Disaster and Justice

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Cardiff University

Policing with Contempt: The Degrading of Truth and Denial of Justice in the Aftermath ofthe Hillsborough DisasterAuthor(s): Phil ScratonReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 273-297Published by: Blackwell Publishingon behalf of Cardiff UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1410746.

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2/26

JOURNALOF

LAW AND

SOCIETY

VOLUME

26,

NUMBER

3,

SEPTEMBER

999

ISSN:

0263-323X,

pp.

273-97

PolicingwithContempt:TheDegradingof Truthand Denialof

Justice

in

the Aftermath

of the

Hillsborough

Disaster

PHIL

SCRATON*

The

Hillsborough

disaster

happened

at a

premier

United

Kingdom

soccer stadiuminApril 1989 claimingthe livesof ninety-sixmen, women,

and

children. Over the

next decade there

ollowed

a

Home

Office inquiry,

a criminal

investigation, compensation

hearings

as

far

as the

House

of

Lords,

the

longest inquests

in recent

history,

a

judicial

review,

a

judicial

scrutiny,

and

private

prosecutions.

Media

coverage

has remained

intense

and

there has been

persistent

parliamentary

debate.

Despite

the

evidence

amassed,

much

of

it

undisclosed,

he

legal argument

and

official

discourse,

the bereaved

and survivors

remain

deeply

concerned

that the

'truth'

of

Hillsboroughhas been suppressedand reconstructed.

This

paper

considers

Hillsborough

and its

long-term

aftermath

in

the

context

of

a

theoretical

discussion

of

the

reconstitutionand

registrationof

'truth'within social

democracies when state institutions

stand accused.

It

adopts

a critical

analysis

drawing

on human

rights

discourse

n

discussing

how

'regimesof

truth'

operate

to

protect

and sustain

the interests

of

the

powerful'.

In

examining

the

formal

legal processes

and their outcomes

regarding

Hillsborough,

the

paper

demonstrates

how

they

were

manip-

ulated

to

degrade

the truth

and

deny justice

to the

bereaved.In

revealing

the

procedural

and structural

inadequaciesof

these

processes,

the

paper

raises

fundamental

questions

about the

legal

and

political accountability

of

the

police. Finally,

it

discusses

alternative

orms,

informed

by

a human

rights

agenda,

through

which 'truth'can be

acknowledged

and institution-

alized

injustices

reconciled.

* Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice Studies and Director,

Centre

or

Studies

in Crime and Social

Justice,

Edge

Hill

University

College,

Ormskirk,

Lancashire L39

4QP,

England

Many

thanks to

my colleagues

at the Centre for Studies

in

Crime

and Social Justice

for

their

personal

and

professional support

and their academic

and

political

commitment to 'truth and

justice'. My

deepest appreciation

to

the

many

bereaved families and survivors whose accounts

are at the heart

of

the wider

study.

Their

strength,

warmth

and

integrity

is remarkable.

273

? Blackwell Publishers Ltd

1999,

108

Cowley

Road,

Oxford

OX4

1JF,

UK and 350 Main

Street, Maiden,

MA

02148,

USA


3/26

THE

PRODUCTION

OF TRUTH

AND THE EXERCISEOF POWER

Truth

is an

enigmaticconcept.

It is

simultaneously

onstrained

and liber-

ated

by

the

possibility

of the absolute.

Its

definition,

dentification,

nd

veri-

fication involve intellectual, political, and legal processes seemingly

straightforward, et

inherently omplex.

Establishing

precisely

and contex-

tually

what

reallyhappened'

t

any given

moment,

n

specific

ircumstances,

is

rarely

uncomplicated.

Perception,

nterpretation,

nd

representation

re

essential characteristics

f

'self;

the world 'at the level of

appearances'.1

They

reflect he 'livedrealities'

f

agency,

of

personal

placement,

n

the

struc-

tural

dynamics

of

culture,

politics,

and materialism.2

Underpinning egal

processes

and the

administration

f

justice

in social

democracies s the distillation of broad consensusfrom individualtesti-

monies.

The

weighing

and

weighting

of

personal

ruths,

exploring

heir

expe-

riential

grounding

and

examining

selective

memories

together

expose

the

myth

of absolute truth.

Yet,

at least

in

principle,they

offer

procedures

through

which

the

truth can be

aggregated.

Ostensibly,

criminaland civil

investigations,

official and

unofficial

inquiries,

courts and

tribunals,

are

evidence-bound.

They

seek truth

in

people's

stories;

stories

stripped

o

the

bare bones

of

formal

statements;

memories ested

by

cross-examination.

The

transition

rom

stories

to

statements,

he

latter

devoid of the under-

lying

contexts

of

perception

and

interpretation,

oes

not

take

place

in a

vacuum.

Advanced' emocratic

ocieties,

whatever

heir

claims

or the insti-

tutionalisation f

equality

and

liberty,embody

and

reproduce

he structural

inequalities

of

global

capitalism,

patriarchy,

and neo-colonialism.

These

inequalities

re

not

figments

of

ideological

onstruction,

hey

are woven into

the fabricof the state and civil

society;

hegemonic

ather han

ideological.

The

casual,

almost

flippant,

dismissal

of

structural

nequality

as

if it

belonged

o some

bygone

modernist

ge

-

has

deflected ttention

away

from

the

strength

of

determining

ontexts.3

Yet class is

inextricably

inked to the

social relations of

production.Unemployment,poverty,

and

opportunity,

globally

and

nationally,

are

expressions

of those relations.Whatever he

advances laimed

or

women,

post-feminism'

s a new era

of

post-patriarchal

opportunity

annot be sustained

n

theory

or

in

practice.4

Neitherhas there

been

significantprogress

n

challenging

nd

resolving

he subordination f

different

exualities.5

imilarly,

he consolidation f 1990sFortress

Europe

has

1

E.O.

Wright,

Class,

Crisis and

the State

(1978).

2

A.

Giddens,

The Constitution

of Society (1984).

3 P.

Scraton

and K.

Chadwick,

'The

Theoretical

and

Political

Priorities of Critical

Criminology'

in The

Politics

of

Crime

Control,

eds.

K.

Stenson and

D.

Cowell

(1991).

4

V.

Coppock,

D.

Haydon,

and I.

Richter,

The

Illusions

of

Post-Feminism: New

Women,

Old

Myths

(1995).

5

See

R. N.

Lancaster

and M. di

Leorardo

'Gender,

Sexuality

and

Political

Economy'

(1996)

6(8)

New Politics 21.

274

?

Blackwell

Publishers Ltd 1999


4/26

renewed

mphasis

on,

and awareness

f,

the harsh

ntra-national

s well

as

international ealities

f neo-colonialism.6

As academic

debatehas

challenged grand heory'

and

'standpoint' naly-

sis,

correctly

noting

the

diversity,

complexity,

and

multiple

aces of

oppres-

sion,there s no substance o the argumenthat thedeterminingontextsof

structural

nequality

have diminished.While

not

underestimating

he

sig-

nificance

f

power

n

interpersonal

elations,

he relations

of

power

between

exploiters

and

exploited',7

rooted

in the material

reality

of

political-

economies,

are central to

the

dynamics

of

those contexts. Resistance

to

exploitation

and the

struggle

or

rights, particularly

he collective

strength

of mass

movements,

deny 'power'

he

authority

of total

determination.

Yet,

while

power

is derived

structurally

n

the material conditions of

production, eproduction,

nd

neo-colonialism,

t is realized

n

the

state,

its

institutionsand its interventions.Not

only

does

the state claim

legitimacy

for

the

operation

and functionof

power,

t

proclaims

and confers

egitimacy

on

truth.

