ?ACTORS VHICH ARE NOT DUPLICATED IN ANT OTHER LRADER NOV ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE. AYATOLLAH EOSSEIN ALI MONTAZERI, APPOINTED rnrn Jon'ra OF TEHRdK I N PLACE OF TELEGHANI. HAS NOT ATTRACTED TEE SANE LOYALTY. MONTAZEBI'S PERFORMANCE AT H I S FIRST FRIDAT PRAYSRS ON SEPTEMBER 15 AT BEHESHT-E-ZAHRA WAS UNIMPRZSSIVF. HE I S UYDISTINGUISHED IN APPEARANCE, AND AN INNFFECTIVR SPEAKER. ALTEOUGE MANY BTTENCED FRIDAT PRAYERS OUT 0 1 RESPECT FOR THE MEHORY OF TALECHANI. MONTAZERI MAT FIND I T DIFFICULT TO ATTRACT TALFGHANI'S MASSIVE CONGREGATION AT TEBRAN UNIVERSITY WHEN FRIDAY PRAYERS BESUMl THERE ON SEPTEHBER 21.

5 . SIGNS HAVE ALREADT APPEARED QN THE GATES 0 1 TEERAN UNIVERSITY PROCLAIMING I T TO BE TALEGBANI UNIVERSITY , A N D MONTAZERI nrr NOT BE ABLE TO MATCH THE PMIPORMANCE OF E I S PREDECESSOR. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OBVIOUS REPLACWEIT FOB TALECHANI AS LEADER OF THE EDUCATED, IT APPEARS TEAT KROMEINI HIMSELL IS MAKING CONCILIATORY MOVES TOWARD THIS GROUP.

6. THE EDUCATED HAD PREVIOUSLY BElN A TARGET IOR SBOMEINI'S SCORN AND RIDICULE. JUST A FEY DAYS BEFORE TALEGBANI'S DEATH, RHOMEINI TOLD A GATHERING AT m I Z I E H SCHOOL IN OOM TBAT THOSE EASTERNERS VHO HAD MADE THE VEST THEIQ ~A'ABA WERE TEE FOLLOVERS OF TAGHUT (THE DEVIL) SPOKEN Q F IN THE QORAN. KBOMEINI SAID THAT BLIND IMITATION OP THJ VEST HAS BROUGET THE FREEDOM FOR OUR T_O_UNG PEOPLE TO WATCH PBRNOGRAPET ON TELEVISION, TO

N N N N VZCZC 265

.---- RR RUEHC-BUEYJCS RUEKJCS RUQMBI RUQ RUQHOD RUSBQD RUQflRA.RUSBLK RUQMKW RUEHMO RUOMMT R U P N P S RUSNAAA ~ i i RUQMER i02e1/02 2831313 Z N T CCCCC ZZH R 2012SZ S E P 79 M AMEMBASST TEHRAN T O RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 387'7 I N r O RUEKJCS/SECDE? WASH DC R U E K J C S / J C S WASH DC RUQMBI/AMXMBASSY ABU DHABI 0294 RDQUGU/AMEMBASST ANKARA 0278 R U ~ A C / U S I N T BAGHDAD 8298

IAM

R U Q M R A / A M ~ M B A ~ S ~ JIDDA 0328 RUSBLK/AHEMBASSY KABUL 8337 RUQMKW/AMlMBASSY KUWAIT 0297 R ~ D T C / ~ E M B A S S ~ LONCON e4es

8 RUQnAM/AME!lBASSY MANAMA 0264 2 R U ~ M O / A M E M B A S S Y MOSCOW 8291

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0182 ? RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY P A R I S 0358 i RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I B I N G E N G E

MORE O P I U M , AND T O WASTE T H E I R L I V E S I N BROTHELS LND 1 BARS. A m R B F L I T T L I N G T H E IMPORTANCE O F T H E COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC I NWASTRUCT*URE, i ( H O ~ E I N 1 W I T H GREAT EMOTION

: TOLD H I S L I S T E N E R S , ISLAM I S S E R I O U S . I S L A M I S NOT I B I V O L O U S . I S L A M DOES NOT MEAN YOUNG BOYS AND G I R L S T A K I N G O f x T H E I R CLOTHES AND G E T T I N G I N T O T H S WATER TOGSTEER. KHOMEINI S A I D THAT I S L A M ALLOWS ONLY TWO S P O R T S , SHOOTING AND HORS7, R A C I N G , BOTH O P WFICI l iIAC OVERTONES O F M I L I T A R Y T R A I N I N G . THE L A T T E R , H E S A I D , IS S O IMPORTANT T E A T ISLAM E V l N ALLOWS E E T T I N G ON T H E R E S U L T S .

7. K H O M E I N I ALSO CONDEMNED T H E U S E O F WESTERN NAMES FOB SHOPS, ROADS, AND P A R K S - A N ~ ASTED FOR THE BOYCOTT 01 PRODUCTS AND S H O P S WHICH BEAR WESTERN NAMES S I M P L Y FOR T H E S A K E O F P U B L I C I T Y AND S A L E S . ONLY I N T H I S WAT BE SAID, WOULD IRAN BE ABLE T O OVBRCOMG ITS F A S C I N A T I O ~ FOR T B P WEST AND T O BECOMP SOWETHING OTHER THAN A P A S S I V E ABSORBER O F EVERYTHING T H E WEST C I S H E S OUT.

8. K H O H E I N I , I N T H I S ANDIOTHER S P E E C H E S , FAD E S P E C I A L L Y HARSH WORDS FOR I R A N I A N I N T E L L E C T U A L S . I N AN E A R L I E R S P E E C H H E HAD S A I D , WE DO NOT WANT I N T E L L E C T U A L S " AND THEN RETRACTED S L I G H T L Y B T S A Y I N G THAT SOME PEW M I G R T B E WORTHWHILE. I N H I S S E P T 8 S P E E C H I N QOM H E ACCUSED T H E I N T E L L E C T U A L S O F B E I N G I N F E C T E D WITH T H E SAME I U l A T U A T I O N W I T H T H E V E S T ( G H A R B Z A D E G I ) WHICH HAS CORRUPTED THE E N T I R E I R A N I A N S O C I E T Y E X C E P T FOR THE MOSQUES AND THE CLERGY. ( F Y I : I R O N I C A L L Y T H E VERY T E 9 K :;*y A D t G I WAS C O I N E D ET T T E L A T E J A L A L AL ARMAC, O+JE

I N T F L L E C T U A L S WHO X H O M E I N I HARSHLY A T T A C L S . 1 THF DUTY F T H E I N T E L L E C T U A L S , S A I D X H O M E I N I , WAS NOT T O

VZCZC 266

190

VZCZC 266

ADVOCATE THE FALSE FRLIMlM OF THE VEST, BUT TO EXPOSE ITS EVILS AND ITS E S S ~ N T I A L VORTHLESSNESS.

MODRRATE HIS ANTI-TI

NOW ?OR UNITY ESPECIALLY UNITY BETWEEN THE CLERGY AND THE INTEL~ECTUALS . 10. SPEATING IN QOM ON SEPTEMBER 13* IEOMEINI URGSD THE INTELLECTUALS TO BECOME PART O? THE SEA OF RELIGIOUS POWZR SO TEAT TEE COMBINED STRENGTH O? THESE GROUPS coaiD BETTGR SERVE THE C O U N ~ Y . "YOU ARE ALL 01 THE SAME NATION, LIVE IN ONE COUNTRY AND ONE HWg. SO JOIN FORCES AND PROTECT TOW HOUSE. ALTHOUGH STILL C R I T I C I Z I N G THE INT~LLICTUALS'INFATUATIOY urra THE WEST,

i HE SPARED THW THE HARSH* BLANXET CONDmNATION$ RE HAD $ MADE ONLY FIVE DAYS BEZORE.

11. IHOMEINI ALSO APPEALED TO T I E RELIGIOUS LEADERS g NOT TO dBUSE TRE POWER IN THEIR RANDS AND VARIED TEEM

AGAINST OPPOSING TBB rJNIVERSITY-EDUCATED YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO CONSTITUTE THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP 0 1 THE NATION.

- THE OVER-RIDING CONCERN BOTH FOR THE UNIVIRSITY AND FOR f THE CLmGY 8 2 SAID SHOULD TIE UNITY. $E ENTREATED BOT9 ; THE CLERGY 'AND THE UNIIERSITIES NOT t o SPLIT n INTO ?UEDING ?ACTIONS AND TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERNAL ' UNITY O? PURPOSE.

12. TEE IMAM TOOK A SIMILAR CONCILIATORY LINE I W A

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. SUCB A STEP WOUL~'SFRI0USLY YE4<EN TRE GOVERNflENT. ADVOCATING PATIENCE, YHOMBINI SAID TBAT SUCH DRASTIC MEASURSS WERE ILL-ADVISEC AND TBAT SUCH REFORM SHOULD FOLLOW APP!?OlAL 09 THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ?ORMATION O? THE NEV LEGrSLATITB ASS?M9LY. 13. COMMENTI &LT?IOURE *POMEIN1 HAS NOT ILF,TRIAT?LD FROM ANT OF HIS mNDAMENTAL IDFAS ON THE HARt!RlL ElFECT OF FOREIGN INFLOENCSS ON IRANIiN SOCIfTY. 4R APPBASS TO BE CONCERNED TEAT BE NOT ALIRNATR THE LATE 4YbTOLLAH ET 00291

NNNN VZCZC 266

VZCZC ZE? RR PUERC RUBIJCS RUEXJCS RUQMEI RUQMGU RUEHAD ROQMOD W S B f D RUQMRA RUSBL".UQYYV RUDTC RUQMAM BUEHMO RUQMMT RUFNPS RWSNAAA DE RUQNsR #&?281/03 2 6 3 1 3 2 1 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 2 0 1 2 5 5 2 SEP 79 FM ANSMBASSY TEERAN TO ?EEHC/SECSTATE VASEDC 3878 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDV WASR DC BUEYJCS/JCS WASH DC

e u i u ~ ~ / t i s r N T BAGHDAD 2 2 9 1 RUQMO~/AMT"BASSY COHA 0266 SFSBQD/dM~MbASSY ISLAMABAD 0 3 2 1 RUQF~RA/AMEMEASSP JIDDA 8322) FDSEL?/AM'FP!BASST r(A3UL 033B RtQMC iJ/AMVBkSSY $UWAIT 029E RUDTC/AhE?BASSY LONDON 0 4 0 6 ECQMAM/AMSYBASSY MANAUA 0 2 6 5 QUEHNO/bNEMBASST YOSCOW 0 2 9 2 RUQnM?/ANZHEASSY VUSCAT 2 1 9 3 RCFNPS/ANEMSASSY PAR18 0 3 5 9 ?USNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I S I N G ~ N GE B T c o N 7 I D E Y T I A t S E C ~ O Y e3 OP 03 EBRAN 1 0 2 e 1

TALEGQANI'S SUPPORTERS AMONG MODERATES I N THE CLSRCT AND TFE VNIVFRSITIES. TBF ABSFNCE OP TALEGHANI HAS APPARENTLY FOPCEC TFB IMAM TO TONY DOWN SOWE OF B I S MORR EXTBEeE ATTACKS A>AINST TYf SFCULAS AND WESTERN-ORIPNTED SECTION? CF THE SOC19TY. WHO* HE HAD ILEGULARLY ANATHEMATIZED IN H I S EARLIPR SPESCBES.

1 4 . IN VOCIFTING H I S PUBLIC STATTYENTS, T 8 3 IMAM MAT FAVP BEEN INFLUENCED BY TEE INMINSNT OPENING OF TRE SCBOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES, WHEQZ THERE ARE RUMORS OF SLBIOES DIVISIONS YETIFEN THE RZLICIOUS AND T9E SECOLhR STUCZNT SFOOPS. XHOMPINI WAY REALITY TSAT HT I S TRE ORLY POSSISLF RBPLACRVEYT FOR TALEGuANI AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN DISPUTI%C FACTIONS. TBFRT I S NO OY3 FLSE WITH FNOUG? STAT'JRP AND P R F S T I W . ALTiiOU24 I T I S STILL TOO EARLY TO PE CESTATN, I T APPFAeS THAT (HOMPIMI I S ATTEMPT- I N 2 TO FXTTND TPE !iAYD OF FRIZLDSSIP TO A YIDER StCTOR OP IRANItN SOCIFTY VITHOUT CEANGINZ R I S UNDERLYING NESSAGB TYAT IRAN'S SALVATION L I E S NEITDER IN PAST NOR 'J:EST, BUT If4 TE3 ST9AIG9T PATH (SIBAT AL-YUSTAQIY) OF ISLAM.

15. I T I S S T I L L UNCLYAR YhAT THOMEINS'S YORE MOD3RATZ LINP IN Y I S RECENT SPEECXZS YILL YEAN IN PQACTJCAL TIRYS OR WFETSER RE 1 5 OPPElING THE MODESATES ANYTEING MORE THAN WORDS. ON3 ARPA TO WATCH WILL Bt THE COUYCIL OF ETPWTS, WBICH HAS BESN CONVERTING TE9 ORIGIYAL DXAPT CONSTITUTION INTO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAV OF A THEOC3ArIC STATE ( 4 B F 5 ) . I T RWAIYS TO13E SEEN WSFTBSR TSF DPIVF TOR TEEOCQbCT IN TEE COUNCIL, uED BY ATAT0514<S

T I Ah'!' YONYAZ R I . I S AT ALL BL'lNTED -T T I Z S H I F T - , E 0: P ~ O Y E I V I ' S PUFLIC STATEMENTS. I T I T I S NOT, HOMlI4I 'S EFFiRTS AT R7CONCILIATIOY WILL BE

VZCZC 267 vr7

VZCZC "267

CIFFICULT, WPECIALLT AS MODERATES MAT SEE TSWSELVES BEING SYSTFMATICALLY EXCLODED FROH ANY SEARS I N TBE IXANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS.

1 5 . WE CCTE THAT A ~.AOYEINI SPEECH AUGUST 19 TO A I R TOBCX OFFICERS IN oon MADE ATTER TBIS CABLX WAS WRITTEZ bG4IN COYTAIN? AN ATTAC6 ON WESTERNIZED INTELLFCTUALS. I T I S DIPFICWLT TO SAT YEETHBR THESF COMMENTS WILL MARK TEE BESINNIN4 OP A NYW SPATE 0 9 AN WFSTE9W SPEECSES, OR VEETEER TREY ARE AN EXCIPTION TO TEE TSEND YE PAVE BEEN OBSERVING SINCE TALEGBANI 'S DEATH. LA I NGXN ET

N N N N VZCZC 267

VZCZC Z T I 00 RUEHC BUEKJCS EUEYJCS RUQMBI RUQMCU EUFHAD RUQMOD RUSBQD 9UQMfiA RUSBLK RUQH?W RUDTC R U a M t Y RUEBMO RUQMMT R U F N P S RUSNAAA DE R U Q n p a * i i 2 8 8 / 0 1 2631420 ZNT CCCCC L Z R 0 2 0 1 4 0 2 2 SEP 79 FM AflKWBASSY TEHRAN TO RUSHC/SECSTATE WASBDC IMMEDIATE I N F O R U E I J F S / S E C D E F WASH DC R U E I J C S / J C S WASH DC RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0296 R U Q M G U / A M E M B A ~ S Y ANKARA 0201 RWHADNSINT BLGHDbD 0292 R U Q M O D / A M E M B A ~ S T - D O E s267 RUSBQD/AMEMBASST ISLAMABAD 0332 RUQMRA/AMEMBASST J I D D A 0330 RUSBLK/AMENBASSY ~ ~ B U L 0339 RUQM<Y/AMEMBbSST KUWAIT 0299

RUQMMT/AMFMBASSY MUSCAT 0 1 8 r ) BUFNPS/AME~BASSY PARIS a360 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN 5E

* C O N F I D E N T I A L S E ~ ~ I O N B ~

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/28/05 ( L I I B E R T TAGS: P I N T . PGOV. I R

O F 03 TEYRAN

, J O H N ) OR-P

SUBJECT: V ~ R X OF'COUNCIL OF EXPERTS PROCEEDS SLOWLY

I . ( C - ENTIRE T E X T ) .

2. SUMMARY: T H E COUNCIL O F E X P E R T S FOR THE EXAMINATION O F TEE I R A N I A N C O N S T I T U T I O N , WHICH WAS S U P P O S E D TO COMPLFTE I T S WORT B T SEPTEMBER 23. HAS S O FAR APPROVED ONLY X I P T E E N A R T I C L E S O F T E E NEW C O R S T I T U T I O N . THE O B I G I N A L D3AFT SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION CONTAINED 151 A R T I C L E S , S O THE C O U N C I L W I L L HAVE E I T H E R T O S P E E D PP I T S P d C E OR EXTEND I T S MANDATE. ACCORDING T O P R E S S R E P O R T S ON SEPTEMBER 19, T H E COUNCIL 'S L I F E HAS BEEN EXTENDED P O 9 LNOTEER 15 DAYS. HOWEVER T B I S NEW P E R I O D WAY WELL_ NOT B E S U F ? I C I E N f TO COMPLETE THE COUNCIL 'S WORI. s N C SUMMARY.

3. THE WORd O F THE COUNCIL 01 E X P E R T S HAS BEEN PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY, I F SLOWLY. R A D I O AND T E L E V I S I O N BROADCASTS O F TEE SESSIONS HAVE s a o w N THR DBBATES TO BE LIVELY, ORDERLY, AND VERBOSE. M E R E I S NO P R O V I S I O N FOR L I M I T I N G T H E LENGTH OF S P E E C S E S OR O F R E S T R I C T I N G THE S U B J E C T . MATTER. AS A R E S U L T , ALMOST THE E N T I R E F I R S T M E E T I N G S WERE TAKEN U P BY GlNERAL S P E E C B B S BY VARIOUS DELBGATES-- S P E E C H E S WIV L I T T L E RELEVANCE T O T H E S P E C I F I C MATTERS I N THE C O N S T I T U T I O N .

4. T F F g I G H L I G H T S O F T H E MAIN A R T I C L E S P A S S E D S O PAR

A) A R T I C L E 5, T E E GOVERNMENT O F THE THEOLOOIAN INCITE: VZCZC 277

VZCZC 277

(VILATAT-E-FAQIH). THIS ARTICLE WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL SIPTEL. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT MEANING OF THIS ARTICLE I S STILL UNCLEAR, MAJOR IMPLICATION I S TO ENSURE SHIA RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT CONTROL OVER THE OFPICE OF CHIEF OF STATE. PASSAGE OF THIS ARTICLE HAS STIRRED OPEN CRITICISM. RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR EZZATOMB SAEABI HAS SEFERZLY CRITICIZED ARTICLE 5 , SAYING THE NEW PROVISION WILL LEAD TO AN AUTHORITY RUNNING PARALLEL WITH THAT OP THE GOVERNMENT OR IN OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. I T I S DANGEROUS POB ISLAM, HE SAID,.BECAUSE I F A GOVERNMENT MADE MISTAKES I T COULD BE REMOVED. BUT I F A RELIGIOUS LEADER MADE A MISTAXE, P E O P L ~ V O U ~ D LOSE FAITH-IN THE CLERGY ITSELF AND THUS IN ISLAM. ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS DELEGATE ANC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MtMBER ABOLHASSAN BANISADR HAS ALSO CRITtCIZED ARTICLE 5 SAYING THAT I F CLERGYMEN VFRE TO BE.ENTRUSTED WISH S P ~ C I A L POWERS, THEN TEE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT PARTIES WAS UEANINGLESS. HOWEVEE, IN REPLY TO THESE CRITICS, AY~TOLLAH KHOMEINI

% TOLD GROUP OF AIR PORCE OFlICERS TEAT OUR QOVSRNMENT 2 I S ISLAMIC, AND THAT (THEY) UUST SUPPORT ARTICLE 5 SO

THAT THE COUNTRY I S NOT HARMD. THE NATION HAS CAST ITS VOTE FOR TEE ISLAMIC R E p B L I C i ALL 0 T YOU MUST COUPLY, OR YOU WILL BE OBLITERATEn.

