Document of The World Bank

Report No ICR0000540

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IBRD-72230)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF EURO 100 MILLION (US$126 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF POLAND

FOR A

ROAD MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION

PROJECT

JUNE 26, 2009

Sustainable Development Department Central Europe and the Baltic States Europe and Central Asia Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 1, 2009)

Currency Unit = Zloty (PLN) 1.00 = US$ 0.34 US$ 1.00 = 2.93

FISCAL YEAR

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance Strategy CPS Country Partnership Strategy EIB European Investment Bank EU European Union FMR Financial Management Report GDDKiA General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways GDP Gross Domestic Product ICR Implementation Completion Report IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession ISR Implementation Status Report MAP Management Action Plan for GDDKiA MIS Management Information System MoI Ministry of Infrastructure MoT Ministry of Transport PAD Project Appraisal Document PCU Project Coordination Unit PDO Project Development Objective PLN Zloty PPP Public-Private Partnership PSAL Private Sector Adjustment Loan RMR1 First Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project RMR2 Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project SECAL Sector Adjustment Loan SIL Sector Investment Loan SWAp Sector-Wide Approach TA Technical Assistance

Vice President: Shigeo Katsu, ECAVP

Country Director (Acting): Theodore O. Ahlers, ECCU7

Sector Manager: Henry G. R. Kerali, ECSSD

Project Team Leader: Radek Czapski, ECSSD

ICR Team Leader: Ross Pavis, ECSSD

The main text of this ICR evaluates two projects: Poland Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation 1 and 2. These two projects constituted the first two projects in a series of loans aimed at supporting the Government’s six-year development program of the national road network. The Program was designed to improve the effectiveness of Poland's national road rehabilitation and maintenance systems, particularly in the areas of quality, efficiency, road safety, financial viability, and road-user satisfaction. As the components and objectives of each project were closely aligned, and as the closing dates were only six months apart, it was decided that the assessment of the two projects would be more comprehensive and could shed more light on the Program if they were evaluated together. Therefore, there are two ICRs, each with its own datasheet, but the main text in each volume, which assesses both projects, is the same. Ratings apply to the Program. Where there is a deviation between the two projects, it is noted in the text. Each datasheet from the twin project is included as an Annex. A third project in the series is scheduled to close in September 2011.

POLAND

Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................. 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................. 4 3. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................................................................... 7 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcomes ....................................................... 12 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower ........................................................................... 13 6. Lessons Learned ...................................................................................................... 14 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ......... 15 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 17 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 19 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 22 Annex 4. Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...................... 23 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 25 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 26 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 27 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 30 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 31 Annex 10. Datasheet for Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation 2 ............................... 32 Map IBRD No. 32974 ................................................................................................... 36 

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A. Basic Information

Country: Poland Project Name: Road Maintenance & Rehabilitation Project

Project ID: P078170 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-72230

ICR Date: 06/26/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: MINISTRY OF FINANCE

Original Total Commitment:

USD 126.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 121.6M

Environmental Category: F

Implementing Agencies: General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA)

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/22/2003 Effectiveness: 06/10/2004

Appraisal: 02/12/2004 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 03/30/2004 Mid-term Review:

Closing: 06/30/2006 12/31/2008 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately SatisfactoryOverall Borrower Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project No Quality at Entry None

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at any time (Yes/No): (QEA):

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 12 12

Roads and highways 87 87

Sub-national government administration 1 1

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Administrative and civil service reform 33 33

Infrastructure services for private sector development 34 34

Other financial and private sector development 33 33 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Shigeo Katsu Shigeo Katsu

Country Director: Theodore O. Ahlers Roger W. Grawe

Sector Manager: Henry G. R. Kerali Motoo Konishi

Project Team Leader: Radoslaw Czapski Michel Audige

ICR Team Leader: Ross S. Pavis

ICR Primary Author: Graham Smith

Ross S. Pavis F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to improve the effectiveness of Poland's national road rehabilitation and maintenance systems by: (i) significantly increasing the percentage of national roads in good conditions; (ii) establishing reliable and stable funding for the national road maintenance and rehabilitation network and for road safety; and (iii) improving the capacity within GDDKiA to operate efficiently and effectively and to reflect the views of road users in developing its programs. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

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(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : GDDKiA's institutional capacity and performance developed

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

N/A

Management Action Plan (MAP) shows satisfactory progress

MAP adopted, implementation started.

Date achieved 03/31/2004 06/29/2007 09/30/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Moderately successful -- delayed, partly as a result of repeated changes of government.

Indicator 2 : Percentage of roads in good condition Value quantitative or Qualitative)

<37% 43% 49% -- exceeds target

Date achieved 12/31/2003 12/31/2005 12/30/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement)

53% as of December 2008.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Effective use of HDM-4 System by GDDKiA (HDM-4 is a software tool for the analysis, planning, management and appraisal of road maintenance, improvements and investment decisions.)

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

N/A Effective usage

Yes (partial: w/o use of 2005 database and improved interface)

Date achieved 03/31/2004 06/30/2006 09/30/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Only a few branch offices fully utilize HDM capability in their planning, though others use some of its more basic functionalities for organization purposes.

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G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 06/29/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.23 2 11/03/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 113.52 3 05/31/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 114.65 4 03/06/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 117.28 5 01/08/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 120.30 6 02/09/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 120.30 7 02/06/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 122.04 8 07/10/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 122.04

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal In 2003, Poland’s imminent EU membership offered a unique window of opportunity for the World Bank to support the Polish Government, especially as it was initiating an overdue fiscal adjustment. One area where World Bank support was considered essential was in the development of the required institutional and financial capacity for a road improvement program. Time was a critical factor since, beginning in January 1, 2004, Poland was eligible to receive European Union (EU) structural and cohesion funds, and in order to qualify, it was necessary to have a well-conceived and economically justified road improvement program. Furthermore, if the eligible funds were not fully committed by the end of 2006, they would be lost. The lack of institutional capacity within the General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA) had already affected the use of EU funds1 which had been offered in 2002 and 2003 but never utilized. Now this lack of capacity was threatening to affect use of the larger Structural and Cohesion Funds in the absence of strong World Bank support. Poland joined the EU in May 2004, which led to closer economic integration and access to structural funds and which constituted a unique opportunity for further development. In that context, the Bank outlined a new framework for cooperation with Poland, which became part of the new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). The World Bank and the Government agreed to maintain a significant operational program over the next few years in those sectors where the Bank could add value, leverage, and promote and endorse needed reforms. Although Poland’s per capita income was approaching the threshold which could initiate the process leading to eventual graduation from World Bank borrower status, there was still an agenda of important reforms in areas in which the Bank had been a key technical partner. During this time, inadequate, unsafe and congested roads were increasingly recognized as severe bottlenecks to economic growth. High transport costs curtailed opportunities to exploit economies of scale and also exacerbated regional disparities, since in Poland regional income and unemployment levels were strongly correlated with road density. Access to a reliable transportation network is a precondition to a competitive economy, on both regional and national levels. With the lowest ratio of roads in good condition in Central Europe, Poland was already losing a fair amount of foreign direct investments to its more developed neighbors. The poor quality of the road network was identified in the CAS of November 2002 as a key factor that increased the cost of doing business in Poland.

