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Roads to Europe

Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

Momir Samardžić

Samardžić, MomirRoads to Europe : Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 / Momir Samardžić. - Pisa : Plus-Pisa University Press, 2010(Doctoral Dissertations ; 5)

949.71015 (21.)1. Trasporti ferroviari – Aspetti politici - Serbia – 1878-1881

CIP a cura del Sistema bibliotecario dell’Università di Pisa

This volume is published thanks to the support of the Directorate General for Research of the European Com-mission, by the Sixth Framework Network of Excellence CLIOHRES.net under the contract CIT3-CT-2005-006164.The volume is solely the responsibility of the Network and the authors; the European Community cannot be held responsible for its contents or for any use which may be made of it.

Cover: Adolfo Tommasi (1851-1933), The Steam Whistle (1883), oil on canvas, Museo Civico Fattori, Livorno. ©1996 Photo Scala, Florence

© 2010 by CLIOHRES.netThe materials published as part of the CLIOHRES Project are the property of the CLIOHRES.net Consortium. They are available for study and use, provided that the source is clearly acknowledged.cliohres@cliohres.net - www.cliohres.net

Published by Edizioni Plus – Pisa University PressLungarno Pacinotti, 4356126 PisaTel. 050 2212056 – Fax 050 2212945info.plus@adm.unipi.itwww.edizioniplus.it - Section “Biblioteca”

Member of

ISBN: 978-88-8492-703-3

Informatic EditingRăzvan Adrian Marinescu

Editorial assistanceViktoriya Kolp

To my wife Sara

Contents

PrefaceAnn Katherine Isaacs, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson ....................................................... IX

The CLIOHRES Network of Excellence ...................................................................... » XI

Introduction ............................................................................................................. » 1

Maps .......................................................................................................................... » 4

I. The Railway Issue in the Context of European and Serbian History .................................................................................................. » 71. The Great Powers and the trans-Balkan railway ................................................. » 72. Serbia – economy, infrastructure, politics .......................................................... » 13

2.1. Achievements and limitations of an economy on Europe’s periphery ............... » 142.2. (Under)development of the transport infrastructure ....................................... » 202.3. Serbian politics: the struggle between the creation of the envisaged

state and the development of the real state ...................................................... » 223. The railway issue in Serbian politics (up to 1878) .............................................. » 30

3.1. “Serbia will collapse, unless an iron road is constructed over it!” – the foreign policy struggle for a railway ........................................................ » 31

3.2. “Do we need a railway?” – the railway issue in domestic political discourse ........................................................................................... » 37

II. Serbian Railways between Austria-Hungary and Russia .............. » 451. Serbia after Berlin: international position, finances, internal politics ............... » 45

1.1. Serbia’s international position ......................................................................... » 451.2. The state of government finances ..................................................................... » 481.3. The political situation ...................................................................................... » 50

2. International obligations of Serbia and the railway issue ................................... » 533. Unsuccessful beginnings ...................................................................................... » 57

3.1. Initial contacts with Vienna and St. Petersburg .............................................. » 573.2. Pressure from Vienna – Austro-Serbian negotiations of 1879 ........................ » 623.3. Who will build the railways? ........................................................................... » 67

III. Under Opposition Pressure .................................................................... » 771. Strengthening of the opposition ......................................................................... » 77

1.1. On the verge of a coalition ............................................................................... » 771.2. The collapse of one man’s politics? – “Videlo” on the railway issue ................... » 82

2. Vienna negotiations and the signing of the convention ..................................... » 853. The united opposition against the convention ................................................... » 94

3.1. Criticism on the pages of “Videlo” .................................................................... » 95

p.

3.2. Radicals are preparing to attack – Pašić’s concept of modernization ............... » 973.3. The convention in the Assembly ....................................................................... » 100

IV. In Search of a Financier ............................................................................ » 1071. Ristić’s government before the final decision ...................................................... » 1072. New men, new politics, the old problem – Piroćanac’s government

and the concession ................................................................................................ » 1163. Rise of La Société de l’Union Générale and the Serbian railway

concession ............................................................................................................. » 1214. War in the Assembly – adoption of the convention with the

Union Générale .................................................................................................... » 1294.1. Ally conflict – the establishment of political parties ........................................ » 1294.2. New last minute offers .................................................................................... » 1324.3. The convention in the Assembly ..................................................................... » 135

Conclusion .......................................................................................................... » 143

Notes ...................................................................................................................... » 149

Bibliography ....................................................................................................... » 173

Srpski rezime (Serbian summary) .................................................................. » 183

Note on the Author ......................................................................................... » 198

Maps

1. Balkan Railways, 1875. ........................................................................................ » 4

2. Geopolitical Changes and Balkan Railways, 1879. ............................................ » 5

3. Serbian Road Infrastructure, 1865. ..................................................................... » 6

prefaCe

We are very pleased to present Momir Samardžić’s Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881, the most recent in a series of volumes based on doctoral dissertations of researchers who are members of the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence.

Roads to Europe is not ‘just’ a book about railways, although it is that, and a fasci-nating one. Rather it is the story of how a central issue in the agreement reached at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, by which the European powers recognised Serbia as an independent state became the litmus paper with which Serbia and its neigh-bours measured the right of the young country to be considered free, responsible and able to govern itself. Serbia was obliged to build a railway within a set time, although fulfilling this task was contingent on certain conditions, such as reaching trade agreements with other powers and other countries fulfilling their own obliga-tions to build certain links.

Because of the young country’s central position in the Balkan peninsula, it was of obvious interest to both Serbia and the neighbouring powers to connect it to the existing railways in order to export Serbian goods and products to other countries, for transit of merchandise, and to access the Serbian market – building and run-ning the railway could also be a profitable investment in itself. Interested parties in a variety of countries were ready to vie for the right to build it, often with their governments’ support.

As the first part of the title of the book indicates, the railway issue was much more than a technological or economic issue. It was actually the testing ground to estab-lish what kind of relationships the new country would enjoy with other parts of Europe. The obligation to build the railway forced Serbian politicians and men of culture to reflect and take a position on the future of the country. Ideological orien-tations and different beliefs about the best form of government competed. Would Serbia gravitate towards Russia – as the common Orthodox faith might suggest? Or should Serbs accept the obvious and consolidate bonds with Austria-Hungary? Was it the destiny – or within the capabilities – of the Serbian people to trace a new path to modernity without eroding the existing pattern of landholding, the tradition so-cial structures and values? or was it preferable to embrace western values and set up a constitutional government modelled on those of England or France? and finally

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how would the young country be able to meet its financial obligations; who would build the railway, who would finance it, and who – if anyone – could be trusted?

The existing road transport system was obviously not sufficient to realise dreams of economic integration with Christian Europe, eastern or western. The railroad was necessary, but building it gave rise to well-founded worries that Serbia would open its territories to exploitation by others, becoming economically and politically sub-altern –rather than strong, independent and prosperous.

Momir Samardžić tells a gripping story, based on a remarkable number of original documents. He examines blow by blow the initiatives taken by Serbian authorities and the constraints within which they were forced to act. An original feature of his book is his insistence on the tight link between the necessity of building the railway, the constitution of Serbian government and the shaping of the Serbian political sys-tem. Particularly convincing and illuminating is his careful analysis of the way that Serbian politicians, intellectuals and landholders were forced to take position on the railway issue, thus giving form to the political organism and building the bases of present and future political parties.

Roads to Europe is a paradigmatic study of the problems a newly autonomous na-tion-state had to face as it entered the sphere of European diplomacy and politics in the second half of the 19th century. Not only that. Ryszard Kapuściński held that the first thing to do to understand our world is to look at it from different points on the map. Observing at Serbia’s travails and how it handled them in the first crucial years of independence helps to understand from a new point of view the difficulties faced and the challenges met – by many countries and many societies in similar phases in their existence. The solutions found – not always the best, but the best that seemed attainable in a particular concrete set of circumstances – shaped the future for the years to come.We thank Momir Samardžić for his valuable participation in the work of the CLIOHRES Thematic Work Group 1 on ‘States, Institutions, Legislation’. He has contributed chapters to the published volumes of research results and is one of the co-editors of the fifth year volume. We especially thank him for his care and com-mitment in preparing the present text for publication in English, thus making it ac-cessibly for a broad readership. We recommend it to everyone interested in politics and political systems, in whatever period and whatever part of the world.

Guðmundur HálfdanarsonUniversity of Iceland, Reykjavik

Ann Katherine IsaacsUniversity of Pisa

The CLIOHRES Network of Excellence

CLIOHRES is a consortium of 45 universities and research institutions in 31 coun-tries. Each institution is represented by two senior researchers and two doctoral stu-dents coming from various academic fields – primarily from history, but also from art history, archaeology, architecture, philology, political science, literary studies and geography. The 180 researchers in the network are divided into six “Thematic Work Groups”, each of which deals with a broadly defined research area – ‘States, Institutions and Legislation’, ‘Power and Culture’, ‘Religion and Philosophy’, ‘Work, Gender and Society’, ‘Frontiers and Identities’, and ‘Europe and the Wider World’. Furthermore, the Network as a whole addresses ‘transversal themes’ of general rel-evance. These include ‘Citizenship’, ‘Migration’, ‘Tolerance and Discrimination’, ‘Gender’ and ‘Identities’; one of these is targeted each year.

As a Network of Excellence, CLIOHRES is not an ordinary research project. It does not focus on a single research question or on a set of specific questions. Rather it is conceived as a forum where researchers representing various national and regional traditions can meet and elaborate their work in new ways thanks to structured in-teraction with their colleagues. The objective is not only to transcend the national boundaries that still largely define historical research agendas, opening new avenues for research, but also to use those very differences to become critically aware of how current research agendas have evolved. Thus, the goal is to examine basic and un-questioned attitudes about ourselves and others, which are rooted in the ways that the scientific community in each country looks at history. Historians create and cultivate selective views of the national or local past, which in turn underpin perva-sive ideas about identities and stereotypes: national, religious, gender, political, etc. National historiographies today are still largely shaped by problems and preoccupa-tions reflecting previous political and cultural contexts. CLIOHRES aims to create and promote a new structure and agenda for the community of historical research, redirecting its critical efforts along more fruitful lines.

The Network began its work in June 2005, thanks to a five-year contract with the European Commission through the Sixth Framework Programme of its Directo-rate General for Research, under Priority 7, dealing with “Citizenship”. Its activities aim to contribute to the development of innovative approaches to history as re-gards both the European Research Area and European Higher Education Area. The Network works for a closer connection between research and learning/teaching,

�II

holding that this is essential in order to ensure that European citizens possess the necessary information, conceptual tools and more in general the vital critical and self-critical abilities which they will need in the future.

All the thematic groups have worked from the start according to a common research plan, beginning in the first year with reconnaissance or mapping, of how the ques-tions perceived as important for the thematic area appear in the different national historiographies. During the second year they defined ‘connecting’ themes, which are relevant for research in a wider geographical and chronological context. The third phase has concentrated on comparing and reviewing sources and methodolo-gies; the fourth has focussed on cross-fertilisation, that is on showing how problems identified in the previous phases can be developed in new contexts. During the last phase, the groups are defining new and relevant projects, in the broadest sense, for future research in the sector.

Each Thematic Work Group publishes one volume a year in order to share and dis-cuss the results of their work with the broader academic community.

The volumes are not conceived as the final word on the issues that they deal with, but rather as work-in-progress. In addition to the six Thematic Work Group volumes, the Network publishes one common volume per year dealing with the transversal theme targeted. It also publishes abridged versions of the dissertations written by doctoral students who have participated in its work. Together the volumes already published form an invitation to discuss the results of the Network and the novel directions that are emerging from its work; they also constitute a unique patrimony of up-to-date studies on well-known and less well-known aspects of Europe and its history.

All publications are available in book form and on the www.cliohres.net website. They can be downloaded without charge. A list of publications to date can be found at the end of this volume.

IntroduCtIon

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the European Great Powers recognized Serbia as an independent state. It was the greatest foreign policy success of the small Balkan country in the 19th century, after decades of effort – from the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising of 1804 and the creation of the vassal Principality of Serbia within the Ottoman Empire in the early 1830s – to achieve the creation of a Serbian state in the region south of the rivers Sava and Danube, independent from Ottoman rule. However, the gain of independence was a turning point for the newly independ-ent principality in more ways than one. Excluded from the Ottoman territory and faced with the competing interests of the Great Powers, Serbia now found itself without the protection provided by its former vassal status within a multiethnic empire. This occurred at the precise moment when the division of the spheres of interest between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans was becoming clear. St. Petersburg openly supported the Bulgarian national movement, at the expense of the Serbian: Russia was promoting the plan to create a great Bulgarian state in the Balkans, as could be seen from preliminary Russo-Ottoman peace treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. Belgrade was disappointed in the traditional protector of the Slavs and the Orthodox. At the same time, during the Congress the Great Pow-ers permitted Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus dealing a very serious blow to the idea of liberation and unification of all the Serbs living in Ottoman territories. Paradoxically the most significant foreign policy objective of the Principality of Serbia, independence, was achieved in conjunction with the greatest defeat, until that time, of Serbian nationalism. The new political situation would demand new responses.

On the other hand, the change of international legal status of the state opened new possibilities on the road to political, economic and social modernization, now un-constrained by the limits of Serbia’s previous vassal status. Foreign policy and the struggle for necessary reforms were intertwined, and would mark the internal politi-cal life of the principality in the years to come. Given the new circumstances, political life became a powerful and turbulent arena where conflicts sharpened, leading to a clearer differentiation of various political ideologies and the completion of the proc-ess of formation of political parties that had begun during the first half of the 1870s.

Amongst all these events, the issue of the construction of the first railway in Serbia was of great significance not only because it would create a link between the Euro-

� Momir Samardžic‘

pean West and the Ottoman capital: also and equally important, the link between Serbia and the West in political discourse often represented much more than a rail-way connection. Constantly imposed as an unavoidable issue – indeed the most serious problem in both external and internal politics during the first years after the Congress of Berlin – the railway question acted as a kind of a crystallization point through which the foreign policy orientation of the politically weak and economi-cally poor Balkan state was refracted onto a territory that was of special interest to certain Great Powers, thus creating disruptions within the country due to sharp conflicts between different ideas of how the Serbian state should develop.

The title of this book, Roads to Europe: Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue 1878-1881, evokes precisely that dichotomy. The struggle for a railway was not merely a struggle for a more direct physical contact with the European west through the development of transport infrastructure. Nor was it merely an attempt to escape from the economic periphery through accelerated economic development. The views of the Serbian political and intellectual elite on the achievement of a railway connection with Europe reflected their attitudes towards the values on which west-ern Europe was founded: values which they chose to propagate or to oppose, thus constituting the bases of their political activities.

This volume is based on a part of the doctoral dissertation The Railway Issue in the Foreign Policy of Serbia 1878-1888, defended at the University of Novi Sad (Serbia) be-fore a committee formed by Professor Duško M. Kovačević, PhD (University of Novi Sad, mentor), Professor Radoš Ljušić, PhD (University of Belgrade) and Professor Branko Bešlin, PhD (University of Novi Sad). The publication of the English version has brought about significant changes in the structure of the work, including a reduc-tion of the chronological period and an expansion of the themes treated. In particular, while always keeping in mind the play of the Great Powers’ opposing interests in the Balkans, the present edition has required a new detailed explanation of the Serbian political, economic and ideological context, necessary in order to allow understanding of the dynamic events following 1878. In addition, a significant section of the first part of the book is devoted to the prehistory of the railway issue from the 1850s – when it emerged as a foreign policy issue, although not as a result of the government’s desire to take a decisive step on the path to modernization – until the early 1870s when the issue became increasingly present in external, as well as internal public political discourse.

The structure of the book is designed to cover simultaneously, on the one hand, the foreign policy struggle for Serbia to secure a favourable place on the trans-Balkan

�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

railway route and the efforts of the Serbian government to create the necessary political and financial conditions, and, on the other hand, the internal political tur-moil connected to public debate on the necessity of the railway and to criticism by the opposition towards government measures. The second part of the book covers the negotiations with Austria-Hungary and Serbia’s efforts, despite being burdened with internal and external debt, to meet its international obligations concerning the construction of the railway after 1878. The second part also covers the attempts of foreign financial houses to obtain a concession for the construction of the railways. The third part is devoted to the completion of the Austro-Serbian bilateral nego-tiations, the signing of the convention and attacks of the united opposition on the liberal government. The fourth part covers the strong opposition criticism first of the liberal and then of the progressive governments’ efforts to obtain the necessary funds on a foreign financial market.

While contemplating ways to overcome the traditional approach to history of the foreign policy of Serbia, apart from the remarks of the Commission members, of particular importance for me was the knowledge and experience gained by partici-pation in the CLIOHRES.net project (TWG1 States, Legislation, Institutions), an experience that will undoubtedly have, and already has had, a positive effect on the choice of topics as well as approach to the studies of the history of the Serbian state and society. The result is a book that views the modernization of the state from a wider perspective, with an attempt to show the impact of the railway issue on changes in both the foreign and domestic policies. Instead of focusing merely on the negotiations between Serbia, the interested neighbouring countries and the Great Powers, this book links diplomacy, domestic policies, institutions, ideologies, the economy and finance. It intends to show how the idea of constructing the railway, not the construction itself, influenced Serbian politics.

� Momir Samardžic‘

Map 1Balkan Railways, 1875.Legend: Existing Railways Railways under construction Planned Serbian Railway

5Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

Map �Geopolitical Changes and Balkan Railways, 1879.Legend: Existing Railways Nis-Pristina line as defined in the 187� contract Planned route of Serbian and Hungarian railways

� Momir Samardžic‘

Map �Sketch of the Serbian road network, from an 18�5 issue of “Vojin”, a military magazine.

I. the raIlway Issue In the Context of european and serbIan hIstory

From the wars of liberation and unification, as the Serb-Ottoman wars of 1876-1878 were called by the then Foreign Minister Jovan Ristić in his historical mem-oirs, giving them the name later adopted by historiography, Serbia emerged as an independent state with a territorial increase of 10,462 km² for a total area of 48,303 km², and roughly 1.7 million residents1. Following that success, the young inde-pendent state found itself facing numerous internal and external tasks on the road to the overall, but above all economic, modernization of the state. The long desired construction of the railway was intended to be one of the drivers of future economic development. However, numerous obstacles stood on the road to the achievement of this goal, in foreign as well as in domestic policies. Although small in territory, Serbia was placed on a very important geo-strategic location: on the border of two empires, on the shortest and most favourable land route, which connected the East and the Balkans with Central Europe from Roman times on. There is no doubt that this position greatly affected the entire history of the state, putting it at the centre of the Eastern Question and the centre of conflict between the Great Powers over the Ottoman heritage. The failure of Serbia’s attempts to modernise its economy, like that of the other Balkan countries, was undoubtedly partly conditioned by its geographical position, or in other words, its geo-strategic environment and proxim-ity to the developed economies of Western and Central Europe. The construction of the trans-Balkan railway is a good example, pointing to all the advantages and disadvantages of such a position, after 1878. Nonetheless, the internal problems that Serbia had to face on the road to modernization following 1878 had their own prehistory as well. The issues were not only structural deficiencies of the economy and weaknesses of the Serbian finances, but also the opposing concepts of develop-ment of the Serbian state within the Serbian political elite. These were based on the ideologies with which they had entered the political life of the principality a decade before it achieved independence.

1. the Great powers and the trans-balkan raIlway

At the time of the industrial revolution, a modern economy based on mass pro-duction and mass transport would hardly have been able to develop fully on the European continent if there had not been new forms of transportation. The railway

8 Momir Samardžic

revolutionized transportation, and the construction of a modern railway network was an essential part of the transformation and rise of the Western and Central Eu-ropean economies. Advantages of the new form of transportation quickly became obvious, and the construction of a railway became an imperative for every country. The railroad soon became a symbol whose meaning reached beyond its economic significance. It was not only a symbol of modern technology and industry, but also a symbol of progress, speed – in a word, of the modern world – and every reform-oriented politician was at the same time a proponent or a supporter of the construc-tion of a railway2.

The construction of railways was not far behind even in the less developed and un-derdeveloped European countries that had not yet felt the benefits of the indus-trial revolution. Unlike in the Western European countries, the development of a transportation system in the less developed countries had to precede any significant transformation of the industry. This was a result of the developed countries’ econo-mies’ need to conquer markets and secure raw materials for their industries, the next natural step in their economic expansion. The inclusion of underdeveloped areas, rich in raw materials, to which it would later be possible to export industrial products, was of great importance to the developed capitalist countries. This is why their investments were focused on the construction of a single European transport network. Since the countries that were lagging in economic development did not have the capital for large investments, such as, first and foremost, a railway, the ex-port of capital from Western Europe was one of the crucial factors for the integra-tion of European countries into a single economic system. The demand for capi-tal was greater than the supply, so the financial monopoly enjoyed by some Great Powers facilitated the acquisition of large profits for their leading banking groups. Regardless of the financial burden, the realization of a transportation link with the Western European market in underdeveloped countries was seen as an issue of cru-cial importance for further economic development, and this mutual perceived in-terest gradually led to a disproportion between the developed transport links and overall economic development, especially if we consider industrial production3.

The development of the Balkan railways is perhaps the best example in the Europe-an framework of the extent to which the development of transport, which occurred due to huge foreign investments, preceded general economic development. The construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire, of which Serbia was a part until 1878, was completely separate from the economic needs of that Empire and served the direct economic and political goals of the Great Powers. In this sense, in the

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 9

conflicts between the Great Powers over the Ottoman legacy, the Crimean War of 1854-1855 represented a decisive turning point. The alliance of Great Britain and France with the Ottoman Empire in the war against Russia weakened the until that point determined resistance of Constantinople to making economic concessions, and opened the door to foreign capital. The first loan was imposed on the Porte, the Ottoman government, in 1854, and was soon followed by new ones. Twenty years later, servicing the debt alone required 55% of the Empire’s revenue. Unwise handling of the loan money brought the Ottoman State Treasury to bankruptcy in less than three decades, and in 1882 led to the creation of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt as a financial control body of the Empire, with a duty to provide western creditors with an inflow of money from state revenues4.

By accepting the loans imposed by the allies, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost the ability to resist allowing foreign investments and employing foreign experts. Foreign financial advisers became a part of the state treasury, and a group of Western engi-neers was appointed to advise the Tanzimat council on the necessary public works 5. The results were soon visible. Undoubtedly influenced by their Western advisers, in early September 1855 the Council emphasized the importance of the development of a transport network, or the construction of a railway, for the economic develop-ment of the Empire and its integration with Europe. The Constantinople-Belgrade route was mentioned particularly as a means of resolving the issue6. This was not a new idea. The construction of railways through the Ottoman territories had already been discussed during the 1830s in Great Britain and France. The idea had encoun-tered strong resistance in Constantinople itself7. Not until 1852 had the Porte au-thorized a British company to study a route which might connect the capital with the border of the Empire at Belgrade, but the venture ended unsuccessfully and the trans-Balkan railway construction project had to wait for its concessionaire until the end of the 1860s. Meanwhile, the Smyrna-Aidin route, the first railway line in the Ottoman Empire, was built in Asia Minor; following that the first routes were opened for traffic on the Balkan Peninsula – Cernavoda-Konstanza in 1860 and Varna-Ruščuk in 1866. Their construction enabled British trade to overcome the obstacle of the Danube delta and enter the Romanian market with their goods8.

Of particular importance for our topic was the attitude of the Habsburg monar-chy towards the idea of railway integration of the Ottoman Empire and the Euro-pean west. Various railway plans created in the Monarchy in the mid-19th century mentioned a connection with Serbia; there were even concrete efforts during the 1850s, but the connection with Serbia was always considered a secondary issue. The

10 Momir Samardžic

government in Vienna was not interested in a direct railway link with Constanti-nople at that time, but rather in a connection with the Ottoman Empire through Wallachia and Moldova (the Romanian Danube principalities, united in 1859 and from 1861 known as Romania) in order to reach Brăila and Galaţi, the Romanian ports on the lower Danube. The Austrian Drang zum Meer was conditioned by the economic, political and strategic interests of the Monarchy in the Balkans. On the one hand, the unregulated flow of the Danube and the lack of other transport links with the lower river represented a major obstacle to Austrian trade, while on the other the Monarchy was trying to cope with the commercial competition of Great Britain in the area – as well as with Russia’s aspirations to control Bosporus and Dar-danelles through the Balkans, ensuring unhindered access to the Mediterranean for their trade9. However, all negotiation efforts with the Romanian government failed to produce an agreement on the construction of a railway in Romania, which was intended to connect to the existing routes in Transylvania and direct Austrian trade in the desired direction10. The consequences of Austria’s failure were fundamental changes to the detriment of the traditional trade of the Ottoman Empire and Cen-tral Europe, and Austrian trade receded when faced by the commercial competition of the western countries in the Balkans11.

Although Austrian public opinion and political circles during the late 1850s and early 1860s held opinions that argued for abandoning the concept of the railway connection with the Ottoman Empire across Romania and advised turning towards the south, making a link over the river Sava, the officials in Vienna remained firm in their position until 1866-1867. Political changes in Romania and the arrival of a member of the rival German Hohenzollern dynasty to the Romanian throne in 1866 was first strong blow to Austria’s pretensions to the Romanian territory, which was followed in the same year by the war with Prussia, and a settlement with the Hungarians in 1867. With the Ausgleich and the creation of Austria-Hungary, the railway policy became an internal issue on which Vienna and Budapest decided in-dependently. The result was a fundamental change in Vienna’s concept of railway integration with the Ottoman Empire. Although the Hungarian government was not against a connection with the lower Danube, the view of Budapest was that the future railway which was to connect the Ottoman Empire with the European West had to go through Budapest, via Belgrade, providing the Hungarian capital with an outstanding position in the transit traffic with the East. In contacts with Vienna dur-ing the following years concerning this matter, the Hungarian government consist-ently represented the idea of a connection with Constantinople via Belgrade. Vienna

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 11

as well began to think about a railway in the south, but the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary frequently represented the interests of the Austrian part of the monarchy and aimed to attract international transit to Vienna, and avoid the possibility of the Hungarian government controlling the future road to the East. The result of this attitude was the concept of connection with the Ottoman Empire through Bosnia. The conflict between Vienna and Budapest marked the end of the 1860s and beginning of the 1870s, and was of great importance for Serbia12.

Events in the Ottoman capital also went in favour of Austria-Hungary’s interest in achieving a railway link with Constantinople. From the mid 1860s, more and more thought was dedicated in Constantinople to the future railway network, and a law on railways was adopted as a basis for granting future concessions. The issue of rail-way integration with Europe was considered the most important. When negotia-tions with the French bank Crédit mobilier failed, the Porte signed a contract with the consortium behind which stood Count Langrand-Dumonceau, the owner of a financial empire made up of thirty-two financial institutions. The contract with the Porte, stipulated on 25 September 1867, envisaged the construction of a Constan-tinople-Edirne-Niš-Belgrade route, with the branch routes Niš-Thessaloniki, Enos-Edirne and Edirne-Varna, but the route was soon diverted from Niš to go through Bosnia. However, Langrand-Dumonceau rapidly found himself facing financial ruin, and his contract with the Porte suffered a dismal fate. Following unsuccessful negotiations in Vienna, the Ottoman negotiator Daoud Pasha reached an agree-ment in Paris with Baron Maurice de Hirsch, a Brussels banker with family ties to the Bischoffsheim banking house13.

The preliminary contract of 17 April and the final contract of 7 October 1869 with Hirsch envisaged the construction of a main route Constantinople-Edirne-Plovdiv-Sofia-Niš-Pristina-Sarajevo-Novi (at the Austro-Ottoman border), as well as four branch routes: Edirne-Dedeagatch, Edirne-Yambol-Burgas, Pristina-Thessaloniki and from Niš to the Ottoman-Serbian border at a point still to be determined. Dur-ing the signing of the contract, Hirsch respected the Ballplatz’s desires for the main route to go through Bosnia, although it was a much more complicated and expensive route through mountainous terrain. The concession included construction and ex-ploitation, and Hirsch obtained exceptional financial benefits by bribing the Otto-man dignitaries. Following the signing of the contract, Hirsch was left with finding a company for the exploitation, and organizing the financial operation necessary for providing the funds for construction. After an unsuccessful attempt to find a com-pany interested in the exploitation, he took the job on himself. In January 1870 he

1� Momir Samardžic

founded two companies, one to build the railroad – the Société Impériale des Chemins de Fer de la Turquie d’Europe, and one to run it – the Compagnie Générale pour l’ Ex-ploitation des Chemins de Fer de la Turquie d’Europe. Construction soon began14.

The signing of the contract between Hirsch and the Porte completed an epoch in the history of the construction of the first trans-Balkan railway. The joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary and the Austrian government were most in-terested in the fastest possible completion of the designed routes. The future railway link with the East was viewed as one of the prerequisites for the economic pen-etration of the Balkans, which would inevitably be followed by a growing political influence. On the other hand, Russia, economically weak and lacking a financial house or construction company whose interests it could support in the competition for the railway concession, feared the political implications of the future railway construction, justly concluding that the direct link between the Balkan countries and Vienna would inevitably lead to strengthening Austro-Hungarian influence, and weakening its own.

From the signing of the contract with Hirsch until the final establishment of the railway connection, almost two decades were to pass. The venture faced numerous political and financial obstacles, and Austria-Hungary, as the European power most directly interested in achieving it, undertook all the necessary steps to overcome them. To begin with, one of the crucial steps was the resolution of Austria-Hunga-ry’s internal dilemma concerning the route and whether it should it pass through Bosnia or through Serbia. The appointment of the Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Gyula Andrássy, as the minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary in 1871, also meant the victory of the concept of the railway connection between Europe and the Ottoman Empire through Budapest, and therefore Belgrade. Bel-grade and Constantinople became the two points at which the Austrian diplomacy worked simultaneously towards the final realization of the project. Activities in the two capitals were interdependent. Most important was dealing with all the adver-sity that Hirsch’s project faced in Constantinople, while activities in Belgrade were aimed at ensuring the connection between the Ottoman and Hungarian routes through the territory of Serbia.

The project suffered the most serious blow due to political changes in Constantino-ple, which resulted in the revision of the old contract and stipulation of a new one on 18 May 1872. Overall, this was favourable for Hirsch, who secured significant financial benefits through ‘tips’ and freed himself from the obligation to construct

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 1�

the Bosnian route; but it did not make the completion of the construction appear likely. In the new context, Hirsch assumed the responsibility to complete the routes whose construction was in progress within two years, and he fulfilled this obliga-tion by December 1874. The results were the Banja Luka-Dobrljin, Thessaloniki-Mitrovica and the Constantinople-Belovo routes, with the Edirne-Dedeagach and Trnovo-Yambol branches: in other words, 1281 km of reciprocally unconnected routes. The Porte took on itself the construction of the remaining, technically quite demanding routes. The greatest danger lay in the state of the Ottoman finances and the likelihood that the Porte would not be capable of carrying out this project15.

The following years were marked by Austrian diplomatic activities aimed at forcing the Porte to assume more concrete obligations, in order to enforce the provisions of the Hirsch contract. Success was not achieved until 1875, at a time when the upris-ing of the Serbs in Herzegovina marked the beginning of one of the biggest crises in the history of the Eastern Question. With two diplomatic notes, of 1 July and 30 September 1875, the Porte assumed the obligation to complete the construction of the route from Belovo to the border with Serbia by the end of 1879. Austrian diplomacy had tried to achieve similar success in Belgrade for years, the Hungar-ian-Serbian convention on a railway link was almost signed in 1873, but significant progress was not made until the Congress of Berlin. In solving the issues that came up with the crisis in the Balkans, the Ottoman defeat in the war with Russia in 1877-1878, and the vexed provisions of the preliminary peace in San Stefano, on a proposal from the Austrian delegation the Great Powers once again committed the Porte to meet its obligations, while Serbia and the newly formed Principality of Bul-garia assumed the same obligations with respect to the former Ottoman territories that now stood within their borders. With a separate convention, Austria-Hungary imposed a series of obligations on Serbia, among which was the construction of the railway within a three year period. The provisions of the Treaty of Berlin and the Austro-Serbian Convention created a framework for resolving the issue and con-structing the first trans-Balkan railway. It would finally begin to operate in 188816.

2. serbIa – eConoMy, InfrastruCture, polItICs

Thanks to its geographical position, Serbia had an important place in the con-struction plans of the trans-Balkan railway. These plans were observed in Belgrade through the prism of Serbia’s interests for the future route to cross over its territory and thus provide its economy with all the positive results of transport integration

1� Momir Samardžic

with foreign markets. The struggle for a railway was significant in many ways, since it was viewed as a driver of faster development of the small state on the European economic periphery. Economic development appeared to be a prerequisite on the path to the long desired independence and territorial expansion in the surround-ing Ottoman provinces, whose population was partially of Serbian ethnic origin. A capitalist transformation and the struggle for sovereignty and national independ-ence were closely linked; ending the relations with the Ottoman overlord appeared to be the only possible road to modernization and economic prosperity. Therefore, the efforts for economic modernization were part of the struggle for liberation from the Ottoman rule17. Following the changes in the international legal position of Serbia and due to the obligations it assumed in Berlin, the railway issue was once again placed on the agenda. However, the extent to which the Serbian state would succeed in protecting its own interests, and also in gaining significant benefit from its success, depended not only on its diplomacy, but also on a number of other fac-tors deriving from the achievements and limitations of its previous economic, social and political development.

2.1. Achievements and limitations of an economy on Europe’s periphery

When Serbia emerged on the international political scene as an independent state, its economy was far from developed. The struggle for political independence which had gone on from the beginning of the 19th century had not been followed by changes which could transform an underdeveloped agrarian economy into a devel-oped one, based on manufacturing and further industrialization18. A characteristic of Serbia, as well as of other Balkan states, was an extremely slow and contradictory inner transition19. It “did not go down a road that could be considered a belated imitation of western development, but has during its modern history, in a cultural, historical, social and economic sense, paved its own unique road”20.

Economic modernization, or the complete transformation of the economic struc-ture, meant reducing the role of agriculture and increasing the role of industry in the gross national income21. However, by the end of the 1870s the contribution of industry to the gross national income of Serbia was hardly visible. According to Walt Rostow’s stages of economic growth, the prerequisite phase of industrializa-tion implies a few important factors: an agricultural revolution to free a work force for industry, the accumulation of public investments (roads, railroads, canals) to expand the market and enable its supply, the development of institutions to serve

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 15

industry, and above all the development of a banking system and the existence of entrepreneurs willing to take risks of investing in industry, a qualified workforce, as well as energy sources and an increased exploitation of raw materials. Another important condition was a centralized national state, due to the interdependence of the economic and political prerequisites22. In the year 1878, Serbia hardly met any of these economic and institutional requirements.

Serbia was primarily an agricultural country. According to statistics from 1884, 87.5% of the population (1,664,500 persons) lived in the countryside, and during the following three decades this percentage did not change significantly. The remain-ing 12.5% (237,500) was considered in Serbian statistics as urban, even though this included certain towns having populations of less than 2,000, and sometimes even less than 1,000, residents. The only thing that distinguishes such ‘cities’ from villages was the fact that they were the location of administrative centers of certain areas or districts. In such conditions, it does not come as a surprise that even the “urban” population often engaged in agriculture, which means that a realistic estimate of the percentage of the urban population would be well below 10%23.

To understand the problems the Serbian economy faced on the road to moderniza-tion, the structure of land tenure is of particular importance. According to the first Serbian census, of 1889, 32.65% of agricultural households owned property of less than 2 ha, less than the required minimum for supporting a family; 39.96% owned property of 2-5 ha, enough for supporting a family and a limited market production, and 20,31% held properties of 5-10 ha. In addition, this small and autarchic prop-erty was further divided into lots and cultivated extensively. The logical outcome of the use of inappropriate cultivation methods and poorly developed agricultural techniques was the low productivity of Serbian agriculture. Therefore, the fact that at the turn of the 20th century only one fifth of the annual grain production ended up on the market does not come as a surprise; in the rest of Europe at least half, and even four fifths of the annual production was commercialized. The traditional economy impeded the development of agriculture, and this “zero growth” in the pri-mary sector condemned all the modernization incentives to failure. The agricultural revolution, as a basic precondition for the industrial revolution, had not occurred24.

Traditional society, as an obstacle to economic development, is usually indicated as one of the causes of the structural deficiencies of the Serbian economy25. In fact, statistics from 1889 on the structure of the land tenure indicate a relative uniform-ity of ownership – 92.9% owned property that was less than 10 ha26. And just as

1� Momir Samardžic

important, farmers were the owners of the land. This reform move by the Serbian state was part of the liberation process from Ottoman rule. The formal gain of au-tonomy within the Empire by the sultan’s hatt-i sharifs 1829-1833, was followed by the recognition of the peasants’ ownership of the land, because, during the two uprisings (1804-1813, 1815), they carried the biggest burden of the struggle for the liberation from Ottoman rule27. As a result of this development of the political struggle for liberation, a state of small landowners was created with an egalitarian socio-economic organization, followed by significant formal participation of the peasantry in politics, with far-reaching consequences for the history of Serbia.

However, agrarian reform was not followed by changes that would lead to the rapid development of agriculture and a transformation of the agrarian economic struc-ture. Land cultivation continued to be organized around the zadruga or ‘coopera-tive’ – that is within a family or extended family community, a “living and working community and community of goods based on kinship, under the patriarchal au-thority of an elected chief elder”. The system was characterized by “indivisible com-mon property, a cooperative economy, as well as a completely legal community of cooperatives”. The principles on which the family cooperatives were based were con-trary to the modern notion of property, mobility of land tenure and the workforce. Thus the breakdown of the cooperative was a fundamental prerequisite for early industrial development. However, from the mid-1830s until the late 19th century, the state had repeatedly adopted laws that protected a minimum landholding, pro-hibiting its sale or use as collateral for obtaining loans. The results were intense frag-mentation of the land holdings and division within the family cooperative, binding the peasants to a non-profitable piece of land with which they could “neither live nor die”, as well as impeding the concentration of property in the hands of medium and large landowners who would have been able to improve methods of cultiva-tion28. Impressed by the egalitarian socio-economic structure of Serbia, the British travel writer Herbert Vivian called the small Balkan state in the late 19th century “a poor man’s paradise”29. The reality, however, was far different.

The role of the state in countries that were lagging in economic development was of great importance, since a road to modernity needs to be paved from above, through reform legislation. The state was supposed to create an institutional framework to facilitate economic growth and establish the legal and institutional preconditions of capitalism30. In the Serbian case, reform legislation played a role that was opposite to that desired. It contributed to the preservation of the traditional social structures inherited from the Ottoman period, and prevented the rapid development of agri-

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 17

culture necessary for the transformation of the agrarian sector and the development of a modern market-oriented economic structure31.

The situation was similar in other areas of the economy as well. Following the achieve-ment of autonomy, economic freedom was declared in 1838. This led to the rapid development primarily of crafts, and even of manufacturing production. However, while deciding the legal regulation of this area, the state succumbed to the pressure of craftsmen who requested protection from foreign and unqualified competition; thus the Law on Guilds from 1847 created a “closed system for mutual support, education of professional staff and protection from outside competition, which in many aspects resembled – with all its faults and virtues – medieval European guild organizations”32. The law did not prevent the import of industrial products and the increase of unqualified competition, but legalized an anachronistic order and slowed the progress of crafts that represented a foundation on which the Serbian industry was to develop. On the other hand, despite the formal declaration of freedom of trade in 1838, a whole series of restrictions and prohibitions in trade legislation were enacted, and had fatal consequences for the expansion of the market economy and the development of demand for handicraft and industrial products33.

Numerous legal regulations in different areas had created a situation in which vari-ous branches of the economy blocked one another34. Having in mind the restric-tions on the freedom of crafts and domestic trade, as well as the above mentioned agrarian social structure and self-sufficient, small peasant property, legally protected and uninterested in market production, it is not surprising that the internal market – one of the most characteristic indicators of rapid economic development of a country – was sluggish. Although from the mid-19th century monetary exchange increasingly replaced exchange in kind and market development gradually under-mined the traditional social order, reform legislation did not achieve the desired effect, and the laws adopted were not sufficient to trigger a decisive step on the road towards a comprehensive economic and social modernization. Obviously the vari-ous factors were mutually connected and conditioned each other. Serbia did not possess the objective conditions for development, having neither a moderate level of underdevelopment, nor well-defined economic activities and market forces, nor a social framework open to change35.

On the other hand, the reasons for slow economic development of Serbia cannot be sought only in legal constraints, the social structure and economic conditions. There were also objective obstacles in the form of international circumstances which

18 Momir Samardžic

influenced the possibility of faster economic development. Foreign trade, or more precisely the livestock trade with the Habsburg monarchy as an economic activ-ity that provided Serbia with a positive foreign trade balance, is perhaps the best example. The Ottoman Empire, as well as the nation-states that were appearing in the Balkans with its gradual breakup, were faced with different economic and po-litical constraints imposed by their position in Europe’s geographical, but above all economic, periphery. The growing needs of the industrialized countries for food and raw materials provided a possibility for the activation and development of the economies of the Balkan states. But it also carried a hidden risk that the economic and political superiority could lead to the creation of ancillary economies serving only to provide food and raw materials, without additional incentives for the devel-opment of economy due to increased trade36. Precisely this proved to be the case of the Balkan states, including Serbia.

After gaining autonomy, Serbia tried to take advantage of its good geographical po-sition on the border between two empires and all the advantages brought by the newly established relationship with the Porte by encouraging the development of trade. The structural defects we have mentioned – low agricultural productivity and an underdeveloped internal market – did not offer the possibility to export agricultural products – the export of grains did not occupy a significant place in the statistics until the second half of the 1860s (1866-1875 with an average of 10.35%). However, the demand for meat in the neighboring Monarchy, especially in the Aus-trian part, which had the leading role in its industrial development, opened up the possibility for the export of livestock from Serbia. The Habsburg monarchy was Ser-bia’s most significant foreign trade partner and the most important export product were pigs. During the period 1843-1875, an average of 80.46% of Serbian exports was directed towards the Monarchy, and its value increased by nearly four times (from 8,959,651 francs in 1843 to 35,014,874 in 1875)37.

The rapid strengthening of exports was still not sufficient to determine a strong economic transformation. An entrance into the world market could be of use for states lagging in economic development only if the growth of foreign trade pro-duces a ‘spin off ’ effect, and causes changes in other branches of the economy as well38. A transformation of the whole economic structure could only be caused by a chain reaction bringing about a number of dynamic changes, with the encourage-ment of industrial development39. In Serbia’s case, even the importance of a nearly fourfold increase of the value of exports during the period 1843-1875 should be accepted with reservation. Apart from the gradual increase of the livestock fund

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 19

and the progress of trade with the neighboring monarchy, there had been a strong demographic growth (during 1834-1874 the population increased from 678,192 to 1,353,890)40 followed by a gradual transition from livestock farming, as the most significant economic sector, to agriculture. Therefore, the internal structural defi-ciencies of Serbian agriculture prevented the faster rise of export and reduced its potential impact on the development of other industries. Entering international markets and a rapid rise of the livestock trade could only partially compensate for the deficiencies that were derived from underdevelopment of the internal market and low productivity, and could not lead to changes that would lead to a transfor-mation of the economy as a whole. The most important result, with a lasting impact on the history of Serbia until the First World War, was to tie the Serbian economy, as an exporter of raw materials and importer of industrial products, to the economy of the Habsburg monarchy. In the long term, the involvement in international trade was important because the development of economic relations inevitably triggered processes that instigated capitalist transformation in Serbia itself. However, the “un-favorable conditions of exchange and one-sided export structure”, as well as being bound to the Austrian market, reduced the positive effects of the rise of foreign trade, which only increased the economic backwardness of Serbia41.

The most significant outcome of the rapid economic rise was supposed to be in-dustrial development. It has already been discussed that at the end of the 1870s, at the time of gaining political independence, the share of industry in the gross na-tional income of Serbia could barely be noted. Paradigmatic for the history of a state whose most important foreign policy goal was national liberation and unification, the most important and oldest industrial plant was a gun factory, initially in Bel-grade, and since the beginning of the 1850s in Kragujevac. Related to its establish-ment, while the first plant was being built in Belgrade in 1849, was also the appear-ance of the first steam engine on the territory of the principality. In vassal Serbia, apart from the emerging milling industry and attempts to manufacture glass, other industries besides the gun factory did not exist. The attempts of the state during the 1840s and 1850s, to organize the production of textiles, leather and footwear in the state economy on Topčider, a hill near Belgrade, ended in failure42.

According to the standards established by the Western European examples, at the end of the 1870s Serbia was not even at the beginning of a sustainable process of industrialization. In fact, with only 16,000 industrial workers (less than 2% of the country’s labor force) and total industrial horsepower of 25,000 in 1910 and, with an industrial production in 1911 that even the most benevolent statistician could

�0 Momir Samardžic

not push above 15% of gross national income, Serbia, despite significant efforts in the decades following its independence, before the era of wars (1912-1918) still stood at the beginning of the industrialization process43. “Bearing in mind that the effectiveness of government intervention depends on complex domestic and exter-nal factors, and that government action alone cannot accelerate economic growth in underdeveloped countries, it should not come as a surprise that state intervention in the Balkan countries’ economy was in large part ineffective”44.

Lacking sufficient internal forces able to execute an economic transformation, faced with restrictions imposed by its international position, at the dawn of its independ-ence and a time when it was necessary to resolve the railway construction issue, Ser-bia was a state with an underdeveloped economy, a one-sided export structure, and – as an exporter of raw materials and importer of industrial products – was almost entirely bound to the Austrian market.

2.2. (Under)development of the transport infrastructure

One of the major prerequisites of economic development was a developed trans-port infrastructure. The appearance of the railway brought substantial changes and rapid economic development to continental Europe, leading gradually to a firmer economic integration of geographically remote areas. For states on the economic periphery the construction of a railway was of special importance since, bearing in mind the ever growing need of the European West for large quantities of food, the construction of an international system of transportation was a vital precondition for economic development45.

However, the economic incentive of the Western market could be used fully only if, in addition to an international transport link, there was a sufficiently extensive internal network of roads, which were at the same time a prerequisite and a result of a developed internal market. This was not the case in Serbia. The network of roads that Serbia inherited from the Ottoman Empire when it gained its autonomy at the beginning of the 1830s was such that the majority of the roads were not even suitable for carriage traffic. The roads were muddy and dug up, built in a primitive way and impassable. Running through Serbia from north to south, from Belgrade to Aleksinac, was the Constantinople road, one of the most significant roads of the Ottoman Empire and the best and shortest land road connecting the Ottoman cap-ital with the capitals of major European countries. In addition, Serbia’s capital was connected with northwestern Bulgaria by a land road through Vidin, with Bosnia

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �1

by two roads, and by one with Kosovo. Of particular importance for internal traffic was the road that connected the two most important cities in Serbia – Kragujevac and Belgrade – and there were other roads as well that connected these with certain areas of the principality46.

After gaining autonomy, the state had invested considerable efforts in the construction, maintenance and repair of roads and bridges, and the improvement of river traffic was not neglected either. The first legal measures on the construction of roads were adopted in 1848, and then in 1852 and 1860, but a significant advance in the domain of trans-port policy was not achieved until the legal measures of the 1860s: the Law on public land roads from 1864 and the rules on the reconstruction of existing and construction of new roads issued by the Ministry of Public Works in 186647. However, progress was slow, and the large disparity between what the law established and what was actually in place was obvious. Roads were still in bad condition and during the rainy season often impassable. The condition of roads during the 1850s is best testified by the fact that in 1857, due to the poor condition of the roads, the arrival of peasants to Belgrade was impossible, leading to a significant rise in food prices48. Efforts to repair the roads were continued. The Law on public land roads from 1864 made proclaimed that there were four state and eighteen district roads in Serbia, and worked towards paving them in stone so as to allow unimpeded traffic during the rainy season as well49.

Nevertheless, the development of the road network was slow and insufficient, and more importantly, it did not reduce the costs of the transport of goods. Therefore, the existing transport infrastructure could not play its role as an integrative factor, helping to link the inland with the major trade routes, as well as to the development of the internal market. The fact that in the early 1870s some of the most fertile areas in the Morava River valley were cut off from the market although the Constanti-nople road passed nearby, speaks enough about the problems that Serbian trade faced. An attempt to provide cheap transport by rafting on the Morava, the river which connects the southern and northern borders of Serbia flowing into the Dan-ube downstream from Belgrade, ended in failure. The case of the areas surrounding the Morava River is significant because it shows to what extent the internal market in Serbia was divided and disconnected50. One of the most important conditions for overcoming the such deficiencies was the construction of a network of roads which would contribute to the development of the internal market as a prerequisite of faster economic development of Serbia, as well as connect the inland with the border export centers.

�� Momir Samardžic

When the Serbian government in 1865 decided to hire the French engineer Kuss to recommend the most favorable route for the future Serbian railway, he added an opinion to his study on the need for Serbia to build a railway. Given the current level of development of the Serbian economy, Kuss recommended that the government should build a railway only if it was to be part of a significant international route. If this was not possible, he suggested that Serbia did not need a railway, because it would be spending money in vain. His study clearly shows the state of the roads dur-ing the mid 1860s and the extent to which the internal market was developed. Kuss believed that the Serbian government should invest money in improving the exist-ing system of land roads and regulating the river flows. In that case, Serbia would “develop as a flower develops in the sun’s rays”, or in other words, the development of the transport infrastructure would contribute to faster economic development, including the development of the industry, whose further progress would at some point in time require the construction of a railway51. In other words, in a state with an industry at its beginnings and poorly developed domestic trade, the construction of a railway was not a vital need on which further economic growth depended. However, it was precisely the Serbian economy’s focus on export that pointed towards the idea of building a railway, and imposed this issue on Serbian domestic and foreign policy.

2.3. Serbian politics: the struggle between the creation of the envisaged state and the development of the real state Serbian nation, leaving aside ethnic, anthropological and cultural assumptions about it, is basically the result of the Serbian national revolution that began in 1804 with an uprising against the Ottoman authorities. Modern European nationalism, trans-posed to the Balkans as an integrating doctrine of ethnic homogenization, created a dilemma in Serbia’s case as to whether a nation should be defined by religion or language. Thus, the Serbian nation in the beginning was determined by two different criteria, of language and religion, and any attempt to combine the two created inter-nal contradictions. The first criterion “pulled the national space towards the west, and the other towards the southeast”52. As a result, conflicting interpretations of the nation appeared in an attempt to bring together all the desirable territories together with a combination of historical, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and territorial rights. The Serbian nation was created from ethnic potential by a system of vernacular mo-bilization, as Anthony Smith would put it53, so the natural conception of the nation of the Serbs was solely genealogical/ethnic, having the classical characteristics of such a nation as described in theoretical works. Consequently, the ethnic conception of

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 ��

the nation determined all the fundamental characteristics of its equivalent organicist, nationalist ideology, whose main objective was national liberation and unification, and the method for achieving it was war, as a catalyst for national homogenization. Bearing in mind that the Principality of Serbia only covered a small part of the ter-ritories settled by Serbian people and following the widely accepted formulation of Ernest Gellner that nationalism is primarily a theory of political legitimacy, which points out that ethnic boundaries should not be transected by political ones, the process that ensued mirrors closely what we would have expected54.

The ambition to overthrow Ottoman suzerainty, achieving territorial expansion and national unification, or even creating an envisioned greater state to bring together all the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire thought to have a population ma-jority of Serbian ethnic origin, dominated Serbian politics and, to a greater or lesser extent, marked the decades following autonomy. Relying on opposing interests of the Great Powers in the context of resolving the Eastern Question, the idea of na-tional unification and liberation gained momentum especially during the reign of Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1860-1868). He put the war with the Ottoman Empire in an alliance with other Balkan peoples, national liberation and the creation of a Serbian-Bulgarian state led by the Obrenović dynasty, at the center of the state policy. Although it was certain before Mihailo’s murder in 1868 that these plans had been postponed indefinitely, the prince’s commitment to their achievement con-tributed to the idea of liberation and unification which was to be remembered as his “testamentary thought”, whose realization was the task of the future generations55. Preoccupation with the idea of national unity – “the idea of all ideas” – dictated the dynamics of the internal development of Serbia by “suppressing the harmoniza-tion of the relationship between the state and society into the background, and giv-ing the process of internal modernization of the country a one-sided and unnatural character”, and any orientation towards the political and economic modernization of the existing state, within the existing territorial framework, was seen as a betrayal of the “testamentary thought” regarding the creation of the envisioned state56.

Namely, thoughts at the internal level about the paths to territorial expansion and national liberation were accompanied by minor, but constant aspirations towards the expansion of individuals’ freedoms, and by the struggle for liberal political re-forms. While in 1844 Ilija Garašanin was writing the Načertanije, a secret draft of long-term expansionist goals of the Serbian foreign policy, a part of Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois was published for the first time in Serbian translation. However, Serbia, being “a socially undifferentiated, agricultural country of small land hold-

�� Momir Samardžic

ings”, without a developed civil society, and consequently without a liberal political tradition, did not have the basic prerequisites for a more profound adoption of the liberal ideology. In fact, the lack of social, political, economic and cultural precon-ditions, as well as the congruence of the nation building process, strengthening of national movements and the emergence of ambitious plans to build a larger state, on the one hand, and the struggle for political freedom, on the other hand, gave Serbian liberalism a specific content57.

The actual impact of liberal ideology on political life in the principality can be dis-cussed only beginning from the 1850s. It began with individuals who studied at Western universities and returned to Serbia “with ambitions for reform, soon to become practical political ambitions”. Having in mind the position of the Serbian nation and state within the Ottoman Empire, as well as the fact that German and Italian unification movements were on the rise at the time in Europe, it is not sur-prising that the founders of Serbian liberalism were not only under the influence of liberal ideology, but also under the influence of revolutionary democracy and nationalism, “coming from the positions of modern European ideas of individual and national freedom”. National independence and liberation of their compatriots who were still under Ottoman rule were for them “only a link in the chain of other freedoms” and the road to general improvement. National liberation was viewed as equal to political liberation, and freedom from the outside could not be without freedom on the inside. Liberation and unification and the expansion of political freedoms were mutually dependent for the Serbian liberals. Nationalism gave their liberalism the power that it would not have had otherwise58.

