DL3.1-Report on Technological Shortcomings Early Warning

EU-CIVCAPPreventingandRespondingtoConflict:DevelopingEU

CIVilianCAPabilitiesforasustainablepeace

ReportonTechnologicalShortcomingsinEarlyWarningandConflictAnalysis

Deliverable3.1

(Version1.4)

30January2017

JennyBerglundandDenisBruckert

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementNo653227.

DL3.1ReportonTechnologicalShortcomingsinEarlyWarningandConflictAnalysis

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Howtocitethisreport

JennyBerglundandDenisBruckert(2017),“ReportonTechnologicalShortcomingsinEarlyWarning and Conflict Analysis”, EU-CIVCAP Report DL3.1, available from:https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/eu-civcap_deliverable_3-1.pdf.

Summaryofthedocument

Title DL3.1ReportonTechnologicalShortcomingsinEarlyWarningandConflictAnalysis

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30January2017

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JennyBerglundandDenisBruckert

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Abstract The report aims to map and analyse theavailable technological tools for conflictearlywarningandconflictanalysisoftheEU,identifypossibleshortcomingsandproposesolutions.

Keywords • ConflictEarlyWarning• ConflictAnalysis• Information• Data• Analysis• EarthObservationGeospatial

Information• Horizon2020• ICT• BigData• InformationExchangeTechnologies


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TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURES............................................................................................................................................4

Executivesummary.......................................................................................................................................5

LISTOFABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................................7

1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................................8

1.1THEEU’SCONFLICTEARLYWARNINGSYSTEMANDCONFLICTANALYSIS..........................................9

1.2CONFLICTEARLYWARNINGSYSTEM.................................................................................................10

1.3CONFLICTANALYSIS...........................................................................................................................12

2.MAINTECHNOLOGIESFOREARLYWARNINGANDCONFLICTANALYSIS................................................15

2.1EARTHOBSERVATIONGEOSPATIALINFORMATION..........................................................................15

2.2INFORMATIONANALYSISANDMEDIAMONITORINGTOOLS............................................................21

2.3HORIZON2020TECHNOLOGICALSUPPORTINEUEARLYWARNINGANDCONFLICTPREVENTION.25

2.4INFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONTECHNOLOGIES.................................................................28

2.5BIGDATA...........................................................................................................................................33

2.6INFORMATIONEXCHANGETECHNOLOGIESFOREARLYWARNINGANDCONFLICTANALYSISOFTHEEU............................................................................................................................................................36

CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................39

REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................41


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LISTOFFIGURES

Figure1.FourstepsoftheEU’sConflictEarlyWarningSystem.............................................12

Figure2.TheEU’sconflict-preventioninternalmechanism...................................................14

Figure3.SatCenIMINTproductforthemonitoringofmilitaryactivityinacrisisarea.........18

Figure 4. Example of a SatCen Copernicus product in support of external action: Riskassessmentoftheproductionofillicitcrops..................................................................19

Figure5.SWOTforEarthobservationgeospatialinformation..............................................21

Figure6.ExamplegraphfromEMM.NewsBrief.eu................................................................23

Figure7.SWOTforinformationanalysisandmediamonitoringtools..................................24

Figure8.SWOTforHorizon2020technologicalsupport.......................................................27

Figure9.Mobilenetworkcoverageandevolvingtechnologies.............................................28

Figure10.SWOTforICTs........................................................................................................32

Figure11.SWOTforBigData.................................................................................................36

Figure12.SWOTforinformationexchangetechnologies......................................................38


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

AccordingtoArts3(1)and21(2)oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,theEUaimsto“promotepeace,itsvaluesandthewell-beingofitspeoples”andto“preservepeace,preventconflictsandstrengtheninternationalsecurity”.Consequently,oneofthemaintasksoftheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)consistsofpreventingtheemergenceofconflicts innon-EUcountries.Towardsthisaim,theEEAShasestablishedaConflictEarlyWarningSystem(EWS)andaconflictanalysismethodtodetectpotentialsituationsinnon-EUcountriesthatpossiblycouldleadtoaviolentconflictifunattended.

TheEWSisbasedonsystematiccollectionandanalysisofinformationcomingfromavarietyofsources,inordertoidentifyandunderstandtherisksofviolentconflictinacountryandtodevelop strategic responses. Conflict analysis gathers and analyses, in a structuredframework,thecontext,thecausesoftheconflict,theactorsandthevariousdynamics; italso identifies the existing and planned responses, the key gaps, options and realisticstrategies to respond to conflict. In support of these activities, the EU has varioustechnologicaltoolsatitsdisposal.Theaimofthisreportistomappossibletechnologicaltoolsfortheimplementationofconflictearlywarningandconflictanalysis,assesstheiruseintheEWSandtheconflictanalysisof theEU, identifyanypossibleshortcomingsandgaps,andfinallyproposesolutionsandrecommendationstobridgethem.

The assessed tools have been grouped into five clusters: Earth observation geospatialinformation, analytical tools, Horizon 2020 projects, information communicationtechnologies(ICT),BigData1andfinally,alogisticalcluster,necessaryfortheeffectivenessofthe EWS and conflict analyses, which is information exchange systems. Each cluster isanalysedbyusingaSWOTmodel(onstrengths,weaknesses,opportunitiesandthreats).

WhileEarthobservationgeospatial informationandanalytical toolsarecommonlyused intheEU’searlywarningandconflictanalysis,theHorizon2020projects,ICTandBigDataareanalysedinthelightoftheirpotentialuseinthisarea,sincethisreportcannotfindevidencethat these technologies are officially being used by the EU in its methodology for earlywarningandconflictanalysis.TheoutcomesofongoingHorizon2020projectsinthisareaarestilltobevalidatedandimplemented.

ThefindingsofthisreportshowthatthefirsttwoclustersmentionedaboveserveasevidencebasesfortheEUinpredictingpossiblefutureconflictsand,consequently,indecidingonearlyreaction. Themain strengths of Earth observation geospatial data are the possibilities toobtaininformationinanon-intrusivemanner,inrealornearreal-time,andfromremoteandinaccessible areas. The fact that Earth observation data only can detect physical signs ofchange to a situation, that this information should be processed and analysed by skilledimageryanalystsoranautomatedsysteminordertobeuseful,andthattechnologicalmeansof secure communication are needed to share sensitive information, can be consideredweaknessesofEarthobservationgeospatialdata.

1TheconceptofbigdataisdifferentiatedinthisreportbyusinguppercaseletterswhenreferringtoBigDataasa‘fieldofpractice’andlowercaseletterswhenreferringtothedataassuch.


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TheanalyticaltoolusedintheinitiationoftheEWScycle,theGlobalConflictRiskIndex,isbasedonquantitative indicators,usinga linear regressionmodel tocalculate the riskandprobableintensityofaviolentconflictinacountrywithinonetofouryears.Theindexisbasedontheprincipleof‘datain,dataout’,whichmeansthatifthesourcedatahaveerrors,arenotupdatedoraremissing,theoutcomewillreflectthat.Italsolacksperception-baseddata.

Inviewofthedevelopmentof ICTandthehugeamountofdatathat itgenerates, theEUshouldconsiderintegratingit,togetherwithBigDatatechnologiesandanalytics,inordertocomplement and optimise the information already obtained from the two technologiesabove.

TechnicalsupportfromHorizon2020projectscanenableacomprehensive,comparativeandmultidisciplinary analysis and development of EU capabilities in this area. Horizon 2020projects take into account user requirements in various policy areas of the EU and bringtogether key actors in the private and public domains to address new technologies. Theweaknessesidentifiedincludethecomplexityoffinancialrulesandagreements,whichcoulddiscourage smaller organisations, structures and innovative small and medium-sizedenterprises fromparticipating inaproject.Nevertheless,amongtheopportunitiesarethesupportreceivedfromusersandinstitutionalactors,thepotentialdevelopmentofnewtoolsandservicesforearlywarning,conflictanalysisandprevention.

Finally yet importantly, this report highlights the lack of a unified information exchangesystemwithintheEUstructures,withalmosteveryEUpolicyareaandservicehavingitsownclassifiedsystem(civilian,military,intelligence,etc.).Giventhelackofinterconnectivitybothon a technological level and on a human as well as physical level – as the EU’s conflictprevention structures are based in different premises – good personal contacts andcooperation between different actors and services, willing to share information andcooperate,arekeyconditionsforasmoothandeffectiveexchangeandsharingofinformationamongtheassortedBrussels-basedbodiesandEUdelegations.

Torespondtothedifferentshortcomingshighlightedinthisreport,itisrecommendedthattheEUenvisagethefollowingactions:

1. Reflect on how new technologies such as ICT and Big Data could be added, in asustainablemanner, to theexisting technological tools forearlywarningandconflictanalysis.

2. Update,mainstreamandcoordinatethevariouscapacitiesandtheirusewithindifferentservicesdealingwithconflictearlywarningandconflictanalysis,inordertobridgegaps,improveinterconnectivityandavoidduplication.

3. Properlyfamiliarisestaffinvolvedintheearlywarningandconflictanalysiscyclewiththeavailabletools.

4. AssurethattechnologicaltoolsforearlywarningandconflictanalysisarealignedwithEUpoliciesonconflictpreventionandviceversa.


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LISTOFABBREVIATIONS

CFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy

CSDP CommonSecurityandDefencePolicy

DGDEVCO Directorate-GeneralforInternationalCooperationandDevelopment

DGECHO Directorate-GeneralforHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection

EC3IS European External Action Service Corporate Classified Communication andInformationSystem

EEAS EuropeanExternalActionService

EMM EuropeanMediaMonitor

EUMSB EUMilitaryStaffIntelligenceDirectorate

EWS EarlyWarningSystem

FFP FundforPeace

FSI FragileStatesIndex

GCRI GlobalConflictRiskIndex

GEOINT Geographicalintelligence

HR HighRepresentative

ICT Informationandcommunicationtechnologies

IMINT Imageryintelligence

IntCen EUIntelligenceandSituationCentre

JRC JointResearchCentre

PSC PoliticalandSecurityCommittee

RPAS Remotelypilotedaircraftsystems

SatCen SatelliteCentre

SECPOL SecurityPolicyandConflictPreventionDirectorate

SECPOL.2 Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Division, EuropeanExternalActionService

SIAC SingleIntelligenceAnalysisCapacity

SMEs Smallandmedium-sizedenterprises

SWOT Strengths,weaknesses,opportunities,threats

UN UnitedNations


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1. INTRODUCTION

Early warning and conflict analysis increasingly require the use of a wide range oftechnological tools. Today, themore ‘classic’ technologies, suchasgeospatial informationsupportedbyremotesensingapplications,areaccompaniedbynewertechnologies,notablydata analysis and information communication technologies (ICT) like mobile phones,smartphones,differentsoftwareandbigdata.MobilephonesandtheInternethavemodifiedourcommunicationhabitsandhowwerelateandengagewiththeworld.“Inthe21stcentury,the revolutionmay not be televised – but it likely will be tweeted, blogged, texted andorganisedonFacebook.”2

TheArabSpringismaybethemoststrikingexampleoftheimportantrolethatsocialmediaplaystodayintheinformation,perceptionandevolutionofevents.DuringtheweekbeforetheresignationofEgyptianPresidentHosniMubarak,forexample,thetotalrateoftweetsfromEgypt–andaroundtheworld–aboutpoliticalchangeinthecountryballoonedfrom2,300aday to230,000aday.3 Sucha changeofpatternof course raises thequestionofwhether current technologies for early warning systems to prevent violent conflict areaccurateand,ifnot,howtheycouldadapttothesociotechnicalcircumstancesoftoday.