GDP growth reached 5.4 percent in 2004, up from 1 percent in 2001, 1.4 percent in 2002, and 3.8 percent in 2003. This rise marked the end of the first serious economic cycle in Poland since the beginning of the transition. Growth originated in a rapid expansion of exports (linked partly to EU accession, but also to efficiency gains), and growing private consumption, while fixed investment only began recovering in 2004. Inflation remained low and relatively stable; it declined to less than 1 percent in 2003, but increased in 2004 on the back of EU-accession effects (adjustments of indirect taxes etc.) and the surge in oil and other commodity prices. However, second-round effects appeared to be contained, as monetary conditions were tightened through both a hike in interest rates and appreciation of the zloty. Further, wage pressures were held in check by the persisting slack in the labor market. The current account deficit stayed at a very

1 Funds available through the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA).

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low and safe level, helped by a healthy increase in exports and muted investment demand. External debt at 47 percent of GDP posed limited risks. Poland’s development agenda had as its overriding objective to put the economy on a path of high and sustainable growth through improved competitiveness of firms and regions, to contribute to the recovery of employment and promote strong social cohesion in order to reach two-thirds of the EU average income per capita by 2013. This strategy recognized the need to manage the economy prudently in order to increase employment and reduce poverty, converge (in the medium-to-long term) to average European income levels, and meet the requirements for the adoption of the Euro. While it was clear that other institutions – notably the EU, European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – were likely to be longer-term partners for financing Poland’s road network, their ability to help was still constrained by Poland’s weak institutional capacity to develop and implement a large program of high priority road investments. The World Bank drafted a partnership strategy around Poland’s development priorities. In particular, Bank-supported roads programs focused on the institutional restructuring of the sector with the aim of improving its planning and implementation capacity, and on the financing of the sector in order to be able to tackle the large maintenance backlog and the large new investments required for expansion.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)2 RMR1. The objective of this Project was to improve the effectiveness of Poland's national road rehabilitation and maintenance systems by: (i) significantly increasing the percentage of national roads in good condition; (ii) establishing reliable and stable funding for the national road maintenance and rehabilitation network and for road safety; and (iii) improving the capacity within GDDKiA to operate efficiently and effectively, and to reflect the views of road users in developing its programs. Achievement of the Project Development Objective was to be confirmed using the following key indicators: (i) adoption and continued use of improved road maintenance and rehabilitation practices within GDDKiA; (ii) evidence of use of a coherent six-year rolling roads expenditure program, together with an adequately balanced maintenance/investment program; (iii) significant increase in the percentage of the road network in good condition when compared with pre-project conditions; and (iv) evidence of high road-user satisfaction following rehabilitation or maintenance operations when users were polled, both about the quality of the completed sections and the inconveniences associated with the rehabilitation or maintenance processes. RMR2. The objective of this project was to continue improving the effectiveness of Poland’s national road rehabilitation and maintenance systems by: (i) further increasing the percentage of national roads in good condition, (ii) establishing reliable and stable funding for the national road maintenance and rehabilitation network, and (iii) improving the capacity within the Road Administration to operate efficiently and effectively. Achievement was to be confirmed using the following key indicators: (i) adoption and continued use of improved road maintenance and rehabilitation practices within GDDKiA; (ii) evidence of use of a coherent six-year rolling roads expenditure program together with an adequately balanced maintenance/investment program; (iii) significant increase in the percentage of the road network in good condition when compared with pre-project conditions; and (iv) evidence of high road-user satisfaction following rehabilitation or maintenance operations when users were polled, both about the quality of the completed sections and the inconveniences associated with the rehabilitation or maintenance processes.

2 From Section B3 of the PAD. See Section 3.2 for comment.

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1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

RMR1 PDO indicator “Percentage of Roads in Good Condition” was added in 2006 (which made it consistent with indicator in RMR2).

1.4 Main Beneficiaries The primary beneficiaries of the two projects were road users who benefited from the improved overall quality of the national road network, including aspects of traffic safety. Though these projects were not expressly targeted at the poor, and they do not meet the criteria for being classified as “poverty-focused operations”, improving the country’s road network increases access to schools, health services and job markets, which benefit poor populations. The other beneficiary of the project was GDDKiA. The agency benefited from a strengthened institutional capacity to carry out its mandate, providing an improved and more sustainable road system.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

RMR 1 The project loan amounted to €100 million, equivalent to US$126.0 million, and funded the following four components: The GDDKiA Modernization Action Plan (MAP) ($2.5 million). The plan was articulated around

four major topics to be implemented within one year: (i) to carry out a detailed diagnosis of the current situation at GDDKiA, implement modernization measures at headquarters, and launch works for development of procedures for preparation and implementation of roads projects [Stage 1]; (ii) to complete the process of reorganization at the central level, undertake reorganization at the regional level, and finish works on procedures for preparation and implementation of roads projects [Stage 2]; (iii) to establish a proper system of strategic planning [Stage 3]; and (iv) to evaluate the efficiency of implemented measures, pursue modernization of the gaps that would continue after Stages 1 to 3, and review potential for further improvements in order to further increase efficiency.

The Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Program ($115.9 million) which had been prepared by

GDDKiA within the framework of the 2004 budget provides details on the content of the road expenditure program that amounts to PLN5.4 billion (equivalent to $1.4 billion) for the year 2004. The national budget funds allocated to road maintenance and rehabilitation, pooled with the resources provided by the projects, amounted to PLN.634 million, equivalent to $159 million. The proceeds of the loan provided additional resources to tackle essentially the current road maintenance backlog. Funds were disbursed as a percentage of the agreed program of rehabilitation (67 percent) using local procurement (country system) for contracts below EUR 6 million. The purpose of this financial support was to maintain the right balance between maintenance/ rehabilitation, strengthening and reconstruction of existing roads, together with new construction of motorways and expressways.

The Road Safety Improvement Program ($5.7 million) to reduce significantly the cost to society of

road accidents, estimated at two percent of GDP. Actions would focus on further contributing to the reduction of road traffic fatalities as part of the National Road Safety Program. This would be realized by enhancing the capacities of prevention and mitigation of crash consequences through the provision of financing to support partially local initiatives in the area of black spot mitigation and traffic calming, additional equipment to the road traffic police, the fire brigade, possibly also the ambulance

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service, and the Road Transport Inspectorate. The program would be coordinated by the Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council in the Ministry of Infrastructure.

Technical Assistance to Increase Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) ($0.6 million) provided to

GDDKiA and MoI to define an adequate policy framework providing incentives for the development of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) schemes in Poland.

RMR2 The project loan amounted to €100 million, equivalent to US$130.5 million, and included two components: The Road maintenance and Rehabilitation Program ($125.5 million) was prepared by GDDKiA

within the framework of the budget for 2005 and with a financing scheme and implementation arrangements similar to the ones applied under RMR1. The national budget funds allocated to road maintenance and rehabilitation would be pooled with the resources provided by the Bank and EIB loans, to be used for reducing the existing road maintenance and rehabilitation backlog. The content of the road expenditure program amounted to PLN 7.0 billion (equivalent to $2.3 billion) for the year 2005. The national budget funds allocated to road maintenance and rehabilitation, pooled with the resources provided by the IBRD and EIB loans, amounted to PLN 0.7 billion, equivalent to about $205 million. Funds were disbursed as a percentage of the agreed program of rehabilitation (62 percent) using local procurement (country system) for contracts below EUR 6 million. The purpose of this financial support was to maintain the right balance between maintenance/rehabilitation, strengthening and reconstruction of existing roads, and with new construction of motorways and expressways.

GDDKiA Management Information System (MIS) ($5.0 million). A specific risk identified under the

RMR1 project was the lack of a modern MIS within the organization which would integrate financial-accounting information with the contract data, including planning and physical measures. Therefore, the GDDKiA Modernization Action Plan included the design of a modern MIS.

1.6 Revised Components

No components were revised.

1.7 Other Significant Changes There were no other significant changes. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry It was agreed during the preparation of RMR1 that the Bank’s total financial support to the medium-term governmental road rehabilitation program would most likely be provided through three sequential loans, scheduled one year apart. Much consideration was given to the choice of lending instrument. Lengthy discussions were held over a period of many months with management, Bank procurement, legal and safeguards staff, and with the Polish Ministry of Infrastructure, which compared three different approaches: Private Sector Adjustment Loan (PSAL), Sector Adjustment Loan (SECAL) and Sector-wide Approach/Sector Investment Loan (SWAp/SIL). The Government had a preference for the PSAL for a

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variety of reasons, including: they saw this as an opportunity to carry out essential reforms of the road administration through PSAL conditionalities; they had already extended strong efforts in complying with PSAL requirements; and they were looking for un-tied budgetary support for road development which they could use to finance expenditures such as land expropriation. This approach was initially accepted by the Bank, but views began to change as problems with the instrument emerged. The IMF expressed reluctance in endorsing budget support in light of Poland’s deteriorating fiscal position; there were difficulties with Poland’s procurement law, which was not acceptable at that time to the Bank’s legal or procurement departments; and there were also problems with financial management (among others). The SECAL had similar problems. A SWAp was proposed as an alternative which would address several of the issues; there were no concerns from the IMF, or from procurement, legal or financial management, since their concerns could be addressed by the implementation framework. Although the loan was essentially devoted to financing physical investments related to road maintenance and rehabilitation, it also provided support to the needed improvement of the institutional capacity of the GDDKiA, and supported the process of road safety improvement. Under a SWAp, the project funds for the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation component were to be pooled with those from the national budget, while the three other components were to be implemented using World Bank standard arrangements. This made the SWAp something of a hybrid. To some extent, the loan would rely on government systems, so that the borrower would not have to create special implementation units, nor adopt rules and procedures solely for Bank-supported investments. It aimed at quick disbursement with minimal transaction cost to the borrower, and had partially pooled funds. In sum, the Bank team and the Government took their time with preparation in order to carefully consider the appropriate instrument and design, taking into account the complex economic and political issues existing during that period. It should be noted, however, that there was a built-in timing conflict between the works components and the institutional components vis a vis the implementation of the second loan (see next section). Preparation of RMR2 was considered a repeater project and followed closely the model developed during RMR1. After the first loan was approved, there was a fairly lengthy exchange between the Bank and MoI/GDDKiA, about the exact specifications of the technical assistance (TA) contracts. This led to a reformulation of the Management Action Plan (MAP) in time for the second loan’s appraisal.