As

Foucault

argues,

truth sn't outside

power

or

lacking

n

power';

rather,

t is a

'thing

of

this world'. He

continues:

Each

society

has its

regime

of

truth,

its

'general politics'

of truth: that

is,

the

types

of

disclosure which it

accepts

and makes function as

true;

the

mechanisms

and

instances

which

enable

one to

distinguish

true and false

statements,

the means

by

which

each

is

sanctioned;

the

techniques

and

procedures

accorded value

in

the

acquisition

of

truth;

the status of those who are

charged

with

saying

what counts as true.8

Coming

from a

markedly

different

perspective,

Becker9

roposes

hat

the

'relations

of

power

and

authority'

not

only

subordinate ndividualsand

groups

but also subordinate heir

'truth'.Put

simply,

'it

is

taken as

given

that membersof the

highest group

have the

right

to definethe

way

things

are'.

Further,

within the

'established rder

...

knowledge

of

truth and the

right

to

be

heard are not

equally

distributed'.10With

'superordinacy'

n

powerful political

and economic

institutions come

'hierarchiesof cred-

ibility'.'1

Just

as institutional

power provides

ts holders with the

capacity

to

apply

the

'labels'of 'deviant'and

'criminal'

o

certain

acts,

so their ver-

sions

of 'truth'stand

highest

n

the

hierarchies

f

credibility,

nowheremore

visibly

than

in

the media.

In

introducing

'propaganda

model' to

analyse

he mass

media,

Herman

and

Chomsky

concludethat the

'societal

purpose

of the

media

is

to incul-

cate and defend

the

economic,

social,

and

political agenda

of

privileged

6

A.

Sivanandan,

Communities

of

Resistance:

Writings

on

Black

Strugglesfor

Socialism

(1990);

see,

also,

F.

Webber,

Crimes

of

Arrival

(1997).

7

N.

Poulantzas,

State,

Power,

Socialism

(1978)

35.

8

M.

Foucault,

Power/Knowledge:

Selected

Interviews

and

other

Writings

1972-1977,

ed.

C.

Gordon

(1980)

131.

9

H.

Becker,

'Whose

Side Are We On?'

(1967)

14

Social Problems 241.

10

id.,

p.

242.

11

id.,

p.

241.

275

?

Blackwell

Publishers Ltd 1999


5/26

groups

that dominatethe domestic

society

and the state'.12While

'spirited

debate,

criticismand dissent'

are not

only permitted

but

encouraged

s

part

of a

supposed

free

press'they

must

'remain

aithfully

within

the

system

of

presuppositions

nd

principles

hat constitute

an elite

consensus,

a

system

so powerfulas to be internalized argelywithout awareness'.13n other

words,

Becker's hierarchies

f

credibility'

have become

part

of the fabric

of

defining,representing,

nd

transmitting

nformationas

fact;

interpreta-

tion

as

truth.

Discussing

he

'underlying

tructure

f communicative

elationships,

with-

in

a

particular

ocial

order',

Williamsnotes

that

'[w]hat

s at stake

is

indeed

authority

at its

deepest

level:

that

deep

sense of

propriety

and

legitimacy

which

has

assigned

both

authority

and

responsibility

o

certain

public

sources of news and

interpretation'.14

his

assignment

of

authority

and

responsibility

s

not

confined o news and

interpretation,

or to 'hierarchies'

reducible

o

organizational

tructure

and

ascribed

status. For

Foucault,

it

extends o

the

representation

f

truthand

the

ordering

f

knowledge,

linked

in

a circularrelationwith

systems

of

power

which

produce

and sustain

t,

and to effectsof

power

which

t

inducesand which

extend

t'.15

What s

pro-

duced

is

a

'regime

of

truth'.

Foucault ists five

key

'traits'

haracterizing

he material

eality

of

regimes

of truthwithin

society.

First,

'truth' s

'centredon the form

of scientificdis-

courseandtheinstitutionshatproduce t'. Second, it is subject o constant

economic and

political

incitement'.

Third,

'it

is

the

object

.

. . of immense

diffusion

and

consumption'.

Fourth,

'it is

produced

and transmittedunder

the

control,

dominant

f

not

exclusive,

of

a few

greatpolitical

and economic

apparatuses'.

inally,

it is the issue of whole

political

debateand social

con-

frontation

ideologicalstruggles)'.16

Howeverdiverse he 'relationsof

power

which

permeate,

haracterise nd

constitute he social

body',

their influenceand effectiveness

depends

on

the

'production, ccumulation, irculationandfunctioningof a discourse' tself

closely

associatedwith the

'production

of

truth':17

We are

subjected

o the

production

f truthandwe cannotexercise

owerexcept hrough

the

production

f truth

..

the

relationship

etween

power,right

and

truth,

s

organ-

ised

in

a

highly

specific

ashion ..

we

are forcedto

produce

he truth of

power

that

our

society

demands,

f

which

t

has

need,

n

order o function:

we

must

speak

he

truth;

we

are

constrained r

condemned

o confess or discover he truth.Powerneverceases

its

interrogation,

ts

inquisition,

ts

registration

f

truth:

t

institutionalises,

rofession-

alises and

rewards ts

pursuit

. .8

12

E. S. Herman and N.

Chomsky,

Manufacturing

Consent:

The

Political

Economy

of

the Mass

Media

(1988)

298.

13

id.,

p.

302.

14 R.

Williams,

What Came o

Say (1989)

116-17.

15

Foucault,

op.

cit.,

n.

8,

p.

133.

16

id.,

pp.

131-2.

17

id.,

p.

93.

18

id.,

pp.

93-4.

276

?

Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999


6/26

In

discussing

he

'refractory'

onstitutionof

institutions,

Becker

notes

the

failuresof

hospitals

o cure

patients,

of

prisons

o rehabilitate

risoners,

of

schools to educate students.

Such institutional

ailing

invokes

in

officials

'ways

both of

denying

the

failure

of

the institution o

perform

as

it

should

and explaining hose failureswhich cannot be hidden'.19t is here, at the

heart

of

institutional,

professional

discourses hat the 'truth' s

reconstituted

or,

as

Foucault

argues,

registered'.

The

'view from above' becomes

recast,

conciliatory

and

excusing

while

disqualifying

he 'view from

below'

as

une-

ducated, schematic,

ll-conceived

or

partisan.

What

can the

marginalized,

the

excluded

or

the outsiders offer to

challenge

the

'great political

and

economic

apparatuses'?

How can

they

find the

legitimacy,

he

credibility

o

contest 'official' scientific

discourse'?

In challenging he establishedpractices,societalconsequences,and offi-

cial

discourseof

those

overtlyoppressive egimes

which

employ

and endorse

gross

violations

of human

rights

-

genocide, political

killings,

disappear-

ance,

state-sanctioned

errorism,

orture

-

two

formal 'mechanisms'

have

gained

international

egitimacy.

These

are human

rights reports,

usually

commissioned

xternally

while

regimes

are still

operational,

and truth

com-

missions,

established

nternally

after

their overthrow.

Given that the

'polit-

ical

discourseof

the

atrocity'

s,

according

o

Cohen,

'designed

o

hide its

presence romawareness',20umanrights nvestigations sanctionedornot

by

the

state

under

scrutiny

seek

to

reveal violations

through

document-

ing

and

cohering

the 'view

from

below'.

Similarly,

ruth commissions

rely

on

storytelling21

o

provide

alternative

ccounts

as

evidence.