E" 2 - (B) ARTICLE12,ESTABLISHINGTWELVERJA'fABISBI'ISM - AS THE STATE RELIGION O r IRAN ?OR LTBBNITT. THIS ( ARTICLE WAS OPPOSED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUNNI

ARFAS, NOTABLY MOWLAVI ABDULAZIZ DELEGATE FOR BALUCHPSTAN, 0 WHO SAID THAT THE OPFICIAL RELIGION SHOULD BE ISLAM --

NOT ONE SECT. THE ARTICLE ALSO NOTES TEAT THE VARIOUS SUNNI LA# SCHOOLS ARE RWPECTED AND HAY BE PREELY APPLIED IN AREAS WHERE SUNNIS PRBDOUINATB. - ( C ) ARTICLE 13 DEFINES TEE RECOGNIZED NON-UUSLIM MINORITIES: C B R I S T I A ~ S , JEWS AND ZOROASTIANS. THESE MINORITIES ARE GUARANTEED m r m n OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE ANC EDUCATION, AND dRE ALLOWED TO APPLY THEIR OWN LAWS OF DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE. TAIS ARTICLE CREATED A BRIEP S T I R OF INTEREST IN A SMALL ANCIENT SECT CALLEC THE SABEANS, WE0 CLAIM TO BE FOLLOWERS OF JOHN TEE BAPTIST. AYATOLLAH MAHARRENI-SBIlAZI ENDED THAT CONTROVERSY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE SABPANS WERE INCLUDED UNDER TEE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO JEWS AND CHRISTIANS. THE BAHA'I SECT. HOWEVER. I S NOT CONSIDERED A TRUE BT

N N N N VZCZC 277

VZCZC 278 OG aUEHC RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUQMBI RUQMGU RUEHAD RUQMOD RUSBQD RUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT RUPNPS RUSNAAA DE RUQMHR #0288/02 2631428 ZNY CCCGC ZZH 0 2014022 SPP 79 Pn AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE VASHDC IMMEDIATE 388e INFO RUEKJCS/SECDL? VASE DC RUEKJCS/JCS VASE DC RUQHBI/AMEt4BASSY ABO DEABI 0297 a u Q n o u / A n s n s A s s r ANKARA 0282 RUEHADhSINT BAGHDAD 8293 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0268 RUSBQBhMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0335 r t u Q n a r / A n r n s A s s r JIDDA ass1 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0340 R U Q M K ~ / A ~ ~ M B A ~ ~ ~ ~ U W A I T 0300 BUDTC/AMEMBASS Y LONDON 0408

8 BUQMAM/AMBMBASSY MANAMA 0267 f ~uimonnsnarss~ noscov 0294

BUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0185 E RUINPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0361

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINOEN GE ' BT f C 0 N P I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 01 83 TEERAN 10288

ELIGION BY THE n o s L m s AND, THEELMBE, IS NOT PBOTECTED BY THIS ARTICLE.

- (D) ARTICLE 17, ESTABLISHES I I V E ARHS 01 THE STATE, TO BE COMPRISBD OF THE PWPLE, THE LBQISLATORE, TEE EXECUTIVE, TEE JUDICIARY AND TEE THlaCRATIC LmDSBSBIP. THE THEOCRATIC LEADSBSHIP I S O I V E l TRP P m R TO S t f TEAT TEE PRINCIPLES AND ARTICLES O? T H I CONSTITUTION ARt IMPLEMENTED, IN ADDITION TO BEING TEE LIAISON B n W P t N THE OTHER FOUR ARMS 01 TEE STATE.

- ( E ) ARTICLE 21. MAKES PfRSIAN TBll OlFXCIAL LANGUAGI oa IRA!, BUT-ALLOVS .FOB~THIC USE OF O T H ~ . "LOCAL AND TRIBAL LANGUAGPS ALONGSIDE 01 PERSIAN IN PUBLICATIONS, TEE HBEIA, AND THE TEACHING O? LIl'ERATUBE IN LOCAL SCHOOLS.

4. THE ASSEMBLT HAS BEGUN TO PACE THE FORMIDABLE TASK OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE JUDICIARY, AND TEE CABINET. UNLESS THP PACE O? WORK I S SPEEDED UP, TBP;RE SEEMS LITTLE PROSPBCT POR TEB COUNCIL TO FINISH ITS WORK BEK)RE THE END OF 1979. ON 19 SEPT HOWEVER. KHOMEINI AGAIN URGED TBf ASSEMBLY TO EXPIDITI P A S S A G ~ . O F TEE CONSTITUTION G I V I N G INDICATION THAT HE HAY BE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH TBE ASSEMBLY'S SNAIL LIKE PACE. SHOULD KHOMEINI STEP IN EE COULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPEED UP THE PSOCESS.

5. THE COUNCIL HAS CHANGED I T S ROLE FROM THAT ORIGINALLY GED. IT WAS FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD

QUICS REVIEW OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND E I T WITH MINOR CHANGES. INSTEAD. TEE ~ O U N C I L

VZCZC 278

VZCZC 27t'

HAS TURNED INTO A GENUINE CONSTITUBNT ASSEMBLY, RE- WRITING, ADDING AND OMITTING ARTICLES AT WILL. 6. NOT ALL ARE PLEASED WITH WHAT I S EMERGING FROM THE COUNCIL. THERE APPEARS TO BE A STABLE BLOC OF ABOUT FIFTY TO FIFTY-FIVE DELEGATFS WHO SUPPORT VOVES TO INCREASE THB ROLE OF THE CLERGY I N THE NEW GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE I S NO FORMAL FACTION OR PARTY STRUCTURE. AYATOLLAHS MONTAZERI AND BEHESHTI EAVE GENERALLY BEEN SPOIESMEN FOR THIS GROUP. T2ERE I S A SMALL MINORITY I N C L U D I N G SOME or TEE NON-MUSLIM DELIGATES A N D M O Q A D ~ A M NARAGHL'I, DELEGATE FROM TABRIZ FROr THE MUSLIM PEOPLES REPUBLICAY PASTY (MRPP) WHO EAVE BEEN UNSUCGESFULLY R I S I S T I N G TEE MOVES TO YEaGE CLERICAL AND SECULAR AUTHORITY.

7. ALTiOUGH TEE DRAFT CONSTITUTION SPECIRICALLY MENTIONED RIGHTS FOR THF NON-PERSIAN ETENIC GROUPS IN IRAN, TAB COUNCIL HAS SO FAR MADE NO MENTION OF TZESE GROUPS I N

5 THE ARTICLES APPROVED. TBE OAIGINAC ARTICLF 5, WHICH : GUARANTEED WUAL FI3ATS FOR PERSIANS, YURDS, TURKS, - ARABS ETC., EAS SO FAR BFEN IGNORED BY TEE ASSEWBLY. ~ R I T E R A N D C B I T I C D R . R E Z A BASAHENI TOLD A N HRPP MEETING

TEAT IY H I S OPINIOV I F THE CONSTITUTION I S RATIFIET VITHOUT GIVING AUTONOMY TO THP MIYOPITIES, I T WOULD NOT E E IN LINT WITH TFE IBANIAN REVOLUTION. COMMENT: THE : IRANIBN EXPERIENCT WITH CONSTITDTIONS ANC PARLIAMENT,

E EAS NOT BEEN A PAPPY ONE. THS 1906 CONSTITUTION WAS ONE OP THE YOST VENERABLE AND h 3 S T IGNORED COCUMFNTS IN THE MIDDL6 EAST. AN IBINIAN POT! CF THX PSE-EEZA SHAH ERA ONCE NEOTI IN FXASPERATIOK, ONF CAN ONLY DEFECATE ON SLCH A PAELIAMSNT.

e. MITE THIS BACGG03ND I T I S PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE TFAT TSE PPCCEEDIdZS OF +FE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS "AV3 NOT EXCITED CSEAT INTJSEST, DESPITE THE FACT Ti'IT I T S I!ZCISIOYS & I L L BE CRUCIAL I N DETERWINING THT SHAPE OF A NEW GOVERNMZNT. SONE CONSIDIR TRT SNTIBX PROCEDURE A CRAPADE gHICE WILL COYPLSTE I T S WORr AND THEN BE IGNORED BY SOME lvJW DICTATOP. OTHTR MIDDLE-CLASS IRANIANS ARE WOR2IED EY TET DOCVYENT EMERGING. THRY SEE T B r KEk CONSTITUTION AS CONFIRMING THEIR WORST FEARS ThAT IPAN I S FACING A PTFIOD OF RXACTIONARY CLSRICAL B I #8288

NSNN VZCZC 27']

VZCZC m 00 ?.UEEC P U E K J C S R U E X J C S BUQMBI RUQMGU RUEHAD RLQKOD R U S B ~ D l U Q V R A RUSBLK RUQMEV RUDTC R U Q M M RUEHEO aUQMMT R U F N P S BUSNAAA DE PUOMSP f@288/83 2631437 Z h Y CCCCC ZZR 0 2 8 1 4 0 2 2 S F P 79 PM A M W B A S S Y TEEBAN T O R U E B C / S S C S T A T E VhSHDC I M M E D I A T E 3889 I N F O R U E K J C S / S E C D E P WASH DC R U E Y J C S / J C S V A S E DC RUQMBI/AVBVBASSY ABU D H A B I 0298 RUQHG@/AMEMBASST ANKARA 0283 R U S H A D h J S I N T BAGHDAD 0294 RUCMOD/AMEMBASSY DOEA 0269

J I D D A KABUL

EUQMKW/AMEMBASSY S U V A I T 0301 RUDQC/AMEMBASSY LONWN a409

3 R U Q V A M / A M E ~ B A ~ ~ Y - M A N A M A ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCW 0295 : RUQMMT/AUBk'BASST m S C A T 0186 ? RUPNPS/AMEMBASST PAFIS 0362

RUSNAAA/LiSCINCEUR V A I E I N G E N G E - - 1 t T O N ?F 1 D E N T I A L S E C T I O N ' R U L E ? H A T W I L L UNDO MANY 01 T E E

T H E I R C L A S S EAS ACBIRVED I N T R E - L A I N G E N ' BT #0288

HARD-WON S O C I A L G A I N S L A S T F I F T Y YBARS.

NNNN

Un11.d Sures olAmema Weshmomn. D C 2&%7

September 26,1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: State/NEA- Mr. Huohi 8. h u n d e ~

FROM: IcA/NEA - R T. Curryq'.c

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Communication &tween United States and Iran October 1979 - February 1980

Based on discussion# in lap office on September 7, ICA agrees that some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for communication between the United States and Iran in the public diplomacy area Is in order in the next four a five months.

k a &ding practice, we will try to encourage institutiond linkages, a ccncept of commuuication endwred on September 7. These linkage. will stress the two-way flow of relations. At t hb time i t must he recognized that their development depends on aeat ing an atmosphere of t n u t and respect. In initial stages, friendly and u n d u r t a d h g onwonone penonally developed ties u e essential. Tbrougb c a d p e r d rapport can be built carefully determined inntitutional linlugn which, in t w , can nurture further mutual relationships. Likely fie& for initiating or reestablishing contact include Iranolqy, the humanitiu, physical sciences, English teaching, .ad physical dumtion.

Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest farhim with currently limited, one-way - Iranirpr to the United States - programs, Is the work of the Fulbright Commission. The United States dould maintain its f h c i d capport of these operations 8s a well- established and core institutional link between private and public

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject to General Declaeaification Schedule of Executive Ordu 12065. Automatically Downgraded a t Two Y e u h t e rvab 8nd D e c b i f i e d m September 7.6, 1985.

educators ;ld kutituti- in both c w t r k r Mmilub, fudictnult p h d activities of the Amwican hutitute for 2r.ni.n Studin .baJd be fatered.

Within thi. general approach md responding to the recomm.Pd.timu of tbe Charge' and our Public-Affairs Officer, we will e u m h e tbe followiug venues for some restrained ini t ia t im wbkh may be considered if k8nian authorities make it c k u t h t w Marest in enhanced relationships ia reciprocated:

1. Propose visits to Iran by cuefully selected u h o l u and public figurer. Whenever possible, the &its +ill be privately uranged. hdividluk Add h e aedibility and relev~nce to premnt-day Iran.

2. Enccurage inritations to Iraahn ktUDic s c h h aad, poaalbly, Iranian religiarr figure* to the EejCa annivemary celebrations in the United Stat- Events during the vlsft should also hcluda limikr representatives Lom other Islamic wcietkr to rtrar the multi-aational nature of the Q~S~WUIC~S. Sponsorship should be privately uranged with the Hejira Anniversary Committee pla* a mdor role.

3. Discuu with private entities, such u the Johnua Foundation m unireraity-based semimars includiug the Eut-Weat Center, be- groups of kmiau rcholars to the United States to ccasklm non- controver8lu topics. Preferably the mmtbgs .bOUld be mu1tiaation.l P-bh field. w litmatme. eeative writing a, more p.~matic.IIy, library development 8nd lib? y science.

4. Work with a few cuefully selected foc~ipa shd4nt advisers md admissions officers at ~mircnities sophisticated in handling Shmic and k.nLr, StudOnts a) to assen during this period of change In Lam evolving needa and attitudes of kan1.n dudenu so u b) to look towud p h s f w a posstbk student conference or other type dialogue in the United Stater a t some future propi tw~. date.

5. l % p h r dLb h & 8 U c d ~ t l d bIS&tW take part in a arppat otha d d u t i o n ~ excbnge opra t iau tn h m k thM-unmtries, ouch u thorn of tbi- University of Nebraska at Omda in

- Pakintan, pooil$Uthe f w inviting I?- stlrhacr and academia to take p u t in aub m m b w jmojects wbkh f a t e intellectual uadsnt.ndin(( .nd on-gobg contact.

6. Cauider augmentation of current X C W S Eq@bb- t e a c w ud cultural InrtitutkuU poridcd t h t rdminttrutin claim8 for ,put draagss m d ~ t r a t i o o r 8m gl*.n cop, ix8nes by &MfM mthorlties.

7. Be r b t t to o p p a t d t i a to invite k.lrknr to take p u t in multi-regiond exchange p w a m s , particularly thae in m w m&

NOTE

The V O A p d i r m ~ pLvv to inomuc bodcast time to Inn in P c n i e by one bau a day about th twn of tJm new yeu. It wil l .bd a thirtyminut* mornjag ibor featuring new8 and new8-dat.d material lad 8o ulditiwd thirty minut- to tbe front md of the current --hour evening .bar. Tb extended $bow wil l provide prsater opportdty fa M p t h cowet-e rd nrlhlrd materid C p i d u r t i m nmrr ereat. in baa outside the politlcd sphere, a series on Iranian klamk studk. and Centera i the United States, .ed interviews ria Am4c.n scholar# and k d o & t s ud appropriate public IIgurw representing a wide spectrum of political and foreign policy viewpoints.

DISTRIBUTION:

D - The Acting Mractor ECA - Ms. Alice Ilchman MGT - Mr. James kb t te r ,

PGM - Mr. Huold Scbneidmur VOA - Mr. Peter Straw State/NEA - Mr. Peter Conrtable

\ State/NEA - Mr. H u u y Recht

IC '?IS OEPAETFiiE StATPEBNT AL'OOSZ 23. TAlDf REPORTEDLT. PPPSS TklAT hSS:L?S P1SCUSSIl;G RELATICNS 3ETVEIK

7'10 CJ:'WPFIES #Ire r A # C E . rAZD1 SAID RE WILL ALSO h k AMEEICAN PLlY TO L A N E COYEAT TOOOPS 1 1 T.1 : C P L F T O PEGPfDP S?AEILlT? IN TRL FtS lOU. SUCK A

CS, US SAID, WILL NOT IN-ART VAT W L P hhY OF Thr RECICM'S' COlILICTS .

COK!:P~T: TEilRAN PRFSS EAS BEPY POLLOfIN3 WITlI IWTLEWT !CLS ETlTEarKTS PT QSC OPYICIALS PE3ARff10 fOIMfiTIOV

r ~ F . 6 ~ 6 . T6?Bt BAS BEEL A BRLAT DYAI ETRE TliAT C S i INTENDS T 3 0! IAS I U C I E I ED

EAT ~ 1 1 I I l ~ T O i C V IN TEE GULF 1851, TFLT WE YA' TO fSUD IN FOPCtS TO LFZKINISTAW; AH3 TBbT US G C04SIDX91':: SbMi AC:ION LOAIYST OIL tIELDS


DE RUQMHR 10500 273".

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

0 3012552 SEP 79 ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC =DATE 3992

BT

C O N F ' I D E N T 1 ALTEHRAN10500

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CHRGE: STAT 9/30/79 APPRV: CHAROE:LBLAINOEN

DRFTD: P0L:EASWSIFT:OO

CLEAR: NONE

OISTR: POL 2 CHG CHRON

RF NEA/IRN FOR HENRY PRECHT

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE SEPT 24 BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. ACTION OFFICE CLAIMS NON-RECEIPT.

QUOTE


E.O. 12065: GDS 9/24/79 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) 0R.P

TAGS: IR, PORG,MASS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH YAZDI: GULF DISTRICT;

US PRESENCE IN PERSIAN GULF

REF: TEHRAN 10i83

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH YAZDI OCTOBER 3, WE SUGGEST SECRETARY VANCE RAISE QUESTION OF OUR ACCESS

TO COMMISSARY, GULF DISTRICT AND OTHER MILITARY PROPERTIES

SUCH AS MOTOR POOL AND ARMY COMMUNICATION COMMMAND

(ACOM) FACILITY.

3. FOLLOWING DEATH OF AYATOLLA TALEGHANI, THE TALEGHANI COMMITTEE FORMERLY CONTROLLED COMMISSARY IS TURNING

OVER CONTROL OF COMMISSARY AND OTHER PROPERTIES

(BOTH US AND IRANIAN) EITHER TO OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINTSTER OR TO ARMY. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHO ACTUALLY

CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT. WE HOPE THAT COMMISSARY AND THE GULF DISTRICT MAY END UP IN HANDS

OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. IF SO, YAZDI WOULD BE IN

A POSITION TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY AND GULF DISTRICT. WHILE YAZDI HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIVE TO

OUR APPROACHES IN THE PAST, WE THINK IT NOW MIGHT BE

WORTH ANOTHER TRY.

4. IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT AUGUST 23, YAZDI REPORTEDLY TOLD PRESS THAT " BESIDES DISCUSSING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH VANCE, YAZDI SAID HE WILL ALSO DISCUSS AN AMERICAN PLAN TO LAND COMBAT TROOPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE REGION, SUCH A MOVE BY THE US, HE SAID, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY HELP DEFUSE ANY OF THE REGION'S CONFLICTS.11

5. COMMENT: TEHRAN PRESS HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITH INTEREST VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS REGARDING FORMATION OF RAPID REACTION FORCES. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION HERE THAT USG INTENDS TO 04 HAS ICREASED ITS COMBAT MARINE FORCES IN THE GULF AREA; THAT WE MAY INTEND TO SEND IN FORCES TO AFGHANISTAN; AND THAT US MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SOME ACTION AGAINST OIL FIELDS IN MIDDLE EAST. LATEST VERSION OF THIS IS KAYHAN STORY AUGUST 24 QUOTING KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UAE MODARESSI THAT FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND US TROOPS ' ARE STATIONED IN JUFAIR BASE IN BAHRAIN. IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF SECRETARY COULD DISCUSS WITH YAZDI DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF SO HE WILL HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTION IN THE AREA,CHARGE TOOK OPPORTUNITY DURING CALL ON MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINISTER MINACHI TODAY TO DESCRIBE PRESS REPORT OF U.S. TROOPS IN BAHRAIN AS TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND UNHELPFUL TO ATMOSPHERE AFFECT ING US RAN RELATIONSHIP. LAINGEN UNQUOTE. LAINGEN BT #0500

NNNN


Dee PaDily, It'. F r i L y aft.noon, )he 1 1 0 8 l d Sunday, and eP the f i m t dny e l nw tam

day woeknd. 11. (ping t e p1.j t.1.i. with the I t a l i u A ~ b u r s d u i n 8 few a*. We t a w 0 . u 6G or 70 %bas-iem here, a p o i mumbar ccmpilred to Wta. Sbviot e o l 1 . y ~ . i e n veky memior Soviet d i p l u t , refleoting rtke importance they attach k tbi@ plm. I have not cmllad on hi. yet, iniMe he wan g..o a &ood doal of the -... bot I u k d to make a courtesy c d l on him the ether aad was told... c a l l again im on* wad~ab time, the Ambassador i a ill.. sounds lib a diplomatic i l lness to me81

J The place where the action i s these day9 i n N Elb8s.l is the C n m l u sbet*a... thd vier issuing place. ~9f.1-o the Revolution the consular section was l e o a t d im a oop8mta bui-diag in another part of toke. EP$n then it w ~ s bysy, siace the student flw t o the a USA ha8 always been heavy. %Ut tha t buildin# was dm& during the m v e l u t i e ~ and eo wo clo ed down eur c o n a a l d ao t iv i t id . off icial ly except fo r s.lrgev requiracmtsi Ve told the govoruent here that u n t i l we had suff icient personnel back hero of our m, u.rtil we had t ine to rebuild en efPieo faoi l i ty , and...-bet important... u@i l tho gaveras?nt could .ssu,a eur secl(Sity ip the coap.un&, we# wore not going to mopenf. That s i k u t i c n cantirued unt i l a week a gm, who8 we f ina l ly fiWshed work on 8 d w u d vrry modern rudgf io ien t visa issuing facility... l i k e a b a d , with r..r ef o f f i e i n bmhind bu l le t glass. 1180 we f i u l l y o o n ~ m a d tho gw-t h e n tha t thy bad t o "8- 20-25 police t8 control the o r d s , u d that they f-4 did.