Thisreportanalysestechnologiesforpeacebuildingandconflictprevention,withtheaimofmappingpossibletechnological tools for the implementationofconflictearlywarningandconflict analysis, assessing their use in the EU’s EarlyWarning System (EWS) and conflictanalysis, identifyinganypossibleshortcomingsandgaps,andfinallyproposingsolutionsorrecommendationsinordertobridgethem.

Awidedefinitionoftechnologieshasbeenappliedinthisreport,inwhichtechnologyreferstoi)theapplicationofpracticalsciencestoindustryorcommerce;ii)themethods,theoryandpracticesgoverningsuchapplication(e.g.ahighlydevelopedtechnology);andiii)thetotalknowledgeandskillsavailabletoanyhumansocietyforindustry,art,science,etc.4

Thesetechnologicaltoolshavebeenclusteredinthefollowingcategories:

- Earthobservationgeospatialinformation(includingimageryintelligenceandremotelypilotedaircraftsystems(RPAS));

- analyticaltools(providedbytheEUJointResearchCentre(JRC));

- theaddedvalueofHorizon2020researchinaddressingtechnologicalshortcomings;

- ICT(mobilephones,smartphones,theInternetandsoftware);

- BigData;and

- informationexchangesystems.

2CatherineO’Donell,“NewStudyquantifiesuseofsocialmediainArabSpring”,UWToday,12September2011(http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-of-social-media-in-arab-spring/),lastaccessedon15November2016.3Ibid.4CollinsEnglishDictionary–Complete&Unabridged,10thEdition,NewYork,NY:HarperCollins,2010.


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Thefirstsetoftoolscanbeconsidered‘classic’toolsforinformationcollectionandanalysisforearlywarningandconflictanalysis-relatedactivities.Theyhaveexistedforafewdecadesandarewidelyusedandconsolidated,whileICTandBigDataoftenarereferredtoas‘newtechnologies’,whichduringthelastdecadehavehadanimpactonourwayofrelatingandcommunicatingwithoursurroundingenvironment. In linewiththefindingsof thisreport,these tools are not yet (officially) being used in early warning and conflict analysismethodologies,andthereforetheyaredescribedmoreinthelightoftheirpossibleusage,and assessing their potential influence on early warning and conflict analysis workingmethods.

To apply an analytical framework to this report, the different tools presented will beevaluatedthroughaSWOTanalysis(onstrengths,weaknesses,opportunitiesandthreats);the first two elements look at internal aspects, while the last two assess the externalenvironmentinwhichthesetoolsareused.Thisframeworkallowsforanintegralanalysisthatcanserveforplanningandstrategicpurposes.

Duetothelimitedscopeofanalysisofthisdeliverable(EWSandconflictanalysis),thisreportwillconcentrateonthetoolsusefulforthispurpose,thoseweknowarealreadyusedbytheEU in this area, and tools that could have potential use and bring added value to thoseactivities. Other tools that we found more applicable to crisis management andpeacebuilding, but not specifically to earlywarning and conflict analysis, such as satellitecommunicationsystems(SATCOM)andsatellitenavigationandpositioningsystems(SNAP),have not been included in this report, but are mentioned in the EU-CIVCAP report on“Preventing Conflicts: Personnel, Procedures and Technology in Conflict Prevention andPeacebuilding” (DL 2.1), whichmaps key capabilities by using case studies from four EUMember States. Furthermore, another EU-CIVCAP paper (DL 2.3) will focus on dual-usetechnologies,suchasdifferentsatellitetechnologiesinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.

Thisreportisbasedonprimarydocuments(officialdocumentsandreports)andsecondaryscholarlysources.In-houseexpertiseoftheEUSatelliteCentre(SatCen)hasbeenusedintheelaborationof thisdeliverable,especially for the sectionsonEarthobservationgeospatialinformationandBigData.

1.1THEEU’SCONFLICTEARLYWARNINGSYSTEMANDCONFLICTANALYSIS

AccordingtoArts3(1)and21(2)oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,theEUaimsto“promotepeace,itsvaluesandthewell-beingofitspeoples”andto“preservepeace,preventconflictsandstrengtheninternationalsecurity”.Consequently,oneofthemaintasksoftheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)ispreventingtheemergenceofconflictsinnon-EUcountries.PreservingpeaceintheEUneighbourhoodisalsoawayofguaranteeingsecuritywithintheEuropeanborders.Toanticipateeffectivelytheemergenceofnewconflicts,theEEASreliesonitsEWSandconflictanalysiscapabilities.

TheEWSwas implemented in2011, inaccordancewith theTreatyof Lisbon (Art. 21c). Itconsistsofthe“systematiccollectionandanalysisof informationcomingfromavarietyofsourcesinordertoidentifyandunderstandtherisksforviolentconflictinacountryandto


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developstrategicresponsestomitigatethoserisks”.5Thegoalistoassessthestructuralrisksofconflictemergence,whichwillallowthepursuitofmoreefficient,earlypreventiveactions.Withatimehorizonoffouryears,theEWSisupdatedeverysixmonths.

Conflict analysis aims toprovideEUdecision-makerswithaccurate informationabout thestructuralelementsofaconflict,inordertoallowforacomprehensiveapproachtoconflictanalysisandresponse.AccordingtotheEEASguidancenoteontheuseofconflictanalysisinsupportofEUexternalaction,aconflictanalysis“usesastructuredframeworkasthebasisforinformationgathering,analysis,interpretation,appreciationoftherealmsofthepossibleandprioritisationofresponses”.6Thekeyelementsanalysedarethecontext,thecausesoftheconflict,theactorsandthevariousdynamics;alsoidentifiedaretheexistingandplannedresponsesandfinally,thekeygaps,optionsandrealisticstrategiestorespondtotheconflict.7

BeforetheTreatyofLisbon,EUconflictpreventionwasguidedbytheEUProgrammeforthePrevention of Violent Conflicts established in 2001, with the Policy Planning and EarlyWarningunitbeingresponsibleforearlywarningactivities.Currently,conflictpreventionandcrisisresponseareundertheresponsibilityoftheDeputySecretaryGeneraloftheCommonSecurity and Defence Policy (CSDP). The division SECPOL 2 – Conflict Prevention,PeacebuildingandMediation–isspecificallydedicatedtotheseissues(seeFigure1insection1.2).

1.2CONFLICTEARLYWARNINGSYSTEM

The EWS process can be divided into four steps – risk scanning, prioritisation, sharedassessmentandfollow-up,andmonitoring–eachstepassociatedwithvariousinstitutionsandactors.

Therisk-scanningphasefocusesonthepreparatoryworkoftheEWS.Itconsistsofcollectingdata and risk information to enable the prioritisation and assessment of the risks. This ismainly done by the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen) and the Military StaffIntelligenceDirectorate(EUMSB)throughtheSingleIntelligenceAnalysisCapacity(SIAC)andtheSecurityPolicyandConflictPreventionDirectorate(SECPOL).IntCencompilesinformationthrough its two divisions IntCen 1 (Intelligence Analysis) and IntCen 2 (Open sourceintelligence),whiletheSituationRoom(IntCen3)willinterveneforlaunchingearlyalertsandprovideworldwidemonitoring.ThedataacquiredbytheSIACisusedalongsidetheGlobal

5EEAS,“EUConflictEarlyWarningSystem”,FactSheet,Brussels,September2014.6 EEASandEuropeanCommission, “Guidancenoteon theuseofConflictAnalysis in supportofEUexternalaction”,Brussels,29October2013,p.3.7Ibid.,p.4.


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ConflictRiskIndex(GCRI),8themainresourceforthisstageoftheEWS.9Othertoolsareusedforriskscanning,suchastheInfoRMindex10ortheearlywarningwatchlist.11

Drawingontheseelements,prioritisationcantakeplace.ThemanagementandstaffoftheEEASandCommissionservices,includingdelegations,reviewthepreparatoryriskscanning,assessingitinconjunctionwithspecificEUinterestsandthevalueofreviewing,enhancingorexpandingEUengagementtoincreasetheEU’simpactonpreventionand/orpeacebuilding.TheresultofthisissharedwithMemberStatesthroughthePoliticalandSecurityCommittee(PSC).TheseactorsdiscusstheresultsprovidedbytheriskscanningwithMemberStates,andaccordingtotheprioritisationdecision,askforfurtheranalysis.12

Following the result of the discussion in the PSC and, if relevant, upon its appropriateguidance,thesharedassessmentandfollow-upinvolvesmanyparticipants:EUdelegations,field offices of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and CivilProtection(DGECHO),CSDPmissionsin-country,EUSpecialRepresentatives,MemberStates’embassies in non-EU countries, the geographical and thematic staff of the EEAS andCommissionservices'headquarters,CouncilworkinggroupsandthePSC.In-country,allEUactorsareconsultedbasedona structureddiscussionarounda seriesof factors linked tohumansecurity,coveringpolitical, socialcohesionandpublicsecurity,conflictprevalence,geography and environment, and economic factors provided by the Conflict Prevention,PeacebuildingandMediationdivisionoftheEEAS(SECPOL2).

ConflictanalysisreportspreparedbytheCommission'sDirectorate-GeneralforInternationalCooperationandDevelopment(DGDEVCO)andbyDGECHOonexistingconflictsorrisksofconflict,throughdeeppoliticaleconomyanalysisorsimplythroughlight-touchanalysis(seesection1.3),arealsotakenintoconsiderationandevaluatedinthisstep.Theoutcomesofthisprocessareregroupedintochecklistsforthestructuralrisksofconflict,whichrepresentthecollectiveassessmentofEUactorsatthecountrylevel.ThesechecklistsarethenusedbytheEEASgeographicalservicestowriteconflictpreventionreportsthatpresenttherisksnotedand some recommendations for action. These reports are discussed within the EEAS,CommissionservicesandwithMemberStatesinordertodeterminetheactionsandstanceof the EU. The conflict prevention reports stemming from this process are shared and

8TheGCRIisbasedonquantitativeindicatorsfromopensources;itprovidesevidence-basedstatisticsabouttheprobabilityandintensityofviolentconflictsforthenextfouryears.Thistoolisfurtherdescribedinsection2.2ofthisreport.9TheSIACisaworkingarrangementbetweentheEUMSBandIntCen,producingjointcivil–militaryintelligenceassessments.10Theindexproposesarankingofcountriesaccordingtotheirlevelsofriskofemergenciesanddisasters(veryhigh,high,mediumandlow).Theindexistheresultofinteragencycooperation(http://www.inform-index.org/).11EverysixmonthstheInternationalCrisisGrouppublishesanearlywarningwatchlistofuptotencountriesparticularly vulnerable to an outbreak of violent conflict in the following six or twelve months(http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/watch-list.aspx).12 European Commission, “EU Conflict Early Warning System: Objectives Process and Guidance forImplementation”,JointStaffWorkingDocument,SWD(2016)3final,Brussels,14January2016,pp.4-6.