Cohen

considers

he

production

and

publication

of human

rightsreports

as

ends

in

themselves: he

'[b]elief

that even

without

results there is

an

absolute

duty

to

convey

the

truth,

to

bear

witness'.22 ut such

reports,par-

ticularly

directed

owards

oppressive

egimes,

elicit three

forms of

reaction:

'the "classic"discourseof officialdenial'; the

strategy

of

turning

a defen-

sive

position

into an attack

on the

critic';

the

disarming ype

of

response,

characteristic f

more

democratic

societies,

which

partially

acknowledges

the

criticism'.23

ithin he

'classic'

discourseare:

literaldenial

nothinghap-

pened);

nterpretive

enial

(what

happened

s

really somethingelse);

impli-

catory

denial

(what

happened

s

justified)'.24

ven

torture s

recast

through

'reinterpretations

nd

justifications'.

19

Becker,

op.

cit.,

n.

9,

pp.

242-3.

20

S.

Cohen,

'Human

Rights

and Crimes of

the

State:

the Culture of

Denial'

(1993) 26(2)

Australian and New

Zealand

J.

of

Crim.

97-115.

21

E.

Stanley,

'Towards Truth:

the Risks and

Responsibilities

of

South

Africa's

Storytelling'

unpublished paper,

1999.

22

S.

Cohen,

'Government

Responses

to

Human

Rights

Reports:

Claims,

Denials

and

Counterclaims'

(1996)

18

Human

Rights

Q.

517.

23

id.,

p.

521.

24

id.,

p.

522.

277

?

Blackwell

Publishers Ltd

1999


7/26

Reinterpretation

s a

process

is difficultto

identify,

pin

down

or

study

because

nterpretation,

s

noted

earlier,

is inherent n the

naming

of all social

events'.As Cohen

observes,

Many

current

orms

of

radicalsocial construc-

tionismor

epistemological

elativismwould

assert .. therecan be no

objec-

tive,universally greeddefinition f anysocialevent'.25 orexample,McNay

argues

that Foucault revised

his

position

of truth 'as a

concept dependent

on

power'

to one

in

which 'dominant

power

structures

o

longer

have the

monopoly

in

defining

"truth".'26

et,

while this shift

is

anti-reductionist

n

that it

rejects

ruth as 'a monolith

exclusively

defined

by

a dominant

power

formation',27

t does not

deny

that official

discourse

as

a

primary

manifesta-

tion

of states'

regimes

of truth

s,

fundamentally,

n

expression

of

power.

Following

he

collapse

of

regimes

n

which

human

rights

violationsand war

crimeswere

endemic,

ruthcommissions

ave beenused

as 'an obviousmech-

anism for

reaching

he

truth ..

serv[ing]

s a validationand

acknowledge-

ment of

the victims'

xperience'.28

hey

can

'provide

hose

who

have suffered

persecution

he

space

to be

heard

and

understood

hrough

giving

testimony

to what

happened,

nd

to have theirvictimization nd hurt

recorded,

memo-

rializedand

officially ecognised

. .'.29

A

truthcommissiondoes

not

necessarily

dd

anything

new to that which

is

known,

'except

for one

important

element:

t is an official

acknowledge-

ment of abuses

of

the

past'.30

or,

the

'individual

ictimneeds

to know the

truth as

part

of

the

process

of

healing

... so does

society

overall

if

citizens

are

ever

again

to

renew

their

trust

in

the rule of

law .

.

.'.31

Reflecting

on

Chile's 1991

National Commissionon Truth and

Reconciliation,

Rolston

considers hat

while it confirmed the

argument

f victimsand

human

rights

activistsabout

the

past', healing

could

'only begin

when

the

state acknowl-

edges

its crimes'.32

eglect

of

this

principle

created

deep opposition

within

the Chilean

population

to

Augusto

Pinochet's

self-servingamnesty

which

absolved

him of

'the

elimination,

disappearance

r

tortureof thousandsof

people

. .'.33

As

Stanley

comments,'.

.. when victims

and

perpetrators

ive

side

by

side

. .

knowledge

tself is not

enough

...

they already

know ...

their

concern

is

focused on

developing

an

acknowledged

ruth'.34

s

acknowledgement

enough?

The

issue

of

justice

arises

for

the bereaved

and

survivors

when

25 id.

26 L.

McNay,

Foucault and Feminism

(1992)

135-6.

27

id.,

p.

138.

28 B.

Rolston,

Turning

the

Page

Without

Closing

the Book: The

Right

to Truth in the Irish

Context

(1996)

41.

29

E.

McLaughlin,

'Political

Violence,

Terrorism

and Crimes of the State'

in

The Problem

of

Crime,

eds.

J. Muncie

and E.

McLaughlin

(1996)

309.

30

Rolston,

op.

cit.,

n.

28,

p.

18.

31

id.,

p.

21.

32 id.

33

'UK-Chile: Pinochet's

comeuppance'

(1998) 18(6)

Statewatch

15.

34

Stanley, op.

cit.,

n.

21,

p.

3.

278

?

Blackwell

Publishers

Ltd 1999


8/26


9/26

justice

functions

as 'a

very

activeand effective

political

and

ideological

orce

with

profoundconsequences'.46

t 'does not reflect he

opinions

of all sec-

tors',

nor

their best

interests,

and

consequently

becomes

an instrumentof

sectional violence'.47 rom routine

targeting

and surveillanceof

'suspect

communities' o the brutal excesses of

miscarriages

f

justice,

differential

policing

and the administration

f criminal

ustice

have institutionalized

he

violation

of

libertiesand

rights.

The criminal

ustice

system

s both a man-

ifestation

and

reinforcement

f structural

nequality.

The

deeplypainfulprocesses

of

marginalization

nd exclusionare the out-

comes of

integratedpolitical,

cultural,

economic,

and

ideologicaldynamics.

In

states

which

proclaim

rights

and liberties

n

a

political

context

of

plu-

ralismwhile

using

a rhetoricof

tolerance,

outsider' tatus

is

regularly

on-

ferredon identifiable

ndividuals, amilies,communities,

nd

'lifestyles'.

This

occurs hrough heopencondemnationf 'others'amountingo dissociation.

Invariably

t

leads

to

questioning

heir

morality,

their

very humanity.

As

Cohen

argues,

he withdrawal f 'shared

humanity'

s

nothing

ess than dehu-

manization.While more

clearly

evident

in

wartime

propaganda,

his con-

struct was

successfully

and

blatantly

mobilized

by Margaret

Thatcher

n

railing

and

legislating

against

the

'enemy

within'.

Closely

associated,

at least

in

popular

discourse,

with dehumanizations

the related

process

of

demonization,

hrough

which

established,

scribed

neg-

ative reputationsare consolidated.Onceany claim on humanityhas been

denied,

openly

rejected,

nything

oes.

Then,

any

dreadful

ct,

however

base,

can be attributedwithout

question.

And all

this

happens

within

a

purpose-

fully

orchestratedacuum

of

decontextualization;

he

marginalized,

he exclud-

ed,

the

'enemy'

within or

without,

cut loose from the

structural,

material

worldswhich

they occupy.

How

easy

it

then

becomes

or

state nstitutions

o

promote

their denials and their

rationalizations.

n

the denials of

what

happened,

of

responsibility,

f those killed and

injured,

state institutions

endeavouro neutralizeheiractionsand condemn heircondemners.

As

democratic tates use advanced

echnology

o

gather

nformation

and

reconstitute

vents,

so it

becomesvital that the 'truth' s both witnessed

and

acknowledged.