The practical political activity of the first liberals was directed against the oligarchic regime, the so-called Ustavobranitelji [‘Defenders of the Constitution’, i.e. defenders of the 1838 constitution that made them politically dominant], who, in an attempt to copy the Austrian bureaucratic centralist system under an absolute monarchy, began to turn Serbia into a civil state with an organized administration and judiciary, and a planned economic and educational policy. At the same time they created a state that provided citizens with private but not political rights. The main political goal of the liberals was the introduction of a representative system of government, or the transfer of authority from the State Council – the official body which acted as the pillar of the regime – to the National Assembly. In an egalitarian society without significant social differences, as Serbian society was in the 19th century, leaning on the experience and tradition of the patriarchal family cooperatives (zadruga) and municipalities (opština) as the basis of a local government system and most important stable form of social

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �5

community within which the social life of Serbs took place, the survival of the institu-tion of the Assembly – as an institution of customary law, part of historical tradition and a relic of the local government system from the Ottoman period – contributed to the creation of the notion in people’s minds not only that the Assembly was a per-manent and necessary authority, but also that the people had a role in political deci-sion-making, which was crucial for the development of Serbian parliamentarianism. The first attempt of the liberals to achieve their political plans led to the overthrow of Prince Alexander Karađorđević (1842-1858) at the Assembly in 1858, to the end of the Defenders of the Constitution regime and the return of the rival Obrenović dynasty, but without the political regime actually being liberalized59.

Not until the political instability following the assassination of Prince Mihailo in 1868 was the way opened for liberal reforms, but a compromise between the Court and the liberals led to a moderation of the doctrinal attitudes represented by the leading liberal ideologues Vladimir Jovanović and Jevrem Grujić, and brought to the fore the moder-ate forces led by Jovan Ristić. With the constitution of 1869 Serbia became a consti-tutional monarchy, and a representative system and a principle of division of powers were adopted for the first time. The guiding idea that followed Ristić during his work on the constitution was the introduction of moderate and limited liberal reforms, the expansion of the rights of the National Assembly and the division of power between it and the ruler, but at the same time preserving the centralist state and a strong execu-tive government. The constitution declared Serbia to be a “constitutional monarchy with a people’s representative body”, but the legislative power as well as other powers of the National Assembly were narrowed and limited to the benefit of the executive. However, despite the fact that Serbia was being transformed from an absolute to a constitutional, and not a parliamentary monarchy, the 1869 constitution undoubtedly marks a turning point in the process of building a modern state and the most impor-tant legislative act in the 19th century, because it “institutionalized the participation of the people in political life, and in doing so created conditions for articulation of public opinion and the confrontation of different political ideas and programs”60.

The Constitution and the subsequent organic laws were the work of Ristić and rep-resented his vision of the maximum political reforms that the state was ready for at the time. Within the framework of the newly established political system, with no desire for its further liberalization and democratization, a Regent during the ado-lescence of Prince Milan Obrenović 1868-1872, and for many terms of office Prime Minister and/or Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1880, Ristić sought, through the control of government mechanisms, to divest his political opponents of any po-

�� Momir Samardžic

litical influence. But the roots of his failure lay in the very system that he created. The adoption of the constitution led to the acceleration of political life, both in the Assembly and beyond, inevitably leading to political grouping, public politi-cal conflicts, struggles to win over public opinion and to the gradual formation of articulated and controlled parliamentary politics61.

Criticism of the constitution, as well as the challenges to the political system it cre-ated, began shortly after its adoption. Paradoxically, the most persistent liberal criti-cism did not come from the most significant liberal ideologues of the 1860s, but from the political heirs of the Defenders of the Constitution, the so-called ‘young conservatives’: future progressives, who “gave back strength to the liberal-reformist movement, which was lost through the identification (...) of liberals with the vicari-ous regime”. During the first half of the 1870s most later progressives were part of the conservative opposition to Ristić’s regime. This united the older generation of conservatives from the Defenders of the Constitution time and a younger genera-tion of Serbs, Ristić’s opponents, who were educated abroad during the 1860s. The term “young conservative” refers, to a certain extent, to a heterogeneous group of Belgrade intellectuals who were, above all, united by their discontent with the au-tocratic manner in which Ristić led the state, excluding from the levers of power all those who were educated enough to be able to confront him, especially if he were to allow their entry into the National Assembly. Following up on criticism of the con-stitutional solutions as inappropriate for the current level of political awareness of rural Serbia, immediately started by the old conservatives following the passing of the constitution, the young conservatives opposed Ristić’s version of moderate lib-eralism based on the Prussian model with their own vision of a political state order based on the English and French model. But theirs were models from the 1830s and 1840s, which were supposed to bring power to a narrow class of the intellectual elite and, thus, had little in common with the democratic ideas of European liberalism of the 1860s. At the same time, they advocated for a consistent transfer of experiences and achievements of Western Europe which would lead to internal moderniza-tion, “whose inseparable parts they considered strict legality, personal and political freedoms, as well as a responsible government”. Although they were no less nation-alist than their political opponents, following independence their most significant representatives emphasized internal political change as the most important goal, as a prerequisite for successful work on national unification. Despite the undoubted reliance on the heritage of European liberal political thought, it must be admitted that the ideology of the young conservatives had certain conservative features62.

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Despite the political disagreements and criticism that the new regime suffered from the young conservatives, certainly the main idea of both the liberals and the young conservatives was to build Serbia as a modern state by following the West-ern European example. However, critics of the regime did not come only from the right. Serbian society encountered liberalism at a time when in Europe it was already suffering criticism based on socialist theories. By the end of the 1860s a socialist movement occurred in Serbia on the liberal left, radicalizing the liberals’ program on the social issue. Serbian socialism represents “a reaction to the begin-nings of modernization of the Serbian patriarchal society, to the slow process of its economic stratification and political institutionalization”. Bearing in mind the cur-rent historical moment in which Serbia found itself – “a period of transition from in kind to monetary relations, accompanied by signs of modernization, the pen-etration of foreign capital and the deterioration of the old institutions of economic and political life of the people” – family cooperatives and municipalities – while at the same time rejecting the adoption of liberal principles and institutions, or the idea of political and economic modernization according to the Western Euro-pean model, which was to varying degrees represented by both the liberals and the young conservatives, the first Serbian socialists found a response to the challenges of modernization in the ideology of populism or populist socialism of the Rus-sian Narodniki. The ideas of Nikolay G. Chernyshevsky about the possibility of skipping stages in social development, with reliance on the principle of collective property preserved in the patriarchal institutions of traditional society, seemed to respond fully to the need for reform of the still significantly egalitarian, socially undifferentiated agrarian society, or a society without developed capitalism and clearly defined class differentiation63.

“Starting from the belief that the Slavic civilization does not accept a distinction be-tween the state and society, characteristic only of the western nations”, the Serbian socialist ideologue Svetozar Marković built a “program for the transformation of the Serbian state into an ‘organized society’, into a ‘people’s’ or ‘social state’”, “a free community of equals (...) as an alternative to the Western model of a civil society”, whose foundation would be cooperatives and municipalities, as patriarchal institu-tions; and the basic principle of organization would be self-government64. In the words of Russian historian Andrey L. Shemiakin,

His general message was completely anti-liberal – it proclaims that the main task of Serbian socialism is ‘to create a new society on the old patriarchal foundation’, which implied a patriarchal-egalitarian type of social environment, the old tradition of munic-

�8 Momir Samardžic

ipal self-government and the principle of collective property and collective production within the family cooperatives65.

On the other hand, national liberation is closely tied to social liberation, but Marković’s vision of liberation and unification was substantially different from the vision of the Serbian rulers and statesmen intent on creating a centralist state led by the Obrenović dynasty. The National Revolution of Serbs in the Ottoman Empire, as a means of liberation and unification, was to be followed by a general Balkan uprising that would not lead to unification under one centralized state, but to the creation of a federation of municipalities in the Balkan region, or at least to the crea-tion of a Serbian-Bulgarian federation as a first step towards achieving this goal66. The revolution was supposed to have a social as well as national character67. The turbulent events after Marković’s death (1875) – uprisings of the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks, wars of the Balkan states and Russia against the Ottoman Empire, and the new geopolitical situation in the Balkans after the Congress of Berlin – would lead on the one hand to strengthening the national component of the ideology of his successors’s (the ‘radicals’, as they already began to call themselves during his life-time), and, on the other, to the gradual suppression of the social component, gener-ally emphasized only for demagogic purposes.

As a precursor to the social, and even the national, revolution, there should have been a political revolution, or the conquest of political power as a means for achieving the final goal. Proceeding from Chernyshevsky’s idea of a non-capitalist path to develop-ment, avoiding the mistakes of the Western industrial society, Marković relied to a large extent on the ideas of another Russian thinker, Pyotr Lavrovich Lavrov, that change of the existing order must be executed with the help of the people68. An ori-entation towards public action through newspapers and the National Assembly had a decisive influence on the rise and evolution of Marković’s movement. Already dur-ing his studies in St. Petersburg he was planning to establish the party of the people, which he called the Radical Party. His immediate political goal after returning to the country – taking over the National Assembly as an institution that would lead to fu-ture fundamental changes – made it necessary to expand the social and political bases of the movement. Turning to the peasantry was the logical choice. The new political system created by the constitution institutionalized the participation of the people in political life, and Marković’s idea of creating a new society on the old patriarchal foundation meant taking as allies in the Assembly a small group of peasant represent-atives – in historiography usually called the populist opposition, which openly and very strongly opposed all modernization efforts of the government. In the Serbian

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �9

case, the development of the state and its institutions went significantly ahead of the evolution of the collectivistic, patriarchal mentality of the peasantry. Formed within the local community and then projected onto the society as a whole, the peasant mentality fostered the rise of a negative attitude towards the alienated, bureaucratic state apparatus, as well as towards all attempts to modernize the state. Opposing the bureaucratic polity with the idea of a people’s self-government and striving for the de-bureaucratization and democratization of the political system, Marković and his ideological heirs, the radicals, relied on this collectivistic mentality of the Serbian peasant, who saw the state as a large family cooperative69.

Through their newspapers, successively started and then quickly banished by the gov-ernment, the socialists (radicals) gave support to the struggle of the peasant opposi-tion led by the “first Serbian populist” Adam Bogosavljević and Jevrem Marković, Svetozar Marković’s brother70. The combination of an organized minority outside the Assembly and a spontaneous movement of the peasantry, which expressed it-self during the assembly sessions as well, provides an explanation of the subsequent rise and evolution of Marković’s movement71. The most significant moment in the fusion of the two movements was to be the entry, in 1878, into the Assembly of Nikola Pašić, Marković’s close associate and successor, a very capable organizer who would unite the peasant assembly opposition and create a strong political party on the ideological foundations laid by Svetozar Marković.

Therefore, in the decade that preceded the gain of independence, two “fundamentally different ideological-doctrinal and practical-political projects” were formulated in Serbia. On one side, there was the “state project that was the result of the reception of liberal political principles and institutions”, while on the other side stood the concept of “the people’s state” which rejected the fundamental values of the liberal civil society and represented an attempt to negate it72. In determining itself according to Europe and its liberal values, and choosing the strategic path for its future development, Ser-bia had to make a choice between a modern, liberal state, as a means of rapid moderni-zation, and “the people’s state” as “a guardian of historic traditions of its people, which were seen as a pledge of its self-sufficient socio-cultural development”73.

Opposing political concepts also implied different approaches to the issue of eco-nomic modernization. However, focused on the struggle for political reforms, the Serbian intellectual elite significantly neglected the need for the development of a comprehensive program of economic reforms. It can be said that even after the formation of political parties during the 1880s, none of the parties had a well for-

�0 Momir Samardžic

mulated and thoroughly worked out economic program, although fundamental de-bate on the need for economic reforms was not lacking74. Present during the 1880s, this tendency marked the previous decades as well. Educated over a wide area, from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Berlin, Heidelberg and Paris, Serbian intellectuals, politicians, and especially economists, had felt the strong and varied impact of Eu-ropean economic thought – including the classical British-French liberal economy and the older German historical school, as well as socialist ideas75.

The first two approaches had their stronghold among liberals and young conserva-tives, although it is not possible to make a clear differentiation and division based on economic schools. We can rather talk about the powerful influence of certain economic thinkers, but this was in no way exclusive, so “with the majority of Serbian economists we can feel different, sometimes even contradictory influences, even lib-eral and interventionist at the same time”. Although the impact of liberal economic theory could be felt, the political and economic circumstances were not favorable for its growth, while the opposite was the case with the older German historical school which advocated state interventionism and economic protectionism as a prerequi-site for the development of the domestic industry76. On the other hand, based on the ideas of Russian populism (populist socialism), Marković’s idealistic vision of skipping stages in development and avoiding the mistakes of Western European path to modernization saw political reforms only as a precondition and precursor of economic reform, while his political heirs, the radicals, placed emphasis on political reforms, ignoring the economic aspect. This meant recognizing the impossibility of realizing Marković’s vision through a reform instead of a revolution77. These different concepts of economic modernization – the liberal and the populist-socialist (radi-cal) – would inevitably surface in connection with one of the most significant issues that dominated Serbian politics since the end of the 1860s, and especially during the late 1870s and early 1880s – the construction of a railway in Serbia.

3. the raIlway Issue In serbIan polItICs (up to 1878)

The issue of the construction of a railway, as the most obvious symbol of the eco-nomic rise of the West, had to find its place not only at the center of foreign policy activities of the Serbian government, but also at the center of the political struggle within Serbia itself, contributing to its intensification and the crystallization of dif-ferent political concepts. Following the Congress of Berlin, the railway issue was to reach its culmination. However, an important link in understanding the events that

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �1

followed independence is the period of struggles for the railway – both inside and outside Serbia – prior to 1878.

3.1. “Serbia will collapse, unless an iron road is constructed over it!” – the foreign policy struggle for a railway

The first proposal for the construction of a railway in Serbia (1837) was a result of the visit of Baron Sigismund von Herder, one of the most famous European mining ex-perts, but it did not encounter any positive response78. The opening of the Ottoman Empire to foreign capital during the 1850s brought Serbia into the intricate web of relations between the Empire and the Great Powers in connection with the construc-tion of railways in the European provinces. The Porte did not consider it necessary to negotiate with the Serbian government on obtaining a concession on the territory of Serbia. This act was viewed in Belgrade as a violation of the autonomous position of the principality and they tried to confront not only the effort of the suzerain to give away a concession without an agreement with the vassal, but also the intention of the Porte to dispose freely of the land and natural resources of Serbia79. In 1852 the British engineers who with the sultan’s firman arrived in Serbia, without prior contact with the Serbian government and with the intention to make the necessary measurements for the future railway route, were expelled, and after a statement from the Tanzimat council in September of 1855, the State Council decided that Serbia was to request from the Great Powers to pressure the Porte into allowing the Serbian government to negotiate the construction of the route through its territory and grant a concession for the construction itself. This was done despite certain threats from the Porte that Serbia would be bypassed if it continued to oppose, and that the connec-tion with the Austrian railways would be achieved through Vidin and Wallachia80.

While looking for support in resisting the intentions of the Porte, Belgrade already in 1852 turned to Vienna and expressed a desire that the railway in Serbia be built by an Austrian company. However, until the second half of the 1860s, the corner stone of Austrian policy was to pursue its interest in a railway connection with the Roma-nian principalities through Transylvania, and the opening of the Lower Danube for a rapid penetration of the Austrian trade. Thus Austrian diplomacy was not interested in a railway connection with the Ottoman Empire through Serbia. Without making an open refusal, it was in a diplomatic way made clear to the government in Belgrade that it would be desirable to wait for a more favorable moment81. Guided by the same logic, the Serbian government after the Crimean War saw with good faith the of-

�� Momir Samardžic

fers of the Austrian private railway companies, although they were very unfavorable financially, since a concession for an Austrian company would bring with it the sup-port of the Austrian diplomats in Constantinople, and Serbia required the support of the major powers in its effort to resolve this issue without the interference of the Porte. Belgrade did not much regret the failure of negotiations with the Austrian companies, because the dealing with this problem was conditioned solely by foreign policy, so every action of Serbia merely represented a reaction to a decision made in Constantinople. Since the Porte itself was not thrilled about the idea of building a railway, negotiations with various foreign companies continued all the way until 1869. Such an attitude, in fact, suited Serbia as well, because it did not impose the necessity of quickly resolving this issue at the expense of the state’s interests82.

Although for most of the 1860s there were no significant attempts to connect West-ern Europe and the Ottoman Empire at Belgrade, Prince Mihailo Obrenović, dur-ing his short reign, repeatedly returned to the railway issue as a part of his efforts to reform the Serbian state and encourage the development of its economy83. Dwell-ing abroad for sixteen years, the prince traveled through Europe precisely during the time of the economic rise that was marked by the construction of the railway network across the continent. During his stay in Paris and Vienna, thanks to his connections in financial circles, he had the opportunity to get better acquainted with the financial side of the enterprise. He accepted the construction of a railway through Serbia as inevitable, and as the only way for Serbia to make a decisive step in its escape from the economic periphery84. He viewed the railway through Serbia as a part of the great international route from Thessaloniki to the European west, via Belgrade, well aware of the importance that this route would have after the comple-tion of the Suez Canal, when the shortest route from India to Britain would lead through Serbia. He wrote in one letter to Ilija Garašanin: “Serbia will collapse, un-less an iron road is constructed over it!”85

Failure of the Serbian Prince and the government to resolve the issue of the railway construction was primarily a result of the lack of interest from the two countries that were most called on to resolve it – the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy. However, the contract with Langrand-Dumonceau in September 1867 on the construction of the Constantinople-Belgrade route placed this issue at the center of interest of the governments of the Great Powers, and the Serbian govern-ment as well. The Porte had not forgotten the previous problems that it had with the Serbian government, so the contract stipulated that the obligation of the company that was to build the route from Niš to Belgrade would cease if an agreement was

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 ��

not reached with the Serbian government within three months. A representative of the company stayed in Belgrade in November of 1867, but the financial conditions offered were rated as unfavorable, and this development of events imposed on Con-stantinople the question of alternative routes. However, Langrand-Dumonceau soon went bankrupt and the deal fell through86.

The signing of the contract between the Porte and Baron Hirsch in October 1869 marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the trans-Balkan railway. The layout of the main route through Bosnia, although it was financially and technically much more demanding than the route through Serbia, met the strategic interests of the Porte and the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, the route bypassed Serbia and Hungary. The two governments were in-terested in securing simultaneous construction of the Serbian connection and a de-termination of identical tariff rates for the Serbian and Bosnian routes, which would in reality make the construction of a more expensive and demanding Bosnian route pointless. Although the contract provided access to the Ottoman-Serbian border, Serbia did not have much reason to be satisfied. Given the current level of economic development, the state could bear the financial burden of building a railway only if the constructed route was to have international significance. The Serbian govern-ment began to act on the Porte in February 1869, striving to determine the point of junction between the Serbian and Ottoman routes, while negotiations between the Porte and Hirsch were in progress. Such efforts continued unsuccessfully during the following years. In 1869, due to uncertainty about the place of junction and because final agreement had not yet been reached, the first attempt of the Serbian govern-ment to find a company interested in building the railway through the country by asking for bids came to an end87.

The support of the European powers was always of decisive importance for success in Constantinople, and this is why the opposition of the Hungarian government to the concept of a railway connection through Bosnia was of particular impor-tance for Serbia. Unlike the Serbian government, the government of Hungary had a powerful pressure instrument – the determination of the junction point between the Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman railways depended on its consent. The gov-ernment in Budapest was ready to give its consent for a connection of the Bosnian route with the Austrian at Novi only if it simultaneously guaranteed the construc-tion of a railway through Serbia, through the Morava valley, which would give the capital of Hungary a direct connection to Thessaloniki and Constantinople. The conference in Vienna, held on 16-18 July 1871, represented a compromise attempt

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which saw the participation of representatives of the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Austrian and Hungarian governments, the Ottoman Empire, Serbia and Hirsch’s company. Thanks to the activities of the Hungarian Govern-ment Prime Minister Count Gyula Andrássy, Hirsch’s attempt to avoid the obliga-tion of building the Serbian connection, with the support of Vienna, was prevented. The decisions of the conference protected the interests of Serbia and confirmed the obligations of simultaneous construction of both connections, implying an agree-ment between Belgrade and Constantinople on the point of junction88.

The conclusions of the conference meant success for Serbia, since the Porte’s state-ment represented a framework agreement to permit the railway connection. With the approval of the National Assembly, negotiations with Hirsch on the construc-tion of the railway through Serbia followed. However, Hirsch’s financial conditions were very unfavorable and the negotiations ended unsuccessfully89. At the begin-ning of 1872, further attempts to find a company interested in the construction seemed pointless, because it became clear that the Porte did not intend to fulfill the obligations it had assumed at the conference. All efforts of the Serbian repre-sentative at the Porte were in vain90. The prospects of Serbia providing a crossing of international lines through its territory became further reduced with a revision of the Hirsch-Porte contract in May 1872, which brought the completion of the entire trans-Balkan railway project into question. However, it was of particular im-portance for Serbia that the revision of the contract meant an essentially negative resolution of the Bosnian route issue, because it was certain that the Porte could not provide the necessary funds for its construction. The fall of the concept of a connec-tion through Bosnia suited the interests of Serbia, because it provided the Serbian route with an exceptional position. However, occasional news raised concern that, despite the financial problems which it was facing, the Porte was not inclined to realize a railway link with Europe through the territory of an insubordinate vassal, and that Constantinople was giving thought to realizing the connection with the Hungarian railway through a Sofia-Vidin route91.

The most important issue – determining the junction point of the Serbian and Ot-toman routes – still remained open after the revision of the Hirsch-Porte contract. The refusal of the Serbian government to reach an agreement after the conference of 1871 on the link between the Serbian and Hungarian railways separated Serbia from its ally precisely at the moment when, in the autumn of 1871, Andrássy was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary. Thus Serbian diplomacy was forced to act independently. As expected, all efforts remained unsuccessful.

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �5

Meanwhile, Andrássy’s efforts to find a compromise solution – instead of the de-signed Bosnian and Serbian routes – and convince the Porte to build a third route connecting the Hungarian routes through Bosnia at the river Sava near the Serbian border, ended in failure as well. The problems that both Vienna and Belgrade faced in Constantinople contributed to them becoming closer in the spring of 1873. A visit from the Serbian Prime Minister Jovan Ristić to Vienna in April 1873 marked the beginning of a political convergence of the two states. Ristić received a benevo-lent welcome in Vienna, and one of the results of his visit was an agreement that the two countries begin negotiations on a bilateral railway contract, after which both could pressure the Porte into an agreement to connect the Serbian railway with the Ottoman route that was to go from Niš92. The result of the negotiations between the Hungarian and Serbian governments, conducted during the period July – De-cember 1873, was the draft of a railway convention that in 1879 would become the basis for negotiations on the same issue. With the draft contract of 13 December 1873 Hungary and Serbia agreed to complete the construction of the Budapest-Belgrade-Serbian/Ottoman border route within three years. Serbia agreed to the equalization of tariff rates on the route, they were to be fixed by a special conference of representatives of Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Serbia, and in the case of a failure of the conference agreed to accept the tariff rates of the Hungarian connecting route. Of particular importance, however, was the fact that the Austrian representatives accepted the request of the Serbian government that the convention be signed only after a connection between the Serbian and Ottoman railways was provided. This was a great success for the Serbian government, because it ensured the diplomatic support of Austria-Hungary in future efforts towards the Porte93.

The positive effects of Austrian diplomatic support in Constantinople became quickly visible. Under the pressure of ambassadors of the Great Powers the Porte gave in, and on 22 or 23 March 1874 a decision was made in principle to approve Serbia’s connection at Aleksinac, with a note that, due to financial problems that the Ottoman Empire was facing, it was impossible to determine the deadline for the construction of the route. The manner in which the decision was formulated as well as the subsequent activities reflected the Porte’s intentions to deny Serbia its railway link94. However, European diplomacy was too interested in the final establishment of a railway link with the Ottoman capital to allow the Porte to avoid fulfilling its commitments. A powerful incentive for the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy was the fact that most of the routes being built by Hirsch were already in use, making it easier for the British and French traders to penetrate the internal market from

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the Ottoman ports, while Austria-Hungary could not manage to establish a railway link not only with the Ottoman Empire, but even with Serbia, thereby protect-ing its economic interests. Despite the initial success in Constantinople and the pressure from Vienna, without a guarantee from Constantinople on the fulfillment of its obligations, the Serbian government refused to sign the contract from 1873, forcing the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy to represent the interests of Serbia at the Ottoman capital. The result was, in mid-October 1874, the sultan’s decision to ap-prove the route from Sofia to Niš and Aleksinac95. However, the new note from the Porte also had a restrictive provision on the construction of the route only after the provision of the necessary funds, so the Serbian government maintained its opinion that these guarantees were insufficient. Faced with the new refusal, the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy continued its efforts to influence the Porte into setting con-crete deadlines for establishing the connection between the Serbian and Ottoman railways. The results were notes from 1 July and 30 September 1875 in which the Porte accepted the construction of the route across Niš to Aleksinac, with a dead-line for construction by the end of 1879. Similar success was not achieved with the Thessalonica route. Only the obligation of the Porte to solve this issue through an agreement with Austria-Hungary entered into this note96.

The Porte’s notes removed the last obstacle that stood before the signing of the Hungarian-Serbian convention. Diplomatic pressure soon began from the Min-istry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary on the Serbian government to fulfill the obligation it had assumed in December 1873 and sign the convention, as well as to request the railway link from the Porte97. However, the Serbian government considered that this was not a favorable moment for taking on that commitment98. The uprising of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been going on for several months; war preparations were taking place in Serbia, relations between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire were becoming very tense, and a war between the two countries seemed ever closer. In such a situation, Belgrade could not be burdened by the railway agreement with Austria-Hungary and the request was de-nied99. However, after the first unsuccessful war with the Ottoman Empire in 1876, when the Serbian army finally achieved military success in 1877-1878, the Serbian government was forced to pay for the diplomatic support of Austria-Hungary for the recognition of independence and territorial expansion at the Congress of Berlin with important concessions, formally stipulated in a convention signed in Berlin on 8 July 1878. One of the most significant concessions was the consent finally to reach an agreement on the Hungarian-Serbian rail connection. On the other hand, the

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �7

decision of the Great Powers to include a section in the Treaty of Berlin dedicated to the Balkan railways confirmed the international character of the problem of the completion of the first trans-Balkan railway, and with the provision on solving the problem in agreement of the four interested countries – Austria-Hungary, the Ot-toman Empire, Serbia and Bulgaria – the Great Powers placed the mandate for the realization of the Treaty provisions in the hands of the most interested great power, Austria-Hungary100.

The Treaty of Berlin represented one of the key points in the history of the first trans-Balkan railway, and consequently in the construction of the railway in Serbia as well. Despite the obligations that it assumed, Serbian diplomacy had achieved the goal the governments been aimed for over the past decade. Following the text in the Treaty dedicated to the railway, there was no longer any dispute about the route which would connect Constantinople with Vienna: it was now certain that the railway would go through Serbia.

3.2. “Do we need a railway?” – the railway issue in domestic political discourse

Efforts of the Serbian governments during the late 1860s and early 1870s to provide Serbia with a place on the route of the trans-Balkan railway were accompanied by public debate in the Serbian press on the need for the country to build a railway. Although the possibility of its construction was mentioned in the official newspa-per Srbske novine [Serbian newspaper] back in the mid-1840s101, and the educated Serbs during the time of the Defenders of the Constitution envisioned “the iron roads that should like a web be knitted over our hills and valleys”102, it is not sur-prising that the first public debate – an announcement of future political conflicts related to this issue – was not recorded until the late 1860s. For the most significant representatives of the generation of Serbian liberals, the railway had a “special, al-most cult meaning” as “a symbol of progress, its materialization and its driver”103, as “proof that the Golden Age was really before us”, as was written by the leading ideologist of Serbian liberalism, Vladimir Jovanović104. The conflict between the liberals and Prince Mihailo, who forced Jovanović and Grujić to emigrate, was re-lated primarily to the different concepts of the political order of the state, while the desire for a faster economic development of Serbia was common to all. During the last year of Mihailo’s rule, when the pressure of the regime relented, the newspaper Srbija [Serbia] saw the light of day, “a liberal, but not an opposition newspaper”, which did not openly criticize the current regime, but did promote liberal ideas, pri-

�8 Momir Samardžic

marily through economic issues, gathering young educated Serbs who brought out their own opinions or those of distinguished foreign authors, on the most impor-tant issues of economic development transposed onto the Serbian situation105. In the promotion of liberalism through economic topics, a significant role was played by Čedomilj Mijatović, one of the few educated economists among the leading ideologists of Serbian liberalism who, after studies in Munich, Leipzig and Zurich, and specialization in Vienna, took over the department of political economy and finance at the Belgrade Great school (an institution from which in 1905 the Univer-sity developed) and wrote several textbooks in those fields of study106.

It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that precisely Mijatović stood in the center of two fierce debates – in 1868 and 1871 – on the importance of and need for a railway in Serbia. After news in the fall of 1867 on the success of a foreign company in Constantinople and negotiations with the Serbian government, Mijatović was the first to begin advocating in the press for the necessity to build a railway as soon as possible, as a prerequisite of the economic development of Serbia. Next, in the arti-cle “In its time”, appeared a critique from Mijatović’s colleague Stevan Popović who was, in a long polemic which lasted several months, supported not only by Panta Srećković and Alimpije Vasiljević as members of a group of liberals educated during the 1850s, but by Živojin Žujović as well, an intellectual with an ideological orienta-tion on the border between liberalism and socialism. Popović was, like many Serbian economists, educated in Germany and adopted the views of the so-called older Ger-man historical school which regardless of political liberalism stood for state inter-vention and economic protectionism in the economy. Popović was also particularly influenced by economic thoughts of the American economist Henry C. Carey, simi-lar to the German historical school107. Precisely referring to Carey and in response to Mijatović’s support for the construction of a railway, Popović argued that the state should implement a protectionist policy that would prevent free export of domestic raw materials and the import of foreign industrial products, thus contributing to the development of domestic industry. In this sense, he viewed the railway as a great danger that would thrust “a sharp knife into the heart of the people’s future”, prevent further development of the Serbian economy, crush the already humble beginnings of a domestic industry, open the door to colonial expansion of Austria-Hungary and cause “hunger and displacement of the people”108. The attitude of Popović and his like-minded liberals was characteristic for a part of the liberal-oriented intellectu-als educated during the 1850s, especially those who, like Srećković and Vasiljević, gained their education in Russia. Above all nationalists, like the German and Italian

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �9

liberals they were focused on national unification, were more “national romantics, and less progressives”109. They focussed their struggle on winning political freedoms as the presumption of national liberation, while the economic dimension of the lib-eral ideology was adapted to the Serbian reality, so it was more suited by the views of German economic theorists than the British-French classical liberal laissez faire economy. Essentially, they were not against the railway, but were afraid of the possi-ble consequences. They believed that its construction should be preceded by a series of state measures that would lead to a strengthening of the economy and the develop-ment of internal transport, so that the construction of a railway could be approached when it became necessary for Serbian industry and not for its foreign trade, based on the export of raw materials. A similar opinion was held by Žujović as well110.

On the other hand, although he had also studied in Germany, Mijatović stands in debate as a proponent of free trade and an opponent of protectionist policies. He accepted a number of Adam Smith’s theses “as the true basis and foundation of to-day’s development of the science of political economy” and did not believe that they were totally opposed to the views of the German theorists111. He belonged to a generation of liberals educated during the 1860s, out of whose circles were to grow the leaders of the progressives, a generation that had slightly different views on the struggle for political freedoms and different perceptions of the economic prerequisites for national freedom: they were closer to the spirit of the liberal eco-nomic theory, but also guided to a great extent by the attitudes of German theorists. Summing up his views on the importance of a railway for the development of the Serbian economy at one moment in the polemic, Mijatović wrote:

For this we should indulge to develop the industry by means much more natural and much safer (than protectionism – M.S.), and among them comes first the improvement of means of transportation. This last is for, due to improved transport it is immediately possible to associate and assemble the small amounts of country scattered capital, unit-ing of people, their ability, knowledge and skills, which further opens up a larger market for products of the earth, which is already saving one expenditure that people spend on carrying goods that can be capitalized, which will, due to the opening of a larger market, increase the earth production and provide an opportunity to capitalize more, which will make the national transformation go forward. When as a result of developed means of transportation education penetrates greatly among the people, when you multiply the equity and when the result of higher education and capital and needs of the people develop, then will the industry, for which Serbia has most natural conditions, set its own root and develop112.

�0 Momir Samardžic

It was obvious that Mijatović viewed the railway as a tool to reach faster economic development, a tool that would contribute with its positive consequences to the acceleration of economic development on the European periphery. Prince Mihailo shared his opinion113, but his death by assassination prevented him from making a decisive step in this regard.

During the adolescence of Prince Milan (1868-1872) the liberals became a part of the ruling elite and, regardless of their earlier opposition of individuals to Mijatović’s po-lemical views in 1868, the issue of the railway was barely raised publicly, and Vladimir Jovanović composed a hymn to the importance of the “Iron Road” on 26 pages of his Political dictionary114. Jovan Ristić – one of the regents, creator of the constitutional regime and the program of moderate reform – cautiously approached the solving of this issue by observing it in the context of relations between Belgrade and Constan-tinople, Budapest and Vienna. As a supporter of the railway, Mijatović at that point was actively engaged in negotiations with Budapest in 1869 and 1871 on the pre-vention of the Bosnian route, or reaching the Hungarian-Serbian convention115, and once again in 1871, he had to defend his views publicly. The occasion was the Serbian government’s negotiations with Hirsch following the conference in Vienna.

This time the attack came from the left and its long-term significance and impact were much greater. Namely, taking advantage of the new political system created by the constitution from 1869, Svetozar Marković began a political struggle for the realization of his own vision of modernization of the Serbian state. In April 1871 he launched the “Radenik” [Worker], the first socialist newspaper in the Balkans, in which he criticized the current situation in Serbia and proposed the necessary polit-ical and economic reforms in which the railway construction issue had great signifi-cance. Prior to the first elections for a new National Assembly in September 1871, his brother Jevrem, a candidate, on 14 August, four days before the election, signed with six other candidates, mostly liberals and socialists, a joint program of activities in case they were elected. The program significantly reflected Svetozar Marković’s ideas about political reforms, and one of the points was disapproval of the proposal for the construction of the railway that was soon expected to be brought before the Assembly116. None of the signatories of the program were elected, however, and thus Svetozar Marković’s first attempt to gain direct political influence in the na-tional representative body failed. But on 19 September, two days after the Assembly started its work, Jevrem Marković began a series of articles in the “Radenik” titled “Do we need a railway?”, in which he, from a political, economic and military point of view, denied that Serbia needed a railway at that moment117. Feeling that he was

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 �1

called upon to reply, Mijatović defended his views from 1868, while some words on the military significance of the railway were written by an unknown author, per-haps Milutin Garašanin, a recently graduated officer of the French military school at Metz, son of Ilija Garašanin, creator of the Načertanije and a statesmen from the time of reign of the Defenders of the Constitution and Prince Mihailo118. In the debate which ensued thanks to Mijatović’s response, two more unknown authors from the other side119, and finally Svetozar Marković himself, entered120.

Their texts clearly indicate the positions of the socialists on the place of the railway in the concepts of an economic modernization of Serbia, as well as its political im-plications. Avoiding, or skipping the capitalist road of development, the basis of Marković’s ideology, in the case of Serbia meant postponing the construction of the railway, because it would encourage the development of capitalist economic rela-tions, thus increasing both “the wealth of one class and the poverty of the people”. This meant, in Marković’s view, that those who spoke about the importance of a rail-way for the welfare of the people were not thinking of the vast majority of the popu-lation – the Serbian peasants – but rather they had in mind the wealth of the group of people possessing capital, “the international force” as he called it. He felt that “the railway was the most reliable way for capital to dominate the labor of uneducated, unskilled, poor people; to lead those people into such a position where they could not even think of convergence with other people, social relations or their education”. On the other hand, for the development of the people, or “the people’s state” ac-cording to Marković’s vision, before building a railway, it was necessary to provide the prerequisites for the development of agriculture, the most important sector of the economy. These prerequisites implied, in his opinion, education of the people, population increase and the development of domestic industry to be followed by the development of means of transportation: the regulation of the Morava river flow to make it navigable (a series of articles was devoted to this issue in the “Radenik”); the establishment of a Serbian steamboat society on the border rivers with Austria-Hungary, the Sava and the Danube; building a network of good stone-paved roads; improvement of the means of land transportation independent of the railway; better organization of the transport of passengers and goods; and if necessary, in certain places the construction of horse-pulled railways. Delaying the construction of a rail-way would prevent the influence of the developed European economies, above all of neighboring Austria, until “the manufacturing industry is improved and the level of industrial development is raised, so that we can enter with less risk into competition with the foreigners”. Therefore, the result of activation of all the national potentials

�� Momir Samardžic

would be economic development which would eventually lead to the need for the construction of a steam railway, but at that time this would not imply the domina-tion of foreign capital and the conversion of the Serbian economy into an additional economic space to be used by the developed European economies121.

However, in justifying such strong opposition to the construction of a railway, more important than these economic reasons were considerations of a political and mili-tary nature. Socialists, as well as their political opponents, attributed great signifi-cance to the issue of the liberation and unification of the Serbian people.

Our political situation is such that faithful to our national policy – we must as soon as possible strive to achieve national unity and overall national freedom. To do this, we must not start an enterprise such as railways, that will exhaust all of our credit and that would commit us to a long-term friendship with the neighboring peoples, above with Hungar-ians and below with the Turks who were since ancient times our enemies122.

Evidently: we need as soon as possible to prepare for war. (...) If I will guarantee some company to pay a percentage on 3-4 million ducats (...) how shall we equip for war? Our people will be economically strangled by the burden, paying for the war equipment and for the railway. (...) Our enemies are surrounding us with the railway and preparing to politically numb us123.

If it wished to fulfill its mission of liberation and unification of Serbs which, accord-ing to Marković’s ideas should be accompanied by an overall Balkan uprising and the creation of a Balkan confederation, Serbia needed to focus its financial strength on preparations for war. The proposed economic reforms were part of the prepara-tions, and even the eventual borrowing abroad was justified in achieving this goal. “The Cultural Mission of Serbia in the east has to be realized with a military revolu-tion (rebellion), and this should be done first, and then we can build railways, or else our mission will end up in a blind alley”, wrote Svetozar124. Therefore, the basic idea was that the liberation and unification must precede the railway, since the con-struction of the designed trans-Balkan railway would facilitate access for the armies of the neighboring empires that might want to prevent the territorial expansion of Serbia. Moreover, this is why the construction should be postponed even if it did not present a financial burden for the state125. Bearing in mind that the socialists viewed the war as a catalyst for internal political change, delay of the construction of a railway appeared as an issue of particular importance.

On the other hand, Mijatović defended the earlier views on the economic and political importance of a railway as an incentive for future economic development, assuming

Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881 ��

the opening of the Serbian market and providing Serbia with a place on the interna-tional railway route with all the requirements that Marković demanded. He especially referred to the opinion that the construction of a railway was postponing the fulfill-ment of the “testamentary thought” of national unification, stressing that a country without modern transport links, as a symbol of overall progress, cannot pretend to a “cultural mission” in areas where those links exist, because the possession of modern transport is one of the most important ways of displaying civilizational superiority. An unknown soldier at the same time argued that the railway would provide for a more effective military defense of Serbia, due to the greater mobility of troops126.

It is interesting, however, that – although the representatives’ range of choice was carefully controlled – there was a small group in the Assembly, led by Ljubomir Kaljević, which was against the immediate construction of a railway. Kaljević was a liberal, founder and editor of “Srbija”, a critic of the constitution and Ristić’s policy of moderate reform, and later a progressive127. The reasons for which he stepped for-ward were founded in the arguments of Popović and others on the pages of “Srbija” in 1868, but we should not neglect the impact of the public debate conducted in the Serbian press during the Assembly session. Its essence was the request to delay con-struction and to introduce stronger customs protection for the Serbian economy, whose development would eventually point to the necessity of a railway. After a discussion, the Assembly decided that it was “necessary in the interest of the state and the general public to build a railway from Belgrade to Aleksinac” and the gov-ernment was left with achieving this desire128.

This was the last time that the liberals publicly expressed doubts about the need to build a railway as soon as possible. However, the battle of the socialists continued, and it gained momentum with the new elections of 1874, and the entry into the As-sembly of a group of opposition peasant representatives led by Adam Bogosavljević. Bogosavljević was one of the closest friends of Svetozar Marković during their edu-cation at the Great School; then he returned to the countryside as a respected, edu-cated and rich householder, and in the early 1870s successfully propagated Svetozar’s ideas among the peasantry. Along with the liberals and conservatives, Bogosavljević and others – the populist opposition – represented the third political power in the Assembly. Their area was strengthened by the entry of Jevrem Marković after the early elections of 1875. Socialists around Svetozar and the representatives around Bogosavljević, and later Jevrem, represented a unique political circle – the core of the future People’s Radical Party, and Bogosavljević and Jevrem, as the most highly educated, were the main interpreters of Svetozar’s ideas in the Assembly129.

�� Momir Samardžic

The Assembly sessions of 1874-1876 were marked by intense activity of the popu-list opposition, which opposed all of the legislative proposals of the government for the economic modernization of the state and advocated a simplistic version of Marković’s ideology, already expressed in the program of the candidates for repre-sentative in the 1871 election. Because of this, the reforms proposed by the populist opposition were comprehensive, “so our people can develop from within themselves (...) without the pressure and interference of ‘graftings’ from others”, referring to the heritage of the Western civilization, capitalism, liberalism, and a civil society130. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the Assembly of 1875 and 1876 heard the same arguments against the railway that Jevrem and Svetozar Marković present-ed in 1871131. During a debate in 1875 on the approval of funds for the study of the Belgrade-Aleksinac route, Bogosavljević even said:

I certainly do not hold, that we so need to build the railway because, our people(…) have no bread to eat, let alone railways to make ... We are not able to build the railways our-selves, but some foreign state or some foreign company must undertake to build it, or we must take money from the side, and Serbia has the task to liberate the Christians and their brethren from Turkey and from under the Turkish yoke; that state, from which we borrow money to build a railway, will keep our country always in some dependency and will not allow us to liberate ourselves and take our national liberation, only because it will be afraid that its capital which it invested in our railway might be lost, just as Eng-land sustains Turkey, only because it of interest, because it lent money to her132.

Several months later, on the next session of the Assembly, Jevrem Marković spoke in the same manner133.

Nevertheless, taken all in all, the debate about Serbia’s need for a railway during the decade before the gain of independence showed an almost unanimous position that Serbia did need a railway, but ideological differences caused the appearance of differences in the approach to resolving this issue – from Mijatović’s position on the necessity of faster construction to various reasons for its postponement. When, under new circumstances in the years following the Congress of Berlin, the need for the construction of a railway, came to be the most important foreign policy issue, it was also to become a point of differentiation between the various approaches to the political and economic modernization of the state.

II. serbIan raIlways between austrIa-hunGary and russIa

The Congress of Berlin placed the solution to the problem of building the Balkan railways high on the agenda. Construction of the railway became one of the major issues before the governments of the interested countries – Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Serbia, and Bulgaria. However, the war and its consequences, the disastrous state of public finances, a new international legal status and conflicts of interest between the Great Powers, as well as the internal political situation, had a determining impact on the manner of resolving the railway issue in Serbia after 1878, with significant implications in foreign and domestic policy. The problems that the Serbian government would have to face were already visible shortly after the German chancellor closed the Congress.

1. serbIa after berlIn: InternatIonal posItIon, fInanCes, Internal polItICs

1.1. Serbia’s international position

The political map of the Balkan Peninsula was significantly changed by the deci-sions of the Congress of Berlin. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania received recogni-tion of their independence and territorial expansion. Bulgaria was created as a vassal principality within the Ottoman Empire, as was the autonomous province of East-ern Rumelia in the area south of the Balkan mountain. In addition, of particular importance was the consent of the Great Powers to Austria-Hungary’s temporarily occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina and keeping military formations in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, strategically an extremely important area lying between Serbia and Montenegro, thus preventing their possible unification. With a land border 1,329 km long134, as the only European country, apart from Switzerland, that did not have direct access to the sea135, Serbia found itself surrounded by countries that in Bel-grade, to a greater or lesser extent, were seen as threats to state and national interests, and even to the survival and preservation of independence: on the northern and western border Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire on the south, and Bulgaria on the east. The central position in the Balkans and the territorial expansion to the southern part of the Morava valley, or in other words, the dominance over a key po-sition on the road from Central Europe to the Balkans and the Middle East, further emphasized the sensitivity of Serbia’s geostrategic position.

�� Momir Samardžic

When Serbia finally gained its long awaited independence, it found itself at the crossroads of the spheres of interest of Austria-Hungary and Russia, which were to be clearly defined in 1881 with a secret agreement on the restoration of the League of the Three Emperors (Dreikaiserbund). Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of Austria-Hungary’s sphere of interest, and Bulgaria of Russia’s, while Serbia was much too important to be given to either of the contenders. After the Congress, Austria-Hungary stepped into the Balkans to stay there until its downfall. Its influence was based on the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the economic penetration of the Balkans. By entering into the two Ottoman provinces, the Monarchy protect-ed the Dalmatian hinterland and reduced the “Slavic threat” that would have been strengthened with the unification of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the con-trol of navigation on the Danube, the construction and exploitation of the future trans-Balkan railway, as well as favourable trade agreements, were meant to create the bases for the economic penetration of the Balkans, which would lead essentially to an economic annexation, without the need for a political conquest136.

On the other hand, following the Congress, Russia was trying to emerge out from its diplomatic isolation and one of the main goals of its Balkan policy was the pres-ervation of the positions it had acquired in Bulgaria. Due to its economic weakness, Russia was not able to strengthen its influence in the Balkans through economic expansion, or the export of capital, but it traditionally based it on political power and did not scruple to use it not only in the Principality of Bulgaria, but also in the independent states of Serbia and Montenegro, which in their struggle for inde-pendence in previous decades had relied mainly on the support of Russia. Although Russia’s attention was primarily focused on Bulgaria, the importance of Serbia was not neglected and the Russian diplomacy sought to preserve the positions it had previously acquired, and to work on improving relations between the Balkan Slavic countries. This would inevitably lead to strengthening its influence, thus slowing down the Austrian-Hungarian penetration to the southeast and truncating the suc-cesses of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans137.

However, it is precisely in this respect that Russian diplomacy had made the biggest mistakes in the previous years. These would crucially affect the gradual change in the course of foreign policy in Serbia following the Congress of Berlin, as Serbia aban-doned its traditional policy of reliance on Russia and shifted to an evermore obvious reliance on Austria-Hungary. The shift was certainly linked to the strong position of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans following the Congress. Indeed, in the provisions of the preliminary peace treaty of San Stefano between Russia and the Ottoman Em-

�7Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

pire, the essence of Russia’s Balkan policy was expressed completely, as was clear from the favour accorded to the Bulgarian national movement. By creating a large Bulgar-ian state with an access to three seas (Black, Marmara and Aegean) whose borders in-cluded the entire territory of Macedonia, Russian diplomacy made it clear that it put Bulgaria’s interests before those of Serbia. Aspirations of the Bulgarian national move-ment to create a national state on the territory stretching from the Danube to the Aegean Sea, undoubtedly coincided with Russia’s interest to take control of the Straits and gain access to Mediterranean. The realization of the project of a large Bulgarian state as a Russian outpost in the Balkans was prevented by the other Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin, but Belgrade had not forgotten the uncertainty produced when news of the creation of a greater Bulgaria arrived from San Stefano138.

Always keeping in mind the “testamentary thought” of liberation and unification of Serbs living in Ottoman territory, Serbian foreign policy found itself in an unenvi-able position. The entry of Austria-Hungary into Bosnia and Herzegovina brought an end to all hopes of uniting with these provinces towards which strong political and propaganda activities had been directed during the previous decades, while Aus-tria-Hungary’s control of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar discouraged any similar attempt directed towards Montenegro. The only possible direction of territorial expansion of the Serbian state was towards the south, onto the territory known as Old Serbia, because it included areas that had been within the borders of the medieval Serbian state, as well as extending into Macedonia. Openly entering into the Balkans, Aus-tria-Hungary deflected the views of Serbian politicians towards the south, pushing Serbia into a conflict with Bulgaria, and so, indirectly, into a conflict with Russia. The fear of restoration of ‘San Stefano’ Bulgaria after 1878 was constantly present in the thoughts of Serbian Prince Milan and the greater part of the political elite. Such a state, which would cover a large territory, would place Serbia on the level of a secondary Balkan state, small as to territory and population, surrounded on all sides by potentially hostile states. Most importantly, it would bring the hope of territo-rial expansion and national unification to an end. The Serbian political elite drew significant lessons for the future from the events of 1878. San Stefano was the point after which Prince Milan slowly began turning towards Austria-Hungary139.

This change in orientation was not caused only by the policy of Russia. After all, the new foreign policy orientation would not be clearly manifested until during the change of government in the fall of 1880. By recognizing Serbia’s independence at the Congress, the Great Powers – under the influence of Austria-Hungary – also immediately limited her by insisting on the commitments she had accepted with re-

�8 Momir Samardžic

spect to the construction and exploitation of the planned trans-Balkan railway and the conclusion of trade agreements. The neighbouring monarchy directly imposed additional obligations on Serbia through a separate Convention. Entering the order of independent states, Serbia had to prove – by respecting and fulfilling its commit-ments – that it belonged there. On the other hand, the fulfilment of obligations related to the construction of the railway and the conclusion of trade agreements was of great importance to Serbia because it was a prerequisite of a comprehensive economic modernization to which, it seemed, the door had been opened with the recognition of independence. All this indicated Austria-Hungary as the most im-portant economic partner, as a gateway to and paradigm of Europe.

1.2. The state of government finances

Bearing in mind the commitments made in connection with the construction of a railway, one of the most significant issues that stood before the Serbian government after two gruelling wars was the consolidation of state finances. The financial situ-ation was very serious. The state treasury was empty at a moment when independ-ence and territorial expansion imposed an increase in government spending, and a significant part of the territory in the east had been devastated after the attacks of the Ottoman army in 1876. In addition, years of war and bans on the export of cer-tain products had contributed to the decline of export trade, and thus the decline of revenues from customs duties as one of the pillars of state revenue. Therefore time and good will from the most important trade partner – Austria-Hungary – were necessary if exports were to reach the pre-war level. At the same time, new borders and conditions in the surrounding areas of the Ottoman Empire had disrupted the old trade routes and connections with the former suzerain.

In the period before the wars for independence, Serbia had been granted a loan in 1867 in London with the help of the Russian government, while a new loan was con-cluded in Russia in 1876. During the wars, all the state cash had been spent (in pre-vious decades it had been used for covering budget deficits), as had private deposits, which were located at the Administration of Public Funds (Uprava javnih fondova), the most significant state financial institution, founded 1862. The state announced an internal voluntary loan, then a forced loan, while other war expenses were cov-ered by requisition and purchases with a grace period. When it gained independ-ence, Serbia had a total debt of 32,103,965 dinars (=francs). Of this, 24,742,685 dinars were domestic debts without interest, while the external debt with interest

�9Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

amounted to 7,361,280 dinars. At the end of the fiscal year in 1878 the country faced a deficit of 3,007,750 dinars (around 20% expenditures more than anticipated by the budget). This was impossible to cover with the usual allocation of money from the state treasury; there were outstanding payments for war loans as well as for private deposits and war procurement. Apart from this, a specific problem was the support of war-torn regions of Eastern Serbia where thousands of families had been left without a roof over their heads140.

Financial difficulties required finding new sources of revenue and stabilizing the state’s finances. Through serious saving measures the government was able to bal-ance revenues and expenditures within the budget in 1879 (18,969,950 revenue and expenditure) and in 1880 (19,560,500 revenue and expenditure), but it had covered around three million dinars of budget expenditures that had occurred in 1878 from vaguely defined “unplanned sources”, while for repayment of the debt, a special budget was created, which also had ‘special’ sources. Of course, the most im-portant question was how to find resources for the budget, and this was not possible without placing new burdens on the taxpayers. The measures that Jovan Ristić’s gov-ernment attempted had financial, as well as political significance. Bearing in mind that the burden of war for the most part fell on the shoulders of the peasantry, the government attempted to transfer the new financial burden on the wealthier classes of the population. However, the implementation of the new Law on the restitution of state debts, adopted in early 1879, created serious problems for the government. The resignation of the Minister of Finance Vladimir Jovanović at the end of 1879 was followed by a change in the law which transferred part of the tax burden on the peasantry after all141.

Viewed overall, thanks to financial reforms and large savings, the government man-aged to control the finances and balance the budget significantly. However, at a time of resolving other important national issues such as the construction of a railway and the signing of trade agreements, the financial reforms had great political signifi-cance because they violated the government’s reputation with the wealthy classes of the population on whose support it had relied during the previous years, but they haven’t contributed to the state treasury to an extent that could facilitate fulfiling the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Berlin and the Austrian-Serbian Berlin Convention. After two wars, the state of Serbian finances was worse than ever at a time when it was necessary to approach the largest construction enterprise in the history of Serbia in the 19th century.