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discussedwiththerelevantgeographicalworkinggroupsoftheCouncilandserveasabasisforfollow-upbythevariousEEAS/Commissionservices,EUdelegationsandMemberStates.13

Figure1.FourstepsoftheEU’sConflictEarlyWarningSystem

Source:http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf.

Finally, themonitoring step is the ‘reviewmoment’of theEWScycle,occurringevery sixmonths and throughwhich services report on progresswith regard to recommendationsidentifiedintheconflictpreventionreports,issuedattheshared-assessmentlevel.Proposalsforearlyaction thathavebeen identified, initiatedor implementedand their impactsareassessed.Atthisstagetheidentifiedoptionsforactionmaybemodified,updatedandrevised.ThismonitoringservesasatriggerfornewguidanceonfutureactionaswellasabasisforlessonslearnedduringtheEWSprocess.ThisstepiscarriedoutbythestaffoftheEEASandCommissionservices,aswellasbyMemberStaterepresentatives.14

1.3CONFLICTANALYSIS

Conflictanalysis isthesecondpillaroftheEUconflictpreventionsystem, indispensabletoassesseffectivelytherootsofaconflictand,consequently,toimplementanefficientsetofactions.Oneofthegoalsofconflictanalysisistobeabletoapplyaproactiveconflict-sensitiveapproach,inordertocomplywiththe‘donoharm’Europeanvalue.15Conflictanalysisfollowsaprecisepath,whichhasbeendefinedby theEEASguidancenoteon conflict analysis insupportofEUexternalaction.Thisguidanceidentifiessevenkeyelementsthathavetobetakenintoconsideration:thecontextoftheconflict,itsroots(structural,proximatecauses,

13Ibid.,pp.5-6.14EEASandEuropeanCommission(2013),op.cit.,pp.6-7.15Ibid.,p.1.


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factorsofresilience,etc.),theactors,thevariousdynamics,potentialoutcomes,thepossibleresponsesandfinallytheidentificationofkeygaps,optionsandrealisticstrategiestorespondtotheconflict.Still,accordingtothisguidance,aconflictanalysisprocessshouldinvolve“theactiveparticipationofalltheEUstakeholderswhoneedtoownanduseitsfindings.Typically,thiswillincludethedelegation(s),theEEASandDGDEVCO,andotherCommissionservicessuchasDGECHOandtheForeignPolicyInstrument(FPI).”Theconflictanalysisprocedurecanbe initiated by an EU delegation, country desks or staff at the headquarters of theCommission,theEEASandEUSpecialRepresentatives,ornumerousotheractors(seeFigure1).SECPOL2andtheDGDEVCOunit forFragilityandCrisisManagementwillprovide, forexample,analyticalsupport.Dependingonthesituation,twotypesofconflictanalysiscanbeapplied.Thefirstoneisalight-touchconflictanalysisthatcanquicklyprovideanoverviewofthesituationtothedecision-maker.Ifnotsufficient,itcanbecompletedbyamorein-depthstudy.Light-touchanalysisisbasedonaninteractive,cooperativeconflict-analysisworkshop,whichcanbeundertakeninoneortwodayswith,ifpossibleandnecessary,externalexperts.Thelight-touchanalysisisbestsuitedwhenaquickresponseisneeded.

Thesecondone isaconflict-sensitive,politicaleconomyanalysis. It isappliedfor in-depthassessmentsandprovidesadeeperunderstandingofthecountry,sectordynamics,interestsand issues. It focuses on the particular interests of groups and individuals, and on thedistributionofpower,wealth,etc.Herealso,DGDEVCO’sFragilityandCrisisManagementunitalongwiththeQualityofDeliverySystemsunitarepartoftheprocess.Similarly,civilsocietyinputisalsotakenintoaccountinthisprocess.

Figure 2 provides an overview of the internal structure and procedures for the EWS andconflictanalysis.


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DeputySecretaryGeneralCSDP

andcrisisresponse

EARLYWARNING CONFLICTANALYSIS

INTCEN

EUMS

EUdelegations,EUrepresentatives,EEAS&Commissionservices,PSC.

ECHOfieldoffices

• Shared-assessment

• Prioritisation

SECPOL2Conflictprevention,

peacebuildingmediation.

Risk-scanning ForeignPolicyInstruments

Politicaleconomyanalysis

Earlyresponse

PoliticalandSecurity

Committee

Collectdata

SatCenGeospatialIntelligence

NetworksforInformation

Exchange

Technologicalsupport

Horizon2020Projects&newtechnologies

DGECHO

DGDEVCO

Light-touchanalysis

Figure2.TheEU’sconflict-preventioninternalmechanism


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2.MAINTECHNOLOGIESFOREARLYWARNINGANDCONFLICTANALYSIS

Thissectionexaminesanumberoftechnologicaltoolsandtheirpotentialtosupportearlywarning and conflict analysis activities. More specifically, this section will analyse thefollowingtools:

- Earthobservationgeospatialinformation;

- analyticaltools;

- theaddedvalueofHorizon2020inaddressingtechnologicalshortcomings;

- informationexchangetechnologies(includingclassifiednetworks);

- ICT(mobilephones,smartphones,theInternetandsoftware);and

- BigData.

2.1EARTHOBSERVATIONGEOSPATIALINFORMATION

Geospatial information relies first and foremost on Earth observation data obtained byremotesensingtechniques(satellites,aerial imageryandRPAS)usedtoelaborate imageryintelligence(IMINT)andgeographicalintelligence(GEOINT)products.16

Different satellites give images with a different resolution and different wavelengthdependingon the specificationof the instrument (sensor) carriedby the satellite (optical,radar,infrared,video,etc.).Theelectionofacquiringimageryfromasatellitewithonetypeof sensor or another depends on the purpose for the usage of the imagery, weatherconditionsandothercontextual conditions.Today, commercial satellites cangive imageryresolution as high as approximately 23-25 centimetres,while governmental satellites canperformslightlybetter.Technicaldevelopmentsarecontinuallycompensatingfortheflawsofsatelliteimagery(cloudcoverage,sunsynchronousorbitsmakingsatellitespassoveranareamoreorlessduringthesameperiodoftheday,poorresolutionandprogrammingissuessuch as shuttle control). The introduction of microsatellites on the commercial market,expectedwithintwotothreeyears,willmakeitpossibletohavemoresatellitesinorbitthatwillbeconstantlyactive(vsprogrammedacquirement),permittingaccesstoahugequantityofdata.Multispectralsatellitescarryingdifferentsensorsalsomakeitpossibletouseoneoranotherdependingonthecurrentconditionsatthemomentofacquiringanimage.Satelliteconstellations consist of a groupof satellitesworking in concertwith coordinated groundcoverage,operatingtogetherundersharedcontrol.Satelliteswithinasatelliteconstellationaresynchronisedsothattheyoverlapwellincoverage(meaningtheperiodinwhichasatelliteorotherspacecraft isvisibleabovethelocalhorizon).AnexampleofanEarthobservationsatelliteconstellationistheDisasterMonitoringConstellationfortheInternationalCharterforSpaceandMajorDisasters,consistingofsatellitesfromChina,Spain,NigeriaandtheUK.Anothertypeofconstellation is theCopernicusSentinelSatellitessupportingthedifferent

16 In this report, geospatial information in the domain of Earth observation to retrieve information andintelligenceforsecuritypurposesisconsidered.


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servicesoftheCopernicusprogrammewithEarthobservationdata.TheSentinelsconsistofsixdifferent‘families’,witheachfamilyconsistingoftwosatellitesoperatingintandem.17

Inviewoftheimprovedaccesstogeospatialintelligence,andconsideringtheroleoftheEUSatCenandtheCopernicusprogrammeservicesinsupportofEUexternalaction,whichsoonwillbeoperational,theEEASfunctionsinvolvedinEUearlywarningandconflictanalysiswillconsequentlyhaveaccesstobetterandregularlyupdatedgeospatialinformation.

AerialvehiclessuchassurveillanceairplanesandRPAS,morecommonlyknownasdrones,alsoofferimagerywithhigherresolutionsincetheyoperatemuchclosertotheearth,andthustheobservedlocations,thansatellites.Unlikesatellites,dronescanmonitoralocationoranareacontinuouslyoveralongtimespan.Theycanalsobemultisensorialandtransmitdatainrealtimebystreaming.Thereareseveraldisadvantagesofusingaerialvehiclessuchasdronesforearlywarningpurposes,however.For instance,unlikesatellites,theycanbeconsidered intrusive (with the consequences that this implies, i.e. territorial sovereignty,personalprivacyissues,etc.).Furthermore,inordertouseandnavigateadroneinanon-EUcountry,permissionshouldbegivenby theauthoritiesof thestateonwhich territory thedroneistobeoperated.RPASarepilotedunderspecialaerialnavigationrules,andnaturally,dronesaremorevulnerableandcaneasilybejammedorannihilated.

GEOINT combines several disciplines, such as mapping, charting, imagery analysis andimageryintelligence.ThebasicprincipleofGEOINTistoorganiseandcombineallavailabledata around its geographical location on Earth, and then exploit it in order to prepareproductsthatcaneasilybeusedbyplanners,politicaladvisersanddecision-makers.GEOINTproductsderivedfromEarthobservationdataareconsideredaccurateandusefultoolsforcrisismanagement, toobtain information from thebattleground, toelaborateevacuationplansor toanalyseahumanitariancrisisandmigrationmovements inconnectionwithanongoingconflict.Theycansimilarlybeusedforconflictpreventionpurposes,servingasanearlywarning tool and supporting a conflict analysis bymainly confirming or denying anassumption, for detection and/or monitoring of physical, geographical signs, showingevidenceoftensionorchangestoaprecarioussituationbetweenorwithinstates.

WhenitcomestoGEOINT,theEUSatCenprovidestheEUwiththiscapability.TheEUSatCenis an agency of the EU and its products and services span over the wider field of crisismanagementandpeacebuildingbyprovidingproductsthatrangefromanalysesofmilitarycapabilitiestohumanitarianaidandnon-proliferation.18Itoperatesunderthesupervisionofthe PSC and under the operational direction of theHigh Representative of theUnion forForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy(HR).ThemissionoftheSatCenhasbeendefined,byArt.2oftheCouncilDecision,as“supportingthedecisionmakingandactionsoftheUnioninthefieldoftheCFSP[CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy]andinparticulartheCSDP,includingEuropeanUnioncrisismanagementmissionsandoperations,byproviding,attherequestof

17Seehttps://sentinels.copernicus.eu/web/sentinel/home,lastaccessedon29November2016.18 For more detailed information on the different products and services of the EU SatCen, seehttps://www.satcen.europa.eu/services/geospatial_intelligence.