2.2 Implementation In each project, the road works were implemented rapidly (in under one year in the first project). The intention was to provide a large, quick-disbursing loan for what was a national priority, and to allow a return to the table a year later for a second loan if still justified by the clients’ needs and its performance during the first project. This created an inherent tension, however, between the shortness of time allotted for works and the longer amount of time allotted for the technical assistance (TA) components. The three major TA contracts, all complex and ambitious in nature, would under the best of circumstances probably have taken at least half a year to procure and probably a year or more to deliver in full. In fact, the TA contracts all took much longer than expected to procure and implement, and were responsible for requiring an extension of the closing date of the first loan by 18 months (from June 30, 2007 to December 31, 2008) and the second loan by 18 months (from December 30, 2007 to June 30, 2009).

A primary component of the technical assistance was to improve the capacity within GDDKiA to operate efficiently through the development of a Management Action Plan to formalize contract-type business plans governing MoT’s mandate to GDDKiA, and GDDKiA HQ’s mandate to its regional branches (including the launching of consequent institutional changes. The target was to agree among the parties

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and then to implement. A number of issues led to multiple delays and impediments to progress. The Consultant FinnRoad delivered its Phase I report in December 2004, which focused on diagnosis of the institutional weaknesses and recommendations for short-term solutions. There was a lengthy hiatus caused by the change of government in 2005, during which various proposals were considered. The previous minister wanted to completely eliminate GDDKiA and decentralize responsibilities to the regional branches. This was reversed by the new government. In 2007, FinnRoad delivered the two most important parts of its Phase II (Implementation) report: the draft ‘contracts’ between MOT and GDDKiA, and between GDDKiA and its branches. GDDKiA, however, was not satisfied with the first draft of the consultant’s review of organization structure and management processes in six other EU states, the purpose of which was to inform GDDKiA of options, their rationale and results.

It was only in May 2008, when new top management was appointed to GDDKiA, that momentum was regained. Since then, institutional changes have been introduced with a view to increasing its institutional capacity. The changes include:

decentralization of some functions from HQ to branch offices related to investment planning, preparation and implementation, while coordination of some vital functions was retained at HQ;

re-engineering of key business processes and procedures in GDDKiA aimed at simplification, focus on results, continuous learning, limiting unnecessary controls, and active communication with external partners;

creation of the following units within GDDKiA: Department of the Environment, Department of Technology, Projects Monitoring Unit, EU Projects Unit, and Office of Internal Audit and Control.)

As important as these changes were, as was the initial diagnostic assessment that was completed, it was still less than was originally envisioned under the two projects, which also included completing the process of reorganization of headquarters and the regional branches, and creating a broader system of strategic planning and analysis.

A comprehensive management information system based on SAP began to be rolled out to GDDKiA’s regional offices to standardize accounting practices and support the decentralization process by unifying and streamlining internal control procedures, as well as the flow of documents and approvals. GDDKiA approved the Strategy for a Comprehensive Information Technology System in early 2004 with the support a local consultant, and went on to develop the second phase of the task – a review of the IT infrastructure and an analysis of processes and workflow. During 2006 it was decided to proceed with three main contracts: a service contract with a telecom provider for a wide area network; design of the so-called Enterprise Resource Processing (ERP) software; and a further consulting contract to computerize workflow processing. After a lengthy two-stage procurement process, the ERP contract was signed in January 2007. The workflow-processing contract was due to be signed in September of the same year, but it was cancelled from the loan funding and postponed until the ERP implementation is more advanced to assure better coordination between workflow and ERP. The pilot start-up of the key modules of the MIS system, all financial management and accounting components, took place in January 2009, the start of GDDKiA’s financial year. Full gradual roll-out into all regional branches is planned for later in 2009. Funding of MIS key components are being continued in the third RMR loan project.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Though the PAD gives little detail on SWAps, performance-monitoring indicators are one of the elements central to the SWAp concept, and focus more on results, and less on the processes by which the borrower achieves them. (They are discussed in Section 3.2 below.) The ICR missions found that insufficient attention was given to the indicators as a central element of project design and supervision. As discussed

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in 3.2, the quantitative indicators which measured the works constructed under the project, and also measured the number of traffic accieent fatalities under the safety component, were monitored and effective. However, the indicators designed to measure institutional progress were much less so.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance The two projects were rated as ‘financial intermediaries’ for purposes of safeguards, and the civil works triggered only minor environmental impacts. Safeguard compliance was never an issue. At one stage in 2006, financial management was rated moderately unsatisfactory because release of funds to contractors was taking excessively long and the Ministry of Transport3 was failing to submit satisfactory FMRs. These problems were overcome by Bank-supplied training to MoT financial staff.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase A third loan, very similar in objective and composition but larger – $150 million, was negotiated and approved 14 months after the second. This was consistent with the initial concept of a programmatic approach to support rehabilitation of the main road network. At the time it was approved it was thought to have been the last of the “repeater” loans in the program. However, during 2007 a fourth loan was prepared, though currently it remains on hold, pending approval by the Government. Motorways construction program: It is worth noting that MoT has proposed a “mega-program” of highway construction, aimed at building out almost the entire planned 2,000-km network of motorways and expressways in time for the Euro 2012 Football European Cup, to be held in Poland and Ukraine jointly. MoT estimated the cost at Euro 25-30 billion, though there is reason to think that as the road construction industry continues to gain experience, unit costs will be lower. In 2007 the Government also adopted a multi-annual roads program for 2008-2013 which is currently under implementation. These sizable undertakings provide very strong incentives for the Government to ensure that GDDKiA’s institutional capacity continues to be strengthened.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The PADs for the first two loans correctly caught the essence of Poland’s situation, with emphasis on the importance of building up the national Government’s capacity to manage a large program of infrastructure works, and especially rehabilitation of deteriorated roads for the high-level goal of supporting Poland’s economic growth. It was also intended to serve the narrower goal of making sure Poland did not miss out on large grants being offered by the EU for a limited period to ease the transition to EU membership and reduce the income disparity between the new members and the EU core. When the projects were being prepared, Poland was indeed missing out on ISPA funds that were offered but not taken up, because the Government failed to submit applications for good projects.

3 The new government that took office in September 2005 broke up the Ministry of Infrastructure (created by the previous government) and reverted to a Ministry of Transport.

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The project concept – or more correctly, the program concept – was sound regarding the urgency of Poland’s need and the proposition that Bank attention to maintenance would help secure larger budget allocations for an activity with a very high and quick economic return but which, for lack of political attention, would otherwise go under-funded. And it embodied many elements of the SWAp approach, conceived as a response to complaints from large middle-income borrowers about the high transaction cost of doing business with the Bank. The first loan rightly attached considerable importance to a diagnosis of the institutional set-up for planning road investments and managing their implementation. In the long run, the most significant benefit from this program would be the re-invigoration of the roads administration, built around resource allocation decisions based on technical and economic reasoning rather than local politics.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Indicators, PDO and Results Framework There is a lack of internal clarity in parts of each project’s documentation regarding the PDOs and the indicators – they are written in different ways in different places. The PDOs as written in the two Loan Agreements are the most specific and come closest to encompassing the full scope of the project. They read as follows:

“The objective of the Project is to improve the effectiveness of Poland's national road rehabilitation and maintenance systems through: (i) significantly increasing the percentage of national roads in good conditions; (ii) establishing reliable and stable funding for the national road maintenance and rehabilitation network and for road safety; and (iii) improving the capacity within GDDKiA to operate efficiently and effectively and to reflect the views of road users in developing its programs.”4

As noted, however, there are inconsistencies in the documentation which create some ambiguity about the objectives and their measurement. For example, in RMR1, the above PDO taken from the Loan Agreement appears in the PAD’s Results Framework as:

The project aims to improve the overall quality of the national roads network to speed up Poland’s economic integration in the EU.