50 Momir Samardžic

1.3. The political situation

The bad condition of state finances as well as the government’s measures played a significant role in the gradual worsening of its position. Following the Congress and the great success that achieving state independence represented, it seemed that the position of the government was stronger than ever. Indeed, that was the case for more than a year. The rebellious convocation of the Assembly in 1875-1877, that placed proposals for radical reforms before the government, ended its three-year work with the adoption of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. Following the au-tumn pause in 1878, a new government was formed – the former minister of foreign affairs, Jovan Ristić was now Prime Minister, but as ministers he named mostly in-dividuals without significant political reputations. As Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ristić was at the peak of his career, and his power was enhanced by Prince Milan’s lack of interest for state affairs. After coming of age and stepping to the throne in 1872, the young Prince started playing a more significant role in political life, often supporting Ristić’s opponents, and complying with the leader of the liberals only because of political necessity. After the Congress, the prince spent a year withdrawn in Niš (the city which had been the most significant gain in the recent war against the Ottoman Empire) and had no decisive influence on state af-fairs. Under the new conditions, while the emergency measures declared before the start of the war in 1876 were still in force, while there was not a single opposition newspaper, and when the government announced illegal elections for the new As-sembly in the new districts where it could count on certain success, the victory of the government’s supporters in the parliamentary elections of November 1878 did not come as a surprise142.

However, although it was not as strong as in the previous convocation, there was an opposition in the new Assembly. Due to the lack of organized political parties, the number of representatives that opposed the government is not certain – accord-ing to various estimates it ranged from 10-15 to 37, or even to 40. In certain areas of central Serbia, traditionally not inclined to favour the government, as well as in Eastern Serbia, in which the consequences of war were most strongly felt, opposi-tion representatives were elected in spite of government control and influence over the elections. The most significant oppositionists from the previous convocation were re-elected as representatives. A great loss was Jevrem Marković, executed at the explicit request of the Prince, despite insufficient evidence on his involvement in a military rebellion before Serbia’s entrance into the war in December 1877. Almost

51Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

all the most significant representatives of the socialist movement – the radicals as they called themselves – were abroad. In September 1878 in Novi Sad, in Austria-Hungary, Pera Todorović, the leading ideologist of the movement after the death of Svetozar Marković, launched the newspaper “Straža” [Guard], in an unsuccessful attempt to reduce the obvious lack of an opposition newspaper on the territory of the principality. Immediately prohibited in Serbia, “Straža”, staying within the framework of Marković’s teachings, was developing the ideology of a socialism that placed the people at its centre: all reforms of the state and society were to be carried out in the people’s interest and with their approval, while liberalism and civil society were at the same time marked out as the people’s enemies143.

A positive note and a hope for success, however, came from the other side. Nikola Pašić, the only leader who had remained in Serbia, a man who during the life of Svetozar Marković had demonstrated exceptional organizational skills, was elected as a representative in November 1878. He entered the Assembly with a highly de-veloped ideological concept. In 1876, in a letter which is considered to be the first program of the future People’s Radical Party, he wrote:

The people are sovereign and therefore they own all rights, to political and economic organization of the country. Political rights of citizens can be best preserved when the municipality, county and district, and all of Serbia are moderated by self-government. Economic freedom, i.e. independence can be regulated if a road of unification is adopt-ed and if the funds for building industry and agriculture are not given to one person, but to one cooperative. In other words, we want democratic freedom, decentralization, we want to save the people from adopting the faults of the Western industrial society, where it creates a proletariat, and immense wealth, but to build industry based on co-operatives. (...) As for the ‘liberation and unification’ outside, we help it as always, only we would be happiest if we were to make the liberation by revolution. (...) We are for an alliance of the Bulgarian-Serbian people, and if possible, the Danube Confederation, always provided of course that the Serbian people organise themselves according to the principle of self-government144.

In short, “at the domestic level, national sovereignty, self-government, a non-capi-talist road to development in order to avoid the mistakes of the Western industrial society, common property”, and for external policy, national liberation by revolu-tion, an alliance with the Bulgarians and a confederation of the Danube peoples145. Pašić’s concept of Serbia’s modernization was based on a determined rejection of the European models, “on a firm belief that it is necessary to preserve the most impor-tant institutions and norms of the traditional way of life” on which a comprehensive

5� Momir Samardžic

development should be based146. “Take only the technical knowledge and science from the West and use them in the Slavic-Serbian spirit”, was the thought that rested at the base of his concept of progress147.

Pašić’s election as a representative was of exceptional significance to the populist opposition in the Assembly. In a significantly altered political situation follow-ing the wars and the gain of independence, under the influence of the events of war, repressed under a regime of extraordinary measures and, above all, “ideologi-cally insufficiently constructed and organizationally incoherent”, the opposition found itself in an on-going crisis148. After the execution of Jevrem Marković, Adam Bogosavljević was left as the pillar of the opposition. However, during the Assem-bly sessions during late 1878 and early 1879, his word was almost unheard. He re-mained on the sidelines. “For an effective fight against the government, a reform was necessary. And that reform was associated with Nikola Pašić”149. Close contacts between opposition representatives and Pašić existed from a time before the war, when the political activity of the populist opposition, supported by the socialist newspapers in which Pašić cooperated as well, was at its peak. His organizational skills were precisely what the opposition needed. While the first Assembly session saw disagreements within the opposition, and its participation in debates was much less aggressive than before, Pašić’s entrance into the Assembly marked the beginning of the gradual process of organization of the opposition, implementing order and discipline in its operations. The foundations were laid for a future successful politi-cal party organization150.

In an Assembly with a peasant majority, where a fourth of the representatives were formally designated by the prince (but by that time really chosen by the nearly all-powerful Prime Minister), an opposition having an ideological point of view that was not populist-radical would have been impossible. Ristić did not want to allow his educated opponents, the young conservatives, to enter into the Assembly. In a situation where there was no opposition newspaper, their operations came down to a narrow circle of educated people, mainly in the capital. Shortly after the Congress, in a text on the translation of the part of Bluntschli’s Staatswörterbuch151, funded by the Endowment of Nikola Čupić which consisted of a majority of government opponents, Milan Piroćanac wrote that a liberal party is not one that is so called, but one that operates in the spirit of liberal ideas, and respects freedom, legality and personal security; that Serbia “has people who think and work as conservatives but support the liberals; as well as others who think and work as liberals, but support the conservatives”, clearly alluding to Ristić; that those who in the Assembly pre-

5�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

vented the adoption of the law on the freedom of press, personal security and mu-nicipal self-governments, as Ristić had been doing during the previous years, cannot be called liberals; that the existing constitution has serious flaws that are preventing Serbia from going down the road of full constitutionality152.

At the end of 1878 and during 1879 the practical political activity of the opposition was modest and mostly limited to the narrow circle of intellectuals in the capital who were not in the Prime Minister’s graces. However, in order to oppose the gov-ernment effectively it was necessary to enter into an open battle and that the ideo-logically very diverse sides of the opposition be united in this battle. Just as had been the case before independence, it was necessary to find unity of action of very diverse forces, and it took more than one year to arrive at a tactical convergence of the op-position inside and outside of the Assembly. In the meantime, the government had enough time and space for a peaceful realization of its vision of state reforms. It also took a decisive step on the path towards economic modernization, making the necessary agreements with the neighbouring countries on the construction of the railway, as well as attempting to obtain the necessary funds.

2. InternatIonal oblIGatIons of serbIa and the raIlway Issue

The Treaty of Berlin and the Berlin Convention resolved the decades-old dilemma of the Serbian government on the construction of a railway route along the Morava valley. At the proposal of Austrian-Hungarian representatives, provisions on the Balkan railways entered into the text of the Treaty of Berlin153. According to article 38, Serbia was forced to inherit the obligations of the Porte towards Austria-Hun-gary and the Hirsch’s Compagnie Générale on the territory of the annexed areas re-garding the construction and completion of the connecting routes, as well as their exploitation. Through article 10, the same obligations were imposed on the Princi-pality of Bulgaria, while the Porte, according to article 21 assumed the obligation to comply with the provisions of the existing contracts relating to the construction and exploitation of railways on the territory of the newly created province of East-ern Rumelia154. It concerned fulfilling the obligations that the Porte had assumed towards Austria-Hungary with a note on 30 September 1875 in connection with the construction of the Belovo-Sofia-Niš-Aleksinac route, but also respecting the rights of Hirsch’s companies for the construction and exploitation deriving from the contracts between Hirsch and the Porte. The May 1872 contract envisaged that if the state did not intend to build its own railway independently, then Hirsch’s So-

5� Momir Samardžic

ciété Imperiale would enjoy primacy in negotiations with the state on a concession for its construction. In addition, the contract envisaged that, after the completion of the construction, exploitation rights would be given to Hirsch’s Compagnie Géné-rale. Vienna judged that supporting Hirsch was the best way to realize the interests of the Dual monarchy, since it would be difficult to find a company that would consider building railways in the Balkans, in view of the obligations of the Porte to-wards Hirsch. Hirsch also thought that he needed Austrian-Hungarian protection in order to realize the benefits that the contract provided, so prior to the Congress he transferred the company headquarters from Paris to Vienna and obtained Aus-trian citizenship155. Apart from protecting Hirsch’s rights on the territory of the new districts, Austria-Hungary used the Berlin Convention to obtain Serbia’s con-sent – within the old borders of the Principality and within three years – to build and start exploiting the route from Belgrade to the old Serbian-Ottoman border, previously envisaged in the project of the Hungarian-Serbian Convention of 1873, as well as the junction route towards Belovo and the Thessaloniki-Mitrovica route. In return, Austria-Hungary made a commitment to connect its railway network to the Serbian at Belgrade within the same deadline156.

Of particular importance for future negotiations between Serbia and Austria-Hun-gary in connection with the signing of the railway contract was the fact that the text of Articles 10 and 38 made no mention of a committee within which the railway issue between Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Serbia and Bulgaria was to be solved. In addition, it does not mention a contract, but contracts, between the four mentioned countries. A committee of the four countries is mentioned only in the text of the Berlin Convention, but there it also stated that the task of the committee was to produce conventions between the four countries on the one hand, and inter-ested companies, on the other hand, for the purpose of fulfilling previous contracts. Austria-Hungary particularly protected its interests with a provision that the con-struction and exploitation of the mentioned railways was to be uniform, and that the future rules on exploitation should coincide with the rules of exploitation on the major Austrian-Hungarian routes157. The acceptance of this provision by the other states, or the equalization of the tariff rates of the Austrian-Hungarian railways with the tariff rates of the projected routes would represent a significant step towards the expansion of the Austrian-Hungarian economic space onto the Balkans.

With the new geopolitical state created by the decisions of the Congress, the future route connecting Constantinople with Europe would pass through the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria and Serbia, while crossing from Serbia onto the Hungarian terri-

55Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

tory of the Dual monarchy, with a tendency to connect with the Hungarian railway network. Out of the routes whose construction was planned by the Porte’s agree-ments with Hirsch and Austria-Hungary, by 1875 the Constantinople-Belovo and Thessaloniki-Mitrovica routes were built, with the Edirne-Dedeagach and Trnovo-Yambol branches. With intent to ensure the completion of the construction and the connection of the Ottoman routes to its own, Austria-Hungary used the mentioned points of the Treaty of Berlin to impose on Serbia, the Ottoman Empire and Bul-garia, the obligation “immediately following the conclusion of peace” to reach an agreement with her on the construction of the railways. The route across Bosnia was no longer mentioned, so the Ottoman Empire was left with building two routes – towards the Serbian and Bulgarian border, Bulgaria was expected to build the section from the border with the Ottoman Empire, through Sofia, to the border with Serbia, and the section Belgrade-Niš with branches towards the border with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire was the obligation of Serbia.

Counterbalancing the recognition of independence and in addition to the obligations imposed by the Articles related to the railway, Serbia was according to the Treaty of Berlin also burdened with other obligations that would restrict its newly acquired sovereignty in the following years. These were closely associated with the problem of concluding a railway contract with Austria-Hungary. The most significant were the provisions restricting the right to initiate an independent external trade policy. Rep-resentatives of Austria-Hungary, France and Italy had proposed at the Congress to adopt provisions that would limit the independence of Serbia in trade policy158. The first limit, written in Article 37 of the Treaty of Berlin, related to the transit of goods. Serbia was not allowed to charge any transit customs duties on goods passing through its territory from the Ottoman Empire towards Europe and vice versa159. At the time the Treaty was signed, the provision on the prohibition of charging transit customs duties did not make sense because Serbia had already abolished transit customs duties with the customs tariff of 1864. The assumption that the representatives of the major powers were not familiar with the Serbian tariff from 1864 does not seem likely, since its first proponent was an Austrian-Hungarian representative, and Vienna was well acquainted with the regulations concerning trade in the Serbian principality. Apart from this, an identical provision could be found in the part of the contract relating to the Principality of Bulgaria160. The prohibition of implementing transit customs was directly associated with the planned construction of the railways. The future rail link of the Ottoman Empire with the European West across Bulgaria and Serbia was to be one of the most important and lively international transport routes on the European

5� Momir Samardžic

continent. The trade agreements mainly signed during the early 1860s, provided the Great Powers with favourable conditions for trade with the Ottoman Empire. The Porte had a right to collect customs duties on imported goods in the amount of 8% of the value that the goods had in its coastal harbours, and foreign traders could do business almost without restrictions. Austria-Hungary had received additional ben-efits because its right to export to the Ottoman border areas and pay lower customs duties was recognised – 3% for import into Serbia and Romania, and 6% for import into Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the trade agreements with the Great Pow-ers did not even give the Porte the status of most privileged partner, as was usual at the time. After the conclusion of a favourable trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire, thanks to the provisions on the prohibition of transit customs that were noted in the Treaty of Berlin the Great Powers fully secured their own economic interests in the future trade exchange between the southeast and west of Europe161.

Article 37 of the Treaty also stipulated that until the trade agreements between Serbia and other countries were signed, the trade agreements that the individual countries signed with the Ottoman Empire would remain in force. So the agree-ments from the 1860s continued to be recognised, thus giving the Great Powers large benefits in trade with Serbia as well. In addition to exceptional benefits that Austria-Hungary, as Serbia’s most important trade partner, had under the contract with the Ottoman Empire, Serbia’s customs tariff from 1864 recognized the right of all other countries to export to Serbia with a customs duty of only 3%, making their rights equal to that given since 1862 to Austria-Hungary with the Austro-Ot-toman agreement. It could be said that Serbia used the three-percent base of the customs tariff to pay for the tacit consent of the Great Powers for a step for which, given its position as a vassal of the Porte, at that time it had no right. With the cus-toms tariffs of 1864, Serbia had inaugurated an independent trade policy. Article 37 of the Treaty of Berlin represented a step backwards. Serbia, as an independent state, had been forced into dependence on other countries, since whether the cur-rent situation would be changed or not depended precisely on their good will. The Serbian government spent the next five years trying to reach agreements with the countries with which the Ottoman Empire had signed trade agreements. Only after the expiration of these agreements in the early 1890 was Serbia able to begin a fully independent foreign trade policy162.

Serbia’s most important foreign trade partner was Austria-Hungary. Given its role in foreign trade, quickly reaching a new trade agreement was for Serbia of great im-portance. According to the Berlin Convention, the start of negotiations on a new

57Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

trade agreement was scheduled for no later than four months. At the same time, the possibility of concluding a customs union between the two countries was left open. While helping Serbia in Berlin to liberate itself from the Ottoman suzerainty, Aus-tria-Hungary also sought, with the obligations deriving from the Treaty of Berlin and the Berlin Convention, to engage Serbia fully in its sphere of influence, eco-nomically and therefore politically. With this intention Serbia was forced to sign the Convention by which an agreement was reached regarding the construction of a railway and regulating trade relations, as a condition for support in obtaining its territorial expansion. An integral part of the convention was a provision on the res-ignation of rights in favour of Austria-Hungary to regulate the flow of the Danube at the Iron Gate, which would facilitate trade along the Danube163. Negotiations regarding the fulfilment of provisions of the Treaty and the Convention represented the essence of relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary until the signing of the railway and trade agreement in 1880, and in 1881. In the relations between the two countries, solving these problems was often intertwined and mutually conditioned. The efforts of the Serbian government to sign a trade agreement with Austria-Hun-gary as soon as possible are therefore of special importance in any study of the prob-lem of the construction of the first railway in Serbia.

3. unsuCCessful beGInnInGs

3.1. Initial contacts with Vienna and St. Petersburg

Shortly after the ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, the Serbian government was ad-dressed by representatives of the Staatsbahn, an Austrian-French railway company that was building and exploiting significant routes in both parts of Austria-Hun-gary164. On the other hand, the Russian representative Alexander Persiani spoke to Ristić in mid October of 1878 about the interest of Russian entrepreneur Baranov in building the Serbian railway165. Initial inquiries immediately showed that the construction of Serbia’s railway, or finding the funds and a concessionaire for its construction, would first of all constitute a political issue of the first order which would bring into conflict the interests of the two most interested Great Powers – Austria-Hungary and Russia. With its success at the Congress of Berlin Austria-Hungary had strengthened its position in the West Balkans, and with the conven-tion with Serbia it had further secured its own economic interests. The signing of a bilateral railway convention which would establish the deadlines for the railway construction on the territory of Serbia, and grant the concession to a company close

58 Momir Samardžic

to the interests of Vienna, would confirm the Dual monarchy’s dominant position in Serbia. Therefore, it was first necessary to persuade the Serbian government to enter into bilateral negotiations on the basis of the Convention, and then to prevent it from taking a loan for construction which would force it to grant the concession to a foreign company. The Staatsbahn’s wish to build the Serbian railway had sup-port of the government in Vienna. Although the Staatsbahn was a private, and not a state railway company, with a participation of Austrian and French capital, during the past two decades the interests of the company had often coincided with the in-terests of the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Austrian government. There was already Staatsbahn railway route on Austrian-Hungarian territory: it went from Vienna to the border with Romania which passed a few dozen kilometres from the Hungarian-Serbian border, and could be, it seemed, easily connected with the Ser-bian railway. Therefore, the Staatsbahn could offer the Serbian government condi-tions which no other railway company could compete with.

Meanwhile, Vienna’s greatest fear was that construction of the railway might be granted to a Russian company, since this would also mean a new strengthening of the Russian influence in Serbia. In later reports about the efforts of Russian entre-preneurs to win over the Serbian government, the Austrian diplomatic representa-tive in Belgrade, Baron Herbert, did not hide his concern. In a report to the Minis-try of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary he wrote:

Russian influence would be increasing and that would give us great difficulties in the po-litical, commercial and military terms that could be followed by harmful consequences. Russia, if it was to get the railway in Serbia, would receive in the south of our Kingdom a permanent and reliable observer, a force, a new agitator on our southern border, in the end it might get allies in Serbia. This prospect would be enough [...] for us to start preventing the establishment of Russia on our southern border166.

Herbert’s words clearly indicated the essence of the fears present in Vienna concern-ing Russia’s intentions, as well as the possible consequences if the railway construc-tion in Serbia came into the hands of Russia. The interest of Russian entrepreneur Baranov immediately after the Congress of Berlin indicated that such a possibility was realistic. However, it is precisely in the issue of the Serbian railway construc-tion that the full extent of the complexity of Russia’s international position after the Congress became visible, as did the complexity of its policy towards Serbia in the new circumstances. Russia had no real economic interests in Serbia, but Russia’s rul-ing circles considered it unacceptable to yield it to the exclusive economic influence of Austria-Hungary. Shortly after returning from a secret mission, during which he

59Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

stayed in Serbia in June of 1878, the retired Russian general Rostislav A. Fadeyev, a representative of the Russian Slavophile circles, warned the Deputy of the Russian Foreign Minister Nikolay K. Girs, that it was necessary to save Serbia from the eco-nomic dependency into which it would fall if the railway through Serbia was built by Austria-Hungary, or by a company liege to Austrian-Hungarian interests. After the Congress, Fadeyev presented Tsarevich Alexander with the principles by which the Russian diplomacy should conduct itself in the future relations with the Balkan countries. In his opinion, Russia needed to base its future influence on trade-politi-cal agreements, providing assistance to the Balkan countries to the extent possible, thus strengthening the prestige of Russia. Helping Serbia to build a railway fit into these plans because Fadeyev felt that construction by a Russian company would be of decisive importance for the economic consolidation of Russia in Serbia. A similar opinion was also held by Russian historian Alexander A. Maykov, who wrote that the goal of the Austrian-Hungarian railway project was to separate Montenegro from Serbia and remove Serbia and Bulgaria from Russian influence167.

St. Petersburg, however, had to act cautiously. At the Congress of Berlin, Russia found itself alone opposite a coalition of states led by Great Britain. Financially exhausted and unprepared for new confrontations with the interests of the other powers, Russia intended to look for a way out of its diplomatic isolation after the Congress through convergence with Germany and Austria-Hungary, or in the res-toration of the League of the Three Emperors which had ceased to exist during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878. The decision in this regard had already been made in September 1878, but during the following months the efforts of the Russian dip-lomats did not yield favourable results168. Although it was interested in the issue of the Serbian railway, with its current allocation of forces Russia could not afford a conflict with Austria-Hungary even on much more important issues. On the other hand, the Russian government did not want to accept the role of passive observ-er, and the construction of the railway by a Russian company and its integration with the Russian railway network across Romania would be one of the ways to stop the spread of Austrian-Hungarian influence in Serbia169. It was important for the Russian government to avoid the public knowing that stood behind the efforts of Russian entrepreneurs to obtain the concession for the construction of the railway. Girs therefore entrusted Fadeyev with the task of finding someone among the Rus-sian entrepreneurs who would be interested in the construction of the railway. The Russian government’s idea was simple – the Serbian government could undertake the construction of the railway itself, after which the construction work would be

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transferred to a Russian company recommended by the Russian government. At the same time, the agreement between the Serbian government and Russian entrepre-neurs needed to be done in such a manner that the role of the Russian government would be completely invisible170.

The steps taken by the Russian government coincided with thinking in Belgrade. Prince Milan and Ristić were aware of the new position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and the potential threat to Serbia’s newly gained independence. On the other hand, they were also aware that the country, in its efforts to accomplish all the tasks that stood in the way of the modernization of its transport system, as well as of its entire economy, was directed towards the neighbouring monarchy. Given the current state of finances, the priority for the Serbian government was the conclusion of favour-able trade agreements. If events developed favourably, the fulfilment of the provisions related to the construction of the railway could be approached after the condition of the state treasury had improved, or in the worst case, after achieving simultaneous agreements with the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, thus securing a connection of the Serbian route with Thessaloniki and Constantinople. The Prime Minister’s wish was first to talk about the new trade agreement, while the fulfilment of contractual obliga-tions in connection with the construction of a railway was temporarily delayed. Since the signing of the Railway Convention was distant, the granting of a concession for the construction of the railway to a foreign company was also currently not an issue, especially bearing in mind that Belgrade had hoped that there was a possibility that the state would find a favourable loan abroad that would enable it to supervise the construction itself and organize its exploitation. However, considering the first pos-sibility, Ristić was aware of the potential hazards if the Serbian railway was left in the hands of an Austrian company. In Belgrade it was assumed that if an open tender was announced, other interested railway companies would find it difficult to beat the of-fers that the Austrian companies – primarily the Staatsbahn – could make. Therefore, they opted for a different approach and tried to find a strong counterweight to the in-fluence of Austria-Hungary in Russia. Delaying the start of negotiations with Vienna and secretly negotiating with St. Petersburg in connection with the construction of the railway represented the backbone of Ristić’s plan.

Shortly after the formation of a new government on 13 October 1878, the new prime minister, with a note on 5 November, raised the question of an extension of the three-year period that was provided for the construction of a railway by the Aus-trian-Serbian Convention, linking his proposal with the inability of the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria to meet the obligations they had assumed with the provisions

�1Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

of the Treaty of Berlin171. This note represented the beginning of Ristić’s efforts to avoid bilateral negotiations citing the need for a meeting of the Committee of the four countries that was only mentioned in the Convention, but not in the Treaty. However, the effect was opposite to that expected. After the Congress, the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was busy with numerous problems deriving from the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The most significant was the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had encountered major resistance both in the Austrian as well as in the Hungarian part of the monarchy. In addition, the current Austrian government was only tentatively performing its duty, and this problem had to be solved because the negotiations with Serbia had to be preceded by an agreement between the Austrian and Hungarian governments on a draft of the convention which the representatives of both parts of the monarchy would try to force the Serbian negotiators to accept. Occupied with external and internal prob-lems, the Austrian and Hungarian government and the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs were far from an agreement. Ristić’s step warned Foreign Minister Gyula An-drássy finally to pay attention to the negotiations with Serbia. After receiving Ristić’s note he encouraged the Austrian and Hungarian ministers of Trade and Transport to create a basis for the start of negotiations with Serbia as soon as possible172.

On the other hand, the need to begin negotiations with Serbia was also referred to in news which arrived soon the Serbian note was received on 5 November. The Serbian Minister of Education Alimpije Vasiljević, a former Russian student with numerous acquaintances in St. Petersburg and Moscow and one of the most important and influential Russophiles among Ristić’s liberals, was travelling to Russia173. Vasiljević’s trip was the second part of Ristić’s plan. Besides other issues, among which the pro-posal on the signing of trade agreements stands out, his most important task was to inquire whether it was possible to establish a company in Russia that would assume the responsibility of the construction of the Serbian railway without requiring guar-antees from the Serbian government or, if this was not possible, to ask the Russian government to mediate with certain French and British banks to give Serbia a fa-vourable loan for the construction of the railway174. He was well received in Russia and spoke of the Serbian railway with Girs, Milyutin, and even the Tsar Alexander II. Their common position was that Russia wanted the construction of the Serbian railway to be done by Russians. However, under the burden of international cir-cumstances, the plan for achieving this goal provided that the Serbian government would announce that Serbia itself was going to build the railway, which would be followed by the arrival of Russian entrepreneurs in Belgrade. The company would

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then negotiate, having received all the necessary guarantees from St. Petersburg for the successful completion of the venture175.

Vasiljević returned to Belgrade satisfied. At first, it seemed that the agreement with the Russian government would bring success. From the Russian diplomatic office in Belgrade, the government received news of the interest of Russian entrepreneurs. In the second half of January 1879 a group of Russian engineers sent by the contractor Ivan F. Mamontov arrived in Belgrade, while at the same time Serbia was visited by Russian general Mikhail G. Chernyayev, former commander of the Serbian army in the war of 1876, in an attempt to ensure that the contract would be signed with the Russian banker Samuel S. Polyakov176. However, that was it. Chernyayev and the Russian engineers left Serbia without reaching an overall agreement with the Serbian government, and Ristić’s questions, directed to Girs, received vague answers from St. Petersburg177. The plan of the Serbian Prime Minister was doomed to fail on both tracks. The reaction from Vienna came swiftly.

3.2. Pressure from Vienna – Austro-Serbian negotiations of 1879

An inevitable consequence of the failure of Ristić’s plan was the worsening of the Serbian state’s position in relation to its powerful neighbour. Serbian diplomacy had to deny rumours in the Austrian and Hungarian press not only that the railway concession would be given to the Russians, but also that there was an agreement to introduce the Russian language in secondary schools in Serbia178. Once warned, the slow Austrian-Hungarian state machinery turned its activities towards ensuring that the Serbian government would not default on fulfilling its obligations. While encouraging negotiations between the two parts of the monarchy on the condi-tions for future negotiations, Vienna at the same time used a powerful tool against Serbia: pressure on the export of livestock. Serbian exports suffered a first blow on 1 November 1878 with the introduction of a ban on importing horned livestock into the territory of Austria-Hungary, and on 1 January 1879 a new customs tar-iff entered into force, much less favourable for the most important Serbian export product: pigs179. In this way, at the beginning of 1879, the necessity for a new trade agreement with Austria-Hungary became obvious, completely reducing Serbian diplomacy’s space for manoeuvre in trying to delay talks on the railway conven-tion. At the attempt in February 1879 to raise the question of signing a trade agree-ment180, Vienna made it clear that the bilateral railway convention must come first, while the signing of a trade agreement “is not so urgent that it could not wait for

��Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

a few months”181. Ristić tried to find a way out of the new situation by suggesting negotiations on both issues182, but at the same time on 13 March 1879 he further ir-ritated the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by calling all interested countries to sign trade agreements with Serbia. This was shortly followed by the signing of a temporary trade agreement with Great Britain, the biggest competitor to Austrian-Hungarian trade in the Balkans, and soon after with Italy and Russia. The basic idea behind this action of the Serbian government was to forestall possible demands from Austria-Hungary and strengthen its position prior to the negotia-tions. A sharp protest came from Vienna, but nothing more. The protest was not accompanied by any significant measures, and the issue did not come up again on the agenda until June 1879183.

An unsuccessful start of the conference of representatives of both sides of the mon-archy on the conditions for future negotiations with Serbia on the trade and rail-way issue was the possible reason for Vienna’s attitude. An agreement between the Hungarian and Austrian government was not to be achieved until mid May184. The draft convention was based on a revised version of the previous draft from 1873 and reflected the plan for expanding the economic space with which the representa-tives of the Dual Monarchy went to the Congress of Berlin. Understandably, the most significant article was the eleventh, dedicated to tariffs, because its purpose was to enable economic penetration by the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans. Arti-cle 11 provided for the introduction of direct shipments and direct tariffs between the major railway stations in Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Serbia and the other Balkan states on the other. Serbia was prohibited from applying higher tariff rates from the existing ones on the Hungarian connecting route for transports from Austria-Hungary into Serbia or a third country; Serbia was expected to assume the obligation of adjusting its rates to any reductions and benefits that any of the major railway companies in the neighbouring monarchy allowed on their railways; and finally, the Serbian government would be obligated, for transport from Serbia into third countries and vice versa, as well as for transit from third countries, not to ap-ply tariff rates that were less than those applied in Austria-Hungary. The freedom of regulating internal transport was the only thing left to an independent decision of the Serbian government. On the other hand, the entire railway administration was to be organized according to Austria-Hungary’s form, sanitary regulations on the railways in Austria-Hungary would be complied with, and the Serbian government would be obliged to follow the changes in the railway regulations in the neighbour-ing Monarchy as well. Fearing the penetration of British goods into the interior

�� Momir Samardžic

before the connection of the Serbian and Hungarian route, the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave particular importance to the demand to build the Belgrade-Niš route first, thus opening the way for Austrian-Hungarian goods, while the route from Niš across Pirot towards the border with Bulgaria and an unidentifi-able route in the project towards the border with the Ottoman Empire, were to be opened later185.

However, the project did not include all the issues that the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was interested in resolving. This goal was to be reached by a comprehensive protocol, as an integral part of the convention. The Foreign Affairs Ministry wanted to achieve two things with it: first, provide Hirsch with certain rights and privileges for the construction of a railway on the territory of Serbia and, second, to prefigure the future work of the Committee of the four states. Moving of Hirsch’s company headquarters to Vienna, the significant participation of Austrian capital in the company, as well as the fact that the final construction of a route to link the Ottoman Empire to Vienna and Budapest suited the monarchy, forced the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protect the interests of the company. By adopting the text of the protocol the Serbian government would have obliged itself to build not only the route Niš-Vranje which it had decided to build itself as the shortest connection to the Ottoman Thessaloniki-Mitrovica route, but also the route from Niš to Prepolac, a point on the south-western bor-der of Serbia towards the Sanjak of Novi Pazar which Hirsch was obliged to build according to the previous convention with the Porte. In addition, if the Serbian government did not undertake supervising the construction itself and granted a concession for it, it was obliged to give priority to Hirsch’s company which, ac-cording to the convention with the Porte, was already entitled to the exploitation. On the other hand, the protocol predicted a cooperation of Austria-Hungary and Serbia in future negotiations with the Ottoman empire and Bulgaria which would be based on the Austrian-Serbian Railway convention and provide the Dual monar-chy with complete control over the transport of goods on the trans-Balkan routes. With the agreement of the two governments on the draft of the convention and protocol, all the conditions for starting negotiations with Serbia had been created. At the same time an agreement had been reached to ask the Serbian government to provide the necessary information about the project for the future Serbian customs tariffs. Thus the Austrian-Hungarian side could prepare for the start of negotiations on the trade agreement. In other words, the call to send the necessary information on the customs tariff was supposed to encourage the Serbian government to send a

�5Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

representative to Vienna to negotiate on the railway convention. Now the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy could move186.

The time for starting new negotiations was good, at least concerning the interests of the Dual monarchy. Just before the call for talks in Vienna, the Serbian govern-ment had attempted to enter into negotiations on the junction point with the Porte and the Bulgarian government, that is with the Russian administration in Bulgaria formed after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. This attempt, made in early June, ended without success. Bulgaria was still under Russian control, the Bulgar-ian government was not even formed, and the Russian imperial commissioner in charge of the administration was preoccupied with concluding existing issues prior to departure of the Russian military and civil administration. It was unrealistic to expect that in such a situation the Russian government would be ready to open ne-gotiations on the railway connection, which would have undoubtedly lasted some time. On the other hand, Constantinople was not interested in discussing the pro-posal from Belgrade either. Following the Congress, the Porte faced a number of issues that the Great Powers insisted that it must solve. Ottoman diplomatic tactics consisted of using the conflicting interests of the Great Powers in order to delay resolution or to achieve it under favourable conditions for the Porte. In addition, the railway construction was associated with large financial burdens which the Ot-toman state treasury could not bear187. With that in mind, it was clear that with no diplomatic support from one of the Great Powers and long-term pressure such a significant success could not be achieved. In this case, Austria-Hungary was the one of the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin left with ensuring the completion of construction of the trans-Balkan route towards the Western capitals, so without its support success was impossible. Failure in Constantinople clearly showed the Ser-bian government the only way to resolve this issue – it led to Vienna.

When Belgrade received a call from Vienna in mid-June to send a delegate to the capital of the Dual Monarchy to negotiate on the Railway Convention, as well as to send the necessary documents for the study of the issues of the trade agreement, the Serbian Prime Minister accepted. If it wanted the trade agreement, the government in Belgrade had to accept the path set forth in Vienna. However, Ristić still main-tained the position that the settlement of the railway issue required an agreement of four states, because the provisions of the Austrian-Serbian convention could not oblige the Bulgarian and Ottoman governments concerning the junction with the Serbian railway. The main goal of the Serbian government was still to provide, along with a link to the north, a connection of its routes in the south and southeast with

�� Momir Samardžic

the Ottoman and Bulgarian routes, thereby ensuring profitability of its railway and access to the sea in Thessaloniki. Apparently yielding to Andrássy’s request, Ristić, “wanting to give evidence of his good will” as he informed Herbert, sent the Min-ister of Public Works Ranko Alimpić and engineer František Všetečka to Vienna. They travelled with only one instruction – to get acquainted with the wishes and intentions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary concerning the Railway Convention, while final negotiations would be possible only after it was determined which issues could be discussed without the Ottoman and Bulgarian representatives188.

It seemed that sending a delegate who was not authorized to sign the convention was not a serious move. However, it turned out otherwise. In the negotiations of 8-12 July 1879, Alimpić, despite the instructions he received from Ristić, as well as the fact that he himself was the architect of the plan to stall by sending delegates without authorization, caved in under the pressure of the Austrian-Hungarian representa-tives and agreed to accept the proposed project ad referendum as a basis for nego-tiation, studied it point by point, and finally, without Ristić’s permission, agreed to note in the official résumé, which had the signatures of all the negotiators, that the representatives of the Serbian government considered that the proposed project of the railway convention could serve as a good basis for a final agreement between the two governments189. The result of his negotiations with the representatives of Aus-tria-Hungary was therefore temporary, but entailed a complete agreement on the Railway convention which only lacked the consent of the governments on certain minor modifications. In other words, this was exactly what Ristić wanted to avoid.

The attitude of the Serbian Prime Minister towards the project was negative. He felt that the issues set forth in it fell within the scope of work of the Committee of four states, and not Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Serbian government must continue to insist on the simultaneous provision of connections to the Ottoman and Bulgarian railways190. Negative opinions of foreign and domestic experts that the government approached for an opinion on the project of the convention and protocol only strengthened the Prime Minister’s decision to continue to resist191. When contacts on the matter with the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs were renewed in early autumn, Ristić continued to insist on an earlier position that the railway issue could not be solved without the Ottoman Empire and Bul-garia, and that he did not want to enter into a discussion about the project. At the same time, he tried to use Vienna’s desire for a railway convention to restart negotia-tions on the trade agreement192. This attempt also ended without success. In fact,

�7Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

Ristić’s note from 27 September 1879 opened a new chapter in the resolution of the Austrian-Serbian railway dispute marked by strong pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary on the Serbian government, while resistance of the Serbian government to accept further negotiations on the convention project worsened relations between the two countries overall193. In each of the subsequent exchanges of opinion the Austrian-Hungarian diplomats assumed a firmer position, insisting on the literal fulfilment of the obligations. New firmness was particularly evident when Andrássy was replaced at the position of Foreign Minister by Baron Heinrich von Haymerle194. “We have come so far that we have to insist on absolute compliance with contractual obligations”, Herbert informed Ristić in early Novem-ber195. The Serbian government found itself before a choice – to give in to the de-mands of Vienna or to face an open conflict. A principle decision on accepting the opinion that it was possible to continue negotiations with a discussion of certain articles of the July project was adopted by the government in mid November196, but still Serbia delayed sending delegates to Vienna. Not until mid December, when the government received news of a possible increase in customs duties on pigs and other measures that would damage Serbian merchants by further aggravating trad-ing conventions with the neighbouring monarchy, and the pressure of the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy was joined by the British diplomacy, did Belgrade make the decision to send a formal positive response to the demands from Vienna197. The Serbian government was finally ready for negotiations.

3.3. Who will build the railways?

Efforts of the Serbian government in late 1878 and during 1879 to postpone the railway construction deadline in negotiations with the government in Vienna did not automatically mean that the government was not aware that the task lay ahead of it in the near future. Parallel with attempts to find an entrepreneur in Russia for the construction of the railway and attempts to obtain the consent of Austria-Hun-gary for the delay, Belgrade was thinking about the expected obligations in connec-tion with the construction, as well as the manner in which they could best be met. The government found itself before three basic possible solutions: the state could build and exploit its own railway; it could build it itself, and then grant exploitation to a foreign private company; or it could grant the company a concession for both the construction and exploitation. The possibility of a favourable decision was ham-pered by the fact that the Serbian state treasury was empty, so it was necessary to find the money for construction abroad. The first offers of foreign companies and finan-

�8 Momir Samardžic

cial houses and contacts with Vienna and St. Petersburg had clearly demonstrated the political significance of the decision that was before the government. The first way was undoubtedly the best for state interests, but it required financial resources and a sufficient number of skilled professionals (Serbia had neither) – while the third method was the least favourable financially. The intermediate solution was a possibility that the state obtains a loan and then controls the construction, and then organizes by itself or concedes to others the organization of exploitation.

It was clear from the start that the question of financing the construction would determine the freedom of government to decide on the manner of construction, as well as the final decision. This fact became apparent in the spring of 1879 when an expert committee, composed of Serbian and foreign engineers asked to advise the government on the most appropriate solution, estimated that it would be necessary to obtain a loan of 92 million francs for construction198. The committee advised, however, that the state take over the construction and exploitation itself199, but it was obvious, with the current balance between the Great Powers in the Balkans, that with a budget of 19 million and a debt of 32 million, this would not be possible. The amount of attention that the diplomacy of Austria-Hungary devoted to this issue is testified by Herbert’s activities to persuade Austrian-Hungarian engineers in the committee to act in the interests of Monarchy, to oppose any idea that might lead towards independent construction of the railway and to point out the advantages the Serbian state would gain by granting a concession to a “powerful neighbouring company”, as was stated in Andrássy’s instructions to Herbert200.

Until the spring of 1880 there was only one “powerful neighbouring company” on whose success Vienna had counted in the future tender for the construction of the Serbian railway. It was the Staatsbahn. The powerful railway company was inter-ested to connect its existing route, which ran from the Hungarian capital across Velika Kikinda towards the Romanian border, with the Serbian railway network, build connecting routes with the Bulgarian and Ottoman railways through Serbia, and that if the opportunity arose to take over the construction and exploitation of the routes in the Ottoman Empire from the languished Hirsch, thus becoming one of the most powerful European railway companies. There was, however, a seri-ous obstacle to achieving this goal. The plans of the company had the support of the Austrian government and the Joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but not of the government of Hungary, and the route that was to be built on the territory of the Dual Monarchy as a connection to the Serbian railway was located on the territory of Hungary. After the Ausgleich, railway policy was the internal matter of each of

�9Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

the parts of the Monarchy, and the Hungarian government was extremely sensitive to any violation of its rights and did not intend to allow the construction of such a major international route to be taken over by a private company which it regarded as the extended arm of the Austrian government and which was already exploiting a significant part of the Hungarian railway network. The Hungarian government planned to establish a link with Serbia through a direct Budapest-Zemun line and remained consistent in its decision despite the pressures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 1879 and in the spring of 1880201.

In an effort to convince the government of Hungary to entrust them with the provi-sion of a junction with the Serbian railway, the Staatsbahn calculated that a posi-tive decision of the government in Belgrade on a concession for the construction of the Serbian railway could contribute to a change of mood in Budapest. The Vienna offices of the company indirectly informed the Serbian government in early May of 1879 that the Staatsbahn was interested in entering negotiations with an offi-cial of the Serbian government on the provisions of the future agreement202. Direct contact was established in July during Alimpić’s stay in Vienna203. In mid August company representatives were in Belgrade204, and on 6 September the government adopted the text of the principle agreement. The government had agreed to grant the company a concession for the construction of the railway as soon as the issue was resolved by international agreements with the interested countries. On the oth-er hand, the company would assume the obligation to obtain the necessary capital for the construction with a favourable interest rate that would not be greater than 5%, but the Serbian state was to pay an additional depreciation on capital during the entire concession period. The concession grant is not mentioned explicitly in the text of the agreement, but equipping the railway for exploitation was also the obligation of the company, while the Serbian state would pay the interest on capital invested in the organization of exploitation only after its began, within a time frame that would be established subsequently. In addition, the agreement stipulates that the Staatsbahn receives the advisory role in negotiations on railway connections with neighbouring countries, while in negotiations with the Compagnie Générale it would represent the interests of Serbia in resolving the issues deriving from the text of the Treaty of Berlin. Of particular importance was the fact that the representa-tives of the company brought the continuation of negotiations into connection with obtaining a concession to build a route on Hungarian territory that could be tied to the projected Serbian route. However, in the case that they did not succeed in getting the concession, the company representatives expressed a desire to from

70 Momir Samardžic

the Belgrade-Niš railway, in an agreement with the Serbian government and at no expense to the Serbian state, build a route to the Danube opposite of Romanian town Baziaş, a point downstream from Belgrade where the Staatsbahn route on the territory of Hungary reaches the river. In this way the company would compen-sate for the negative effects of a possible failure of negotiations with the Hungarian government, provide a direct link for its Hungarian routes with the international trans-Balkan railway and attract a part of the transit with affordable rates. On the other hand, although the Serbian Ministry of Public Works tried to obtain more fa-vourable interest rates, the agreement was important to the company because of its negotiations with the Hungarian government and the provisions of the agreement were undoubtedly favourable for Serbia, especially in view of later bids and the final concession agreement that was signed with the Union Générale205.

After successfully completing negotiations, the Staatsbahn representatives left Bel-grade. The next step was submitting the agreement to the main office of the compa-ny in Paris, so that negotiations could be resumed after their acceptance. However, their stay in Serbia was closely followed by the diplomatic representatives of the Great Powers, especially the charge d’affairs and secretary of the Russian Embassy in Belgrade, Bakunin. The decision of the government at the meeting of 6 September 1879 to accept the Staatsbahn offer became known to the Russian Embassy the very same day. Bakunin immediately sent a letter to Ristić asking whether this informa-tion was correct and what the terms of the agreement with the Staatsbahn were206. In addition to the importance that the Russian diplomacy attached to the issue of the Serbian railway, on this occasion there was another factor. At the time of final negotiations between the government and representatives of the Staatsbahn, the en-gineer Zawacky arrived in Belgrade, soon followed by Kossecky, both representatives of the Russian entrepreneur Baranov207. The principle proposal which they brought out before the government – the procurement of capital through a state loan with terms that would depend on the offered guarantees, while the railway would imme-diately after the completion of the construction be owned by the state – followed in the wake of the advice given to Vasiljević in St. Petersburg in the late autumn of 1878208. The Russian diplomatic support of his efforts to obtain the concession for the construction of the Serbian railway did not come as a surprise. In late September 1879, Baron Herbert wrote to his minister in Vienna that a Russian company under the protection of the Russian diplomacy is doing everything to prevent the grant of a concession to Staatsbahn. On the other hand, the diplomatic representatives of Austria-Hungary discreetly pointed out the unreliability of Russian entrepreneurs

71Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

and the ruthlessness with which the Russian officials in Serbia could conduct them-selves, noting in particular that no company except Staatsbahn was able to provide a guarantee that it will build a good railway209.

However, it was not only Baranov’s offer that worried the Austrian-Hungarian di-plomacy. In late September of 1879 the arrival in Belgrade of Louis Fremy, a former governor of the Crédit Foncier, one of the most famous French banks, was an-nounced. Several months before Fremy had signed an agreement with the Serbian government on minting the first Serbian dinars210. His plan was well designed. The success of the Staatsbahn representatives in Belgrade did not remain without an echo in the European press and financial circles, so in the first place it was neces-sary to defeat the rival company’s success. The problems that the Staatsbahn had with the Hungarian government were not unknown, so Fremy, as a representative of a financial consortium consisting of two Parisian financial houses – the Société de dépôts et Comptes courants de Paris and the Société Financiere de Paris – and the Anglo-Österreichische Bank of Vienna, managed to be in front of the Rothschild’s Kredit-Anstalt and impose himself in Budapest on the Hungarian government as a potential concessionaire for the Budapest-Zemun route. He arrived in Belgrade with a written statement from the Hungarian government that he was to be given the concession for the construction of the Hungarian route, but that this obligation would be stopped if Fremy did not receive a concession for the construction of the Serbian railway by 1 November 1879. In this way, he partially nullified the success of the Staatsbahn, created favourable conditions for starting negotiations with the Ser-bian government and increased the chances of success of the offer that he brought with him. But the deadline was extremely close. The Consortium was interested in the concession for both construction and exploitation, and was willing to provide the necessary capital. The amount in question was around 100 million francs, with an interest rate of 6.2%, and the state would have to guarantee the company 15,000 francs, and in the revised version 13,500 francs of net income from the exploitation per kilometre during the concession period of 90 years211.

In early November, the Serbian government had before it three different offers. Fre-my’s consortium consisted of financial houses that could, for an adequate financial compensation, easily provide the necessary funds, contractors and the organization of exploitation. Staatsbahn was a railway company with a great reputation and ex-perience that could easily obtain capital on the western European financial mar-kets, while Baranov had certain experience and support of the Russian diplomacy, but still had to provide most of the prerequisites for the successful execution of the

7� Momir Samardžic

work. Of course, in the consideration of the offers, the most important role was the financial side, especially given the difficult state of public finances. Baranov’s offer was therefore the farthest from success even though construction under direct state control would undoubtedly have been the most favourable solution. On the other hand, Staatsbahn and the French consortium could with no problem obtain the necessary capital. The principle agreement with Staatsbahn was financially more fa-vourable for the Serbian state than the Consortium offers, and it appeared that Bel-grade viewed him in such a manner regardless of the possible political implications. Ristić explained his favouring of the agreement with Staatsbahn in talks with the French diplomat in Serbia, de Beaucaire, by stating that, with the current financial situation the financial aspect is much more significant than the political aspect of the railway issue, and the Staatsbahn is in a position to provide the most favourable financial conditions212.

However, Fremy’s notification of the failure of Staatsbahn’s efforts to obtain a con-cession from the Hungarian government brought uncertainty as to the possibility of achieving an agreement, so Ristić sought to find out through the Serbian diplomatic representative in Vienna whether this news was reliable and whether the company was still interested in cooperation213. The news that soon arrived in Belgrade was not good. The office in Vienna did not mention the failure in Budapest, but said that the main office in Paris was not satisfied with the agreement and that representatives of the company had exceeded their powers and entered into much too detailed nego-tiations214. The company office in Vienna stressed to the Serbian diplomat that this did not mean that the company was no longer interested in the Serbian railway, and as proof made a decision to send six engineers to study the route215. However, this move was only an attempt to leave open the possibility of a later agreement in the event of a favourable outcome of negotiations with the Hungarian government and Ristić was well aware of this.

The failure of negotiations with the Staatsbahn opened space for the operation of the French consortium, but also for new offers. Fremy tried to obtain in Budapest an extension of the deadline for an agreement with the Serbian government until mid December, but his efforts were only partially successful. The Hungarian gov-ernment granted him an extension, but only until 20 November, noting that this was the deadline after which all the obligations of the government towards the Con-sortium would cease to exist216. Failure in Budapest did not prevent Fremy from indicating that he had received a concession for the construction of the Hungarian routes while passing through Vienna on his return to Paris, and that he entered into

7�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

a binding agreement with the Serbian government, and that there is no longer fear of competition217. He reached an agreement in Paris with members of the Con-sortium on a new offer for the Serbian government, and by the end of November 1879 his engineer representative Filleul Brochy went to Niš, where the National Assembly had begun, and went before the government with new proposals. In the offers of 26 and 29 November, the basic financial terms of the concession for the exploitation did not significantly differ from the conditions in the first two offers, and were even somewhat less favourable, but the Consortium tried to win over the government with the proposed declaration of 29 November in which it assumed the obligation to pay 6,300,000 francs on various grounds to the Serbian state treasury within one month of the signing of the agreement. In this proposal for the first time the cost of the loan and the construction of the railway per kilometre were specifi-cally determined – with a fictitious 100 million francs at a rate of 85, so in fact 85 million, the cost of building one kilometre would amount on average to 181,050 francs218. New refusal led to the changes in the Consortium (Anglo-Österreichische Bank was replaced by La Société de la Banque d’Escompte de Paris) and in early Janu-ary of 1880 a Consortium representative tried to win favour of the government by increasing the amount at the disposal of the government to 10 million, but without success. The financial proposals were followed by advice to the government that political reasons suggested giving the concession to a company that would not be influenced by the government in Vienna, and that the Consortium constituted pre-cisely such a company. The Staatsbahn company, on the other hand, was shown to be a protector of an exclusively Austrian interest, and signing a contract with it as a sure way for Serbia to fall into a vassal relationship with the neighbouring Monar-chy. Turning towards the French Consortium, towards the London and Paris finan-cial market, would prevent such a scenario, Brochy claimed in a letter to the Serbian Prime Minister219.

Apart from the French, in early December of 1879, once again the Russians ap-peared in the competition. Russian bankers Baron Ginsburg and Polyakov, in whose name General Chernyayev visited Serbia in early 1879, represented one of the most powerful Russian financiers, with strong ties to the Paris banks. In the second half of 1879 they came forth with a wider plan for economic penetration in the finances of the Balkan states through obtaining concessions for the construction of railways and the establishment of national banks. In June of 1879 their representatives un-successfully presented a plan in Sofia for the construction of a railway network and the establishment of a bank in Bulgaria, and later that year once again lobbied for

7� Momir Samardžic

the grant of a concession for the establishment of a national bank220. At the same time, through the Metropolitan Mihailo, the head of the Serbian Orthodox church and the greatest devotee of Russian influence in Serbia, Chernyayev once again made contact with the Serbian government as a mediator of the Russian bankers221. Although the essence of the General’s proposal – that the State would not make a call for tender for a concessionaire, but personally select a contractor and con-trol the construction – coincided not only with the wishes of Alimpije Vasiljević presented in Russia in December 1878, but also with the interests of the Russian government and the majority recommendation of the expert committee, but the repeated requests from the Metropolitan Mihailo for the government to accept his visit and pressure the Serbian representative in Paris, Jovan Marinović, remained without results222.

The reasons for refusing Fremy’s, as well as the Russian offers, were not difficult to determine. Ristić briefly told Chernyayev’s representative that the government is receiving everyone’s suggestions, but is not able to enter into negotiations with anyone before they have resolved the international issues related to the construc-tion of railways. The government was aware that the construction of a railway was inevitable, not only because of the commitments of the Treaty of Berlin and the Berlin Convention, but also because of the need for further economic development of the principality. However, all the issues deriving from the mentioned interna-tional agreements were still open, the final phase of Austrian-Hungarian pressure to start negotiations on a bilateral convention went on in the late 1879, and the first months of 1880 were marked by negotiations of representatives of the two govern-ments. Of course, the government was interested in the offers of foreign financiers. Since the negotiations with Austria-Hungary had been prolonged, and the negotia-tions with the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria in the true sense had not even begun, the government was receiving offers, but did not want to engage in any negotiations before it signed the necessary international agreements that could affect the content of the contracts with the foreign companies. In addition, Belgrade was still not sure how the state intended to build the railway, and hoped that the state alone could get a favourable loan abroad and take on the job itself. In this case, the Russian offers suited the government more. On the other hand, offers from the Staatsbahn and the Consortium led by Fremy provided the Serbian state with the necessary financial resources, but left the exploitation of the railway in foreign hands, and state finances burdened with returning the debt incurred during its construction. In such a situa-tion, the government was suited by the current situation because it left enough time

75Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

for negotiations with interested companies in the anticipation of a final decision not only on who would build the railway, but also how the Serbian state would build it. Aware that before the end of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary the Serbian government will not be ready for negotiations, the potential contractors and financiers decided to await the outcome of the negotiations in Vienna before submitting new proposals to the government.

III. under opposItIon pressure

At the end of 1879 and during the first half of 1880 there were signs of upcoming changes on the Serbian political scene. Threatened by an ever stronger opposition, both in the Assembly and outside it, and by the obvious desire of Prince Milan to remove the current prime minister, the government found itself in a very precari-ous position. Under such circumstances the resolution of the major issue facing the state became extraordinarily difficult. All facets of the new political situation in the country were laid bare during the Austrian-Serbian negotiations and the signing of the railway convention, whose adoption served as a pretext for what was, up until then, most powerful attack on the government.