Se wo roopn- a week y, t o rid about 3000 poplo 4-w tho atxwot8 aatold* a d c1uori .g for visa.- especially students, B u y of them marrhr m i o w to got tLem ti. i n ti.. f o r f a l l c d s s classes u d ...J, m a w mbro 8f them simp4 8ppIJh# Sor 8 s

- t o t ry t e gain entry into oome soh001 which they claimad to ua - ;am grr@ t o them. of these students, however, hare such lw grade8 p.d moh limitad mob tht we su8pect th8ir.re.l Furpore i s aimply to get to the US and 8 w a u wad-be irigub

So our refumal ra te i a high... UP t o for ty poment. We n w ha.). 8 . m o f f i o q , 1ncludi.q two wives, irtFrm one of whss you've .rdrr sat, Pevne, who sit k h h d tke i r bul ls t proof P a m a d ~ntorview applieadte a l l day long. A Marine help. contr.1 t h i y r irside, ale* bebind thick bullet proof glass, u d a11 sor t s of e lectr io brunen o p m t . tno eng.m l a d exit.. A oomputer bank, linked t o f i l e 8 1n P u i e , is zrn%x a d l a b l o ; to c ~ e c ~ % ~ l i ~ ~ t # t ~ 68temino whetlor ha's been turred d o n -re before. f

EutAeutoide i s a mesa. The #s police are get t ing bet ter a t o r c d cmtrb l , grrduUXyl I but h moot days It we simply haw to close d m beasuse no order or l n o o w bo ,

oaintahed. Tke plaoe has become &*st a touris t a t t r a c t i n in thie city, s i d d v nclrrs h=ve s e t up shep, u d we suspect that tho A-Ya police m invelrod in all -a r t s fa of petty bribery in a s s u r i q pepplo of ~ l d h u 8 n 8 . s ~ prof0u.d p&oo8 h the limos. So far, fortunately, t h e n ' s beem no reriou8 riolencc, u d mo &kid baa b-en threaten+d i n ply way. But we worry 8 b i t about that , o.p.cially the r ia U reac t im of ama 80rt from tho8e who a n tuxmod d m . Honce the bullet m e f r h m m iuU.l - - a d thm pbiice ~ u t s i a ~ .

Why the mumberm?.. . p o d qW.tir. Partl). tho e o n t i m u t i n 8f a pt-... A] - :-.>*la have been the preferred elace fo r highbr education of P*rsim student8 9r.r 8 i ~ o v d l d W - r 11. part& too of courlb 138 aimply tho dosire t o get out of ~ r o l u t l n l d y Iran, not the most plenaant place theso day8 for tho seau lu , wostsnisod Iruiu... sere t h d h r l t of tho Crowds eutside are ~ o t u d o n t s , thoso Iruius ~ e t +n 1migra.t vim. glfan the .mall n u b - r of those n w available u d who w a m t t o go the US em "viait' but who really intbud to stay.

I dem't mean to imply that a11 thi8 i e bad. It is f a I r u V 8 thW,beouuf it u .9 r t s t o 8 torriblo brain h i m . But fo r U 8 it i 8 u d d ~ d 01-t im .rp bi la te ra l relationship with thi8 cbuntry... a kuu l ink that dh .d*8 m u Lp.rtut atremuth a t the grass root8 to UsdarstanUng. Am& yet tho p i e h that a l l this p r o m - i s a b i t o f a puadox... we a n not the most poplar people im Iru theso &ye) w - obrioum and toe supportive of a d i l l i k d r y i m e undw the shU. So mr our Mode hem cautioum about being seen 6.0 cl8eb t o us... u d yet t k r n is thir pie* of hua&ed8 p.d sometime8 thm8ud8 of I r a n i u 8 out8ide ~u r ETba88y emh w, .shl obrioum 'dospusto t o get to the Unit.d Stat081

Tho worther i 8 loroly here n w l we had a d u a t i y of n o u n tko u p i f l e n t a- wul ta in r l ~ y c behimd t ~ u a i ty l a a t week. u d t h m i r a t x c h of id1 im * rir d m i n the city. Tko oky i 8 blue, tho oelebrated Por+iu b l w of th i s e u a weather, mad we try to p t out int* tho m&Ms8 on hikoo ud pimica doing that trmorrw, ef which 1'11 w r i t * in r y noxt lsttrr.l....

116

hluu, Iru

mlu Emily, lu AP t i h r it;r i m mi* twt.

nurw tkt tb A&fi ia t reUu h u d - i m t a uma IAhsam u A ~ b U d n te Irn. 88 tlw tal-a i a r i m g w n d 11. w i a g it, tk m~ tht id ~ ~ 8 u . a te b.Lw 8. IkoimiU b U mt k.r 8*n l dl fl'N l m m W i t * EM) h m-pli*,

w 8-t tk rmp.rt. ykn I rrU thrm vu ma h i m t a it, te q b w l d g o , .h.

q n t . B*v nba hd ?an*. rw i. s . b m y r ) l r u d I f n w t t a u k . I Ud a& tkor tr ratan tln p e w whioh I hop #ha did.

I thimk you all h w tha t 1 haw wry mixad f a a l i . 0 a h t fL* po*ribi;if mf .O kty 4 h m u hbrsadar . . .. b e u u a af the f d l y aaP . rAat ia iarmlvd. I liJ q.Ur h a 7 4 it wm't h p p n , a t th .un tino u I m i m a tha t I u a

P r o r i d a t rut ma t a servo. I m a t k r wrb I 'm di8cipli.Y. n 8ubJaot te diroiplfie... d a t tk m t k I 'm a Y. Vk Uvom h i s f u i l y u d m i n * . t h u terr ibly r-t ~ l , aapocimlly taml(lit with -8 r\1..r u a u d . Bvem1mp rrr Lud, awm vith th r n n d ef Bat iorr l r eo~pt i .u t holp l l i ' L I 1 e ' ~ e a ~ y m i d a f f tle aaplr.tim. Dyfiw h tel-bl., baomma r & buy r-.m tun i r RI* t. r. n -tkr im g l n i ? tho- 1J1 w, ly afhr day d perfect Idiu -, ud that h e l p YL. thi* p l ~ . M b l e . ant nt .uulL. I d n * t lilu tb W l y r i t u r t i r ~ " r g m t t a mpalf i m t a ..1 I +a.t m i d uJiy ma. I f I L.l it te do .m .(.i. ....

Wt X a r u * m utirrl dy.... a-eaptia ia a u ~ i f i o m t a p r a v l i y ydn r i t b a full na mrhod.. . Komu b p i t 8 l i t . J i a lilu tha t af Jupu.. . g.oiau8 e d

d e l i u t e , tb wra ia k m t i h r l K a n u u t id h a s af mait b i l l w i ~ 01.- il put01 ca lm. . . *rery..e date- te uL. y- o d a k b l * a t wa+r turn. But M a t i d D.j. are buiy muathalama... the a u c pomplb, the m u m rmad of ruman t a a h , tb m a n f a d fraqueatly, t h e th E m u . . . l ike the Chiawa m a r l i e r t h i s w k . . .ia U f f . r r t d de1ici .u~. Our n l a t i a s with Sema kiy p u t i o d b 4 c l a a a , ~ got a 8pooi.l r1+

I've had a bod prosa looally thin m*k, t h u k r t e a o m m a n a t i n I had a f w (y. h o k with the Mimister af Imeriar. I omlled am hi. i m what ur m a l l a c m u r k q c a l l i , '

t k i r buminesr... That ia,I had mat ut n talke d vi th him k f a n u d I u k t e d t a beorwe I Lw trid t a c a l l am a l l the Mimirtan. Va had am L.u ta&ethm, a c c m n r u t i a fi R r a i u with 3ae of ay you& effioera d e n & fa t r u a l e t a . It w e 8 a11 vary f r i n d l y mad courtewr sad I Yd a* n u r m t a think that a f t e r I t a d l e f t Che ~ ~ m h t a r w d d -11 j m tho l a d prers end t a l l t h p l that I had e r e ir t a protest tha a e c t t i e n s reccstly af three elderly f a a e r s a u t a f a r k i a g "taghrut*, whiob maarm carrupt r e n u t s af the Shah'm rogiae. I m f ac t I had ~ l t i ~ m d theme axrcutiama as the kimd af actiaa that the m g ) ~ t&aa that & i n s it u a.p.cia1ly b d i l ~ . i m tba DG,ud I thaugbt the Mialrter ahould ~ B O V tht. f msid I taek ma panitiom on the ,@lc a r i8macmoa af tho80 three n m , or of u y mf the etkar 500 a r 8. atharm w b hare k u a n u u i l y exccutllrd ' here, but t h a t he ahmuid how that the ~ n n o r y mature af the t r i a l 8 oad the quick a- d u - c u t i r s did o u a a plblic apiniam i m my cauhtry t a wmdar whether th i s m & k was lval lg u y differeat frm thet i f the Shh. Uerewer I hew I n l u u r r e l i & i n l f atrcy u d capumiom asd I did mat rae evideaca af the t vhem 81 y o u cld farmer Seu ta rn were l i n d up u d ahat rt twa i m tL. -+A&

I abviau*ly tauchad r m e m with thkr. Far thia a r whatever n a s d the Uimimter went public with thin u d th i r cauaad the C.rt. 8 ok-rum t a accuse me of "undue - meddling" (1 wemaor what "duo" mdd'ing weuld be!J.ACally th i s b0si~tsm about the axecutimr w e 8 omly ane ~ T a f a long camrt.raatimm which was, I theught, a rutual a f f a r t through d-elmy. t a L.lr facur om v(ys t a build a bat ter ralat ia ishlp. The next diy a mawspaper clasa t a K r e i a i damnucad w in the r e s t v i t r i a l i o texas, call-mg me 8 pem, a v i sohu prm f a r the CIA, pre8idl.g aver an Fhbasey f u l l ef expic~8gc we&, -3. w i t * hadm bloodied f r a H i n r b i u , Via tau u d Cad knwa vhat el*.. I t could mat b r a ham wma. It wra r e bmd that I think amst n d e n f e l t np~pathy fa r ma, u d I W. .IILr ma doubt that my m faelingo about these ex-dt icna are ahrted widely u c y I r u L u a . But w ere # t i l l i m the midue af r great deal af reralutlamuy f e m z h e n u d m dm meqd t a walk a careful liae... t a d y the oludastime Sorir t r a d i o OYr: tha t braadout8 fraa 8.ku t a I ru lu the f u l l t e i t af the maaty a d i U r i a 1 and prawedad te duanuca n i m tbir m word.. That'r akw; I daa't d a d mch whet the ;wi e t a k v a

l aubJact. I u matiafiad havain& thLt what I raid war right.

117

DB aupnaa #m97/8i 277 ** ZNT CCCCC Z Z B CLASS : C O N F I D E N T I A L P 0 4 1 3 1 1 Z OCT 79 CHRGE: S T A T 18/4/79 Ff4 M I V B A S S T TEHRAN APPBV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN T O $UI;HC/SECSTATE WASHDC P R I O R I T I 40W PRFTD: P O L ~ M J . L ( E T R I N K O : O ~ I W M RVICIIJCS/SECCEP VASE M: C L E A R r P 0 L : E A S V I F T RUICJCS/JCS WASH DC DISTR: POL^ CHG ICA RUQMBI /AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 031 1 ECON CONS CHRON RUQMGU/AMErBASSY ANTARA 0300 R P R U E H A D / U S I N T BAGHDAD 0303 S Y- RUOMOD/AMEMBASST DOHA 0282 BUSBQD/AMBMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8348 RUQMRA/AMEUBASSY J I C D A 0350 RUSBLK/AMBMBASST KABUL 8352 RWQMKW/AMEMBASST KUWAIT 8314 BIIDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0422 R U Q H ~ ~ / A M ~ B A S S T MANAMA 0279 ~ o r a n o / ~ n r n ~ n s s r noscow 0311 RUQMMT/AMBMBASSY MUSCAT 0192 aniw~s/mmsllss~ PARIS 0381

.RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE : B T . C 0 N 1 I C E N T I A L S E C T I O N 01 O F TEHRAN 10697

E.O. 12865: G C S 18/4/55 ( S W I F T , E L I Z A B E T H A. ) OR-P I TAGS: SHUM, I R , P I N S , P I N T

S U B J E C T : WEEKLY P O L I T I C A L ROUNDUP z ~

$ I. (C - E N T I R E T E X T ) . i: : 2. SUMMARY: A GROWING NUMBER O P DEMONSTRATIONS AND

P R O T E S T S BY T H E UNEMPLOYED HAS SWEPT IRAN I N T H E L A S T :TWO WEEXS, AND T H E S E R I O U S NATURE O F THE P R O T E S T S MAT . B E T H B H A J O B REASON FOR A R E P O R T E D BAN ON UNAUTHORIZED

P R O T E S T S AND GATBERINGS. ACTS O F T E R R O R I S M AND SABOTAGE ALSO C O N T I N U E WITH KHUZESTAN AND T E E KURDISH ABEAS B E I N G THE M A ~ N AREAS O F U N R P S T . THE C I T Y O F MASHAC BAS V I T N B j S E D TWO RECENT A S S A S S I N A T I O N S . BOTH V I C T I Y S B E I N G CLERGYMEN. I N S I S T A N AND BALUCHISTAN. A S E C U R I T Y PROBLEM BETWEEN T R I B g S P E O P L f AND GOVERNMENT P O R C T S SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN D E F U S E D B T T R I B A L LEADERS AND T H F LOCAL GOVERNOR GENERAL. ACROSS THX COUNTRK T H E R E I S A GROWINC. E F F O R T BT C I T I E S T O B R I N G UNRULY COMMITTEES UNDER CONTROL. END SVY'IARY. 3. THE I R A N I A N P O L I T I C A L S C E N C E HAS BEEN DOMINATED DURING T B E P A S T WEEK BY MAJOR C A B I N E T R E S H U F F L I N G , T E E CONTINUATION O F THE ASSEMBLY O P E X P E R T S WORC ON A NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N , AND THE APPARENTLY QO?l I N S P I R E D C R I T I C I S M O F NATIONAL I R A N I A N O I L CO. HEAD RASSAN N A Z I 3 WHICH RESULTED I N H I S T E P A S T U R E FROM THE NIOC AND D I S A P P E A R A N C E , RUMORS S A T P E R B A P S T 3 P A R I S .

4. A C C O R D I N G T O DEP P P I M H I N T A B A T A B A I , THE GOVERNMENT U S BANNED A1.L UNAUTHORI Z E C R A L L I E S , CEMONSTRATIONS , GATHERINGS AND MARCBES Y I T B A WABNING THAT T H O S E WBO P E R S T I N T B E S E P R O T E S T S W I L L 9 E DEALT W I T H AARSFLY. I B E 1 5 PROBABLY A R E S U L T O F T H E 1ROWTN3 C D N P L A I I I I AND MONSTRATIONS FROM THE RANKS O F T F E UNEMPLOYEr

C O N l I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10697/1

B E I N G S E E N ACROSS I E A N . ONE O F T H E MOST T E L L I N G INDICATIONS OF THE s n r a r n OF rat Paoamn WAS THE sIzr O F A CROWD Y E I C H JAMMED THE AREA NEAR TEERAN'S IRAN A I R O F F I C E S ON SEPTEMBER 23. P A R S NEVS S E R V I C E C L A I M E D THAT "THOUSANDS" O F P E O P L E CAUSEC A MAJOR T R A n I C S N A R L , N E C E S S I T A T I N G T E E U S E O F P O L I C E CARS AND B E L I C O P T E R S TO D I S P E R S E TEE CROWD. T H E THRONG BAD GATHERED AROUND T H E IRAN A I R B U I L D I N G T O A P P L Y FOR T E E TWENTY A I R STEWARD J O B S A D V E R T I S E D AS VACANT BY T H E NATIONAL A I R L I N E S . I N T H E C A S P I A N COAST TOWN O F BABOL. T E R E t H U N D R t D R E C W T L T GRADUATED TEACHERS ENGAGED I N A S I T - I N A T TAZ C I T Y ' S EDUCATION DEPARTMENT T O DEUAND JOBS AND A S I M I L A R I N C I D E N T O c c u R R E D I N T H E NEARBY C I ~ Y or S A R I . A T NOUSHAHR AND LANGRUD, 1200 B I G H SCHOOL GBADUATES DEMON- S T R A T E D TO ATTRACT A T T E N T I O N T O T H E I R LACK 01 J O B S , A S D I D 200 XI-STUDENTS A T BABAK (NEAR KERMAN). ONE HUNDRED F I t T T H I G E SCHOOL GRAGUA?ES AT S I T A R K A L G A T B E R I D I N FRONT O F T H E EDUCATION O F F I C E . D I S M I S S E D T E E B U I L D I N G S S T A F F AYD BEGAN A S I T - I N FOR TW SAME R t A S O N S . ON SZPT HS ~ H U N D R E D S ~ O I UNEMPLOTED YOUTHS OATHERED IN PRONT O F T H E P R I M E M I N I S T W T O DRAY A T T E N T I O N T O T H E P L I G H T O F J O B L E S S RECENT GRADUATES, A GROUP THEY E S T I M A T E AS 218,008 STRONG. ANOTHER CROWD O F 350 DEMONSTRATEf A T T H E M I N I S T R Y O F LABOR ON S E P T E M B E R 26. T H E DEYONSTBATIONS A T THE P R I M E M I N I S T R Y C O N T I N U E D DURING THE V E M , GROWING T O A CROWD E S T I M A T E D A S 1200, AND R E S U L T I N G I N T H t REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS D I S P E R S I N G T H E CROWD U I T E S H O T S I N T H E A I R AND T H E M L P I S T O F S I X DEMONSTRATORS ON OCTOBER 1. DEMONSTRATIONS AT T H E P R I M E M I N I S T R Y BECAME TENSE. REPORTEDLT SOUE O F T H E DEMONSTRATORS V E R B SHOUTING "DOWN W I T H K H O W I N I . W I T H V A C A N C I E S M I N I M A L I N P R I V A T E INDUSTRY, W I T H T H E I R A N I A N U N I V E R S I T Y SYSTEM ABLE TO ABSORB ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE O F A P P L I C A N T S F O R H I G H Z R EDUCATION. AND V I T H M I L I T A R Y S E R V I C E PROCEDURES S T I L L B E I N G S O U W H A T CONFUSED. THERZ S E E U S T O B E NO Q U I C S S O L U T I O N FOR T H E UNEMPLOYMENT P R O B L t M .

5. THE SLOW BUT STEADY ATTXUPT BY C I T I E S ACROSS IRAN E I T H E R T O D I S S O L V E T H E C O M P L I C A T E D COMMITTEE STRUCTURES OR T O MERGE THEM I N T O P O L I C E OR REVOLUTIONART GUARD

NNNN

TEHRAN

O I O A N I Z I T I O N S BAS W T WITH VARYING DEGREES 01 S U C C E S S . WIIllO T E E MONTHS S I N C E THE P L Y O L U T I O N l THE COMMITTEE S?ST# BAS COUP I N 101 A GRPAT DEAL O F C R I T I C I S R , WITH C O M I T T S E BANDS B E I N G POPULAPLY ACCUSED O F C R I M E S RANGING non ram TO zoarwa TO ILLEGAL ARRESTS. ON SEPT 11. KHOMEINI O R D E R b REVOLUTIONARI ORGANIZATIONS NOT T O ACT ON T H E I R OWN I N GOVERNMELT A T I A I B S . SOME EXAMPLES HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY, E S P E C I A L L Y I N T A B R I Z 01 COMMITTEE M U B I B S B E I N G ARRESTED AND T R I E D PO11 ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTS. I N TEHRAN, ATATOLLAX MOHAMMSD R E Z A MAHDAVI-KANI, NAFIONAL DIRECTOR O r IRAN'S U V O L U T I O N A R T COMMITTEES, HAS ANNOIIIICED THAT A L L O F TEHRAN'S REVOLUTIONABY SUB- C O M M I T T E D ARE D I S S O L V E D . AT P R E S E N T , TEHRAN HAS A REVOLUTIONARI connIrrrr FOR r A c a or ITS 14 D I ~ T R I C T S , AND ONE E T I M A T E O F T E E SUB-CORMITTEES HAS BEFN G I V E N AS 1,280. ACCORDING TO MAKDAVI-KANI, THE YEMBERSHIP O P T B E 14 D I S T R I C T COMMITTEES W I i L B E S T R I C T L Y CONTROLLEE. AND ANYONE WITH A QUESTIONABLE RECORD WILL B E P J R G E D . 6. ACTS O F SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM CONTINUED THROUZHOUT T H E COUNTRY L A T E SEPTEMBER AND EARL^ CCTOBER. SEVERAL

. S H O P S WERE DAMAGED WHEN AN E X P L O S I O N SHOOX THE BAZAAR ! A? KHOBPAMSHMR, ALTEOUGH NO I N J U R I E S HAVE BEEN REPORTED. . " A 70 METER COMMUNICATIONS TOYER ON T H E iHORRAUjHA!IR-A9YIZ ;ROAD WAS BLOWN U P ON S E P T E U B E R 31, AND COMMUNICATIONS - U I N I S T E R HASSAN ESLAMI CLAIMED THE L X P L O S I O N YAS CAUSED :BY A T I n r BOPB. THE TOWER PELL ACROSS A N ADJACENT RELAY L S T A T I O N , DAMAGING THAT B U I L I I N G . AND CAi lSING A CUT O F F ; I N COMMUNICATIONS EETWEEN T H E MAIN C I T I E S O F THE O I L f P R O V I N C E AND T H E R E S T 01 IRAN. ON SEPTEMBER 38 ANOTKER : E X P L O S I O N OCCURRED NEAR T H E KEORRAMSHAHR GOVERNOR'S

O I F I C E . NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. AT LEAST E I G H T . P E O P L E WFgE K I L L E D AND 17 I N J U R E D ON OCTOBER 3 #HEN A ! BOMB EXPLODED ON THE TEERAN-KHORRAMSHAXR T P A I N . T E E R T I S PSTILL NO I N C I C A T I O N VBO S E T OF? THE BOMB. " I N TXERAN A F I R E BROKE O U T A T T E E AFGHAN EWBASSP ON

SEPTEMBER 23. AN EMBASSY SPOXESMAN CLAIMED THE BLAZE WAS CAUSED BY A B S O N I S T S . DAMAGE WAS APPARENTLY L I M I T E R T C T H E GUARDS CABIN AT THE E H B A S S I . ANOTHER DXPLOSION, PERHAPS FROM A GRENADE, TOOX P L A C E O U T S I D E T E E S A U D I ARABIAN W B A S S I ON S E P T E H B E R 24 DURING THE O F F I C I A L CELEBRATION BEING HELD TO YART SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL DAY. TWO A S S A S S I N A T I O N S HAVE TAKEN PLACE I N MASHAD, BOTH INVOLVING LOCAL CLERGYMEN. HAJ MOSHALLAH HOMAI WAS GUNNED DOVN L A T E I N THE EVENING ON SEPTEMBER 22. A NEWSPAPER REPORT CLAIMED THAT T H E CLERGYMAN HAD S E E N A SUPPORTER O F T H E SHAH. A SECOND CLERSYMtN WAS A S S A S S I N A T E D I N MASHAD ON OCTOBER 1. S E T T E D ADMAD AHMADI WAS SHOT T O DEATH ON T H E COORSTEP O T H I S OYN HOUSE,AND RUMORS C I R C U L A T I N G I N MASHAD CLAIM THE DEATR WAS P A R T O F A PLOT T O L I Q U I D A T E 21 PROMINENT P E R S C N A L I - T I D I N THE C I T Y .