17

theCouncilortheHR,productsandservicesresultingfromtheexploitationofrelevantspaceassetsandcollateraldata,includingsatelliteandaerialimagery,andrelatedservices”.19

The Centre works upon being tasked by the EU or itsMember States, while the CouncilDecisionalsolaysdowntheprovisionforcooperationwithotherEUagencies, institutions,internationalorganisationsandnon-EUstates.Consequently,theSatCenworkscloselywithnumerouspartners,suchastheEuropeanDefenceAgency,FRONTEX,theEuropeanMaritimeSecurityAgency(EMSA),theEuropeanCommissionandtheEuropeanSpaceAgency.Italsocooperatesandworkscloselywith internationalorganisations,suchas theUnitedNations(UN),theOrganisationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope(OSCE)andtheOrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(OPCW).

Inthefieldsofconflictpreventionandearlywarning,theSatCenworksinclosecooperationwiththecrisismanagementstructuresoftheEEASundertheoperationaldirectionoftheHR,ofwhich the EUMSB and IntCenare themain task initiators andusersof theCentre.Asalreadymentionedabove,SatCenproductsforearlywarningandsupportforconflictanalysiscanbeusedmainlyfortheconfirmationorthedenegationofanassumptionofafact,fordetectionand/ormonitoringofphysical,geographicalsignsshowingevidenceoftensionorchangestoaprecarioussituationbetweenorwithinstates.Assuchtheyhavetheirnaturalplaceintheearlywarningsystemprocessasseeninsection1.2.Intherisk-scanningphasetheyservetocomplement,verifyandcontrastdataobtainedfromquantitativetoolssuchastheGCRI,andtosupportthesharedassessmentandthedeeperriskanalysiscarriedoutatthisstage.Theyarealsousefulatthemonitoringstagetoreportonthefollow-upofproposedactionsandtheirimpact.

ExamplesofproductsgeneratedbytheEUSatCen,whichcanserveandfeedtheearlywarningand conflict analysis structures of the EU, include border control and bordermonitoring,treatyverification,armscontrolandnon-proliferation(encompassingchemicalweapons),aswellasthedetectionandmonitoringofillegalcropping.

19CouncilDecision2014/401/CFSPof26June2014ontheEuropeanUnionSatelliteCentreandrepealingJointAction2001/555/CFSPontheestablishmentofaEuropeanUnionSatelliteCentre.


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Figure3.SatCenIMINTproductforthemonitoringofmilitaryactivityinacrisisarea

Source:Pleiadesimagery©CNES2015.

Furthermore,theinvolvementofSatCenintheCopernicusservicesinsupportofEUexternalaction will complement its current capabilities, by augmenting its capacity to assiststakeholdersintheEUexternalactiondomaininearlywarning,conflictpreventionandcrisismanagement.TheCopernicusSentinelSatellitesandcontributingmissionsareavailabletofeed the SatCen with geospatial information to underpin, for example, the study andmonitoringofinfrastructure(suchasdams,pipelinesandothercriticalinfrastructure)inordertopreventnaturaldisasters,which insomecircumstancescouldtriggersocial tensionandconflict.


19

Figure 4. Example of a SatCen Copernicus product in support of external action: Risk assessment of theproductionofillicitcrops

Finally,theSatCenhasbeendevelopingnewtoolsthatalsocanserveforearlywarningandconflictprevention,suchasgeoportals–web-basedapplicationsallowingtheconsultationon, editing and sharing of geospatial information. Especially developed for situationalawareness and crisis management, they offer specific features like the calculation ofevacuationroutes.TheGISMOproject(“GeospatialInformationtoSupportdecisionMakinginOperations”),developedtogetherwiththeEuropeanDefenceAgency,facilitatestheaccesstoSatCenproductsandservicesforkeyCSDPactors.Thesetoolscouldeasilybeadaptedforuseinanearlywarningandconflictanalysiscontext.

The SatCen does not have direct control over or access to satellite sensors. Although itssourcesofprimarydataarecommercial,governmentalprovidersareinvolvedonacase-by-casebasis,anditgivespreferencetoEuropeanspaceassetswhenthequality,reactivenessandcostsareeven.

WhiletheEUSatCenisconsideredthecapabilityoftheEUwithregardtoGEOINTforcrisismanagement, security anddefence, the JRC20 also supports the EUwith satellite imageryanalysisforagricultural,environmental,disasterandforestobservationpurposes,aswellasfordisasterandcrisismanagement.TheJRCsupportstheEmergencyManagementServiceof

20AmongtheDirectorate-GeneralsoftheEuropeanCommission,theJRCfallsundertheresponsibilityoftheCommissionerforEducation,Culture,Youth&Sport,withthemissiontocarryoutresearchinordertoprovideindependentscientificadviceandsupportforEUpolicies.


20

theCopernicusprogramme,andhasforinstancedevelopedaGlobalHumanSettlementMapinordertoidentifyallpopulatedareasontheglobe.Furthermore,itcarriesoutautomatic analysis of satellite data to provide information products and analyses for disaster riskreduction, conflict prevention and assessments for post-disaster responses, recovery andreconstructionplanning.21This informationisused,amongothers,byCommissionservicessuchasDGDEVCOandDGECHO,andbyMemberStates’civilprotectionservices,inordertosupporttheirwork.

Insum,Earthobservationgeospatialinformationgivesnearreal-timeinformationoverareasofdifficultaccess,whichservestoconfirmorrefuteinformationobtainedfromothersources.Newtechnologiesandtheuseofconstellationsofsatellitesprovidefastercommunicationandimprovetheimageresolution.Thefactthatgeospatialinformationonlydetectsphysicalsignsoftensionorachangetoasituationisoneofitsweaknesses,aswellastherequirementofexperiencedstaffto interpretandanalysethedatacomingfromthistool.CyberattacksalongthewholeproductionchainofGEOINT,andthelackofknowledgeofthepotentialuseofgeospatialinformationandGEOINTproductsforearlywarningandconflictprevention,aresomeofthethreats.Asdiscussedabove,oneofthemainrecommendationsinthisareaistoensure that potential users of geospatial products are trained and informed about thepotentialandcapacitiesthatsuchproductshaveforconflictpreventionapplications.

21Seehttps://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/earth-observation,lastaccessedon29November2016.


21

Figure5.SWOTforEarthobservationgeospatialinformation

2.2INFORMATIONANALYSISANDMEDIAMONITORINGTOOLS

Analysisofdataisaprocessofinspecting,cleansing,transformingandmodellingdatawiththegoalsofdiscoveringusefulinformation,suggestingconclusionsandsupportingdecision-making.Dataanalysishasmultiplefacetsandapproaches,encompassingdiversetechniquesunderavarietyofnames,indifferentbusiness,scienceandsocialsciencedomains.

National governments, multilateral organisations, universities, non-governmentalorganisationsandthinktankshavecreatedmanydifferentmodelsdesignedtopredictconflictandinstability,withadiversesetofmethodologies.Asanexample,theFundforPeace(FFP),by combining social science techniques with information technology, has produced the

Strengths- Real-timeinformation(RPAS)andnear

real-timeinformation(satellites)- Informationfromremote/non-

accessibleareas- Complements,confirmsorrefutesinformationfromothersources

- Non-intrusive(satellites)

Weaknesses

Weaknesses- Canonlydetect'physical'signsofchange

toasituation- Theinformationmustbeprocessedbya

skilledImage/DataAnalystorbyautomatedmethods

- Technologicalmeansofsecurecommunicationareneededtoshare

sensitiveinformation- Canbeconsideredintrusive(RPAS)

- Needstocomplywithaerialnavigationrulesandisvulnerabletojammingand

physicalattacks(RPAS)

Opportunities- Newtechnologies:

- useofconstellationsofsatellitesforbetterrevisitingtime,allowingforfastercommunicationandimprovedimage

resolution;- microsatellites,allowingmoresatellitesin

orbitandconstantactivationoftheirsensor;

- developmentoffullmotionvideosatellites;

- RaisedawarenessoftheuseofEarthobservation/geospatialproducts

Threats- Cyberattacks

- Poorunderstanding/knowledgeofEarthobservation/geospatialinformationasatoolforearlywarningandconflictanalysis

- Lackofaunifiedsystemforsecurecommunicationbetweendifferentactors

Earthobservationgeospatialinformation


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patentedConflictAssessmentSystemTool(CAST),whichtheFFPusesannuallytoelaboratetheFragileStatesIndex(FSI).Basedoncomprehensivesocialsciencemethodology,datafromthreeprimarysourcesistriangulatedandsubjectedtocriticalreviewtoobtainfinalscoresfortheFSI.Millionsofdocumentsareanalysedeveryyear.Byapplyinghighlyspecialisedsearchparameters, scoresareapportioned foreachcountrybasedon12keypolitical, socialandeconomicindicators(whichinturnincludeover100sub-indicators).22

The EU can of course access different open-source databases in order to extract usefulinformation for its EWS and conflict analysis. However, it appears that, as mentioned insection 1.2 of this report, the EU EWS uses an information analysis model as a tool forassessing the global situationwith regard to violent conflict in the first step of the earlywarning system (risk scanning), the GCRI, developed by the JRC together with experts,academics and scientific organisations. Based on quantitative indicators, it uses a linearregressionmodeltocalculatetheriskandprobableintensityofaviolentconflictinacountrywithinonetofouryears,collecting25variablesin5structuraldimensions(social,economic,security,politicalandgeographical/environmental). It isbasedonopen-sourcedataand isaccessible for anyone to consult. The construction of theGCRI builds on thework of theInfoRM index, an open-source global risk assessment of humanitarian crisis and disaster,usinganinteractiveplatformfordataanalysis.

IthastobetakenintoaccountthatthemodelfortheGCRIonlyconsidersthedata,sothereisnoexpertjudgementoranalysisusedinthesix-monthlyupdatesoftheGCRI.Theindexisbasedonthe‘datain,dataout’principle,soifthesourcedatahaveerrors,arenotupdatedoraremissing,theoutcomewillreflectthat.Initsuseforafirstassessment,itnonethelesshelpswithanevidence-basedanalysisforEUexternalactiontowards‘atrisk’countries.23Yetthe contemporary academic and policy literature on conflict early warning and responsearguesforamorepeople-centredapproach.24Perception-baseddata,i.e.dataindicatingapopulation’ssentimentorreactiontowardsanevent,aswellaspotentialtriggeringevents,aremissing from this kind of information analysis. Furthermore, the GCRI onlymeasuresinternalconflict;interstateconflictsareexcludedduetolackofdata.25

TheEuropeanMediaMonitor(EMM)incorporatessoftwarethatprovidesa24/7monitoringof international news. It gathers and filters the information coming from thousands ofdifferentsourcesandisabletotakechargeofupto70languages.TheEMMnotonlyprovidesadatabaseforanalystsanddecision-makers,itisalsoabletoextractkeyinformationoneachsourceandtoclassifyit intomorethan500differenttopics.TheEMMhighlightsthemaintrendsinthenewsbyprovidingreal-timestatistics.TheseproductsareeasilyavailableontheEMM’s website, called News Brief,26 displaying the hottest topics discussed in the worldduringthelastminutesorhours.Theimagebelowisanexampleofwhatcanbefoundonthe

22Seehttp://fsi.fundforpeace.org/methodology,lastaccessedon3November2016.23Seehttp://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.24EmmanuelLetouzé,PatrickMeierandPatrickVinck,“BigDataforConflictPrevention:NewOilandOldFires”,inFrancescoMancini (ed.),NewTechnologyandthePreventionofViolenceandConflict, InternationalPeaceInstitute,NewYork,April2013,p.7.25Seehttp://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Methodology,lastaccessedon10November2016.26 See http://emm.newsbrief.eu/NewsBrief//web/html/EMMAlertsHelp.htm, last accessed on 10 November2016.