Only

through

he storiesof

witnesses

o events

and the

pub-

lic

recognition

of their

egitimacy

an the

'passive

acceptance'

f

officialdis-

course

enjoyedby

democratic

governments

be

challenged

and

miscarriages

of

justice

exposed.

For too

long,

the

witnessing

and

acknowledgement

f

the

'truth',

through

alternative

accounts

formally

presented

and

recorded,

have

been considered

appropriate

nly

after the overthrowof

terror-based

state

regimes.

Yet there is a case for a wider

application.

46

C.

Sumner,

'Criminal

Justice

Systems'

in Censure

Politics

and

Criminal

Justice,

ed.

C.

Sumner

(1990)

41-2.

47

id.,

p.

44.

280

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10/26

HILLSBOROUGH

1. The disaster

On 15

April

1989 at

the

Hillsborough

Stadium

n

Sheffield

a

fatal

crush

occurredon the terracesat one

of

the United

Kingdom's

most

important

soccermatches.As a

result,

ninety-six

men, women,

and childrenwere

killed,

hundreds

physically

njured,

and thousands traumatized.

Many

involved

directly

or

indirectly

have not worked

since and others' lives have

ended

prematurely,

he

longer-term

onsequences

of

post-traumatic

tress.

What

happened

s

uncomplicated

nd,

mostly,

uncontested.For the

second time

in

successive

years

Liverpool

had

drawn

Nottingham

Forest

in

the semi-

finals

of

the

FA

Cup. Hillsborough,

the home

of Sheffield

Wednesday

Football

Club,

was hired

by

the Football Association

as

the

neutralvenue.

It

was

a

carbon

copy

of the

previous

year's

semi-finaland the

pre-match

arrangements

were

virtually

dentical.

It

was a

sell-out,

all-ticket

match

with

Liverpool

ans allocatedthe west

end

of the

ground, including

the West

Stand,

the

Leppings

Lane

terrace,

and

the

North

Stand. Stadia such

as

Hillsborough

were

nearly

a

century

old. While modificationshad

been

made,

and areas

upgraded,

he essential

fabric of

the

terracing,

oncrete

steps

on

packed

earth,

remainedmuch

the

same

as

it

had

always

been. Such soccer

grounds

remain

prisoners

of

their

history,

squatting

uneasily

amidst the

compact

terraced

housing

of well-

established

working-class

ommunities.

Formerly

vast and

uncovered,

hey

were

constructedwhen

nobody

travelled

by

car

and

spectators

were

packed

onto

inherently

unsafe

steps,

their

movement

restricted

only

by

crush

barriers

placed

throughout

he terraces.

Entry

to the

stadium for

all

24,256

Liverpool spectators

was

through

twenty-three

utmodedand

regularly

malfunctioning

urnstiles,

et back off

a bend n

Leppings

Lane nan

areano

bigger

han a small

school

playground.

Access

romthe Lane

was

through

ix sets of

low double

gates,

a comer

shop

on one

side and a

fence above the

River Don

on

the other. It was a

serious

bottleneckand

potentiallydangerous.

n

June 1986a

police

inspector

wrote

a

memorandumo

his

senior

officer

warning

hat the

Leppings

Lane

turn-

stiles 'do not

give

anything

ike the

accessto the

ground

.. needed

by

...

fans'.48

upporters

ad

become

justifiably

ratebecause

of the

inefficiency

f

the

system,

which was

turned

on

the

police

and could have

resulted n

public

disorder.'Hisassessmentelated o

ordinary

lub

matches;

semi-final

guaranteed

full

stadium.

The

memorandum

went

unheeded.

On

the

day

Liverpool

ans

travelled

by

train,

coaches,

transits,

and cars

to

Sheffield.49

any

coaches

and

transits

were

stopped

and

searched

by

the

48

Internal South

Yorkshire

Police

Memorandum,

from

Inspector

Calvert:

'Policing

-

Hillsborough

Football

Ground',

dated

11

June

1986.

49

The

following

account is edited

from

P.

Scraton,

Hillsborough:

The Truth

(1999)

chs. 2-3.

281

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Publishers

Ltd

1999


11/26

police

en

route.

Arriving

n

Sheffield,

ll weredirected o

designated

ar

parks,

searched,

nd

briefed

by

the SouthYorkshire

Police.Those

arriving

by

train

were

escortedon buses or on foot

from

the

stations

to the

stadium.

Delays

on the

journey

meant that

thousands of

Liverpool

supporters

arrived

n

Sheffieldn the hour before the 3 p.m. kick-off,only reaching he stadium

after2.30

p.m.

Instructions n theirtickets

requested

hat

they

be inside

the

stadium

by

2.45

p.m.

Within minutesthe

congestion

at

the turnstilesoverwhelmed

he

police.

Lack of

stewarding

nd no

filtering

meantthat

as more arrivedat the

outer

gates

than

were

being

processed

hrough

he

turnstiles,

a seriouscrush

was

inevitable.

Police on

horsebackwere

trapped

and fans

struggled

o breathe.

The

senior officeroutside

radioed

the

match

commander

n

the

police

con-

trol box insidethe stadium. After some hesitation,viewingthe crushon

CCTV

monitors,

Chief

Superintendent

Duckenfieldaccededto the

request

to

open

an exit

gate, bypassing

he

turnstiles

and

relieving

he crush.

Fans

outside,

our or five

abreast,

walkedunstewarded nd

without

police

direction

hrough

he

exit

gate,

down

the 1 in 6

gradient

unnel

beneath he

West

Standandonto the

Leppings

Lane errace.Thetunnel

was

directly

ppo-

site

the

gate.

Whatthe

fans did not

know was

that

it

led into two central

pens

(3

and

4)

behind

he

goal.

Pens like

cattle

pens,

fences o

the side

and

at

the

front;andno wayback.The sidepenswere halfemptywith fanssittingon

the

steps

in

the

sunshine

eading

newspapers

nd match

programmes.

Over

2,000

fans

entered

he

alreadypacked

central

pens.

With twice

the

number of

people

on

the

steps,

compression

was

immediate.

Faces

were

jammed

against

he

perimeter

ence,

people

went down

underfootand

then,

near the

front of

pen

3,

a barrier

collapsed

resulting

n

a

tangled

mass

of

bodies. The

screamsof

the

dying

were

drowned

by

the

thunderous oar of

the crowdas the match

kicked-off.

nitially

he

police

failed

to

respond.

Up

in the control box at the south end of the terrace,a stone's throwfromthe

central

pens,

Duckenfield ailed to

identify

he

severity

of

the crush.On

the

perimeter

rack,

officers

were under

explicit

orders

not

to

open

the

tiny

perimeter ates

into the

pens

without the

authorization f a

senior

officer.

The failure

o

close

off the

tunnel

before

allowing

so

many

so

quickly

nto

the

stadium,

and

redirecting

hem to

the side

pens,

was

compoundedby

the

failure o

respond

mmediately

nd

effectively

o

the

desperate

rushon

the

terraces.

Eventually

the two

perimeter

gates

were

opened

and the

full

horrorof the pens beganto dawn.It was impossible o evacuate he pens

efficiently iven

the restricted ccess.The

match

was

abandonedat

3.06

p.m.

as fans and some

police

officers ried

to

resuscitate hose

who had lost

con-

sciousness.Bodies were

dragged

rom the

pens

and

laid

on

the

pitch.

Fans

tore down

advertising

hoardings

as

makeshift

stretchers.

They

ran

with

bodies the

full

length

of

the

pitch

to the

Hillsborough

gymnasium.

Only

fourteenof

the

ninety-six

who died

made

it

to

hospital.