7 . T E E ETHNIC KURCISH AREAS HAVE ALSO BAD A F A I R SHARE O F UNREST DURING THE P A S T FEW DAYS. ON OCTOBER 3 E I G H " B U I L D I N G S I N NAQADEH. I N C L U D I N G T H E TOWNS WATER S U P P L Y , T E E GENDARMERIE HEADQUARTERS AND P R I V A T F HOMES

AMAGED I N A GRENADE ATTACK. S P O R A D I C VIOLENCE T OTHER KURDISH TOWNS TOO, AND CLASHPS AND I N C I I L V T S

C O N P I D E N T I A L TI

129

HAVE BEEN PEPOBTXD I N SAEDASHT, BANLH. S A Q W Z , IIAEAMD, AND ~ U U I T E E f a r z r I r n e ) . rr ~ A N A N D A J TXE uousr or A REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSIIAN VAS WRECKED BY AN ZIPLOSION ON OCTOBER 1. ON OCTOBER 2 A GROUP OF 24 n E V o L m I o N A n r

' GUABDSUEN WERE AHBUSHED I N SAPDASH? RESULTIN6 I N I I V E 0 I TEE GUARDS BLING KILLED, EIGHT VOUNDD AND THE BEST BEING CAPTURED.

8. THE BALUCHISTAN BIIOION BAS ALSO SEEN RECENT ONBEST. ON SEPT 28 WNCBEDS O t ZAHIDAN IISSIDINTS SUF'POPTBD BY PSOPLP FROM KHASH AND IRAN S U E R DWONSTBATED A3AINST THE NEV IRANIAN CONSTITUTION AIITICLES W I C B STATE THAT THE OFOICIAL RELIGION 01 IRAN I S TEE JA'AIAEI SECT 01 S H I I T E ISLAM. BALUCHISTAN I S A PRBDOIIINANTLT SUNNI AREA. U N C O N P I P ~ D nunons OF BESTLESSNESS HAVE BEEN FREQUENT FROM THE REGION, BUT THEBE HAS BLlN LITTLE 8 T

NNNN C O N I I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10697N

COVERAGE I N T H E I R A N I A N P R E S S . THE GOVERNOR GENERAL O P S I S T A N AND BALUCHISTAN, DR. H A R I R 1 , P A I D A RECENT V I S I T T O QOM TO R E P O R T ON C O N D I T I O N S I N H I S P R O V I N C E . C L A I M I N G THAT THE R E G I O N I S UNDER CONTROL. S O t l E TROUBLE HAD OCCURRBD IN THE LASHAR AREA YAERE TRIBESMEN ATTACKED TWO GENDARMERIE P O S T S AND DISARMED THE S E C U R I T Y YORCES T H E R E . LEGOTIATIONS V I T A T R I B A L LEADERS R E S U L T E D I N A PARDON ?OR T H O S E ACCUSED O F A T T A C F I N G T H E GENDAEHERIE P O S T S , AND H A R I R I CLAIMS THAT THE T R I B E S P E O P L E V I L L SURRENDER T H E I R WEAPONS. L A I N G E N R I

NNNN C O N F I D E N T I A L TEERAN 10697/1

DE RUQMHR 10752/01 280**

ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 0713472 OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4122

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC

RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC

RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0315

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0303

RUEHADDSINT BAGHDAD 0308 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0286

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0353

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0354

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0355 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0318

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0428

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA C283

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0315

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0196

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0386

RUSNAAA/USClNCEUR VAIHINGEN GE BT

CLASS:CONFIDENTIAL

CHRGE: STAT 10/7/79 APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN

DRFTD: POL: JL1NBERT:GO

CLEAR: POL: EASWIFT

DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA

E C O N ~ ( I CHRON

RF

C 0 N F I D E N T A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10752

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/7/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, PINR, IR

SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY MASHHAD

REF: TEHRAN 10151

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) . 2. SUMMARY: POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN MASHHAD, CAPITAL OF NORTHEASTERN PROVINCE OF KHORASAN. CITY WAS IN FESTIVE MOOD AND FILLED WITH VISITORS ON

OCCASION OF BIRTHDAY OF EIGHTH IMAM. MASHHAD CONTINUE

T?P TRADITION OF GOING ITS OWN WAY OUTSIDE OF THE MAIN-

rTlEAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI

HAS ESTABLISHED HIS AUTHORITY THOUGH A DELEGATE WHO

WERSHADOWS BOTH THE CIVIL GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE TWO NFLUENTIAL LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO RAN THE CITY FOR IrE MONTH BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVE COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL OVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN JANUARY 1979 AND THE REVbLUTION

P FEBRUARY. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CONDITIONS T MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO LEADING MASHHAD

ELI'GIOUS FIGTJRE. END SUMMARY. 123

3. EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN WASHHAD

THE CAPITAL OF KHORASAN PROVINCE AND THE SITE OF THE

SHRINE OF IMAM REZA. EIGHTH IMAM OF THE SHI'A MUSLIMS. OFFICER HAD NOT VISITED MASHHAD IN EIGHT YEARS AND DURING

HIS VISIT HE CALLED ON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ON

AYATOLLAH HAJ HASAN TABATABA'I-QOMI, ONE OF SENIOR . RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE PROVINCE. FOLLOWING ARE

IMPRESSIONS GAINED FROM THE VISIT. - HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

4. MASHHAD HAS TRADITIONALLY FOLLOWED A PATH INDEPENDENT OF THE MAINSTREAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. THE

REASONS FOR THIS INDEPENDENCE ARE OBSCURE, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY BE RELATED TOTHE CITY'S GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION TEHRAN

IS 600 MILES WEST AND THE ROADS BEYOND MASHHAD GO NOWHERE,

THEY SAY). HISTORICALLY THE CITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN MORE CLOSELY LINKED TO CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN THAN TO

THE CENTRAL PERSIAN HEARTLAND. FOR WHATEVER REASONS,

THE CITY'S ROLE IN THE MAJOR POLITICAL UPHEVALS OF THE

PAST DECADES--THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS AFTER WORLD WAR 11, THE MOSSADEGH PERIOD, AND

THE RECENT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION--HAS BEEN PERIPHERAL. THIS CHARACTER OF THE CITY EXISTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT

MASHHAD IS A CERNTER OF PILGRIMAGE, FOR ALL SHIA MUSLIMS.

IS ONE OF THE FIVE LARGEST CITIES IN IRAN, AND IS THE

CENTER OF ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL

AREAS.

5. MASHHAD HAD REMAINED RELATIVELY FREE OF THE DISTURB-

ANCES WHICH COVERED SO MUCH OF IRAN THROUGHOUT LATE 1978. THE INHABITANTS' HOPE FOR PEACE WERE SHATTERED IN EARLY JANUARY,lo79,HOWEVER ,WHEN FOUR DAYS OF FIGHTING LEFT

ABOUT 2,000 PERSONS DEAD. ACCORDING TO LOCAL SOURCES,

AT THAT TIlilF THE ARMY WENT ON A RAMPAGE, ATTACKING A

t'OcPITAL AND SHOOTING INDISCRIMATELY AT ANYONE IN THE ST17ETS. FOLLOWING THAT FIGHTING, VANY OF THE SOLDIERS

FLFD THEIR BARRACKS, AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITY MELllED AWAY. THE FARMANDAR (TOWN GOVERNOR) JOINED THE

REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE OSTANDER AND OTHER CENTRAL

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES LFFT THE CITY. FRON EARLY

JANUARY UNTIL THF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION, EFFECTIVF AUTHORITY WAS IN THE HANDS OF AYATOLLAH HAJ HASAN TABATAAA'I-OOMI

AND AYATOLLAH SAYYID ABWLLAH SHIRAZI, WHO RAN THF AFFAIR?

OF THE CITY PROM THEIR HOMFS AND SCHOOLS. IT WAS AYATOLLAH SHIRAZI, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO FORBADE THE PFOPLE FROM ATTACK-

ING FOREIGNERS. THE FOREICH COMMUNITY LEFT MASHHAD AROUND JANUARY 7 AND TRAVFGED OVERLAND TO HEART.

6. DOLLOWING THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN

WFPQUARY 1979, THF TWO AYATOLLAPS OF MASHHAD LOST

M1'CP OF Tt'FIR POLITICAL POWER TO SHEIKH TARASI, AYATOLLAH m-

u--<:

':Nn ':


KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN MASHHAD. TABAST WAS AN OBSCURE CLERGYMAN BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, BUT ASSISTED BY

KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY AND BY A SMALL GROUP OF RNOIJJTIONARY GUARDS, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO ASSERT HIS CONTROL OF THE CITY

TO THE POINT THAT HE NOW ORDERS ARRESTS,TRIALS, AND EXECUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND OTHER RE PRESENTATIVES OF THE

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY

TABASI . 7. A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT, LIBERAL MASHHAD FAMILY

EXPLAINED THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF THE TklO AYATOLLAHS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DURING KHOMEINI'S 15-YEAR EXILE FROM IRAN, THE

MASHHAD RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD BEEN FORCED TO M K E

ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES. AZIZI, THE LAST GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHORASAN UNDER THE MONARCHY, HAD

ESTABLISHED EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE MASHHAD RELIGIOUS

LEADERS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE NEW REGIME HAS NOT MOLESTED

HIM (AZIZI). HOWEVER, THE AYATOLLAHS HAD ALSO DEAL WITH EX-GOVERNOR GENERAL VALIAN, WHO IS ONE OF THE NEW REGIMJX'S

NUMBER ONE TARGETS. KHOMEINI'S THREATS TO REVEAL THESE

ASSOCIATIONS HAS PREVENTED THE MASHHAD AYAYTOLLAHS FROM

EFFECTIVELY OPPOSING HIS POLITICAL AUTHORITY.

- (B) DURING THE FIRST WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH TABATABAI-QOMI DID VOICE SOME OPPOSITION TO

THE PROCEDURES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. SPECIFICALLY,

THE AYATOLLAH NOTED THAT UNDER ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE THE ASSERTIONS OF A PLAINTIFF HAD TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE

TESTIMONY OF IMPARTIAL WITNESSES. HOWEVER, THE

REVLUTIONARY COURTS WERE USING THE KAINTIFFS AS WITNESSES

AGAINST THE ACCUSED. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCE, KHOMEINI SIMPLY IGNORED THESE OBJECTIONS AND "BLACKMAILED" THE AYATOLLAH'S INTO SILENCE BY THREATENING TO MAKE AN

ISSUE OF THEIR ASSOCIATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PAST

REGIME.

8. THE MASHHAD AYATOLLAHS HAVE REPORTEDLY ALSO BEEN

UNHAPPY AT THE CULT OF PERSONALITY WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT

UP AROUND KHOMEINI. THE RECENT AHNIVERSARY OF HIS TRAVELS

FROM IRAQ TO PARIS(0CT 5) WAS DESCRIBED ON THE STATE RADIO AND TELEVISION AS THE SECOND GREATEST HEJRAT

(MIGRATION) IN ISLAMIC HISTORY, SECOND ONLY TO THE TRAVEL

OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMAD FROM MECCA TO MEDIFIA. SUCH LANGUAGE VERGES ON HERESY FOR STRICT MUSLIMS. KHOMEINI

HAS ALSO ASSUMED THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT CLERICAL TITLES ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. TRADITIONALLY SUCH HONORIFICS

AS AYATOLLAH AND HOJJAT AL-ISLAM WERE NOT BESTOWED BY

ANY INDIVIDUAL BUT 'WERE GRANTED BY CONSENSUS OF THE

SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY WHEN A PERSON HAD REACHED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF LEARNING AND PIETY. KHOMEINI'S UNILATERALLY

BESTOWING THESE TITLES ON VARIOUS CLERGYMEN IS SEEN AS A

THREAT TO THE COLLEGIAL SYSTEM WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY

PREVAILED AMONG THE SHIA LEADERSHIP.

9. EMBASSY SOURCE SAID HE HAD VISITED AYATOLLAH QOMI AS

PART OF A DELEGATION . IN PRIVATE, THE AYATOLLAH TOLD ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS THAT KHOMEINI WAS ABLE TO " SIT UNDER AN APPLE TREE IN PARIS AND ISSUE EDICTS

W!ILE THOSE LEADERS ON THE SCENE HAD TO TRY AND ALLEVIATE

THE BLOODSHED AND SUFFERING OF THEIR FOLLOWERS. DURING

THE WORST OF THE FIGHTING IN MASHHAD, BODIES OF THE

VICTIMS WERE STORED IN AYATOLLAH QOMI'S HOUSE UNTIL THEY

COULD BE WASHED AND BURIED SECRETLY. QOMI SAID HE HAD TO C0E:SOLE THE SURVIVORS AND TO DEAL WITH THE AUTHORITIES

TO TRY AND STOP FURTHER KILLING. "WHERE WAS KHOMEINI DURING ALL THIS"? HE REPORTEDLY ASKED.

BT

10752

NNNN


10. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CALL ON CONDITIONS

OF MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO AYATOLLAH TABATABA'I-

QOMI . LAINGEN. BT

60752

NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10752/3

,126

0 0 RUQMHR DE RUEHCR XI001 2850238 ZNY S S S S S ZZH

cti: 2746

CHARGE' 0 1202102 0'3 79 Rrl SECSIATE WASHDC TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5685 / CHRON INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEhRAN IMMED IATE 4949 RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5864 RUWRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1630

BAGHDAD 2270

2. EGYPT IAN EMBASSY OFFICERS ZANT AND HAREDY CALLED ON NEA/IRN OCTOBER I 0 FOR A BRIEFING ON IRAN. I N GENERAL EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO SHARE GENERAL L I N E S OF OUR ASSESS- MENT SUMMARIZED BELOW.

Lh

3. THE ECONOMY: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION S T I L L DOWN 5 0 PER CENT. OIL PRODUCTION HOLDING 3.5 - 4.0 MILLION B/D WITH REVENUES PROBABLY EXCEEDING 1978. GREATEST DEFICIENCY I S LOSS OF EXPERIENCED MANAGERS. UNEMPLOYMENT ESTIMATED 20 - 40 PERCENT; INFLAT1011 2 0 PERCENT. GOOD AGRICULTURAL YEAR. SPOTTY SHORTAGES SOME MERCHANDISE. GENERALLY SLOW MOVEMENT TOWARDS RECOVERY. ENCOURAGING THAT INCREASING NUMBEE OF US FIRMS BEING PAID AND SOME AGREEING TO RESUME WORK (FLUOR ON ISFAHAN REFINERY, AMC TO ASSEMBLE J E E P S ) .

4. KLRDS AND ARABS:' RECENT OUTBREAK OF BOMBINGS A N D ARMED ATTACKS CONSIDERED SERIOUS. DIFFICULT T O EVALUATE I M R I C A T I O N S FOR REGIME, HOWEVER, AS THERE HAVE BEEN MOMENTS OF SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR PGOI IN THE PAST.

5. ARMED FORCES: SLOW MOVEMENT TO REGROUP. NEW COMMANDER OF IAF APPEARS STRONG AND DETERMINED. .OUR CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN MILITARY GENERALLY BUSINESSLIKE AND P O S I T I V E IN

T ONE.

6. LEFT AND MIDDLE CLASS: LYING LOW. SMALL I N NUMBER, NO MASS APPEAL, FRAGMENTED, LACK OF STRONG, CHARISMATIC LEADERS. POTENTIAL AUGMENTATION OF STRENGTH SHOULD PRESENI REGIME STUMBLE BADLY. TUDEH PARTY SMALL AND DISCREDITED BY SOVIET LINKAGE. ,,,

7. Q E R Z C A L ASCENDANCY: K H O M E I N I - - D E S P I T E M I D D L E C L A S S , L E I T - W I N G AND E T H N I C D E F E C T I O N S - - C O M M A N D S S T R O N G M A J O R I T Y S U P P O R T O F T H E MASSES. . HE AND OTHER H A R D - L I N E MULLAHS A P P E A R D E T E R M I N E D T O A S S E R T T H E I R D O M I N A N C E OVER NEW C O N S I I T U I I O N AND E L E C T I O N S FOR M A J L I S AND P R E S I D E N T . N E V E R T H E L E S S , T H E R E SOME R E S I S T A N C E W I T H I N T H E P G O I (BAZARGAN, Y A Z D I ) AND AMONG C L E R I C S ( S H A R I A T M A D A R I ) .

8. F O R E I G N R E L A T I O N S : R E G I M E D E E P L Y S U S P I C I O U S O F S H A H - S U P P O R T E R S THOUGHT T O B E BACKED I N K U R D I S H AND A R A B A R E A S B Y I S R A E L AND IRAQ. VAGUE F E A R O F A S A U D I - I R A Q A L L I A N C E BACKED B Y U S A G A I N S T IRAN. SOMEWHAT L E S S F E A R O F S O V I E T T I R E A T . S O V I E T HAND I N I R A N NOT NOW A P P A R E N T . E M B A R R A S S E D D E S I R E B Y P G O I T O R E A S S U R E G U L F S T A T E S A F T E R C L A I M S AND T H R E A T S A S S E R T E D B Y V A R I O U S A Y A T O L L A H S A G A I N S T B A H R A I N AND K W A I T . A B I D I N G FEAR O F U S M I L I T A R Y P R E S E N C E I N T H E G U L F AND O F U S A S N A N I P L L A T O R O F OMAN1 I N I T I A T I V E FOR S T R A I T O F HORNOZ. R E S T R A I N T ON A F G H A N I S T A N D E S P I T E C O N C E R N F O R I N C R E A S E D S O V I E T ROLE. C O O L I N G P R I V A T E A T T I T U D E S TOWARD R A D I C A L P A L E S T I N I A N S OUT O F C O N C E R N FOR T H E I R I N F L U E N C E I N T E H R A N AND P O S S I B L E M E D D L I N G W I T H 0 I L . F I E L D A R A B WORKERS. EQUAL H O S T I L I T Y TOWARDS I S R A E L AND E G Y P T . C O N T I N U I N G S T R O N G S U P P O R T FOR PLO.