23

NewsBrief.Ontheleftsidetherearevariousfiltersthatcanbeappliedinordertoquicklyfindinformation.Eachcurveofthegraphcorrespondstoaspecifictopicandhighlightstheevolution of its presence in the news during the last hours. The headlines and latestinformationarepresentedasshowninFigure6below.Figure6.ExamplegraphfromEMM.NewsBrief.eu

Source:EMM.NewsBrief.eu,30August2016.

EMM’sapplicationsarealsoavailableonallmobiledevices.Updatedeverytenminutes,thistool allows analysts and decision-makers to be up to date with the latest events anddevelopments at any time. This is particularly helpful during crises that require effectivemonitoring. In addition to News Brief, the EMM has two other web platforms: NewsExplorer,27whichpresents a summaryof themost recent andmain topics, but also findsfurtherautomaticallyderivedinformationandlistsofrelatedpersonsandorganisations;andMediSys,28whichstandsfor‘MedicalInformationSystem’,whichonlydisplaysarticlesrelatedtopublichealth. It isunclear if theEMMisactuallyused intheEWSandconflictanalysis;however,itappearstobeausefulinstrument,especiallycombinedwithotherearlywarningtoolssuchastheGCRIandothertechnologiesdiscussedinthisreport.

Toconclude,theinformationanalysisandmediamonitoringtoolsdevelopedbytheJRCtakeintoaccountsocial,economic,political, securityandenvironmental factors,extractingkeyinformationfromthousandsofdifferentsources.Thesystemsarefrequentlyupdatedandareopen to everybody. The EMM is also a useful tool for following the latest news anddevelopmentsaroundtheworld.TheGCRIcanbeavaluabletoolforscanningpotentialareasofconflict,givingevidence-baseddataandstructuralindicators.Themainweaknessofthesystemisthatitisbasedon‘datain,dataout’;ifthedatasourceiserroneousorifdataaremissing,thiswillbereflectedintheoutput.Thereisnoexpertjudgementoranalysisofthedata,asthesystemusesaquantitativemethodbasedondataprocessing.Nevertheless, it

27Seehttp://emm.newsexplorer.eu/NewsExplorer/home/en/latest.html.28Seehttp://medisys.newsbrief.eu/medisys/homeedition/en/home.html.


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canbeveryusefulcombinedwithothertoolsandmethodologiesforcompletingananalysisoftheriskofconflictinacountry(seeFigure7).Figure7.SWOTforinformationanalysisandmediamonitoringtools

Strengths- Giveanevidencebase,quantitativeglobalviewofpotentialrisksofconflict

(GCRI)- Takeintoaccountsocial,economic,security,politicalandenvironmentalvariables(rootcausesofconflict)

- Extractkeyinformationfromthousandsofdifferentsources

- Frequentlyupdated(EMM)- Easeofuseandopentoeverybody

Weaknesses

Weaknesses- Datain,dataout;onlybasedonexistingdata,andifthesourcedatahaveerrors,arenotupdatedoraremissing,theoutcome

willreflectthis(GCRI)- Therearenoperception-basedor

triggeringeventsdataincluded(GCRI)- Noqualitativeanalysisofthedata

providedbythesetools- Onlyincludesinternalconflictrisk

indicators(GCRI)

Opportunities- Leadingacademicandscientific

organisationsandexpertsarepartofthemethodologyreferenceworkinggroup

(GCRI)- Combinationwithqualitativeanalysis

Threats- Lackofhumanresourcestomaintain,updateandextractinformationfromthesetools- Accuracyofdata,sometimesless'exciting'dataaremissingorarenotprovided,whichcanbecrucialforanaccurateoutcome(GCRI)

Informationanalysisandmediamonitoringtools


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2.3HORIZON2020TECHNOLOGICALSUPPORTINEUEARLYWARNINGANDCONFLICTPREVENTION

Some projects developed within the framework of Horizon 2020 could also improve theconflictpreventionandearlywarningprocessesof theEU. This sectiondiscusses inmoredetailthethematicfocusofeachoftheseprojects.

The Reaching Out project (“demonstRation of EU effective lArge sCale tHreat and crIsismaNaGementOUTsidetheEU”)proposesaninnovativemultidisciplinaryapproachtoconflictprevention, based on the development of a collaborative framework, with distributedplatformsoffunctionalservices,and78newconnectableandinteroperabletools.

EU-CIVCAP(“PreventingandRespondingtoConflict:DevelopingEUCIVilianCAPabilitiesforasustainablepeace”)willprovideacomprehensive,comparativeandmultidisciplinaryanalysisof EU civilian capabilities for external conflict prevention and peacebuilding in order toidentify“thebestcivilianmeanstoenhancethesecapabilities”.Severaldeliverables,includingthis one, examine in more detail the role of technologies in conflict prevention andpeacebuildingaswellasidentifycapabilityshortfallsinthisarea.29

Foritspart,WOSCAP(“WholeofsocietyConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding”)isaprojectaiming at enhancing the capabilities of the EU to implement conflict prevention andpeacebuilding interventions through sustainable, comprehensive and innovative civilianmeans.30Amongotherthings,theprojectwillinvestigateopportunities,barriersandethicaldilemmaspresentedbytheuseofICTinordertoassessEUcapabilitiesandprovideamorecompletepictureoftechnologyneedsandhowthesecanservetheoperationalgoalsoftheEU.

The CIVILEX (“Supporting European Civilian External Actions”) project resultswill identify,characteriseandmodelthecommunicationandinformationsystemsinuseamongEUcivilianmissions,understandstakeholderrequirementsandprovidepossiblesolutionstomeetthemby a future interoperable situational awareness, information exchange and operationalcontrolplatform.31

iTRACK(“an integratedsystemforreal-timeTRACKingandcollective intelligence incivilianhumanitarianmissions”)willprovideanintegrated,intelligentreal-timetrackingandthreatidentification system to improve protection of responders and assets, and provideinformationmanagementandlogisticsservices,suchasreal-timeinformationupdatesandanalysesaswellasnavigation,routingandscheduling.32

Several of the above-mentioned projects might lead to further developments of pre-commercialprocurementprojects,alsofundedbytheHorizon2020frameworkprogramme,forexampleCIVILEX,asseenabove.Consequently,itisveryimportanttogeteffectivesupportfromusersaswellastheinvolvementofinstitutionalactors,astheseprojectsaredesigned

29Seehttp://www.eu-civcap.net/,lastaccessedon25November2016.30Seehttp://www.woscap.eu/,lastaccessedon25November2016.31Seehttp://civilex.eu/,lastaccessedon25November2016.32Seehttp://www.itrack-project.eu/,lastaccessedon25November2016.


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toimprovetechnologicalcapabilitiesandbridgegapsincrisismanagement,includingearlywarningandconflictprevention.

TheSWOTanalysisshowsthatthetechnicalsupportfromHorizon2020projectscanfacilitatea comprehensive, comparative and multidisciplinary analysis and development of EUcapabilities in this area (see Figure 8). Horizon 2020 projects take into account userrequirementsinvariouspolicyareasoftheEUandbringtogetherkeyactorsintheprivateand public domains to address new technologies. The weaknesses identified include thecomplexityoffinancialrulesandagreements,whichcoulddiscouragesmallerorganisations,structuresandinnovativesmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs)fromparticipatinginaproject,andinsomecasestheformationofverybigconsortiamakeitdifficulttomanageaprojectinworkingtoreachtheexpectedoutcomes.Nevertheless,amongtheopportunitiesarethesupportreceivedfromusersandinstitutionalactors,andthepotentialdevelopmentof new tools and services for earlywarning, conflict analysis and prevention. The threatsidentifiedare therisk that theproject resultsarenotendorsedbydecision-makersor theindustry,andthusremaininthe‘scientificcommunity’.Anotherthreatisthattheusersarenotfullyinvolvedintheprojects,withtheresultthattheprojectoutcomesdonotreflecttheirrequirements.


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Figure8.SWOTforHorizon2020technologicalsupport

Strengths- Enablesacomprehensive,comparativeandmultidisciplinaryanalysisanddevelopmentof

EUcapabilities- CollectsuserrequirementsinthevariousEU

policyareas,includingCFSP/CSDPandexternalaction

- Providesmultidisciplinaryandnewapproachestoconflictprevention

- Bringstogetherthekeyactorsintheprivateandpublicdomainstoaddressnew

technologiesandtoolstosupportEUpolicy- SupportsthedevelopmentofEUflagship

programmes

Weakness

Weaknesses- Verybigconsortiacanbedifficultto

manageinworkingtoreachtheexpectedoutcomes

- Resultsfromcapabilitydevelopmentprojectsdonotalwaysleadtonewtoolsandapplications,particularlyintheabsenceof

sustainablefunding- Complexityoffinancialrules,reportingandconsortiumagreementscoulddiscourage

innovativeSMEsandsmallerstructuresfromparticipatinginaproject

Opportunities- Supportfromusersandinstitutionalactors- Developmentofnewtoolsandservices

forconflictpreventionandconflictmanagement

- Developmentofpre-commercialprocurementisanassetforfacilitatingtheemergenceofnewtechnologiesandtools

Threats- Projectresultsarenotendorsedby

decision-makersorindustryandremaininthe'scientificcommunity'

- Usersarenotengagedintheprojectsandprojectresultsdonotreflecttheirrequirements(technologypush)

Horizon2020technological

support


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2.4INFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONTECHNOLOGIES

Newtechnologies,suchasmobilephonesandsmartphones,andtheincorporationofdigitalsocialmediainourdailylivesarechanginghowandwhenwelearnabouteventsandhowthesearecommunicated.Today,95%oftheglobalpopulationlivesinanareathatiscoveredbymobilenetworks,whilemobilebroadbandnetworks(3Gorabove)reach84%oftheglobalpopulation.33 Hence, the sources of information are multiplying and becoming multi-directional,stemmingfromtheclassicaltop–downchannels,fromstateandgovernmental-influenced information sources, as well as from a bottom-up flow of information fromindividuals and fromactors at the grassroots level. AllanDafoe and Jason Lyall call this ademocratisationofICT,andsuggestthatwearestandingatthethresholdofanICT-driventransformationofpoliticsthatwillrivaltheintroductionofearliertechnologies,suchasthetelegraph,newspaper,radioandtelevision.34Figure9.Mobilenetworkcoverageandevolvingtechnologies

Note:LTE–LongTermEvolution;astandardforhigh-speedwirelesscommunicationformobilephonesanddataterminals.Source:InternationalTelecommunicationUnion.

Thesechangesinwaysofcommunicatingeventsputgreaterresponsibilityontheconsumertobeabletoclassifyandsorttheflowofinformationwithacriticalmind.Newtechnologiesallowinformationandnewstoreachalargeamountofthepopulationfaster,whichontheonehandraisestheaccountabilityofastatetowardsitscitizens,whileontheotherhandthey

33 See “ICT Facts and Figures 2016”, International Telecommunication Union (available athttp://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx),lastaccessed28November2016.34AllanDafoeandJasonLyall,“FromCellPhonestoConflict?ReflectionsontheEmergingICT-PoliticalConflictResearchAgenda”,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,YaleUniversity,7July2014,pp.1-3.