1. strenGthenInG of the opposItIon

1.1. On the verge of a coalition

In a country with no opposition newspaper, the National Assembly session consti-tuted the only opportunity to manifest discontent with government policies. In ad-dition its fruitful legislative activity (around 40 laws passed), the regular Assembly session of November 1879 - February 1880, held in Niš, was marked by pugnacity of the opposition and considerably sharper attacks on the government than during the previous session. There were several reasons for this. Although two years had passed since the war, the consequences were still strongly felt, and poor harvests due to drought, followed by a significant increase in prices and, in certain areas, a great scarcity of food, only fuelled existing discontent. Enforcement of the law on restitu-tion of state debt adopted by the previous Assembly caused further dissatisfaction, especially among merchants and wealthy peasants, who themselves often engaged in trade, and many of these had an influence on representatives or were representatives themselves. In a country with no organized political parties, but politically divided under the influence of different ideological currents, where peasant representatives were usually elected on the basis of assessment by local authorities of their current affinity towards the government, and not according to membership in the ruling party, the dissatisfaction of the richest and most influential classes of the population was destined to affect the stability of the government. During the election for presi-dent of the Assembly, the opposition candidate Dimitrije Katić came in second with 87 votes (out of 132 representatives present); 9 of the 31 members of various assem-

78 Momir Samardžic

bly committees were oppositionists; and Nikola Pašić, with the liberal dissenters (no longer under the influence of Ristić), had a majority in the financial committee. The Government reacted immediately. Ristić, despite illness, quickly arrived in Niš; the creator of the law on restitution of state debt, finance Minister Vladimir Jovanović, was sacrificed at the end of November, and in the continuation of the session the law was modified according to the interests of the merchants and wealthy peasants223.

The Prime Minister’s arrival and interventions disciplined the government’s major-ity and enabled the government to approve a series of laws necessary for the trans-formation of Serbia from an Ottoman province into a modern European state, es-pecially norms concerning people’s health, hygiene and the adoption of institutions and principles of modern medicine. The government encountered strong opposi-tion in the Assembly on all its proposals. The opposition continued to be strong even after Ristić arrived in Niš – even the government newspaper recognized that it had 32 to 35 representatives. The problems faced by the government at the begin-ning of the session showed that the opposition had come prepared, and the debate on the response to the throne sermon of the Prince and on the demands that the opposition voiced in their version of a response lasted until early December. Larger and fiercer than in the previous session, the opposition came out with a variety of demands that had characterized the populist opposition in previous years. These ranged from requests for changes in the law on the press and greater local self-gov-ernment to appeals for the simplification of administration and greater savings. In addition to resistance against the implementation of the law on the restitution of state debt, during the entire duration of the session every proposal from the govern-ment was criticized, regardless of its significance, and even regardless of its contribu-tion to the real interests of the people, as was the case with the law on the preserva-tion of public health and the establishment of a medical fund224. However, despite stronger criticism towards the government, it was still not possible to speak of an ideological evolution of a – at the time – diverse and ideologically poorly devel-oped group. It was still not a unified opposition block, a political party, backed by a clearly formulated ideology. There was an obvious rise in the reputation of Nikola Pašić in relation to the other leaders of the opposition, but he was still only one of its most active members in trying to bring the opposition together over certain proposals and interpellations, and who often stood up as a speaker to criticize the government’s legislative proposals225.

Along with the joining and strengthening of the Assembly opposition under the leadership of Pašić, two factors that were to have a decisive influence on the political

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life of the country over the following years appeared on the scene – Prince Milan and an opposition outside the Assembly gathered around the newspaper “Videlo” [Daylight]. After spending a year in Niš in solitude with his family, Prince Milan from the autumn of 1879 played an increasingly vital role in the creation of public policy. The Serbian ruler had never liked his prime minister and never forgave him for adopting the Constitution of 1869 which, illegally during his adolescence, limit-ed the prerogatives of the rulers. However, Ristić’s political skills directed the Prince to place his confidence in him at critical moments during the 1870s. By the end of 1879 he began to think about an alternative to the current government. Reasons for this should be sought in the deteriorating relations with Austria-Hungary, but also in the obvious problems that the government encountered in domestic politics. The Serbian Prince had not forgotten the position of the Russian diplomacy during the last war and its favouring of the Bulgarian national interests, nor the fact that the Serbian territorial expansion had been approved at the Congress thanks to the support of the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy, dearly paid for. At the time when the government had succumbed to pressure from Vienna to begin final negotia-tions on the railway convention, the Prince announced to Herbert his intention to thank the Austrian emperor personally for his support of the interests of Serbia at the Congress, and to notify him that he wanted not just good, but the best possible relations with the neighbouring Monarchy. At the same time he rejected an indirect invitation to come to St. Petersburg226.

On the internal level, at the end of 1879 Prince Milan was thinking about forming a new political party on whose activities he would have a decisive influence, “through which he could expand his activities on the political field”, as he personally told the former Minister of Finance Vladimir Jovanović. According to the Prince’s words, the new party would be made up of “young liberals, young conservatives and the then called Socialists”, or Radicals, and the Prince would “support it with his author-ity as ruler”. After Jovanović was removed from the position of Minister of Finance, the Prince tried to win him over to his ideas, as well as through him some other prominent liberals who were not Ristić’s puppets; but his attempt ended without success227. He met a much better reception in the Assembly, among opposition rep-resentatives. The support of Prince Milan was one of the reasons for the fierceness of the opposition and the problems the government encountered in the Assembly. The representatives often came to court or, through an intermediary, received instruc-tions on the next steps. Despite frequent attacks on the government for unnecessary expenditure of state money, the only issue that did not encounter any opposition

80 Momir Samardžic

from the Assembly was the increase of the Prince’s civil list, an amount received by the Prince each year from the budget. This change was adopted with an accla-mation. The situation was also similar with the budget of the Ministry of Defence which the Prince cared about particularly. In essence, the Prince did not yet intend to overthrow Ristić’s government, but felt that it was necessary to establish good relations with the Assembly opposition, which could be of use to him later 228.

As the only possible alternative to Ristić’s government, the gathering of the op-position outside the Assembly was of particular importance. A few weeks before the start of the Assembly, it seems precisely at the time when the prince briefly vis-ited Belgrade, Milan Piroćanac, Milan Đ. Milićević, Milan Kujundžić and a few like-minded people began considering the idea of starting an opposition political newspaper. The final agreement was reached in mid December 1879, and the first issue of “Videlo”, the first opposition newspaper after the shutdown of the “Staro oslobođenje” [Old Liberation] newspaper in 1876, came out on 14 January 1880. The founders of the new paper and future leaders of the Progressive Party were the most significant members of the intellectual elite in the capital. It was a very het-erogeneous group with regard to its members’ former political views. These ranged from the moderately conservative to the moderately radical, and would be reflected in the group’s future political activity, but for the moment all members were all united by their discontent with Ristić’s political activity, undoubtedly also fuelled by the fact that he did not allow them more active participation in political life229.

In the first issue of “Videlo”, in an introductory article written by Piroćanac and Kujundžić, the political platform on which the founders of the paper stood was clearly defined. “Law, freedom, progress, these are the three main colours of the flag, which we are developing here, and these are the three inseparable foundations of true consti-tutionality”. Speaking of the “true”, “pure” or “full constitutionality”, which confront-ed Ristić’s “false constitutionality”, the group around “Videlo” criticized the liberals’ vision of political reforms from the 1850s and 1860s which had led to the adaptation of Western European parliamentarism to the patriarchal tradition of peasant Serbia and to the creation of a unicameral Assembly with a peasant majority, an assembly into which educated Serbs could enter only through the good will of the government. The first issue of “Videlo” and the subsequent articles presented ideas about how to obtain a “pure constitutionality”. Developing the idea of an alleged political affilia-tion without actual ideological content, the group around “Videlo” deemed the es-tablishment of political parties and the election of civil servants as a prerequisite for political development. The gathering of representatives around individuals, in this

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case Jovan Ristić, would be replaced by gathering around a precisely defined political agenda, and clear political division would then lead to the creation of a government that would reflect the political will of the Assembly, rather than personal loyalty and patron-clientele relationships. Freedom of speech and writing, freedom of meetings and alliances, guarantees of personal security, full ministerial accountability and ju-dicial independence were the political freedoms that the “Videlo” agenda’s authors demanded. Its realization would lead, after its supporters came to power, to a consti-tutional reform that would provide entry for the intellectual elite into the Assembly through elections, and not through appointment by the Prince, i.e. the government. Pragmatic reasons led the “Videlo” group not to create a clearer picture of the vision for reform of the electoral law in the press right away, but the foundations were visible in the two constitutional drafts that Piroćanac, as the leading party ideologist, wrote during 1880. A property census and a bicameral Assembly were supposed to turn the current predominantly peasant Assembly into a modern parliament in which, based on their numbers and authority, the intellectual elite would be in charge. In this way constitutional reform would lead to a gradual shaping of free parliamentary political life in a socially, economically and politically backward country such as Serbia230.

Although they considered internal reforms a priority, seeing them axiomatic for the modernization of the state, the “Videlo” group did not disregard foreign policy. The introductory text of the first issue, but also the following articles, promoted the credo “The East to the Eastern peoples”. This idea was Piroćanac’s, as the writer of the paper’s agenda, but the majority of the participants of the meeting at which it was agreed upon certainly stood behind it. All of them were witnesses or partici-pants of the events of 1876-1878, witnesses to the uncertainties during the winter and spring of 1878 and to the disappointment at the Russian policy of favouring Bulgarian national interests. With the future progressives, there was a clear sense of national or state interests that primarily involved the mission of unification of Serbs on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, as well as territorial expansion onto the Vilayet of Kosovo and Macedonia, strategically very important territories of the central Balkans along the Morava Valley and Vardar. In that sense they could not be distinguished from the liberals, nor from the radicals. The difference was in priorities and the way they viewed the new international status of independent Serbia. In the existing foreign policy situation in which Serbia found itself after the recent geopolitical changes in the Balkans, especially after the blow that the “testa-mentary thought” of unification of Serbs had suffered with the entrance of the Aus-trian-Hungarian army into Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principle “The East to the

8� Momir Samardžic

Eastern peoples” meant that the Great Powers needed to leave the Balkan peoples to decide freely on their own fate. “We do not wish the east to be Russian, nor to be Austrian”, was clearly stated in the second issue of “Videlo”. The preservation of hard-won national independence was a priority231.

1.2. The collapse of one man’s politics? – “Videlo” on the railway issue

Always emphasizing their commitment to the Prince and the Dynasty, the group around “Videlo” criticized government actions on the pages of their newspaper, de-manding political changes and more liberal laws. Since the first issue events in the Assembly were regularly covered, with emphasis on the statements by the opposition representatives, while the attitudes of the government were accompanied by critical commentary and special articles. Doing their best not to break the law on the press, they primarily directed criticism at Prime Minister Ristić who was regarded as the person most responsible for the current problems of the state. Every opportunity was used to point out that public interest must not be jeopardized by the views, opinions and desires of one man. Strained inter-state relations, the silence that surrounded all the steps taken by the government and the obvious fact that it had succumbed to the requests of Vienna relating to the railway convention, created a good opportunity for criticism of Ristić’s policies while at the same time emphasizing the opposition position on the necessity of defending state interests. Articles from the Austrian and Hungarian press on relations with Serbia, especially on the railway issue which was the most current, were regularly transmitted. The criticism began with texts by Mi-lutin Garašanin, the most conservative individual within the group gathered around “Videlo”. Garašanin was not a signatory of the agenda from the first issue, but he joined later, precisely because of the need to speak out critically on government poli-cies regarding the railway issue. Piroćanac quickly joined in the criticism232.

In the newly formed political group, brought together and maintained by primarily political, not economic interests, it can hardly be said that they shared a single view of the paths to economic modernization. There is no doubt, however, that amongst the young conservatives and Ristić’s liberal dissidents who formed the majority of the group around “Videlo”, there could not have been any opponents to the con-struction of a railway. Neither Garašanin nor Piroćanac were against the railway: their criticism was mainly focused on the activities of the government, or the prime minister. The reputation and honour of the whole nation were at stake, Garašanin believed, and Serbia had to fulfil its international obligations regardless of the un-

8�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

favourable moment in which the issue had to be solved, taking into account both its own interests and those of the other stakeholders. In this sense, he directed his criticism towards the government, which kept the course of the negotiations secret; therefore all the responsibility for the far reaching mistakes could only be its own.

The mistakes that it (construction of the railway – M.S.) draws with it today cannot be corrected from year to year, but will stretch out for many years, and the consequences – whether good or harmful, with regard to the political and financial, as well as the eco-nomic and military – will be felt by the most distant generations of Serbians233.

In essence, Garašanin’s criticism of government policy in relation to the railway issue was marked by the motives that had led to the convergence of a part of Belgrade’s intellectuals and to the establishment of “Videlo” – in essence, Ristić’s paternalistic notion of leading state politics without consulting public opinion and especially without addressing his well-educated political opponents.

However, bearing in mind the later role of the progressive government in making the final decision on the railway concession and the concessionaire, more interesting are the views of Garašanin on the issue of the method of construction. Garašanin felt that capital, technical education, capability and experience in the construction of railways and their exploitation were the factors without which it would not be possible to approach this venture independently. Since Serbia could not provide any of these conditions, the only option was to grant a concession to a foreign financial house or company. The obviousness of such a conclusion imposed the problem of the selection of a concessionaire, not only as a financial, but primarily as a political issue. Garašanin’s thoughts were on the same track as the foreign policy credo pub-lished in the first issue of “Videlo” – (“The East to the Eastern peoples”) – although the brunt of his criticism was much more directed against granting a concession to a company that would serve the interests of Austria-Hungary. He did not openly mention Russia anywhere, but stated that the construction of the railway must not “serve as a political tool to those nations whose views intersect today on the Balkan Peninsula”. He openly, however, disavowed Baranov, arguing that “it seems that he does not care much about our railway”234.

On the other hand, starting from the proposition that a positive development of Austrian-Serbian relations would require mutual respect of interests, he turned his criticism against Vienna’s Balkan policy, which tended to pull the former Ottoman territories into its sphere of interest, and to provide Austrian industry with a market in the east and south. With conservative political views, an advocate of protectionist

8� Momir Samardžic

economic policies, Garašanin believed that Serbia enjoyed good conditions for the development of industry, and that the future railway would play a significant role in stimulating it. “Serbian Railways in the hands of an Austrian-Hungarian company will rather clear the path for the Austrian-Hungarian industry than contribute to the rise and development of the Serbian industry”. In this sense, he thought that it would be particularly dangerous to grant the concession to the Staatsbahn, because this powerful company not only dealt with matters of construction and exploitation of railways, but also with the organization of navigation on the Danube, building various industrial facilities, and exploiting coal and iron mines. A strong and versa-tile company, with the support of ruling circles in Vienna, presented a real danger to the expected industrial development of Serbia and Garašanin openly wrote that granting the concession to Staatsbahn “was directly against the interests of Serbia in all possible directions”, regardless of the possible favourable financial conditions that the company could offer235.

The solution he proposed was granting the concession to a company originating from a country in which it was possible to obtain the funds under favourable condi-tions, but which had no direct political interest in Serbia.

We must look for a railway which is cheaper and may be of greater benefit to the coun-try. And these purely financial and economic reasons – free from any political influence – lead us to a deep conviction, that not the state railway company, nor any Austrian company, will meet our modest and just demands236.

He saw a way out in turning to Belgium and France as countries in which govern-ment should “seek satisfaction of our financial and economic, and serenity of our political demands in the issue of our railways”237.

On the other hand, Piroćanac did not deal with the financial side, but as one of the best Serbian lawyers of his time, turned his attention to the contracts which defined Serbia’s obligations to build the railway and the interests of Austria-Hungary. In addition to protecting the rights and reputation of the state before the neighbour-ing monarchy, whose most consistent supporter Piroćanac later became, his inten-tion was to contest Ristić’s governing abilities, not only for the manner in which he led negotiations, but also for the fact that he participated in their conclusion and built his political reputation on them. Piroćanac’s original view of the international obligations of Serbia was based on the idea that the obligation of signing a conven-tion provided in the Treaty of Berlin had already been fulfilled by the simultaneous signing of the Austrian-Serbian Convention in the German capital in July of 1878.

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Therefore, “Serbia today is not bound by contract to build its railway for the love of Austrian-Hungarian interests”, and “is free to follow purely Serbian interests in the issue of railway construction”, and this clearly imposes the need for the simultaneous construction of all connecting routes towards Thessaloniki and Constantinople as an assumption of fulfilment of all other obligations arising from the Austrian-Ser-bian Convention. In this regard, he considered the original government’s position on a meeting of the Committee of the interested states as righteous, but concluded that the government had abandoned this attitude under pressure from Vienna, with detrimental consequences for the state and national interests. He warned:

There is not a single representative in the Serbian Assembly, nor will you find a single minister in Serbia, who would and could sign any contracts to the evident damage of their country. It is no use placing hopes in Mr. Jovan Ristić; Serbia’s destiny is in the hands of the Serbian people238.

At the beginning of 1880, the political situation in Serbia was becoming more com-plex, and Garašanin’s and Piroćanac’s texts were only a preview of the criticism of the Prime Minister’s policies that were to take place after the signing of the Convention. Responding indirectly to that criticism and directly to the parliamentary interpella-tion on the development of negotiations with Austria-Hungary inspired by the writ-ings of the “Videlo”, Ristić stated on 14 February in the Assembly that the construc-tion of a route which was not international would mean economic disaster for Serbia, and that the government was giving this issue special attention239. Failure to fulfil this public promise would contribute significantly to the deterioration of the prime minis-ter’s reputation and would facilitate the opposition’s criticism of the Convention.

In the meantime, the government was faced with fierce open attacks from the pop-ulist opposition in the Assembly, “Videlo” successfully criticized its work outside the people’s representative office, and both sides of the government opponents had more or less open support of Prince Milan who was waiting for a propitious op-portunity to get rid of the prime minister. In such a political state of affairs, it was necessary to reach an agreement with Austria-Hungary on the railway convention and ensure that it would be ratified in the Assembly.

2. VIenna neGotIatIons and the sIGnInG of the ConVentIon

At the beginning of 1880, Ristić finally yielded to pressure and the government de-cided to send delegates to Vienna. However, this gesture did not mean that the con-vention project would be accepted. In July of 1879 Alimpić made his approval of the

8� Momir Samardžic

project dependent on subsequent consent by the government, and Ristić deemed that the Minister’s action did not obligate the government to approve it. Of course, Austria-Hungary was pleased by the adoption of a project which was not signifi-cantly different from the text adopted at the conference of Austrian and Hungarian government’s representatives in the spring of 1879. The Austrian-Hungarian diplo-macy did everything in its power to persuade or compel the Serbian government to accept the continuation of negotiations based on the proposed project. Since the development of events clearly showed that it was not possible to ignore the de-mands of the diplomacy of a Great Power without real support from other powers, the Serbian government had to agree to such an interpretation. However, Ristić did not give up the view he had set out in correspondence with Vienna during the previ-ous months. In a formal note of 18 January 1880 with which he officially notified the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the arrival of the Serbian delegate, he argued once again that the Treaty of Berlin and the Berlin Convention fully confirmed his view that a prior meeting of the Committee of the four states was necessary. He explained that he had consented to send a delegate to Vienna to give proof of that the Serbian government was well disposed240. After yielding to pressure, Serbian diplomacy was left with the task of doing everything possible to have the provisions of the project modified according to Serbian interests.

Preparing for the negotiations, the Ministry of Public Works equipped the new ne-gotiator Manojlo Marić, former minister, with instructions in the form of a counter-project. Its purpose was not to oppose the Austrian-Hungarian project entirely, nor was it to be discussed during the negotiations; rather it was meant to serve Marić as a sort of guide to the interests of the Serbian state. Particular attention was dedicated to the issue of tariffs and deadlines for construction. The experts to whom the govern-ment turned for assessment of the convention project were unanimous in condemn-ing the tariff provisions because their acceptance would have resulted in considerable financial losses every year for Serbia, and during the construction of the railway itself it would be very difficult to find a company willing to build a railway without a guar-antee241. This is why a long and elaborate article of the Austrian-Hungarian project which sought to provide privileges for export and transit of Austrian-Hungarian goods was reduced to one brief paragraph in the Serbian counter-proposal. The Ser-bian proposal envisaged that, if they wished to, the two governments could work on the introduction of direct shipping and a single tariff calculation for railway trade and passengers between Austria-Hungary on the one side, and Serbia and the Balkan states on the other242. Belgrade thought in principle that the tariff issue should be

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resolved in the Committee of the four states and the article in question suited such an approach. Since it was clear that the Austrian-Hungarian side would not be will-ing to adopt this view, it is possible that Belgrade was using that position merely as a starting point for negotiations during which the Serbian government foresaw mak-ing certain concessions. It appears most likely that the intention of the government was to ensure the same privileges for Serbian products on the routes to Vienna that Austrian-Hungarian products would enjoy on the routes toward Serbia. In this way, the international agreement would open the path for future Serbian exports, and the governments in Budapest and Vienna would not be allowed to adopt any changes without the consent of the government in Belgrade.

Bearing in mind the state of public finances, Marić’s most important task was to shift the deadline for construction or, in other words, make it conditional on the re-alization of a connection with the Ottoman and Bulgarian railways. A link between the Serbian and the Ottoman and Bulgarian railways was the most important issue for Ristić from the beginning, and this is why he constantly insisted on a meeting of the Committee of the four states. By agreeing to a three-year deadline for build-ing the Hungarian connecting route from Budapest – a more precise definition of which was requested – as well as all the routes on the territory of Serbia, the Serbian government demanded in the counter-project that the three-year period for the re-alization of all the sections would begin only when a connection with the Ottoman and Bulgarian railways had been effected243. This demand was in line with Ristić’s statements during the previous months, but certainly it was impossible to realize it, despite the Prime Minister’s explicit declarations in front of the Assembly. This is why the question was raised as to the best possible solution that could be reached during the negotiations by deviating from the initial high demands. On the basis of the steps made in Constantinople in mid 1879, as well as of the monitoring of the situation in the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, Belgrade was aware that Constan-tinople and Sofia were in no mood to fulfil rapidly the commitments assumed with the Treaty of Berlin on the construction of the railways. In such a situation, this was a point on which the Serbian negotiators could insist with hope for success, in order to postpone the construction of one of the sections of the railway.

In talks with Herbert in November 1879, Ristić already mentioned the possibility of delaying the construction of the section towards the Bulgarian border244. The se-lection of this section was logical. The route towards the Ottoman border at Vranje, which would connect by the shortest route with the Ottoman Thessaloniki-Mitro-vica line, was much more important to the Serbian economy than the line to Sofia

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and Constantinople. A link with Thessaloniki would provide the Serbian economy with the shortest link to the sea and enable access to foreign markets independently of Austria-Hungary. Due to deterioration of relations with Austria-Hungary which had resulted in new measures at the border, this issue was becoming increasingly ur-gent. In addition, even though it was short (108 km), the line through Pirot towards the Bulgarian border would be extremely challenging to build because of the nature of terrain, and therefore very expensive. On the other hand, Ristić believed that with the help of the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy it would be easier to reach an agree-ment with the Porte on the link with Thessaloniki, than with the both Porte and the Bulgarian government such as would be necessary for the connection via Sofia to Constantinople – particularly in view of the fact that Russian diplomacy would no doubt support the Bulgarian government’s resistance. Contacts with the Bulgarian government in January 1880, just before Marić’s departure to Vienna, confirmed that the Bulgarian government did not intend to fulfil its duties any time soon245. Apart from that, it is possible that Ristić was motivated by another reason. Despite the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy’s insistence that Serbia first reach a trade agree-ment with the neighbouring monarchy, as its most important trading partner, at that very time secret negotiations with Great Britain on a trade agreement were al-ready close to completion246. The railway connection with Thessaloniki would allow for the arrival of competitive British goods onto the Serbian market, just as Vienna feared, and would open a huge British market for potential Serbian exports.

However important the provisions that entered into the text of the counter-project, the deletion of other provisions from the Austrian-Hungarian project was equally significant. The obligation of Serbia first to build and open the Belgrade-Niš route to traffic was not mentioned, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary was particularly intent on it, in order to limit British competition from Thessaloniki. Any mention of harmonization with Austrian-Hungarian legislation and provisions of the Austrian-Hungarian statutes were excluded from the Serbian project. However, it is especially significant that the provisions the Serbian gov-ernment believed were within the remit the Committee of the four states were ex-cluded, or only vaguely mentioned247. Similar reasons also led the government in its consideration of the Austrian-Hungarian project protocol. The Serbian counter-project did not in any way engage in debate on the issues mentioned in it248. Two reasons can be adduced for this. The Serbian government thought that a part of the provisions of the project protocol entered into the scope of work of the Committee of the four states and that they had no place in the Austrian-Serbian bilateral agree-

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ment, and thought that it was unacceptable to impose Hirsch as the concessionaire. Since Alimpić had received the project protocol as well as the entire contract ad referendum, the government did not consider itself obliged to engage in a discussion of its provisions249. Equipped with precise instructions contained in the counter-project, Marić set off for Vienna.

Marić arrived in late January, and negotiations with the Austrian-Hungarian pleni-potentiaries began on the last day of the month. During the first meeting with Bar-on Haymerle, Austria-Hungary’s foreign minister marked the rail issue “as a test to show how Serbia takes its contractual obligations and responsibilities and how she stands as to her mood and trust towards Austria-Hungary”. Regarding the trade agreement, he noted that the negotiations could start soon “if the railway issue is resolved favourably”250. The negotiations can be divided into three phases. Marić spent the first half of February 1880 in Vienna, negotiating with the Austrian-Hun-garian delegates, and then returned to Belgrade at Ristić’s behest to report on the results. In early March the negotiations were resumed, and then discontinued be-cause of diplomatic pressure on the Serbian side. In late March they resumed and a few days later an agreement was finally signed.

The negotiations in February showed that there was still no agreement on many important issues. Most significant at that point was the new demand of the Serbian government to postpone the construction of one section. The Austrian-Hungarian negotiators were unwilling to accept that possibility, demanding the simultaneous construction of all the sections. However, Ristić intended to remain firm on this point. After Marić returned to Belgrade and referred on the course of the negotia-tions, the government decided to demand that the text of the convention clearly state that there would be a delay of construction for the section from Niš towards the Bulgarian border, as well as that Austria-Hungary would be obliged to negotiate with the Bulgarian and Ottoman governments with the aim of providing a railway link as soon as possible251. The request to define accurately the route of the connec-tion line from Budapest to Zemun also presented a problem, because the govern-ments of Austria and Hungary had not yet reached an agreement on this issue252. Regardless of the opposition of Austrian-Hungarian delegates, Marić once again received clear instructions to keep insisting that the Hungarian government openly declare which route the railway would follow253.

The Serbian government agreed that the Belgrade-Niš line could be opened for in-ternational traffic before the other lines, even if these were completed sooner. How-

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ever, the question of the construction deadline, or rather the delay of the construc-tion of the section towards the Bulgarian border still remained open. The three-year deadline envisaged in the Austrian-Serbian Convention of 1878 for the completion of construction (summer 1881) was no longer taken into account, but Vienna and Budapest wanted to impose as short as possible a deadline for fulfilment of the obli-gations assumed: if possible, in 1882254. On the other hand, the Serbian government accepted the three-year period, but it proceeded on the premise that the period for completion of the Belgrade – Niš – Ottoman border route would begin only after the ratification of the Austrian-Serbian Convention; and that for the section from Niš to the Bulgarian border, the period would begin after a contractual provision of a link with the Bulgarian line had been made. The new guidelines announced to Marić did not modify this position255.

The tariff issue was close to resolution. Austria-Hungary’s negotiators did not in-tend to give up on their original demands easily. They insisted on ensuring privileges for Austrian-Hungarian goods on the Serbian railway because the Austrian-Serbian Convention was to serve as a model for the future convention of the four states. The Serbian government therefore yielded and gave up the brief formulation of this article. Beside the Serbian proposal of a possible introduction of direct shipping without changing freight cars and single tariffs even when crossing international borders, the signatory parties reciprocally recognized each other the right of most privileged nation in traffic on the Hungarian and Serbian part of the future trans-Balkan railway, with tariffs to be harmonized by a special agreement256. Viewed over the long term, these provisions could have been useful to the Serbian economy as they secured low tariffs for the transport of Serbian goods, but they also represent-ed a threat to the development of the Serbian industry because they would favour competition from the cheaper Austrian-Hungarian goods. Marić was left to try to obtain most privileged nation status for the transport of Serbian goods on other important lines in Austria-Hungary as well, or at least on the lines leading to Vi-enna257. Apart from this, the desire of the Serbian government to avoid explicit ac-ceptance of the provisions of the Austrian-Hungarian legislation also encountered opposition. The Austrian-Hungarian negotiators insisted that Serbia must apply Austrian sanitary measures to prevent the spread of disease. The government in Belgrade still demanded changes, because, as was stated in the new instructions to Marić, “the measures, for which we assume the obligation under this article, are not exclusively Austrian measures but of all the advanced nations in European railway traffic”258. The Austrian-Hungarian side finally gave in concerning the specification

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of the route of the Hungarian connecting line. Velika Kikinda and Szeged, towns in southern Hungary, were designated as potential connecting points of the Serbian and Hungarian railway network if the Hungarian government did not build a direct line from Budapest to the Serbian border259.

The question of the protocol was still open. Austrian-Hungarian negotiators re-mained firm in their belief that a more extensive protocol was necessary and that it should resolve the issues related to the realization of connections with the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, as well as to Hirsch’s company’s right to exploit a part of the Serbian railway. Just as prior to Marić’s first trip to Vienna, the Serbian government was still not prepared to agree to protocol proposed in Vienna. Any attempt to de-termine the jurisdiction of the Committee of the four states before the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria gave their consent was considered unacceptable by Belgrade. In contrast to the extensive text of the version of the protocol proposed in Vienna, the Serbian government submitted a proposal that the protocol should have only one ar-ticle. This would note briefly that the signing parties would collaborate in an attempt to organize the meeting of the Committee of the four states as soon as possible, and would act in this regard as soon as the Austrian-Serbian Convention was ratified260.

Provided with new instructions, on 6 March 1880 Marić returned to Vienna261. Both sides had made certain compromises and agreement on most of the minor issues was quickly reached262. Marić was able to obtain most privileged nation status for Serbia, not only for the Budapest-Zemun line, but also for the lines connecting the Hungarian and Austrian capitals. The Austrian members of the Dual Monar-chy delegation were quite happy with this request from Serbia, because all the tariff privileges regarding Hungarian territory in any future agreements with Serbia were guaranteed, despite the possible dissatisfaction of the Hungarian government. After a brief hesitation, Hungarian members also agreed to the grant263. In return, Marić agreed to specify the ratification deadline for 15 June 1880264. However, he failed to obtain the removal of the text which stipulated that the Serbian railways had to apply the sanitary regulations of the Austrian-Hungarian railways265. Although the framework of the agreement had been established the most important issue still remained unresolved – the construction of the section of the railway from Niš to the Bulgarian border.

Informing Belgrade from Vienna about what had been achieved, Marić recom-mended accepting the new text because it would significantly reduce the Austrian-Hungarian delegation’s space for manoeuvre in rejecting the most important Serbian

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demand266. Ristić was determined to persevere in trying to delay the construction of the section from Niš to the Bulgarian border, despite the fact that Prince Milan, more and more dissatisfied with his Prime Minister’s policy, made a bet that Vienna would not want to give in267. The strongest opponent to yielding to Serbian request was the leader of Austria-Hungary’s negotiating team, baron Schwegel268. However, at the conference of the representatives of both sides of the Monarchy he admitted that it would be hard not to agree to this demand if it should prove to be the only ob-stacle to reaching an agreement269. Marić came forth with precisely this argument:

After the concessions that it has agreed to, the Serbian government in this section con-necting it with Bulgaria, expensive due to difficult construction conditions, cannot ex-pose itself to the risk of financial sacrifices with no guarantee, and not be sure whether this will be a dead-end railway line. Serbia intends, and within three years, will build the railway, but only if a timely connection is ensured270.

In negotiations on this issue, Marić was left with no room for compromise. Ristić sent word from Belgrade that his instructions indicated the final position of the Serbian government and that he was not to give in unless he is willing to be disa-vowed271. Faced with Marić’s very explicit opposition, the Austrian-Hungarian negotiators showed its willingness to give in. Representatives of the Hungarian government tried to reach a compromise. They suggested that the deadline for con-struction of the disputed branch be postponed until 1884, but demanded that the precise deadline be written in the contract regardless of whether an agreement with Bulgaria could be reached or not before the contract was signed272.

The second half of March 1880 was used for diplomatic pressure on the Serbian government through Herbert and the newly appointed diplomatic representative of Serbia in Vienna, Filip Hristić. The first meeting of Hristić with Haymerle, as well as an audience with the Emperor Franz-Joseph, consisted largely of discussion of the railway issue. The Austrian emperor spoke of the need to preserve friendly relations between the two countries and mentioned the “wisdom and considerate-ness” of the Serbian government on which reaching an agreement depends273. On the other hand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not fail to provide a series of accusations against the Serbian government’s position on this issue274. After both meetings, Hristić was left with the impression that the future policy of the Dual Monarchy towards Serbia would be determined by the experience gained during the negotiations on the Railway Convention:

It is my firm belief that on the agreement with Austria-Hungary on the matter which we are interested in at this point, depends not only the fate of other negotiations, that are for

9�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

us of vital and immense importance, but also the character of the relations between us and this monarchy, the nature of the position and the success or failure of your work with this country, that plays such an important role in relation to us275.

His conclusion was that the reaching of an agreement would fundamentally change the situation and improve relations between the two countries276.

Baron Herbert tried, following orders from Vienna, to convince Ristić to consent to the new version of the contract. A strongly written message from Haymerle that the government in Vienna expected Serbia to accept the contract did not help. How-ever, Ristić did not explain his refusal in the usual way by adducing the impossi-bility of fixing a construction deadline before agreement with Bulgaria; instead he cited criticisms from “Videlo” and explained his intransigence with public opinion, dissatisfied with building a line that would lead to a critical state in the public fi-nances; he declared that he could not bring such a convention before the Assembly, which had the final word over its acceptance. The Serbian Prime Minister used the fact that Austria-Hungary’s diplomacy was well aware of the growing problems sur-rounding the government as it faced an ever stronger opposition in securing consent on this very important issue. Herbert wrote to Vienna that there was no doubt that the Serbian people, although “inexperienced and unskilled in assessing far-reach-ing interests”, were unanimous in their opposition to such a convention. Bearing in mind Garašanin’s and Piroćanac’s critique of the Austrian-Hungarian Balkan policy on the pages of “Videlo”, he considered it pointless to attack Ristić, whose departure would leave open the question of whether the next government would be ready to sign the Convention. The arguments from Vienna had more influence on Prince Milan, but Herbert judged that the prince did not have a strong enough will to force Ristić to give in to the demands from Vienna277.

The final round of talks began in Vienna on 30 March278. Yielding to Serbian de-mands, the Austrian-Hungarian negotiators offered, as their final proposal, that the Serbian government assume the commitment that, if an agreement with Bulgaria was reached within one year, it would build the section from Niš to the Serbian-Bul-garian border within two years. This would mean that the disputed section would be completed within the same period allowed for the construction of the other routes279. Final agreement was reached on 6 April. The Austrian-Hungarian delegates agreed to the delay under the assumption “that Serbia will do everything in its power to finalize the convention with Bulgaria with consent of the Austrian-Hungarian mon-archy, as well as its legislative approval within a one-year period”. Marić stated on this

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occasion that the Serbian government “fully shared the local [i.e. of the Austro Hun-garian delegates] assumptions and shall unconditionally do everything in its power to avoid differences in the timing of the construction of the two lines that branch out from Niš”280. The concessions were recorded in a special final protocol, as an integral part of the convention. The text stated the main reasons which forced the Serbian government to request the postponement of construction of the disputed section and noted that both governments would cooperate in an effort to ensure the construction of the routes on the territory of Bulgaria provided by the Treaty of Berlin. However, if the convention with Bulgaria was not signed within one year, it was agreed that the calculation of the three-year deadline period for the construction of the section from Niš to the Serbian-Bulgarian border would start on the day a connection with Bulgaria was secured by a convention. The protocol specified Velika Kikinda and Szeged as potential connecting points to the Hungarian railway net-work281. Having received the consent of the Hungarian and Serbian governments on the text of the final protocol, the convention was signed on 9 April 1880282.

3. the unIted opposItIon aGaInst the ConVentIon

The Serbian Constitution of 1869 provided that the Assembly had to give a favour-able opinion on any agreement that involved a new financial burden on the state283. This obligation brought new problems for the government. Shortly after “Videlo” started publication, close cooperation was established between the group gathered around the newspaper and the opposition in the Assembly. Despite conflicting po-litical ideas which both sides were aware of, the common interest was clear – to over-throw Ristić’s government. “Videlo” reported on the Assembly sessions, affirming the struggle of the populist-radical opposition, and the opposition representatives attacked the government, while referring to the writings of “Videlo”. The benefit was mutual. Conducting an ever fiercer political battle, the group around “Videlo” im-posed itself on the Prince as an alternative to the unpopular government, while the radicals, in the absence of their own media, used the “Videlo” to promote their own ideas, influencing voters and strengthening their organizational structure. Although there were signs of conflict in early May of 1880, these were quickly overcome. Both sides were aware that it was much better to focus all their activity against the gov-ernment. In such a political situation, the signing of the railway convention and the special session of the Assembly where it was supposed to be adopted provided a wel-come opportunity for a confrontation with the government284.

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3.1. Criticism on the pages of “Videlo”

“Videlo”, with its criticism of the text of the convention, provided a preview and an introduction to the Assembly debates. After Garašanin’s and Piroćanac’s articles, “Videlo” simply followed and printed articles from the Austrian and Hungarian press on the negotiations; after the signing of the Convention it published the text in its entirety, without comments. Sharp and detailed criticism followed in a series of articles from 16 to 26 May, in the days leading up to the assembly debate, in order to have the greatest effect. The writer was Mijatović – the most competent amongst the “Videlo” group285.

As an old proponent of the railway, Mijatović did not intend to oppose its construc-tion, despite the unfavourable situation of state finances. Rather, he contested the political wisdom of the convention, signed by the government he opposed. Taking into account not only the technical, economic and financial, but also the politi-cal weight of the issue, and the importance of maintaining good relations with the neighbouring monarchy, as well as the belief that the construction of a railway un-der favourable conditions might be “the beginning of a new era of prosperity and comprehensive progress”, Mijatović concluded that the proposed convention was harmful and very dangerous for Serbia. His criticism focused on the most signifi-cant disadvantages.

The most obvious was the obligation of building a railway in a short period of time, without being sure that it could be linked with the Ottoman - Bulgarian line. As a “poor country, sparsely populated, with no industry (...) and such a low trade turno-ver that it would not be able to support the railway alone”, without an ensured link “the Serbian railway would only be a so to speak ‘economic dead-end’ and a ‘finan-cial torn bag’”, while with it the railway would be on one of the most significant transport routes on the European continent. If Serbia were to fulfil the obligation assumed with the convention to complete the construction of the Belgrade-Vranje line within three years, it was certain that it would not get the connection to the Ottoman railway, Mijatović claimed. He cited a number of political and financial reasons that were leading the Porte away from assuming the obligation to complete the connecting route from the Thessaloniki-Mitrovica railway to the Serbian border at any time soon. The situation was further worsened by the fact that the Serbian railway, given the current situation of the public finances and the state’s low repu-tation in European financial circles, would be built by a foreign company which would undoubtedly enjoy significant financial gains. Since the state would have to

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guarantee an annual income from exploitation that the local line would not be able to supply, the unrealized link to Thessaloniki would further impoverish the state budget for an uncertain number of years.

He linked the solution to this situation to the removal of another flaw – the delayed conclusion of a trade agreement with Austria-Hungary that was vitally necessary for the Serbian state. Without a connection to the south and with no trade agreement, Serbia was “voluntarily surrendering to the sphere of trade and transport interest of Austria-Hungary” and “temporarily becoming a sole area of a foreign industry”, Mijatović said. The solution that he proposed was the following: that the govern-ment present to the Assembly either a convention with the Ottoman Empire pro-viding for the simultaneous completion of connecting lines, or a favourable trade agreement with Austria-Hungary that would facilitate Serbian export and protect the Serbian industry in its beginnings286. Of course, Mijatović was well aware that these conditions could not be met.

The shortcomings mentioned were reinforced by criticism of the provisions on tariffs and the opening of the line from Belgrade first, rather than from Vranje. Mijatović classified Article 11 (in which Serbia agreed to adjust its tariff policy for international traffic on the Serbian and Hungarian connecting line to the current Austrian and Hungarian tariffs) as amongst the most dangerous, judging it as an “economic capitulation” and calling it “the main link, with which Serbia is being chained to the sphere of political and commercial interests of Austria-Hungary”. The tariff on the Serbian railway would not be determined by the interest of its trade and industry, but by the interest of the neighbouring monarchy. Connected to this was a criticism of the provision, predicting that the line from Belgrade to Niš would be opened before the that from the southern border towards Niš and Belgrade, thus obstructing the possibility of opening the Serbian market for British and French industrial goods and securing the interest of the Austrian industry287. To criticise the convention, Mijatović also used the parts that regulated the construction of a bridge over the river Sava and transferred authority to the Hungarian State Railways on the line from the bridge to the Belgrade railway station. Although this issue was among those that had not caused much discussion during the negotiations between the two governments, it was appropriate for criticism since it provided the opportunity to appeal to national pride because of the alleged grant of state territory to another state, “a peculiar kind of occupation of Serbian territory”, as Mijatović put it288. In an Assembly in which most representatives were peasants and all representatives were nationalists, such an argument could count on success.

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At the end of his detailed analysis, in an article published on 26 May, the day after the Assembly established a committee to study the Convention, Mijatović advised the national representative body to reject the proposed convention and allow Serbia to try to reach better conditions in new negotiations. This undoubtedly implied a new government as well. Finishing his analysis, Mijatović tried to obtain a success for the opposition by indicating the burden of responsibility to each and every rep-resentative:

No one should forget the greatness of the issue which he needs to give his vote on. Let no one forget that what they currently give their votes to and approve, cannot ever be fixed or undone. Let no one forget that this is not a question of only one expensive construction, which Serbia is obliging itself to build at a bad time with a large financial risk. The matter is far greater. The real question lies in this: will Serbia voluntarily enter into a vassal submission to Austrian-Hungarian political-commercial interests or not. If this is what we want, then the special assembly will accept the contract. But if this is not what we want, then the contract will be rejected289.

The opposition’s task was to defeat the agreement in the Assembly

3.2. Radicals are preparing to attack – Pašić’s concept of modernization

The special session of the Assembly, scheduled to start on 23 May, made it necessary for the assembly opposition to develop a stronger organization. Nikola Pašić, whose role as informal leader among the opposition representatives was unquestioned even before the death of Adam Bogosavljević in March 1880, had already begun, in the spring of 1880, to establish firmer organizational integration and create the future party structure in the interior. In early April he launched an initiative to form a fund for helping Bogosavljević’s family. Its activities were to be carried out in the various parts of the country by representatives of opposition and by respected citizens of that inclination. Branches of the Fund represented the organizational beginnings of the People’s Radical Party290.

As an engineer who had received a scholarship from the Serbian government specifi-cally to study the construction of railways, Pašić could not oppose its construction. However, relying on the criticism put forward in the “Videlo”, his resistance to the convention was based on deeper ideological assumptions. On 14 May, a few days before the start of the Assembly session, Pašić published an article in “Videlo” that clearly defined the agenda principles of the future party which he already called the “People’s Radical Party”. Although it was based on Marković’s concept of a “people’s

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state”, Pašić’s program was a step forward in the evolution of the original socialist program with a dominant social component towards a more pragmatic program of the radicals, primarily guided by political reforms, as the first stage in the transfor-mation of the Serbian state and society, or the prerequisite for achieving the “testa-mentary thought” and maintaining social egalitarianism. The essential difference in comparison to Marković’s program was that it transposed the ideas of collectivism and egalitarianism of Serbian society from family cooperatives and municipalities to the country as a whole. Strengthening of the state, as well as the national component in the radicals’ agenda, was the result of the events following Marković’s death, or the wars, as well as awareness of the new geopolitical balance of power in the Balkans after the Congress of Berlin and the necessity of protection of the now independent state, not only from the greatest new enemy of the achievement of the “testamentary thought” – Austria-Hungary – but from its supporters in Serbia as well291.

Pašić promised to respond to the external, as well as the internal, danger with a ver-satile internal political and economic modernization in line with the views set out in the programme from 1876, and repeated in the spring of 1880. The basis of the political reforms would be reforms of the financial, administrative and judicial sys-tem in the spirit of a people’s self-government; the abolition of district prefects and standing army: an integral part of the reforms and their final culmination was to be a constitutional reform. However, at that historical moment, political reforms needed to ensure the preconditions for the creation of a state that would provide “people’s wellbeing”, or allow for a successful economic modernization, but without the strong social disruptions clearly visible on the horizon after the gain of independence. “Take only technical knowledge and science from the west and use them in the Slavic-Ser-bian spirit” because “the Serbian people have so many good and healthy institutions and customs, that we should only cherish and supplement them with the good insti-tutions, which can be seen in the Russian people and other Slavic peoples”, Pašić later wrote292. The essence of his conception was to accept the technical knowledge and scientific achievements of the West, but not the values that accompanied them. His vision of a special path to the development of the Serbian economy was built on it.

The most important task of the reform would be to preserve economic independ-ence from Austria-Hungary, as the basis of political independence, and the best way to achieve that was to undertake a series of measures to encourage agricultural pro-duction, open new markets for Serbian exports and, above all, help the domestic industry293. In this regard, at the end of 1879, Pašić submitted a proposal to the Assembly on encouraging the development of Serbian industry: he called for a deci-

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sion that the army had to wear clothing produced in Serbia, that the country should purchase abroad only those products that could not be produced in Serbia, that labour from abroad could be employed only if qualified workers could not be found in Serbia. The Administration of public funds was to give grants primarily for fund-ing projects for the development of domestic industry294.

Following on his earlier ideas and in order to criticize the Convention, Pašić, the most competent among opposition representatives, called for the delay of railway construction in an agenda article in “Videlo”. In other words, he asked that the Con-vention not be adopted until a trade agreement with Austria-Hungary was con-cluded, and he also proposed signing a trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire which would open the road for Serbian exports through Thessaloniki295. The pro-posal for stalling was in full compliance with Pašić’s concept of economic moderni-zation of Serbia as set out in 1876, and which indeed dated back to 1872, when he was under the full ideological influence of Svetozar Marković.

Serbia is a country that, if it wants to live, must get into the flow of European industry and civilization. If it opposes this it must be condemned to a completely separate and static life and always defend itself from the flood of European industry. (...) Today’s direction of manufacturing – industry – is such that a railway is nothing but a part of that direction, that is, the railway is a necessary follow-up of today’s industry. (...) A railway will pass through Serbia as soon as this is in commercial traffic with the rest of the industrial world. The task of each government is to lead the industry’s progress in accordance with national interests. (...) Whether Serbia builds the railway itself or some other company, we must first make sure that the greatest requirement is fulfilled and that the railway cannot be of harm to the people’s liberty and national prosperity. Foreign companies threaten this condition the most296.

Serbia’s political and financial situation in 1880, despite the change of the interna-tional legal status of the state, was maybe even less favourable than in 1872, when Pašić wrote these passages, and the negative political consequences of the submis-sion of the principality to foreign capital were clearly observable. Bringing the de-velopment of industry, as well as the time and manner of construction of the railway “into accordance with national interests”, as Pašić stated, meant delaying construc-tion until the other conditions were ensured, providing the Serbian economy with transport links to the more developed European economies. It can be said that his views essentially matched the views of the Marković brothers during the public de-bate of 1871. Pašić’s actions, as well as those of other opposition representatives in the Assembly, were based on them.

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3.3. The convention in the Assembly

Ristić was aware of the strength of most of the arguments set out on the pages of “Videlo”, as well as the fact that the opposition in the Assembly would focus its attacks on the shortcomings pointed out by Mijatović. Therefore it was necessary to consoli-date the government’s majority in order to prevent surprises. Ristić had the advantage that Prince Milan was not against the convention, since its refusal would mean an in-tensification of difficult relations with Austria-Hungary. In the new state of geopoliti-cal relations in the Balkans, this was precisely what needed to be avoided. The Prince would have to wait for another opportunity for a confrontation with Ristić, although for him weakening the government’s reputation would be a desirable consequence of the internal political conflict concerning the adoption of the convention297.

While awaiting the start of the Assembly sessions, faced with ever more powerful attacks from the “Videlo”, Ristić tried to block criticism regarding the two most im-portant shortcomings – lack of a connection with Thessaloniki and postponement of negotiations on a trade agreement with Austria-Hungary. On the one hand, he hoped that the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aware of the re-sistance the convention was facing in Serbia, would start negotiations on the trade agreement and revoke the export ban on livestock before the Assembly opened. The head of the Sanitary Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladan Đorđević, was in Budapest at the time trying to obtain the abolition of the prohibi-tion298. On the other hand, Ristić decided to attempt, before the debate in the As-sembly began, to obtain an answer from the Porte to the question of whether and when they intended to enter into negotiations with Serbia on a railway link. He hoped thus to forestall criticism from the opposition. On 18 May, five days before the Assembly opened, orders were sent to the Serbian representative in Constanti-nople299. However, Ristić’s hopes were unfounded. Neither Vienna nor Constanti-nople supported him. The government came before the Assembly on 23 May with no new arguments in its defence300.

Conflict broke out from practically the first minute – on the choice of the tempo-rary Assembly president, on the election of the assembly committee for verifying authorization, and on the efforts of the opposition to designate their members as members of the special committee for studying the convention. While the com-mittee studied the convention, telegrams supporting the opposition in the fight against it were sent to the Assembly and were publicly read each day. Thirty-seven members of the opposition presented a proposal to dissolve the Assembly, and that

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the convention should be the object of discussion by a Grand Assembly, specially chosen for the occasion. The success of such a proposal would undoubtedly mean a delay in the adoption of the convention. An opposition victory in the elections for the Grand National Assembly, where the number of representatives would be four times that of the normal assembly, was a real possibility. Ristić judged this proposal unconstitutional and it was never even discussed. After that, the opposition was left with no alternative to criticizing the content of the Convention301.

Members of the expert committee were government representatives, and the Prime Minister controlled their work. In a speech he gave at the beginning of the commit-tee session, whose main points became an integral part of their report, he explained that he had had to yield to the demands of Vienna because of diplomatic pressure, accompanied by the threat of closing the Hungarian border to Serbian trade. He presented as a success the fact that the Austrian and Hungarian negotiators had giv-en up their demands for building both connecting lines, stating that the Niš-Pirot line whose construction was delayed, was much more important to Austrian trade. Having failed to obtain a formal response from the Porte on its intent to build the connecting line, Ristić argued before the expert committee that the interests of the Great Powers, European trade and financial houses, and formal obligations of the Porte arising from international agreements, spoke strongly in favour of the fact that the Serbian railway would not remain a dead-end, and that these factors together constituted a stronger guarantee than a formal contract with the Porte would have done. The rest of the report, containing questions from the committee members to the Minister of Public Works and his answers, represented a refutation of “Videlo”’s objections – the Serbian railway would not be left without a connection to Thessa-loniki, its exploitation would be profitable, the provisions on opening the lines from Belgrade first and the building of a bridge and the grant to use a part of the territory of the Belgrade railway station did not constitute a violation of state interests or the violation of national pride, while the issue of tariffs was settled to mutual benefit, so a different text would have been “nonsense”. The report with which the committee came before the Assembly on 1 June led to the logical conclusion that the conven-tion “fully protected the interests of Serbia”, and the issue of a link to Thessaloniki, “which had to formally remain undiscussed out of consideration for other interests of our country, has such a strong chance for a positive resolution, that it leaves no reasonable basis for anxiety and fears”302.

The Assembly debate began on 2 June. On the same day, “Videlo” attempted for the last time to furnish arms to the opposition. Before the start of the morning session

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on 2 June (the day after the report by the expert committee was read), the front page of the newspaper published a letter from Stevča Mihailović, one of the leaders of the Liberals during the past decade and Prime Minister during the wars of 1876-1878, in which the convention was evaluated as “fatal for Serbian interests”. Mihailović noted that “there is no political party in Serbia today that would accept the Con-vention such as it is proposed before the Assembly” because “only a defeated Serbia could be forced to accept it”. Piroćanac was behind the writing and publishing of the letter: he wanted to use the negative opinion of the respected representative of the Liberals to sway the representatives of the government majority. With such an introduction, the opposition immediately went on the attack303.

As the most competent among the opposition representatives, Pašić led the criti-cism. In discussions with the Minister of Public Works and Ristić, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pašić continued to limit his attack to the Convention. He ques-tioned the necessity of building the railway at that point in time, but did not deny its potential importance for the development of the Serbian economy eventually.

Our industry is not that grown, to seek a quick and cheap road to world markets. Our trade is not so widespread and branched out to require the railway. Our agriculture is not so strongly developed, to raise its voice for the railway. Our internal conditions are such that they look for other solutions, not the railway. (...) All that our railway could export is raw materials, which are required by the Austrian-Hungarian factories. And once we have finished exporting raw materials, then we shall become laborers of foreign factory owners and capitalists304.