The indicator for this PDO in the Framework reads, “Development of a coherent roads expenditure program with an adequately balanced maintenance/investment program to meet Poland’s needs as an EU member.”5 In the ISR6, the indicator for the same PDO reads, “GDDKiA’s institutional capacity and performance developed.” (A second PDO indicator on condition of roads was added in 2006; though here it was added as a PDO indicator, the same indicator appears in RMR2 as an intermediate results indicator). The indicators in the Minutes of Negotiation come closest to being internally consistent with the PDO as it is written in the Loan Agreement, and it is these upon which this assessment is based. However, it is

4 The second project’s Loan Agreement, adds the words “continue to” [improve the effectiveness…] and so forth.

5 This PDO indicator does not appear in any other project document.

6 The respective datasheets in this ICR are generated from the information in the ISR.

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important to note, that even the PDO in the Loan Agreement does not capture all the major activities under the projects. Finally, given some of these ambiguities, there is the question of weighting the respective significance of the sub-development objectives. Around 90 percent of all project funds went to the rehabilitation of roads, which as discussed below, was satisfactory. The strictly institutional reform components comprised a little over 1 percent, though when the related MIS component is factored in, as well as the measures taken to reduce traffic fatalities, it largely account for the rest of the funds. The question arises: which is the higher order objective and should govern the overall assessment? This report takes the view that the institutional components of the project, in the long run, have the potential to lead to greater impact, and that since their success has only been moderate they must carry a strong weighting in this review. Sub-objective 1: Significantly increase the percentage of national roads in good conditions7

GDDKiA’s excellent March 2007 report on the condition of national roads at the end of 2006 showed that since 2002, the percentage of roads in good condition had risen from the high 20s to the low 50s. The target in the PAD for the percentage of national roads in good condition was 55 percent8. The actual at the end of 2006 was 53 percent, showing considerable improvement over the situation prevailing before the first project, of about 37 percent. (Rehabilitation activities were completed by 2006; the projects were extended for the institutional components.) Also, statistics may not capture road sections improved as part of contracts that had not yet been completed.

Though fitting somewhat more logically within the PDO from the PAD that relates to meeting EU standards, a second works activity under RMR2 was strengthening national roads to take trucks of maximum weight authorized by the EU standard for single axle weight (11.5 tons per single axle). Here the target for 2006 was strengthening 2,400 km; actual was well above at 2,912 km.

Sub-objective 2: Establish reliable and stable funding for the national road maintenance and rehabilitation network and for road safety

The target was to have a rolling six-year road expenditure program approved by MoT, originally by 2005 (RMR1 only). The actual: the program was drawn up each year, and by 2007 a local consultant prepared a program based on a nationwide assessment of road condition, updated traffic counts and a comparison of alternative maintenance strategies, using HDM-4. The 2007 report demonstrated a full understanding of the technical issues driving the selection of an economically optimal program of maintenance and rehabilitation works for a network under budget constraints. Management of GDDKiA’s branches in Bialystok and Krakow showed the ICR mission full familiarity and understanding of HDM-4’s capacities and its strengths and weaknesses. It showed us that the current budget and plan are largely – though perhaps not wholly-driven by HDM results. Limited documents given to the mission support the proposition that all GDDKiA branches have strengthened their capacity to do likewise through training of at least two staff in each branch. In-country observers spoke of Bialystok and Krakow as Poland’s best in this regard; other branches may be weaker.

Road Safety. The sub-objective refers to establishing stable funding for road safety but it does not mention the substantial activities carried out aimed at the reduction of road fatalities. The outcome is

7 The targets considered below are those of the second loan, those for the first loan having been subsumed or adjusted by appraisal and negotiation of the second loan. 8 In the second ISR, this was revised down to 52 percent with no comment.

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mixed and difficult to assess for several reasons. Overall, fatalities nationwide are down about 31 percent since the early 1990s when the death count peaked. But the 2008 actual of 5,437 is 22 percent higher (i.e. worse) than the target. It should be noted, however, that the target was set for the whole network, of which GDDKiA is responsible for only 5 percent in length (though this includes about half of the traffic). Also, the statistic is an absolute number, not an accident rate that allows for fleet growth. From 2005 to 2008 the number of deaths on the whole network, as well as on just national roads, remained virtually static. Since road traffic was growing at least 10 percent per year during this period, the rate of fatalities improved.

Sub-objective 3: Improve the capacity within GDDKiA to operate efficiently and effectively and to reflect the views of road users in developing its programs

A Management Action Plan was developed to formalize business plans governing MoT’s mandate to GDDKiA, and GDDKiA HQ’s mandate to regional branches. The target was to agree among the parties and to implement. Actual: only partly implemented. As seen in Section 2.2, government changes led to delays and losses in momentum, and as timed passed, the need was found to redefine substantially the reform measures that would be required, and hence the TA tasks likewise needed redefinition, and in some cases, scaling back. Some significant progress was made in the following areas: (i) overall diagnosis and assessment, (ii) decentralization of some functions from HQ to branch offices; (iii) re-engineering of key business processes and procedures in GDDKiA; and (iv) creation of new units within GDDKiA on environment, technology, monitoring, the EU, and audit and control. But a wider reorganization and a full capability for planning and analysis, and a complete decentralization is not yet realized.

GDDKiA approved the Strategy for a Comprehensive Information Technology System in early 2004, designed under RMR1, and an MIS began its roll-out to GDDKiA’s regional offices to standardize accounting practices and internal procedures. Not all contracts, however, have been completed (The contract for workflow-processing was canceled from loan funding and postponed until the enterprise resources processing software – another contract under the project – was further along in its implementation). A pilot start-up of the key modules of the MIS system, and all financial management and accounting components, took place in January 2009, the start of GDDKiA’s financial year. Road user satisfaction surveys completed and published. 2006 target: completed. Actual: A base-line survey was conducted in mid-2004, followed by another in early 2005. The most recent one was undertaken in January 2009, including questions that allow direct comparison with the results of the earlier surveys. Its results were not available at the time this ICR was written. Users’ dissatisfaction ex ante with the poor quality of the roads was well documented but not their response to the specific works carried out under the projects, since such narrowly dedicated surveys would have been hard to carry out and of limited use for GDDKiA’s overall public relations communication activities.

Award of pilot contract for performance-based maintenance by private sector (RMR1 only): 2005 target: one contract awarded. Actual: GDDKiA decided not to pursue this option using loan funds, preferring to use its own resources at a later date. At no point has GDDKiA shown much sense of ownership for this proposal. The Bank recognizes that international experience with performance-based road maintenance by the private sector is still somewhat experimental and, if it is to succeed, requires a willing and engaged client. It therefore accepted GDDKiA’s decision.