9. U.S.-IRAN R E L A T I O N S : D E S I R E ON OUR P A R T T O F A S H I O N A E W R E L A T I O N S H I P , C O O P E R A T I N G WHERE W A S I B L E , M O V I N G AT A P A C E COMFORTABLE FOR I R A N I A N S I N L I G H T O F S T I L L S T R O N G S U S P I C I O N S AND A N T I - A M E R I C A N F E E L I N G S . L I M I T E D R E S U M P T I O N I N S H I P M E N T O F P R E V I O U S L Y - P U R C H A S E D M I L L T A R Y S P A R E P A R T S AND S A L E O F NEW S P A R E S . ONE-S)(OT S A L E O F K E R O S E N E AND H E A T I N G FUEL. E X T E N S I V E E F F O R T S T O S E T T L E C O M M E R C I A L AND M I L I T A R Y CONTRACT D I S P U T E S . I N T E R E S T I N N A M I N G AN AMBASSADOR AMONG E X E C U T I V E B R A N C H O F F I C I A L S BUT D I F F I C U L T Y O F M A K I N G F R I E N D L Y G E S T U R E WHEN A T N O S P H E R E I N I R A N S O F R E Q U E N T L Y UNFRIENDLY.

10. S C E N A R I O S :

-- H O P E F L L : MODERATE P R A G M A T I S T S M A I N T A I N OR AUGMEVT I N f L U E N C E W I T H O U T C A U S I N G R U P T U R E W I T H C L E R I C S AN0 R E V O L U T I O N A R Y I D E O L O G U E S .

--(LOOMY: P G O I CONTROL S L I P S F U R T H E R . KURDS, A R A B S AND b T H E R S S U S T A I N R E V O L T I N P R O V I N C E S . ECONOMY U N R A V E L S .

- -MIDDLE GROUND: T H E R E A F A I R CHANCE, HOWEVER, T H A T P R E S E N T P O L I T I C A L C O N D I T I O N S WOULD P E R S I S T W I T H O U T C L E A R R E S O L U T I O N FOR SOME T I M E T O COME. I F C L E R I C S E S T A B L I S H E D F I R M CONTROL, AND T H I S NOT YET A S S U R E D , I T SEEMED MATTER O F T I N E B E F O R E C O M P L E X I T I E S O F GOVERNMENT WOULD OVERWHELM THEM. REPLACEMENT P O L I T I C A L F O R C E I M P O S S I B L E T O V I S U A L I Z E AT T H I S T I M E . VANCE BT 17101 1 2 8

Policy Initiatives - Talks with PermReps We do not need to dwell on the importance of Irqn to

the West. Suffice it to say that the independence and

stability of Iran %*,-if anything, more important to us

now than - at the time of the Shah. Our job of

protecting Western interests in Iran is, of course, infinitely

more difficult. We are dealing wtih a government that is

inexperienced, deeply suspicious ok our motives, and attempting

simultaneously to accomplish the conflicting objectives of

restoring normal conditions and transforming the society

according to vaguely-defined Islamic revolutionary ideals.

The U.S. has special problems which make our task more

complex than our allies. The unwinding of our military

relationship is a serious point of contention with the Is-

lamic Government. We are also confronted with a wide range

of similar, but more manageable problems with commercial

contracts. Some of these problems have resulted in action

in U.S. court8 to attach Iranian assets in this country. The

Iranians do not understand the extent to which we are bound

by the separation of powers; the laws, requlations and

precedents which often control our action; and the political

limitations thrtt press treatment of their hynan rights record

has created for the USG. Finally, despite our repeated denials,

the Iranians are deeply suspicious that we areplotting against

them in concert with the Israelis, the Shah, the Saudis, even

the Iraqis and the coannunists.

If, as we conclude, no group or individual outside

Iran, has any real capability at the moment of signifi-

cantly influencing events in Iran (i.e. bringing down the

Government), our best approach would seem to attempt to

-- moderate the policies of the present regime and help to promote greater pragmatism, reconciliation and

economic recovery.

-- help to preserve' and strengthen elements in Iran, especially in the military, moderate religious

and secular groups, which could play a useful role in

the future as the political drama unfolds.

-- build confidence of the regame in an effort to reduce the prospect of harsh measures of reaction which,

in turn, make stability more elusive.

In recent months, the U.S. has taken several limited

steps to begin to fashion a new relationship:

-- release of spare parts in the pipeline and resumption of Iranian purchase of spares. The Iranians

have been slow to take delivery.

-- sale of kerosene and heating oil. -- concerted efforts by the State Department to help

resolve commercial disputes.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

-3-

-- patient efforts to close out the PMS program in a manner which would protect Iranian as well as

US interests.

We would like to appoint an Ambassador, but the

Iranian campaign in the press (and privately in meetings

LL with Yazdi) I not given us a fit opportunity. There

is still considerable reluctance on the part of political

leaders, especially the clerics, to talk to us.

There are five ideaswhich you might discuss with . ' : < , < l . c * .

the other three S&Aers: 1. An approach to Khomeini. To our knowledge no

senior Western ambassador or emissary has seen Khomeini

since the February Revolution. We think it might be use-

ful for Western representatives to call on him, not to

embrace the,clerics, but to reassure him that the West

accepts the Islamic revolution, has no intention of inter-

fering in Iran's internal affairs, and is concerned with

' the continuing instability that derives from weakness of

the Bazargan Government. The object w~uld be to sugqest

very gently to the Ayatollah that Bazargan needs additional

backing if the communists are not to have an opportunity

for serious meddling in Iran.

We have no suggestion as to which country might

make the first move, but perhaps the French, given their

past assistance to Khomeini, would be in the best position,

SECRET-SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-4-

2. Approach to the Iraqis. The Iranians are

convinced that Iraq is actively assisting Kurdish and

Arab rebels in Iran. There may well be some truth to

these assertions. ?t seems very probable that if Iraq

made a serious effort to police its borders, the Iranian

,rebels, especially the Kurds, would find it hard to con-

tinue their insurrection.

As a first step we think the French and Germans

might separately engage the Iraqis in discussions of I

Iranian developments. The ultimate purpose of the exchange, ,

which might require prolonged confidence building, would ;I beto persuade the Iraqis to reduce the pressure on the I Bazargan government.

3. Assistance to Iranian Military. The Iranians

have told us it is their policy to diversify support for

US-origin military equipment. We have replied that we

would have no objection in principle provided the arrange-

ments with Europeans were made within the framework of

our laws, regulations and policies. (We will license

only what we ourselves would provide.) We have also

pointed out the practical problems that may arise. While

there are real impediments to the diversification of

support, we hope the allies will agree,that all of us

should_do what we can to strengthen the iranian military -- which could be a key group in the future. We would like

to stay in close touch with the allies in advance of these

developments in order to assure that the Iranian military SECRET/SENSITIVE

ccgceives the necessary support.

. 4. contadts with Dissident Exiles. we do not believe

m t i a r and otheg Iranian dissidents abroad at this-tim

hold any promise for future political influence. W. intend

t o avoid any association with these groups which could imply

political endorsement.

5. Regular consultations. We believe it would be important

to stay in continuing contact with the allies on Iranian

developaents. We suggest that we encourage our Ambasscldors

and Charge in Tehran to consult'on their activities frquently,

although it may be awkward for all four to assemble at once.

We suggest at least quarterly meetings of the PenaReps.

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:sch '10/13/79 x. 20313

Clearances: IAR/RNA - MLGreene (draft) P - Mr. Newsom (draft)

', e, r... 1r.m Ootmcer 15, 1979

mu friend., 1"m a t heme toa-t, which is uu4Ul l a t e l y because mf a hasry rchedule mf

d i p l e u t i c parties:.. ~ @ v e g a t tke tmlavisrimm em, l i s t e n i y ( i n p e r s i u ) t m a v i s i t i n # PLO dmlept ion beim& lauded a t the Cmamtitutimmal Review Cmuacil sesmicm tmday, with b t h -n PI0 -8 ud the Mullaka deamuaein& the US fmr i t s suppmrt fmr . impcr i r l i su , Z ioa im u d Iaramli agr08mima. It ge t s weprlag af ter a while... you lea& t m dmldier en,

s l a g t ka t at learnt-men mf the rhetmrio is ju s t t : .at - sa id fmr tke recmrd aad maid z z a f y rermlut ianuy @I seal , whioh is stmut indecd h the cmuneila s f the 8 t a t e radim1( u d televimiod .. "*em I.prmteat t m &mvelueat types t ha t t h i s kind mf a t t ~ a k c m a s t a ~ t l y mn US purpmaes i n Iru eannmt r ea l l y s r rve the gmvernments'e mwa in t e r e s t s i n d e n l m p i y a e m d r e l a t i a sh ip v i t k us tke u w e r is usual ly smacting t m the e f f e q t k a t we st rscmpize t h a t tke mvmlution is net ye t cmmplete aad t ha t - t h r gmvaauent i tmalf c u a s t o u t r e 1 erne mf the t h i w tha t u e said mn the r$ib aad tclvision. ~ h i c ~ 18 nmnsemae but what is mne t m do... yester3ay the radi ) carr ied aamthar a tack mn me O am a CIA y m t up t m a l l smrts ef d a a t a ~ d l y t h i am , a s d-mo3strated by my a l l r p d p re t e s t cfrt ever the executimns...... well, I w i l l grumble a b i t when I see the Pmreim ~ U n s t e r tmmerrmv and we sha l l see what he has t m say. -

Even i f muh government were t m deci le t m my name fmruard a s ~ a b a n a a d ~ r ~ ~ ~ s u ~ p e t tkt the enthusiasm mn the pa r t mf the l aca l gcvernment v r i s would be a b i t su86ucl. I n f a c t hm.ever,I caa nmw t e l l ymu tha t the liklihmmd mf my s t ay ins om bere m C T i e e r exis ts , a dacisibn we tomP qui te indepeqdemt mf.atti tude*-here. Far ma i t i m a &nmd thine, f u i l y wise, aad la ply event I have LS1 a f a i r l y e x t e n ~ v e . t m u x here.... when I w i l l be re l ieved i n still u a o l e u , but we shmuld bmw shortly. Yepwhile there is much to dm, u d much t m wmrry abcut, i f one is inclined t m wmrry. I ' m met, mince mur capacity k r e a l l y influence t he evmlutimm mf eventa here is l i a i t e d i n aay event. But I am u mptimist abmut the lmnger t e n . Minister, r e tu r i ag U t m m seeimg Iec:r*ry &ee in New Ymrk, w e f u l l mf c%,izf f :T us mn maay c s w i r , but .lam w n t ma t m ray, publicly, t h a t I r aa neededathe US ju s t aa the US aeeded I raa . Fine. I f tkt 's the policy apprmach here we c u l i v e with t h r t , because I th iJ t h a t kind mf awareness w i l l prmduce r e su l t s , hmwever slmwly.

I have %tuck elmem t m the compmund l a t e ly , because of the pressure m.f work... and t h a t ne t auch a b a d f d e becausa usually there i s plenty of diversiom hem. Temnis is alidays available, u d I play a t - l b a s t every e ther day. This Friday we have a tmurauent here againt the I t a l i a a c e u u a i t y , sad we w i l l aak them to s t ay an f a r dinnek aad the f i l a " I l t ena imna l Velvet". mlm weeks a:@ we had a r a m mf the "Kmmeini CU* tmurame~t i n qmftball, van a a u s u a l by the Marimes... they're y o u # anU tough emmugh t e always b e i t the pp.ts off t'ne r e s t mf us. One might we went, with my bu l l e t prmmf limsusime u d L pmlice i n a fmllmw-car, t o a b ig PirUthday part a t the homo of an Ambricu g i r l married tm u Iruiu. Fine time, u a t i l midaibbt when the revmlutiamaries frmm the meigkborhmd . %rnitehn discovered hy car and the p l l i c e eutside the gates ef the heuse and deolded t ey h a ' t l i k e what was gmkag m l . Sm the blacked m u r way and i n s i s t ed we fmllmw them t m Kamitsh hdqs. we sa id tuDu nm, they had 1s r igh t , ctc. After smme minutes they l e t ur leave but them fmllmwmd us. dernuding mvar the Wlkie- ta lk ies (they have them t m m , atmlen frcm mur campmund i n ~ e b r ~ i r y ) t ha t we ffmllew then t e t h e i r hdqs. But my dr iver , tei!lnd the wheel mf the'hmmred tamkl'that iy Chrysler has becmme, i s ne t t m be t r i f l e d with a t u y heur amd especia l ly net a t midnight. Sm we zmsmed mff end were eventually l e f t air" . Yesterday a Cernan busimessman whm l ive s tatbbmex in the b i t y was aasasainated a s he l e f t fmr wmrk, killmd by two yauthm with mileama en a mm~mrc~ole. This has sent mhmck waves tnrsugh the fare . b u s i ~ e s s ce.ouaity,aad it w i l l bxm: be even mere l i f f i c u l t t m g e t brez b u s i n e s r t t m c me here. ~e (hink i t i s an except i .n t e the ru i e rec-mtiy... the s u r i t y situat,?on has cer ta in ly bren imp@@v:ng, a t l e a ~ t in Tehrm. Tlaewhere i n the couqtry, 1.. The f ight ing i n Kurdestan i s g e t t i ~ g worse and tbere i s t r ru&le i m Baluchistin tmm. ~ l l of which i s bad, but tol-rbble fmr t h i s regime, sm 1 m y as things remain uader cmntrml i n the m i l prmvi.ce ef Khuzistan. Wen the re , t h r r e has been trouble l a t e ly , and t ha t could r ea l l y sprkk t r ~ u b l , .

Yeatarday I ca l l ed an a leading Hullah fmr a long chat... it went well u d I wa8 w8raly received but I c u e away with a new appreciatimn mf hew much mf a c m m u a i c a t i r &ap exixts betweea the West aad the c l e r i ca l leadership mf t h i s place. Suepicims mf m i 8 deep indeed, a prmduct mf m u r auppmrt fmr the Shah, I s r ae l , amd a perceptiea *f mr h c i c t y d a s a ma te r i a l i s t mse r ) e r r a l l y hmatile tn Islan. Hmwever much I t r i ed t m emphasize t ha t we tam a re a p.mple with s t r s ag s p i r i t i u a l values and premcoupatimnm I fmund

because. t m c s h a phrase, I s l a a i s here t m atay.... 134

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

suewcr: The Current Situation in Iran (Speech given at 33rd Annual Conference of the Middle East Institute)

PARTICIPANTS: James Bill University of Texas

PLACE: Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

DATE: October 5, 1979

DISTRIBUTION: INR/DDR NEA/I RN Embassy Tehran NEA/ s/p

Approximately half of Bill's speech was devoted to explaining the background of the Revolution. (Bill's analysis Can be found in the Wlnter 1978-79 issue of Foreign Affairs). He then turned to the current situation with the comment that he expected continued chaos in Iran for the following reasons:

--a leadership famine; --no viable political institutions; and --the tremendous disruptive nature of'the revolution itself.

Bill maintains that there would be even more chaos than there is presently if Khomeini and the clerics suddenly departed the scene. They are presently the only ones who have the capacity to hold the social mosaic together. However, in the long run the ayatollahs do not have the ability to erect a new political structure. Historically, the Shi'a clergy have always been outside the government and have , acted as a negative force. They are mentally and emotionally un- prepared for the challenge of rebuilding Iran.

:.:: DS.I?W UNCLASSIFIED - - .- - 135

/

ruling cllque:

--the ethnic tribes; \ --"countarrevolutionary" groups. of remants of the old military and security apparatus. Bill believes they at least 600 revolutionary guards, komiteh or religious leaders. ) ;

--the far left, particularly the Fedayeen-a1 Khalq;

--the secular, modern intelligensia. ("Ultimately Iran cannot be ruled without their support.") I

The Future. Bill believes that the conservative fundamentalist clergymen will not be able to retain power over long run. Eventually a triple alliance composed of the military, the progressive religious clergy and the secula technoc~ats might emerge to allivate the continued chaos (which will persist as long as the fundamentalist are in power.) Amplifying on this senario, Bill suggested:

--Iran must have a central instrument of coercion and the military is the only institution which can fulfill that role. Although it has been decapitated, it will rebuild itself.

--There are progressive religious leaders who are waiting in the wings. He put the following individuals in that catewry: Zanjani, Shariat- Medari, Shirazi, Beheshti and Lphuti. I

The US Position. In order to improve US/Iranian Bill suggested we:

--Admit past policy "errors"; / --Send a "new breed" of representative

technical- and administrative aid. (We should assure this aid reac and not just the government

--Avoid contacts with the exiles.

UNCLASSIFIED 136

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN (f--<3 (for 2nd Quadripartite Meeting, October 15, 1979)

The Current Situation

Nine months after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, the Iranian revolution has still not run its full course. Power continues to be fragmented, the economy is stagnated, andmilitaryand security forqes remain shattered. The loose coalition of forces which overthrew the Shah has collapsed as its leaders have split over the kind of society that they envision for the future. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini is the pre-eminent figure in Iran and will most likely remain that for the coming months.

Internal Political Situation: Three major forces are currently at work in Iran. .

First, Khomeini is consolidating his power and control over =aspects of Iranian society. This effort is being waged simultaneously on several fronts. A Council of Experts is preparing a final draft constitution, which will provide the legal basis for the Islamic Republic. In this process, the constitution is being made more strictly Islamjc. The .constitutional referendum and national elections which will follow are likely to be dominated by clerical forces. Religious forces could easily win the election and dominate the new government.

Religious leaders are increasing their control in other key areas:

--The ousting of bil chief Hassan Nazih removes the man who was most outspoken in opposition to the Clergy.

--The threatened purges in the oil company, the military and the government bureaucracies are designed to eliminate the less fervent supporters of the new order.

--Even the very halting steps aimed at curbing or eliminating the independent local komitehs are part of a process which strengthens clerical control.

CONFIDENTIAL

137

CONFIDENTIAL

Second, parallel to this increased clerical domination, factions wlthin the ruling clique are jockeying for power and position. Khomeini remains the final arbitrator of any dispute among these factions. His associates include other ayatollahs who agree with him to various degrees and secularists such as Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi. These latter men continue to fight a quiet internal battle against the clerics for Khomeini's good will. None of these associates is accepted as a possible successor to Khomeini. That fact, plus Khoneini's age (he is 79),adds much uncertainty to the regime's future course.

Finally, the new regime is being challenged by several opposition groups including:

--the ethnic minorit~es (most notably the Kurds and the Arabs) ;

--remnants of the old regime, including military and SAVAK personnel;

--leftist forces who are underground, well-armed but not an immediate threat; and

--the exiles in Europe and the US who are composed of former army officers, technocrats, the intelligentsia, and liberal politicians.

None of these groups has been able to put together an organization which can effectively challenge the Khomeini machine. The clerics have run rough-shod over the ethnic minorities and have outmaneuvered the left. Although many of the exiles,would like to topple the regime, they appear to be uncoordinated and disorganized, notwithstanding the efforts in Paris of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. We believe Bakhtiar has very little prospect of political success in Iran.

#foreign Polic : The form and the content of the new regime's foreign p%licy are still taking shape. Present foreign policy reflects the confused domestic situation, but several trends are becoming clear:

2. --Xenophobic nationalihm: This includes general ant-tern and specific anti-US policies.

--Islamic messianism: Khomeini wants to export the revolution to Islamic or Shi'a groups abroad.

CONFIDENTIAL 130

CONFIDENTIAL 6

- 3 -

So far, however, he has not supplied much material aid to such groups. Rather, he has been eXpbrting an idea and the revolutionary techniques and the organizational theory necessary for the idea's implementation. Iran8s,anti-Israel and pro-PLO stances, as well as some pro-Shi'a activities in the Persian Gulf are the key expressions to date of this drive. The Iranians have, however, been quite restrained in Afghanistan.

--Participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): Iran has been searching for a new international framework to substit te for the Shah's close ties to the West. The N d presents some possibilities, but in general Iran will remain a lone wolf.

--Recognition of Iran's geopolitical realities: Inevitable tensions exist between this element and the Islamic one.- Those tensions have been particularly evident in the Persian Gulf: the "realists" of the Foreign Ministry want normal relations, but the clerics want to export the revolution. One result has been insecurity in the region as the Gulf regimes attempt to assess what Iran will do. Those states are convening a security conference (without Iran) in November. Another result has been a more assertive attitude among the minority Shi'a communities in the Gulf.

The Econom : Iran is faced with strong inflationary pressures, unem:lqyment of 2-3 million (20 percent of the work force), and a decline in real GNP of 20 percent. Yet, the Iranian economy is functioning and even shows some tentative (if DerhaPs orilv,tem~orarv) sisns of improvement. Banks are functioning, seGera1-majo; joint ventures are operating. oil continues to ~rovide $60-570 million per dav in revenues, and the important- wheat, and rice harvests- appea; satisfactory.

The longer-term outlook, however, remains less encouraging. There is nothi g on the economic horizon to replace oil as a vehicle for gro !l th when crude production begins to decline gradually early in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Bazargan government has inherited an economy afflicted with a twin curse: a legacy of unrealistic prestige programs initiated during the oil boom, and the near anarchy Wreaked by the revolution itself.