29

become the perfect instrument to spread propaganda and false information fast andefficiently.

Anexampleofhowthesetechnologiescanbeusedtoinfluencesocietyisillustratedbytheproject“PoliticalinformationtechnologyandpoliticalIslam”,carriedoutbytheUniversityofWashington,whichanalysedtheuseofmobilephonesandsocialmediaintheNorthAfricancountries touched by the events of the Arab Spring. The project showed evidence that“suggests that socialmediacarriedacascadeofmessagesabout freedomanddemocracyacrossNorthAfricaand theMiddleEast,andhelped raiseexpectations for the successofpoliticaluprising”.Datafortheprojectcamedirectlyfromimmensedigitalarchivestheteambuiltoverthecourseofseveralmonths.Theresearchincludeddataabouttechnologyuseandpoliticalopinionfrombeforetherevolutions.ItassembleddataaboutblogginginTunisiaonemonthpriortothecrisisinthatcountry,andhadspecialdataonthelinkstructureofEgyptianpoliticalpartiesonemonthpriortothecrisisthere.35

Inviewoftheseeventsandthedecisiveinfluencethatmobilephones,smartphonesandsocialmediahad increatingasphereofpoliticalorganisationanddebate,thesetoolsshouldbeconsideredusefulforthepreventionofviolentconflictbyvariousmeans.ThemostevidentusewouldbethecollectionofbetterdatatofeedtheConflictEarlyWarningSystem.36Thesetoolswouldalsoallowresearchers,alongwithearlywarningandconflictpreventionactorstoaccessperception-baseddata,somethingthattheinformationanalysistoolspresentedinthesectionabovearelacking.

Software such as Frontline SMS collects data through SMS or smartphones (Magpi,KoBoToolbox)andcapturessocialmediadata(Geofedia).For instance,Ushahidi,anopen-sourcesoftwareplatformfor informationcollection,visualisationand interactivemapping,wasoriginallycreatedintheaftermathoftheKenyanpresidentialelectionsin2007withthepurposeofcollectingeyewitnessreportsofviolencecommunicatedbyemailandSMS,placingthem on a Googlemap. The organisation uses the concept of crowdsourcing37 for socialactivism and public accountability, serving as an initial model for what has been coined‘activist mapping’ – the combination of social activism, citizen journalism and geospatialinformation.Ushahidi offers products that enable local observers to submit reports usingtheirmobilephonesortheInternet,whilesimultaneouslycreatingatemporalandgeospatialarchive of events. The software has since been used in various settings, ranging fromhumanitariancrisestonaturaldisastermanagement.38

Mobilephonesandsocialmediaarealsousedtoalteraprevailingdiscourseandtospreadalternativenarratives.Thisprocesscouldbeappliedtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuildinginordertocreateanalternativediscourseenablingtheturnofasituationawayfromtension

35O’Donell(2016),op.cit.36AnneKahlandHelenaPuigLarrauri,“TechnologyforPeacebuilding”,Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurityandDevelopment2,No.3,Article61,2013,p.3.37MerriamWebstergivesthefollowingdefinitionofcrowdsourcing:“thepracticeofobtainingneededservices,ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially from the onlinecommunity rather than from traditional employees or suppliers” (merriam.webster.com/dictionary/crowdsourcing).38Seehttps://www.ushahidi.com/,lastaccessedon15November2016.


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andtheset-upofadialogueforpeace.39Asshowninthesectionbelow,BigDataapplicationsfortheanalysisandextractionofinformationfromICTcanfurtherexpandtheopportunitiesforenhancedearlywarningandconflictanalysis(aswellasforconflictpreventioningeneral).However,thedigitaldivide40shouldnotbeoverlookedwhentalkingabouttheopportunitiesandapplicationsofICTforearlywarningandconflictanalysis,anddataextractionandanalysisofICTdataalsoprovokesconcernsregardingpersonalprivacyanddataprotection.

TheEUdoesnothaveapolicyontheuseofICTforpeacebuilding,conflictearlywarningorconflict prevention. Still, the very recent Council Conclusions on “Mainstreaming digitalsolutionsand technologies inEUdevelopmentpolicy”call fordigitalisation tobeproperlymainstreamed“acrossallpolicyareas,includingtheEU’sdevelopmentandforeignpolicies,whileaddressingcyberchallengesandassuringpromotionandprotectionofhumanrights,includingprivacy,dataprotectionandfreedomofexpression”.41More importantly fortheEWSandconflictanalysis,the“CouncilinsistsontheimportanceofusingICTasanenablerforsustainabledevelopment,inclusivegrowthandinclusivesocieties.Tothisend,theCouncilencourages the Commission to develop its capacities in this regard and the HighRepresentative of theUnion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to raise awareness atheadquarterslevelandincountrydelegations.”42

The Council also calls for the rapid launch of pilot initiatives in selected priority areas,including support for formulating appropriate policies and strategies for digitaldevelopment.43Theseconclusionsshouldopenupmanypossibilitiesfor improvementandprioritisationofICTwhenitadditionallycomestoearlywarningandconflictanalysis.

ItisnonethelessuncleartheextenttowhichICTisusedinthecollectionofinformationfortheEWS,atwhichstageandbywhom.Inprinciple,EUdelegations,providinginformationandinput to the EWS and the conflict analysis process, could use ICT for the collection ofinformationin-country.Furthermore, it ispossiblethatcivilsocietyworking inconjunctionwiththedelegationsandthedifferentEEASserviceswithregardtoearlywarning,conflictanalysisandconflictpreventionareusingdifferentsoftware,smartphonesandotherICTintheirwork.Nevertheless,atthetimeofwritingthisreport(December2016),theredoesnotappeartobeasystematicanddirectuseofICTforearlywarningandconflictanalysisattheEU level. For instance, out of 292 projects funded by the instrument on contributing tostabilityandpeace,only12haveanICTcomponentandmostoftheseonlyfocusonthemediaingeneral,includingradio,withonly1projectspecificallyhavingreferencetoICT.44

39KahlandPuigLarrauri(2013),op.cit.,p.5.40 The digital divide entails economic and social inequality with regard to access to use of, or impact ofinformation and communication technologies; see for example “ICT Facts and Figures 2016”, InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(availableathttp://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx).41CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“MainstreamingdigitalsolutionsandtechnologiesinEUdevelopmentpolicy”,CouncilConclusions,14682/16,Brussels,28November2016,p.2.42Ibid.p.7.43Ibid.p.7.44JenniferRhianGaskell,HelenaPuigLarrauri,JohannesRieken,AliAli,AnoukRigterink,“UsesofInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs)forEUConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding”,WOSCAPDL2.4ScopingstudyonICTs,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceandBuildUp,31March2016,p.7.


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As seen in Figure 9 above, ICT tools are widely used for human communication (mobilephones,smartphones,theInternetandsoftware)throughwhichahugeamountofdatacanbeextractedandanalysedinordertomonitoranevent,getperception-basedknowledgeorengageandcreatecommonspacesforsocialandpoliticaldialogue.EventhoughtheydonotfigureamongthecurrenttoolsfortheEU’searlywarningandconflictanalysisprocesses,theCouncilConclusionsonmainstreamingdigitalsolutionsandtechnologiesopenadoortoitsfutureinclusionintheEU’scrisismanagementstructures.Atthesametime,theanalysisherenotes that the utilisation of such data for extracting informationwould need to carefullyconsiderissuesofpersonalanddigitalprivacy,anddataprotection.


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Figure10.SWOTforICTs

ure10.SWOTforICTFigure10.SWOTforICT

Strengths- Almostatworldwideconnectivity

(mobileconnectionandmobilebroadbandnetworks)

- Real-timeconnections-Newspacesforpoliticaldialogueand

organisation- Possibilitiesforinformationsharing- CollectionofdatasinceICThabitsaretraceable(SMS,socialmediausage)

makingitpossibletocollectperception-baseddata

- Softwarefordataanalysisandorganisation,datafusion

Weaknesses- Digitalhumanactivityproducesalarge

amountofunstructureddata- Digitaldivide

Opportunities- RaisedawarenessoftheinfluenceofICTinoursocietyandmorespecificallyon

conflictearlywarningandconflictanalysis- Softwarefordataanalysisand

organisation,datafusion

Threats- Intrusiveifpersonalprivacyanddata

protectionarenotrespected- AdverseusageofICT

- Cyberthreats

ICT


33

2.5BIGDATA

BigDatareferstoanaccumulationofdatathatistoolargeandcomplexforprocessingbytraditionaltoolsfordatabasemanagement.45However,asmentionedearlier,itiscrucialto

distinguishbetweenBigDataasafieldofpracticeandbigdataasdata.

As a field of practice, Big Data refers to Big Dataanalytics, i.e. methodologies leveraging advancedcomputing techniques as well as the actors andinstitutionsusing them to gain insights fordecision-makingpurposes.46Asdata,thebigdataiscommonlycharacterisedbyfivekeyattributes,theso-called5Vs:volume(agreatamountofdata),variety(diversedatafrommultiplesources),velocity(arapidinfluxofthedata stream), veracity (uncertainty of the data) andvalue(informationextractedfromthedata).47

BigDatatechnologiescanbeusedforprocessingdatafasteraswellasforextractingknowledge(analysing)

datainadistributedmanner.BigDatatechnologiesandanalyticscanbeappliedtoanyofthetoolsforearlywarningandconflictanalysisdiscussedinthisreport,exceptperhapsfortheinformationandcommunicationexchange tool,due to its classifiedcharacter.Concerninggeospatialinformation,BigDatacanfacilitatetheaccesstohugedatasets(imagery),speeduptheprocessingandassistintheirstorage.ThiswouldenabletheaccessandprocessingofthelargenumberofimagesthatareorwillbeprovidedbytheCopernicusSentinelsandfuturemicrosatellites. By the end of 2016, the Sentinels are expected to producemore than 6terabytesofdataperday,openandfreeofchargeasperitsdatapolicy.Itcanalsobeappliedto the analysis of satellite imagery in order to perform statistical analysis and extractinformation fromtimeseriesofEarthobservation imagery.BigData technologiesarealsomoreandmorerelatedtodatafusion:theintegrationofdataandknowledgefromsources,whichisalsousefulfortheelaborationofGEOINTproducts.

Inthecaseofanalyticaltools,traditionaldatabasescouldbereplacedbyBigDatasystems,byintegratingdifferentdatasources,extractingandanalysinginformationfromendlesslymoredatathanatraditionaldatabasemanagementtooliscapableof.ICTtechnologiesareprobablythosethataregoingtobenefitthemostfromBigDatatechnologies,sincetheyallowfortheaccess,classification,fusion,extractionandanalysisofmassivestreamsofcomplexreal-timedatathatareproduceddailybymobilephones,smartphones,theInternetandsocialmedia.Foractorsdealingwithearlywarningandconflictanalysis,BigDatawouldmakeitpossibletogetaquickoverviewofcomplexsituationswithinputsfromvarioussourcesanddatasets,to

45 See “Big Data”, atMerriam-Webster.com (http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/big%20data), lastaccessed26November2016.46Letouzé,MeierandVinck(2013),op.cit.,pp.8-9.47Ibid.,p.10.