3.3 Efficiency Neither appraisal report presented an economic return (ER) for a set of specific road sections. Instead, in the spirit of a program loan, they evaluated the capacity of the borrower to conduct economic analysis

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appropriately. It was judged fully satisfactory, showing the necessary precision and detail. In due course, 80 percent of sections were selected using HDM4. The PADs summarized the main parameters of the calculation. All road sections would already be in poor condition and yet carry traffic of at least 6,000 vehicles per day. Steady traffic growth was expected throughout the network, leading to a doubling in less than ten years. The typical unit savings in vehicle operating costs were also stated. The core elements of the analysis were: (i) the cost per km for the proposed works and the additional works cost that would have to be incurred to rebuild the road if left to deteriorate further; (ii) starting traffic and forecast traffic growth rate; and (iii) unit vehicle operating costs without and with the project. With the values given, they would each generate an ER of at least 25%, well above the opportunity cost of capital –and in many cases far higher returns. In this sense, the quality at entry was satisfactory. Both PADs included a table showing the year-by-year costs and benefits for a single example. However, these tables were not informative, since they did not make clear any of the core elements of evaluation listed above. As for the present ex-post evaluation, the final construction cost and actual traffic after improvement are now known. However, we do not have calculations for all the hundreds of sections improved, only a few examples from one region based on sample review. Examples from the Bialystok region show rates of return per road section calculated for appraisal of between 27 and 50 percent, comparing timely overlays against no immediate intervention but reconstruction several years later. Such high rates of economic return are not uncommon for works of this type on roads carrying as much traffic as is common in Poland. ERs calculated after the works were completed (i.e. using actual construction cost and actual opening year traffic) are even higher, ranging from 42% to 87%. However, the Bialystok ex-post analysis is not strictly comparable with the ex-ante, as the ex-ante analysis had been done some years before the Project, using a simplified methodology.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately satisfactory This rating averages the satisfactory relevance of design, the satisfactory outcome of the road works, and the moderately satisfactory outcomes of the technical assistance. It is weighted on the basis that, while the road network is a high economic priority for the sector, the institutional components are equally – if not more – important in terms of longer term development impact.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development NA (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening As seen in Section 3.2, achievement of the institutional objectives has been somewhat disappointing so far, since among the four main areas – road safety, management restructuring, introduction of a comprehensive MIS, and launching of a pilot performance-based maintenance contract – only road safety has really put in place a productive mechanism, staffed by competent and energetic people, and already showing effective results.

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The National Road Safety Council has been functioning now since about 2001 but did not become fully effective until around 2004. It has brought together all national-level stakeholders and launched numerous safety campaigns. It has publicized high-risk sites (“black spots”), the wearing of helmets by motorcyclists, and the use of vehicle headlights in daytime for added visibility. Its campaign for wearing seatbelts won a national award for ‘most effective social campaign launched in Poland in 2005”. Poland has been recognized as having one of the most effective campaigns for reducing alcohol-related deaths on the road. And it is working on the issue of safety-testing of second-hand cars, which are being imported in large numbers from the richer EU member countries. The first loan financed the road safety coordinator, speed detection cameras, rescue vehicles for clearing accident sites, and patrol cars for the Road Transport Inspectorate, which enforces truck licensing, weights and drivers’ hours. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) NA

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Surveys The surveys conducted in 2004 and 2005 rated more than 80% of the network as bad in each of the three regions where the survey was conducted. Expectations were mixed about whether the situation would worsen or improve. It was widely recognized that not enough was being spent on road improvements. The respondents showed very limited awareness of the role of GDDKiA, tending instead to blame local governments. Many respondents expressed the wish to see public information on the road expenditure program issued regularly. A survey completed in January 2009 found that the negative perception had dropped to 61%; but at least two issues make drawing conclusions from these surveys problematical. First, the survey was not targeted only at roads funded by the project, and second, the questions on the two surveys were different. Perceptions of road changes tend to take some time, as most users tend to remain in their local area and only gradually begin to perceive changes in the greater system. In future, surveys will need to be more precise and consistent to provide a more nuanced beneficiary assessment.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcomes Rating: Moderate The national government and the MoT leadership at the time of this writing have become strongly supportive of the concept of large-scale rehabilitation and modernization of the national road network. This is encouraged by the European Commission, not just with words but also with money, on a big scale, as evidenced by the involvement of EIB in co-financing RMR2, and the generally rapid and appropriate implementation of the third loan in this series programmed for 2006 to 2011. GDDKiA produces good quality periodic reports that clearly present relevant data on the condition of the network and apply appropriate logic in arriving at estimates of the financing needs and the priorities that should govern choices within the network in order to live within a constrained budget. On the other hand, until its change of management in 2008, GDDKiA did not show the degree of ownership of the program that one might have expected. The TA contracts progressed slowly. But HDM-4 has been used by consultants and at least some of the regions. A concern going forward is the adequacy of annual road maintenance budgets to sustain the priority of maintenance over new construction. The budget for 2008 fell substantially short of what was needed –

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about PLN 2.5-3 billion per year. The budget for 2009 also has been severely cut – as part of the government’s response to the global economic crisis. Though hit less hard than some, it has also been affected by the severe economic downturn in the neighboring countries. The Government is faced with difficult fiscal choices. Under RMR3 the Bank continues to remind it of the importance of adequate budgeting for maintenance, if the gains of the past few years are to be sustained.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory For many years, the Bank in its dialogue with the Polish Government had advocated increased funding to maintenance, which the Government had been neglecting, allowing the road network to deteriorate severely to the point where the economy suffered and trade was constrained. The results of the works carried out under these two operations have been good and widely welcomed by road-users’ and have made a significant contribution to the road system. Incorporating HDM-4, a model developed under World Bank leadership, contributed to efficiency and planning at the regional level.

‘Soft’ components were designed to strengthen government capacity for economically sound road planning, budgeting and accountability for results; GDDKiA lacked champions for reform, while today MoT strongly supports road sector reforms and is taking courageous initiatives. The World Bank worked with the Government to build such elements into the project framework which have contributed to these positive developments.

The Bank encouraged GDDKiA toward greater transparency, through ‘clean’ procurement (now valued by the Polish government) and consultation with road users, other government branches and civil society. Finally, the Bank strongly pushed for greater attention to road safety through three consecutive operations, and it is paying off. The National Road Safety Council is now up and running and delivering excellent initiatives to inform the public.

The positive features above are somewhat mitigated by a monitoring and evaluation framework that had weaknesses, such as the exclusion of important indicators, and previously noted inconsistencies. Also, as noted above, there was an inherent design flaw, in that the rehabilitation and maintenance components under the first project were planned to happen quickly to prepare the way for a quick transition to the second project. However, the institutional components needed to progress at a slower pace, and impeded the readiness for important parts of the second project. Finally, there were broad inconsistencies between the road user surveys completed in 2005 and early 2009 which weakened some measurements of progress.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory Frequency of supervision (two to three missions each year) has been adequate and the supervision teams have brought to bear all the relevant skills, some from HQ and some from the Warsaw office, in a cost-effective way. The Bank team brought in technical specialists to try to resolve differences in the delayed TA contracts. It also helped MoT secure Spanish trust funds to pay for a consultant who provided sound advice on so-called second-generation PPP’s for motorway concessions.

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(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Poland is a sophisticated country that joined the EU only three years ago and is poised to play a large role among the new members from the former Eastern bloc, because of its economic size and central location. It has, however, lacked strong and consistent political leadership over the recent years, which perhaps is to blame for the somewhat disappointing performance of the roads administration over the past decade. That being said, the condition of the road network has been improving steadily since 2004. The World Bank’s lending operations have played a substantial part in shining the spotlight on the right things: rehabilitation before new construction, and building institutional capacity. The Bank’s willingness to innovate in the design of these projects is commendable, though improved planning and design, as noted above, might have enhanced some of the institutional progress.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory The Ministry of Infrastructure/Transport has performed in a fully satisfactory way, notably by ensuring rapid compliance with the conditions of board presentation and effectiveness, as well as complying with its obligations regarding financial management and reporting (with just one supervision period when FM was rated moderately unsatisfactory). (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory As noted already, implementation of the civil works component and the road safety component have been satisfactory, whereas the rest of the capacity-building component is much delayed and the TA contracts are still in progress. This makes it impossible to judge whether the latter objective will be met. GDDKiA is the locus of most of the delay, because of the internal and external weaknesses noted above. There is some basis for attributing some of the delays to higher changes in government beyond GDDKiA’s control. That said, GDDKiA was the central locus of implementation. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory GDDKiA is the central implementing agency, which ought to have taken full advantage of these operations to strengthen its technical and management capacity, but it has not, and consequently many of the activities have not reached fruition. 6. Lessons Learned What can the Polish experience teach us about SWAps? The experience of these projects is relevant to other middle-income countries. These two loans were an early example of applying the so-called “Sector-