CONFIDENTIAL

139

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 - I

There could be a silver lining: the revolution affords I

planners a rare chance to wipe the slate clean, strip away past excesses, and rationalize the economy. The present political climate is not, however, conducive to this development. Moreover, uncertainty about the future is causing an exodus of those whose skills and talents are crucial to any economic recovery in Iran. t

The initial hope that accompanied Khomeini's arrival is being replaced by disillusionment as expectations remain un- fulfilled. The removal of National Iranian'Oil chief Aasrsn Nazih not only casts doubt on the ability of the petroleum organization to function effectively but also will be seen by the modern technocrats and professionals as an attack on then.

The Soviet View of Iran

Moscow welcomed the creation of the new Iranian regime in I

February and set out to encourage the new regime's anti- I

Western policies, to help prevent the repression of pro-Swiet groups, and to protect the USSR's economic interests. Since then, the Soviets have been pleased with Iran's continuing , anti-Western orientation but perturbed over their inability to improve economic and political relations with the Ithomeink regime. The Soviet Ambassador has had two unpleasant en- 1

counters with Khomeini, and Khomeini has indirectly accused the USSR of involvement in the Kurdish conflict.

Moscow's options in dealing with Iran are limited. A. long as there is no group that can effectively challenge Khomeini's rule, the USSR will continue to try for good relations with Iran's present leaders, even though it wants a more secular, pro-Soviet government eventually to emerge. To this end, Moscow has encouraged Iran's "progressive element*" (the ethnic minorities, the left a;d the recular moderates) to unite and "build for tomorrow.

Direct Soviet support for the "progressives', however, will probably remain cautious and circumspect. The Soviets are well aware that their relations with Tehran will be damaged if their efforts are detected. They must also know that support for subversive actions increases regional suspicion of Soviet intentipns and risks producing a counter- action by other regional states.

CONFIDENTIAL

140

The Soviets are perhaps most immediately concerned with bilateral economic probl-ems. The Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Economic Relations conferred with Iranian officials twice last summer in an apparently unsuccessful effort to persuade Iran to comply with various contractual colPmitmants to the USSR including natural gas deliveries. The reduced gas deliveries and Tehran's decision not to construct the export segment of a second natural gas pipeline to the ~ S S R are particularly aggravating to the Soviets.

Moscow's frustration over the lack of progress in Soviet- Iranian bilateral relations has been evident in recent Soviet press commentary. The Soviets have used selective quotations from remarks by Iranian officials as a basis for increasingly open criticism of the Iranian leadership, particularly Bazargan's provisional government. The Soviet press has generally stopped short of direct critikism of Khomeini, but kt has conveyed it$ displeasure with some of his policies and statements.

The Soviet media have openly defended the Iranian Tudeh Party and the ethnic minorities. However, the media have also emphasized the necessity for those groups to operate within a framework of national unity. This cautious line suggests Moscow does not want to antagonize Khomeini further Dr unnecessarily increase the Tudeh Party's already exposed position.

CONFIDENTIAL la1

VZCZC '224 0 0 EUSNAAA rY RUOMHR # 0 9 7 ? 2 9 a l i 5 S ZNY CCCCC G 1 5 1 P 5 9 Z OCT 79 FY CARYISH/MAA: TfFRAN IRAY I 0 USCIYCEUR VAIUIN3EY GE I P h E D I P I E Ern U'

C 0 V F I D .E h T I A L TEHRAN IRAN 1 P 9 7 3

FOR ECJ4/7-SA

Z'laJECT: SPTCIAL FY-61 PZVIEW OF OVERSIAS PEaSOhY7' a

!-IF: YCUR CCNFIrFYTIAI MSs 1 1 1 Q 0 1 Z CCT 7 ? . S4"F 533ZtCT

1. REF MSG hE3UFSTEI AFMIcS-YAA9 V I F d S . ZCOSCIYATFI k I T F iMBPSSY AEi? PFFFhSS ATTAChE OFFICS iDAO'. C V POSSIBLE . CCNSCLIrATIOY OE TAO AND SFCU?IT" ASSISPAY3Z t ' A V A 2 F W J ~ 2

2. ALTHCUGH I T I S RECCGhIZFC TnhRF Y9Y >F SOY] BFGFIJS TO CONSOLIPATION OF SYALL OR3AhIZATIOiS k d E Q i SOME IPPLICATIVE MAk'PCLTR SPACES MIGHT 3 ) SAVEr. ?B:CMMFFr TPE hFb OrC I h IRAK. FORYED Oh 1 OC" 7 P , hOT 33 C O h S I ? ? r S r a CANLILPTF KCH C'lKSOLIDA?ION AT T-:IS TIME. fY6 l O L I C J I ; ' 1 DEASONS AQP OFFEREC 'OR COYSICER4TIOh:

A. AS A hESbLT CF TFF 4EB 7 9 3FBOLJTICh I& ' IAEY, TU' SECURITY ASSISTAYCT DR3SEPN IY IRAN. THi L4.23'31 l'S1 TRCGRAM OF ITS "INT IN L F I S 3 U C F PRICR TC THE RTVCLLTICY, HAS BEEN UVDFR;OING DRASTIC CHAY;ES. BECPrSF C"TP?SL CHANGES IN RFSPfil'CTO"Ih'3 A V T THX S I G k I F I , ^ 4 \ I T PCTEh"1 IYPACTS CPOh TPE ENTIRF US: FYS PRO:RAY, IT I S EIFt ' ICCZT, I F HCT IMPCSSIPLFp 5C TOR7AST YAFPF E NEd IRANIAN PiiO- GRAY YAY IEAC. FPESEkTLY YANY OF THE INDIVIDUfL r 'ESIL34L PROGRAMS S T I L EEING CLOSED OUT. SUCH AS PEACE ZEBRA. A3E LAlGEH TEAU F T I F E PFCGFAY' CF CTHES COUNTFIES. ATCITICN- ALLY, THFRZ 'I H YE BEEN INDICATIONS FROY THE F;OI TriAT TdEF b I L L WAN? SUPPLY SUPPORT PTCGRAVE REIVITIATZC IY THP FUTU3E. AS A RESULT OF TIiFIR FOiiCE STRUCTUPE ANl' PRSVIOUS USG FUBNISHED EC.ITIF't'ENT ALRFADY PURCilhSFD, I T J3ULD BE FEASONABLF AT TfiIS TIME TO ESTIY4TE A PROSRAY TO SDPFOET THESE US PROVIDEC SYSTEPS WOULD BE EXTENSIVE. F. CUE TO TZH UYCFRTAINTFS SURROUNLING TAF RFSTRUSTUPIhG ACTIOhS ON THE PPESZNT IRhYIAN FMS FR03EAr ANT THF S I Z P OF THE PRCJECTEC PROGRAM. AS STATFr IN ?A AZOV?, A CC'uSCIITAT ED OROANIZATION, REPUCED IN S I Z E . WOULD PR034ZLY a7 UMAaLE TO HANCLE TPE NEW SECURITY ASSIST4NCE FUNCTIONS WdI:P PAY bE LEVIED. THEREFOR!?. TATIYG ACTIOh TO COlSOLICATF ?PIOR TO A NEJLY DEFINIT-IZED PROGRAP WOULD PF PRHNAIURE.

C . F R E S E ~ T L Y ?AO T E H R A N HAS TGLVE ( 1 2 ) I U T S O B I Z F ~ P C S I P - SN P C S I X C N S 9E;AUSr. E A r i CE :HISF UIPED, AhP NZ FYSCEIJS NO kEDUCTIO\ I h N I F TIIF r A 3 !blC .'qr t 'AbG * " R E 13 El ICIFATT NO REDUCTIOVj IY 2 4 0 STACTS EALI7E3. THT hEJLV FOiPEC PhD ACIIVPTEI SIX , B J YILITARY ?FFSCAYPI h P H A C i I Z i POTrY'iIAS CONSOLI3P1ION M 2 v E r 1'4

i"2CzC @24 l A 2

VZCZC Z i 4

TnE LOCJL NATICFEI P C S I T I O h S PCSSIBLY O h 3 D 9 I V F 9 COt'LL R P PLIhINATED AND THY ODC FSN CLERT P O S I T O N ELIYILAIE: . ONE CTHER P O S S I B I E PCSITION VSISH Y I S F T 9F F L I Y I N B T F r I S Y E ODC GS-7 ATYIN CO-ORDINAmOR. WIT8 THY W-C COOiCIVAT09 I h THE CAO, T 3 I S VICYT BE UNNECESSAFY DYPLICAIION. KOIEVTR, 5TCAUSE OF RPASONS S P E C I F I F r EAQLIE9 IN 2 4 % N r 3, AGAIN WE C4NNOT PREDICT TBE k O R ( L 0 I D IN SECURITY ASSISTAECF. Ah? I T ~cvLr TUEREFORE S T I I L A ~ P E A R IMPSUEEVT rc RECUCE ~ I T H O U T . - . . - ANY FACTUAL W09iIOAD DATA RE3UIREMENTS.

1. TEE YOST APPARENT PROBLEM YE ANTICIPATF. I S THE REICT- IOh OF TXX F C O I . ALTHOUCP WF ARE YOVIY3 SLOWLY I N ?RE S A RFSTRIlCTU9ING EFFOBT. d E APPEAR TO RE UA(Ik: P R 3 C a l S S . WE HAVE ACCCYPLIS?Er T H I S BECAUSE OF TAE APPAEFYT TRUST CUR LOGISTIJS PERSChNEL FAVE FSTABLISHED #IT!! T F E I R CO3YTER- PARTS. T E I S TRUST MIGHT BF SERI9USLT JEOPARDIIEE I F TSE FCOI PERCEIVED CUR OPC PEOPLE 4S BTING PART CF TfiB DAC. OUR CISSION/PURPOSS I S DISSIMILAR IY TfiAT L4E ODC I S T b S i E P TO A S S I S T THE HCST COUNTRY IN S d TYPE SUPPORT. WHEHFAS l'AC EERSCNNEL OBVIOUSLY ART RECOGLIZEO AS COLLECTORS O F OVERT INTELLIGENCE I.NFORCATI3Y. AS AN EZAPPLE. PRESENTLY OUa ODC PECPLE CAN MAKE V I S I T S WITH THEIR CCUNTERPARTS AS A PAR1 O F NOitCtAL OPERATI3NS. WITHCUT ANY PROTCCGL REgUIREMYhT ON THE OTHER AAkC, DAO I S PRESEhTLY RXSTRICTED TC % O I h 5 THROUGH J O I N T S T b P F PROTOCOL BEFORE MEETIN3 Y I 1 R CEMBERS OF THE PGOI . 3. IN CONCLUSION, REC3CMENr THAT TIlE NEW OrC 3RGANIZAPION I h IRAN NOT BE CONSOLIDATED WITA DIO. TEE SAVINSS I h PFR- SCNNEL ANC FUNrING YCUIC BE MINIMAL. AN1 THE PCTENTIAI i C 9

,LOST GROUND IN SECURITY ASSISTAECE/OPC YISSION ACCOYFIISH- MENT WOULC BE UNNECESSARILY INZRl'ASPC.

4 . CAARGE CONCURS. BT

RULYCSA T COYCARGSU SIX REEPERA T USS JOSEPU STRAUSS R 1700122 3CT 7 9 FM DIA WASHINSTON DC//JSI-?// TO DIACURINTEL AIG 7011 A ~ G 7933 RUVAAAA/AFLC ~ P A F B OE RUFLEY.k/NAF SIGONELLA I T / / I N RUEBDSA/DFSC CAMERON STATION VA//FOSC/ /BG SFAMON RT - - C O t i F I D F N T I A L 5934 DIADIN 283-3A (AS OF: 1453 EDT 16 OCP 79) SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLISENCE NOTICE ( D I N ) (U) I IRAN: WOVE TOWARD THEOSRACY. (U) I 1. ( C ) THE ASSEflBLY OF EXPERTS DO!lIN&PED BY MUSLI5 RELlCIObS LEADERS WHOSE MANDATE I S TO REVIEW TET DRAFT CONSTITUTION BAS BEEN GRANTED AN EXTEYSIO* OF TIflR BECAUSE I T I S MAZING SUBSTANTIV~ CFANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION. MOST OF TEESE CHANGES BAVE BPEN

PAGE 2 HUEZJCS 4381 C 0 N 5 I D E N T I A L DZSIGNED TO CONCENTRATE ALL POWER IN IRAN IN THE HANDS OF S B I I T E LEADERS. THE LATEST CONSTITLJTIONAL CLAUSE ESTABLISEES TEE POSITION OF A SUPREKE R2LIGI3CS LEADFR, WHICH WILL B t ASSOiIED BY TEE ONE MOST RESPECTED BY H I S COLLEASUES. I F ONE CANNOT BE CHOSEN, TEE OFFICB WILL BE HELD BY A COUNCIL OF HOLY YEN. THE SUPREME LEADER WOULD BE COMMANDEI IN CFIEF OF TEE ARMED FORCES, WOULD HAVE POWER TO DECLARE JAR IN CO#SULTATION # I T 0 F MILITARY COUNCIL (YHICE HE APPOINTS), AND WOULD BE AGTAORIZED TO REHOVT THE ELECTED PRESI- DENT. FOLLOWING THE PASSAGS OF T E I S CLAUSE, THE ASSEMBLY I S NOW DEBATING THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THF PRESIDENT, YilOSE AUTEORITY, IN VIEW OF TFE NEW CLAUSE, 6OULD BE PUESTIONABLE. THIS BODY I S REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING TBRET OPTIONS. qE COULD BE APPOINTED BY THE PARAMOUNT RELIGIOUS PERSON, ELFCPED WITE TKE LAFFER'S APPROVAL, OR CHOSEN FROM A L I S T OF CANDIDATES CRAWN UP BY TEE LEADER. 2. ( C ) I T I S CLEAR IRAN I S EVOLVING TOdARD A THEOCRATIC STATE IN YEICB THERE WILL BE LITTLE ROOM FOR DISSENTING VIEWS. ALTHOUGH TAE CONSTITUTION MUST BE PASSED BY A POPULAR REFERENDUM, I T I S EXPECTED TO BE APPROVPD BY A L A W F M A R G I N . IN S P I T E OF 'INCREASINGLY VOCAL OPPOSITION BY TEE LEFTISTS AND YODERATE SECULARISTS, TEE DEEPLY DPVOJP LOkXR CLASSES APPARENTLY R#MAIN STFADFAST IN THEIR

SUPPORT FOR KHONEINI AND WILL VERY LIKELY CONSIDER SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION THEIR RELIGIOUS DUTY. I T WILL NO LONGE9 BE NECESSARY mL AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO RUN FOR TEE PRESIDENCY, OR FOR ANYONE ELSE FOB THAT MATTER. THE LATPST C L b U S t WILL LEOITI - MIZE THE U N O r l I C f A L POSITION.HELD BY KEOMEINI AND WILL REDUCE TEE PRESIDENT TO A WERE FIGURXHEAD. P R E P j S D BY% LCDR D. ADAPIS, USN, J S I - 5 (DECL 16 OCT 85) BT

wMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

I R A N -

S e t t i n s

The f i r s t s i x weeke of 1979 marked the f i n a l phase

?of the Iranian revolut ion. The Shah l e f t t h e country on

January 16, Ayatollah e o m e i n i returned on February 1,

the Government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar collapsed on

February 11, and a new provis ional GQvernment under Prime

~ i n i s t e r 'Ba2argan:was in s t a l l ed . For most I ranians ,

Ayatollah Khomeini remained the p r inc ipa l p o l i t i c a l f igu re

as s p i r i t u a l guide and leader of t he revolut ion. An

Islamic Republic was proclaimed following a nat ional

refqrendum on March Sfi I n twe t a l l 4 elected Council I I of Experts prrppred a new cons t i tu t ion which was t o be

submitted ta a referendum pr io r t o t h e e l e c t i o n of a new

government.

Violence againstunarmed crowds by the secur i ty

forces of the previous regime t h a t had begun i n ea r ly

1978, and wbich took thousands of l i v e s , continued i n t o

1979. In addition, beginning i n l a t e 1978, mobs, widely

btl ievell t o have been h i r ed by the previous regime,

attackefl supporters of t h e revolution i n severa l loca-

tions. Thus, Wan the revolut ion succeeded, f ee l ings of

-2-

bitterness and revenge against the leaders and supporters

of the Shah's regime were intense. The traditional-security

forces and judicial system were discredited. In consequence

power was diffused among a variety of groups which were

rarely responsive to the directions of the central govern-

ment. It was a period of great revolutionary fervor,

political uncertainty and confusion. Revolutionary courts

were established on the national and local levels: most

administered justice according to their own standards.

Rough justice was.'aleio meted out by a variety of revolu- - tionary committees and armed groups -- some of which had no legal standing whatsoever; their weapons gave them

authority. Throughout this period the formal government

under Prime M-ijster Bazargan was committed to according

full due process, criticized practices of the revolutionary

courts, but was-ble to interfere with those practices.

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person,

Including Freedom From:

a. Torture.

We are aware of no reports of torture by any government

agency or by the national system of revolutionary courts.

There were two or three reports of harsh t r e a t - c n t Sy

revolutionary groups in the provinces. In general, those

persons accused of crimes by the revolutionary courts seem

to have been fairly treated in the circumstances of a

chaotic prison system. Authoritative Government and

clerical leaders have stated on various occasions their

condemnation of torture which is specifically prohibited

in the new draft constitution.

b. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment. .p,oh~b'. ' - 5 ~ -

More tha@<xecutions by firing squads, often carried

out in the midst of night, took the lives of political and *

s,Jdb c ~ , ~ e d u.h h . b . 3 ~ e-b.b**da military figures a'idehtif ie0 with the previous Governmentfi

counter-revolutionaries accused of plotting to overthrow

the new Government and persons accused of violating Islamic

ethical norms (prostitutes, homosexuals, drug sellers).

The Government argued that the public rage against such

persons was so intense that if some had not been speedily /

tried and executed by the revolutionary courts, crowds

would have taken justice into their own hands causing

a far higher death toll. There is no way to prove or

disprove this assertion.

The number of executions of persons from the previous ?FIRVCL o r

regime declined/subs=> kolloxing an amnesty declared Oph,* 1 - '! R

,n July 11 by Ayatollah Khomeini for all pprsons except I '

ddni those directly involved with murder or orders to kill. c a 0 k

into the fall months. The working of revolutionary

courts caused widespread fear and resulted i15 the

flight from Iran of thousands of citizens who believed

they could be victims of an unfair system.

c. .Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment.

Arrest and imprisonment by revolutionary groups--with

or without Government sanction--remained an ever

present threat 'through 1979; the incidence of such

arrests declined in the second half Of the year. Pro-

longed imprisonment without charge was frequent. Many

prisoners arrested in spring on suspicion of polrtical

crimes were released beginning in July. In October

political the Government stated there were

prisoners held in jails throughout the country. We

believe.. . . . d. Denial of Fair Public Trial.

Although supporters of the new Government have stated

that the revolutionary trials were conducted fairly

and-with due process, we cannot agree. Most of the trials

were carried out in secret in a very short time and with-

out right of appeal. Most accused persons we know of were

not afforded the right of defense counsel or time to pre-

pare evidence in their behalf. The summary nature of the

-5-

trials by revolutionary courts was strongly criticized s.ne

byaeaders of the Iranian Government, as well as Iranian

and international human rights groups. The guilt or

innocence of persons condemned by these courts will

never be known.

e. Invasion of the Home.

The search by revolutionary groups for figures from

the previous regime led to frequent invasions of the

privacy of homes. Our impression is that these incidents

were significaritly reduced in the second half of the.year.

as Government police forces began to reassert

over revolutionary groups.

2. Governmental Policies Relating to the Fulfill-

ment of Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, health

d r e and Education.

The new government clearly considers among its

highest priorities the improvement in the standard of

life of the average Iranian citizen, especially the

pscrrr classes. The Government 1s cowlt:~CI to the

revitalization of agriculture, the extension of educa-

tional opportunities and the prcvislon ef improved

housiiio and health care. Bur beraose of the revolutionar:

turmoi1,'only limited steps could be taken during the

year to implement these policies. One beginning was /l

the work of the Reconstruction Crusade which sent yo ?g .%

Xranians into the countryside and poorer neighborhoods u;" t

to build schools and other public buildings and perform $'

previously-neglected public services. Slowness in

economic recovery made the reduction in unemployment

levels a key government concern. Some progress was made

in stimulating economic activity during the summer and

fall.

3 . ~espect for Civil and Political Liberties,

' Including :

a. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion, and

Assembly.

It is clear that freedom of speech, the press and

assembly were significantly strengthened with the advent /

of the new government. That situation continued generally

until August when the Government felt threatened by the

Kurdish challenge to central a ticism

from left and center groups. wspapers

and,rnagazines were closed and 18 * foreign

I correspondents were expelled. A new xequirenent for

licenses for demonstrations was established. h press

law promulgated in August established penalties f ~ r

criticism of political and religious leaders and was

harshly criticized by Iranian journalists as excessively

restrictive. The arrest of several prominent critics

was ordered and they remain in hiding.