Pašić argued that instead of enabling faster economic development of Serbia, the Convention would open the way for the penetration of Austrian industrial goods, preventing the development of the Serbian industry which was still in its begin-nings. He did not spare the policy of the neighbouring monarchy, despite the usual presence of an Austrian-Hungarian diplomat in the Assembly gallery, claiming that its interest lay in the indebtedness and financial ruin of Serbia, which would lead to the submission of Serbian trade and the transformation of the independent princi-pality into an Austrian-Hungarian province. Not forgetting to mention the entry of Austria-Hungary into Bosnia and Herzegovina, the biggest defeat of Serbian na-tionalism up to that point, he stated that the policy of the Dual Monarchy clearly went against the interests of Serbia, and the Railway Convention was part of that plan. He laid a significant part of the responsibility on Ristić who had broken his promise given at the previous Assembly session in February of 1880 by agreeing to concessions to which he was not obliged by the previous agreements in Berlin. He

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stressed above all the lack of a connection with Thessaloniki. “I hold true that no Serb can accept this Convention, or even dare to accept it”305.

Pašić’s attack was conceived within the framework of his conception of economic modernization, although this was not explicitly promoted. Pašić attempted to trans-pose the idealistic concept of modernization avoiding the Western European path, as formulated by Marković, from the conceptual level to the immediate Serbian reality. He hoped to square the circle between the negative aspects of economic moderni-zation followed by industrialization and proletarianization, and the inevitable dis-ruption of the still significantly present social egalitarianism of the Serbian peasant society. Building a railway in the current historical moment was in stark contrast to the state and national interests of Serbia and the Serbian nation because would make it impossible to realize the idealistic vision of independent economic development; foreign capital would certainly enter Serbia immediately and the railway would bring Serbian political independence into question as well, thus destroying the possibility of realizing the “testamentary thought”, according to which Austria-Hungary was the biggest obstacle at the time. “The opponent of our national liberation and unification has changed and instead of the ‘rotten Turkey’ we have a civilized Austria-Hungary, with internal civil freedoms”, Pašić wrote a few days before the Assembly306.

The Convention was also understood in the same sense by Pašić’s comrades in the assembly, peasant representatives, many of whom had been part of the populist op-position led by Bogosavljević in the previous assembly. Having a patriarchal mental-ity, fearful of the widespread acceptance of the achievements of Western civilization – a fear of novelties was characteristic of the traditional peasant society – especially afraid that any focus on internal development would make Serbia drift away from its mission of unification and liberation, they attacked the Convention with much stronger words than Pašić’s. All the objections referred to in “Videlo” found their place in the attack: the Serbian economy’s lack of readiness for the railway, the prob-lem of Thessaloniki and Ristić’s promise; they demanded the conclusion, first, of the trade agreement with Austria-Hungary and, after that, the railway convention. However, the centre of their criticism was Austrian-Hungarian policy – the Dual Monarchy was the enemy of unification and, from the Serbian perspective, the para-digm of Western civilization.

In the fiery, often very picturesque speeches, the issue of the Convention was rated as “fateful not only for today’s generation, but for future generations, the Serbian future and the liberation and unification of the Serbian people as well”307 and the

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neighboring monarchy was called “a dragon who wants to swallow Serbdom and Slavdom”: that is Austria was using the Convention to “swing at us with a sharp sword, that when it hits us, our head will fly off ”308. “The heavy and bitter condi-tions” of the Convention were considered to have paved the road to restoration of the vassal position of Serbia, and the Convention itself was judged to be a “knife, which the enemy is handing us with a smile to destroy our national economic-politi-cal future”309. The consequences of accepting the Convention and the construction of a railway were painted by the opposition in the darkest colours:

In the Iron Road, which will pass through the heart of Serbia, I see that fierce dragon, which will in the most fertile areas of Šumadija (Central Serbia – M.S.) swallow thou-sands of families whose grandfathers and fathers made all sacrifices for the freedom of this country. The colonies will be power, but not Serbian, but of other people, which will with an iron hand brake paralyze every future move of the Serbian Unification and Liberation, which will give rise to rights to foreigners to interfere in our internal mat-ters and interfere with our every independent national development. With such evident intention, which Austria-Hungary skilfully crept into the Convention, I hold true that there is no Serb who will accept it, because it carries within its stipulations nothing less than poison for the Serbian future310.The first whistle of a railway locomotive that whistles through the boundaries of our country will be a sad and dreadful bell, which shall invite the Serbian people to the requiem of our dear country311.

The politics of Austria-Hungary were observed in the context of the conflict between the West and the Slavic East in which the neighbouring monarchy, with Germany behind her, “carries culture, industry, capital and the Germanic spirit across the Bal-kan peninsula into the east to the contrary of the characteristics and size of the Ser-bian people, the culture and life of the Slavic peoples”312. Serbia was in this way put in the centre of the Slavic-Germanic conflict, manifested in the Balkans primarily through the Austrian-Russian conflict of the division of the spheres of interest. Al-though Russia was not mentioned once openly, but referred to a “centuries old friend of Serbia, which had many times helped the Serbian people”313, the speeches of the oppositionists were a clear indication of the future pro-Russian foreign policy orien-tation of the People’s Radical Party, not only as a result of the traditional adherence of the Serbian peasant to Slavic and Orthodox Russia, but also as the logical outcome of increased economic and political pressure from the Dual Monarchy.

As a skilled and experienced politician, Ristić, despite the demand of the majority to end the debate and move on to the vote, allowed all the most significant repre-

105Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

sentatives of the opposition to present their opinions and in doing so calmed the atmosphere in the Assembly. On the other hand, the Convention was defended by the most reliable experts and by Ristić himself. A faith in the railway as a means of comprehensive transformation was visible in their speeches, characteristic for the generation of Serbian liberal intellectuals who had been educated in the West and even those gathered around the “Videlo” who opportunistically criticized the Con-vention, but not the railway. The words of one representative that the construction of a railway would mark “an epoch in the history of Serbian progress in general, and individual in the history of the field economy, crafts, trade and fabrication, and will at the same time be a phase in the cultural and educational life of all the Serbian people”314 are a characteristic example.

Finally, Ristić stood up before the Assembly. In a speech that exemplified his skills as a statesman, he agreed with the opposition’s claims that Serbia was in danger of economic subjection to Austria-Hungary. He stressed that the need for the con-struction of faster transport routes came precisely from Serbia’s need for open ac-cess to the sea, and to free its economy and trade from subjection to others. He considered the absence of a formal contract with the Ottoman Empire as the only objection that could be made against the content of the Convention. Once again he explained in detail the reasons that gave the government hope that the connection with the Ottoman railways was not far from realization. Then he quoted parts of reports of the Serbian representatives in St. Petersburg and Paris containing positive evaluations of the Convention, the note from the British representative that the British government would support Serbia’s demands to the Porte for a railway link, as well as the note from the Austrian-Hungarian representative in which the start of negotiations on a trade agreement was to be fixed immediately upon the ratification of the Railway Convention. He finished his speech by emphasizing that the respon-sibility of the decision is carried by the representatives:

Now, gentlemen, it is your turn to evaluate. We believe that all was achieved that could have been achieved, and if there is anyone who would have faith and be able to accept the responsibility of trying to achieve more, we’re all men ready to depart immediately, and to recommend him to His Highness for his replacement. It is still not too late, we have still not voted. (...) Whoever is not convinced that all is indeed achieved that in the days and conditions could be achieved, no one has the right to ask him to vote for the Convention; it is not a matter of the government, but a matter of the country, and is of great importance. Therefore, in the solemn moment before us, let us put all other

10� Momir Samardžic

considerations aside, and put before us our conscience and the interest of the country. Let that be the only thing guiding us in the vote315.

The speech was immediately followed by the vote. The Convention was adopted with a convincing majority – 122 votes “for” and 40 votes “against”, with 3 “ab-stained”316. The government had to be satisfied. The Prince was satisfied as well. The opposition had failed to prevent the Convention’s being adopted, but with its sharp criticism managed to influence public opinion “which, even after Ristić’s explana-tion, remained convinced that he had conceded more to Austria than he should have”317. The reputation of the government was seriously compromised at a moment when important foreign policy objectives stood before it.

IV. In searCh of a fInanCIer

Signing the Convention with Austria-Hungary marked the beginning of the final phase of the railway struggle. Acceptance of the formal obligations and deadlines made it necessary to take for rapid decisions regarding all the remaining unresolved issues in order to start construction. Although state finances were in a very bad situ-ation, and the reputation of Serbia on the international financial market was low, it was no longer possible to delay the final decision. It was necessary for the govern-ment to decide how it would to build the railway, to provide the necessary funds and experts, and to have its decisions approved by the Assembly as well. Efficient resolution was made more difficult by an ever more complex internal political situa-tion that saw the fall of Ristić’s government and the formation of a new government led by Milan Piroćanac. The new government was even readier to take decisive steps on the path to the political and economic modernization of the state.

1. rIstIC’s GoVernMent before the fInal deCIsIon

The months that followed the signing of the Convention were marked by negative developments in relations with Austria-Hungary. It took Austrian-Hungarian di-plomacy nearly two years to persuade Ristić to sign the Convention. From the mo-ment this gesture was finally completed, Ristić continued his resistance against the further new demands of the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Ministry aimed towards the same goal – strengthening the economic impact of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans. Despite warnings from Vienna, Serbia first signed a trade agreement with Great Britain. The reaction of Vienna was to demand that Belgrade recognize its rights as most privileged nation before the start of negotiations – as was common in trade agreements, but without reciprocity, which was an insult. Ristić refused the request and negotiations for the trade agreement did not even start. At the same time, he also opposed the attempt by the Austrian-Hungarian representatives in the European Danube Commission (the body charged with making decisions on the measures required for smooth navigation and monitoring of the river) to secure their countries’ interests at the expense of those of the other coastal states. In the end, he refused to send a delegate to Vienna to negotiate with his colleagues from the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria on the Balkan railroad ties and a unique manner of exploitation, and he adhered consistently to this position until the fall of the gov-

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108 Momir Samardžic

ernment in October 1880. In such a context, accompanied by ever fiercer attacks by the united opposition and growingly tense relations with the Prince, Ristić’s govern-ment was thinking about ways to solve the railway construction problem318.

The Convention stipulated that Serbia and Hungary would complete the construc-tion of the Budapest-Vranje line within three years from the date of exchange of rati-fications, or in other words by 14 June 1883. Faced with new proposals from foreign financiers, with the need to make a final decision on the construction as well, the government first had to clarify the position of the Staatsbahn management on the principle concession agreement reached in September of 1879. At the time of sign-ing of the contract in Vienna, Serbian Prime Minister Jovan Ristić received news that the company was still interested in building the Serbian railway319. It seems, however, that this was just an attempt to preserve the favourable position previous-ly attained while waiting for the company’s management to reach a final decision. Faced with persistent refusal of the Hungarian government to give the Staatsbahn a concession for the construction of the Hungarian section of the route, the manage-rial council of the company in Paris finally decided in mid May 1880 to abandon the project to build the Serbian railway, as well as that for the Velika Kikinda – Zemun route320. The management decided to look for a railway link through Romania and Bulgaria and began negotiations with their governments on the construction of a line to connect Craiova with the Rumelian Belovo-Constantinople line and thus provide a link with the Ottoman capital that would yield profits on the transport of goods along the East-West route. In June 1880, the company’s engineers found themselves in Sofia with the task of obtaining the consent of the Bulgarian govern-ment. Their proposal was not approved by Sofia, because the Bulgarian government would have an interest in supporting the construction of that line only if it were released from the obligation of building the Caribrod-Sofia-Vakarel line. Without support from Vienna and St. Petersburg, the efforts of the Staatsbahn were destined to fail, and the company was left without further opportunities for involvement in the construction of the Balkan railways321.

Anticipating a final negative answer from the Staatsbahn, the Serbian government found itself faced with a new offer from Fremy’s consortium. The decree of 28 April 1880 on convening the National Assembly had just been published, and Fremy’s plenipotentiary Filleul Brohy arrived in Belgrade in early May with a new proposal. The proposal, dated 7 May 1880, coincided in essence with the earlier proposals. The Serbian government was to guarantee an annual income of 5,500,000 francs to the Consortium, where 500,000 francs would represent an interest of 5% on the

109Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

amount of ten million that the Consortium was to place at the disposal of the Ser-bian government, within a period of time to be negotiated subsequently, followed by an agreement on the terms of depreciation. As in the proposal of 29 November 1879, the remaining five million were linked to the capital to be invested and rep-resented 5% of the estimated 100 million necessary for the construction of the Ser-bian railway. Other conditions, having to do with the guaranteed annual income per kilometre and with the reduction of the guaranteed amount of five million francs and its return to the state, were identical to those in the proposal of 29 November 1879, as were the provisions on the deposit and obligation of the Consortium that exploitation would not begin until a connection with the lines of the neighbour-ing countries was secured322. However, the Consortium withdrew its offer from Belgrade at the end of May 1880. Brohy explained this decision with the fact that the Consortium had still not managed to obtain a concession from the Hungarian government for the construction of the Budapest-Zemun line. A decision from the Hungarian government was expected in June 1880, and Fremy’s representative noti-fied Ristić that they would send the Serbian government a new proposal as soon as they obtained the general consent of the Hungarian government to the grant of the concession323.

In early June 1880, the Serbian government was aware that the Staatsbahn had giv-en up on its intention to compete for the construction of the Serbian railway324. It knew that Fremy’s consortium intended to deliver a new proposal as soon as a general agreement with the Hungarian government was reached. The Railway Con-vention with Austria-Hungary was adopted and ratification was impending. The government came to a point where it had to make a final decision on how Serbia would build the railway. After the Congress, it leaned towards the decision to build it under its own direction. Despite the financial debt abroad, the state would have the railway’s revenues at its disposal after the completion of construction, and there-fore, the restitution of the loan would present a smaller financial burden. The big-gest obstacle was the fact that Serbia would have difficulties in obtaining the funds for construction through a loan abroad. To obtain a loan it was necessary to have the support of a Great Power. In Serbia’s case, the easiest way to obtain a loan would be to gain the support of Austria-Hungary for the plan for the Serbian state to direct the construction of the railway. The Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs was, however, against this idea from the start. Therefore, the only possibility for Serbia to find the necessary money without granting a concession was through Russian support. Imperial Russia, however, was itself in too difficult a financial posi-

110 Momir Samardžic

tion to be able to loan a hundred million francs to Serbia, and it was unlikely that Russian support would contribute to the approval of a loan on the Paris or London financial markets. In addition, for political reasons the Russian government could not openly support the Serbian government, thus taking a stance would not please Vienna: at that very time St. Petersburg was taking steps towards the renewal of the Austro-German-Russian alliance. The current state of relations amongst the Great Powers traditionally most interested in the Balkans was not favourable to Serbia’s plan to build a railway under its own control.

On the other hand, if the Serbian government were to make such a decision, this would significantly delay the start of construction, since it would first be necessary to find the financial resources, and then a foreign contractor interested in the con-struction. With the signing of the Austrian-Serbian Convention, the government had accepted the three-year time frame for the completion of construction and, if it wanted to respect the convention, it had to resolve the issue of the method of con-struction as soon as possible. By granting a concession for construction and exploi-tation the government would resolve this issue in the fastest possible way because the problem of obtaining the money would be transferred to the concessionaire, as would be that of finding a contractor and organizing the exploitation. The develop-ment of events in the months leading up to the signing of the Convention with Aus-tria-Hungary, and the approach of foreign companies to the problem of building a railway in Serbia, made it clear that the country would most likely have to grant a concession if it wished to honour its international obligations. However, the final decision still had to be made.

In mid June, the government established an expert committee with the task once again of advising it on how to solve the problem325. The committee held its first meeting on 23 June. At the beginning of the session a majority of the members thought that the state should build the railway under its own management, but the data on the state finances and the poor prospects of obtaining the required funds led a part of the members to waiver in their beliefs326. When the members had been fully informed about the government’s efforts up until then and the offers from foreign banks, at a meeting held on 27 June the committee split into a majority which thought that the state should grant a concession for the construction and exploitation to a foreign company, and a minority who maintained its position that the state could easily obtain the necessary funding and build and exploit its railway itself327. However, it was a very “close” majority of ten to eight, which still left the government in doubt as to the advisable course of action328.

111Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

Before a final decision in favour of granting a concession was made, the government wanted to determine what the real possibilities of Serbia obtaining a loan for the construction of the railway under its own management were. The government sent instructions on the first day of July 1880 to Jovan Marinović, its representative in Paris and London, to examine with the financial houses of the two capitals under what circumstances and with what interest rates Serbia might obtain the necessary money. As a guarantee, the government offered state income and revenue from the railway itself329. A few days later Marinović was further instructed to attempt to discuss with experts in Belgium and France the issue of how Serbia should build its railway330. Marinović first travelled to London and spoke to Nathaniel Rothschild, the head of the London house of one of the world’s largest banking families. The conversation ended without success. Rothschild referred Marinović to the Vienna house of Rothschild, as the one having the greatest authority to make a decision on granting a loan to the Serbian state331. In Vienna, however, the Serbian government was referred to the Paris house, as the main house. Determined to reach a conclu-sion, Ristić ordered Marinović to demand a final answer in Paris332.

While Ristić was waiting for a response from Paris, two offers arrived in Belgrade – the first was from Polyakov and the other from Fremy’s consortium. The con-tent of the offer that Polyakov presented to the Serbian government is unknown, but there is no doubt that in essence it did not differ from the principal proposals of early 1880, or from the offer presented to the Serbian government in February of 1881333. The company that Polyakov represented made the construction of the railway conditional on the establishment of a Serbian National Bank under whose supervision the entire financial life of the principality – including large construc-tion enterprises, such as the construction of a railway – would revolve. Such a bank would belong to the state only nominally, or from another point of view it would be the state’s since it would control state finances. The state would be left with the su-pervision of the railway construction and would retain the power to decide whether to carry out the exploitation on its own, or leave it to another company. However, since the state would have had to approve the establishment of the bank under the proposed conditions, there was little doubt about who would actually supervise the construction and exploitation of the railway.

Not waiting for the call for tender, Brohy submitted a new offer dated 14 July 1880. During June 1880, Brohy tried in Budapest to obtain a concession from the Hungar-ian government for the construction of the Budapest-Zemun line; at the same time he demanded that, during the negotiations, the Hungarian government assume the

11� Momir Samardžic

obligation not to negotiate on the grant of the concession with any other company for the following three months. The government in Budapest was not ready to accept such conditions, but was interested in negotiations on the concession334. Despite the fact that he had failed to secure a concession in Budapest, Brohy appeared in Belgrade with a new offer. The specification of an amount of 260 million francs which the three financial houses that formed the Consortium had at their disposal, along with their intentions to build the entire line from Budapest to the Serbian-Bulgarian, or Ser-bian-Ottoman border, was supposed to demonstrate the seriousness of the Consor-tium’s intentions. The proposal that Brohy brought to Belgrade differed to a certain extent with respect to the previous ones. It mentioned the possibility, which had not been mentioned previously, for the government to redeem the railway after the expi-ration of a twenty year period from the start of exploitation. In previous negotiations the duration of the concession was one of the reasons for the Serbian government’s dissatisfaction with the Consortium’s offer. Faced with competition, the Consortium had to make its proposal acceptable, so it decided to include a provision to foresee the possibility of redemption. In addition, the Consortium took on the responsibility of establishing a connection with the Hungarian line at its own expense, as well as secur-ing the completion of the connecting lines to Constantinople and Thessaloniki in So-fia and Constantinople. The Serbian government was to guarantee 12,000 francs net, or 22,500 francs of annual gross income per kilometre. The guarantee would be valid starting with the first day of exploitation, i.e. from the day the Serbian line was con-nected to the Thessaloniki and Constantinople lines335. Trying to make his offer even more enticing, Brohy suggested the establishment of the National Bank with a capital of 25 million francs and links to the three banks in Paris, which formed the Consor-tium and which could facilitate future efforts of the Serbian state to find the necessary financial resources on the European financial markets. In addition, the Consortium offered a loan of several million francs to be made fully available to the Minister of Finance for the state’s needs, but demanded that it be granted a concession to develop and exploit Serbia’s mineral resources, especially the coal mines336.

At that point, the Serbian government had not yet decided on how it intended to build the railway, and thus it did not intend to engage in more concrete negotiations with Polyakov nor with Brohy. In addition, Ristić received a report from the Ser-bian representative in St. Petersburg that did not go in Polyakov’s favour: Russian officials expressed a negative view on him, on how he had conducted his business during the construction of the railways in Russia, as well as on the quality of the construction itself. Baranov was not criticized much, but the officials did express

11�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

the opinion that he did not possess the necessary capital. The mildest in his state-ments on Polyakov was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Girs. However, of particular significance to the Serbian government was Girs’ declaration that he no longer wished to interfere in the matter. “Everyone can do as they please and are able”, he told Protić, “That venture no longer concerns me”. Furthermore, he said that he would not view the grant of a concession to a western company as marking an alienation of Serbia from Russia337.

In late July 1880, when Protić’s report arrived from St. Petersburg, the government was coming closer and closer to deciding to build the railway using the system of a concession. Prince Milan had already made a decision in this regard. During the work of the expert committee and during the government’s efforts to obtain a loan, as well as when the last two offers arrived in Belgrade, Prince Milan had been at Bad Ems for spa treatment. Before the Prince’s departure and during his stay at the spa, relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary had significantly deteriorated because of conflicts about signing of the trade agreement and also because of Ser-bia’s refusal to send a representative to Vienna for a session of the railway commit-tee of the four states. Observing the overall foreign policy context in which Serbia found itself, fearing the complexity of conditions in the Ottoman Balkan provinces and the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia, as well as the spread of a possible uprising into Macedonia – the principal worries in the spring and summer of 1880 – Prince Milan concluded it was of the utmost impor-tance for Serbia to maintain good relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany, as countries that could be of assistance in protecting state’s interests across its southern borders. Improving the relations with Austria-Hungary meant yielding to the de-mands of Vienna on the trade and railway issues. In addition, it meant that Russian entrepreneurs would not in any way participate in the construction of the railway in Serbia. When the Prince passed through Vienna, Austrian-Hungarian statesmen let the Serbian ruler know that they would be “very uncomfortably touched” if the construction of the railway was granted to Polyakov, because they were convinced that his company would “only guide its policy against the will of the Serbian gov-ernment”. Another reason that directed the Prince towards the need for Serbia to begin the construction of its railway as soon as possible was the news that during his stay in Vienna the representative of the Romanian government had also passed through the Austrian capital, accompanied by Staatsbahn’s engineer de Serres: they were travelling to Paris where an agreement was to be reached on the construction of a line from Craiova across the Danube towards Sofia338.

11� Momir Samardžic

After returning from the spa, at the government meeting on 30 July, Prince Milan set forth his ideas about the manner in which the railway should be built. He pre-sented the view that Serbia was not able to build the railway independently and he openly pleaded in favour of granting a concession for both the construction and the exploitation. The Prince’s position was also supported by Ristić who read Protić’s report on Polyakov and Baranov to the members of the government, as well as by a telegram from Marinović stating that because of illness he was unable to perform the task entrusted to him and expressing the opinion that the government should be happy if it got a loan with 6% interest339. Outspoken opponents of the conces-sion were Finance Minister Vladimir Jovanović and the Minister of Education Al-impije Vasiljević, who travelled to St. Petersburg in late 1878 as a government envoy. According to the testimony of the Minister of Defense Lieutenant Colonel Jovan Mišković, Jovanović in particular defended the system of construction directed by the state, presenting the view that the construction of the railway should be con-nected to the establishment of a National Bank340. It was possible to overcome the conflict within the government if it could finally be determined whether Serbia could obtain the necessary loan in Paris and under which circumstances. In this sense, instructions were once again sent to Marinović on 3 August341.

The response that arrived from Paris was disappointing for all the supporters of the state-managed construction. On 23 August, Marinović finally spoke to Alfonso Rothschild, the head of the Paris house of Rothschild. The Parisian banker explained Serbia’s position to the Serbian representative without hesitation. His message was that granting government loans is more a political than a financial issue, and Serbia, if it wished to obtain a loan, must have a great power behind it that would support its request with the bank. Rothschild considered Serbia to be only formally an inde-pendent state, in reality dependent on Austria-Hungary in everything, so he singled out the Dual monarchy as the only state with whose support Serbia could obtain a loan. He did not think that Serbia had any state income that would constitute suf-ficient guarantee for a loan unless Austria-Hungary stood behind it. In a talk with Marinović, Rothschild was very open:

Small countries, such as your own, are not able to determine their policies; you will be drawn, whether you like it or not, into the sphere of interest of a larger state, and for now this sphere, as it is known, is the Austrian; for on your word or your promise, we cannot count, because you are condemned to play the second role in all major events that may oc-cur; therefore the only way to succeed in the matter of a loan, is to put yourself under the wing of Austria, and have her show interest in you, and have her guarantee the fulfilment

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of the conditions (...) but if you are directly looking for a loan in London or Paris, I tell you frankly, you will not succeed342.

After Marinović reported on his talks with Rothschild, the government finally de-cided to announce a call for tender to grant a concession for the construction and exploitation of the railway343. The call was announced on 31 August, and it was published the following day in the official newspaper “Srpske novine”. The deadline for the submission of bids was 13 October 1880344. According to the testimony of Mišković, Vladimir Jovanović informed the members of the government on the fi-nal day of the call “that only one competitor has come forth, and this is Filleul, who represents several financial companies. There are 2 more letters besides this, but it is unknown about what”345. The only offer that Jovanović mentioned was the offer of Fremy’s consortium from which the La Société de la Banque d’Escompte de Paris had withdrawn in the meantime. For this occasion Brohy, as Fremy’s plenipotenti-ary, and Caillat, as a plenipotentiary of the two companies that now formed the Consortium, arrived in Belgrade. In the new offer, adapted to the conditions pub-lished in the call, the Consortium indicated 233,333 francs as the price of railway construction per kilometre, with an interest of 6%. The Consortium intended to obtain the necessary capital by selling shares and issuing bonds, and the government was to guarantee a net annual revenue of 14,000 francs, or gross profits of 26,000 francs per kilometre346.

It is uncertain, however, what the two letters were about. In the offer from No-vember of 1880, the Belgian-Russian company lead by Baranov referred to an offer made on 7 October 1880347. If this information is correct, it is uncertain what terms were offered. There is no doubt that the only serious offer, considered by the govern-ment’s committee established for the occasion, was that of Fremy’s consortium. The committee decided that this offer did not match the prescribed conditions and the call remained without issue348. The report of the committee, which ended its work on 21 October, did not reach the government. In early October 1880, the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary regarding the signing of the trade agreement reached its culmination. On 20 October, the day before the expert committee con-cluded its evaluation, at a government meeting it was decided that it was impossible to accept the demands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary (which presented the main obstacle for the continuation of negotiations) to recognize the Dual Monarchy as most privileged nation before starting negotiations on the trade agreement349. When the committee completed its work on 21 October, the Minis-ter of Public Works urged Ristić to schedule a government meeting for the follow-

11� Momir Samardžic

ing day to discuss the report and the next steps to be taken350. This meeting however never took place. Ristić had a decisive conversation with Prince Milan the same day in which he maintained his position that it was necessary to resist the demand of Austria-Hungary351. After this it became clear that the survival of Ristić’s ministry was impossible. A few days later, on 31 October, a new government was formed, led by Milan Piroćanac. When the new government took over the administration, all issues relating to the construction of the Serbian railway still remained open.

2. new Men, new polItICs, the old probleM – pIroCanaC’s GoVernMent and the ConCessIon

Despite cooperation of the Assembly opposition and the group around “Videlo” in the fight against Ristić’s regime and the contribution of the former to the final victory, the Prince was not sympathetic to the idea of the participation of Pašić and the uneducated peasant representatives in the government. Piroćanac’s government was made up almost exclusively by the members of the “Videlo” group. The most important functions were performed by Mijatović, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and representative of the Minister of Finance, and Garašanin, as Minister of Inter-nal Affairs. From the old government, the new one “inherited two long term tasks: building an independent state and fulfilling international obligations”352. Under the conditions it had inherited, and basing its political creed on the same liberal politi-cal tradition, the new government could continue on the path of the previous one to achieve its vision of a modern state. The only, but significant, difference was in the intensity of the planned reforms. In the words of Nikola Pašić, both the liberals and future progressives were “devotees of the Western European institutions, with the only difference that Ristić holds the middle position, that he is more careful and slower in the transfer of Western institutions onto the Serbian land (...) while the progressives would immediately want to turn Serbia into some Western statelet”353.

The old Assembly in which Ristić’s supporters had the majority was dissolved, and elections for the new Assembly were scheduled for 12 December. Expecting elec-tions, the new government prepared a set of reform laws with which, before adopt-ing a new constitution as the culmination of the planned reforms, they intended to demonstrate the difference between Ristić’s “false” and their own “true” liberalism. However, the reform “from above” was not only to be limited to the reform of polit-ical institutions, but was envisaged as a decisive step forward on the road to overall modernization. The government also planned radical reforms in the spheres of the

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economy, education, finance and healthcare. Such plans faced resistance from the allies of the previous assembly, which had fought for “the people’s state”, as opposed to a state based on the Western model: considering the West and its institutions and accomplishments, such as railways, foreign to the spirit of the Serbian nation354.

While planning the internal reforms, the Progressive government immediately found itself before two major foreign policy tasks – the trade agreement with Aus-tria-Hungary and the construction of the railway. Both issues required a quick reso-lution. The trade agreement was the reason for the resignation of Ristić’s ministry, and the only condition that Prince Milan put before Mijatović and Garašanin dur-ing the negotiations for the new government was the acceptance of the demands from Vienna. Mijatović thought that Serbia could obtain the capital for the ac-celeration of its economic growth only by expanding the market for its own agri-cultural products, therefore it was necessary to reach a trade agreement with Aus-tria-Hungary, and he, as the leading economist of the group around the “Videlo”, immediately agreed to the Prince’s request. The new government quickly granted Austria-Hungary the right of being recognised as most privileged nation in trade without insisting on reciprocity, thus creating the necessary preconditions for the start of negotiations. The government rapidly agreed to send delegates to the meet-ing of the railway committee of the four states as well, thus contributing to further normalization of relations with the neighbouring monarchy355.

Parallel with the work on the normalization of relations with Austria-Hungary, the government was thinking about fulfilling the obligation assumed by the Conven-tion to begin with the construction of the railway within six months of ratification. The stipulated deadline was approaching, and the government had still not even found a company that was willing to build the railway. In a circular note to repre-sentatives at the end of November 1880, Mijatović wrote that the government “is taking into account the effect that the character of the company would make not only in Serbia but outside of Serbia as well”356. His words were primarily related to the impression that could be caused in Vienna by the grant of a concession to a Rus-sian company. Shortly after the arrival of the new ministry, he visited Vienna in or-der to determine the position of the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Ministry towards the new government. On that occasion, the Chief of the Political Department of the Ministry Benjamin von Kállay informed him “that Serbia has every right to give the construction and exploitation to whomever it finds for the good, but of course, that Austria-Hungary would not be happy to consign the railway to a Russian com-pany”. At the same time, he mentioned that Vienna had learned that the Russian

118 Momir Samardžic

government had decided to send Polyakov to Belgrade to try to obtain a concession from the Serbian government357. Kállay’s words showed that the struggle between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the Serbian railway continued or, in other words, that the efforts of Austria-Hungary for the concession to be granted to a company that would suit the interests of the monarchy were continuing.

Piroćanac’s government decided on a different approach than its predecessor. In-stead of an open call for tender, it invited all of the interested parties to present their offers, without setting explicit conditions. It is possible that such a decision of the government was influenced by the new offer from Fremy’s consortium on 6 November 1880. The change of government was a welcome opportunity to come to an agreement with the new government. After the negative decision of the previ-ous government, Fremy and the representatives of the two banks that formed the Consortium reached an agreement on the changes in the offer with respect to that of 13 October 1880. The Consortium intended to obtain the funds required for construction by issuing bonds and shares; the concession would be granted for a period of ninety years, while the Serbian state would have the right of redemption after thirty years. The Consortium would assume the obligation to build the railway from Belgrade to Vranje within the time period specified by the Austrian-Serbian Convention, while the Niš-Pirot branch was to be built within three years after agreement between the Serbian and Bulgarian governments. The Serbian govern-ment would guarantee a net income of 14,000 francs and gross income of 26,000 francs per kilometre358.

“The government has neither accepted nor refused these propositions, but keeps them in order to compare them with the propositions that it is still expecting, so it can choose what will be in the best interest of Serbia”, Mijatović noted at the end of November 1880359. He promised the Consortium representatives that he would not make a final decision before they presented their final offer360. It was not difficult for Mijatović to give such a promise because at that moment the government was only negotiating on the concession with the Consortium and the final decision was far off. After the return of its representatives to Paris, the management of the two con-sortium banks considered that it was necessary to emphasize to the Serbian govern-ment that the realization of the agreement based on the November proposal would depend on two conditions – securing the construction of the Hungarian connecting line and a precise definition of the sources with which the government would guar-antee the fulfilment of the financial obligations it assumed361. Despite the condi-tions, it is possible that the government was considering granting the concession to

119Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

the Consortium. It seems that in December 1880 Mijatović was preparing to inform its representatives that the government would accept its financial terms362, but before signing the agreement he intended to demand the withdrawal of the conditions363. However, his request was not sent, and the government temporarily withdrew from the negotiations with the Consortium. The change of position was most likely influ-enced by the appearance of several competing offers that had to be considered.

In late November 1880 the government was expecting an offer that was supposed to be submitted by the Belgian-Russian group Tercelin-Monjot - Société Générale de Bruxelles - Baranov364. Protić’s report from St. Petersburg in July of 1880 indicated to the government that Baranov did not possess the funds necessary to finance the con-struction of the Serbian railway365. The Russian entrepreneur had sought the money on the Western financial market and had been able to arouse the interest of a promi-nent Belgian financial house from Brussels, as well as that of Victor Tercelin-Mon-jot, Belgian senator and the president of a Belgian railway company. The Belgian representative in Belgrade, Borchgrave, officially recommended the Belgian-Russian group to the Serbian government366. Apart from this, instructions from St. Peters-burg to support Baranov were also received by the Russian representative Persiani367. Although the instructions from St. Petersburg were contrary to the opinion that the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Girs stated in mid 1880368, the appearance of the Belgian-Russian group as a competitor for the construction of the Serbian railway fully suited Russian interests as, at the end of 1878, Tsar Alexander II had person-ally illustrated to Vasiljević: the capital would be secured on the financial market of Western Europe, Russia would have influence to a certain extent through the Rus-sian contractor, and the concession would not be granted to a company representing Austrian-Hungarian interests. Moreover, all this would take place without obvious direct support of the Russian government, which was particularly important to St. Petersburg in its effort to preserve good relations with Vienna at a time when nego-tiations were in progress on the restoration of the League of the Three Emperors.

The Serbian government was aware that the negotiations with the group in which the Russian entrepreneur participated would cause adverse reactions in Vienna. However, Mijatović considered Tercelin-Monjot to be the real leader of the Bel-gian-Russian group. He thought that the Belgian part would dominate the Russian part, and that the government would eventually negotiate with a group that would be entirely Belgian369. Most probably in early December 1880, the representatives of the group, engineers Zawacky and Kossecky, arrived in Belgrade. The proposal presented to the government provided that the state would obtain the necessary

1�0 Momir Samardžic

funding through a loan, to be organised by the board led by Tercelin-Monjot and the Société Générale de Bruxelles. The board would immediately take upon itself to provide thirty million francs, while the remainder was to be secured by emitting a loan on the European stock exchanges. Representatives of the group proceeded from the standpoint that signing the contract would open the road for Serbia to the European financial market and improve prospects for obtaining the Serbian loan, making it possible to secure the money at a more favourable rate. In addition, the group assumed the obligation to build the railway within three years, “according to the actual cost, with only a percentage surplus, in the name of benefit for the con-tractor”. The government would supervise the execution of the construction and procurement, and after the completion of construction it would become owner of the railway370. The initial offer did not specify the financial resources the govern-ment would need to put up as a guarantee for the loan; there was no mention of the construction cost per kilometre; nor of the percentage of profit of the group and the contractor for carrying out such a large-scale financial operation as the emission of a state loan of one hundred million francs. All the other modalities of the agreement still had to be negotiated371. According to later testimony, in late December 1880 the negotiations were going in a positive direction and Mijatović considered the offer of the Belgian-Russian group as favourable and planned to propose its accept-ance to the government and the Assembly372.

In mid January 1881 the Serbian government received an offer for the construc-tion of the Serbian railway from a British company, led by the banking house Hume Webster, Hoare & Co. Great Britain respected the interests of Austria-Hungary in connection with the construction of the Serbian railway and the British govern-ment’s policy clearly suggested that the main British interest was for the railway link to be established, but that it did not intend to be significantly involved in solving of the problem373. Nevertheless, the British representative, Gould, unofficially rec-ommended the British banker to Mijatović374. The British bank estimated the cost of construction of the Serbian railway to be 94,545,922 francs, and the necessary funds would be secured by issuing government bonds with an annual interest of 6% and depreciation of 0, 5% per year. The company considered it desirable for the government to issue bonds of the value of 112,500,000 francs at the average rate of 90.5%, and the government would be able to use the surplus, not needed for the railway, as it wished375. The British bank’s associate James H. Webster presented the British offer to Mijatović in early January 1881 and tried to obtain the grant of the concession to the British company376.

1�1Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

However, the company represented by Webster was not considered a serious com-petitor in Belgrade. The Serbian government took some time to understand that Hume Webster, Hoare & Co was a small bank with no significant ties to London’s major financial houses, and that the future of the Serbian bonds was uncertain, as would be therefore the construction of the railway. The offer of the British bank did not present serious competition for the Belgian-Russian group with which the government led negotiations at the end of the year. Real competition came from the French bank, La Société de l’Union Générale.

3. rIse of La Société de L’Union GénéraLe and the serbIan raIlway ConCessIon

La Société de l’Union Générale was considered at the time among the most respected financial institutions in France. Its president, Eugène Bontoux, had had decades of experience in all matters relating to railways. Since 1857 he had worked as a railway expert in Austria. After three years of work at the Staatsbahn, from 1860 to 1878 he was first the commercial and then general manager of the Südbahn. As a young man he thought about big business ventures, primarily in Austria. In an article published in the early 1860s he wrote that Austria had to employ all its available strengths to develop its trade and industry, because this was the only way to utilize its economic potential and increase its wealth and power. During his employment at the Südbahn he worked closely with industrial companies, especially those linked to coal mining and the pro-duction of equipment for the construction and maintenance of railways, and acquired the necessary knowledge and experience. He tried to realize his ideas for development of the industry in 1877-1878 with a proposal to link together the large ironworks in Austria-Hungary, merging them into one. However, this attempt was unsuccessful be-cause it failed to find sufficient support from the Vienna Rothschilds377.

Bontoux’s intention was to direct French capital towards ventures in the Danube region and the Balkans. Failure in Austria convinced him of the necessity of es-tablishing a new financial institution, one that would counter the dominance of the Kredit-Anstalt, or the Vienna Rothschild bank, which Bontoux considered re-sponsible for his previous failure. The establishment of La Société de l’Union Géné-rale was such an opportunity. After the initial failure in 1875, a new attempt to attract capital from conservative Catholic circles in France ended successfully in May 1878 with the establishment of the Union Générale. The intention of a part of

1�� Momir Samardžic

the founders was for the new company to display openly the flag of Catholicism in its business ventures, fighting against ‘Jewish’ capital which, not only in the hands of the Rothschilds, dominated the French market. However, a part of the founders amongst whom Bontoux himself, advocated a more tactical approach. His election as president of the bank in September of 1878 meant a predominance of the group led solely by financial motives which wanted, with the Union Générale, to create an institution that would attract the savings of Catholic investors, but be focused primarily on successful business. Successfully completed business with the obliga-tions of the Hungarian railways pulled the Union Générale out of its initial financial problems and strengthened Bontoux’s position. After that, the road to Bontoux’s plans in the Danube region and the Balkans was open378.

Bontoux’s new and stronger position markedly improved the chances for the future concessionaire to realize his previous plans regarding the economic development of Austria-Hungary. The plan went beyond the establishment of a mere branch of the Union Générale in Vienna. His intention was to establish a strong and independent credit institution, which would then encourage the development of the economy. It was necessary to obtain government approval to establish a joint stock company in Austria. Since the collapse of the Vienna Stock Exchange in 1873, the government had not made any concessions. Bontoux believed that the government of Prince Auersperg would not grant one either, so in the anticipation of better opportunities he began buying coal mines in Austria-Hungary. The change in the Austrian gov-ernment in June 1880 opened the door for Bontoux’s plans. An agreement with the government of Count Eduard Taaffe was facilitated by Bontoux’s numerous con-nections in Vienna. However, what contributed more than anything to Bontoux’s success was that the government itself was very interested establishing a new finan-cial institution in Vienna. In Vienna’s financial circles there were two particularly influential groups: on the one hand the Boden-Kredit-Anstalt and Wiener Bankv-erein, and on the other the Kredit-Anstalt and the Rothschilds. Taaffe’s government had a hostile attitude towards both groups – towards the first because it sympa-thized with the previous government, and towards the second because it was under the influence of the opposition to the present government. The Taaffe government sought a way out of its ‘financial isolation’: establishing a strong financial institution in Vienna under state supervision would contribute to the development of trade and industry, and, at the same time, would not be under the influence of ‘Jewish’ capital. Bontoux’s acquaintances from his time spent in Austria, but also the Union Générale’s connections with the French Catholic circles, recommended Bontoux to

1��Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

the Austrian government. Negotiations began in August 1880, and the result was the establishment of the Österreichische Länderbank in October 1880 with a found-ing capital of one hundred million francs379.

Bontoux planned to build railways in two directions – towards Hungary and to-wards Serbia. He was interested in participating in the construction of the line from Budapest to Vranje and Pirot, while the next step would be the construction of the remaining unfinished sections towards Constantinople and Thessaloniki. His in-tentions regarding the construction of the Serbian railway fully suited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary. As a French company, the Union Générale was much more acceptable to the Serbian government than an Austrian company would have been. On the other hand, the links between the Union Générale and Länderbank assured the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a cer-tain influence, especially bearing in mind that the Union Générale and Länderbank had reached an agreement on participation in the Serbian railway construction ven-ture for 30% of the total amount380. The Serbian government was not aware of this fact, and thus the illusion remained that the company trying to obtain a concession for the construction of the Serbian railway was French. In addition, the success of the Union Générale in Belgrade would remove all of Vienna’s fears that a concession might be granted to a company under Russian influence.

In December 1880, Bontoux’s negotiations with the Serbian and Hungarian govern-ments began. The Hungarian government was interested in a loan that would allow for the construction of the Budapest-Zemun line, directed by the state, but con-sidered Bontoux’s conditions unfavourable. Despite this, just as in the negotiations with Fremy, Budapest expressed willingness to enter into an agreement with Bon-toux under the terms offered if he succeeded in obtaining a concession for building the railway through Serbia381. Bontoux came into contact with the Serbian govern-ment in the first half of November 1880382, and his offer was supported by favourable opinions of the Serbian representatives in Paris and Vienna. They judged the Union Générale to be the most serious competitor for the railway concession and warned of the unreliability of the French consortium383. The course of negotiations between Bontoux and the Serbian government is unknown. It appears that the first to arrive in Belgrade was Hachette, an engineer and Bontoux’s representative. He arrived at the end of November and presented the company’s first offer to the Serbian govern-ment384. In early December, Bontoux and his right hand man, Viscount Emanuel d’Harcourt, journeyed to Vienna, where Hachette was awaiting them385, and in late December d’Harcourt arrived in the Serbian capital with a new proposal and an

1�� Momir Samardžic

authorization to negotiate386. After d’Harcourt returned to Vienna, Bontoux an-nounced to Hristić, the Serbian representative in Austrian capital, that he intended to depart for Belgrade on 11 January 1881, accompanied by d’Harcourt387. Howev-er, instead of an invitation from the Serbian government, Hristić received a telegram from Belgrade that the negotiations with Bontoux must be postponed for a week due to the government’s obligations in the Assembly, while the press brought news of an offer from Hume Webster, Hoare & Co and negotiations of the Serbian govern-ment with the British bank388. Not only were negotiations with James H. Webster taking place in Belgrade at the time, but the news of the Serbian government’s nego-tiations with other financial houses prompted Fremy’s consortium to withdraw the conditions it had highlighted in its letter of 4 December 1880. With a letter dated 8 January 1881, Consortium representatives informed the government that the offer it had made on 6 November 1880 was valid without any restrictions389.

Bontoux had to act quickly if he wanted to reach an agreement with the Serbian government. Speed was also essential if he were to reach an agreement with the gov-ernment of Hungary. D’Harcourt arrived in Belgrade, but in the end he was not successful390. The failure of negotiations and competition from other banks that he faced in Belgrade showed Bontoux that there was resistance towards the Union Générale proposal from with the government itself, and that if he wished to reach an agreement, he must go to Belgrade in person. Bribery and Austrian-Hungarian sup-port were the two factors he was counting on. The Austrian-Hungarian diplomatic representative, Baron Herbert, did not hide from Prince Milan that the Ministry in Vienna would be very happy to see Bontoux become the concessionaire of the Serbian railway391. In addition to viscount d’Harcourt, Bontoux brought the Aus-trian government adviser Hann, director of the Länderbank, with him to Belgrade. This clearly indicated the support of Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Ministry for his plans, but it also made clear to the Serbian government and public that there were close connections between the Union Générale and the Länderbank. In addition, Austrian-Hungarian support for Bontoux was indicated by the presence of Michael Rosen, ‘a man of trust’ of the Dual Monarchy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rosen was an Austrian citizen and an expert on Serbia and on Serbian politics who had spent some time as a journalist in the country. This is precisely why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had recommended Rosen to Bontoux. His task was to use his acquaintances for agitation and bribery392.

Mijatović later claimed that Rosen told him that Bontoux had a large sum of money at his disposal, with which he aimed to ensure the grant of the railway concession,

1�5Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

and that Rosen had been given full freedom of action in an effort to use that money to win over the people who were to make the decision. Rosen proved to be well-chosen for his role. In testimonies on bribery in Belgrade after Bontoux’s arrival, the name of the Prince’s uncle, Đorđe Catargiu, was mentioned most frequently and with the most convincing evidence. There is almost no doubt that he was bribed. If Prince Milan accepted money, it was almost certainly done through his uncle. In support of this conclusion, we have Mijatović’s testimony that Katardži came to him with a request to accept three million francs with which the Prince’s debts would be paid, as well as Bontoux’s words to Mijatović at a meeting in Paris after the fall of the Union Générale in 1882, that the amounts received by the Court had been recorded under various names in the bank’s books. Mijatović later wrote that Bontoux threatened to have him relieved of his position if he failed to deliver the decision in favour of Bontoux’s offer. If this was indeed the case, his words indicate that such an influence could not have been merely the result of a pleasant impres-sion that the banker left on the prince, but that the impression was enhanced by the money the prince received through Catargiu. Therefore, although there is no hard and detailed evidence about how the bribery took place and what amounts were involved, there is little doubt that the Court was bribed. On the other hand, there is almost no trustworthy evidence about bribing of members of the government and the ruling party, although in later testimonies all claimed that there had been brib-ery, but always indicating someone else as the recipient of the money. The involve-ment of the government, or some of its members, is certainly indicated by the fact that the government was aware that Rosen was buying the consent of politicians in Belgrade, but did nothing to stop him. The bribery was a public secret, discussed in the Serbian capital, and it reached the always well informed representatives of the Great Powers393. Only after bribing the Court and the ministers was Bontoux able to ensure that the contract would be received394.

By the end of January 1881 it was time to make the decision. There were three seri-ous offers before the government – those of the Union Générale, the Belgian-Russian group and the French consortium which made a final attempt with a telegram from 8 February, but offering the government a delay in determining the tariffs until the beginning of exploitation when they would be fixed by an agreement395. As a repre-sentative of the Minister of Finance, Mijatović was appointed to study the offers and suggest the best one to the government. Later, during a debate in the National As-sembly in March of 1881, he explained that the government considered the offer of the Consortium unfavourable because it demanded an exploitation period of ninety

1�� Momir Samardžic

years, and that the government, apart from this, could not afford to be without influ-ence on the decisions regarding tariff rates. The Consortium, not the state, would own the railway, so this offer was unacceptable for the government396. Mijatović did not mention to the Assembly that the Consortium was willing to decide on the tariff rates in an agreement with the government. However, the requested period of exploi-tation was too long for the offer to be acceptable. According to Mijatović’s words to the assembly committee which was studying the contract with the Union Générale, the only offer acceptable to the government was that of the Belgian-Russian group. There was an obstacle: the group was unable to assume the responsibility to provide all the necessary funds for the construction rather than a third of them as it had pro-posed. Mijatović told the assembly committee that “this company is solid and strong, that the government was most keen to conclude a deal with it, that it led negotiations with it and offered it a special guarantee, but that it withdrew when the government asked that it take the entire amount of the loan upon itself, and especially when it heard that Serbia had failed to pay even the first interest on its national loan from 1876”, and that the group later “submitted a proposal to find a loan for Serbia, not giving any guarantees that it will be all written in, but rather merely asking for a sim-ple commission for their services”. The government could not accept such an offer, because it did not provide even the initial third of the necessary funds397.

Since it could not obtain the funds for construction itself, the government attached special importance to the financial house that was to be granted the concession hav-ing the necessary funds. In this regard, the Union Générale appeared to the Serbian government to be the most solid company, even without the bribery that followed Bontoux’s arrival to Belgrade. However, the government was not aware that the Union Générale at that point was much weaker than it had been initially. By emit-ting a new series of shares in November 1880, the Union Générale had increased its base capital to one hundred million francs. Previously it had had access to an actual amount of 12.5 million francs, or one fourth of the fifty million francs of its initial capital that was increased by the sale of shares in April of 1879398. At the time it signed the contract with the Serbian government, the Union Générale had access to far lesser resources than those necessary for the construction of the railway. However, during the previous two years the bank had concluded several favourable business ventures, stock prices were rising and it is not surprising that the Serbian government was under the impression that it was a strong financial house with a base capital that could be considered a reliable guarantee for the funds necessary for building a railway.

1�7Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

According to later testimony from Mijatović, in the government session where the decision had to be made, he opined that the offer of the Union Générale was the best since it had the largest capital, but that he believed that this company should not be granted the concession because of bribery, as well as the resistance of public opinion which claimed that Austria-Hungary had bought the consent of all the ministers and the Prince. As the next in line he proposed the Belgian-Russian group, noting that before the final proposal the government wanted to speak with the representa-tive of the group Eduard Kossecky about the capital the group possessed. Then, al-legedly, a conversation took place in which Kossecky announced to Mijatović that the group had 50 million francs of capital at their disposal. After that, Mijatović made his proposal that the government sign a contract with the Union Générale399. The preliminary contract was signed on 3 February 1881.

The General Convention for the construction of the first Serbian state railway consisted of three parts. The first part deals with the loan by which the necessary funds would be provided, the second part is devoted to the construction of the railway, while the third part indicates the basis for the future agreement on the establishment of an exploitation company. The contract was divided into three parts because the Union Générale estimated that it could in this way achieve greater profits than it would with a single contract. Apart from this consideration, the bank needed such a con-tract because it could not perform any of the three activities alone. It was merely an intermediary between the Serbian government and the financier, the contractor and the exploiter of the future railway, and on each of these operations it planned to make a good profit. The Serbian government decided on the Union Générale be-cause it believed that its financial strength was a guarantee that there would not be problems with obtaining the money for construction. However, the Union Générale did not possess the necessary resources. In reality, it did not take the concession for the construction of the Serbian railway because this would imply that it assumed the obligation to procure the funds for the construction on its own. With the loan contract, the Serbian government entrusted the Union Générale with the manage-ment of operations for obtaining the money, while pledging the country’s own tax revenues and the revenues of the railway400.

An agreement was reached with the company that the loan in the nominal amount of 100 million francs was to be realized by the real exchange rate of 71.4. The company was to use the amount of 71,400,000 francs exclusively for the construction of the Belgrade-Vranje railway line, while the burden of building a part of the Sava bridge assumed by the agreement with Austria-Hungary fell on the government, as did the

1�8 Momir Samardžic

link between the bridge and the Belgrade railway station, the cost of supervision of construction, as well as land purchase and compensation necessary for the construc-tion. For a nominal sum of 100 million, the Serbian state was to pay six million francs per year over fifty years, guaranteeing the payment of the mentioned amount with the net income from the exploitation of the future railway line Belgrade-Vranje, as well as customs and tax revenue401. This was an unfavourable loan because the government agreed to a 71.4 rate and the real interest exceeded 7%. While emitting the bonds of the Serbian railway loan on the European financial market, the Union Générale could count on a sure profit. According to the words of Bontoux himself, the conditions in the part of the contract dedicated to the loan that the Serbian government agreed to, secured the company a profit of eight to ten million francs, as the bonds nominally worth 500 francs were obtained at 357 francs, and could without major problems be placed among their clients at a price of about 400 francs402.

The second part of the contract, dedicated to the construction of the railway, con-tained even more onerous conditions. According to Bontoux himself, the second part comprised conditions that favoured the contractor: the burden of compensation for the land was taken on by the state; all the materials necessary for the construction and organization of exploitation were exempt from customs duties and taxes, while the Serbian government agreed on a price of 198,000 francs per kilometre whereas the real cost of building the Beograd-Vranje line was no more than 150,000 francs per kilometre. Consequently, l’Union Générale could, according to Bontoux’s estimate based on the text of the second part of the contract, count on a profit of fifteen to sixteen million francs. In addition, the Serbian government had promised the bank a concession for the construction of the Niš-Pirot line at a price which ranged between 210 and 225 thousand francs per kilometre. The mentioned line was more demanding for construction due to the difficult terrain, so the cost of construction was certainly higher. However, there is no doubt that the bank’s profit in this case as well would not be under 40,000 francs per kilometre, or not less than four million francs all told403.