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Wide Approach” (SWAp) concept9, and like some other early SWAps, these were hybrids. The SWAp concept aims to address flexibly the need to reduce the transaction cost of lending to middle-income countries, and in this respect, these two operations have been successful. Having ex-post reviews instead of ex-ante, not only simplified Bank supervision, but also enhanced the implementation process for the client. A second characteristic of a SWAp is ‘greater reliance on country systems.’ With regard to the road components, the Government was successful in utilizing the country’s regional apparatus. The Bank approved the medium-term investment plan of the implementing agency (MoI/MoT) on the basis of its prior Public Expenditure Review and use of HDM-4, a rigorous tool for ensuring that investment priorities would be based on economic reasoning. The road components – the great majority of the projects’ funds – were quick disbursing, with more than $100 million having been disbursed in about half a year in each case. Mixing quick-disbursing operations with capacity building risks disappointment. It was logical for the Bank to offer relatively large, quick-disbursing support to a part of the infrastructure that is perennially a poor cousin: maintenance and rehabilitation – because the new economy of the enlarged EU is very much reliant on intra-EU trade and much of that trade is road-based; and because mobility is a fairly high priority among consumption goals in new middle income countries. However, institutional change is never rapid, even in a literate, educated country, especially during a period of political instability. It may be tempting to hope that the fast-disbursing elements of a project will generate leverage to induce institutional change, but success is far from assured. Since the first of these loans, the Bank has rightly increased emphasis on results as the central criterion for evaluating success and hence for orienting management attention – ‘what gets measured gets managed’ – both in the Bank and in the borrower’s administration. These operations, which embody that policy, suggest that the key performance indicators should become an integral part of the loan agreement, rather than a supplementary letter which is not (clearly) in the public domain, so that everyone gives them more prominence in design and implementation. At the same time, attention needs to be paid to ensuring consistency and clarity in the definition of the indicators. Too often in Bank projects, measures that are proposed to mitigate risks are not sufficiently targeted or given enough “teeth” to get the job done. In the case of the MAP component, the risk mitigation measures were “close monitoring of the progress made in the implementation of the GDDKiA MAP and annual review of budget allocations…” which do not fall outside the regular boundaries of normal supervision. If approaching a complex or difficult component which contains risks which could compromise implementation, unless realistic mitigation measures can be proposed which have a reasonable chance of being successful, the component should be carefully reexamined and other options considered. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

The views and comments expressed by the Borrower in Annex 7 are consistent with this Report. (b) Cofinanciers

9 More precisely, it could be categorized as “Program-Based” as the program was focusing wholly on the road sector.

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(c) Other partners and stakeholders

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

RMR1

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)*

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)*

Percentage of Appraisal

A. GDDKiA modernization action plan 2.86 1.60 56% B. Road maintenance & rehabilitation program

131.60 133.31 101%

C Road safety improvement program 6.44 6.57 102% D. Design and Procurement of long-term pilot contracts for the Performance-based Management and Maintenance of Roads (Promotion of P in the road sector)

0.71 0.84 118%

Total Baseline Cost 141.61 142.32 100.5%**

Physical Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0%

Price Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0% Total Project Costs 141.61 142.32 100.5%

Front-end fee IBRD 1.43 0.72 50% Total Financing Required 143.04 143.04 100%

* Exchange Rate 1 EUR =1.4304 USD as of 29-Oct-2007. ** Additional 0,5% resulted from decrease in Front-end fee level. (b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)*

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 70.50 202.30 286.95 IBRD 124.70 122.04 97.87 * includes external sources such as EU grants or EIB loans.

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RMR 2

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal

Estimate (USD millions)*

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)*

Percentage of Appraisal**

Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Program

137.32 137.32

Goods under Management Information System

5.29 5.29

Consultants’ services including auditing services and TA for MIS

0.43 0.43

Total Baseline Cost 143.04 143.04 100%

Physical Contingencies

0.0

0.00

0%

Price Contingencies

0.0

0.00

0% Total Project Costs 143.04 143.04 100%

Project Preparation Fund 0.00 0.00 0% Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0%

Total Financing Required 143.04 143.04 100%

* Exchange Rate 1 EUR =1.4304 USD as of 29-Oct-2007. ** Percentage based on estimations dated October 29, 2007. TA for MIS and goods for MIS are still to be financed under the loan. (b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)*

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 77.50 250.00 322.58IBRD 130.50 121.28 92.93* includes external sources such as EU grants or EIB loans.

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component RMR 1 – Outputs by Component

Component/ Subcomponent

Expected Outputs (from PAD/Original

Implementation Plan)

Actual Delivered Outputs

Remarks

Component A: GDDKiA Modernization Action PlanMap Phase I Detailed diagnosis and

implementation of modernization measures.

Consultant FinnRoad delivered its Phase I report in December 2004, which focused on diagnosis of the institutional weaknesses and recommendations for short-term solutions.

Delays in 2005 caused by change in Government.

MAP Phase II and III Conclude process of GDDKiA reorganization at central level; undertake reorganization at regional level. Establish a proper system of strategic planning

In 2007, FinnRoad delivered two of the most important parts of its Phase II (Implementation) report: the draft ‘contracts’ between MOT and GDDKiA, and between GDDKiA and its branches. GDDKiA was not satisfied with the first draft.

The contract is still ongoing and nearly two years late.

Advisory services for six-year planning for GDDKiA.

Updated rolling six-year expenditure program elaborated using HDM-4.

A rolling six-year program has been drawn up each year, but only in 2007 has a local consultant prepared a program well based on a nationwide assessment of road condition, updated traffic counts and a comparison of alternative maintenance strategies, such as HDM-4 allows. This was delivered in July 2007 and is pending approval by GDDKiA.

Advisory services for six-year planning for GDDKiA.

Preparation of PR Strategy.

Strengthening of GDDKiA spokesman office and improvement of public relations with road users.

PR Strategy was developed and approved by the GDDKiA. Its web site was upgraded and new services were added (i.e. road information system, internet press office)

Actions started under RMR1 are followed up by projects financed from RMR III.

Component B: Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation ProgramRoad Maintenance and Rehabilitation.

Improvement of the national roads network.

Number of roads in good condition rose from 40.1% in 2003 up to 45.5% in 2004.

917 km of roads were treated with pavement maintenance & rehabilitation, including improvement of drainage system and road safety features.

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Component C: Road Safety Improvement Program NRSC Strengthening. Traffic accident

fatalities (whole network, national and regional): 2006 target: <4,500. Actual: 5,243 – some 15% away from target.

Regional Black Spot Treatment Program was started on regional and local roads in all 16 regions of the country. Number of road deaths has been cut, even while traffic has been growing at 10-15% per year. It is estimated that in 2005 and 2006 - 289 road crashes were avoided, 10 lives were saved and 85 serious injuries were prevented. A successful seatbelt campaign was launched (93% of targeted audience was reached). The project was awarded the EFFIE prize for the most effective non-profit campaign in Poland. 560 country professionals received five day training on road safety issues. Purchase of three patrol cars & office vans increased the efficiency of Road Transport Inspectorate. Number of weight controls raised from 158 202.00 in 2005 up to 160 267.00 in 2006.

Target is for the whole network, of which GDDKiA is responsible for only 5% in length (though about half of traffic), and the statistic is absolute, not an accident rate that allows for fleet growth.

Road Transport Inspectorate

Increased number of weight controls. Resulted in increased amount collected by Road Transport Inspectorate from fines.

Fire Brigade Purchase of two heavy rescue vehicles increased the population protection rate in Mazovia and Silesia voivodeships. Response time was also diminished.

Police 17 speed cameras were procured. In voivodeships where cameras were installed, the number of road accidents diminished by 5.5% in comparison to 19 % increase in rest of the voivodeships in the same period.

Component D: Promotion of PPP in the Road Sector Preparation of long-term performance based area maintenance contracts (PMMR).

2005 target: one contract awarded.

Two years late, not yet awarded, and borrower ownership is in doubt. The consultant has not completed a background statement of the rationale and draft bidding documents to GDDKiA’s satisfaction.

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RMR2 – Outputs by Component

Component/

Subcomponent

Expected Outputs (from PAD/Original

Implementation Plan)

Actual Delivered Outputs

Remarks

Component A: Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation ProgramRoad maintenance and rehabilitation.

Percentage of national roads in good condition: 2006 target: 55%.

Actual: 53%, showing considerable improvement over the situation prevailing before the first project, of about 37%. The overall value for end 2006 was very close to the target

749.2 km of roads were treated with pavement maintenance & rehabilitation, including improvement of drainage system and road safety features.

Component B: Management Information SystemMIS design. Management

Information System adopted and implemented successfully in GDDKiA.