The

major

ncident

plan

was

not

operationalized.

282

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Publishers

Ltd

1999


12/26

As these

deeplydistressing

cenesunfolded

directly

n front of

the

police

control

box,

Duckenfield

dispatched

his

assistant,

Superintendent

Murray,

to

the

pitch.

An

Assistant Chief Constable arrivedbut Duckenfield

was

'unable o

give

an

accurateaccount of what the situationwas

other than

a

possible pitch

invasion .

.

.50 Soon

after

3.15

p.m.

two senior

officials

from

the

Football

Association,

accompaniedby

the Sheffield

Wednesday

Club

Secretary,

were

told

by

Duckenfield

hat

Liverpool

fans had

forced

open

Gate

C,

causing

an inrush nto the

packed

central

pens.

Duckenfield

ater

gave

evidence:

The

blunt truth

[was]

hat

we had

been

asked

to

open

a

gate.

I

was not

being

deceitful... we

were all

in

a state

of

shock

... I

just thought

at

that

stage

I

should not

communicate

ully

the

situation .. I

may

have

misled

Mr

Kelly'.5'

He

did. And

Kelly,

unwittingly

reiteratedDuckenfield'sie

to the

waiting

media.Minutes ater t

was broad-

cast aroundthe world. BBC'sinitial bulletins

reported

hat

gates

hadbeen

'broken down' and

'large

numbersof

ticketless

fans' were

determined

o

force

entry.52

s

the

disasterwas

happening

he fans were

blamed.

2. The

aftermath

Less than an

hour

after

Duckenfield

'misled'

the

FA

officials,

Chief

Superintendent

ddis,

Head

of

South

Yorkshire

CID,

was

given

responsi-

bilityfor handling he incident.He took controlof SheffieldWednesday's

gymnasium,

redesignated

a

temporary

mortuary.

Rather

than

transport

bodies

to

Sheffield's

purpose-built

Medico-Legal

Centre,

the

decision

was

taken

to

put

them into

body bags,

lay

them out in

rows

on

the

gymnasium

floor,

take

Polaroid

photographs

of

their

faces,

and

give

each

body

a

num-

ber

corresponding

o the

relevant

photograph.

The

gymnasium,

stated

Addis,

was 'an

ideal

situation,

f

you

don't mind

me

saying

so,

to

put

all

the

eggs

in

one

basket'.53

Thecoroner,Dr StefanPopper,arrivedat approximately .45p.m. and,

in

consultation

with

the

police,

took the

unprecedented

ecision

of order-

ing

blood

alcohol

samples,

recording

he

blood alcohol

levels of all

who

died,

including

children.

He

'realised

hat the

vast

majority

were in

fact

extremely

oung'

but 'we

were

doing

them for

all,

irrespective

f

other con-

siderations .

. .

youth

. . .

is no

guarantee

that

alcohol is

not

ingested'.

According

o

Popper,

t was an

entirely ustifiable

decision

'given

where t

[the

disaster]

happened

and

all the

circumstances

urrounding

t

.

...54

50

Statement of

Chief

Superintendent

D.

Duckenfield,

p.

12.

51

Lord Justice

Taylor, Inquiry

into the

Hillsborough

Stadium

Disaster:

Transcripts of

Proceedings

(May-June 1989)

notes of J. L.

Harphan

Ltd.,

Sheffield

Day

8,

pp.

112-13.

52

Scraton,

op.

cit.,

n.

49,

p.

113.

53

Personal

interview

with Chief

Superintendent

T.

Addis,

Sheffield,

March

1990.

54

Inquests

into the

Deaths

of

the

Victims

of

the

Hillsborough

Football

Stadium

Disaster

on

15

April

1989:

Transcripts

(18

April 1990)

Day

1

(a.m.),

pp.

1-2.

283

?

Blackwell

Publishers Ltd 1999


13/26

Popper's

decision

mmediately

mplied

hat each of

the

deceased

.. in some

way,

could

have

contributed o theirown

and others'

deaths.It was a received

agenda

already

et

by

Duckenfield'sie

and

senior officers'

nitial

assessments. t

guaranteed

hat

allega-

tions of drunkenness

would remaincentre

stage.

It

deeply

hurt the bereavedas

they

realised hat the

naming

of theirdead would

imply

the

shaming

of their ives.55

What followed

was one of the most inhumane

and

damaging episodes

in

recent

post-disaster provision.

Those

seeking

information

were

directed to

a disused

boys'

club close

to Hammerton Road

Police Station.

There,

in the

most

appalling

conditions,

they

were

held without

information,

until

being

bused

to the

gymnasium.

They queued throughout

the

night

awaiting

their

turn to enter the

gymnasium

foyer.

Over

eighty polaroid photographs

of

faces

in

body

bags

were

displayed

on

screens,

each with a number

attached.

Inside,

the

gymnasium

was

divided into three sections. At the far

end

bodies were laid out in

body

bags;

each

body

allocated a

police

officer, each

police

officer

given

a bucket of water and

sponge

to clean the faces

of

the

dead.

The

central area housed

police

officers

on

'breaks';

'around the

walls

...

sitting

down

eating

chicken

legs'.56

Close

to the main doors an area was

laid out with tables

and chairs. It was here the

police

took

formal

state-

ments of

identification.

Following

the

distress

of

viewing

the

poorly

reproduced

photographs,

rel-

atives stood at the

gymnasium

door while

the

body

was

brought

on a

trolley:

.

. .

unzipped

t,

just

showed

you

the head

...

I

bent

down to

cuddle

[him]

.

they

hawkedme

up

and

told

[us]

hat

they

[thebodies]

werethe

property

f the

coroner

and

we

couldn't ouch

him

...

They

quicklyzipped

he

bag up,

ushered

us

away

and

they

were

gone.57

A

bereaved

father stated:

They virtually

manhandled

s,

sort

of

grabbed

our

shoulders,

grabbed

our arms ...

they

didn'twant me to

stay

for

a

second

onger

than was

necessary.58

According to a mother identifying her son:

...

they

didn't

give

the

poor people

who werekilled

any

dignity

.. I

bent down to kiss

and talk to

[my

son]

and as we stood

up

therewas a

policeman

who

came

from

behind

me ...

trying

to usher

myself

and

my

husband out ...

I

had to

scream at the

police

officer o

allowus

privacy

.. the total

attitude

was,

you've

dentified umber

]

so

go 59

Told that the

procedure

was for

identification

purposes,

forbidden to

touch,

caress or

kiss,

the bereaved

were led to the

tables. Here

they

were

subjected

to a

barrage

of

questions

about the loved

ones

they

had

just

iden-

tified. Did they have criminal records? Had they ever been ejected from foot-

ball

grounds, expelled

from

school? Did

they

drink? The

procedure,

more

55

Scraton,

op.

cit.,

n.

49,

p.

89.

56 Personal

nterview,

enior

Ambulance

Officer,

SouthYorkshire

Ambulance

ervice,

March

1990.

57

Personal

nterview,

Doreen

Jones,

June

1998.

58 Personal

nterview,

Barry

Devonside,

January

1990.

59

Comments f a

bereaved

mother,

Mrs

Delaney,

After

Dark

(Channel

,

20

May

1989).

284

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Blackwell Publishers

Ltd

1999


14/26

akin to an

interrogation

han

identification,

went on

through

the

night.

It

demonstrated

callous

disregard

or the traumaof suddenbereavement

nd

reflected

a

fast

consolidatingpolice perspective:

he

full

responsibility

or

the

tragedy ay

with

the

behaviourof the

fans.