5VsofbigdataVolume–agreatamountofdata

Variety – diverse data frommultiplesources

Velocity – a rapid influx of thedatastream

Veracity–uncertaintyofthedata

Value – information extractedfromthedata


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builddatapatternsanddochangedetection48.BigDatacouldprovidetheperception-baseddatathatisnotofferedbytoolssuchastheGCRI.

EmmanuelLetouzé,PatrickMeierandPatrickVinckhavealsoshownhowBigDatacouldhelpreveal key insights into the drivers, triggers and early signs of violent conflict in order tosupportandimproveconflictpreventioninitiatives.49Theyhavecoinedtheconceptof‘BigData for Conflict Prevention’, built on the application of Big Data for the purposes ofdevelopment put forward by the UN Global Pulse initiative,50 and have identified threecategoriesofbigdataforconflictprevention:

1. “digitalbreadcrumbs”,i.e.tracesofhumanactionspickedupbydigitaldevices,orthedigitaltranslationofhumanactions(makingaphonecall,makingapurchase,onlineresearch,sendingatweet,updatingaFacebookprofileorpostingablog);

2. open web data (social media, blogs, online news, etc.), most of which isunstructured;and

3. remotesensingdatausingsatelliteimagery.51

Furthermore,BigDatamayservethefollowingobjectivesinconflictprevention:

1. earlywarning,i.e.theearlydetectionofanomaliesinhowpopulationsusedigitaldevicesandservices,whichcanenablefasterresponseintimesofcrisis;

2. real-time awareness, i.e. how Big Data can paint a fine-grained and currentrepresentation of reality, which can inform the design and targeting ofprogrammesandpolicies;and

3. real-timefeedback, i.e.theabilitytomonitorapopulationinrealtimemakesitpossibletounderstandwherepoliciesandprogrammesarefailingandmakethenecessaryadjustments.52

However,tobenefitfromBigDatatechnologiesandanalyticsandtosetupaBigDatasystemforconflictpreventionorearlywarning,appropriateexpertiseisnecessary.ExpertiseinBigDataarchitectureandexpertiseinthefieldofthesubjecttowhichBigDatatechnologiesandanalytics will be applied is also crucial.With the constant inflow of real-time big data, acompletelydifferentapproachtointegratingandcommunicatingtheinformationextractedbyBigDataisrequiredaswell.Thiscouldbeachallengeforsomeorganisationsandcouldleadtotheremodellingofpreviousdecisions,plansandstrategies.Ifanorganisationisnotusedtohandlingdataatarapidrate,itcouldleadtoincorrectanalysis,whichcouldcauselargerproblems.OthercaveatsofBigDataaretheprotectionofpersonaldataandpersonalprivacy.BigDataraisesthechallengethat,whileextractinginformationfromanincredible

48Changedetectionwhenappliedtoremotesensingtechniquesreferstotheprocessofidentifyingdifferencesinthestateoflandfeaturesbyobservingthematdifferenttimes.Moregenerally,changedetectionalsoincludesthedetectionofanomalousbehavior(ofastatisticalpatternforexample).49Ibid.,p.4.50GlobalPulseisaflagshipinnovationinitiativeoftheUnitedNationsSecretary-Generalonbigdata.Itsvisionisafutureinwhichbigdataisharnessedsafelyandresponsiblyasapublicgood(www.unglobalpulse.org).51Letouzé,MeierandVinck(2013),op.cit.,p.11.52Letouzé,MeierandVinck(2013),op.cit.,pp.8-9.


35

amountofdatasources,thisinformationandtheanalysisofitshouldnotviolateprivacyanddataprotectionrights.Inrelationtothis,theCommissionadoptedtheCommunicationonthedata-driveneconomyasaresponsetotheEuropeanCouncil’sConclusionsofOctober2013,whichfocusedonthedigitaleconomy,innovationandservicesasdriversforgrowthandjobsandcalledforEUactiontoprovidetherightframeworkconditionsforasinglemarketforbigdataandcloudcomputing.53.Inaddition,theHorizon2020programmehasongoingprojectsonBigData,forexampleBigDataEurope(“IntegratingBigData,Software&CommunitiesforAddressingEurope’sSocietalChallenges”).54Thisprojectaimsatevaluatingpossibletoolsthatcouldimprovetheoperationalcapacityforthetimelyandefficientmanagementofextremelylargeandcomplexdatasets.

TheEUEWSanditsconflictanalysisprocesswouldmostcertainlybenefitfromBigDataasdescribedinsections1.2and1.3.ABigDatasystemforconflictpreventionfusing(integrating)different data sources and types, classifying them while constructing statistical patterns,basednotonlyondatasourceslikethoseusedbytheGCRI,butalsoondatafromICT,wouldontheonehandfacilitatetheworkoftheEU’sconflictpreventionstructures,whileprovidingbetterdata.Ontheotherhand,thequestionregardingwhetherthecurrentorganisationalanddecision-makingstructureoftheEUwouldbeabletofollowthepaceoftheinformationobtainedfromsuchasystemremains.Moreover,thedigitaldivide(theeconomicandsocialinequality with regard to access to, use or impact of information and communicationtechnologies)andgender-relatedissuesshouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhileanalysingdata obtained from ICT, since the obtained data will most probably to a higher degreerepresenttheurban,malepopulation.55

Inconclusion,BigDatahasthewidestpossibleapplicationofthetoolsdiscussedinthisreport.BigDatacanhelpspeedupandfacilitatetheprocessingofhugedatasetsofsatelliteimagerythatnewgenerationsof satelliteswillprovide (Sentinelsandmicrosatellites), improve theanalysis and create statistical patternsoutofunstructureddata from ICT. Furthermore, itcouldserveasatoolforconflictprevention(includingearlywarningandconflictanalysis)byconstructinganintegratedsystemcombiningandintegratingdifferenttoolsanddatafromdifferentsources inordertoprovideBigDataforconflictprevention,which inturnwouldprovideearlywarning,real-timeawarenessandreal-timefeedback.BigDatamight,however,challengeanorganisationsuchastheEU,whichwillprobablyhavetochangeitscurrentITarchitecture,datahandlingpolicyanddataanalysis.Ifthelargeamountofdatathatcanbeextracted by Big Data analytics is not correctly handled or analysed, it is likely to have anegativeimpactontheorganisation.

53EuropeanCommission,“Towardsathrivingdata-driveneconomy”,CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncil,theEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommitteeandtheCommitteeoftheRegions,SWD(2014)214final,Brussels,2July2014.54Seehttps://www.big-data-europe.eu/about/.55 See “ICT Facts and Figures 2016”, International Telecommunication Union (available athttp://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx),lastaccessedon22November2016.


36

Figure11.SWOTforBigData

2.6INFORMATIONEXCHANGETECHNOLOGIESFOREARLYWARNINGANDCONFLICTANALYSISOFTHEEU

Ascanbeseen, theEUEWSandconflictanalysisarebasedonstrongcooperationamongmultiple actors and agencies. The recent Global Strategy for Foreign and Security PolicyhighlightedthenecessitytoimprovetheinteroperabilitybetweenEUagencies.Forexample,Terri Beswick has identified various problems regarding internal communication, such asdifferentlinesofreportingwithintheEWSandconflictanalysisstructures.56Shenotedthat“each EU in-country actor appears to have their own reporting line toBrussels” and thatinformationtransmittedisnotbeingautomaticallysharedwiththerelevantactorswithintheEWS. Furthermore, she highlighted that there are “outstanding technical obstacles thatundermine cooperation and information- and analysis-sharing between departments”,

56 Terri Beswick, Improving Institutional Capacity for Early Warning, Synthesis Report, Initiative for PeaceBuilding,London,January2012,p.12.

Strengths- Handlesahugeamountofdata

- Fasterdataprocessing- Abletoextractandanalyse

informationfrombigdatasets,andcreatestatisticalpatternsfromthem- Facilitatesstorageoflargeamounts

ofdata- Abletointegrate(fuse)datafrom

differentsources

Weaknesses- Changesanorganisation'sapproachtointegratingandcommunicatingtheinformationextractedbyBigData

- Therapidrateofdatacouldleadtoincorrectanalysisoranorganisationbeingunabletokeepupwiththe

paceoftheBigDatainformationflow- Digitalpersonalprivacyissues

Opportunities- Increasesthecapabilityofaccurateandfastearlywarningandconflict

analysis- Increasesthecapabilitytoextract

valuableknowledge- BigDataforconflictprevention

Threats- CybersecurityissuesforBigData

environments

BigData


37

notablyencryptionincompatibilitybetweenthedifferentteamsandsectionswithintheEEAS,EUdelegationsandotheractorsintheEWSstructure.57Thisanalysiswasproducedin2012,but these issues still persist. The aforementioned difficulties can easily be understood bylookingatthearchitectureoftheEEASclassifiedsystems.TheEEASisusingacollectionofclassified systems inherited from two main sources: the Commission and the GeneralSecretariat of the Council, with different actorswithin the EEAS using different classifiedsystems.58TheEUMS,IntCenandtheCrisismanagementandplanningdirectorate(CMPD)directoratesuseaclassifiedEUsystemcalledSOLAN.TheEUOpsWan isapermanentEU-SECRET network linking the Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters in the EUMemberStatestotheEUSatCeninTorrejóndeArdoz,Spain,andtotheEUMSheadquartersinBrussels.FromBrussels,thesystemfeedstheSatCenproductsfurthertootherservices,e.g.IntCen,viaSOLAN.TheEUOpsWannetworkwasinitiallyintendedfortheplanningofEUmilitary operations and offers email, a collaborative tool (CAMEO) and some videoteleconferencefunctionalities.

INTELLANisthesystemusedbythemilitaryintelligence,whereasthesystemusedbythecivilintelligenceisSINTCENLAN.TheEEASheadquartersanddesignateddelegationshaveasecretEUsystemcalledCIMS,andthecivilianCSDPmissionshaveaccesstoDEUSanditsmobileextensionNOMAD(systemsstemmingfromtheCommission).Thismultiplicityofsystemsisof course anobstacle to information sharing,which is a necessity for conflict prevention.Moreover,allofthesesystemsareoutdated,goingbackto2003and2008atthemostrecent.Consequently,thereisacrucialneedtoreplacethesesystemswithamodernandcentralisedone.59

It is tobehopedthat this issuewillbeaddressedby theEC3IS (EEASCorporateClassifiedCommunicationandInformationSystem)programme.TheEC3ISwillbeacommonplatformprotectingclassifiedinformationusedbytheEEASservices.Itwillreplacetheabovesystemscurrentlyinuse,integratingallfunctionsthatalreadyexist,addingsecuremultimediaservicesasacommonservice.Itsimplementationwillleadtobettersecurityforclassifiedinformationandtogreaterefficiencyininteragencycollaboration.Somededicatedserviceswillstillexist,especially for the EUMS, but common services will include an electronic directory, officeautomationtools,emailservices(includingelectronicsignatureandcalendarsharingtools),telephonyviavoiceoverIP(VoIP)functionality,videoconferencinginend-to-endandmulti-pointmodes,anarchivinganddocumentmanagementsystem,collaborativetools,aforumandchat.Nevertheless,althoughtheinitialstepsofitsimplementationbeganduringthefirstpartof2016,itisnotyetoperational.60

In sum, in the case of information exchange technologies, the weaknesses seem toovershadow their strengths (see Figure 12). While there are networks for informationexchangewithintheEUstructuresdealingwithearlywarningandconflictanalysis,theyarehighly fragmented, only connecting certain actors. The different systems seem to be

57Ibid.,p.12.58EEAS,“Fromindividualitiestocommunity”,EC3IS(EEASCorporateClassifiedCommunicationandInformationSystem)ProgrammeVisionStatementDocument,Brussels,16May2014,pp.6-9.59Ibid.,p.5.60Ibid.,p.9.


