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Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University

Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University

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  • Slide 1
  • Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University
  • Slide 2
  • Collective Action Problems: Great Cities from Dismal Swamps
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  • Collective Action Cures: Authority
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  • Collective Action Cures: Enlightened Self-Interest
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  • Collective Action Cures: Collaborative Institutions
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  • Collective Action Cures: Self-Organizing Federalism Feiock and Scholz, eds., Cambridge Press, 2010 HobbesMill Ostrom
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  • Networks as Cures Bonding Bridging Relationships Relationships COOPERATION: Trust and commitment Strong ties Reciprocity, transitivity COORDINATION: Information Weak ties Centrality, closeness, brokerage
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  • Field Study Evidence Berardo and Scholz 2010 Stakeholders seek Bridging Capital
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  • Field Study Evidence Bridging, Not Bonding, Increases Level of Collaboration Scholz,Berardo and Kile 2008 Degree (log).36**(.06) Betweenness Centrality.22**(.04) Egonet Density-.06*(.03)
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  • Agent-Based Modeling Evidence Scholz and Wang 2006 Bridging increases the evolution of cooperation
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  • Experimental Evidence VOLUNTARY DILEMMA- Subjects play repeated prisoners dilemma, but with a choice of partners 14 subjects per session Subjects propose to any number of potential partners, and play PD if both partners propose in the period. Repeat for 20 rounds (known in advance).
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 1
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 2
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 3
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 4
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 5
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 6
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 7
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 8
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 9
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 10
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 11
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 12
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 13
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 14
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 15
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 16
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 17
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 18
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 19
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  • Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 20
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  • The Network Century for Collective Action??? Utilize multiple research methods and designs Develop additional methods of field observation Email and agency contact lists Media Archives and issue networks Internet Crawlers and social media Utilize Measures directly related to concepts Nature of the problem (credibility vs resource flows) Extent of effects (ego network, alter network, full network)
  • Slide 34
  • John T. Scholz FSU
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  • Cooperation is favored when b/c>k Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak, Nature 441: 502 (May 2006)
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  • Bonding Relationships Cooperation games with risk of defection Bonding relationships enhance commitment, trust, norms, providing social capital to resolve Collective Action Problems as represented by prisoners dilemma, public goods, common-pool resources Tie Strength => Strong, frequent, intense, multidimensial interactions with strong affinity for partner Network Structures => Reciprocity, transitivity, redundant, overlapping ties.
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  • Bridging Relationships Coordination games with low risk of defection Matching, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt Tie Strength => Weak, infrequent as needed, unidimensional, with many partners and little affinity Network Structures, flows => Degree, Reach, Closeness, non-redundant, overlapping ties. Network Structures, Brokerage => Betweenness, structural holes, brokerage
  • Slide 38
  • Experimental Evidence Cooperative communities emerge when cooperators successfully find each other Clusters do not change behavior, at least in the short run. Remaining challenge: Can clustering enhance long-term cooperation when none exists???