The full start-up of the entire MIS system, including all financial management and accounting components, was programmed for January 2009, the start of GDDKiA’s financial year. ERP system will be fully implemented by mid 2009.

Advisory services for six-year planning for GDDKiA.

Updated rolling six-year expenditure program elaborated using HDM-4.

GDDKiA’s branches in Bialystok and Krakow showed full familiarity and understanding of HDM-4’s and that current budget and plan are largely driven by HDM results.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis To date, the only examples of economic re-evaluation of rehabilitation sections at completion come from the Bialystok regional office. The three sections shown in the table all had relatively high initial traffic and high economic rates of return. The pavements were 25 years old and extensively cracked (25-35% of surface). The information supplied gives the actual investment cost and opening year traffic but not the appraisal estimates. We therefore lack the basis for evaluating whether the outcome exceeded or fell short of the forecast economic return. The very high ex post economic internal rates of return are not surprising, considering the relatively heavy traffic for a two-lane road (4,000-6,000 vehicles per day) and the poor initial condition of the pavement.

Contract

No.

Section

Description

Length (km)

Cost per km

($000)

Actual Traffic

VEH/day

Initial Pavement

IRI

ER at Appraisal

(%)

ER at Completion

(%)

1

Modernization of NR 61 Warsaw-Augustow, Piatnica-Stawiski section

21.8 412 6,173 3.6 50 87

2

Modernization of NR 61, Warsaw-Augustow, Stawiski-Grajewo section + crossing with NR 669

7.0 654 4,353 4.9 50 81

3

Rehabilitation & pavement strengthening of NR8, Sztabin-Kolnica section

5.3 906 5,472 3.6 27 42

In each case: Surface age: 25 years IRI after rehabilitation: 1.5

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Annex 4. Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending Michel Audigė Lead Transport Specialist ECSSD Team Leader Anca Dumitrescu Transport Specialist ECSSD Team Leader Andreas Schliessler Senior Transport Specialist ECSSD Peer Reviewer Barbara Letachowicz Environmental Specialist ECSSD Environment William Paterson Consultant EASTR Peer Reviewer Chiyo Kanda Quality Reviewer OPCIL Quality Chiyo Kanda Senior Operations Officer OPCIL Peer Reviewer Claudia Pardinas-Ocana Senior Counsel LEGEC Legal Daria Goldstein Counsel LEGEC Legal Elena Kastlerova Transport Specialist ECSIE Transport Elzbieta Siemenska Procurement Specialist ECSPS Procurement Iwona Warzecha Senior Financial Management

Specialist ECSPS Financial

Management Marie Laygo Program Assistant ECSSD Team Support Supervision/ICR Michel Audigė Lead Transport Specialist ECSSD Team Leader Anca Dumitrescu Transport Specialist ECSSD Team Leader Radoslaw Czapski Operations Officer ECSIE Team Leader Claudia Pardinas-Ocana Senior Counsel LEGEC Legal Daria Goldstein Counsel LEGEC Legal Iwona Warzecha Sr. Financial Management Specialist ECSPS Financial

Management Karina Mostipan Sr. Procurement Specialist ECSPS Procurement Magdalena Wasik Program Assistant ECCU7 Team Support Malgorzata Michnowska Program Assistant ECCU7 Team Support Marcin Jan Sasin Economist ECSPE Economic Analysis Marie Laygo Program Assistant ECSIE Team Support Piotr Krzyzanowski Senior Environmental Specialist ECSSD Safeguards Robert Kietlinski Senior Operations Officer ECSIE Operations Zoe Kolovou Senior Counsel LEGEC Legal Ross Pavis Operations Officer ECSSD ICR Team Leader Graham Smith Consultant ECSSD ICR Author

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(b) Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle

RMR1

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY03 23.9 62.8 FY04 31.8 101.1

Total 56.3 164.7 Supervision/ICR

FY04 0.7 0.85 FY05 21.1 58.6 FY06 18.1 52.6 FY07 9.6 30.0 FY08 12.3 31.8 FY09 17.0 51.6

Total 78.9 226.0

Stage of Project Cycle

RMR2

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY05 35.7 112.9

Total 35.7 112.9 Supervision/ICR

FY05 0.2 0.1 FY06 30.2 77.1 FY07 15.6 54.2 FY08 16.7 58.6 FY09l 19.4 58.2

Total 82.1 248.2

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results A Beneficiary Survey, “Public Attitudes Toward the Need of Bearing Costs for Using the Road Infrastructure in Poland” was carried out in December, 2004, by Pracownia Badań Społecznych. Issues that stood out included a very poor public perception of the roads. Users appeared willing to contribute additional costs that could be required to upgrade roads but had a strong belief that the money that was currently being spent was wasted. This strong perception of wastage seemed to be one of the most important causes of the low credibility of those responsible for road maintenance. Until there could be a perception change, the public seemed extremely hesitant to contribute more funds. The survey found that the most successful channels for potentially changing public opinion would be radio and the local press.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results NA

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Implementation Completion Report for the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project (7223-POL) and the Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project (7282-POL) – Ministry’s input The Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Loan (7223-POL) and the Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Loan (7282-POL) were considered from the beginning as a part of a larger financial envelope for several yearly programmes for maintenance and rehabilitation, starting from the year 2004 (“Programme”). At the beginning the financial scope of the Programme was defined as: WB financing 350 MEUR EIB financing 500 MEUR Budget 200 MEUR Total 1050 MEUR The total contribution of the WORLD BANK was estimated at 350 MEUR which were finally divided into free Finance Loans. The largest portion of the financing was dedicated to the financing of maintenance and rehabilitation interventions: (i) 92,5 MEUR and (ii) 96 MEUR out of 100 MEUR in each case. These works components were to finance the yearly governmental Programmes in 2004 and 2005 realized by the road administration (“GDDKiA”). The outstanding amounts were dedicated to several technical assistance schemes to be mainly implemented by GDDKiA in the field of road administration modernization: (i) MAP performed by the Finnish consultant Finnroad, (ii) first stage of MIS, (iii) HDM4 implementation, and (iv) area maintenance under the PMMR task. The other components of the road safety character were implemented by:(i) the National Road Safety Council acting in the Ministry of Infrastructure, (ii) Police, (iii) Fire Brigade, (iv) main Inspectorate for Road Transport. All these components were identified as a support to the implementation of the RMR programme in order to improve the efficiency of the Polish road related authorities and to increase confidence of the Polish public towards the implemented actions on the road network. I RMR Programme At the start of the Programme implementation a serious backlog in the area of national road maintenance was identified. In previous years the allocated funds were insufficient to improve the quality of the network. Thanks to WORLD BANK support the dedicated financial envelope increased substantially and enabled GDDKiA to constantly improve the status of its assets. Starting in 2004 we had only 45 % of roads in good condition and at the end of 2008 (last available results) the percentage increased over 53 %. We have observed also a decrease for roads in bad condition (with approximately same level of % for the roads in acceptable one) from 26 % in 2004 to 21% in 2008. With the start of the programme, Polish authorities focused on the pavement treatment itself, implementing schemes dealing with the surface layers treatment. As a result the percentage of roads in good condition improved by 5,4%. Thereafter, it was decided to expand the scope of the works, not limiting to the pavement reconstruction but also including intervention on the lower road layers, shoulders, drainage system, vertical road signs and minor road safety facilities. This approach has increased the average km cost of the implemented schemes but proved to be an efficient and effective way of adapting our roads to modern standards of load axle requirements. As a result, the same percentage of roads in good condition improved for the next year of RMR implementation on an average of 2-4%.