The third part of the contract contained the bases for an agreement on exploitation. The Serbian state was recognized up front as having the right to determine the tariffs because this was a commitment it had assumed in the convention with Austria-Hun-gary. The government had obliged itself to pay the exploitation company 7,800 francs annually per kilometre for two regular daily trains (passenger and mixed), while it promised further reimbursement for all special trains. In addition, the company re-ceived 5% interest and 2% depreciation on the capital invested in the rolling stock, as well as 2% of the gross income from exploitation. The contract on exploitation was

1�9Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

to be valid for twenty five years, while the Serbian government was left with an open possibility, during the last ten years, to reach an agreement with the company and take the exploitation into its own hands404. The negative side of the exploitation sec-tion was that the company had an income guaranteed by contract, and thus was not motivated to work towards the further development of railway transportation and increase the exchange of goods. Bontoux estimated that the earnings from exploi-tation would amount to approximately six million francs. The total profit that the president of the Union Générale expected from successfully concluding the contract with the Serbian government was at least thirty million francs405.

In addition, Bontoux offered the Serbian government a lottery loan for regulating the state of government finances, or offering the state money that would be used to pay the existing state debt and outstanding interest. The nominal amount of the loan was 33 million francs, while the effective amount was 24,585,000 francs – with an emission rate of 75, 5%. The deadline for restitution was fifty years with an an-nual fee of 1,650,000 francs. The reason for the conclusion of this loan lay in the fact that the Union Générale did not possess the resources necessary to start con-struction, and placing lottery bonds on the financial market was much easier, so this is how the company intended to obtain the necessary initial funds. On the other hand, a lottery loan suited the Serbian government as well, because it needed the money not for repaying its debts, which was the formal reason for taking the loan, but for the construction activities that it was responsible for according to the terms of the contract. The preliminary agreement on the lottery loan was signed on 16 February 1881406. Only one step remained – the adoption of the Convention and the lottery loan by the Assembly.

4. war In the asseMbly – adoptIon of the ConVentIon wIth the Union GénéraLe

4.1. Ally conflict – the establishment of political parties

Already during negotiations with the interested financiers, especially during the fi-nal negotiations with representatives of the Union Générale in January 1881, it was certain that the convention would run into sharp opposition in the Assembly. At the elections on 12 December, the first free elections in the history of modern Serbia, the officially still allied new government and former assembly opposition had achieved a complete victory (121 of the 128 seats). The elections allowed entrance into the

1�0 Momir Samardžic

Assembly for Pašić’s educated supporters – Svetomir Nikolajević, Pera Velimirović, Raša Milošević, Kosta Taušanović, as well as a large number of representatives who were elected for the first time and whose political orientation, in a state without po-litical parties and without clearly differentiated political campaigns of the opposed ideological allies, was uncertain. Pašić was aware of the essential differences between the liberal program of the “Videlo” group and his views, and before the elections he sought to ensure the entry of as many of his own supporters into the Assembly as possible, despite the fact that the radicals and future progressives presented a single list to oppose Ristić’s liberals. The final preparations began for the establishment of the party and the publication of a party newspaper407.

The gathering of the Assembly, which began its work on 11 January 1881, passed without conflict. However, the Prince, who had the right to make the final choice in the election for President and Vice President of the Assembly, did not take into account the strength of the radicals. He selected government supporters, and this was the reason for the final breakdown. On 20 January, after two months of prepara-tions, the first issue of “Samouprava” [Self-Government] was published. This was a newspaper that presented itself to the public as the official party organ of the Peo-ple’s Radical Party, with a program signed by 38 representatives, and a note that it was supported by 38 more – in all, almost half of the Assembly408. The first sentence of the program read “As the goal of our state organization we consider: the wellbe-ing and freedom of the people on the inside, and on the outside, national independ-ence and liberation and unification of the other parts of Serbdom”. As the radicals themselves had pointed out, it was a program for practical reforms, in the wake of the ideas set forth in Pašić’s agenda article of May 1880, while the most significant step forward was the clear position that the Assembly should have full legislative power. The realization of the idea of “the people’s state” or the “material wellbeing of the people (...) by strengthening the national manufacturing power and justly sharing the state’s burden” were objectives, the radicals intended to obtain through political, administrative, educational and financial reforms, while in foreign policy they stressed the idea of an alliance of the Balkan peoples and cultural assistance to parts of their own nation outside the state borders of Serbia409.

The publication of “Samouprava” marked the birth of the first political party in Ser-bia. It was a real shock for the government. Two days later, the Serbian Progressive Party was founded with the principles set out in the first issue of “Videlo” in 1880 as their political agenda410. Open conflict in the Assembly soon began, as well as on the pages of the party newspapers. Apart from the unanimous adoption of a law on

1�1Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

the freedom of the press, one of the most liberal of its kind in Europe, the radical op-position strongly opposed all law proposals from the government with which they planned to make a decisive step towards overall modernization by following the Western European models. The construction of the railway was one of these steps, the first serious test of the new government’s capabilities and the endurance of its agenda. However, the government received strong opposition at precisely the mo-ment when it was finally necessary to resolve the railway concession issue.

The positions of the radicals were known, although they were not completely ex-pressed in the agenda of 20 January. Although Svetozar Marković, the idealistic predecessor of the radicals, had established the basic agenda of skipping stages in development and avoiding the path of western capitalism, in the 20 January agenda the concept of economic modernization could only be detected in the mention of the establishment of a National Bank to support the development of agriculture and industry. “To clear the old and open new roads and new international markets for our products”, was one of the tasks of foreign policy411. One of the ways in which it would be possible to achieve this goal was through the construction of the railway, but, apart from a general attitude that was not opposed in principle to its construc-tion, the radicals were against the realization of the railway project by continuing down the road that the previous government had taken. Their attitude derived from their substantial opposition not only towards the entry of foreign capital and pen-etration of industrial goods, but also towards the numerous achievements of the Western European civilization that they considered harmful. In this regard, several sentences from the article “Our economic position”, published in the “Samouprava”, illustrates this attitude in several passages:

In our country, while setting foundations of the new Serbian state, we have not gone down that path, that would develop our people mentally and financially, but the results of a long-term and centuries old European civilization were favoured; it was attempted to establish a state in the mould of a bureaucratic structure, which has succeeded, and not on the foundation of a people’s self-government, which has more or less existed since our grandfathers. Due to such a direction of people’s development, it is natural that the external shape – “form” – of the Serbian state began to develop at the expense of the – “content” – the internal intellectual and economic life of the people. The natural and logical consequence of such development is an internal economic decline and develop-ment of the outer glow. It was desired, at any cost, to enter the circle of the “civilized” states, so all that our statesmen observed “abroad”, “in a foreign world”, in the national life and organization of the Westerners, was grafted onto every field of public life412.

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These words reflect the essence of the criticism of the road to modernization in Serbia following Western European models. From an economic perspective, oppo-sition to foreign capital and the transformation of Serbia into an exporter of raw materials and a market for exports of industrial goods was viewed as a precondition for an independent road to economic modernization. It does not come as a surprise that the penetration of foreign industrial goods was described as “a conquering in-dustrial war, after which there almost always comes military occupation”413.

It is obvious that the convention with the Union Générale brought all the things that the radical leaders were against – it left the Serbian door wide open for foreign capital and strengthened the influence of Austria-Hungary on state affairs (the “Samoup-rava” wrote about the links between the Länderbank and the Union Générale), while the completion of construction and provisions of the Austrian-Serbian Railway Convention of 1880 secured transport and import conditions that favoured the penetration of Austrian-Hungarian industrial products. Since the appearance of the first news in the foreign press that the government had reached an agreement with the Union Générale, the “Samouprava” had criticized the way in which the govern-ment, without publishing a call for tender, apparently outside of the legal framework, was resolving the issue. Before the convention was presented to the Assembly, before the conditions agreed upon were known, the “Samouprava” wrote that the people’s representative body should demand that the government supply it with the offers of all the interested companies, so that the Assembly could compare them and decide which was more useful for the public interest. “Only then could the Assembly with conscience give its vote for the most favourable offer” the author of the “Samouprava” editorial warned, announcing difficult days to come for the government414.

Perhaps this text was inspired in part by General Chernyayev, who suddenly ap-peared in Belgrade in early February.

4.2. New last minute offers

The situation regarding the adoption of the Convention was further complicated by the appearance of two more proposals for the grant of a railway concession – the British engineer Tancred and a Russian company led by Polyakov delivered these to the government at precisely the time when the contract with Bontoux was to be presented before the Assembly. Thomas Tancred represented the London financial house of the Stern Brothers and the London and Parisian house of Harding415. He took the road to the East with a similar idea to those of Fremy and Bontoux – to

1��Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

obtain from the Hungarian and Serbian governments the concession for the con-struction of the entire line from the Hungarian capital to the Serbian-Ottoman, and Serbian-Bulgarian border. After a stay in Budapest and negotiations with the Hungarian government, Tancred arrived in Belgrade on 10 February416. Regardless of the preliminary contract that the government had signed with Bontoux, the Brit-ish engineer believed that he could reach an agreement with the government. He spoke to Mijatović about the offer of the British houses on 13 February417, and his final proposal bears the date of 17 February 1881, a day before the government pre-sented the Union Générale convention to the Assembly418. The offer that Tancred presented to the government was similar in several ways to Bontoux’s. It planned the establishment of a Serbian National Bank which would build the railway. The founding capital of the bank would be five million pounds sterling, or 125 mil-lion francs, with cash in the amount of one fifth of the capital as security. The bank would be willing to assume all the state debts created during the wars of 1876-1878, estimated (overestimated) at 36 million francs, while the funds invested would be returned by the bank’s taking over a tax voted on by the National Assembly with an aim to repay state debts, and there would be 6% annual interest on the debt until the investment was paid off. The bank would build the railway from Belgrade to Vranje and obtain the materials necessary to begin exploitation, only after which the state would pay an annual fee of five million francs for fifty years. Among other condi-tions, the bank would take 55% of the gross income for maintenance of the railway, but not less than seven thousand francs per kilometre419.

At the same time that Tancred arrived in Belgrade, Polyakov’s representative Chern-yayev appeared. The Serbian government had sent an invitation to Polyakov in early December of 1880, inviting him to come before it with an offer420. However Chern-yayev only brought the Russian entrepreneur’s proposal to Belgrade in February 1881. He presented the construction of the railway primarily as a political issue on whose resolution the future of Serbia would depend. In his opinion, it was crucial for Serbia that the railway be state owned, so that it could serve the state for military purposes as well as for the country’s trade and industrial development. Therefore, the government must not waive its right to influence the development and exploi-tation of the railway. The offer with which he came to Belgrade would provide the government with such an opportunity: the company however would be willing to carry out the exploitation if the state decided not to manage it under its direct super-vision. A condition for building the railway was a concession for the establishment of a Serbian National Bank, through which the company would obtain the funds

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necessary for the construction, but the bank would also have the right to supervise the state finances fully. The bank would negotiate the necessary loans, take care of the repayment of the state debt, undertake the necessary construction work, such as the construction of railways on the territory of the Principality, and perform all the necessary financial operations, and in this way monitor the entire economic life of Serbia. As to the railway connection between Belgrade and the Ottoman and Bul-garian borders, the offer envisaged that the construction of the Belgrade-Vranje line would begin as soon as the necessary projects were approved, and that it would be completed within three years, while the Niš-Pirot line was to be completed within two years from the moment that the government approved its construction. The cost of building the line from the Serbian capital to the border with the Ottoman Empire would be 190,000 francs per kilometre, while the cost of the branch line from Niš to the Bulgarian border would be around 210,000 to 215,000 francs. In Polyakov’s offer, the provision regarding interest on the capital to be spent – one of the most significant – appeared at the end. For their services in procuring the neces-sary capital they requested a high 7% interest over the period of fifty years421.

The appearance of new offers showed that signing the preliminary contract between the Serbian government and the Union Générale had not meant that the other fi-nancial houses interested had abandoned their efforts to obtain the railway con-cession at the last minute. Criticism from the opposition provided the interested parties with an opportunity to try to prevent the Assembly’s approval of the Union Générale convention. The Assembly was the state institution on whose approval the fate of the preliminary convention depended. Therefore the fight for, or against, the convention with Bontoux was transferred to the Assembly, and a prerequisite for success was to familiarize the representatives with the offers the government had turned down. Before the criticism in the “Samouprava” quoted in the previous chapter appeared, in January 1881 Mijatović mentioned in his talks with the Rus-sian representative Alexander Persiani that the offer of the Belgian-Russian group was unacceptable for the Serbian government. Persiani asked Mijatović to present their offer to the Assembly, but the Serbian minister refused to do so422. However, after the “Samouprava” article was published, a representative of Fremy’s consorti-um spoke with Mijatović on the same subject and found greater understanding. The Serbian minister promised him that the Assembly would be acquainted with the proposal423. Hume Webster, Hoare & Co also presented a request to the government that the Assembly be acquainted with his proposal424. It seems that Chernyayev de-veloped the strongest campaign to defeat the contract with Bontoux in the Assem-

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bly. For the convention to be adopted the Assembly had to reach a quorum of three quarters of the representatives. According to the testimony of Alimpije Vasiljević, Chernyayev negotiated with two radical representatives – Raša Milošević and Kosta Taušanović, for the radicals to leave the Assembly, leaving it without a quorum, and thus preventing the approval of the contract425.

4.3. The convention in the Assembly

The agreement with Bontoux did not come up on the agenda of the Assembly was only reached on 18 February. An assembly committee under the chairmanship of Ljubomir Kaljević was formed the following day, and put in charge of studying the convention426. Unlike in the previous sessions, in this case the opposition managed to obtain the entry of its own members into the committee. Amongst these Nikola Pašić, as an engineer, was undoubtedly competent to be a member427. Before the committee began its work, its members requested an answer to two questions that the “Samouprava” had asked as well: whether there were any other offers besides the Union Générale’s, and why the government had not searched for a concession-aire through the publication of a call for tender. The government gave the com-mittee all the offers, and then at the request of the committee, agreed that each representative would receive a copy of the five most significant offers in addition to the contract with the Union Générale – those presented by Fremy’s consortium, the Belgian-Russian group, Hume Webster, Hoare & Co, Tancred and Polyakov428. The committee’s action made it clear that the government still would have to struggle to have the contract adopted – not only in the Assembly, but also in the committee itself. The committee members made numerous objections to the Convention and were sharply divided on the question. Urged by the government to end its work as soon as possible and write a positive report to the Assembly, the committee had no time to study in detail the contract with the Union Générale, nor was it able to study the other offers carefully. On the offers of the other companies, the majority in the committee simply accepted the government’s opinion, which was in favour of signing the contract with the Union Générale, insofar as it was the only bank that could provide the financial resources necessary for the construction of the railway. In mid March 1881, the committee finished its work. During the vote, six commit-tee members voted to adopt the contract, and six against while two abstained. Only later did the two abstaining members vote to adopt the Convention thereby ensur-ing the necessary majority429.

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In parallel with the work of the committee, a struggle by the radical opposition against the contract took place on the pages of “Samouprava”. In each issue there was criticism of the provisions of the contract and claims that Bontoux would earn fifty million francs at the expense of the Serbian state. “With the iron road, built by Bon-toux, the Serbian people’s wellbeing will fall beyond recoverability”, the “Samouprava” predicted. In the opinion of the paper’s editorial writer, none of the offers received by the Serbian government were good. The Government should withdraw from the agreement with the Union Générale and seek a loan for financing the construction of the railway. On another occasion, the “Samouprava” presented a view that the government should announce a call for tender to find a new concessionaire. If it was to be unable to resolve the issue in this manner, the paper proposed another solution – for the state to build the railway itself from its own resources. The “Samouprava” based such proposals on the fact that the government, after signing the contract with the Union Générale, would still have to find nine million francs to pay for the obliga-tions assumed by the convention: these funds in the view of “Samouprava” should be invested in construction, rather than used to pay interest430.

The writings published in the “Samouprava” before and after the convention was brought before the Assembly showed the government and Bontoux that there might be insurmountable obstacles to gaining the Assembly’s approval. The work of the assembly committee only confirmed their suspicions. The government could count on the adoption of the convention, because it had the necessary majority, but only if the radical representatives did not leave the Assembly, a result that Chernyayev was working to obtain. Bontoux, determined to prevent such a development, resorted to a proven method: bribery. A year later, the president of the radicals Nikola Pašić ex-plained his actions at the party’s gathering in Kragujevac. He stated that his intention had been to leave the Assembly with the representatives, but that when the time came for these to leave, it seemed that there were not enough of them ready to do that, thus keeping the Assembly without a quorum and preventing the approval of the conven-tion431. There is no doubt that an unknown number of radical representatives had re-ceived money. According to the testimony of Čedomilj Mijatović, Rosen had begun bribing opposition representatives even before he proposed the convention with the Union Générale to the government. Viscount d’Harcourt told Mijatović that Rosen had managed to thwart the departure of the radicals from the Assembly by giving money to “one of the key” and several “prominent” radicals432. “One of the key” radi-cals was perhaps the very leader of the party, Nikola Pašić. Prime Minister Milan Piroćanac later noted that Bontoux told Mijatović that Pašić had received 20,000

1�7Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

francs not to leave the Assembly433. According to the opinion of Stojan Novaković, the Minister of Education in Piroćanac’s government, Bontoux received advice about whom to bribe from Prince Milan himself. “Rosen led the direct negotiations, Bon-toux gave the money – the purchase price for the consciences were decided by Milan”, historian Slobodan Jovanović concluded. Not only the radical but the progressive representatives as well were bribed, because the convention met with great opposition in the Assembly, and it was uncertain whether even the government representatives would vote for its adoption. The Vice President of the Assembly Milan Kujundžić later claimed that Ljubomir Kaljević, as president of the railway committee, received a bribe of 40,000 francs, while Piroćanac noted that Bontoux told Mijatović that Kaljević had received 50,000 francs. There is no doubt that the government knew about the bribery of the representatives, but it did nothing to stop it434.

In mid March of 1881, the committee, urged on by the government, completed its work. What followed was the eagerly anticipated debate in the Assembly. Driven by the fierce campaign on the “Samouprava” and efforts of “Videlo” to defend the contract with the Union Générale, the public in the Serbian capital was extremely interested in the Assembly debate on the Convention. The first day of the hearing the public tore down the door at the entrance to the Assembly hall, located in Bel-grade’s Red Cross building. The hall was too small to be able to accommodate all the interested parties, so many others remained outside or on the street. “The last two or three days before the vote, the Assembly seemed be possessed by the people. Gendarmes on horseback had trouble keeping the huge crowd in line”435.

The Assembly debate, which the “Samouprava” called “the most important histori-cal moment for the life of our state both for internal and for foreign policy”436 began on 16 March with the reading of the reports by the committee majority, which ex-pressed the opinion that the convention should be adopted, and by the committee minority, which voted against its adoption, arguing that “the contract would inflict huge and vast damage on Serbia in relation to the economic as well as financial future and even our state independence”. The reading of the minority report was merely an overture to attacks by the opposition. The radical representatives had studied the contract down to the smallest detail and they repeated the criticism brought forth by the “Samouprava” and the committee minority. As to the first part of the con-vention, regarding the loan, they considered it to be very unfavourable for Serbia, performed at a low rate and inadequate for the completion of all the necessary work. The estimate of the cost of construction was too high. The radicals claimed that the price could have been lower by as much as forty thousand francs per kilometre.

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The critics of the third part of the convention focused their objections on the fact that the future exploitation company’s earnings would be guaranteed regardless of whether the railway was doing good or bad business: thus the company itself would not have an interest in promoting the development of traffic on the railway. In ad-dition to the technical reasons, political reasons militating against approval were pointed out as well. The radicals properly concluded that the grant of the conces-sion to the Union Générale was in accordance with the interests of the government in Vienna, and the connections between the French company and the Länderbank were mentioned as well, although the representatives themselves did not know all that this entailed. The Assembly hearing did not conclude without there being open allusions to the acceptance of bribes437.

Attacks on the convention, and therefore the government, were led by Pašić, fol-lowed by the educated radicals, while a special tone was given to the criticism by prominent peasant tribunes. As an expert and one of the principle supporters of the railway, Pašić primarily based his attacks on the convention on the omissions that he identified and on the unfavourable conditions agreed to by the government. How-ever, in his last speech before the vote, he pointed out at the end that the most im-portant reason for rejecting the convention was to stop the penetration of Austria-Hungary into the Balkans, a prerequisite for achieving the “testamentary thought”.

You are aware that our national politics have always been coming, and are coming into conflict with the politics of Austria-Hungary. The idea of our people, this is an idea of liberation and unification; while the idea of the Austrian-Hungarian state, especially of recent times, is the idea of extension to the south-east. The two countries have always conflicted in their national interests and shall conflict in the future as well. That is why we insisted and keep insisting that this deal is not to be accepted, as we can see that the company, whose deal this is, has merged its interests with the policy of Austria-Hunga-ry. (...) You know what interferences the Austrian state performed even during our first liberation (First Serbian Uprising 1804-1813 – M.S.). You know that Austria-Hungary has always been against the progress and liberation of our people. (...) Are you forget-ting Bosnia and Herzegovina?438

Pašić’s fiery nationalist rhetoric was followed by Svetomir Nikolajević, considered as “one of the most European radicals”. He interpreted the construction of the rail-way as an abandonment of the traditional policy of Serbia which, seeking unification with its “not yet freed brothers”, sought political support primarily in Russia and had a tendency towards connection and cooperation of the Balkan peoples. This was in-cluded in the foreign policy framework of the party’s agenda, published in the first

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issue of the “Samouprava”. Nikolajević believed that the abandonment of such a for-eign policy course and turning to western science, culture, and even railways, meant abandoning the policy of inter-Balkan cooperation. He went so far as to say that if the convention were approved, Serbia would be “a traitor of the Balkan peoples”, rousing a stormy reaction from the Assembly439. Other educated representatives of the radi-cal opposition took a similar tone as they gave their first parliamentary addresses to the people’s representatives – stating “that our cultural situation, our production, our poor, do not allow us to have a railway”, that it “has no importance for Serbia, and that Serbia, according to its terms, has no grounds to build it”, that the Convention is “harmful, too harmful for our country in every way” and the like. The shortcomings of the Convention were criticized, the danger for the future of the state and national interests from the entry of foreign capital and the penetration of Austria-Hungary into the Balkans was stressed, and a rejection of the Convention was demanded as was the publication of a call for tender to find a new concessionaire440.

The old peasant tribunes, members of the previous Assembly convocations, ex-pressed the same requirements. However, they “instinctively felt that the introduc-tion of the railway would take away that peace, quiet work and cooperative life, which were all dear to our people”, and their speeches showed their fear of the rail-way as a novelty that they had never seen in their life, a novelty that symbolized “someone else’s will and foreign interests, which will destroy the essence of Serb-dom, embodied in the economic equality of the people and its self government” and “throw the country into a new economic slavery”441. The patriarchal idyll of the once “happy country” which “had no landowners and the rich, had no nobles, but also had no poverty as other nations have”, where “only songs could be heard in the Serbian fields”, and where “when you meet a Serb, you saw a cheerful face”442, was contrasted with a grim vision of the situation after the wars that would further deteriorate because of the “heavy chain of the railway” apocalyptically represented as a “cold serpent (...) that will squeeze through the heart of the Serbian people and which the Serbian people must keep warm, and thus feed the dragon itself, which will eventually swallow them”443. Therefore, the railway was viewed as a means of subjugation to the spiritually alienated West, and its construction was perceived as a threat to the realization of the ideals and historical goals of the Serbian nation.

It is a testament of our grandfathers, and a testament of our people, not to be interested in the flow and trade of riches, but its testament is this, to unite decimated Serbdom, to unite its brothers who were torn from their mother Serbia and to stand strong in the circle of the other peoples444.

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The adoption of the Convention with the Union Générale, “the cup of deadly poi-son”445, was presented as a sure way to make the “great grandfather testament”, or “testamentary thought”, impossible, and to bring the political and economic inde-pendence of Serbia into jeopardy.

The progressives opposed the criticism of the radical opposition with arguments that testified to a completely different perception of the importance of the railway in the context of modernization of an independent state. With the gain of independence, accelerated modernization had become a necessity, because it was a prerequisite for survival. While planning a program of reforms aimed at comprehensive moderniza-tion, the progressives viewed the construction of a railway as an important step on the path of economic modernization, a step that necessarily must be taken as soon as possible, especially bearing in mind the international obligations that Serbia had assumed. In this sense, the construction of the railway had foreign as well as do-mestic policy relevance – as a “Berlin child” it was “the price of independence, but also the foundation of the modernization of the state”446. The progressives believed that the arrival of foreign capital should be viewed from a positive perspective of encouraging domestic economic development as a result of the increased quantity of money in circulation: the increased volume of labour in their view would favour-ably and inevitably help to effect the recovery of the Serbian economy, weary from war and under pressure from Vienna447. According to the words of the Minister of Education Stojan Novaković, Serbia found itself before a civilizational challenge: it had the choice of turning towards the new or stubbornly holding on to the old.

We are left with looking eye to eye and finding out where the danger is coming from. The danger is either to stay or to go? It was before us gentlemen, to chose; we will either see the education of the Western world as the enemy from which we need to flee, or we will see an elder friend and teacher, with whom we are to be friends and must be friends. (...)Will we, can we and dare we to say (...) that Serbs are incapable of development, that they do not want railways, they do not want meter measures, they do not want the telegraph, they do not want postal offices, they do not want a joint dinar monetary system, they do not want a community in education. That is the question, gentlemen, before you.(...)We cannot escape from Europe. We must be with her in a community and in a society. If we must fight with it, we must fight those assets and forces that threaten us. Consider-ing the railway issue from this standpoint, it is of no threat to us448.

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Progressives thought that if it wanted to be recognized as an equal member of the community of independent states, Serbia had to fulfil its international obligations, and against the dangers that would be brought by openness to foreign capital and industrial goods, it had to fight by developing domestic industry, improving agricul-tural production, improving the transport infrastructure (in which, of course, the railway was included), as well as enhancing educational and cultural development. They thought that with comprehensive reforms based on the Western European model and the acceptance of achievements of Western European civilization Serbia could set off down a path of modernization that would allow for rapid development and the preservation of political and economic independence. Acceptance of the convention with the Union Générale, followed by the construction of the railway, were meant to be the first steps along that path, representatives were assured by the progressive ministers449. The debate finally ended on 22 March, and the convention was adopted with 97 votes “for”, 57 “against” and 5 “abstaining”. Twenty days later, on 13 April, the Assembly also adopted the Law on the Lottery Loan450.

The adoption of the Convention marked the end of decades of effort – starting in the early 1850s, building up speed during the late 1860s – while its realization, through dynamic diplomatic activity and tumultuous political conflicts, was seen after 1878. Serbia had secured a place on the route of the trans-Balkan railway, and in negotiations with the interested foreign countries and financial houses all the prerequisites for beginning construction on the Principality’s territory had been en-sured. On 3 July 1881 a ceremony took place between Belgrade and Topčider which marked the start of construction. The Belgrade-Niš line was officially opened on 4 September 1884, the Ottoman railway connection to Thessaloniki was established on 19 May 1888, and on 13 August of the same year the first international train on the Budapest-Belgrade-Sofia-Constantinople line passed through Serbia451.

ConClusIon

As the states of the European economic periphery looked towards the developed economies of the European West, the basic question was how to achieve accelerated modernization in an attempt to compensate for what had been lost. In a geopoliti-cally very sensitive area, conditioned by the struggle for separation from the Otto-man civilization, and subject to the long-term strategic interests of the Great Pow-ers, the Serbian state turned towards European influences. The history of modern Serbia was marked by the efforts of rulers and ruling elites to provide the necessary prerequisites for the development of capitalism through a “reform from above”, or with reform legislation and the creation of an appropriate institutional framework. This process represents a constant in the history of Serbia, but a constant character-ized by different degrees of intensity in the modernization effort. Faced with com-plex internal and external factors the state failed to take the decisive steps toward successful economic modernization. Serbia was burdened by an ossified traditional social structure from the Ottoman period and the closely connected inability to develop its agriculture: a necessary precondition for the transformation of produc-tion and the development of the market-oriented economic structure. Conflicting laws and regulations impeded economic development; international circumstances had forced it to become exporter of raw materials and an importer of industrial products. The state attempted, but failed, to push the economy forward through effective intervention.

One of the major reasons for the failure of economic reforms was that the elite fo-cused almost entirely on political modernization, the reform of institutions, espe-cially on restructuring the constitution as the culmination, but also the framework, of the desired reform of the political system. The need for comprehensive social and economic modernization was neglected, and this led inevitably to deviations from the social and political models and to the failure of political reforms, that in the end did not have a deep impact on social change. In addition, both before and after the gain of independence, the pursuit of national unification and territorial expansion dominated Serbian politics, largely determining the dynamics of internal develop-ment. The concept of modernization which the ruling elite represented was based on the acceptance of the achievements of European liberalism, regardless of whether it was liberalism under the strong influence of European revolutionary democratism as in the era of Italian and German unification or the doctrinal liberalism of the first

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half of the 19th century. On the contrary, rejecting the adoption of liberal principles and institutions, or the idea of political and economic modernization according to the Western European model, the first Serbian socialists found a response to the challenges of modernization in the ideology of Russian populist socialism. They elaborated the idea that it was possible to skip stages in social development, relying on the principle of collective ownership preserved in the patriarchal institutions of traditional society. At the basis of the conflict, in which very soon, due to the spe-cific historical development of Serbia, the peasantry as an important political factor was to become the natural ally of the socialists (radicals), was the nature of the rela-tionship towards Europe and its values: the willingness to accept them or the desire to deny them, always laden with the burden of the foreign policy situation and the need to achieve the “testamentary thought” of national liberation and unification.

As a symbol of the economic rise of the West, the railway represents a paradigmatic example of all the contradictions of modernization; and the questions surrounding the trans-Balkan railway – a direct road towards Europe in the context of a symbolic choice of civilizational orientation – bring out, in all their specificity, the problems Serbia faced, in foreign as well as internal policy, in its efforts to position itself on its new route. The interest of the European powers in achieving a direct railway con-nection with the Ottoman Empire in the early 1850s pulled Serbia, as an autono-mous vassal principality of that Empire into a geo-strategically sensitive position, into a whirlwind of conflicting interests, and imposed on the Serbian government the idea that it was necessary to build a railway. On the other hand, precisely the fa-vorable geo-strategic position gave the government the opportunity to provide the Serbian economy with all the advantages connected to being placed on the route of one of the most significant European railways. Besides accelerating its economic development, by negotiating this issue independently, Serbia would confirm its in-dependent position in relation to the Porte and strengthen its international posi-tion. In both cases, it would be another important step towards the ultimate goal, political independence.

Since the autumn of 1867 and the Porte’s final decision to build the trans-Balkan railway, the railway issue was one of the most significant foreign policy issues ad-dressed by the Serbian government until the beginning of the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878. Of particular importance was the fact that the imposition of the need for constructing the railway as a foreign policy issue coincided with the political rise of the liberals followed not only by political reforms and dynamization of the political life after the adoption of the new constitution in 1869, but also by efforts to follow

1�5Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

the Western European example, making a decisive step forward on the path of eco-nomic modernization through the construction of the railway. The government’s foreign policy activities in resolving the railway issue always reflected its actualiza-tion in internal political discourse, so its two dimensions – external and internal – were constantly and mutually conditioned and interwoven. While in its external policy the government acted freely and, in accordance with its own assessments, sought to make the right decision and ensure Serbia a place on the trans-Balkan railway route, in the internal public discourse the construction of the railway as the “subject of the day” evolved from expert debates among the liberals themselves to passionate political debates in the context of different responses from the liberals and socialists, and even peasant representatives in the Assembly not inclined to the government, to the challenge brought by modernization.

Opposition, on the one side, of the orientation of the liberal intellectual elite to-wards political and economic modernization by following more or less consistently the Western European example and, on the other side, Marković’s socialist ideol-ogy of not repeating the Western European road, which relied on the patriarchal mentality of the Serbian peasant, came to expression to full extent under the new circumstances in which Serbia found itself after the Congress of Berlin. Due to the change of international legal status and the necessity of fulfilling the obligations imposed on it in Berlin, as well as the growingly clear division of the spheres of in-terest between the Great Powers and the dominant position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, Serbia found itself before numerous challenges in its first years of inde-pendence, or before the necessity of “choosing a perspective path to socio-cultural development or the final civilizational orientation”, as Andrey L. Shemiakin points out. Perhaps the most significant foreign policy challenge was the fulfilment of the commitments assumed in the Treaty of Berlin and Austrian-Serbian Convention regarding the construction of the railway. Due to resistance, and then growingly stronger foreign policy reliance on Austria-Hungary, its constant presence imposed the railway issue as the most important domestic issue as well, related to not only the victory of a certain political concept and the adoption of the modernization concept, but also to the more and more present issue of a choice of foreign policy support that was imposed as a result of the change in international legal status and the latest constellation of relationships between the Great Powers within the East-ern question.

Although in nominal terms, the construction of the railway was part of the plans of the ruling liberals, the extraordinary position of this issue in Serbian politics after

1�� Momir Samardžic

the Congress of Berlin was a consequence of foreign policy pressure from Vienna. The decision of the Congress definitely resolved the trans-Balkan railway route is-sue to the interest of Serbia, but viewed from the perspective of the state of Serbian government finances after two wars, it was the least favorable possible moment. In this context, financing the construction of the railway was of particular importance, because it was certain from the beginning that this was a top political issue on which the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian interests will cross. The issue of finding a “suit-able” company, or some sort of control over the choice that would prevent foreign influence, was for these powers not only a matter of proving political supremacy, but also providing long-term foreign policy interests in the Balkan region. With the current arrangement of powers on the international stage and the current state of public finances, the Serbian diplomacy was not left with a large maneuvering space, especially bearing in mind that respecting international agreements and the fulfillment of international obligations for a state which was only recently recog-nized independence was a way of proving the justification of the given trust. The recovery of state finances was a long term process and the refusal of Jovan Ristić’s government to sign a bilateral convention with Austria-Hungary and immediately approach the construction of the railway was merely buying time in an attempt to secure as favorable conditions as possible under unfavorable circumstances. Ristić achieved partial success in this, but in the context of the international position of Serbia between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and Russia’s support for Bulgaria’s na-tional aspirations, the further straining of relations with the neighboring monarchy after the signing of the convention in the spring of 1880 was unacceptable to Prince Milan and Ristić’s government had to step down, leaving the new government of Milan Piroćanac with improving the relations with Vienna and the pursuit of a fin-ancier for the construction of the railway. This venture was completed in March of 1881 with the signing of the convention with La Société de l’Union Générale, which provided all the necessary prerequisites for the start of construction of the railway.

Imposed as a foreign policy priority, the railway issue became one of the most sig-nificant issues in political conflicts in the country, gaining in dynamics as its reso-lution was approached. The convention with Austria-Hungary, and especially the grant of the concession to the French Union Générale with the undoubted support of Vienna, as well as the new government’s consistent persistence in promoting the concept of accelerated political and economic modernization with as consistent as possible respect to the Western European models, had led to the profiling and first great confrontation of different conceptions of modernization, whose frames

1�7Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

were defined prior to the gain of independence. Marković’s concept of “the people’s state”, a state of “people’s wellbeing”, which with his political heirs the radicals saw an evolution by the transposing of the idea of collectivism and egalitarianism of the Serbian society from the family cooperative and municipality onto the country as a whole, represented a negation of liberal political principles and institutions, and set the ruling political elite as opponents, both before and after the change of government. On the other hand, the expressed national component in the program and political activities of the radicals implied cooperation with the Balkan coun-tries with the support of Russia and was clearly directed against Austria-Hungary which was perceived as the greatest enemy of the state’s independence, as well as the achievement of the “testamentary thought” of national liberation and unification. Political reforms, as part of the radical, or Pašić’s response to internal and exter-nal threats, was supposed to be followed by economic modernization marked by the development of agriculture, by opening new markets for export and encourag-ing the domestic industry, with an ultimate goal of preserving the economic, and therefore the political independence from Austria-Hungary. Preventing the entry of foreign capital was viewed as a prerequisite for an independent road to economic modernization, thus the radicals were determined opponents of the construction of the railway in the time and manner that the current government envisaged. At the same time, accepting the grant of the concession to the Union Générale was called a national betrayal and viewed in the context of the choice of foreign policy support and long-term consequences for the future of the state and nation. On the other hand, the new, progressive, government perceived the construction of the railway as an integral part of the accelerated path to economic modernization, as a prerequi-site to survival with positive foreign policy, as well as domestic consequences – as a civilizational challenge before the choice of turning towards the new or holding on to the old. They thought that, with comprehensive reforms according to the West-ern European model and acceptance of the achievements of the Western European civilization, Serbia was meant to go down a road of modernization that would allow for rapid development and the preservation of political and economic independ-ence. In the existing system of international relations the civilizational choice at the same time represented a foreign policy choice that implied entering the sphere of influence of Austria-Hungary, the immediate neighbour who, in some way, was per-ceived as a paradigm of the West.

The granting of the concession to the Union Générale and the construction of the railway that followed represented a current victory of the progressive concept of

1�8 Momir Samardžic

modernization. However, the consequences of the construction were far from the publicly proclaimed hopes and the railway did not bring Serbia the expected level of economic development. In fact, the case of the Serbian railway confirms the obser-vations of Iván Berend and György Ránki that state intervention in the economy of the Balkan states has proved itself ineffective to a great extent, because the state rail-ways did not create a basis for the development of the domestic industry, while the underdevelopment of the internal market and low productivity did not allow for an increase in exports to the extent that would lead to economic development that would affect the transformation of the economy as a whole. Although the railways did contribute to gradual economic growth, compared to the developed and devel-oping economies this rate was significantly lower and Michael Palairet, in speaking of the economies of the Balkan countries in the 19th century, and therefore the Serbian economy, rightly speaks of “evolution without development”. In this sense, the Serbian government’s efforts to secure Serbia with a place on the trans-Balkan railway route undoubtedly represented a significant step in the realization of the concept of successful economic development, but the railway was only one of its preconditions, or only one of the factors that would enhance it. The railway alone was certainly not enough. The earlier mentioned structural deficiencies of the Ser-bian economy and society, as well as the geopolitical environment and one sided structure of exports represented an obstacle which the political elite failed to over-come and the economy never reached the level of flexibility that would lead to its adaptation to the demands of the market. At the same time, the debates about the appropriateness of the construction of the railway seem in vain as well, because pre-cisely the state, whose intellectual elite was discussing the problem, was responsible for the lack of a legal framework suitable for change and thereby created a signifi-cant obstacle for economic development.

We may conclude that because of its perceived foreign policy significance as a test-ing ground in the struggle for political and economic independence, as well as be-cause of the opposed concepts on modernization cultivated by different sectors of the Serbian elite, the railway issue turned out to be less important for its economic, financial and infrastructural consequences than for its effects as a catalyst and a founding moment for the nascent political system.

notes

1 H. Sundhaussen, Historische Statistik Serbiens 1834-1914: Mit europäischen Vergleichsdaten, Mu-nich 1989, pp. 53, 80-81.

2 I.T. Berend, G. Ránki, The European Periphery and Industrialization 1780-1914, Budapest 1982 (Zagreb 1996, pp. 128-134).

3 Ibid., pp. 105-153; D. Milić, Die ökonomische Penetration des Balkans und der Türkei durch die Industriestaaten, in R. Melville, H-J. Schröder (eds.), Der Berliner Kongress von 1878: die Politik der Grossmächte und die Probleme der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 473-475; H.J. Habakkuk, M. Postan (eds.), The Cambridge Ecomomic History of Europe, vol. VI: The Industrial Revolutions and after, Incomes, Population and Technological Change, vol. II, Cambridge 1965, pp. 212-273; E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolu-tion: Europe 1789-1848, London 1962 (Zagreb 1987, pp. 54-57).

4 S. Pamuk, Foreign Trade, Foreign Capital and the Peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire 1830-1913, PhD manuscript, Berkeley 1978, pp. 95-102; D.S. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, New York 1966, pp. 23-39.

5 Pamuk, Foreign cit., p. 108.6 W. Rechberger, Zur Geschichte der Orientbahnen: Ein Beitrag zur österreichisch-ungarischen Eisen-

bahnpolitik auf dem Balkan in den Jahren von 1852-1888 (=Ein Beitrag), PhD manuscript, Vienna 1958, p. 29.

7 Y.N. Karkar, Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1914, New York 1972, pp. 64-65; S. Khairallah, Railways in the Middle East 1856-1948: Political and Economic Background, Beirut 1991, pp. 32-34, 48-49; K. Grunwald, Türkenhirsch: A Study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch, Entrepre-neur and Philanthropist, Jerusalem 1966, pp. 28-29.

8 G. Rosegger, J.H. Jensen, British Railway Builders along the Lower Danube 1856-1869, in “The Sla-vonic and East European Review”, January 1968, XLVI, 106, pp. 108-119; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 42-43.

9 W. Rechberger, Zur Geschichte der Orientbahnen: Österreichischе Eisenbahnpolitik auf dem Balkan (=Österreichischе), in “Österreichische Osthefte”, 1960, 5, p. 348; G. Rosegger, J.H. Jensen, Transyl-vanian Railways and Access to the Lower Danube 1856-1914, in “East European Quarterly”, Janu-ary 1996, XXIX, 4, pp. 428-429; Dž. Juzbašić, Izgradnja željeznica u Bosni i Hercegovini u svjetlu austrougarske politike od okupacije do kraja Kállayeve ere, Sarajevo 1974, p. 7.

10 Rosseger, Jensen, Transylvanian cit., pp. 434-439.11 Rechberger, Österreichischе cit., pp. 348-349; Id., Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 39-40; Rosseger, Jensen, Bri-

tish cit., pp. 117-122.12 Grunwald, Türkenhirsch cit., pp. 31-39; Rechberger, Österreichischе cit., pp. 351-354; Id., Ein Bei-

trag cit., pp. 39, 60-66, 77-123; G. Mérei (ed.), Magyarország története 1790-1848, vol. 1, Budapest 1983, pp. 977-978; Juzbašić, Izgradnja cit., pp. 7-9; M. Todorović, Оријенталне железнице, in “Економист”, May 1913, II, 9, p. 129; Id., Уговорни однос између Турске и Друштва Оријенталних Железница, in “Економист”, June 1913, II, 12, p. 177.

150 Momir Samardžic

13 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 47-59; Id., Österreichischе cit., pp. 351-352; Grunwald, Türken-hirsch cit., pp. 20-21, 30.

14 P. Hertner, The Balkan Railways, International Capital and Banking from the end of the Nineteenth Century until the Outbreak of the First World War, in G.D. Feldman, P. Hertner (eds.), Finance and Modernization, A Transnational and Transcontinental Perspective for the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, n.p. 2008, pp. 128-130; Grunwald, Türkenhirsch cit., pp. 31-39; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 60-66, 77-123; Id., Österreichischе cit., pp. 352-354; Todorović, Оријенталне cit., pp. 129-131; Id., Уговорни cit., pp. 177-183.

15 Grunwald, Türkenhirsch cit., pp. 38-41; Hertner, The Balkan cit., pp. 130-131; Todorović, Оријенталне cit., p. 9; Id., Уговорни cit., p. 177; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 144-148; Id., Österreichischе cit., p. 354.

16 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 136-137, 154-161, 168-174; Id., Österreichischе cit., pp. 353-355; Писма Јована Ристића Филипу Христићу од 1870-1873 и од 1877-1880, in “Зборник за исто-рију, језик и књижевност српског народа”, 1931, 20, pp. 221-222; Č. Popov, Србија и Француска 1871-1878, Belgrade 1974, pp. 149, 187-190, 211-213; The Hungarian-Serbian commission - July, August and November 1873, MOL, K 26, 1873, 1052, VI, 3009; Дневне белешке, AS, MID-PO, 1873, F-I, D-II, Ž/1, pov. br. 245; M. Vukčević, О политици грофа Андрашија према нашем народу уочи источне кризе, in “Гласник Историјског друштва у Новом Саду”, Novi Sad 1933, 13/V/3, pp. 414-415; M. Samardžić, Европа и обележавање граница Србије 1878-1879, Novi Sad 2006, pp. 36-37, 42-47; W.N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and after: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880, London 1938, pp. 1-35; J. Ristić, Дипломатска историја Србије за време српских ратова за ослобођење и независност 1875-1878, vol. II, Belgrade 1898, pp. 159-295; V. Đorđević, Србија на Берлинском конгресу, Belgrade 1890, pp. 1-96; M. Marković, Međunarodnopravne odredbe o železnicama i izgradnja pruga u Srbiji do Prvog svetskog rata, in “Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo”, 1972, 1, pp. 64-75.

17 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 50-51.18 J.R. Lampe, Financial structure and the economic development of Serbia 1878-1912, PhD manu-

script, University of Wisconsin 1971, pp. 11-12.19 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 102-103.20 D. Stojanović, Уље на води: политика и друштво у модерној историји Србије, in Lj. Dimić, D.

Stojanović, M. Jovanović, Србија 1804-2004: три виђења или позив на дијалог, Belgrade 2005, p. 124; M-J. Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 1815-1941: Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt während der Industrialisierung, Munich 1994 (Belgrade 2004, p. 417).

21 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 37-38.22 W. Rostow, Stages of Economical Growth, New York 1990, pp. 4-7; P.J. Marković, Теорија

модернизације и њена (критичка) примена на међуратну Југославију и друге источноевропске земље, in “Годишњак за друштвену историју”, 1994, I, 1, pp. 17-18.

23 Lampe, Financial cit., pp. 14-16; D. Đorđević, Србија и српско друштво 1880-тих година, in “Историјски часопис”, 1983, XXIX-XXX, p. 414; H. Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens 19.-21. Jahrhundert, Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 2007 (Belgrade 2009, p. 163).

151Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

24 Lampe, Financial cit., pp. 11-14; M. Palairet, Balkan economies c. 1800-1914: evolution without development, Cambridge 1997, pp. 87-103; Sundhaussen, Historische cit., p. 223; Calic, Sozialges-chichte cit., pp. 58-61, 67-69.

25 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 50-51; Id., East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centu-ries, Budapest 1977, pp. 31-36.

26 Sundhaussen, Historische cit., p. 223.27 R. Ljušić, Кнежевина Србија (1830-1839), Belgrade 1986, pp. 45-55.28 Calic, Sozialgeschichte cit., pp. 36-42; J. Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yu-

goslavia, Stanford 1955, pp. 42-47, 178-188.29 H. Vivian, Poor man’s paradise, London 1897.30 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 88-89.31 Calic, Sozialgeschichte cit., pp. 36, 41-42; Stojanović, Уље cit., pp. 124-125.32 Calic, Sozialgeschichte cit., p. 44.33 Ibid., pp. 42-48.34 Ibid., pp. 36-38.35 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., p. 101; Id., East cit., pp. 22-28.36 Ibid., pp. 42-44.37 N. Vučo, Привредна историја Србије до Првог светског рата, Belgrade 1955, pp. 214-216; D.

Pantić, Спољна трговина и трговинска политика независне Србије: први период 1878-1892, Belgrade 1910, pp. 8-17; S.Đ. Milošević, Спољна трговина Србије од 1843-1875 године, Belgrade 1902, pp. 6-24; Sundhaussen, Historische cit., pp. 353-356; Lampe, Financial cit., pp. 90-93; Pal-airet, Balkan cit., p. 115; D.P. Đetvaj, Развој међународног уговорног капацитета Србија у XIX веку, n.p., 1939, pp. 125-128, 221-225.

38 Calic, Sozialgeschichte cit., p. 113.39 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 193-195.40 Sundhaussen, Historische cit., p. 130.41 Calic, Sozialgeschichte cit., pp. 48-64, 112-113; Berend, Ránki, The European cit., pp. 102-103.42 Vučo, Развој cit., pp. 152-169, 182-186, 246-252.43 Lampe, Financial cit., pp. 18-19.44 Berend, Ránki, The European cit., p. 102.45 Ibid., pp. 45-46, 128-130.46 Ljušić, Кнежевина cit., pp. 106-107; T.R. Đorđević, Србија пре сто година, Belgrade 1946, pp.

113-119; M. Perišić, Modernizacija Srbije u drugoj polovini XIX veka: između državnih propisa i društvene stvarnosti, in “Tokovi istorije”, 1995, 1-2, pp. 21-23.

47 Vučo, Развој cit., pp. 122-125; Id., Železnički saobraćaj kao faktor privrednog razvoja Srbije u XIX. veku, in “Acta historico oeconomica Iugoslaviae”, 1978, V, pp. 171-173; Зборник закона и уредаба у Књажеству Србији од почетка до краја 1864, XVII, Belgrade 1864, pp. 125-139.

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48 V. Milenković, Економска историја Београда до светскога рата, Belgrade 1932, pp. 24, 125-126; S. Jovanović, Влада уставобранитеља, Belgrade 1990, p. 83.

49 Зборникъ закона и уредба издани у Княжеству Србiи, одъ почетка до края 1864. године, XVII, Belgrade 1865, pp. 125-129; Perišić, Modernizacija cit., pp. 22-25.

50 A. Aleksić, Морава, њено садање стање и могућност пловидбе, in “Гласник Српског ученог друштва”, Belgrade 1879, XI, pp. 72-80; M. Ilić, Моравска клисура међу Овчаром и Кабларом, in “Гласник Српског ученог друштва”, Belgrade 1875, XLII, pp. 18-21; Palairet, Balkan cit., p. 90.

51 Штудия гвозденогъ пута у Србiи одъ Београда до Алексинца, Belgrade, 20 November - 2 Decem-ber 1865, AS, IG, 1505; P. Milenković, Историја грађења железница и железничка политика код нас (1850-1935), Belgrade 1936, pp. 18-19.

52 O. Milosavljević, U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o „nama“ i „drugima“, Belgrade 2002, pp. 29-31.

53 A. Smith, National Identity, London 1991, pp. 61-62.54 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford 1983, p. 1; M. Bešlin, Национално питање у Ср-

бији крајем шездесетих и почетком седамдесетих година двадесетог века, manuscript, Novi Sad 2008, pp. 28-35.

55 S. Terzić, Јован Ристић и „заветна мисао српска“ (1868-1876), in “Историјски часопис”, 1987, XXXIV, p. 271.

56 L. Perović, Српско-руске револуционарне везе: прилози за историју народњаштва у Србији, Belgrade 1993, pp. 19, 64; A.L. Šemjakin, Идеологија Николе Пашића: формирање и еволуција (1868-1891), Belgrade 2008, pp. 32-33.

57 O. Popović-Obradović, Парламентаризам у Србији од 1903. до 1914. године, Belgrade 1998, pp. 50-51.

58 Ibid., pp. 56-57; B. Bešlin, Европски утицаји на српски либерализам у XIX веку, Novi Sad 2005, pp. 139, 151-160, 163-164, 209-211; Id., Српски либерализам у 19. веку – генеза, идеје, страначке поделе, in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 2003, 67-68, pp. 70-74; M. Samardžić, Serbian Liberals and the Struggle for the National Assembly in the Mid-19th Century, in A. Gémes, F. Peyrou, I. Xydopoulos (eds.), Institutional Change and Stability: Conflicts, Transitions and Social Values, Pisa 2009, pp. 91-92, 95-96; J. Skerlić, Омладина и њена књижевност (1848-1871): изучавања о националном и књижевном романтизму код Срба, Belgrade 1925, pp. 3-30, 139-152; J. Milićević, Прва група србијанских студената, државних питомаца школованих у иностранству (1839-1842), in “Историјски часопис”, 1959, IX-X, pp. 363-365; V. Pavlović, Српски студенти у Пари-зу 1839-1856, in “Историјски часопис”, 1986, XXXIII, pp. 188-191; D.T. Bataković, Француски утицаји у Србији 1835-1914: четири генерације „Паризлија“, in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 1997, 56, pp. 73-74; Lj. Trgovčević, Планирана елита: o студентима из Србије на европским универзитетима у 19. веку, Belgrade 2003, pp. 33-34; J. Milićević, Јеврем Грујић: ис-торијат светоандрејског либерализма, Belgrade 1964, pp. 26-35; G. Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics, Seattle - London 1975, pp. 6-13. Z. Györe, Mađarski i srpski nacionalni preporod, Novi Sad 2009, pp. 340-365, 386-387; Id., A Doctrine of ‘Harmonization of Interest’: the Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz, in Gémes, Peyrou, Xydopoulos (eds.), Institutional cit., pp. 129-148; D. Đorđević,

15�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

Улога националног чиниоца на Балкану у деветнаестом веку, in Id., Огледи из новије балканске историје, Belgrade 1989, p. 34.

59 Samardžić, Serbian cit., pp. 92-102; J. Milićević, Прилог познавању порекла србијанског парламентаризма, in “Зборник Филозофског факултета”, 1970, XI, 1, pp. 609-611; R. Ljušić, Историја српске државности, II: Србија и Црна Гора – нововековне српске државе, Novi Sad 2001, pp. 54-70; Jovanović, Уставобранитељи cit., pp. 33-63, 121-135, 203-262; J. Milićević, На-родне скупштине у Србији 1839-1843. године, in “Зборник Филозофског факултета”, 1957, IV, 1, pp. 157-187; Id., Србија 1839-1868. године, in В. Стојанчевић (ed.), Историја српског народа, vol. 1, Belgrade 1981, pp. 281-283.