Nevertheless, throughout 1979 and even including

the post-August period of restrictions and intimidatio~

Iranians enjoyed a greater opportunity to express their

political views than at any time in the past 25 years.

The press has freely reported events, pursued officials I /with sharp questioning and criticized Government policies

land political eaders. Although opposition leaders and P editors justifiably feel that the freedom they had in

the first half of the year has been abridged, their

ability to speak out is still less restricted than under

the previous government. By December 1, 6 previously banned papers had been allowed to resume publication.

Religious minorities experienced periods of great

anxiety about their well being during the year. With

the execution of the prominent Jewish leader Habib

Elghanian and harsh attacks on Israel and Zionism,

Iranian Jews felt seriously threatened. Similarly,

when a mob attacked a Baha'i shrine and the Government

confiscate3 property of the Baha'i corr~unity, members

of that faith felt similarly threttened. The new draft

constitution continues the provision in the previous

constitution which recognizes the Jews, Chriatians

Zoroas t r ians , b u t n o t t h e Baha' is a s r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s .

The Government s t a t e d r e p e a t e d l y t h a t r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s

would n o t be persecuted , t h e i r r i g h t s would be p r o t e c t e d

and t h a t on ly t h o s e persons charged wi th s p e c i f i c o f f e n s e s

w i l l be a r r e s t e d and t r i e d . There is no evidence of

persecut ion by t h e Government, bu t t h e absence of e f f e c -

tiv-rnment c o n t r o l has sometimes allowed v i g i l a n t e I\

groups t o t a k e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e m i n o r i t i e s , e.g. t h e

a t t a c k on a Bahp ' i s h r i n e i n Shi raz .

b. Freedom o f Movement Within t h e Country, Foreign

Trave l and Emigrat ion.

There a r e no o f f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on movement wi th in

t h e count ry . I n t h e f i r s t month fo l lowing t h e - r e v o l u t i o n ,

t h e d e p a r t u r e of a d u l t males was p r o h i b i t e d . Subsequently,

t h e r i g h t of I r a n i a n s t o l e a v e t h e count ry has g e n e r a l l y

no t been abridged except f o r a group of persons who a r e

wanted i n connection w i t h p o l i t i c a l and c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i -

g a t i o n s , and some of t h e i r r e l a t i v e s . The number of

persons bar red from l e a v i n g t h e count ry from March t o

October is not known but i s be l ieved t o t o t a l around

10,000; t h e 1 s t was reduced In n ~ r b e r I n October. ./-_ - -_ - ---- c . Freedom t o Participate In t h e P o l l t l c a l Process .

P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r e f e r e n e a and e l e c t l o s s helC In I r a n

s i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n has been f r e e l y permi t ted . However,

-9-

a full range of alternatives in the referenda were not

available and there was not time in the elections for

well-developed campaigns or for the organizations of

effective political parties. The voting power has been

a mixture of secret and open balloting. On occasion,

groups identified with pro or anti-Government groups

have intimidated candidates or sought to disrupt the

electoral process. These disruptions were, in part, a

consequence of ineffective government police powers,

in part a result of individual zeal by revolutionary

authorities.

The regime has offered greater autonomy to the

provinces and to the ethnic minorities than they were

permitted under the previous government. The government

proposed autonomy including locally-elected councils

(- elections were held in October) and the use

of local languages with Persian in the schools, media,

and assemblies. These offers have been rejected by

some Kurdish, Arab, an8 Baluchi leadere whose demands

have not been made clear in detail. The demands of

some'leaders may include indepen8ence from Iranian

central government control -- unacceptable to any authority in Tehran. Negotiations between the government

and dissident ethnic groups continued sporadically most

of the year.

The Kurdish revolt and disturbances caused by other

ethnic leaders was often met by a sharp, forceful response

by the Iranian army and revolutionary guards. Excesses

of violence have been committed by both the'regime's forces

and rebel groups, as well as by terrorist groups opposed

to the government.

4 . Government Attitude and Record Regarding

International and Ron-governmental Inves-

tigation of Alleged Violations of Human

~ i ~ h l s :

he Iranian Government has been severely criticized on

human rights grounds by many international and non-

government human rights groups. Representatives of

these groups have been invited to Iran and some have

made visits and inspections. The Government has criticized

these groups and the international press for presenting

a distorted and unfair picture of conditions in Iran.

Although the Government excluded most of the foreign

press, it made an effort to maintain a dialogue with

human rights groups.

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp 10/18/79 - ext:20313

AmEmbassy London I INCOMING TELEGRAM 1 I

NNNNvv 00 RUDTC FND753NAA651 cofi;\o&~@iL3 . . y ~ E D ~ DE PUFHNA 1 7 2 0 5 2 9 2 1 1 3 5 - ZNY CCCCC ZZH FW,: L ~ N A ~ S - . 0 1 9 1 1 3 5 2 OCT 7 9 r f USMISSION USNATO TO AMEYBPSSY LONDON IAMEDIATL 3 7 7 8 1 m

"O: 7165 C O N.F 1 D E N T I A L <

STAD I S - .i FOR G L A S P I E

E . 0 . 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS 1 6 1 1 9 / 8 5 TAGS: IF! SUBJECT: (C) UPDATE ON IRAN

I. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). --

2. PLEASE P A S S TO HENRY PRECUT FR3M HOPPER. .

3. ALL I I E 3 S IN YOUR T A L K I h G POINTS PAPS? WERE USED, IN ADDITION TO I N R ' S ASSESSAEhT.

4. UNIVERSAL AGFEEi'lENT BUT. SOME HESITANCE TO MAKE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL CDNTACT . 5. MODEFATE E X I L E S SEEN A S HOPELESS AT X S T , DANGEROUS AT WOPST. CONFORT WAS EXPRESSED THRT PEESENT CLERICAL REGIXE I S SO CLEARLY NOT ASSOCIATED WITH WEST THAT AT LEAST W E NEED NOT a E SLANED FOR I T S HUMAN RIGHTS F A I L I N G S . PX)REOVER, I T S PECULIAR NATIONAL AND P E L I G I O U S CHARACTER I S A TEMPORARY BARRIER T O CONMUHIST ADVANCES. MEAN- WHILE I T S NON-M~TEPIAL CAST MAKES IRAN UNLIKELY PQOLIFERA- TIOt! CANDIDATE FOP MEDIUM TERN. FINALLY, I T I S AN INTRO- VERTED PEVOLUTION.

5. MOST FELT SOVIETS WERE LAYING BACX WAITING FOR EVENTUAL S C I A L PEVOLUTION. TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULP L O U FOR SIEPS TO INCREASE REGIMES C O N F I D E N C E ~h J E S T , A N D E N A L L Y mPORTANT SEEK CPLN, GRADUATLD S T E P S TO 3 0 L S T E P NEIGHSORING MODERATE STATES.

7. FPENCH A N D G E R M A N MINISTERS HAD F R I E N D L Y MEETINGS W I T H YAZDI I N NEW YORK. THE FOHKEP I h SCHLDULED BILATERAL, T H E LATTEP I N UNPLANNED CONTACT AT IECLPTION. 6 0 T H , HOWEVEP, U V E L I S T S OF BILATEPPL I S S U E S ON WHICH THEY NEED COkCRETE PESULTS BEFOPE THEY WOULD CONSIDEF HIGH-LEVEL V I S I S S .

3. OTHERS SAW GPEATER PISK OF LEFT-WING F E A C P I O L W I T H I N SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.

9. Y Y P IDEAS TO LOOK FOP PFACTICAL S T E P S WERE WELCOME 331 FrOVOLE3 FEW Ii ' lMiDIATE FESFGhSE5. S S I G TnGuGHT S O T d TURKEY. WHOSE EMSASSY REPOPTEDLY HAS E:TASLISHED GOOD C O N T A C T S , AND I N D I A h S . X I G h T U ~ E F U L L Y PLAY-MIDCLL?IAN POL5 WERE I T NOT FOR COtlNTEPVAILIhG PZOILENS. SOME THOUGHT THEY MIGHT ALSO a E USED TO PASS C A J T I O N A P Y irOFCING TO

10. ASIDE FPOM I g A N ' S POLE k1TH P-0 -- WHICH ALSO CAUSED LATTEP SOME PROSLEMS -- T i i I " FOREIGN POLICY I S I O T PPD- 9LEi'l NOW-FOR WEST. XEY QLtESr!ON 1 s dkZ?aZF( CLERICAL PEGIME CObLD ADD R A ~ I O ? ~ A L S T a U C T b F f C i E S J E P N GOVEPNNENT TO I T S ICEOLOGICPL DASE.

156

t 1 . E E - 9 A T T E R P T I N G . I h D I V I G U 4 L L Y A N D C O L L E C T l V E L Y W A I N - T A I N P L L A T I O N S . I N F A C T C O ? I ~ U S I T Y c o h 5 ~ c i E t ~OPEUL t i i ~ o - T I A 7 I O N S I t 1 A U G 3 S f . S I L L T E i A L T R A i i C C N T l N U i S A N D U S E 3 F G O V E R N P E N T G U A R A N T E E S C H E R E S h R S &EN L i S S THAN F E A R E J .

12. LOCAL CONTACTS B Y Z X B A S S I E S nus Y ~ U P I D E A OF C L O S Z ~ C O N S U L T A T I O t 4 , I N T E P P A N A N D E L S E r Y i ? i , W E L C O X E J . ANOW- L E D G E G A P E X I S T i D F E G A P D I N G P 4 i S E N T P F A C T I C E S . G L I T m A N m

LIFII'I'ED OFFICIAL USE

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Tehran, Iran

October 25, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Files

FROM: L. Bruce Laingen - Charge dfAffaires, a.i.

SUBJECT: Comments by the French Ambassador Raoul Delaye

I made a courtesy call on the #rench Ambassador today. He has been here two years. I would not describe him as enthusiastic about the present situation in Tehran.

He has seen Khomeini three times; two times were substantive. He describes him as friendly but not warm towards France. He seems convinced that Khomeini will inevitably fail and that the immediate gain will be by the left.

The Iranian Revolution is unvopular in France. No clerical revolution could possibly have strength with the French public.

The presence of Bakhtiar in Paris in itself does not seem to have caused the French much problems with Khomeini; at least not yet, said the Ambassador. Yazdi did not refer to Bakhtiar during his bilateral with the French Foreign Minister in New York.

The French community'numbers about a thousand in Iran. That number may grow slightly following an agreement to resume construction on a conventional power plant in the Tabriz area, an agreement reached t w o or three days ago.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VZCZC -537 RR RUEEIA DE RUQMHR # I 3 7 6 3 0 1 1 3 5 8 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 2 8 1 3 4 2 2 OCT 79 m AMEHBASST TEHRAN TO USICA WASHDC BT C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11376

USICA

E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : N/A SUBJ: USICA IRAN'S PROGRAN NEEDS: TURN ON THE SPIGOT

1. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOfiUTION, THE POST FOUND I T NECBSSART TO CURTAIL I T S STAFF AND ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT AGENCT PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES BE REDUCED OR SUSPENDED.

E CLIMATF IN IRAN HAS NOW SUFFICIENTLY STABLIZED MI? RENEWED PROGRAM ACTIVITY. THE BINATIONAL

IN TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS INITIATED A FEATURE ERIES AND TWO PERSIAN PLATS ARE CURRBNTLT BOOKED

IN TEE IAS THEATRE. TEE IAS I S ALSO EXHIBITING A PERSIAN ARTIST AND THE ART WORK OF PERSIAN CHILDREN. A PIANO CONCERT I S SCHEDULTED FOR NOVEMBER AND SOME 3 , 5 0 0 STUDENTS ARE ENROLLED IN ENGtISH CLASSES. THE LIBRART I S ATTRACTING ABOUT 158 USERS AND FIELDING 28-36 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION A DAT. THE STUDENT COUNSELING SERVICE HAS DIPFICULTY COPING WITH DEMAND. THE BINATIONAL CENTERS IN ISPHAHAN AND SHIRAZ ARE ALSO ACTIVE. THE NLBRIGHT COMMISSION IS'ONCE AGAIN ORGANIZING EXCHANGES ANO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY COME UP WITH CANDIDATES FOR AGENCT PROGRAMS.

3. BOTH THE CLIMATE IN IRAN AND POST OBJECTIVES LIMIT SHARPLY, HOWEVER, THE KIND OF PROGRAMMING WHICH I S FEASIBLE. IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES PRECLUDE ALL BUT CLASSIC MUSIC AND NO PILM,PLAY, OR DANCB'WHICH HAS ANT OVERT SEXUAL ASPECT CAN BE USED. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES CURRENTLT MAKE PUBLIC PROMOTION OF SOME U.S. OBJECTIVES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ( I . E . HUMAN RIGHTS, MIDDLE EAST PEACE BASED O N THE CAMP AVID AGREEMENTS. AMERICAN SECURITT CONCERNS) . ON THE OTHER HAND THE POST CAN MAKE EXCELLENT USE OF ANTTHING WHICH S B O V ~ U.S. INTEREST IN ISLAM. PERSIAN CULTURE, THE WELFARE OF FAMILT AND CHILDREN, SPIRITUAL VALUES, THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT, SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL

3 INTEGRITY OF NATIONS.

$. THE POST'S KEY OBJECTIVB NUST OF NECESSITT BE TO REDUCE IRANIANS SUSPICIAN THAT THE U.S. I S SEEKING TO

3' UNDERMINE TEE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND I S NOT REALLY ? PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IRAN TO RESOLVE ISSUES AND f PROMOTE MUTUAL INTERESTS. THE POST RPCOGNIZES, OF

1 VZCZC 537 8 r

VZCZC 537

COURSE, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE I S DIFFICULT TO ACRIEVE AND I S THEREFORE TAKING A LONG-TERM VIEW I N PLANNING I T S COMMUNICATION PROGRAM. IRANIANS RECALL PAST O.S. POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT REASSURING TO THE

OTHER CONTEXTS: A SERVICE ORIENTED LIBRARY WBICH FOCUSES ON IRANIAN BISTORY AND CULTURE. RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

WORLD ISSUESI FILNS A N D VTR'S 'WHICH SHOW A M E R I ~ A N INTEREST IN MORAL VALUES, SPIRITUAL EXPERIBNCE, FAMILY AND CHILDREN. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT. HEALTH. AND SCIENCE A N D TECHNOLOGY SERVING .BASIC HUMAN NEEDS; FEATURE FILMS VHICH APPEAL TO IRANS STARVED FOR ENTERTAINMENT AND INDICATE U.S. INTEREST I N HAVING FRIENDLY RXLATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN.

5. THE POST THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES AGAIN INCLUDE TEHRAN AS AN ADDRESSEE WEEN ANNOUNCING AVAILABLE MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS.

OST RECOGNIZES THAT MUCH OF WHAT I S BEING OFFERED STS BY THE AGENCY I S INAPPROPRIATE TO IRAN AT

PRE NT, BUT THE POST IS PREPARED TO COPE WITH A LARGE AM0 :;I T OF PAPER I N ORDER'TQ FASTEN ON THOSE FFW OFFERINGS VEICH ARE USEFUL IN IRAN TOCAY. THE POST ALSO RXQUZSTS

,TEAT PDM AND ECA ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN ACQUIRING OR DEVELOPING PROGRAM OFFERINGS WHICE MEET THE NEEED OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS MESSbGE.

6. THE POST RSQUESTS THAT THF 4GENCY SUSPEND, IN THE CASE OF USICA IRAN. RESTRICTIONS ON AGZNCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES WHICR PRECLUDE ALERTING POSTS TO OFFERINGS WHICE ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THEIR PROJECT PROPOSALS BECdUSE USICA TEHR4N DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROJEC PROPOSALS ON RECORD. I F THE CLIMATE IN IRAN REMAINS REASONABLY STABLE, THE POST WILL, ROWEVER, PARTICIPATX FULLY IN THE AGENCY'S NEXT PLANNING CYCLE. GRAVES BT

NNNN VZCZC 537

C E RUQMHR #1405/01 302 ** ZNY C C C C C Z Z H n 2 9 1 2 2 4 2 O C T 79 FM AMEf iBASSY T E H R A N T O R U E E C / S E C S T A T E VASHDC 4529 I N F O R U E C J C S / S E C D E F WASH DC RUECJCS/JCS WASH DC PIIQMBI /AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0351 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANqARA 5345 R U E H A C / U S I N T BAGHCAC 0351

P-7-J T E H R A N 11405 1 / 2

TRFTD: POL:JLIMEERTIEM C L T A R : P 0 L : V L T O H S E T H D I S T B : C H A R G E P O L - 2 ECON

R ~ ~ C B R O N 6 / W E B

RUQMOD/AME?lBASSY DOAA a320 R U S B O D / A M E ~ B A S S Y ISLAMABAD 0396 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY J ICDA 0414 RUSBLK/AMEM B A S S Y T A B U L 0393 RUOMKW/AMEMBASSI SUWAIT 0361 F U D T C / A M Z N S A S S T LONCON a 4 7 4 RUCMAM /LMEMBASSY MANAMA 4319 RUFHMO/A~~EMBASSY MOSCOW 0356 RUQMMT/AMEMBASST MUSCAT 0228 R U F N P S / A M E M B A S S Y PARIS 0426 : E U S N A A A / U S C I N C E U R V A I A I N G E N G E o m

I Dl

; C 0 N F I D E # T I A L S E C T I O N 4 1 O F TEHRAN 11405

i E.O. 12065: C D S 15/29/85 ( T O M S E T H . V.L.) OR-P T A G S : P I N T S A I R t SUBJECT: M ~ L L I ~ N S Y A R C H FOR ~ N I T Y ~ N D K H O M E I N I

1. ( C - E N T I R E T E X T . )

2 . M I L L I O N S O F I R A N I A N S P A R T I C I P A T E D I N O C T O B E R 26 YARCH I N T E H R A L AND T H E PROVINCES T O SHOW S U P P O R T F O R T H E L E A D E R S H I P O F AYATOLLAH K H O M E I N I AND F O R U N I T Y O F I Y A Y ( K H O M E I N I ) A N D O M Y A T ( N A T I O N ) . THE MARCH H A C BEEN C A L L E D BY T H E I S L A M I C P E P S B L I C A N P A R T Y ( I R P ) . L E D BY K Y A ~ O L L A H B E H E S H T I . IY TEHRAN I CROWD E S T I M A T E D A T O V E R O N E N I L L I O N P E O P L E C O N V E R G E D B Y V A P I O U S R O U T E S ON T E A R A N G N I V E B S I T Y WHERE T H E Y L I S T E N E D T O S P E E C H E S , C H A V T E D S L O G A N S , AYC H V L D F E I C A Y P R A Y E R S .

3. MARCH AND F E E T I N G S J E R E O R D E R L Y . I N T E E R A N , CROWD I N C L U C E D MANY WOMEN AND C K I L C R E N AND U N I F O R M E C Y I L I T A R Y r a R S O N N E L . T H E R E WAS A G E N E R A L B O L I D A Y MOOD, 4 N D H 4 R A S S E D Y A R S H A L L S D I C AN E X C E L L E N T J O R O F K E F P I N Z O R D E R AND G O O D S F I F I T S . C R O d D S F I L L E D A L L S T R E E T S S [ J R R O U N D I N l T E R R h N ' N I V E R S I T Y A S WELL P S U N I V T R S I T Y ;BOUNDS, NBLCH # E R E T O O O I L C ~ T E C F C R NANY P T R S O V S T O P R P Y .

I . A T F O a E I 3 N M I N I S T E R ' S S U G G E S T I O N . V I S I T I N G D E P T O P B i ICBT, A C C G M P A N I E C 3~ EYBASSY POLOFF A N D WORRIED-LOOKING I * F I C I i L F 3 O M MPA P R O T 3 r O L A T T E N D E D P X A Y E R S AND R I L L Y .

C \ ,ET P A S T GA'E G U A R C S , Q U I C 3 - T I N T I N 3 MFA O F F I C I A L I ' T n O D U C E D U . S . V I S I T O R S LS 'FROY T H E S E I E G A L E Y B C S S Y ." ~ J T I C ~ P T F L Y , NO 3 N E I N V O L V E D <NEW MUCH A B O U T S E N E G A L . O N & 1

C O Y F I D E N T I A L 161

T E H R A N 11405 1 /2

COLFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11405 1/2

5. CROWD WAS ADDRESSED BY AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE IRP, A N C BY MOHAMMAC ALI R A J A ' I , A C T I N G MINISTER OF EDUCATION. BEBESATI CALLED FOR UNITY FOR ALL SUPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION AND. REITERATED PHQMEINI'S EARLIER CALL FCR UNITY BETSEEN THE CLERGY AND THE UNIVER- S I T I E S . THESE SPEECHES WERE FOLLOWED BY TRE ADDRESS (IEOTBEH) OF AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, IMAM JOM'EH OF TEHRAN. YONTAZERI APPEARS TO H h l E CONSIDFRABLE POPULARITY AYONG THE ORDINARY IRANIAN, dHO APPRECIATESHIS LACK OP AFFECTA- TION ANC H I S SIMPLICTY OF SPEECH. HIGHLIGHTS CF MONTAZERI'S ADDRESS INCLUDED:

- A. PEOPLE SHOULC APPSECIATE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND NOT COMPLAIN AT SHORTAGES 3 F SOAP POIDEB AND MEAT. HE COYPARED THESE COMPLAINTS TOaTHC PORANIC STORY OF PEE ISRAELITES ' COMPLAINTS AGAINST MOSES 4FTER HE HAD LED THEY TO FREEDOM. x

2 - B. PERSONS IU HIGH POSITIONS. INCLUCING CLERGYMEN, k SHOULD FOLLOW T&E EXAMPLE OF THE PROPHET, AND NOT SURROUND "HEMSELVES WITH SERVANTS AND GUARDS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES gF60M TEE PEOPLE.

s" C. ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY BUREAUCRATS SHOULC NOT BE ";AILED. BUT SHOULD BE QUIETLY RETIRED AND REPLACED,,BY

YOUNGER, COMMITTED PEOPLE. MONTAZERI COMPLAINED, AT ]LEAST I N THE OLD EATS FEAR OF THE SAVAK MADE SOYE OFFICIALS :DO SOMETHING FOR THE PEOPLE EVERY NOW AND THEN. NO!