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A strong cooperation with EIB was initiated, following the WORLD BANK’S access to the programme, which finally developed in the form of four loans taken by the Republic of Poland and the National Road Fund amounting to MEUR 800. Moreover, it is to emphasize that the Polish Government is determined to continue this approach in the next years, spending the revenues from the excise tax solely to the road management and maintenance purposes, since the new road investment mechanism through NRF was implemented in 2009. II TA Schemes in GDDKiA As part of the financial package proposed by the WORLD BANK, several areas of intervention for improvement in GDDKiA were identified. The assessment concurred with the analysis performed by the Ministry and the road administration itself about deficiencies of the system and the absorption capacity. The first to be implemented and which constituted a trigger for the other assumed TA components was the Modernization Action Plan (MAP). The task realized by Finnroad was implemented in two stages. The consultant’s conclusions were analyzed carefully by the Polish side. Some of those considerations were implemented internally in the structural reforms and partial decentralization of responsibilities. The realization of the Management Information System (MIS) components was delayed over time. The ERP system to be implemented under the second RMR (7282-POL) Project was shifted to the next loan (third RMR – 7384-POL) and is still under implementation. The first tests started during the current year at GDDKiA headquarters and at the Warsaw branch - the rest of the branches will follow over time. The full implementation of MIS will considerably contribute and will complement the a/m restructuring. The HDM-4 tool implementation financed under the 7282-POL loan was intended to strengthen and prioritize the process for the identification of road investments. HDM-4 is being used by GDDKiA headquarters to prioritize the road maintenance and rehabilitation schemes identified by the GDDKiA regions within yearly programmes. The full implementation of HDM-4 in all branches has been left to their decision. The WORLD BANK resources also financed activities and consultants for a public relations strategy for GDDKiA. With the help of the Bank, the multi-year strategy was prepared and implemented. Several campaigns were planned and realized; an internal professional communication center and network were created. The PMMR component was ultimately not realized due to some disagreement with the consultant on work outcomes achieved. As a result, GDDKiA has also decided not to finance pilot projects under the third RMR (7384-POL). Despite this unsuccessful outcome, however, GDDKiA is trying to implement these types of activities individually in some of the regions using some forms of output-based contracts. Even if the implementation of several components was encumbered by several changes in the management of the Ministry and GDDKiA, the general line of reforms is still maintained. The road administration, facing the implementation of a large and ambitious investment programme, supported largely from EU funds, is internally reforming and adapting its own structures, including the standardization of preparatory and monitoring procedures. Nevertheless, the scope of changes in GDDKiA, and the current assumptions for the changes, diverge from the project outcomes defined for the both loans. III Road Safety The NRSC support in the first RMR (7223-POL) was a continuation of previous cooperation under the Second Roads project (4236-POL). World Bank support helped NRSC to prepare a large programme

29

aimed at the improvement of public awareness about road safety on all public roads. The media campaigns proved to be a success with a high degree of public identification and acceptance. Those arrangements will be continued under the Third RMR (7384-POL) with possible implementation in 2010 and 2011. IV Other Components In RMR 1 (7223-POL) there were also minor components implemented including: (i) acquisition of photo radars by the Police Headquarters; (ii) acquisition of accident rescue cars by the Fire Brigade Headquarters; and (iii) acquisition of adapted passenger cars and vans for the Main Institute of Road Transport. All those components were part of larger investment programmes realized by the relevant authorities. These purchases intended to strengthen the road safety enforcement and accident prevention on the Polish roads. Following the received post-realization feedback, the new facilities helped considerably those entities in achieving defined goals in the area of safety improvement on public roads.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders NA

31

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Aide Memoires, Back-to-Office Reports, and Implementation Status Reports. Project Appraisal Documents (Nos. 27577 POL and 31324 POL). Legal Agreements (7223 POL and 7282 POL). Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) in Europe and Central Asia : Early Lessons of Experience: ECA

Quality Unit, ECSPS, November 2006. Gambit 2005 National Road Safety Program, National road Safety Council, Poland. Poland: Strategic Priorities for the Transport Sector. Public attitude towards the need of bearing costs for using the road infrastructure in Poland by the

individual users analysis by Pracownia Badań Społecznych (December 2004). ARC Rynek I Opinia, Report from Quantity Study [Opinion Survey?] of the Directorate General for

National Roads and Motorways, July 2005 (powerpoint). Review of Road Safety Projects of the RMRI: Contribution to the Implementation Completion Report

(Working Document). Technical Assistance to Prepare A Modernization Action Plan (MAP) to Enhance the Capacity of

General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways, Phase 1 and 2; Finnroad (Final Report, September 2007).

Scott Wilson report on performance-based contracts. General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways Report on the Technical Condition of

Pavements of National Roads as at End-2006, March 2007 (prepared by DRO-Konsult).

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Annex 10. Datasheet for Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation 2

A. Basic Information

Country: Poland Project Name: Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project

Project ID: P088824 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-72820

ICR Date: June 18, 2009 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: Republic of Poland

Original Total Commitment:

USD 130.5M Disbursed Amount: USD 121.3 M

Environmental Category: FI (Financial Intermediary)

Implementing Agencies: General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA)

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: European Investment Bank B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 10/28/2004 Effectiveness: 06/16/2005 06/16/2005

Appraisal: 02/17/2005 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 03/29/2005 Mid-term Review: 02/28/2006 10/03/2006

Closing: 12/31/2007 6/30/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments (if

any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes for Program

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 4 4

Roads and highways 96 96

Theme Code (Primary/Secondary)

Infrastructure services for private sector development 40 40

Injuries and non-communicable diseases 20 20

Regional integration 40 40 E. Bank Staff for Program

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Shigeo Katsu Shigeo Katsu

Country Director: Theodore O. Ahlers (Acting) Roger W. Grawe

Sector Manager: Henry G. R. Kerali Motoo Konishi

Project Team Leader: Radek Czapski Anca Dumitrescu/Michel Audige

ICR Team Leader: Ross Pavis

ICR Primary Authors: Graham Smith, Ross Pavis F. Results Framework Analysis for Program

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Documents) The objective for the Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project was to continue improving the effectiveness of Poland’s national road rehabilitation and maintenance systems by (i) further increasing the percentage of national roads in good condition, (ii) establishing reliable and stable funding for the national road maintenance and rehabilitation network, and (iii) improving the capacity within the Road Administration to operate efficiently and effectively.

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Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) NA (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value Original Target

Values (from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : GDDKiA Modernization Action Plan (MAP)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

MAP adopted, implementation started

MAP shows additional, substantial progress

MAP – Satisfactory progress but slower than expected

Date achieved 02/29/2004 12/31/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)

See Section 3.2 for a fuller discussion of this indicator.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value Original Target

Values (from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Effective use of HDM-4 System by GDDKiA (HDM-4 is a software tool for the analysis, planning, management and appraisal of road maintenance, improvements and investment decisions.)

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

Use at branch and national level started

Usage in at least 50% of branches, based on 2005 or later traffic database.

Yes, but only some branches are able to fully utilize HDM-4’s full potential

Date achieved 05/31/2004 01/31/2008 1/08/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Partly achieved since in spite of extensive training program and dedicated staff only few branch offices use HDM system in their planning

Indicator 2 : Percentage of roads in good condition Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

46% 52% 53%

Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/29/2006 12/01/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

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G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISR

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 06/02/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 04/01/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 115.59 3 01/08/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 116.52 4 01/11/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 117.34

5 02/06/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 117.34

6 07/10/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 117.34

7 04/23/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 121.28

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable Disbursement Profile

KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE

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29

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55

51

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57

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53

63

66

66

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10

10

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11

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15

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1510

10

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16

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Warsaw(Warszawa)

KrosnoNowy Sacz

Tarnow

Przemysl

Rzeszow

Zamosc

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Lublin

Siedlce

BialystokLomza

OstrolekaCiechanow

Olsztyn

SuwalkiElblag

Gdansk

Slupsk

Koszalin

Szczecin

ZielonaGora Lezsno

Legnica

Poznan

JeleniaGora

Walbrzych

Krakow

Katowice

Bielsko-Biala

CzestochowaKielce

Tarnobrzeg

Kalisz

Sieradz

Lodz

PiotrkowTrybunalski

Skierniewice

Radom

Wroclaw

Pila Bydgoszcz

Torun

Wloclawek

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Plock

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GorzowWielkopolski

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BELARUS

14∞ 16∞ 18∞ 20∞ 22 24

16∞ 18∞ 20∞ 22

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IBRD 32974R

APRIL 2009

EXISTING MOTORWAYS ANDEXPRESSWAYS

NATIONAL ROADS

SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

PROVINCE (VOIVODSHIP)BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

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POLAND

FIRST ROADMAINTENANCE AND

REHABILITATIONPROJECT

Baltic SeaNorthSea

POLAND

NORWAYSWEDEN

DENMARK

GERMANYUKRAINE

SWITZ. AUSTRIA HUNGARY ROMANIA

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