Withinhoursof the disaster hebroadcasting f Duckenfield'sie hadfar-

reaching

and

serious

consequences.

The UEFA

President,

acques

Georges,

publicly

condemned

he fans'

'frenzy

o enterthe

stadium,

come what

may,

whatever he risk

to

the lives

of others'.

They

were like 'beasts

waiting

to

charge

into

the arena'.60

Within

twenty-four

hours,

the Prime

Minister,

Margaret

Thatcher,

visited

Hillsborough

accompaniedby

her

then-press

secretary,

Sir Bernard

Ingham.

They

were

accompaniedby

senior

South

Yorkshire

officers,

ncluding

he Chief Constable.

Privy

to

the

press

brief-

ings

and off-the-record

ccounts,Inghamrecalls,

I

know

what I

learnedon

the

spot.

Therewould

have

been

no

Hillsborough

f

a

mob,

who

were

clear-

ly

tanked

up,

had not tried to

force

their

way

into

the

ground'.61

Paul

Middup,

of the Police

Federation,

also

claimed

Liverpool

ans were

'tanked

up

on

drink'and

had

caused a

'simply

errifying'

ituation or offi-

cers.

Within three

days

the

Sheffield

Star

carriedmore sinister

allegations.

Liverpool

fans

were not

only

responsible

or

the

disaster

but

they

had

attackedrescueworkersand stolen

from

the

dead. The

'sickening

tory

the

police

are

piecing ogether'

ncluded

allegations

hat

'yobs'

had

'attackedan

ambulanceman,

hreatened

iremen,

nd

punched

and

urinatedon

policemen

as

they gave

the kiss

of

life

to strickenvictims'.62

he

story gained

further

legitimacy

rom SheffieldConservative

MP,

Irving

Patnick,

on ITN

News:

the

police

had been 'kickedand

punched

even when

giving

mouth-to-mouth

resuscitation nd

people

were

urinating

on them

from

the

balcony

above'.63

Primed

by

off-the-record

olice

briefings,

he

allegations

eceivednation-

al

coverage.

The Sun

gave

its entire front

page

to

the headlines:

THE

TRUTH:SOME

FANS

PICKED

POCKETS

OF

VICTIMS;

SOMEFANS

URINATED ON THE BRAVE

COPS;

SOME FANS BEAT UP PC

GIVING KISS OF

LIFE'.4

It later

transpired

hat the

newspaper's

ditor,

Kelvin

Mackenzie,

initially

intended to use the

banner headline

'YOU

SCUM'.65

he

vilificationof

those

who

died

and survivedbecame

cemented

in

the

public's

consciousness.

Among

the

bereaved,

he

survivors,

and

their

families t caused

outrage,

but also

deep pain

and

suffering:

We soon

real-

ized

that

we

weren't

only

in

a

fight

for

justice

for those who

died but also to

cleartheir

names

and the names of

the fans who lived'.66

60

Cited

in

Liverpool

Echo,

17

April

1989.

61

Correspondence

from

Sir Bernard

Ingham,

13

July

1994.

62

Sheffield

Star,

18

April

1989.

63

News

at

Ten,

18

April

1989.

64

Sun,

19

April

1989.

65

D.

Chippendale

and C.

Horrie,

Stick

it

up your

punter

The Rise

and

Fall

of

the

Sun

(1992)

292.

66

Personal

interview with

Jan

Spearritt,

February

1990.

285

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Blackwell Publishers

Ltd 1999


15/26

3.

The

Taylor inquiry

Having

visited

Hillsborough

with

Margaret

Thatcher,

he

Home

Secretary,

Douglas

Hurd,

appointed

Lord

Justice

Taylor

to conduct a Home

Office

inquiry . . . into the events at SheffieldWednesdayFootball Groundon 15

April

1989

and to

make

recommendations bout

the needs

of

crowd con-

trol and

safety

at

sports

events'.67

Geoffrey

Dear,

Chief Constable

of

the

West

Midlands

Police,

was asked to oversee he criminal

nvestigation

nto

Hillsborough

nd he

seconded

his

AssistantChief

Constable

ull-time o the

Taylor inquiry.

The West

Midlands

nvestigation

eam

not

only

conducted

the criminal

nvestigation

nd

serviced he

inquiry,

hey

also workedas

coro-

ner's

officers or

the

inquests.

Apart

from the

oral evidence to the

hearings

the

Taylor

inquiry

team

processed

2,666

telephone

calls, 3,776 statements,

and

1,550

letters.

'From

this

mass',

stated

Taylor,

'it was

essential o select

only

sufficient

good

and

reliableevidenceto

establish

the

facts and

causes

of the

disaster'.68 ord

Justice

Taylor's

Home

Office

nquiryproduced

an interim

eport

within

our

months.The 'main

cause' of the

disasterwas

'overcrowding',

he 'main

rea-

son'

was 'failureof

police

control'. While

criticizing

he

club,

their

safety

engineers,

and

the

local

authority

which had

failed to issue an

up-to-date

licence for the

ground,

Taylor

reservedhis

most

damning

conclusions or

the South YorkshirePolice.

Taylor

condemned

eniorofficersas

'defensive nd evasive

witnesses',

on-

sidering

neither heir

handling

of

problems

on

the

day

nor

their accountof

it in

evidence

howed

he

qualities

of

leadership

o be

expected

of

theirrank'.

He

concluded

hat

it

was,

'a

matterof

regret

hat at the

hearing,

and

in

their

submissions,

he

South Yorkshire

Police were

not

prepared

o

concede

that

they

were

in

any

respect

at

fault for what had

occurred'.69

s match com-

mander,

Chief

Superintendent

uckenfield's

capacity

o take

decisions

and

give orders seemedto collapse'.He had failed to give 'necessaryconse-

quential

orders'once he

had

sanctioned he

opening

of

the

gate

and he

failed

'to

exert

any

control'

once the

disaster

unfolded.

Worse

still,

he

then lied

to

the

FA

representatives.

Duckenfield's

lack

of

candour'then

'set

off

a

widely

reported

allegation'against

the fans

broadcast

aroundthe

world.70

Taylor's

criticisms,

particularly

f the

police,

took

many

commentators

by

surprise.

n

December1989civil

liability

on

the

part

of

the

police

to

pay

damages

or

negligence

o

the

bereavedwas

acceptedby

the

South

Yorkshire

Police.Whilethe forcesuccessfully ettled with the club, theirsafety engi-

neers,

and

the

City

Council

n

gaining

ump

sum

contributions o

damages

paid,

the

major

proportion

was

paid by

the

police

and

their

insurers.

67

Rt.

Hon. Lord

Justice

Taylor,

The

Hillsborough

Stadium Disaster: 15

April

1989 Interim

Report

(1989;

Cm.

765)

1.

68

id.,

p.

2.

69

id.,

p.

50.

70

id.

286

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17/26

Within

this

context of

conflict,

he

protagonists,

ften eminent

counsel,

and

local

authority

oroners

doctors

or

solicitors

by background)

onductaffairs

with 'a

very

wide

degree

of

largely

unregulated

iscretion'.7

The

objective

of

inquests

s

limitedto

arriving

at a verdictwhich

reflects

theestablishedmedical auseof death.Interested arties, he witnesses alled,

and

the evidenceheard

are determined

y

the

coroner.

The

procedures,

rom

the

order

of

witnessesand

the extent of their

cross-examination,

hrough

o

the

summing-up

f

evidence

and

legal

directionof the

jury,

are laid

down

exclusively

y

the

coroner

within

he broadand

permissive

arameters

f

the

coroners' ules.