60 Popović-Obradović, Парламентаризам cit., pp. 57-58; Id., Prvobitna artikulacija političkih i državno-pravnih programa i njihov sukob (do 1883), in Id., Kakva ili kolika država: ogledi o političkoj i društvenoj istoriji Srbije XIX-XXI veka, Belgrade 2009, p. 59; Samardžić, Serbian cit., pp. 102-105; S. Jovanović, Друга влада Милоша и Михаила, Belgrade 1990, pp. 347-506; D. Mekenzi, Jovan Ristić – evropski državnik, Belgrade 2004, pp. 24-85; Bešlin, Европски cit., pp. 297-300, 649-660; Milićević, Србија cit., pp. 294-301; Č. Popov, Srbija na putu oslobođenja 1868-1878: borba za politički preobražaj i državnu nezavisnost 1868-1878, Belgrade 1980, pp. 48-55; S. Jovanović, Вла-да Милана Обреновића, vol. I (1868-1878), Belgrade 1990, pp. 21-86; J. Nicović, Уставни раз-вој Србије 1804-2006, Belgrade 2007, pp. 104-128; R. Ljušić, Јован Ристић и уставно питање 1869. године, in Живот и рад Јована Ристића: поводом 150-годишњице рођења, Belgrade 1985, pp. 191-213; V. Čubrilović, Историја политичке мисли у Србији XIX века, Belgrade 1982, pp. 244-248.

61 G. Stokes, Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia, Durham - London 1990, pp. 11-41; Popović-Obradović, Prvobitna cit., p. 59.

62 Id., Парламентаризам cit., pp. 58-59; Stokes, Politics cit., pp. 177-181; M. Jagodić, Српски сту-денти у Паризу средином шездесетих година 19. века, in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 2009, 79-80, pp. 175-182; “Видело”, 20 April 1880; A.L. Šemjakin, Либерална идеја и традиција: унутрашња борба у Србији у првој деценији независности, in “Српска политичка мисао”, 1997, 1-2, pp. 120-122.

63 L. Perović, Mogućnosti i ograničenja modernizacije, in Id., Između anarhije i autokratije: srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI), Belgrade 2006, pp. 21-22; Id., Српско-руске cit., pp. 7-21; Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., p. 38; L. Perović, A.L. Šemjakin (eds.), Никола П. Пашић: писма, чланци, говори (1872-1891), Belgrade 1995, pp. 11-15.

64 Popović-Obradović, Парламентаризам cit., pp. 62-63.65 Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., p. 101.66 Perović, Српско-руске cit., pp. 23-24; Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 106-107.67 Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола П. Пашић cit., p. 11.68 Perović, Српско-руске cit., p. 16.69 Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 27-31; H-M. Midlich, Патријархални менталитет као сметња

државне и друштвене модернизације у Србији XIX века, in “Историјски часопис”, 1992, XXXVIII, pp. 115-128.

15� Momir Samardžic

70 L. Perović, Светозар Марковић и скупштинска опозиција 1874. и 1875. године, in M. Marković (ed.), Живот и дело Светозара Марковића, Belgrade 1997, pp. 455-461; Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 101-102; Id., Радикальное движение в Сербии: зарождение, становление, первые шаги (1875-1883), Moskow 1993, pp. 20-23.

71 L. Perović, Српски социјалисти 19. века: прилог историји социјалистичке мисли, Belgrade 1995, p. 56.

72 Popović-Obradović, Parlamentarizam cit., p. 55.73 Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., p. 41; Id., Либерална cit., pp. 133-134.74 L. Perović, Patrijarhalan odgovor na izazov modernizacije, in Id., Između cit., p. 31.75 O. Blagojević, Економска мисао у Србији до Другог светског рата, Belgrade 1996, pp. 98-101.76 Ibid., pp. 98-99; D. Milić, Економска политика либерала, in “Историски часопис”, 1982-1983,

XXIX-XXX, pp. 359-361.77 Perović, Српски cit., pp. 92-97.78 AS, KK, RO, XXV-374; S.M. Velimirović, Први план за изградњу железница у Србији, in “Исто-

ријски гласник”, Belgrade 1965, 4, pp. 85-91; D. Milić, Die Pläne zum Ausbau der Eisenbahn in Serbien in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, in R.G. Plaschka (ed.), Eisenbahnbau und Kapitalinter-essen in den Beziehungen der Österreichischen mit den Südslawischen Ländern, Vienna 1993, p. 31; V. Simić, Из скорашње прошлости рударства у Србији, Belgrade 1960, pp. 31-32; M. Samardžić, Посета барона Хердера Србији и први план за изградњу железнице, in “Истраживања”, 2007, XVIII, pp. 135-144.

79 “Србске Новине”, 1 October 1855.80 Milenković, Историја cit., p. 14; Milić, Die Pläne cit., pp. 33-34; J.S. Nikolić, Историја железни-

ца Србије, Војводине, Црне Горе и Косова, Belgrade 1980, pp. 33-35.81 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 29-32; Id., Österreichischе cit., p. 350.82 Milić, Die Pläne cit., p. 35; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 35-38; Id., Österreichischе cit., p. 350;

N. Ferguson, The House of Rothschild: the World’s banker 1849-1999, London 2000 (Belgrade 2002), pp. 108-109.

83 Ž. Živanović, Политичка историја Србије у другој половини деветнаестог века: књига прва: од Свето-Андрејске Скупштине до прогласа независности Србије 1858-1878, Belgrade 1923, pp. 106, 139-140.

84 Milić, Die Pläne cit., p. 36.85 Prince Mihailo to I. Garašanin, Gastein, n.d., AS, IG, 1200.86 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 47-59; Id., Österreichischе cit., pp. 351-352; Grunwald, Türkenhirsch

cit., pp. 20-21, 30-31; Principales Bases arrêtées par le Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman pour la Concession á la Compagnie representée par Monsieur Toucas, du Chemin de fer de Constantinople á la frontiere Serbe, avec embranchement de Nich á Salonique et de Varna á Enos par Adrinople, Constantinople, 16 Novembre 1867, ASANU, JR, XV/7, 15/149; “Србске новине”, 2 December 1867, 16 January 1868; Milić, Die Pläne cit., pp. 37-38; Nikolić, Историја cit., pp. 42-43; A. Radenić (ed.), Дневник Бењамина Калаја 1868-1875, Belgrade - Novi Sad 1976, pp. 8-9.

155Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

87 MIDS to B. Kállay, Belgrade, 9-21 January 1871, AS, MID-PO, 1871, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 20; MIDS to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 12 January 1871, AS, MID-PO, 1871, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 20; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p. 70; Nikolić, Историја cit., pp. 44-45; Đ. Mrđenović, Гвоздени пут Србије, Belgrade 1974, pp. 32-36.

88 Procès verbal de la Conférence internationale réunie à Vienne à l’Hôtel du Ministère des affaires étrangères pour déterminer le point de raccordement des chemins de fer de l’Autriche-Hongrie avec de l’Empire Ottoman et en particuliere de la Serbie, AS, MID-PO, 1871, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 303; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 128-136; Id., Österreichischе cit., pp. 353-354; D. Matić to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 15 July 1871, AS, PCg, F-II, 14/1879; Popov, Француска cit., p. 120.

89 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 137-139; Marković, Međunarodnopravne cit., pp. 64-65.90 D. Matić to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 24 January 1872, AS, MID-PO, 1872, F-I, D-II, P/5-VII, pov. br.

8; F. Hristić to D. Matić, Constantinople, 15-27 February 1872, AS, MID-PO, 1872, F-I, D-II, P/5-VII, pov. br. 31; F. Hristić to D. Matić, Pera, 16 February 1872, AS, MID-PO, 1872, F-I, D-II, P/5-VII, pov. br. 32; D. Matić to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 6 March 1872, AS, MID-PO, 1872, F-I, D-II, P/5-VII, pov. br. 45; Popov, Француска cit., pp. 126-127; Id., Srbija cit., pp. 88-90.

91 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 140-157.92 J. Ristić to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 26 April 1873, in Писма Jована Ристића cit., pp. 221-222; Popov,

Француска cit., p. 149.93 The Hungarian-Serbian commission, July, August and November 1873, MOL, K 26, 1873, 1052,

VI, 3009; Дневне белешке, AS, MID-PO, 1873, F-I, D-II, Ž/1, pov. br. 245; Rechberger, Ein Bei-trag cit., p. 167.

94 Popov, Француска cit., pp. 163-187; Id., Srbija cit., pp. 94-95; F. Hristić to J. Marinović, Constan-tinople, 27 November 1873, AS, MID-PO, 1873, F-I, D-VI, P/5-VII, pov. br. 260; F. Hristić to J. Ristić, Constantinople, 30 January and 6 February 1874, AS, MID-PO, 1874, F-I, D-V, P/5-VII, pov. br. 25, 38, 39; F. Hristić to J. Ristić, Constantinople, 18 February and 1, 13, 24, 30 March 1874, AS, MID-PO, 1874, F-I, D-VI, P/5-VII, pov. br. 71, 73, 88, 96, 102.

95 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 168-170; Popov, Француска cit., pp. 187-190, 211-213; J. Marinović to K. Magazinović, Belgrade, 10 Octobre 1874, AS, PCg, F-II, 14/1879.

96 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 170-173; Safvet Pasha to Count Zichy, Constantinople, 30 Sep-tembre 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 14/1879.

97 MIDS to K. Magazinović, Belgrade, 4 November 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 30/1875; MIDS to K. Magazinović, Belgrade, 11 November 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 33/1875; MIDS to K. Magazinović, Belgrade, 8 December 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 35/1875; MIDS to K. Magazinović, Belgrade, 16 De-cember 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 38/1875; MIDS to K. Magazinović, Belgrade, 1 February 1876, AS, PCg, F-II, 2/1876.

98 Wrede to MIDS, Belgrade, 25 December 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 14/1879.99 MIDS to Wrede, Belgrade, 30 December 1875, AS, PCg, F-II, 14/1879; Đ. Pavlović to K.

Magazinović, Belgrade, 24 January 1876, AS, PCg, F-II, 14/1879; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 173-174.

100 E. Palotás, Ziele und geschichtliche Realität: wirtschaftsbestrebungen Österreich-Ungarns auf dem Balkan zur Zeit des Berliner Kongresses im Jahre 1878, Budapest 1980, pp. 6-21; I. Diószegi, Die

15� Momir Samardžic

Anfänge der Orientpolitik Andrássys, in Melville, Schröder (eds.), Der Berliner cit., pp. 245-257; Vukčević, О политици cit., pp. 414-415; M. Vojvodić, D.R. Živojinović, A. Mitrović, R. Samardžić (eds.), Србија 1878: документи, Belgrade 1978, pp. 524-525, 560-561, 564, 570; Medlicott, The Congress cit., pp. 1-35; Samardžić, Европа cit., pp. 36-37, 42-47; Ristić, Дипломатска cit., pp. 159-273; Đorđević, Србија cit., pp. 1-96; Marković, Međunarodnopravne cit., pp. 66-75.

101 “Србске новине”, 24 March 1845; Nikolić, Историја cit., pp. 18-19.102 Đ. Đurić, Вук Маринковић: биографија и научни рад утемељивача физике као модерне науке у

Србији, Novi Sad 2007, pp. 63-64.103 Bešlin, Европски cit., p. 731.104 V. Jovanović, Политички речник, Г, Д, и Ђ, Belgrade 1873, p. 602.105 M. Bjelica, Z. Jevtović, Историја новинарства, Belgrade 2006, pp. 281-282; Jovanović, Уста-

вобранитељи cit., p. 392.106 S.G. Marković, Гроф Чедомиљ Мијатовић: викторијанац међу Србима, Belgrade 2006, pp. 24-

30.107 Blagojević, Економска cit., pp. 99-101.108 “Србија”, January-April 1868; Marković, Гроф cit., p. 40; Bešlin, Европски cit., pp. 732-734.109 Ibid., p. 732.110 Ž. Žujović, Сабрани списи, vol. 1, Belgrade 1974, pp. 88-89, 267-280.111 Blagojević, Економска cit., pp. 142-143.112 “Србија”, 13 March 1868.113 Count Ch. Mijatovich, The Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomatist, London - New York - Toronto - Mel-

bourne 1917, p. 253.114 Jovanović, Политички cit., pp. 598-623.115 Marković, Гроф cit., p. 41; Mijatovich, The Memoirs cit., pp. 19-23; A. Radenić (ed.), Дневник cit.,

p. 402.116 V. Krestić, R. Ljušić (eds.), Програми и статути српских политичких странака до 1918. године,

Belgrade 1991, pp. 47-48; J. Milanović, Аћим Чумић: 1836-1901, Belgrade 2007, pp. 82-83.117 “Раденик”, 7, 9, 11, 13 September 1871.118 Треба ли нам железница?, Belgrade 1871; Marković, Гроф cit., p. 43.119 “Раденик”, 7, 13, 16, 18 September and 13, 16, 19 October 1871.120 Ibid., 28, 30 October and 2, 4, 6, 9 and 11 November 1871.121 Треба cit., pp. 1-64; “Раденик”, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18 September, 13, 16, 19, 28, 30 October and 2, 4,

6, 9, 11 November 1871.122 Ibid., 16 October 1871.123 Ibid., 28 October 1871.124 Ibid., 16 October 1871.125 Ibid., 16, 28 October and 11 November 1871.

157Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

126 Треба cit., pp. 25-26, 49-51, 56-64; Marković, Гроф cit., pp. 42-44.127 Bešlin, Европски cit., p. 683; Stokes, Politics cit., pp. 16-17.128 Протоколи Народне скупштине која је држана у Крагујевцу 1871, Belgrade 1871, pp. 620-624.129 Perović, Svetozar cit., p. 102; Id., Programi narodne demokratije u Srbiji druge polovine XIX veka, in

“Tokovi istorije”, 1999, 1-4, pp. 85-88.130 Id., Programi cit., pp. 88-90; Стенографске белешке о седницама Народне скупштине, која је др-

жана у Крагујевцу и Београду 1875/6, Belgrade 1876, p. 1552.131 Perović, Svetozar cit., pp. 107-108.132 Стенографске белешке о седницама Народне скупштине држане у Београду 1874/5, Belgrade

1875, p. 1857; Perović, Programi cit., p. 87.133 Perović, Светозар Марковић cit., pp. 107-108; Стенографске белешке 1875-1876 cit., p. 1095.134 V. Karić, Српска земља, Belgrade 1882, p. 55.135 Đorđević, Србија cit., p. 414.136 Palotás, Ziele cit., pp. 5-15; S.D. Skazkin, Конец австро-русско-германскoго союзa: Исследование

по истории русско-германских и русско-австрийских отношений в связи с восточным вопро-сом в 80-е годы ХІХ столетия, Moskow 1974, pp. 46-47; F. Hauptman, Politika Austro-Ugarske, Trojecarski savez i Tajna konvencija sa Srbijom 1881, in “Godišnjak Istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine”, 1957, IX, pp. 61-66.

137 М.J. Zolotuhin, Россия, западноевропейские державы и Османская империя в период международных кризисов на Балканах (1885-1888 гг.), Moskow 1993, pp. 19-29; История вне-шней политики России (конец XV в. - 1917 г.): вторая половина ХІХ века, Moskow 1997, pp. 220-224; V.M. Hvostov, История дипломатии, vol. ІІ, Дипломатия в новое время 1871-1914, Moskow 1963, pp. 135-142; Ch. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia 1879-1886, Berkeley - Los Angeles 1958, p. 1.

138 Jelavich, Tsarist cit., pp. 1-13; M. Samardžić, Од Сан Стефана до Сливнице: Србија против Бугарске 1878-1886, Novi Sad 2006, pp. 66-68.

139 Ibid., pp. 67-68; Id., Политика Србије према Бугарској и Тајна конвенција 1881. године, in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 2005, 71-72, pp. 29-30; Id., Србија и Бугарско питање 1878-1885, in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 2008, 77-78, pp. 201-202.

140 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 13-18; D. Gnjatović, Stari državni dugovi: prilog ekonomskoj i političkoj istoriji Srbije i Jugoslavije 1862-1941, Belgrade 1991, pp. 18-23; V. Jovanović, Ера страних зајмова у Србији, in “Архив за правне и друштвене науке”, 1906, 1, p. 196; M. Nedeljković, Историја српских државних дугова, Belgrade 1909, pp. 9-26.

141 Протоколи Народне скупштине држане у Нишу 1878-79 год, Belgrade 1879, p. 32; Ž. Živanović, Политичка историја Србије у другој половини деветнаестог века: књига другa: од прогласа не-зависности Србије до абдикације краља Милана 1878-1889, Belgrade 1924, pp. 14-24, 64-67; Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 15-18; Gnjatović, Stari cit., pp. 22-23.

142 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 31-32; J. Milićević, Опозиција у Србији уочи стварања организованих политичких странака, in “Историјски гласник”, 1969, 2, pp. 10-12; Stokes, Politics cit., pp. 139-141.

158 Momir Samardžic

143 Perović, Српски cit., pp. 62-64; Milićević, Опозиција cit., p. 11; Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 31.144 Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола П. Пашић cit., pp. 51-52.145 Perović, Српски cit., p. 79; Šemjakin, Радикалъное cit., pp. 30-32.146 Id., Идеологија cit., p. 135.147 Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола П. Пашић cit., p. 239.148 Milićević, Опозиција cit., p. 11.149 A.L. Šemjakin, О карактеру конзервативно-радикалске коалиције у српској Скупштини 1880.

године и узроцима њеног краха у јануару 1881. године, in “Историјски гласник”, 1994, 1-2, p. 64.150 Id., pp. 64-65; L. Perović, Усредсређеност на национално ослобођење и уједињење, in Id. (ed.),

Никола Пашић у Народној скупштини, vol. 1, Belgrade 1997, pp. 23-31; Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 143-144; Id., Радикалъное cit., pp. 36-40.

151 J. Blunčli, Карактер и дух политичких партија, Belgrade 1880.152 Мишљење г. Милана Пироћанца о преводу Блунчлијева дела „Карактер (значај) и дух

политичких партија“ од Н. Капетановића, in “Годишњица Николе Чупића”, 1879, III, pp. XLII-XLIV.

153 M. Vojvodić, D.R. Živojinović, A. Mitrović, R. Samardžić (eds.), Србија 1878 cit., p. 483.154 Ibid., pp. 524-529, 560-561, 564, 570.155 Grunwald, Türkenhirsch cit., pp. 38-41; Todorović, Оријенталне cit., p. 9; Id., Уговорни cit., p.

177; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 144-148; Id., Österreichischе cit., p. 354.156. Vojvodić, Živojinović, Mitrović, Samardžić (eds.), Србија 1878 cit., pp. 524-525.157 Ibid., pp. 527-529.158 Ibid., pp. 482-483.159 Ibid., p. 570.160 Ibid., p. 560.161 Pantić, Спољна cit., pp. 7-8, 14-15; Đetvaj, Развој cit., pp. 249-251; J. Batizić, Spoljnotrgovinski

odnosi Srbije posle Berlinskog kongresa, in “Tokovi istorije”, 1997, 3-4, pp. 131-134.162 Pantić, Спољна cit., pp. 8-17.163 Milošević, Спољна cit., pp. 38, 46; Vojvodić, Živojinović, Mitrović, Samardžić (eds.), Србија 1878

cit., pp. 529-530.164 F. Hauptmann, Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien 1878-1881, in “Mitteilungen des österrei-

chischen Staatsarchivs”, 1952, 5, p. 145.165 A. Persiani to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 22 November 1878, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/213.166 Baron Herbert to Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 22 September 1879,

MOL, К-26, 422, 1879, III, 2797.167 S.I. Dančenko, Из историје руско-српских односа крајем седамдесетих и у првој половини

осамдесетих година XIX века (према грађи архива СССР-а), in “Историјски часопис”, 1989, XXXVI, p. 101; D.M. Kovačević, Србија и Русија 1878-1889: oд Берлинског конгреса до абдикације краља Милана, Belgrade 2003, pp. 86-87.

159Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

168 Skazkin, Конец cit., pp. 87-89; V.M. Hvostov, Проблемы истории внешней политики России и международных отношений в конце XIX - начале XX вв., Moskow 1974, pp. 174-193; Kovačević, Србија cit., pp. 59-70; M. Ković, Србија у спољној политици Русије од 1878. до 1883. године, in “Политика”, 30 August 1995.

169 Kovačević, Србија cit., p. 86.170 Ibid., pp. 87-88; Dančenko, Из историје cit., p. 101.171 St Quentin to Waddington, Belgrade, 13 October 1878, № 46, AMAE, Turquie, Serbie, 1878;

M.Ž. Živanović, Прилози за проучавање питања империјалистичког продирања Аустро-Угарске у Србију – од Берлинског конгреса (1878) до закључења трговинског уговора (1881), Belgrade 1956, p. 139; J. Ristić to K. Cukić, Belgrade, 24 October 1878, ASANU, FJR, XV/7, 15/247; K. Cukić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 5 November 1878, AS, MID-PO, 1878, F-III, D-VI, P/5-II, pov. br. 763.

172 Hauptmannn, Österreich-Ungarns cit., pp. 146-147.173 A. Vasiljević, Моје успомене, R. Ljušić (ed.), Belgrade 1990, p. 29.174 Ibid., pp. 128, 131.175 Ibid., pp. 130-134; A. Vasiljević to Prince Milan, Niš, 21 December 1878, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2,

25/26 – letter published in Vasiljević, Моје cit., pp. 198-202; Dančenko, Из историје cit., p. 101; Kovačević, Србија cit., pp. 88-89.

176 Sahanski to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 30 January 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-I, D-V, Ž/1, pov. br. 36; Vasiljević, Моје cit., pp. 137-138; Sahanski to J. Ristić, Belgrade 4 February 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-I, D-V, Ž/1, pov. br. 43; A. Vasiljević to Prince Milan, Niš, 21 December 1878, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2, 25/26; Baron Herbert to Count G. Andrássy, Belgrade, 2 February 1879, ASANU, IBA, 7940/7618; Baron des Michels to Waddington, Belgrade, 10 March 1879, AMAE, АD, Ser-bie, 1879; General M. Chernyayev to Metropolitan Mihailo, Moskow, 29 November 1879, AS-ANU, FJR, XXV/13, 25/417; J. Ristić to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 9 February 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-III, D-II, P/5-VII, pov. br. 51.

177 Vasiljević, Моје cit., p. 138; Бележница Јована Мишковића [The notebook of Jovan Mišković], XII, 28 February 1879, ASANU, 7242/ XII.

178 J. Ristić to K. Cukić, Niš, 31 December 1878, AS, MID-PO, 1878, F-III, D-VII, P/5-II, pov. br. 867; J. Avramović to J. Ristić, 3 January 1879, ASANU, FJR, III/8, 3/1361; Vasiljević, Моје cit., p. 135; Baron Herbert to Count G. Andrássy, Belgrade 15 January 1879, ASANU, IBA, 7940/7616.

179 Pantić, Спољна cit., pp. 25-27.180 MIDS to K. Cukić, Niš, 8 January 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-III, P/5-II, pov. br. 9.181 K. Cukić to J. Ristić, Vienna 29 January 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-III, P/5-II, pov. br. 30.182 Živanović, Прилози cit., pp. 135-138; V.I. Bajkić, Историја српске трговинске политике, I свеска,

Аустро-угарска трговинска политика на Балкану до 1880, Belgrade 1902, pp. 74-75.183 Bajkić, Историја cit., p. 34; Rastović, Велика Британија cit., p. 155; J. Ristić to Baron Herbert,

Belgrade, 31 March/12 April 1879, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2, 25/39.184 Hauptmann, Österreich-Ungarns cit., pp. 147-148.

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185 Entwurf einer Übereinkunft (1), Entwurf einer Eisenbahn-Übereinkunft zwischen der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie und dem Fürstenthume Serbien (2), Protokoll der am 8. März 1879 im ge-meinsamen Ministerium des Aeußern abgehaltenen Sitzung der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Zoll- und Handels-Conferenz wegen Vorbereitung der mit Serbien abzuschließenden Verträge (3), Protokoll der am 9. März 1879 im gemeinsamen Ministerium des Aeußern abgehaltenen Zoll- und Handels-Con-ferenz wegen Vorbereitung der mit Serbien abzuschließenden Verträge (4), Protokoll der am 12. Mai 1879 im gemeinsamen Ministerium des Aeußern abgehaltenen Sitzung der oesterreichisch-ungari-schen Zoll- und Handels-Conferenz wegen Vorbereitung der mit Serbien abzuschließenden Verträge (5), Protokoll der am 13. Mai 1879 im gemeinsamen Ministerium des Aeußern abgehaltenen Zoll- und Handels-Conferenz wegen Vorbereitung der mit Serbien abzuschließenden Verträge (6), Protokoll der am 14. Mai 1879 im gemeinsamen Ministerium des Aeußern abgehaltenen Sitzung der oester-reichisch-ungarischen Zoll- und Handels-Conferenz wegen Vorbereitung der mit Serbien abzuschlie-ßenden Verträge (7), MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 1411; МОL, K 27, 25 February 1879.

186 Protokoll. Entwurf, MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 1411.187 M. Samardžić, Железничко питање у српско-турским односима 1878-1880, in “Истраживања”,

2006, 17, pp. 81-88; Id., Влада Јована Ристића и железничко питање у односима са Турском 1880. године, in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 2002, 65-66, pp. 55-62.

188 Bajkić, Историја cit., pp 37-38, 75-76; Baron Herbert to Count G. Andrássy, Belgrade, 20, 21 and 23 June 1879, MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 1854, 1904 and 1855; R. Alimpić to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 12 June 1879, AS, MID-A, 1879, Protokol, № 3697; Стенографске белешке о седницама Народне скупштине, која је држана у Нишу 1879. и 1880. год, vol. II, Belgrade 1880, pp. 2328-2329.

189 Резиме вођених преговора у Министарству спољних послова у Бечу са Заступницима Књажевско-српске владе о уређењу жељезничког питања, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-I, D-V, Ž/1, pov. br. 692; F. Všetečka to J. Ristić, Litomišl, 4/16 July 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/87; R. Alimpić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 27 June/9 July 1879, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/71; Hauptmann, Österreich-Ungarns cit., pp. 147-148.

190 J. Ristić to K. Cukić, Belgrade, 1 July 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br. 314; F. Gould to Lord Salisbury, Niš, 2 December 1879, FO, 105/10.

191 Приметбе на предложену железничку конвенцију and Note relative aux projets de Convention de chemins de fer et de protocole entre la monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Principauté de Serbie, Belgrade, le 16 Août 1879, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/73 and 100; Živanović, Прилози cit., pp. 145-146.

192 J. Ristić to K. Cukić, Belgrade, 27 September 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-III, P/5-II, pov. br. 466; P. Steić to J. Ristić, Vienna 2 Octobre 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-III, P/5-II, pov. br. 484.

193 Baron Herbert to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Belgrade, 19 Octobre 1879, MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 3198.

194 P. Steić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 28 Octobre 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-III, P/5-II, pov. br. 502; Baron H. Haymerle to Baron Herbert, Vienna, 29 Octobre 1879, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2, 25/103.

195 Baron Herbert to Baron H. Haymerle, Belgrade, 6 November 1879, MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 3252.

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196 Baron Herbert to Baron H. Haymerle, Belgrade, 19 November 1879, MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 3395.

197 P. Steić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 10, 14 and 26 December 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-III, P/5-II, pov. br. 627, 641 and 667; Baron des Michels to Waddington, Belgrade, 29 December 1879, № 40, АМАЕ, AD, Serbie, 1879; F. Gould to Lord Salisbury, Niš, 17 January 1880, № 16, FO, 105/14.

198 Извештај вештака, које је Српско Министарство Грађевина позвало, да даду своје мнење о грађењу српске жељезнице, Belgrade 1879; Brand, Вештачко мнење као одговор на питања о српској жељезници, која је српска влада поднела за то одређеној комисији, Belgrade 1879; Baron Herbert to Count G. Andrássy, Belgrade, 6 April 1879, МOL, K-26, 422, 1879, III, 628/1041.

199 Извештај вештака cit., pp. 23-33.200 Baron Herbert to Count G. Andrássy, Zemun/Belgrade, 13, 26 March and 6 April 1879, MOL,

K-26, 422, 1879, III, 628/1347, 800 and 1041; Baron Schwegel to Count Tisza, Vienna, 15 March and 27 April 1879, MOL, K-26, 422, 1879, III, 628.

201 Hauptmann, Österreich-Ungarns cit., pp. 147-151.202 Kreuter to J. Ristić, Vienna, 4 May 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/82.203 F. Všeteška to J. Ristić, Litomišl, 4/16 July 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/87; Kopp to J. Ristić,

Vienna, 5 August 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/93. 204 Бележница cit., XII, 4 August 1879, ASANU, 7242/XII.205 А. Ronna and А. de Serres to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 18 August and Niš, 29 August 1879, ASANU,

FJR, XV/4, 15/95-96 and 97; R. Alimpić to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 12 August 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/216; De Beaucaire to Waddington, 9 and 21 September 1879, № 26 and 30, AMAE, AD, Serbie, 1879, Tome 1; Бележница cit., XII, 25 August 1879, АСАНУ, сигн. 7242/XII; А. Ronna and А. de Serres to R. Alimpić, Belgrade, 7 September 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/94; R. Alimpić to A Rona and A. de Serr, Belgrade, 26 August 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/94.

206 Bakunin to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 25 August/6 September 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/96.207 Baron Herbert to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Belgrade, 22 September 1879,

MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 2797/2843.208 Понуде за грађење српских железница, IV, В.О. Баранова, in “Самоуправа”, 17 February 1881.209 Baron Herbert to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Belgrade, 22 September 1879,

MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III, 2797/2843.210 Бележница cit., XII, 10 and 16 May 1879, ASANU, FJR, 7242/XII; Č. Popov, Француска

дипломатија, балкански проблеми и међународни положај Србије после Берлинског конгреса (1878-1882), in “Зборник Матице српске за историју”, 1994, 49, p. 68.

211 Бележница cit., XII, 6, 10 and 15 October 1879, ASANU, 7242/XII; Baron Herbert to Baron H. Haymerle, Belgrade, 6 November 1879, MOL, К-26, 422, 1879, III, 2797/3252; Des Michels to Waddington, Belgrade, 27 October 1879, № 33, АМАЕ, АD, Serbie, 1879, Т. 1; МОL, К-27, 6 and 11 October 1879; Péchy to L. Fremy, Budapest, 10 October 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/218; L. Fremy to R. Alimpić, Belgrade, 18 and 22 October 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/219 and 98.

212 De Beaucaire to Waddington, Belgrade, 21 September 1879, AMAE, АD, Serbie, 1879, Т. 1.

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213 J. Ristić to P. Steić, Belgrade, 30 October 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-V, P/5-II, pov. br. 531.

214 P. Steić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 3 November 1879, AS, MID-PO, 1879, F-II, D-V, P/5-II, pov. br. 541.

215 Menagement of Staatsbahn to J. Ristić, Vienna, 17 November 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/222.

216 МОL, К-27, 1 November 1879.217 Kreuter to J. Ristić, Vienna, 16 November 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/220.218 F. Brohy to R. Alimpić, Niš, 26 and 29 November 1879, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/100.219 F. Brohy to J. Ristić, Paris 13 January 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/102.220 Jelavich, Tsarist cit., pp. 68-69; E. Statelova, Дипломацията на Княжество България 1879-1886,

Sofia 1979, pp. 46-47.221 General M. Chernyayev to Metropolitan Mihailo, Moskow, 26 November and 25 December 1879,

ASANU, FJR, XXV/13, 25/417 and XIV/5, 14/75; Kovačević, Србија cit., p. 96.222 Metropolitan Mihailo to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 3 January 1880, ASANU, ZDS, 14556/477; Metro-

politan Mihailo to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 9 January 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/75; J. Marinović to J. Ristić, Paris, 31 January and 11/23 February 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-VIII, P/5-IV, pov. br. 65 and 79; Metropolitan Mihailo to Đ. S. Simić, Belgrade, 29 January 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 57; Đ.S. Simić to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 30 January 1880, ASANU, FJR, XII/5, 12/332; J. Ristić to Đ.S. Simić, Niš, 30 January 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 60.

223 Stokes, Politics cit., pp. 159-161; Milićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 12-13; Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 17-18.

224 L. Perović, Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države (Zakon o us-tanovljenju narodno-sanitetskog fonda i Zakon o čuvanju narodnog zdravlja 1879, 1881), in “Tokovi istorije”, 1997, 1-2, pp. 42-53.

225 Stokes, Politics cit., pp. 160-169; Milićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 13-14.226 Baron Herbert to Baron Haymerle, 4 and 22 January 1880, ASANU, IBA, 7940; Jovanović, Влада

cit., pp. 38-39.227 V. Jovanović, Успомене, Belgrade 1988, p. 454.228 Živanović, Политичка cit., pp. 71-74; Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 35.229 Stokes, Politics cit., pp. 179-180; Milićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 15-16; Дневник Милана Ђ. Ми-

лићевића (10. јули 1879. - 31. децембар 1880), књига Х (vol. X), ASANU 9327.230 Milićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 16-18; Stokes, Politics cit., 180-182; “Видело”, 2 January 1880.231 “Видело”, 2, 4 January 1880.232 Дневник cit., January, February 1880, ASANU 9327.233 “Видело”, 23 January 1880.234 Id., 8, 24, 27 February 1880.

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235 Id., 8, 24 February 1880.236 Id., 8 February 1880.237 Ibid.238 Id., 1, 2 February 1880.239 Протоколи Народне скупштине држане у Нишу 1879/1880, Belgrade 1880, pp. 1076-1077.240 J. Ristić to P. Steić, Niš, 6/18 January 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br. 13.241 Ministry of Public Works to MIDS, Belgrade, 22 August 1879, AS, MID-A, 1879, Protocol,

№ 5430; Приметбе на предложену железничку конвенцију, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/100; Živanović, Прилози cit., pp. 145-146; Note relative aux projets de Convention de chemins de fer et de protocole entre la monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Principauté de Serbie, Belgrade, le 16 Août 1879, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/73.

242 Пројект уговора о вези жељезничкој између Кнежевине Србије и Аустро-Угарске монархије, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/74; R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Niš, 31 December 1879, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/74.

243 Ibid.244 Baron Herbert to Baron Haymerle, Belgrade, 19 November 1879, MOL, K 26, 422, 1879, III,

3395.245 M. Samardžić, Србија и Бугарска (1878-1886), manuscript, Belgrade 2003, pp. 92-93.246 Rastović, Велика Британија cit., p. 157.247 Пројект уговора, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/74.248 R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Niš, 31 December 1879, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/74.249 Ibid.250 P. Steić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 19/31 January 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br. 39

and 40.251 Пројект уговора, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76; R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Belgrade 21 February

1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76.252 Hauptmann, Österreich-Ungarns cit., pp. 147-150.253 R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Belgrade, 21 February 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76.254 МОL, K 27, 25 February 1879.255 Пројект уговора, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76; R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Belgrade, 21 February

1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76.256 Ibid.257 R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Belgrade 21 February 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76.258 Ibid.259 MOL, K 27, 18 February 1880.260 R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Belgrade 21 February 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76; Пројект

уговора, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/76.

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261 P. Steić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 26 February 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br. 92.262 M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 5 March 1880, AS, PO, 25/198, 9.263 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p. 189264 M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 5 March 1880, AS, PO, 25/198, 9; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp.

189, 192.265 Железничка конвенција између Србије и Аустроугарске, in Стенографске белешке о седницама

Ванредне Народне скупштине која се састала у Крагујевцу на дан 11. Маја 1880. год, Belgrade 1880, pp. 28-35; R. Alimpić to M. Marić, Belgrade, 15 March 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/84; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p. 189.

266 M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 4 March 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/2, 14/128.267 Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 20.268 M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 1 March 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/78 and 14/79.269 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 188-189.270 Ibid., p. 190.271 MIDS to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 2 March 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br. 105.272 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p. 190.273 F. Hristić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 13 March 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br.

119.274 F. Hristić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 9 March 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br. 114.275 F. Hristić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 19 March 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-IV, P/5-II, pov. br.

132.276 Ibid.277 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., pp. 191-192.278 J. Ristić to J. Marinović, Belgrade, 17 March 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-VIII, P/5-IV, pov.

br. 126; W. Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p. 192.279 M. Marić to R. Alimpić, Vienna, 22 March 1880, AS, PO, 25/198, 7; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit.,

p. 192.280 M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 25 March 1880, AS, PO, 25/198, 7; Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p.

192.281 Железничка конвенција између Србије и Аустроугарске, in Стенографске белешке 1880 cit., pp.

34-35; M. Marić to R. Alimpić, Vienna, 22 March 1880, AS, PO, 25/198, 7.282 Rechberger, Ein Beitrag cit., p. 193; J. Ristić to M. Marić, Belgrade, 26 March 1880, AS, PO,

25/198, 13; M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 27 March/8 April 1880, AS, PO, 25/198, 14.283 M. Radojević (ed.), Српски устави од 1835 до 1990 године са уставима Краљевине СХС и Краље-

вине Југославије, Belgrade 2004, p. 82.284 Milićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 19-21; Šemjakin, О карактеру cit., pp. 64-65.285 Дневник Милана Ђ. Милићевића (1. јануар 1881. – 31. децембар 1883), књига XI (vol. XI),

January-May 1881, ASANU, 9327.

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286 “Видело”, 7 and 14 May 1880.287 Id., 11 May 1880.288 Id., 9 May 1880.289 Id., 14 May 1880.290 L. Perović, Politička upotreba smrti opozicionog narodnog poslanika Adama Bogosavljevića: postavl-

janje organizacije Narodne radikalne stranke, in Id., Između cit., pp. 121-126.291 Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 130-148; Id., Радикалъное cit., pp. 43-50.292 Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола cit., p. 239; L. Perović, Mogućnosti i ograničenja modernizacije, in

Id., Između cit., pp. 21-22.293 “Видело”, 2 May 1880; Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола cit., pp. 51-52, 59-62; Šemjakin, Идеоло-

гија cit., pp. 145-148.294 Milićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 13-15; Perović (ed.), Никола Пашић cit., pp. 307-308; Šemjakin,

Идеологија cit., pp. 147-148; Id., Радикалъное cit., pp. 41-43.295 “Видело”, 2 May 1880.296 Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола cit., pp. 27-28.297 Milićević, Опозиција cit., p. 21; Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 37.298 J. Ristić to F. Hristić, Belgrade, 5 May 1880, in Писма Ристића Христићу cit., p. 273; Samardžić,

Влада cit., p. 60.299 J. Ristić to J. Grujić, Belgrade, 6/18 May 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-II, D-V, P/5-VII, pov. br.

228.300 Samardžić, Влада cit., pp. 58-62; Id., Железничко cit., pp. 87-88.301 Стенографске белешке 1880 cit., pp. 1-61; Živanović, Политичка cit., II, pp. 80-83; Radojević

(ed.), Српски cit., p. 85.302 Извештај одбора ванредне народне скупштине о жељезничкој конвенцији, потписаној између

Србија и Аустро-Угарске 28. Марта ове године, in Стенографске белешке 1880 cit., pp. 62-73.303 “Видело”, 21 May 1880; Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 37; Živanović, Политичка cit., vol. II, p. 84.304 Стенографске белешке 1880 cit., pp. 96-97.305 Ibid., pp. 94-106.306 “Видело”, 2 May 1880.307 Стенографске белешке 1880 cit., p. 117.308 Ibid., pp. 161-162.309 Ibid., pp. 84-85, 121.310 Ibid., pp. 119-120.311 Ibid., p. 164.312 Ibid., p. 119.313 Ibid., p. 121.314 Ibid., p. 116.

1�� Momir Samardžic

315 Ibid., pp. 204-214.316 Ibid., pp. 214-216.317 Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 37.318 Ibid., pp. 22-31; Samardžić, Од Сан Стефана cit., pp. 94-95; Id., Србија и Бугарска 1879-1885, in

“Настава историје”, 2001, 13, pp. 18-30.319 F. Ctibor to J. Ristić, Vienna, 7 April 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/3, 15/185; M. Marić to J. Ristić,

Vienna, 16 March 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/83; M. Marić to J. Ristić, Vienna, 27 March/9 April 1880, AS, PO, 25/198.

320 Kreuter to J. Ristić, Vienna, 22 May 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/94.321 Statelova, Дипломацията cit., pp. 48-50; Jelavich, Tsarist cit., p. 71.322 F. Brohy to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 7 May 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/3, 15/186.323 F. Brohy to J. Ristić, Budapest, 21 May 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/109.324 Kreuter to J. Ristić, Vienna, 22 May 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/94; F. Ctibor to J. Ristić,

Prague, 21 June 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/115.325 Бележница cit., XIII, 31 May 1880, ASANU, 7242/XIII; Бележница cit., XIV, 7 and 9 June

1880, ASANU, 7242/XIV; Đ. Cenić to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 15 June 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/114.

326 Đ. Cenić to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 11 June 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/3, 15/195.327 Đ. Cenić to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 15 June 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/114.328 Ibid.; J. Ristić to Prince Milan, Belgrade, 16 June 1880, ASANU, FJR, XXVII/2, 27/36.329 J. Ristić to J. Marinović, Belgrade, 19 June 1880, AS, MID-PO, 1880, F-I, D-VIII, P/5-IV, pov. br.

330; Бележница cit., XIV, 8 June 1880, АСАНУ, 7242/XIV.330 Бележница cit., XIV, 21 June 1880, АСАНУ, 7242/XIV.331 J. Ristić to J. Marinović, Belgrade, 28 June 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/96; Živanović, Прилози

cit., pp. 146-147.332 Ibid.333 “Самоуправа”, 13 February 1881.334 MOL, K-27, 6 June 1880.335 F. Brohy to J. Ristić , Belgrade, 14 and 22 July 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/4, 15/110 and 111.336 Note pour monsieur le ministre des finances, Belgrade, le 14 Juillet 1880, ASANU, FJR, XV/4,

15/110.337 M. Protić to J. Ristić, St. Petersburg, 5 July 1880, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2, 25/117; Kovačević,

Србија cit., pp. 99-100.338 Prince Milan to J. Ristić, Ems 4/16 July 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/2, 14/30; Živanović, Прилози

cit., pp. 148-152.339 Бележница cit., XIV, 18 July 1880, ASANU, 7242/XIV.340 Id., 19 July 1880.

1�7Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

341 J. Ristić to J. Marinović, Belgrade 22 July 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/95.342 J. Marinović to J. Ristić, Paris, 11/23 August 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/97; Živanović,

Прилози cit., pp. 147-148.343 Бележница cit., XIV, 16 August 1880, ASANU, 7242/XIV.344 “Српске новине”, 20 August 1880.345 Бележница cit., XIV, 1 October 1880, ASANU, 7242/XIV.346 F. Brohy and Caillat to S. Zdravković, Belgrade, 1/13 October 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/2,

14/15.347 “Самоуправа”, 17 February 1881.348 Č. Mijatović to diplomatic representatives of Serbia, Belgrade 16 November 1880, AS, MID-PO,

1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 523.349 Бележница cit., XIV, 8 October 1880, ASANU, 7242/XIV.350 S. Zdravković to J. Ristić, Belgrade, 9 October 1880, ASANU, FJR, XIV/5, 14/118.351 Бележница cit., XIV, 9 October, ASANU, 7242/XIV.352 Perović, Усредсређеност cit., p. 35.353 Perović, Šemjakin (eds.), Никола П. Пашић cit., pp. 238-239.354 Perović, Усредсређеност cit., pp. 34-38; Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 44-46; Stokes, Politics cit., pp.

193-195.355 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 44-45.356 Č. Mijatović to diplomatic representatives of Serbia, Belgrade, 16 November 1880, AS, MID-PO,

1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 523.357 Č. Mijatović, Шта ја знам о давању железничке концесије Бонту, in “Политика”, 18 May 1932.358 Brohy and Caillat to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 25 October/6 November 1880, AS, MF-E, ЕF X,

6/881.359 Č. Mijatović to diplomatic representatives of Serbia, Belgrade, 16 November 1880, AS, MID-PO,

1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 523.360 Durangel and Danon to Č. Mijatović, Paris, 23 November 1880, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.361 Durangel and Danon to Č. Mijatović, Paris, 3 December 1880, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881; Caillat to

Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 4/16 February 1881, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.362 Č. Mijatović to Caillat and Brohy, Belgrade, n.d. 1880, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.363 Ibid.364 Č. Mijatović to diplomatic representatives of Serbia, Belgrade, 16 November 1880, AS, MID-PO,

1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 523.365 M. Protić to J. Ristić, St. Petersburg, 5 July 1880, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2, 25/117.366 Č. Mijatović to diplomatic representatives of Serbia, Belgrade 16 November 1880, AS, MID-PO,

1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 523.367 Kovačević, Србија cit., p. 139; Dančenko, Из историје cit., p. 102.

1�8 Momir Samardžic

368 M. Protić to J. Ristić, St. Petersburg, 5 July 1880, ASANU, FJR, XXV/2, 25/117.369 Č. Mijatović to diplomatic representatives of Serbia, Belgrade, 16 November 1880, AS, MID-PO,

1880, F-I, D-III, Ž/1, pov. br. 523.370 Понуде за грађење српских железница, IV, В. О. Баранова, in “Самоуправа”, 17 February 1881.371 Ibid.372 Tercelin-Monjot to E. Borchgrave, Brussels, 30 December 1880, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881; Kossecky

to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, n.d., AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881; Zawacky to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, n.d., AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881; Mijatović, Шта ја знам cit.

373 Gould to Lord Salisbury, Belgrade, 13 April 1880, FO 105/14.374 Gould to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 12 January 1881, ASANU, PČM, 10042/III, 235.375 Предлог г. Хјума Вебстера Хоара српској влади с меморандумом, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881; Понуде

за грађење српских железница, V, Хјум Вебстер Хоар, in “Самоуправа”, 24 February 1881.376 Gould to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 12 January 1881, ASANU, PČM, 10042/III, 235.377 B. Michel, Zur Gründung der Länderbank: Planung und Einsatz französischen Kapitals im Donau-

raum (1880 bis 1882), in “Österreichische Osthefte”, 1986, 4, pp. 440-443.378 J. Bouvier, Le krach de l’Union Générale (1878-1885), Paris 1960, pp. 21-26.379 Michel, Zur Gründung cit., pp. 442-446.380 V.J. Vučković, Пад Генералне уније и проглас Краљевине (1882), in “Глас САН, Одељење друшт-

вених наука, нова серија”, 1956, CCXVIII, p. 51.381 MOL, K 27, January and February 1881.382 J. Marinović to Č. Mijatović, Paris, 10/22 November 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9940/2.383 Id.; F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 1 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9953/11.384 Id.; F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 15 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9953/13.385 J. Marinović to Č. Mijatović, Paris, 4 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9940/4; F. Hristić to Č.

Mijatović, Vienna, 1 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9953/11.386 F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 15 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9953/12.387 F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 28 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9953/14.388 F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 29 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9548.389 Caillat to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 4/16 February 1881, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.390 F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 29 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 9548; F. Hristić to Č.

Mijatović, Vienna, 4 January 1881, ASANU, PČM, 9460; F. Hristić to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 9 January 1881, ASANU, PČM, 9953/16.

391 Vučković, Пад cit., p. 50.392 Ibid.; Mijatović, Шта ја знам cit.393 Gould to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 31 December 1880, ASANU, PČM, 10042/III, 233; F. Hristić

to Č. Mijatović, Vienna, 6/18 February 1881, ASANU, PČM, 9549; Rastović, Велика Британија cit., p. 176.

1�9Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

394 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 112-119; Mijatović, Шта ја знам cit.; Id., The Memoirs cit., pp. 254-258; Mon Ami (T.Đ. Ivković), Бомбе: посвећене жељезничком друштву језуита, Бонтуа, Контоар д’Есконта, Виталиса, Лендербанке, напредњацима итд, Belgrade 1889, pp. 26-38; Jovanović, Успомене cit., pp. 460-463; Marković, Гроф cit., pp. 107-111.

395 Durangel and Danon to Č. Mijatović, Paris, 29 January 1881, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881; Caillat to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 4/16 February 1881, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.

396 Протоколи Народне скупштине која је држана у Београду 1880 и 1881 год, Belgrade 1881, pp. 482-483.

397 Извештај одбора железничког поднесен Народној скупштини 4 марта 1881, ASANU, 9914/5; Mijatović, Шта ја знам cit.

398 Nedeljković, Историја cit., pp. 30-31, 38.399 Mijatović, Шта ја знам cit.400 Nedeljković, Историја cit., pp. 37-39; Gnjatović, Stari cit., pp. 26-28.401 Општа конвенција за постројење прве српске државне жељезнице, in Зборник закона и уредаба у

Књажеству Србији изданих од 18 августа 1880 до 26 јуна 1881, vol. 36, Belgrade 1881, pp. 295-367.

402 Nedeljković, Историја cit., pp. 39-41; Gnjatović, Stari cit., pp. 27-28.403 Зборник закона cit., vol. 36, pp. 295-367; Nedeljković, Историја cit., pp. 42-43.404 Зборник закона cit., vol. 36, pp. 295-367.405 Nedeljković, Историја cit., pp. 43-44.406 Ibid., pp. 60-63; Gnjatović, Stari cit., pp. 28-29.407 Šemjakin, О карактеру cit., pp. 65-70; Мilićević, Опозиција cit., pp. 22-23; Perović, Српски cit.,

p. 84.408 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 46-50.409 “Самоуправа”, 8 January 1881; Ljušić, Krestić (eds.), Програми cit., pp. 101-104; Мilićević, Опо-

зиција cit., pp. 24-25.410 Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 50.411 “Самоуправа”, 8 January 1881.412 Наш економски положај, in “Самоуправа”, 10 January 1881.413 Ibid.414 “Самоуправа”, 3 February 1881.415 T.S. Tancred to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 14 February 1881, ASANU, PČM, 10042/III-240.416 Gould to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 10 February 1881, ASANU, PČM, 10042/III-239.417 T.S. Tancred to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 14 February 1881, ASANU, PČM, 10042/III-240.418 Тома Селби Танкред, III, in “Самоуправа”, 13 February 1881.419 Ibid.420 General Chernyayev to Polyakov, Belgrade, 1 December 1880, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.

170 Momir Samardžic

421 Пољаков, II, Понуда за грађење прве српске државне железнице и оснивање српске народне банке од царско-руског деиствителног државног саветника С.С. Пољакова и другова поднесена кња-жевско-српском министарском савету 7. Фебруара 1881. од М.Г. Черњајева, in “Самоуправа”, 13 February 1881.

422 Kovačević, Србија cit., pp. 138-139; Dančenko, Из историје cit., p. 102.423 Caillat to Č. Mijatović, Belgrade, 4/16 February 1881, AS, MF-E, EF X, 6/881.424 Извештај одбора железничког поднесен Народној скупштини 4. марта 1881, ASANU,

9914/5.425 Vasiljević, Моје cit., p. 144.426 Živanović, Политичка cit., vol. II, p. 175; Протоколи Народне скупштине 1880 и 1881 cit., pp.

255-257, 275.427 Ibid., pp. 274-275.428 Извештај мањине одбора железничког Народној скупштини, ASANU, 9914/6.429 Ibid.430 “Самоуправа”, 14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28 February and 3, 4 March 1881.431 Jovanović, Влада cit., p. 112.432 Mijatović, Шта ја знам cit.433 M. Piroćanac, Белешке, S. Rajić (ed.), Belgrade 2004, p. 25.434 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 116-119; Piroćanac, Белешке cit., pp. 25-26.435 Ibid., pp. 92-93.436 “Самоуправа”, 4 March 1881.437 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 91-94; Živanović, Политичка cit., vol. II, pp. 175-177; Говори радикалаца

против железничког уговора у Скупштини 1880/1, Belgrade 1881, pp. 15-163.438 Perović (ed.), Никола cit., pp. 582-583.439 Id., Prva železnička pruga u Srbiji, in Id., Između cit., pp. 262-263; Id., Politička elita i modernizacija

u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države, in L. Perović, M. Obradović, D. Stojanović (eds.), Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka, Belgrade 1994, p. 240; Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 159-160; Протоколи Народне скупштине 1880 и 1881, p. 569.

440 Perović, Prva cit., pp. 261-262; Id., Politička cit., pp. 239-240; Šemjakin, Идеологија cit., pp. 158-159; Говори радикалаца cit., pp. 51-63, 100-106.

441 Perović, Prva cit., pp. 262-263.442 Говори радикалаца cit., pp. 34-35.443 Ibid., p. 98; Perović, Prva cit., p. 262.444 Говори радикалаца cit., p. 24.445 Протоколи Народне скупштине 1880 и 1881 cit., p. 492.446 Perović, Prva cit., pp. 263-264.447 Протоколи Народне скупштине 1880 и 1881 cit., pp. 519-520.

171Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

448 Ibid., pp. 542-544.449 Perović, Prva cit., pp. 263-265; Id., Politička cit., pp. 240-241; Протоколи Народне скупштине

1880 и 1881 cit., pp. 519-520, 540-545, 572-573.450 Jovanović, Влада cit., pp. 91-94; Živanović, Политичка cit., vol. II, pp. 175-177; Протоколи На-

родне скупштине 1880 и 1881 cit., p. 755.451 Nikolić, Историја cit., pp. 79-81, 95-97; Arnautović, Историја cit., p. 215; S. Rajić, Влада Нико-

ле Христића (1888-1889), Belgrade 2003, p. 166.

bIblIoGraphy

arChIVes

Arhiv Srbije (Archives of Serbia), Belgrade - ASFond Ilije Garašanina (Ilija Garašanin Fund) - IGKnjažeska kancelarija (Prince’s Office) - KKMinistarstvo inostranih dela (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) - MID

Administrativno-pravno odeljenje (Administrative and legal department) - APolitičko odeljenje (Political Department) - POPoslanstvo u Carigradu (Legation in Constantinople) - PCg

Ministarstvo finansija (Ministry of Finance) - MFEkonomno odeljenje (Department of Economics) - E

Pokloni i otkupi (Gifts and purchases) - PO

Arhiv Srpske akademije nauke i umetnosti (Archives of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences), Belgrade - ASANU

Fond Jovana Ristića ( Jovan Ristić Fund) - FJRIspisi iz bečkih arhiva (Reports from Vienna archives) - IBAPisma Čedomilja Mijatovića (Letters of Čedomilj Mijatović) - PČMZaostavština Dragoslava Stranjakovića (Legacy of Dragoslav Stranjaković) - ZDS

The National Archives, LondonForeign Office - FO

Ministére des Affaires Étrangéres, Archives Diplomatiques, Paris - MAE, ADTurquie, Belgrade, 1878Serbie, 1879

Magyar Országos Levéltár, Budapest - MOLК-26 - Мiniszterelnökségi LevéltárК-27 - Мiniszterelnökségi Levéltár, Minisztertanács

17� Momir Samardžic

prInted sourCes

1. Бранд, Вештачко мнење као одговор на питања о српској жељезници, која је српска влада поднела за то одређеној комисији, Belgrade 1879.