38

outdated,datingbacktotheyears2003and2008.Still,EUinstitutionsseemtobeawareoftheseweaknesses,sinceanewsystem,EC3IS,iscurrentlyinitsimplementationphase.TheEC3ISisacommonplatformforclassifiedinformation,linkingthedifferentserviceswithintheEEAS. The support from various projects under Horizon 2020 also provides a potentialopportunityforimprovementinthisarea.Figure12.SWOTforinformationexchangetechnologies

Strengths- Networksforinformationexchangeexist

andareinterlinkingEUactors- TheEUisdevelopingcybersecurity

capabilitiestoprotectitsinfrastructure

Weaknesses- Afragmentedsystem,withnocommon

EUsystem- Lowinterconnectivitybetweendifferent

actors,servicesanddivisions- Outdatedsystems

- Informationexchangecapacitiesandeffectivenessareoftenbasedonhuman

relations

Opportunities- Creationofacommonplatformfor

classifiedinformation(EC3IS)willenhancetheinteragencycommunicationand

informationexchange- SupportfromHorizon2020,e.g.CIVILEX,

ReachingOutandEU-CIVCAP

Threats- Cyberattacks

- Financialconstraints

Informationexchange

technologies


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CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Assetoutinthisdeliverable,theEUhasacreatedanEWSandconflictanalysisstructurewithquiteafewtechnologicaltoolstosupporttheseactivities. InformationcollectionseemstocomemainlyfromtheSIACandEUdelegations,withoutclarityonthetechnologicalmeansthroughwhichEUdelegationscollectandextractinformationin-country.Attheinstitutionallevel,themaintoolsusedareEarthobservationgeospatial information–probablyalreadyingestedintheinformationproducedbytheSIAC–andtheGCRI.Bycontrast,thesystematicuseofICTforobtaininginformation,andBigDatatoprocessandanalysethisinformation,has not been incorporated into the EU EWS and the conflict analysis structure so far.However, recent Council Conclusions call for the mainstreaming of digital solutions andtechnologiesinEUdevelopmentandforeignpolicies,whichcouldacceleratethepossibleuseofICTforearlywarningandconflictanalysis.OngoingEUprojectsonBigDatacouldalsoopenfurtherthepossibilityofitsapplicationintheconflictpreventiondomain(includingtheEWSandconflictanalysis).Yet,technologicalapplicationsandtheiruseshouldbeanalysedagainsttheinstitutionalcapabilitiesoftheorganisationandthepoliciestheyaresupposedtosupport.New technologies such as ICT and Big Data could present great opportunities for theenhancementofEUearlywarningandconflictanalysiscapabilities,buttheyalsoraisethequestionofhow the complexityofhandling such toolswill be tackledby the relevant EUinstitutions.

Thisreporthasalsoshownthelackofaunifiedsystemforinformationexchange,withalmosteverypolicyareaandservicehavingitsownclassifiedsystem(civilian,military,intelligence,etc.).Giventhelackofinterconnectivitybothonatechnologicallevelandonahumanaswellasphysicallevel–astheEU’sconflictpreventionstructuresarebasedindifferentpremises–goodpersonal contacts and cooperation betweendifferent actors and services,willing toshareinformationandcooperate,arekeyconditionsforasmoothandeffectiveexchangeandsharingofinformationamongthevariousBrussels-basedbodiesandEUdelegations.Atanorganisational level, there is also a lack of knowledge and awareness of the availabletechnologicaltools,theirusabilityandhowtobestcombinethemforeffectiveearlywarningandconflictanalysis.61DespitetheimplementationofacomprehensiveapproachoftheEU,the need to enhance the interconnectivity between different services in order to avoidduplicationandisolation,andtoenhancethecapacitiesandperformanceoftheEUcouldbeimprovedfurther.

Knowledgeofthetoolsathandisadditionallycrucialforassuringtheiroptimalperformance.Asanexample,theEUSatCencanprovideimageryintelligencetosupporttheearlywarningandconflictanalysisoftheEU,butitisuptotheserviceorinstitutiontaskingtheSatCentoaskforsuchaproductanditisthefinaluserwhoassuresthatsuchaproductisusedtothisend.Toachievethis,greaterknowledgeandawarenesswithinthedifferentinstitutionsofthesupportthattheEUSatCencanprovidewouldbebeneficial.

Another important question raised is how the EU, by adding more technologies, wouldpracticallybenefitfromthem.Basedonthefindingsofthisreport,itcouldbearguedthattheuseofnewtechnologicaltoolswouldimprovetheEU’searlywarningandconflictanalysisby

61Beswick(2012),op.cit.,pp.10-12.


40

providingmoreandbetterinformationfaster,butthequestionremainsastowhetherthiswouldenhancethe(early)responseoftheEU.TerriBeckernotesthat“thespeedofdecision-makingandimplementationofresponsesisnotedasaconstrainttoEUpotentialforearlyresponsetoconflicts”.62Inotherwords,willtheintegrationofnewtechnologicaltoolsreducethegapbetweenearlywarningandearlyresponse?

Torespondtothedifferentshortcomingshighlightedbythisreport,itcanberecommendedthattheEUenvisagetheactionsoutlinedbelow.

1. Reflect on how new technologies such as ICT and Big Data could be added, in asustainablemanner, to theexisting technological tools forearlywarningand conflictanalysis.

TheEUmaywishtostudyhowtomakethebestuseofICTandBigDataforearlywarningandconflictanalysis.Todoso,itcouldconsiderincorporatingthepossibilitiesofICTandBigDataasappliedtoEUexternalaction,includingconflictprevention,inthenextcallsforHorizon2020projectsandbeyond..

2. Update,mainstreamandcoordinatethevariouscapacitiesandtheirusewithindifferentservicesdealingwithconflictearlywarningandconflictanalysis,inordertobridgegaps,improveinterconnectivityandavoidduplication.

Anupdatedandunifiedinformationexchangesystemiscrucialforsmoothcommunication,coordinationand interconnectivitybetweenactorsdealingwithearlywarningandconflictanalysisattheEUlevel.Furthermore,theuseofdifferenttechnologiesalreadyavailableandtheintroductionofpossiblenewtoolsshouldbemainstreamedattheorganisationalleveltoavoidduplicationandisolation.

3. Properlyfamiliarisestaffinvolvedintheearlywarningandconflictanalysiscyclewiththeavailabletools.

TheEUshouldraiseawarenessandknowledgeoftheavailabletechnologicaltools,ensuretheirfulluseandunderstandingofhowtobestcombinethemforeffectiveearlywarningandconflictanalysis,byprovidingsuitabletrainingofitsstaffmembers.

4. AssurethattechnologicaltoolsforearlywarningandconflictanalysisarealignedwithEUpoliciesonconflictpreventionandviceversa.

Finally yet importantly, the level of performanceandusability of the tools studied in thisreportshouldgohand inhandwiththepoliciesthattheyareexpectedtosupport. Inthisregard,EU-CIVCAPDL3.2.highlightsthatthereisapositivetrendwithintheEUinstitutionstomainstreamconflict prevention. Yet, this hasbeenaccompaniedneitherby a commonunderstandingamongpolicy-makersofwhatconflictpreventionentailsinpracticenorbyacommonviewonwhatconflictpreventionisorwhatshouldbedonebywhom.63Hence,theeffective use of technological tools for EU conflict prevention (and more precisely earlywarningandconflictanalysis)wouldrequireacommonagreementandacommonviewonhowtheEUshouldcarryoutandpromoteconflictpreventionbeyonditsborders.

62Beswick(2012),op.cit.,p.13.63LauraDavis,“TheEU’scapabilitiesforconflictprevention”,EU-CIVCAPDL.3.2,2017,forthcoming,p.9.


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REFERENCES

Beswick,Terri.ImprovingInstitutionalCapacityforEarlyWarning.SynthesisReport.InitiativeforPeacebuilding,London,January2012.

Council of the European Union. “Mainstreaming digital solutions and technologies in EUdevelopmentpolicy”.CouncilConclusions,14682/16.Brussels,28November2016.

Dafoe,AllanandJasonLyall.“FromCellPhonestoConflict?ReflectionsontheEmergingICT-PoliticalConflictResearchAgenda”.DepartmentofPoliticalScience,YaleUniversity,7July2014.

Davis, Laura. “The EU’s capabilities for conflict prevention”. EU-CIVCAP DL 3.2, 2017,forthcoming.

De Zan, Tommaso, Paola Tessari and Bernardo Venturi. “Preventing Conflicts: Personnel,Procedures and Technology in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding”. EU-CIVCAPDL 2.1,November2016.

EEAS.“Fromindividualitiestocommunity”.EC3IS(EEASCorporateClassifiedCommunicationandInformationSystem)ProgrammeVisionStatementDocument.Brussels,16May2014.

EEAS.“EUConflictEarlyWarningSystem”.FactSheet.Brussels,September2014.

EEASandEuropeanCommission.“GuidancenoteontheuseofConflictAnalysisinsupportofEUexternalaction”.Brussels,29October2013.

EuropeanCommission.“EUConflictEarlyWarningSystem:Objectives,ProcessandGuidanceforImplementation”.JointStaffWorkingDocument,SWD(2016)3final.Brussels,14January2016.

EuropeanCommission.“Towardsathrivingdata-driveneconomy”.CommunicationfromtheCommission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and SocialCommitteeandtheCommitteeoftheRegions,SWD(2014)214final.Brussels,7July2014.

Kahl,AnneandHelenaPuigLarrauri.“TechnologyforPeacebuilding”.Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurityandDevelopment2,No.3,Article61,2013.

Letouzé,Emmanuel,PatrickMeierandPatrickVinck.“BigDataforConflictPrevention:NewOilandOldFires”,inFrancescoMancini,ed.NewTechnologyandthePreventionofViolenceandConflict.InternationalPeaceInstitute,NewYork,April2013.

O’Donell,Catherine.“NewStudyquantifiesuseofsocialmediainArabSpring”.UWToday,12September2011.

RhianGaskell,Jennifer,HelenaPuigLarrauri,JohannesRieken,AliAli,AnoukRigterink.“Usesof Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for EU Conflict Prevention andPeacebuilding”.WOSCAP DL 2.4 Scoping study on ICTs. London School of Economics andPoliticalScienceandBuildUp,31March2016.

Documents

DL3.1-Report on Technological Shortcomings Early Warning