Whilea

range

of

prescribed

erdicts

s available

o the

jury they

are

limited

in

scope

and definition.

Most

contentious ases revolve

around hree

verdicts

which,more or less, imply liability: suicide';unlawfully illed'; accidental

death'/'misadventure'. hen

suicides

occur

in

institutions,

uch as

prisons,

young

offenders'

nstitutions

r

specialhospitals,

he

disputes nvariably

ocus

on

theextent o

which

an

established

uty

of

carewas

compromised.

uriously,

despite

here

being

an

'unlawfully

illed'

verdict and its

counterpart

justifi-

able

homicide'

there s

no verdict

compatible

with

'negligence'.

Routinely,

coroners

begin by

informing

he

bereaved hat it is 'their'

pro-

cedure,

their'

ime,

'their'

ight,

carefully

onstructed nd

delivered o

estab-

lish who

died,when,where,andhow.In controversialases,familiesusually

are aware of

the first

three,

their

principal

objective

being

how

they

died.

Yet,

over the

proceedings

hangs

the

denial of

their

agenda;

a

spectre

.

.'.

The

circumstances f

death,

of how

the

person

died,

can

be discussed

but,

'it is "how"

without

liability;

"how"

without

blame'.79

This is

the

procedure,

n adversarial

wolf in

inquisitorial

heep'sclothing,

o which

the

bereaved

ave to turn.

This

is

the

anachronistic,

nadequate

nd

dishonest orum

which

is

left to

carry

the full

weight

of

responsibility

or

resolving

and

revealing

he circum-

stancesof

death,

while

giving

not

so

much

as

a nod

towards

ndividual

r

corporate

ia-

bility.

Coroner's ourtsare

places

of illusion;oneminute

beckoning,

he next

rejecting.80

As

with

all

other

inquests

involving potential prosecutions,

the

Hillsborough

nquests

were

opened

and

adjourned

mmediately

fter he

dis-

aster.The

Taylor

nquiry

and

the criminal

nvestigation

proceeded

ide-by-

side,

each

serviced

by

the

West

Midlands

Police.

Taylor's

interim

report

encouraged

he

expectation

hat

criminal

harges

would

be

broughtagainst

certain

seniorofficers

and,

possibly,

against

he

South

Yorkshire

Police and

other

corporate

bodies.

As

the

first

anniversary

f the

disaster

approached

he

bereaved

amilies

became

concernedover

the slow

progress

of

the criminal

nvestigation

and,

consequently,

of the

delay

to the

inquests.

This was

compounded

by

78 T.

Ward,

'Coroners

Inquests:

Before the

Inquest'

Legal

Action

Bulletin,

December

1983,

149.

79

Scraton,

op.

cit.,

n.

49,

p.

132.

80

id.,

pp.

132-3.

288

?

Blackwell

Publishers Ltd 1999


18/26

personal

worriesover the

precise

circumstancesn whichtheir loved

ones

died

and

the

persistentallegations

of

drunkenness

nd violence.The

issue

of blood

alcohol levels also caused

deep

anxiety.

Then,

in March

1990

following

consultationwith the Director of

Public

ProsecutionsDPP), thecoronertook the extraordinaryecisionto resume

the

inquests

on a

limited

basis'

ahead

of the decisions

regarding

riminal

prosecution

r

disciplinary

ction.81

reliminary

earings,

or

'mini-inquests',

would be

held

with

each

family separately

before

a

jury.

The

mini-inquests

would

deal

only

with the medical

evidence,

blood alcohol

levels,

ocation of

the

deceased

prior

to

death,

and

subsequent

dentification.There

would be

no

discussion

of

howthe

deceasedcame

by

theirdeath. He

intended o

con-

duct

eight

mini-inquestsper

day

over

three

weeks,

then

adjourn

to

await

the DPP's

ruling

on

prosecution.

Eventually

resumed

again,

the

inquests

would

proceed

on a

generic

basisto address he broader ssueof how.

Once the

general

preliminaries

oncerning

medical evidence had

been

heard he

mini-inquests

were

held

as

planned.

Arriving

t Sheffield's

Medico-

Legal

Centre,

amilieswere

met

by

social

workersand West

Midlands

police

officers.

They

entered he

court

through

one door

after the

previous

amily

had

exited

through

another.

The

blood alcohol

level of the

deceased

was

confirmed

and

the

relevant

pathologistpresented

he

medical

evidence.

What

followed

was

unprecedented.

A

West

Midlandsofficer

read

his/her

summaryof the availableevidence n eachcase. Because t was a summary

of

evidence

he

witness

statements rom

which it

was derivedwere

not dis-

closed and no

cross-examination

was

allowed.

These scant

and

personal

interpretations

f

the available

evidence

n

each case

were

presented

uncon-

tested

by

police

officers

o

the

jury

as

fact.

The

families'

solicitor

accepted

this

process

as an

'information

dissemi-

nation

exercise',

commenting

hat

once

'many

families'

had

received

and

heard

the West

Midlands

Police

summaries,

hey

would be

'satisfied

with

the factual information . . . and not want to take any further action'.82In

fact,

nothing

was

further

from the

truth.

Unable to

raise

key questions,

access

primary

tatements,

nd

cross-examinehe

evidence,

he

families

were

left with

numerous

unanswered

questions,

disqualified

s

being

outside the

agreed

parameters

f the

mini-inquests.

The

dissatisfaction

mong

families over

the

restrictions

and lack

of

dis-

closure

was

universal:

I

felt

I'd

just

been

to

the

theatre ..

it was

rehearsed';

'How is

it

possible

to

gauge

the

truthfulness f

the

evidence

..

when no

opportunitywasgivento cross-examineheindividualswhowerethesource

of the

information?';

Any

trust

I

had

went out of

the

window .. like

many

familiesI

thought

the

mini-inquests

nsufficient'.83

81

Minutes of

meeting

between the

South

Yorkshire

coroner,

Dr

Stefan

Popper,

and

inter-

ested

parties (6

March

1990).

82

Correspondence

from

the

Hillsborough

Steering

Group (solicitors),

14

March 1990.

83

Personal

interviews,

bereaved

families,

summer

1990.

See

Scraton et

al.,

op.

cit.,

n.

74,

pp.

62-71.

289

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Publishers

Ltd 1999


19/26

Four

months after

the

mini-inquests

nded the DPP 'decided hat

there

is no evidence o

justify

any

criminal

proceedings'

against any

of the

cor-

porate organizations

nvolved and

'insufficient vidence o

justify

proceed-

ings against any

officerof the South Yorkshire

Police or

any

other

person

for any offence'.84

The families and their

lawyers

were

left,

bereft

of

access,

to

second-guess

the level and

reliability

of the evidence

judged

as 'insufficient'.

Because of

prohibitive

costs,

it was

impossible

... to take a

private prosecution.

An intolerable

weight

was

[now]

placed

on

the

generic inquest.85

As

the

generic

hearingsopened

the coroner delivered

a

stunning

ruling;

evidence

heardwould be restricted o events

up

to the

'moment'

of the dis-

aster.Therewould be

no

consideration

f eventsafter 3.15

p.m.

on the

day.

Yet most of thosewhodiedwerestill alive at thispoint.Effectivelyhe coro-

ner excluded

any

discussionof the

adequacy

of

the rescue

operation

and the

appropriateness

f

medicalattention

given

to the

dying.

His

logic

was

sim-

ple:

that

by

3.06

p.m.,

the

time that

the

matchwas

abandoned,

all who died

had received he

injuries

hat

killed them.