2. Говори радикалаца против железничког уговора у Скупштини 1880/1, Belgrade 1881.3. Извештај вештака, које је Српско Министарство Грађевина позвало, да даду своје мнење о

грађењу српске жељезнице, Belgrade 1879.4. Крестић В., Љушић Р. (eds.), Програми и статути српских политичких странака до 1918.

године, Belgrade 1991.5. [Марковић Ј.], Треба ли нам железница?, Belgrade 1871.6. Мијатовић Ч., Шта ја знам о давању железничке концесије Бонту, in “Политика”, 18 May

1932.7. Mon Ami [Ивковић Т. Ђ.], Бомбе: посвећене жељезничком друштву језуита, Бонтуа, Контоар

д’Есконта, Виталиса, Лендербанке, напредњацима итд, Belgrade 1889.8. Перовић Л., Шемјакин А. Л. (eds.), Никола П. Пашић: писма, чланци, говори (1872-1891),

Belgrade 1995.9. Писма Јована Ристића Филипу Христићу од 1870–1873 и од 1877-1880, in “Зборник за исто-

рију, језик и књижевност српског народа”, 1931, 20.10. Протоколи Народне скупштине која је држана у Крагујевцу 1871, Belgrade 1871.11. Протоколи Народне скупштине држане у Нишу 1878-79 год, Belgrade 1879.12. Протоколи Народне скупштине држане у Нишу 1879/1880, Belgrade 1880.13. Протоколи Народне скупштине која је држана у Београду 1880 и 1881 год, Belgrade 1881.14.РадојевићМ.(ed.),Српски устави од 1835 до 1990 године са уставима Краљевине

СХС и Краљевине Југославије, Belgrade 2004.15. Стенографске белешке о седницама Народне скупштине држане у Београду 1874/5, Belgrade

1875.16. Стенографске белешке о седницама Народне скупштине, која је држана у Крагујевцу и Београду

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Belgrade 1993.60. Id., Српски социјалисти 19. века: прилог историји социјалистичке мисли, Belgrade 1995.61. Id., Između anarhije i autokratije: srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI), Belgrade 2006.62. Попов Ч., Србија и Француска 1871-1878, Belgrade 1974.63. Id., Srbija na putu oslobođenja 1868-1878: borba za politički preobražaj i državnu nezavisnost

1868-1878, Belgrade 1980.64. Поповић-Обрадовић О., Парламентаризам у Србији од 1903. до 1914. године, Belgrade

1998.65. Рајић С., Влада Николе Христића (1888-1889), Belgrade 2003.66. Растовић А., Велика Британија и Србија 1878-1889, Belgrade 2000.67. Rechberger W., Zur Geschichte der Orientbahnen: Ein Beitrag zur österreichisch-ungarischen Eisen-

bahnpolitik auf dem Balkan in den Jahren von 1852-1888, PhD manuscript, Wien 1958.68. Ристић Ј., Дипломатска историја Србије за време српских ратова за ослобођење и независност

1875-1878, II, Belgrade 1898.69. Rostow W., Stages of Economical Growth, New York 1990.70. Самарџић М., Србија и Бугарска (1878-1886), manuscript, Belgrade 2003.71. Id., Европа и обележавање граница Србије 1878-1879, Novi Sad 2006.72. Id., Од Сан Стефана до Сливнице: Србија против Бугарске 1878-1886, Novi Sad 2008.73. Симић, В., Из скорашње прошлости рударства у Србији, Belgrade 1960.74. Сказкин С. Д., Конец австро-русско-германскаго союзa: Исследование по истории русско-гер-

манских и русско-австрийских отношения в связи с восточным вопросом в 80-е годы ХІХ сто-летия, Moskow 1974.

75. Скерлић Ј., Омладина и њена књижевност (1848-1871): изучавања о националном и књижев-ном романтизму код Срба, Belgrade 1925.

76. Smith A., National Identity, London 1991.77. Стателова Е., Дипломацията на Княжество България 1879-1886, Sofia 1979.78. Stokes G., Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian

Politics, Seattle-London 1975.

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79. Id., Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia, Durham-London 1990.

80. Sundhaussen H., Historische Statistik Serbiens 1834-1914: Mit europäischen Vergleichsdaten, Munich 1989.

81. Id., Geschichte Serbiens 19.-21. Jahrhundert, Vienna-Cologne-Weimar 2007 (Belgrade 2009).82. Шемякин А.Л., Радикалъное движение в Сербии: зарождение, становление, первые шаги (1875-

1883), Moskow 1993.83. Id., Идеологија Николе Пашића: формирање и еволуција (1868-1891), Belgrade 2008.84. Tomasevich J., Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia, Stanford 1955.85. Трговчевић Љ., Планирана елита: o студентима из Србије на европским универзитетима у

19. веку, Belgrade 2003.86. Вучо Н., Привредна историја Србије до Првог светског рата, Belgrade 1955.87. Золотухин М.Ю., Россия, западноевропейские державы и Османская империя в период

международных кризисов на Балканах (1885-1888 гг.), Moskow 1993.88. Живановић Ж., Политичка историја Србије у другој половини деветнаестог века: књига прва:

од Свето-Андрејске Скупштине до прогласа независности Србије 1858-1878, Belgrade 1923. 89. Id., Политичка историја Србије у другој половини деветнаестог века: књига друга: од прогласа

независности Србије до абдикације краља Милана 1878-1889, Belgrade 1924.

srpskI rezIMe

Putevi u Evropu

Srpska politika i železničko pitanje 1878-1881

U državama evropske privredne periferije, sa pogledom uperenim ka razvijenim privredama evropskog Zapada, osnovno pitanje bio je ubrzani privredni razvoj u pokušaju da se nadoknadi propušteno. Na geopolitički vrlo osetljivom prostoru, koji je bio predmet dugoročnih strateških interesa velikih sila, determinisana sve odlučnijim odvajanjem od osmanske civilizacije i okretanjem evropskim uticajima, istorija moderne srpske države bila je obeležena naporima vladara i vladajuće elite da „reformom odozgo“, odnosno reformskim zakonodavstvom i stvaranjem odgovarajućeg institucionalnog okvira, obezbede neophodne uslove za razvoj kapitalizma. Ovaj proces predstavlja konstantu istorije Srbije, ali konstantu koju karakteriše različiti intenzitet modernizacijskih napora. Međutim, suočena sa složenim unutrašnjim i spoljašnjim faktorima – okoštalom tradicionalnom društvenom strukturom iz osmanskog razdoblja i sa njom neposredno povezanom nemogućnošću razvoja poljoprivrede kao neophodnog preduslova za transformaciju agrarne i razvoj tržišno orijentisane privredne strukture; međusobno suprotstavljenim zakonskim propisima koji su sputavali razvoj privrede; međunarodnim okolnostima koje su je dovele u položaj izvoznika sirovina i uvoznika industrijskih proizvoda – država nije uspela da delotvornom intervencijom učini odlučujući korak na putu uspešne privredne modernizacije.

Jedan od najznačajnijih razloga neuspeha privrednih reformi bila je usmerenost elite na političku modernizaciju, na reformu institucija, pre svega na ustavno preuređenje kao vrhunac, ali i okvir, reforme političkog sistema, dok je zanemarivana potreba sveobuhvatne modernizacije, koja je neizostavno vodila ka odstupanju od preuzetih modela i neuspehu političkih reformi, bez dubljeg suštinskog uticaja na društvene promene. Pored toga, i pre i posle sticanja nezavisnosti, težnja za nacionalnim ujedinjenjem i teritorijalnim proširenjem dominirala je srpskom politikom, u značajnoj meri određujući dinamiku unutrašnjeg razvoja. Koncepcija modernizacije koju je zastupala vladajuća elita počivala je na prihvatanju tekovina evropskog liberalizma, bez obzira da li je bila reč o liberalizmu pod snažnim uticajem revolucionarnog demokratizma Evrope u vreme italijanskog i nemačkog ujedinjenja (karakterističnom za liberale šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina) ili doktrinarnom

18� Momir Samardžic

liberalizmu prve polovine 19. veka (karakterističnom za mladokonzervativce/naprednjake). Nasuprot tome, odbijajući usvajanje liberalnih načela i ustanova, odnosno ideju političke i privredne modernizacije prema zapadnoevropskom uzoru, prvi srpski socijalisti, predvođeni Svetozarom Markovićem, odgovor na izazove modernizacije našli su u ideologiji ruskog narodnjačkog socijalizma, odnosno ideji Černiševskog o mogućnosti preskakanja etapa u društvenom razvoju, uz oslonac na princip kolektivne svojine sačuvan u patrijarhalnim ustanovama tradicionalnog društva – u srpskom slučaju porodičnoj zadruzi i opštini kao osnovnoj jedinici lokalne samouprave. U osnovi sukoba u kojem je ubrzo, usled specifičnog istorijskog razvoja Srbije, prirodni saveznik socijalista, a potom i njihovih idejnih naslednika radikala, postalo seljaštvo kao značajan politički faktor, nalazio se odnos prema Evropi i njenim vrednostima, spremnost da se one prihvate ili njihova negacija, uvek opterećeni bremenom spoljnopolitičkog položaja i potrebe ostvarenja „zavetne misli“ nacionalnog oslobođenja i ujedinjenja.

Kao simbol privrednog uspona Zapada, železnica predstavlja paradigmatičan primer svih protivrečnosti modernizacije, a transbalkanska železnica – neposredan put ka Evropi u kontekstu simboličnog izbora civilizacijske orijentacije – ukazuje na svu specifičnost problema, kako spoljnopolitičkih, tako i unutrašnjopolitičkih, sa kojima se Srbija suočavala u nastojanju da se nađe na njenoj trasi. Interesi evropskih sila za ostvarenje neposredne železničke veze sa Osmanskim carstvom uvukli su početkom pedesetih Srbiju, kao vazalnu autonomnu kneževinu Carstva na geostrateški osetljivom prostoru, u vrtlog suprotstavljenih interesa i nametnuli su srpskoj vladi ideju o neophodnosti izgradnje železnice. Sa druge strane, upravo povoljan geostrateški položaj pružao je vladi priliku da obezbedi srpskoj privredi sve prednosti koje donosi mesto na trasi jedne od najznačajnijih evropskih železnica, da pregovarajući samostalno o ovom pitanju potvrdi svoj nezavisan položaj u odnosu na Portu, te da na taj način, ubrzanim privrednim razvojem i jačanjem međunarodnog položaja, učini još jedan značajan korak ka konačnom cilju – nezavisnosti.

Suočavanje sa železničkim izazovom 1867‒1878

Od jeseni 1867. i konačne Portine odluke da gradi transbalkansku železnicu, a posebno posle sklapanja ugovora sa Hiršom sa odredbama koje su predviđale uspostavljanje neposredne veze Istanbula i evropskih prestonica preko Bosne, sa potencijalnim ogrankom preko teritorije Srbije, železničko pitanje predstavljalo je jedno od najznačajnijih spoljnopolitičkih pitanja kojima se bavila srpska vlada sve do

185Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

početka Velike istočne krize 1875‒1878. Osnovni cilj bio je obezbeđenje priključka srpske železnice sa osmanskim i ugarskim linijama, uz napuštanje ideje o izgradnji glavne linije preko Bosne. Teškoće izgradnje železnice na planinskom terenu kakav je bio bosanski, uticaj ugarske vlade koja se zalagala za koncept železničkog povezivanje preko Budimpešte, a samim tim preko Beograda, kao i uticaj na Porti Rusije čije diplomate su pokušavale da spreče realizaciju Hiršovog projekta, išli su u prilog interesima Srbije. Pored toga, Srbija je koristila interes Austrougarske i pritisak Beča da bude potpisana bilateralna železnička konvencija, koji počinje 1871, kako bi obezbedila podršku austrougarske diplomatije na Porti i počela pregovore o određivanju spojne tačke srpske i osmanske linije. U decembru 1873. Srbija je postigla sporazum sa ugarskom vladom o železničkoj konvenciji, ali uz uslov da konvencija bude potpisana tek kada bude obezbeđena veza na jugu. Do leta 1875. austrougarska diplomatija radila je u Istanbulu na uspostavljanju pomenute veze – diplomatske note od 1. jula i 30. septembra 1875, kojima je Porta pristala da izgradi spojnu liniju preko Niša i Aleksinca do kraja 1879, predstavljale su osnovu konačnog sporazuma, čija realizacija je ušla u član 38 Berlinskog ugovora. Istovremeno, Srbija je na Berlinskom kongresu diplomatsku podršku Austrougarske za teritorijalnu ekspanziju obezbedila posebnom konvencijom od 8. jula 1878, nagovestivši privredne ustupke, među kojima je bila i izgradnja železnice u roku od tri godine. U nemačkoj prestonici rešena je dilema trase transbalkanske železnice – ona je išla preko Srbije. Posle Berlinskog kongresa pred srpskom vladom ostalo je pitanje načina ostvarenja ovog zadatka.

Sa druge strane, spoljnopolitička delatnost vlade na rešavanju železničkog pitanja uvek se reflektovala njegovim aktuelizovanjem u unutrašnjem političkom diskursu, te su ove dve njegove dimenzije – spoljašnja i unutrašnja – bile neprestano međusobno uslovljene i isprepletene. U tom smislu, od posebne važnosti bila je činjenica da se nametanje potrebe izgradnje železnice kao spoljnopolitičkog problema poklopilo sa političkim usponom liberala praćenim ne samo političkim reformama i dinamizacijom političkog života posle usvajanja novog ustava 1869, već i nastojanjima da, prateći zapadnoevropski primer, bude učinjen odgovarajući iskorak na putu privredne modernizacije čiji je sastavni deo trebalo da bude i izgradnja železnice. Dok je na spoljašnjem planu vlada nesmetano delovala i saglasno vlastitim procenama nastojala da učini pravi potez i obezbedi Srbiji mesto na trasi transbalkanske železnice, u unutrašnjem javnom diskursu izgradnja železnice kao „tema dana“ evoluirala je od stručnih rasprava među samim liberalima 1867‒1868. ka ostrašćenim političkim raspravama u kontekstu različitih odgovora liberala i socijalista na izazove modernizacije – 1871. rasprava u štampi trajala je nekoliko meseci, a 1875‒1876. ponovilo se nešto

18� Momir Samardžic

slično, ali je tada bila reč o sukobu liberala i tek formirane narodnjačke opozicije u Narodnoj skupštini, podržane od socijalističke štampe.

Suprotstavljenost političkih koncepcija podrazumevala je i različit pristup pitanju privrednog razvoja. Međutim, fokusirana na borbu za političke reforme, srpska intelektualna elita značajno je zanemarila potrebu razvoja celovitog programa privrednih reformi. Obrazovani na širokom prostoru od Moskve i Petrograda, preko Berlina i Hajdelberga do Pariza, srpski intelektualci, političari, posebno ekonomisti, osetili su snažan i raznovrstan uticaj evropske ekonomske misli – kako klasične britansko-francuske liberalne ekonomije i starije nemačke istorijske škole, tako i socijalističkih ideja. Prva dva smera imala su svoje uporište među liberalima i mladokonzervativcima, iako nije moguće izvršiti jasnu diferencijaciju i podelu na ekonomske škole. Pre možemo da govorimo o snažnijem uticaju pojedinih ekonomskih mislilaca, ali nikako isključivom, te se „kod većine srpskih ekonomista osećaju razni, ponekad i protivrečni uticaji, pa i liberalni i intervencionistički, istovremeno“, kako ističe Obren Blagojević. Iako se osećao uticaj liberalne ekonomske teorije, političke i ekonomske prilike nisu pogodovale njenom učvršćenju, dok je suprotan slučaj bio sa starijom nemačkom istorijskom školom, koja je zagovarala državni intervencionizam i privredni protekcionizam kao preduslov razvoja domaće industrije. Sa druge strane, utemeljena na idejama ruskog narodnjačkog socijalizma, idealistička Markovićeva vizija preskakanja etapa u razvoju i izbegavanja grešaka zapadnoevropskog puta modernizacije posmatrala je političke reforme tek kao preduslov i prethodnicu ekonomskih, dok su njegovi politički naslednici radikali naglasak stavljali na političke reforme, zanemarujući ekonomski aspekt, priznajući na taj način nemogućnost ostvarenja Markovićeve vizije reformom umesto revolucijom.

Ove koncepcije privredne modernizacije – liberalna i narodnjačko-socijalistička – neizostavno su morale da dođu do izražaja u vezi sa jednim od najznačajnijih pitanja koja su dominirala srpskom politikom od kraja šezdesetih, a posebno krajem sedamdesetih i početkom osamdesetih – izgradnjom železnice u Srbiji. Za većinu liberala železnicа je bila simbol napretka, „dokaz da je zlatni vek zaista pred nama“, kako je to u Političkom rečniku zabeležio vodeći ideolog srpskog liberalizma Vladimir Jovanović, a njena izgradnja percipirana je kao pretpostavka bržeg privrednog razvoja, kao sredstvo koje će svojim pozitivnim posledicama doprineti ubrzanju razvoja, a samim tim i bekstvu sa evropske privredne periferije. Sa druge strane, ostvarenje Markovićeve vizije „narodne države“ podrazumevalo je odlaganje izgradnje železnice kao deo napora na sprečavanju uticaja razvijenih evropskih privreda, a pre svih susedne austrougarske, sve dok u jednom trenutku, kao rezultat aktiviranja svih nacionalnih

187Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

potencijala samostalan privredni razvoj ne ukaže na neophodnost železnice, ali tada njena izgradnja ne bi podrazumevala dominaciju stranog kapitala i pretvaranje srpske privrede u dopunski privredni prostor razvijenih evropskih privreda. Pored toga, ne manje je važno da je Marković odlaganje izgradnje železnice posmatrao i u kontekstu ostvarenja „zavetne misli“, ističući da oslobođenje i ujedinjenje mora da prethodi železnici, te da Srbija svoje finansijske snage treba da usmeri na pripreme za rat. Imajući u vidu da su socijalisti na rat gledali kao na katalizator unutrašnjih političkih promena, odlaganje izgradnje železnice pojavljuje se kao pitanje od posebnog značaja.

Srpska železnica između Austrougarske i Rusije

Suprotstavljenost, sa jedne strane, usmerenja liberalne intelektualne elite ka političkoj i privrednoj modernizaciji prateći manje ili više zapadnoevropski primer i, sa druge strane, Markovićeve socijalističke ideologije neponavljanja zapadnoevropskog puta koja je oslanjala na patrijarhalni mentalitet srpskog seljaka, u punoj meri je došla do izražaja u novim okolnostima u kojima se Srbija našla posle Berlinskog kongresa. Usled promene međunarodnopravnog statusa i neophodnosti ispunjenja obaveza koje su joj nametnute u Berlinu, kao i usled sve jasnije podele interesnih sfera između velikih sila i dominantnog položaja Austrougarske na Balkanu, Srbija se u prvim godinama nezavisnosti našla pred brojnim izazovima, odnosno pred neophodnošću „izbora perspektivnog puta sociokulturnog razvoja ili konačne civilizacijske orijentacije“, kako to navodi Andrej Šemjakin. Možda najznačajniji od spoljnopolitičkih izazova bilo je ispunjenje obaveza preuzetih Berlinskim ugovorom i austro-srpskom konvencijom u vezi sa izgradnjom železnice.

Iako je, nominalno, izgradnja železnice bila deo planova vladajućih liberala, izuzetan položaj ovog pitanja u srpskoj politici posle Berlinskog kongresa bio je pre svega posledica spoljnopolitičkog pritiska iz Beča. Odlukom kongresa definitivno je u interesu Srbije rešeno pitanje trase transbalkanske železnice, ali je, posmatrano iz perspektive stanja državnih finansija posle dva rata, to bio najnepovoljniji trenutak. U tom kontekstu, od posebnog značaja bilo je pitanje načina finansiranja izgradnje železnice, jer je od početka bilo izvesno da je reč o prvorazrednom političkom problemu oko kojeg će se ukrstiti austrougarski i ruski interesi. Pitanje pronalaženja „podobne“ finansijske kuće ili kompanije, odnosno neka vrsta kontrole nad izborom, čime bi bio sprečen tuđi uticaj, bilo je za ove sile ne samo pitanje dokazivanja političke suprematije, već i obezbeđenja dugoročnih političkih interesa na balkanskom prostoru. Uspehom na Berlinskom kongresu Austrougarska je učvrstila svoj položaj na prostoru

188 Momir Samardžic

zapadnog Balkana, a konvencijom sa Srbijom dodatno je obezbedila vlastite privredne interese. Potpisivanje bilateralne železničke konvencije kojom bi bili utvrđeni rokovi za izgradnju železnice na teritoriji Srbije, a zatim ustupanje koncesije kompaniji poput Hiršove ili Štatsbana, bliskoj interesima Beča, potvrdili bi dominantan položaj Dvojne monarhije u Srbiji. Srpsku vladu trebalo je, zbog toga, prvo ubediti da uđe u bilateralne pregovore o konvenciji, a zatim joj onemogućiti da samostalno dođe do sredstava za izgradnju uzimanjem zajma na zapadnoevropskom finansijskom tržištu, čime bi bila prinuđena na ustupanje koncesije nekom stranom finansijeru.

U Beču su strahovali od pojave ruskih inženjera i finansijera u Srbiji, jer bi srpska železnica u ruskim rukama značila istovremeno snaženje ruskog uticaja. Međutim, upravo u slučaju srpske železnice u punoj meri je došla do izražaja sva složenost međunarodnog položaja Rusije posle Berlinskog kongresa, kao i složenost njene politike prema Srbiji u novonastalim okolnostima. Stvarne mogućnosti da Rusija saglasno vlastitim interesima reši pitanje izgradnje balkanskih železnica gotovo da nisu postojale, ali su ruski vladajući krugovi, uprkos činjenici da Rusija nije imala nikakvih realnih privrednih interesa u Srbiji, smatrali nedopustivim njeno prepuštanje isključivom privrednom uticaju Austrougarske. Izgradnja srpske železnice od strane nekog ruskog društva i njeno povezivanje sa rumunskom, a samim tim i sa ruskom, železničkom mrežom, bio je jedan od načina za uspešno zaustavljanje austrougarskog prodora na Balkan, ali pri trenutnom stanju međunarodnih odnosa Rusija nije sebi mogla da dozvoli sukob sa susednom monarhijom ni u mnogo značajnijim pitanjima nego što je to bila srpska železnica. Zbog toga je bilo neophodno prikriti delatnost vlade – srpska vlada trebalo je da sama preuzme gradnju železnice, posle čega bi ovaj posao bio ustupljen nekoj od ruskih kompanija koju bi preporučila vlada u Petrogradu, čija bi uloga u celokupnom poslu ostala tajna.

Pri postojećem rasporedu snaga na međunarodnoj sceni i pri trenutnom stanju državnih finansija, srpskoj diplomatiji nije ostajao veliki manevarski prostor, posebno imajući u vidu da je poštovanje međunarodnih ugovora i ispunjenje preuzetih međunarodnih obaveza za državu kojoj je tek priznata nezavisnost bilo jedan od načina dokazivanja opravdanosti ukazanog poverenja. Oporavak državnih finansija bio je dugotrajan proces i odugovlačenje vlade Jovana Ristića da potpiše bilateralnu konvenciju sa Austrougarskom, predviđenu Berlinskom konvencijom, i odmah pristupi izgradnji železnice, predstavljalo je tek kupovinu vremena u pokušaju da se u nepovoljnim okolnostima obezbede što povoljniji uslovi. Srpska vlada bila je pre svega zainteresovana za sklapanje povoljnih trgovinskih ugovora koji bi popravili stanje državnih finansija, a Ristić se u nastojanju da odloži izgradnju oslanjao na

189Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

u konvenciji pomenutu komisiju četiri zainteresovane države – Austrougarske, Osmanskog carstva, Srbije i Bugarske, odnosno na nepovoljne prilike u pomenutim balkanskim državama za rešavanje ovog problema. Međutim, predsednik srpske vlade svojim je zahtevom za odlaganjem, upućenim početkom novembra 1878, kao i putovanjem srpskog ministra prosvete Alimpija Vasiljevića u Rusiju u decembru sa zadatkom da se raspita da li bi u Rusiji bilo moguće obrazovati društvo koje bi preuzelo obavezu građenja železnice, postigao upravo suprotan efekat. Jednom upozorena da srpska vlada namerava da izbegne ispunjenje preuzetih obaveza, spora austrougarska državna mašinerija usmerila je svoju delatnost na sprečavanje ovog pokušaja, vešto koristeći ne samo mere prinude pritiskom na srpski izvoz, već i želju srpske vlade da pregovara o trgovinskom ugovoru.

Pozicija Srbije dodatno je otežana kada je ministar građevina Ranko Alimpić, mimo Ristićevih uputstava, u julu 1879. u Beču ušao u pregovore o detaljima železničke konvencije, iako je trebalo samo da se načelno upozna sa planovima austrougarskog Ministarstva spoljnih poslova, dok bi konačni pregovori usledili tek kada se utvrdi koja to pitanja mogu da budu raspravljena bez bugarskih i osmanskih delegata. Rezultat Alimpićeve posete bio je načelni, ali celoviti sporazum, tačku po tačku, dok su razlike u stavovima oko pojedinih pitanja zabeležene u poseban rezime. Ovakvom sporazumu nedostajao je samo pristanak vlada na određene manje izmene, ali okvir rešavanja pitanja bio je određen. Nezadovoljni Ristić odupirao se mesecima da prihvati predloženi nacrt kao osnovu za dalje pregovore, ali je na kraju popustio pod sve snažnijim pritiskom austrougarske diplomatije. Devetog aprila 1880. potpisana je konvencija kojom je Srbija pristala da u roku od tri godine sagradi liniju od Beograda preko Niša do granice sa Osmanskim carstvom kod Vranja, dok su srpski pregovarači uspeli da izdejstvuju odlaganje trogodišnjeg roka izgradnje spojne linije od Niša ka bugarskoj granici do sporazuma sa bugarskom vladom. Austrougarski pregovarači izdejstvovali su tarifne pogodnosti za austrougarsku robu na srpskoj železnici, ali su i srpskoj robi obećane iste pogodnosti na liniji ka Beču. Pored toga, srpski pregovarači uspeli su da se oslobode svih obaveza prema Hiršovoj kompaniji za izgradnju koje su proizlazile iz njegovih ugovora sa Portom. Preostalo je usvajanje ugovora u srpskoj Narodnoj skupštini i donošenje odluke o načinu izgradnje.

Na udaru opozicije

Više od godinu dana posle kongresa vlada se nije suočavala sa ozbiljnijim izazovima na unutrašnjepolitičkom planu. Međutim, teška privredna situacija, pogoršana

190 Momir Samardžic

sve otvorenijim sukobom sa Austrougarskom, dovela je krajem 1879. i početkom 1880. do postepenog jačanja opozicionih elemenata, kako prestoničke inteligencije okupljene oko lista Videlo, tako i Markovićevih političkih naslednika, posle ulaska Nikole Pašića u Skupštinu sve čvršće povezanih sa narodnjačkom opozicijom. Konstantna aktuelnost železničkog pitanja u spoljnoj politici, a posebno u prvim mesecima 1880, u trenutku kada se opozicija ujedinjuje u borbi protiv vlade, nametala ga je i kao najznačajnije unutrašnjopolitičko pitanje, povezano ne samo sa pobedom određenog političkog koncepta i usvajanjem koncepcije razvoja, već i sa sve prisutnijim pitanjem izbora spoljnopolitičkog oslonca koje se nametnulo kao posledica promene međunarodnopravnog statusa i najnovije konstelacije odnosa velikih sila u okviru Istočnog pitanja.

U tek oformljenoj heterogenoj političkoj grupaciji oko Videla – čiji je nastanak u značajnoj meri bio motivisan nezadovoljstvom Ristićevim paternalističkim poimanjem vođenja državne politike bez konsultovanja javnog mnjenja, posebno bez obraćanja obrazovanim političkim neistomišljenicima i koju su činili intelektualci vrlo različiti po svojim političkim pogledima, od umereno konzervativnih do umereno radikalnih, spojeni pre svega političkim, a ne ekonomskim interesom – teško da je moglo da bude reči o jedinstvenim pogledima na puteve privrednog razvoja Srbije. Nesumnjivo je, međutim, da među mladokonzervativcima i Ristićevim liberalskim disidentima, koji su činili većinu Videlovaca, nije moglo biti protivnika izgradnje železnice. Vodeće ličnosti grupe – Čedomilj Mijatović, Milutin Garašanin i Milan Piroćanac – bili su i glavni kritičari Ristićeve politike rešavanja železničkog pitanja, a posle potpisivanja konvencije i njenog teksta, ali je njihova kritika bila pre svega usmerena na delatnost vlade, odnosno njenog predsednika, dok neposredna potreba Srbije za železnicom nije osporavana. Polazeći uvek od uverenja da izgradnja železnice pod povoljnim uslovima može da bude „početak nove ere blagostanja i svestranog napretka“, u detaljnoj kritici tehničke, ekonomske, finansijske i političke strane konvencije pred početak zasedanja Vanredne narodne skupštine, Mijatović je osporavao političku mudrost akta koji je bio rezultat delatnosti političkog protivnika.

Kritika Videlovaca trebalo je da posluži njihovim saveznicima u Skupštini, radikalsko-narodnjačkoj opoziciji predvođenoj Pašićem. Kao inženjer stipendiran od vlade da posebno izučava izgradnju železnica, Pašić takođe nije mogao da bude protiv njihove izgradnje. Međutim, naslanjajući se na kritike iznete u Videlu, njegov otpor konvenciji zasnivao se na dubljim ideološkim pretpostavkama. Njegov politički program, iako je počivao na Markovićevom konceptu „narodne države“, transponovanjem ideje kolektivizma i egalitarizma srpskog društva

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sa zadruge i opštine na državu u celini, predstavljao je korak dalje u evoluciji prvobitnog socijalističkog programa sa dominantnom socijalnom komponentom ka pragmatičnijem, prvenstveno političkim reformama usmerenom programu radikala, kao prvoj fazi u transformaciji srpske države i društva, sa jasnim ciljem očuvanja socijalnog egalitarizma i ostvarenja „zavetne misli“ oslobođenja i ujedinjenja koje je, posle Berlinskog kongresa, dobilo novog najvećeg neprijatelja – Austrougarsku, zajedno sa njenim pristalicama u Srbiji. Političke reforme trebalo je da budu preduslov privredne modernizacije bez snažnih socijalnih potresa. „Od zapada uzimati samo tehničko znanje i nauku i njima se koristiti u duhu slaveno-srpskom“, bila je suština Pašićeve koncepcije modernizacije na kojoj je trebalo graditi viziju posebnog puta razvoja srpske privrede. Smatrao je da je izgradnja železnice u aktuelnom istorijskom trenutku u potpunoj suprotnosti sa državnim i nacionalnim interesima Srbije i srpske nacije, jer je nesumnjivim skorim ulaskom stranog kapitala onemogućavala ostvarenje idealističke vizije samostalnog privrednog razvoja, te dovodila u pitanje i političku samostalnost i ostvarenje oslobodilačke misije.

U istom smislu konvenciju su shvatali i Pašićevi skupštinski saborci, seljački poslanici. Patrijarhalnog mentaliteta, u strahu koji prati sve prisutnije prihvatanje tekovina zapadnoevropske civilizacije – strahu od novina karakterističnom za tradicionalno, seljačko društvo – posebno strahujući da će svako usmeravanje na unutrašnji razvoj udaljiti Srbiju od njene misije oslobođenja i ujedinjenja, oni su konvenciju napadali mnogo težim rečima nego Pašić, a u središtu napada bila je politika Austrougarske – neprijatelja ujedinjenja i, iz srpske perspektive, paradigme zapadnoevropske civilizacije. U tom smislu, u vatrenim, često vrlo slikovitim govorima, pitanje konvencije predstavljeno je kao „sudbonosno ne samo za sadanji naraštaj, već i za buduće naraštaje, srpsku budućnost i oslobođenje i ujedinjenje srpskog naroda“, sama konvencija ocenjena je kao „nož, koji neprijatelj smešeći se pruža da upropastimo svoju narodnju ekonomno-političku budućnost“, a susedna monarhija nazivana je „aždajom koja hoće Srpstvo i Slovenstvo da proguta“. Politika Austrougarske posmatrana je u kontekstu sukoba Zapada i slovenskog Istoka, a Srbija je postavljana u središte slovensko-germanskog sukoba, koji se na Balkanu pre svega manifestovao kroz austro-ruski sukob oko podele interesnih sfera.

Pred oštrim i argumentovanim napadima, vladinu politiku branili su najpozvaniji stručnjaci i sam Ristić. U njihovim govorima vidljiva je bila vera u železnicu kao sredstvo svestranog preobražaja, karakteristična za generacije srpskih liberalnih intelektualaca školovanih na Zapadu, pa i onih okupljenih oko Videla koji su oportunistički kritikovali konvenciju, ali ne i železnicu. Reči jednog poslanika da će

19� Momir Samardžic

izgradnja železnice biti „epoha u istoriji napretka srpskog u opšte, a ponaosob u istoriji poljske privrede, zanata, trgovine i fabrikacije, i učiniće u isto doba fazu ili menu u kulturnom i prosvetnom životu svega naroda srpskog“ samo su karakterističan primer. Posle burne rasprave i završnog Ristićevog govora konvencija je usvojena sa ubedljivom većinom. Sledeći korak bilo je rešavanje pitanja finansiranja izgradnje železnice.

U potrazi za finansijerom

Nastojanje srpske vlade krajem 1878. i tokom 1879. da u pregovorima s vladom u Beču odloži rok za dovršenje izgradnje železnice nije istovremeno značilo da vlada nije bila svesna da taj zadatak stoji pred njom u skoroj budućnosti. Uporedo s prvim pokušajem da u Rusiji pronađe preduzetnika uz podršku ruske vlade, te da od Austrougarske dobiju pristanak na odlaganje roka, u Beogradu su razmišljali o obavezama koje ih u vezi sa izgradnjom očekuju, kao i o načinu na koji bi one najuspešnije mogle da budu ispunjene. Najpovoljnije po državne interese bilo je da država sama gradi i eksploatiše železnicu, ali je ovaj način zahtevao finansijska sredstva i dovoljan broj stručnjaka – Srbija nije imala niti jedno niti drugo, dok je finansijski najnepovoljnija mogućnost bila da država ustupi koncesiju za izgradnju i eksploataciju stranoj kompaniji. Srednje rešenje predstavljala je mogućnost da država uzme zajam i potom kontroliše izgradnju, te samostalno organizuje ili ustupi organizaciju eksploatacije. Mogućnost povoljnog rešenja posebno je otežavala prazna državna kasa, te je bilo izvesno da je novac za izgradnju neophodno tražiti na stranom finansijskom tržištu.

Prve ponude stranih kompanija – Štatsbana i ruskog finansijera Baranova, ubrzo posle kongresa, jasno su pokazale koliki je politički značaj odluke koja se nalazila pred vladom. Uporedo sa pritiscima iz Beča da bude potpisana bilateralna konvencija, pred vladu su tokom 1879. i početkom 1880. izlazili predstavnici stranih kompanija i finansijskih kuća sa različitim ponudama, mahom za ustupanje koncesije za izgradnju i eksploataciju, koja je podrazumevala i pronalazak na stranom finansijskom tržištu sredstava za finansiranja izgradnje. Najpovoljnija je bila ponuda Štatsbana, čije linije na teritoriji Ugarske su prolazile nedaleko od srpske granice, i vlada je u septembru 1879. postigla načelni sporazum sa ovom austro-francuskom privatnom kompanijom. Međutim, do njegovog ostvarenja nije došlo usled otpora ustupanju Štatsbanu izgradnje spojne linije na ugarskoj teritoriji od strane ugarske vlade. Pored Baranovljeve, i ponuda drugog ruskog finansijera, Poljakova, čije interese pred srpskom vladom je zastupao general Černjajev, odgovarala je ranije

19�Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

zacrtanoj koncepciji ruske vlade o zaštiti njenih interesa u pitanju srpske železnice. Sa druge strane, kao konkurencija Rusima i Štatsbanu na čelu grupe francuskih finansijera pojavio se Luj Fremi, bivši guverner Kredi fonsije, jedne od najpoznatijih francuskih banaka, i pred srpsku vladu tokom sledećih godinu dana izašao sa nizom različitih ponuda za ustupanje koncesije.

Srpska vlada bila je, naravno, zainteresovana za ponude stranih društava, ali posle neuspeha sporazuma sa Štatsbanom nije ulazila u pregovore. Razloge nije teško utvrditi. Knez Milan i Ristić bili su svesni da je izgradnja železnice neminovnost, ne samo zbog obaveza preuzetih ugovorom i konvencijom potpisanim u Berlinu, već i zbog potrebe daljeg privrednog razvoja kneževine. Međutim, sve do potpisivanja austro-srpske železničke konvencije sva pitanja koja su proisticala iz pomenutih međunarodnih ugovora bila su i dalje otvorena, a pregovori sa Osmanskim carstvom i Bugarskom nisu u pravom smislu ni počeli, te je vlada samo primala ponude, ali nije želela da se upušta u pregovore pre nego što budu potpisani neophodni međunarodni ugovori koji bi mogli da utiču na sadržaj ugovora sa stranim finansijerima. Pored toga, u Beogradu sredinom 1880. nisu još doneli odluku o načinu izgradnje, odnosno nadali su se da bi država mogla da obezbedi povoljan zajam i sama kontroliše izgradnju železnice. Konačna odluka u prilog ustupanja koncesije doneta je tek krajem avgusta 1880, posle bezuspešnih pokušaja da se samostalno dođe do zajma, ali je prvi konkurs Ristićeve vlade završen bezuspešno, jer vlada nije bila zadovoljna ponudama.

Posle pada Ristićeve vlade, nova vlada Milana Piroćanca promenila je pristup i umesto konkursa uputila neformalni poziv svim zainteresovanim finansijerima. Pored Fremija, Poljakova i Baranova, sada udruženog sa belgijskim finansijerima, u nadmetanje su se uključile i neke manje britanske banke, ali je konačna pobeda, zahvaljujući uspešno stvorenoj lažnoj predstavi o finansijskoj snazi, podršci austrougarske diplomatije i podmićivanju, pripala francuskoj Generalnoj uniji. Posle neuspeha Štatsbana, pojava Generalne unije u potpunosti je odgovarala interesima Dvojne monarhije, a uticaj je dodatno ojačan tajnim učešćem bečke Lenderbanke u poslu sa srpskom železnicom u iznosu od 30%. Smatrajući da finansijska snaga Generalne unije predstavlja garanciju da neće biti problema sa nabavkom novca za izgradnju, srpska vlada odlučila se za francusku banku. Međutim, Generalna unija nije posedovala neophodna sredstva. Ona u pravom smislu nije ni uzela koncesiju za izgradnju srpske železnice, već je srpska vlada, nepovoljnim ugovorom o zajmu od 100 miliona franaka po kursu 71,40, uz interes koji je prelazio 7%, poverila Generalnoj uniji vođenje operacije pribavljanja novca zalažući vlastite poreske

19� Momir Samardžic

prihode, kao i prihode koje bi donela železnica. Pored toga, uz brojne druge pogodnosti za budućeg koncesionara, srpska vlada pristala je na cenu izgradnje od 198.000 franaka po kilometru i kao osnovu za budući dvadesetpetogodišnji ugovor o eksploataciji preuzela obavezu o isplati 7.800 franaka godišnje po kilometru za dva voza dnevno. Prema procenama predsednika francuske banke Ežena Bontua, ukupna zarada trebalo je da iznosi najmanje 30 miliona franaka, dodatno pojačana lutrijskim zajmom srpskoj vladi od 33 miliona franaka (kurs 75,5) radi sređivanja državnih finansija. Poslednji korak bilo je usvajanje konvencije u Skupštini.

Koncesija pred Skupštinom

Već tokom završnih pregovora bilo je izvesno da će konvencija naići na snažan otpor u novoizabranoj Skupštini, posebno posle izlaska prvog broja Samouprave 20. januara 1881. i osnivanja Narodne radikalne stranke, odnosno vladinog odgovora osnivanjem Napredne stranke dva dana kasnije. Radikalska opozicija oštro se suprotstavljala svim predlozima zakona kojima je vlada nameravala da učini odlučujuće korake na putu sveobuhvatne modernizacije sledeći zapadnoevropske uzore. Izgradnja železnice bila je jedan od ovih koraka, a usvajanje konvencije o ustupanju koncesije Generalnoj uniji prvi ozbiljniji test mogućnosti i programske istrajnosti Piroćančeve vlade. U rešavanju ovog problema, nova vlada nastavila je politiku Ristićeve vlade, koja ju je i odvela do sporazuma sa francuskom bankom. Sa druge strane, način na koji je rešeno železničko pitanje bio je u potpunoj suprotnosti sa radikalskim koncepcijama suprotstavljanja stranom kapitalu i jačanju austrougarskog uticaja na državne poslove, te je prihvatanje ustupanja koncesije Generalnoj uniji nazivano nacionalnom izdajom i posmatrano u kontekstu izbora spoljnopolitičkog oslonca, sa dugoročnim posledicama po budućnost države i nacije.

Pitanje usvajanja konvencije u suštini je rešeno novcem kojim su podmićeni pojedini članovi vladine većine, skupštinskog odbora, ali pre svega radikalske manjine bez čijeg prisustva prilikom glasanja usvajanje konvencije ne bi bilo moguće. Rasprava je ipak bila burna. Napade na konvenciju, a samim tim i vladu, predvodio je Pašić, pratili su ga učeniji radikali, a poseban ton kritici davali su ugledni seljački tribuni. Svoje napade Pašić je zasnivao na učinjenim propustima i nepovoljnim uslovima na koje je pristala vlada, ali je u svom poslednjem govoru, pre glasanja, naglasio da najznačajniji razlog za odbijanje konvencije leži u zaustavljanju austrougarskog prodora na Balkan kao preduslova ostvarenja „zavetne misli“. Njegovu vatrenu nacionalističku retoriku pratio je Svetomir Nikolajević, koji je na izgradnju železnice gledao kao na znak

195Roads to Europe. Serbian Politics and the Railway Issue, 1878-1881

napuštanja tradicionalnog spoljnopolitičkog kursa oslanjanja na Rusiju i okretanja zapadnoj kulturi i nauci, koji znači i napuštanje politike međubalkanske saradnje, nazvavši čak Srbiju „izdajnikom balkanskih naroda“.

Odbijanje konvencije i raspisivanje konkursa za novog koncesionara zahtevali su i stari seljački tribuni, koji su u svojim govorima patrijarhalnoj idili nekad „srećne zemlje“ koja „nije imala spahija i bogataša, nije imala blagorodnika, ali nije imala ni sirotinje kao što drugi narodi imaju“, a „po poljima srpskim čule su se samo pesme“, „kad sretneš Srbina, video si mu veselo lice“, suprotstavljali sumornu viziju stanja u državi posle ratova koje će dodatno da oteža „težak lanac železnice“, apokaliptično predstavljene kao „ladna guja (...) koja će se provući kroz srce srpskog naroda i koju srpski narod mora zagrevati, te tako da sam hrani aždaju, koja će ga najzad progutati“. Usvajanje konvencije predstavljano je kao siguran način da ispunjenje „pradedovskog amaneta“ oslobođenja i ujedinjenja bude onemogućeno, a politička i ekonomska nezavisnost Srbije bude dovedena u pitanje.

Kritici radikalske opozicije naprednjaci su suprotstavljali argumente koji su svedočili o potpuno drugačijoj percepciji značaja železnice u kontekstu modernizacije nezavisne države. Sticanjem nezavisnosti ubrzana modernizacija postala je nužnost, jer je ona bila preduslov opstanka. Planirajući program reformi u cilju sveobuhvatne modernizacije, naprednjaci su na izgradnju železnice gledali kao na važan korak na putu privrednog razvoja, korak koji je neophodno povući što pre, posebno imajući u vidu preuzete međunarodne obaveze U tom smislu, izgradnja železnice imala je kako spoljnopolitički, tako i unutrašnjopolitički značaj – kao „berlinsko dete“ ona je „bila cena za nezavisnost, ali i temelj modernizacije države“. Naprednjaci su smatrali da dolazak stranog kapitala treba posmatrati iz pozitivne perspektive podsticanja unutrašnjeg privrednog razvoja kao posledice povećanog obima posla koji će neizostavno povoljno uticati na oporavak ratom i pod pritiskom Beča posustale srpske privrede. Prihvatanje konvencije sa Generalnom unijom, a potom izgradnja železnice trebalo je da budu prvi koraci na putu modernizacije koja bi omogućila ubrzani razvoj i očuvanje političke i privredne nezavisnosti. Konvencija je usvojena 22. marta 1881. Gotovo tri decenije posle prvih nastojanja srpske vlade da u pregovorima sa stranim državama i finansijskim kućama reši pitanje izgradnje železnice u Srbiji, svi preduslovi za njenu izgradnju bili su ispunjeni. Gradnja železnice mogla je da počne.

Ustupanje koncesije l’Union Générale i izgradnja železnice predstavljali su pobedu naprednjačkog koncepta modernizacije. Međutim, posledice izgradnje bile su daleko od javno proklamovanih nadanja. Železnica nije donela Srbiji očekivani

19� Momir Samardžic

nivo privrednog razvoja. Zapravo, slučaj srpskih železnica potvrđuje opservacije mađarskih istoričara Ivana Berenda i Đerđija Rankija da se državna intervencija u privredi balkanskih država u velikoj meri pokazala nedelotvornom, jer državne železnice nisu stvorile osnovu za razvoj domaće industrije, a nerazvijenost unutrašnjeg tržišta i niska produktivnost nisu dozvolili povećanje izvoza u meri koja bi dovela do privrednog razvoja koji bi uticao na transformaciju privrede u celini. Iako su železnice doprinele postepenom privrednom rastu, u poređenju sa razvijenim i privredama u razvoju tempo je bio znatno sporiji, a razlika u razvijenosti se samo povećavala, te Majkl Palajre, govoreći o privredama balkanskih država u 19. veku, a samim tim i o srpskoj privredi, s pravom govori o „evoluciji bez razvoja“. U tom smislu, nastojanja srpskih vlada da obezbede Srbiji mesto na trasi transbalkanske železnice nesumnjivo su predstavljala značajan korak na putu ostvarenja koncepcije uspešnog privrednog razvoja, ali je železnica bila tek jedan od njegovih preduslova, ili samo jedan od faktora koji ga pospešuju. Sama železnica svakako nije bila dovoljna. Ranije pominjani strukturalni nedostaci srpske privrede i društva, kao i geopolitičko okruženje i jednostrana struktura izvoza, predstavljali su prepreku koju politička elita nije uspela da preskoči i privreda nikada nije dostigla nivo fleksibilnosti koji bi doveo do prilagođavanja zahtevima tržišta. Istovremeno, jalovim se čine i rasprave o celishodnosti izgradnje železnice, jer je upravo država čija intelektualna elita je raspravljala o ovom problemu, bila odgovorna za nedostatak zakonskog okvira pogodnog za promene i time stvorila značajnu prepreku razvoju privrede. Na taj način, železničko pitanje imalo je u istoriji Srbije izuzetan značaj, ali prevashodno politički, kao posledica percipiranog značaja železnice u kontekstu spoljnopolitičke borbe za političku i privrednu nezavisnost, ali i suprotstavljenih koncepcija modernizacije države unutar srpske političke elite.

note on the author

Momir Samardžić was born in Našice, Croatia, in 1974. He studied history at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad (Serbia), and 19th century world history (postgraduate studies) at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade (Serbia). He received his PhD from the University of Novi Sad with the dissertation The Railway Issue in the Foreign Policy of Serbia 1878-1888 (Железничко питање у спољној политици Србије 1878–1888). He is now assistant professor at the De-partment of History on the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad. He has been a member of CLIOHRES.net from 2007, has contributed to its research, and is one of the co-editors of Layers of Power in Europe, the fifth book written by the TWG1 (at press).

Until recently his main fields of interests have been international relations in Eu-rope in the 19th century and the “Eastern Question” in the context of Serbian foreign policy and inter-Balkan relations of newly emerging nation-states. Within that frame, during the last two years he has focussed more on the foreign influences on Serbian politics and society and their impact on economic development and the development of infrastructure. The Karen Johnson Freeze Fellowship Fund has awarded him a grant to support his future research on Serbian railways. He is the author of two books and more than thirty articles, mostly in Serbian.

publICatIons of the ClIohres network of exCellenCe

Thematic Work Group 1, “States, Legislation, Institutions”1. Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformation, James S. Amelang, Siegfried Beer eds., 2006;2. Communities in European History: Representations, Jurisdictions, Conflicts, Juan Pan-Montojo, Frederik Peder-

sen eds., 2007;3. Making, Using and Resisting the Law in European History, Günther Lottes, Eero Medijainen, Jón Viðar Sig-

urðsson eds., 2008;4. Institutional Change and Stability: Conflicts, Transitions, Social Values, Andreas Gémes, Florencia Peyrou, Ioan-

nis Xydopoulos eds., 2009.

Thematic Work Group �, “Power and Culture”1. Power and Culture: Hegemony, Interaction and Dissent, Ausma Cimdiņa, Jonathan Osmond eds., 2006;2. Power and Culture. Identity, Ideology, Representation, Jonathan Osmond, Ausma Cimdiņa eds., 2007;3. Power and Culture: New Perspectives on Spatiality in European History, Pieter François, Taina Syrjämaa, Henri

Terho eds., 2008;4. Rebellion and Resistance, Henrik Jensen ed., 2009.

Thematic Work Group �, “Religion and Philosophy”1. Religion, Ritual and Mythology. Aspects of Identity Formation in Europe, Joaquim Carvalho ed., 2006;2. Religion and Power in Europe: Conflict and Convergence, Joaquim Carvalho ed., 2007;3. Bridging the Gaps: Sources, Methodology and Approaches to Religion in Europe, Joaquim Carvalho ed., 2008;4. Routines of Existence: Time, Life and Afterlife in Society and Religion, Elena Brambilla, Sabine Deschler-Erb,

Jean-Luc Lamboley, Aleksey Klemeshov and Giovanni Moretto eds., 2009.

Thematic Work Group �, “Work, Gender and Society”1. Professions and Social Identity. New European Historical Research on Work, Gender and Society, Berteke Waaldijk

ed., 2006;2. Reciprocity and Redistribution: Work and Welfare Reconsidered, Gro Hagemann ed., 2007;3. Rhetorics of Work, Dimitra Lampropoulou, Carla Salvaterra, Yannis Yannitsiotis eds., 2008;4. The Faces of Death. Visualising History, Andrea Pető, Klaartje Schrijvers eds., 2009.

Thematic Work Group 5, “Frontiers and Identities”1. Frontiers and Identities: Exploring the Research Area, Lud’a Klusáková, Steven G. Ellis eds., 2006;2. Imagining Frontiers. Contesting Identities, Steven G. Ellis, Lud’a Klusáková eds., 2007;3. Frontiers and Identities: Cities in Regions and Nations, Lud’a Klusáková, Laure Teulières eds., 2008;4. Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe, Steven G. Ellis, Raingard Eßer, with Jean-François Berdah, Miloš

Řezník eds., 2009.

Thematic Work Group �, “Europe and the World”1. Europe and the World in European Historiography, Csaba Lévai ed., 2006;2. Sights and Insights: Interactive Images of Europe and the Wider World, Mary N. Harris ed., 2007;3. Europe and its Empires, Mary N. Harris, Csaba Lévai eds., 2008;4. European Migrants, Diasporas and Ethnic Minorities, Matjaž Klemenčič, Mary N. Harris eds., 2009.

Transversal Themes1. Citizenship in Historical Perspective, Steven G. Ellis, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Ann Katherine Isaacs eds.,

2006;2. Immigration and Emigration in Historical Perspective, Ann Katherine Isaacs ed., 2007;3. Discrimination and Tolerance in Historical Perspective, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson ed., 2008;4. Paths to gender. European Historical perspectives on Women and Men, Carla Salvaterra, Berteke Waaldijk eds., 2009.

Doctoral Dissertations1. Florencia Peyrou, La Comunidad de Ciudadanos. El Discurso Democrático-Republicano en España, 1840-1868

(2006);2. Marta Smagacz, Revitalisation of Urban Space. Social changes in Kraków’s Kazimierz and the Ticinese District of

Milan (2007);3. Andreas Gémes, Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Between Solidarity and Neutrality (2008);4. Vitaly V. Tichonov, A Historian of the “Old School”. Boris Ivanovich Syromyatnikov’s Scientific Biography (2008);5. Momir Samardžić, The Railway Issue in Serbian Politics (1878-1881) (2010);6. Claudia Bertazzo, I Magnati e il Diritto nei Comuni Italiani del XIII Secolo (2009);7. Michael Refalo, The Maltese Commercial Class 1870-1914: Business, Families, Networks (2010);8. Neval Berber, Unveiling Bosnia-Herzegovina in British Travel Literature (1844-1912) (2010);9. Jeannette van der Sanden, Transferring Knowledge about Sex and Gender: Dutch Case Studies (2010);10. Pieter François, ‘A Little Britain on the Continent’: British Perceptions of Belgium, 1830-1870 (2010);11. Kārlis Vērdiņš, The Social and Political Dimensions of the Latvian Prose Poem (2010).

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