THE SAVAK I S GONE. ANC THEY NEVER TEINK OF THE PUBLIC

- r. F I V E MINUTE ARABIC SPEECH ACVISED ARABS TO LF4VE THE EAST AND WEST AND FOLLOW THE STRAIGHT PATH 3 F ISLAYIC 6. AFTER PRAYERS, CHEERLEADER LED ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES OF REVOLUTIqNARY SLOGAM. THE ONLY ANTI-AVERICAN VERSE WAS. DEBT3 TO TEE CORRUPT TRIUMJIRATE: CARTER. SACAT, AN^ BEGIN." CROWD THEN DISPERSEC I N ORCERLY FASHION.

7 . SIMILAR MARCHES AND PRAYERS WERE HELD IN OTHER C I T I E S B'I #I405

NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11405 1/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L TLXShN 1 1 4 d ~ Z i ?

O F I R A N . I N ESPAHAN, S H E I X H YHALYHALI TOLD THE CROWD THAT GENERAL HUYSER, A C C O n P A N I E D BY TUO BUALY S E R G E A N T S , HAD FORCED THE SHAH OUT OF T 9 E COUNTqY. F t l I D d l Y R A ' E > W H I C H HAC BEEN STOPPEC ~d TEAT C I T Y .OR S O W :rms $ 1 t3y ' RESUflED AT Y H O f l E I N I ' 3 C I R E C T ORDTH UN"ZH THE L F I D E P , H I P OF AYATOLLAH 4AahBBRI. I R A N I A N R A D I O AN1) ' ? E L E V I S I O N ;bVE PROMINENT COVERAGE T O T H E MARCH O F S U P P O R T I N MECCA, C L A I M I N G THAT I T WAS J O I N L D B Y P A K I S T A N I S , I U V A I T I S . ANC CHACIANS.

BT XI405

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, SUBJAC?: THF SHAH IN U.S. $

: hhF: STATE 282888 I

3 I. (c-ENTIRE T ~ X T . )

12. AT NO TIME HAVE WE GIVEN PC01 ANY SUGGESTI3N THAT !

"USG SHOULD HONOH OH RAE ACCEDEC TO REQUEST PHYSICALLY $ T O EXAMINE THE SPAii. dHEN I SAW YbZDI AT ALGERIAN ? N A T I O N A L D A Y R E C E P T I O N OCTOBER 28, I TOLD H I M THEN 5 THAT WE Iihl! NOT AGREED TO FORWARI: THIS REQUEST TO

SHAH'S ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. HE RESPONDED BY SAYIN: f H E WOIILD H A V F T H O U G H T , G I V E N THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE $,OF THIS ISSUE, THAT WE COULD SET ASIDE WHAT I DESCRIBED :TO Bd THE PEDICAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND ETHICAL STANDARDS

THAT HAD PBECLIICED OUR PRESSING THE COCTORS TO AGREP TO A PRYSICBL 2XkHINATION BY IRANIAN DOCTORS.

3. hfl7 HAVF NOT f i R N MEDICAL BULLETIN ON SHAH SINCE THAT Of OCTOBER 2 5 (STATE 2 7 3 1 2 9 ) . IibS THERE BEER OVE SINCE? LAINGEN BT U1445 - N N N N

c o N F I D E N T I A L //NODIS//CSEPO*;EF TEHRAN iius

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L I M ~ T B U OPFICIAL US6 TEHXAN 11523

FOR UNEEBSECRETART COOPXR FROM CEAR:

E.O. 12865:N/A TAGS: 0TXA (COOPER) SUBJ: V I S I T

CLASS: LIPITEl l OBFTCTIT. '..* ---- - - - - - - - - - -. CERGE: STAT 11/2/73 APPRV : CH::LBLAI NGEN SRTTD: CH1:LBLAINGEN:TLl CLEAR: NOKE DISTR: CHARSE' POL CHRON

1. I WANT TO BEYEV THE S'J3:ESTIGS dE TOUCHED ON WBEk ':E TALfED I N LATE AU 9UST P3AT YOU CONS1319 STOPPIQZ BY IRAN

3 ON SOMT UPCOlING TRIP IN C < TZPO?3A P i E AREA. ONE S F Q OUR LIBITATION3 BZRE I S TEAT dE ?>.Vr NOT HAD 4 N f POLICT

LEVEL VISITORS - INLEEC YE ZAVE 'AC NONE S I N C 3 TKE "EVOLUTIOI(. TPI1 TIYE 3 9 5 XOT AI.:AY3 BEEN :OGC, BUT ON $THE YHOLE I T I S EETTE3 NOr' A N h i 'JOT:T.?.JPT"nHF - - - - - - - - ----. - InL ~ ~ A C E E D SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTC: T O F N H A N C E OIJR CRECENTIALS g WITH THE NHV IR1VEAV LT4DERSAIP TEAT A SENIOR VISITOR

f COULD BRING TO BEAh.

~Z~ .TRE PDOI'S OJN POLI,T E I R E C T I O N I N THE ECONOWIC A R E A IS STILL IR A GOOD DEAL O F DISAXBAT, A N D MAT REMAIN

:THAT V11 IOR SOPI% TIYE - THE 307EBHYIVT STILL BEING P R O T I S I O N U AND TEE' COYSTITUTI3NAL DRAFTIN1 PROCESS NOT YET C O W L 3 3 I . HENCE TYRRF; ARE REAL LINITS ON YBAT CAN BE LEaRUllIY PROY f X E I d l N I i V SIDE. BUT riE CAN B ~ N E F I T PXOR d TIUELY REAPFIRYATION 3P OUR RIADINISS T 3 YORC WITH THE P 6 0 I IN A YTITUAL PROCESS OF BUILCING A NEfi RXLATIONSBIP IN THE INP3RTbNT I'CONOY IC/COYMEifCILL/OIL A2EAS.

3 . YE EAVE I N MIND A FA1 RLY BRIEF S'POPOV'R, DITRING dHICH YOU COULC GET SCXE POLICY PCINTS ACROSS IN CI93CT CGNVEBSITIONS WITH SENIOP PSOI TPPXS. P O j S I R L f SIJYPLr. W Z N T ~ I n A N r N r o a v h L s a n I v A a A T TBE: R T S I D E N C I I OR T IF: I9AN ERICAN AN SOCIFTY 3N 1. 3UI S T , INVITATIONAL BASIS.

4. I F YOU COCPIh'lJF TO TilIN' WFLi OF T:i: ICEA, nlE 'JG 817 MELCOYE KNO#ING SOHETHIN: OF POSSIRLE TIMI'J: 5 3 THAT I.

COULD TARE SOME SOUNDIN2S MFH7. LAINZEN B T

LIYITFD 0 :FICI IL USE r d 115, "

C H (KLF : L B L A I N G E N ECON: A G R O S S M A N E C O N - 3 C H A R G E P O L , CHRON

E . 0 . 1 2 0 6 5 : G D S 1 1 / 4 / 8 5 (KENNEDY, M.) O R - E TAGS: k I N V , I R S U B J E C T : O P I & P O L I T I C A L R I S K "- I N V E S T M E N T I N S U R A N C E PROGRAM

O P I C

R E F : A. S T A T E 281949, B.

1. ( C - E N T I R E T E X T )

2. SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S . E M B A S S Y A P P R E C I A T E S T H E O P P O R T U N ~ T Y T O M A K E I T S V I E W S KNOWN A T T H I S E A R L Y S T A G F . WE C O N S I D E R F R E S H I N V E S T Y I N I

B Y A M E R I C A N C O M P A N I E S T O B E A N I M P O R T A N T F A C T O R I N R E B U I L D I N G OUR R E -

L A T I O N C H I P S W I T H I R A N . T H E TWO P R O P O S A L S D I S C U S S E D I N R E F A A R E J U S T T I I E ;

K I N D O F E S T A B L I S H E D , L O W - P R O F I L E I N D U S T R I E S O F I N D I S P U T A B L E U S E F U L N E S S i I;?

W H I C H S H O U L D B E I N T H E V A N G U A R D O F S U C H NEW I N V E S T M E N T . WE H O P E T H A T i /

T H E S E C O M P A N I E S W I L L P R O C E E D WHETHER OR N O T T H E Y A R E I N S U R E D BY O P I C . i 3. WE H A V E W&Xth7 M I S G I V I N G S , HOWEVER, O V E R T H E UTILJTY, B O T H FROM I H E

P O I N T O F V I E W O F [ H E USG A N D O F T H E C O M P A N I E S , O F t S P O U S I N G T H E S E I N V I S T - /

M E N T S ,9fl&qL?A A T T H I S T I M E W I T H T H E P G O I . MOREOVER, B E F O R E I N C R E A S I N G

O D I C I N S U R A N C E L I A B I L I T Y , WE S H O U L D H A V E A B E T T E R F E E L T H A N WE H A V E NOW

FOR P G O I A T T I T U D E 5 TOWARDS F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T , A N D P A R T I C U L A R L Y TOWARDS

C O M P E N S A T I O N I N C A S E S O F N A T I O N A L I Z A T I O N .

4 . OUR R E C O M M E N D A T I O N , THEREFORE, I S N O T T O R E S U M E A L I M I T E D PROGRAM

A T T H I S T I M E , U N T I L T H E S I T U A T I O N C L A R I F I E S . E N D SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S .

5 . P R O C E D U R A L D I F F I C U L T I E S . R E G A R D I N G R E F A, P A R A 2 1 OUR B E S T I N F O R M A -

T I O N I S T H A T T H E FORMER C E N T E R FOR T H E A T T R A C T I O N O F P R I V A T E I N V E S T P E N T

,

I S DORMANT, A N D DOES N O T E V E N A N S W t R THE ( E L L P H O N E . WE A R E T R Y I N G

D I S L R E ~ T L Y T O FIND OUT M O R E A B O U T ITS P R ~ S E N T S T A T U S .

E . : . c / 6. WERE I"0 F I N D S O M t O N E T O T A L K TO, WE WONDER WHAT V A L U E ANY A P P R O V A I

1

G I V E N B Y THE C E N T E R W O r L D H O L D . T H E PGOI I SO F A R A S WE KNOW, H A S N O T . DENOJJNCED T H E I N V E S T M E N T G U A R A N T Y A G R E E M E N T S OF 1 9 5 7 A N D - 1 9 7 9 W H I C H

C L L A R L Y R E S P O N D E D T O T H E P O L I C Y M A N D A T E S O F T H E t O R M E R R E G I M E . W H E T H E R

T H E Y R E T A I N A N Y S I G N I F I C A N C E W I T H I N T H E P O I I C Y A N D I N S T I T U T I O N A L U N C E R -

T A I N T I E S O F T O D A Y ' S I R A N I S ANOTHER Q U E S T 1 N. WE A R E R E A S O N A B L Y C O N F I - k L

D E N T T H A T N o C I V I L S E R V A N T w o u L D A P P R O V E T H E S E P R J i - r ( T s < A N D W I T H T H E M T H E

R E S U M P T I O N O F O P I C P R O G R A M S ) O N H I S O W N . ' E V E N I F A M I N I S T E R WERE T O G I V E

H I S APPROVAL, T H E R E I S NO A S S U R A N C E OF HOW L O N G H E M I G H T S T A Y I N O F F I C E .

I N MORE N O R M A L A N D S T A B L E GOVERNMENTS, A C H A N G E I N M I N I S T E R S N E E D N O T

E N T A I L A N A L T E R A T I O N OF P O L I C Y OR A F F E C T T H E V A L I D I T Y OF G O V E R N M E N T A L

C O N F I D E N C E F O R T H E P G O I .

4hl 7. P O L I C Y P R O B L E M S . WE WOULD H A V E G R E A T E R C O N F I D E N C E I N T<;E A P P R O V A L

\T G R A N T E D B Y A MINISTER W E R E W E CONFIDENT T H A T m M ~ ~ ~ a r n n r ~ S d f c k y ,

R E F L E C T E D S E T T L E D P G O I P O L I C Y R E G A R D I N G F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T . A T T H E

MOMENT, P O L I C Y I S N O T S E T T L E D . A NUMBER OF O F F I C I A L S , OF V A R Y I N G D E G R E E S

O F I N F L U E N C E , W I L L T E L L Y O U T H A T T H E Y A R E A L L F O R RENEWED F O R E I G N '

I N V E S T M E N T . C E R T A I N M U L L A H S WOULD SAY T H E SAME. I H E R E L I G I O U S E S T A B L I S H -

MENT, HOWEVER, I S D E E P L Y D I V I D E D . K H O M E I N I ' S O U N H O S T I L I T Y T O W E S T E R . ! - ww\\., b,l-:.\%,%,

INFLUENCE-'I'N--IRAN OR W H I C H F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T I S A MOST V I S I B L Y SYMBOL, ('------ - ~ \ ~ \ b : v 4 7 t ' n

N E E D S N 0 F C A ~ ~ ~ ~ W . X H & . T J ~ ~ A ~ J ~ S - & ~

PAGE 3

8. I N T H I S AREA, A M B I V A L E N C E SEEMS TO P R E V A I L . FOR EXAPPLE, I S L A M I C

E C O N O M I S T B A N I - S A D R , S A I D TO B E D E S T I N E D TO P L A Y A H I G H L Y I N F L U E N F I A L

R O L E I N T H E NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N A L GOVERNMENT, T O L D US ( R E F ) T H A T HE

FAVORED F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T , P R O V I D E D T H A T I T WAS FOR THE B E N E F I T OF I R A N

AND N O T FOR T H E B E N E F I T OF M U L T I N A T I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N S . B A N I - S A D R D I D

NOT A M P L I F Y H I S S T A T RENT. WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, H E D I S A L L O W R E M I T T N C l S

7 O F P R O F I T S TO F O R E I G N I N V E S T O R S . A S S U M I N G T H A T H E BECOMES THE R E S P O N S I B I F I

M I N I S T E R , WOULD H E I S S U E P R O J E C T APPROVALS, T H t R E B Y R E C O G N I Z I N G T H A T u so

T H E ~ , 7 i I W W ~ W ~ H A S h V A L I D AND C O N T I N U I N G I N T E R E S T I N T H E

I N V E S T M E N T , AND R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y FOR I T S P R O T E C T I O N ? I

9 . R E V O L U T I O N A R Y P A R A N O I A . HOWEVER V A R I E D * T H E C..L"~~'OF A T T I T U D E S TOt IARDS I

, P R I V A T E F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T I T H E CONCEPT OF A L E G I T I M A l E I N V E S T O R G O V t K N -

a ~.h- I ,<d, ,v MENT I N T E R E S T I N I N V E S T M E N T RUNS COUNTER TO DEEP R E V O L U T I O N A R Y 1 FEELINGS. ;HE NOTION O F A SINXSTER ALLIANCE AMONG THE "COLONIALIST" IISG,

.'@ T H E " T R A I T O R " SHAH, AND T H E I R J O I N T HENCHMFN, U.S. P R I V A T E I N V E S T O R S ,

B A N ~ R S I AND CONTRACTORSI C O N T I N U E S TO SURFACE, E S P E C I A L L Y I N C O N l R A C T

S E T T L E M E N T N E G O T I A T I O N S . T H E RENEWED I D E N T I F I C A T I O N I N R E V O L U T I O N h R Y 1 M I N D S O F T H E S H A H W I T H T H E USGI T H E R E S U L T O F R E C E N T M r D I C A L TQAVFL,

S H O U L D G I V E F R E S H L I F E TO T H E S E S U S P I C I O N S .

10. I N T IME, H O P E F U L L Y , T H I S R E V O L U T I O N A R Y P A R A N O I A W I L L FADE AWAY. I N

T H E I N T E R I M , I S I T I N T H E I N T E R E S T O F F U T U R E U.S. F O R F I G N I N V E S T M E N T

G E N E R A L L Y AND OF T H E S E TWO I N V E S T M E N T S I N P A R T I C U L A R , FOR THE USG VAQ /dbvy J.p.=.w *kt\&\ ~ - I ? # - - ~ G T IV Kc& ? -

TO @ ? A ! M ~ ,FOR A L L T H E B E N E F I T S T H A T O P I C I N S U R A N L E WOULD E N T A I L

FOR T H E S E I N V E S T O R S , WE WONDER k lHETHER A H A N D S - O F F P O L I C Y A T T H I S .is%r

M I G H T N O T S E R V E T H E I R I N T E R E S ~ ~ B E T T E R .

P A G E 4

11. P R O H L t M S O F C O R P I N S A T I O N . FOR T H E USG I T S E L F , A T H R E S H O L D Q U E S l I O N

I N D C C I D I N G W H t T H I R OR N O T T O I N C R E A S E O P I C I N S U R A N C E A G A I N S T U N R E A S O N A B L Y

S I O W , I V A D C R U A T E OR I N E F F E C T I V E C O M P E N S A T I O N I N T H E E V E N T O F F i J T U R E ',.<n,l LC

' J A T I O N A I I I A T I O N I 9 , T H E Q U A L I T Y O F T H E C O M P E N S A T I O N A C T U A L L Y B E I N G O F F E R E D

A B Y T H E P G O I . W H I L E T H E R E C O R D I S M I X E D , T H E E X P E R I E N C E T H U L F A R k i A

' J 1 J " I F R OF FORMER C O N T R A C T O R S ( A M E R I C A N B E L L I N T E R N A T I O N A L , G T E t E T C . ) H A S

R F t N F A R F I IOM H A P P Y . WE U N D E R S T A N D FROM I R A N l A N S O U R C E S T H A T B . F . G O O D R I C

I S S A T I S F I F D W I T H I T S S E T T L j M E N T . I N N E G O T I A T I O N S W I T H T H E P E T R O L E U M i?,,:uj\,

J O I N T VENTURES, T H E R E I S ~ ~ ~ ~ % & A Y P ~ E V I D E N C E ( R E F ) T H A T T H E P G O I I S N O T ,\ A V L R S E T O DANGLING T H E L U R E O F F U T U R E C R U D E " A L L O ~ A T I O N S A S A MEANS O F

b H I T T L I N G D t W N C O M P E N S A T I O N C L A I M S . A T T H E V t R Y L E A S T , WE S H O U L D T A K E A

I ' R R D L O O K AT I H E C O N P L N S A T I O N F I N A L L Y AWARDED T O M A J O R U.S. B A N K S A N D

I N S I J R A N C E T O I S P A N I E S B E F O R E T A K I N G A D E C I S I O N T O I N C R E A S E I N S U R A N C E

l,;&%2sG I N I RAN.

T O ' 3 P I N S A T I O N ON T H E P A R T O F T H E P G O I , AN E N D T O P R E S E N T P A R A N O I A , A N D A N

INSTITUTIONAI A N D POIICY EVOLUTION T O ' T H E POINT WHERE INLESTMENT A G R E E -

M r N T S A N D A P P R O V A L S A G A I N R E F L E C T S E T T L E D P O L I C Y , WE S H O U L D A T T H A T T I M E

G I V E r A V O R A D l E C O N S I D t R A T I O N T O T H E R E S T O R A T I O N O F O P I C PROGRAMS I N I R A N .

13. S P E C l I I C RECOMMENDATION$. WE U N D E R S T A N D r H A T U.S. INVETTORS C A N y 4qeyw,..d \ % L ~ V - h3h2 3 6 t L , \ "wh a/

R ~ G I S r E R P R O J E C T S W I T H OPIC G T H O U T A C T U A L L Y ACTIVAGNI; d lbr . / I \h v-L C.<fk$

PI ICSUMABLY, N O A P P R O A C H T O T H E P G O I WOULD B E R E Q U I R E D Ad- I F

T H I S I S T H E CASE, WE SO R E C O M n E N D W I T H R E G A R D T O T H E S E &d I N V E S T M E N T S

FOR T H E I M M E D I A T E F U T U R E . L A I N G E N # #