He

added 'four to

six

minutes'

as

the

time

asphyxia

victims

normally

ive betweenunconsciousness nd death

and took an incontrovertible

marker',

n

ambulancedrivenonto

the

pitch,

as

the

cut-off

time.

Each death, then, lost its individual circumstances to a collective interpretation of the

events

leading

to the disaster. The

only

conclusion to be drawn from

Popper's ruling

was that

those

who died did so

regardless

of

medical attention

received or denied.

Equally, by

this

logic,

those who lived did so

regardless

of medical attention.

A

defiant

logic

which defied reason.86

The

generic

hearings,

he

longest

in

legal

history,

ran

from 19

November

1990 to 28 March 1991. 230

witnesses

gave

evidence,

welve nterested

par-

ties

(six

of whom

were

'police interests')

were

represented,

with one barris-

ter

representing

orty-three

amilies.

Despite

the

cost,

length,

and

volume

of

evidence, hefamiliesweredeprivedof themostsignificant estimony: xam-

ination of

the

precise

circumstances f

death. Not

only

did the

coroner's

ruling

exclude

his

evidence,

here

was no disclosureof the statements aken

in

each case.

Once

again police

witnesses

emphasized

he

very

issues

discounted

as

rel-

evant

by Taylor:

ans'

drunkenness,

ooliganism,

violence,

and

conspiracy

to

enter

he

ground.

Once

again,

the

bereaved nd survivors

especially

hose

giving

evidence)

elt that

they

had to

defend

their

reputations

and those

of

the dead. 'I felt I was on trial',saidone survivor:

84

Letter from Mr

Cleugh,

Head of

Police

Complaints

Division,

to the

Chief Constable

of

South Yorkshire

Police,

30

August

1990.

85

Scraton,

op.

cit.,

n.

46,

p.

141.

86

id.,

p.

143.

290

?



20/26

they

didn'tknow

what I'd been

through

.. I'd lost someonedearto

me,

fought

to

sur-

vive and others

died aroundme

... It was chaos

and

I

know

some could

have

been

saved

.. no-one

helped.

They

didn't

wantto

knowat the

inquest...

It was all a

sham.87

After

230 witnessesand

extensive

egal

submissions,

he coroner

summed

upthe case. He steered hejury awayfrom anunlawfullykilledverdictargu-

ing

that

in termsof a

'serious

and

obvious risk'

foreseeability y

the

police

was not

to be confused

with

'obvious';

hat 'recklessness'

ad to

be

estab-

lished

beyond

all reasonabledoubt. Accidental

death as

a

verdict,

however,

was

not what

it

necessarily

eemed:

. ..

straddl[ing]

he whole

spectrum

of

events ..

from

something

over

which

no-one

has control ... to a situation

were

you

are

...

satisfied that there has been careless-

ness,

negligence

.. and

that

someone

would

have

to make

compensation ayments

n

civil

litigation.88

The coronerconcluded

hat

returning

a verdict

of

accidental

death:

does not mean

that

you

absolve each and

every

party

from

all and

every

measure

of

blame

..

that

people

mademistakes ..

may

have made seriouserrors

..

may

have

been

incompetent

s

not

the

same

as

saying

that a

person

s

being

reckless

..89

Further,

acts or

omissions

had to be attributableo

individuals,

herecould

be no

aggregation

f

responsibility.

On 26 March1991 he

jury

left the court

to

consider ts

verdict,

assured

by

the coroner that accidentaldeath as a

verdictcould incorporatea high degreeof negligence.Two days later,by

a nine-to-two

majority,

an

accidental death verdict on all who

died

at

Hillsborough

was

duly

returned.

Despite

the

Police

Complaints

Authority

howing

a

determinationo have

disciplinary roceedings

rought

against

he matchcommander

nd

his

assis-

tant

for

'neglect

of

duty',

Chief

Superintendent

uckenfield eft the

South

YorkshirePolice on the

grounds

of

ill-health,

and the

case

against

Murray

was

withdrawn. ix families

ook

test

cases to the divisional

ourt

aiming

o

quash heinquestverdicts nthegroundsof irregularityfproceedings,nsuf-

ficiency

of

inquiry,

and

the

emergence

f new

evidence.

In

November

1993

the

judges

ruled

n

favour of the

coroner.

They

concurred hat the

inquests

had

been conducted

properly,

evidence

had

not been

suppressed,

and the

jury's

direction

had been

'impeccable'.

As

one

parent

stated:

Having

exhausted

he

legal process,

not

one

of the

questions

egarding

he death

of our

son was addressed

and this

points

to

the

inadequacy

f

the

legal system

which

needs

radical

reform.90

87

Personal

nterview,

Hillsborough

urvivor,

April

1991; ee, also,

Scraton

et

al.,

op.

cit.,

n.

74,

pp.

139-49.

88

Inquest

ranscripts,

p.

cit.,

n.

54,

day

75,

21

March

1991,

p.

63.

89

id.,

day

78,

26

March

1991,

p.

31.

90

Personal

nterview,

Doreen

Jones,

April

1991.

291

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Publishers Ltd 1999


21/26

5.

From

scrutiny

to sanitization

In

November

1995,

following

six

years

full-time

research,

the first

compre-

hensive research

study

of the aftermath

of a United

Kingdom

disaster

was

published. Reflecting on the Hillsborough inquests, No Last Rights indicted

the

'antiquated,

unfair

and

structurally

deficient

process

run

by

coroners

who

possess

discretionary

powers

in

excess

of their

knowledge

or

capability

to

use

them'. As

for the

judicial

review,

the Divisional

Court,

'dance[s]

to the same

tune

...

trapped

in

procedural precedent'.

And

'in

determining

the

rights

of

the deceased and

bereaved',

the

Hillsborough

inquests

amounted to 'an

insti-

tutional

denial of the

principles

of

equality,

fairness

and

justice

enshrined

in

international

conventions'.91

Of its eighty-seven detailed recommendations for wide-ranging institu-

tional

reform,

eight

focused on the constitution and

potential

of official

inquiries

and

thirty-three

on

the

role

and

function of

inquests.

No Last

Rights

was used

by Jimmy

McGovern,

the

award-winning

Liverpool

dramatist,

to

win a commission for

the

drama-documentary,

Hillsborough.

Broadcast

in

December

1996,

the

programme

made

allegations

concerning

the

suppres-

sion of

evidence,

the

disappearance

of

video

tapes,

and the

emergence

of

new evidence that some who died were

alive

after

3.15

p.m.

Within two weeks

the

Conservative

Home

Secretary,

Michael

Howard,

stated

in

Parliament a commitment to

'searching

for

the truth'.92

On 30

June

1997 his

successor,

Labour's Jack

Straw,

stated his

concern as to 'whether

the full facts have

emerged'.

He

announced

an

independent judicial scrutiny

conducted

by

Lord

Justice

Stuart-Smith 'to

get

to the bottom of this once

and

for

all'.93

While families

immediately

welcomed

the initiative there was

considerable

confusion over

the

status and

powers

of a

'scrutiny'.

It had

no

precedent.

The

scrutiny's

terms

of

reference, although enabling

Stuart-Smith to

pur-

sue

'other action which should be taken in

the

public

interest',

were tied

closely

to

reviewing

evidence 'not available' to the

previous

inquiries

and

investigations.

New evidence would

need

to be of such

significance

that,

in

the

judge's opinion,

it

would have led to

prosecutions

or

changed

the out-

come

of

Taylor

or

the

inquests.

Stuart-Smith visited the South Yorkshire

Police,

and

amidst

much

controversy

took evidence

f

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Disaster and Justice