CASES

IN

NATURAL RESOURCES

SUBMITTED TO: Atty. Ismael Manaligod SUBMITTED BY:

Sophia E. Matote Jonna Maye S. Canindo

Maureen Margareth D. Eslava

Sony Berth Daluping

Eric Gonayon CSU Ll.B- II

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.

However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.

Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;

Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.HELD:

NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.BENGUET CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 163101

Petitioner,

- versus -

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.

J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.

Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.

HELD:

NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91among these agencies areindicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.

Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:

This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu Resources Development Corporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C. Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties.

After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondents failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board. An appeal was filed with the CA but same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that [n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. This provision is obviously an expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it.

Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial bodys decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved partys right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy.

Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 -- among these agencies are -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them. By including questions of fact among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.

According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.

Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of RA 7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN

G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006

FACTS:

Executive Order No. 279, promulgated by then President Corazon Aquino, authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

After some time, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled, An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. This was soon superseded by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on 23 January 1997 after due publication.

Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC) over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.

MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mining act and its implementing rules and regulations are void and unconstitutional specifically Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 for it allows the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.HELD:

NO. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private property without the determination of public use and the payment of just compensation.

The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as actual use by the public has already been abandoned.

Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the governments thrust of accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit. That public use is negated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for the benefit of private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation

LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, Inc. vs RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

FACTS:

On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources. Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover all the modes through which the State may undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources.

The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four modes:

The State may directly undertake such activities.

(2)The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.

(3)Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.

(4)For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.

Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to technical or financial assistance only. They observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners letter.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT Republic Act No. 7942 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:

The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void the following:

(1) provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:

(a)The proviso in Section 3 (aq),

(b)Section 23,

(c)Section 33 to 41,

(d)Section 56,

(e)The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and

(f)Section 90.

(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and

(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.

It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP, hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to WMCP, govern the FTAA.

In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing agreements.

R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

APEX MINING CO., INC.,

petitioner,

- versus -

southeast mindanao gold mining corp. ET AL,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE,

petitioner,

- versus -

southeast mindanao gold mining corp., APEX MINING CO., INC., ET AL,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON. VICTOR O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO (Member) and DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member),

petitioners,

- versus -

southeast mindanao gold mining corporation,

Respondent.

FACTS:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12 July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), of this Courts Decision dated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit evidence that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or after its expiration.

The Assailed Decision likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act of 1995, mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.

SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.

Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through the executive branch. Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.

In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006, Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an exploration permit.

Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a vested right over the disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.HELD:

NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights had been perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was still the operative law. Surely, it is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired mining rights over the disputed area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only in 1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of locations and its prospecting permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no possibility that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining claim under the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Whatever mining rights MMC had that it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered mining rights as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and immortalized in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining.

SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its supposed rights attached to the exploration permit with the rights that a private property land owner has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in law. As earlier discussed, under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, national wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and not by their discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop and utilize said minerals for his own benefit if he has complied with all the requirements set forth by applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through permits, concessions or agreements. In other words, without the imprimatur of the State, any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over the mineral land because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State, and the same cannot be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. (Emphases supplied.)

Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM reveals that MMC assigned to the former the rights and interests it had in EP 133, thus:

1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may have in the area situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is evident that what MMC had over the disputed area during the assignment was an exploration permit. Clearly, the right that SEM acquired was limited to exploration, only because MMC was a mere holder of an exploration permit. As previously explained, SEM did not acquire the rights inherent in the permit, as the assignment by MMC to SEM was done in violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the assignment was effected without the approval of the proper authority in contravention of the provision of the mining law governing at that time. In addition, the permit expired on 6 July 1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no right over the area.CELESTIAL NICKEL MININGG.R. No. 169080

EXPLORATION CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

- versus -

MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION),

BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.

Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.

After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.

Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts.

Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.

Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasias mining areas. It upheld Blue Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB.

Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and executory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.

However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.

Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.

The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestials Motion for Reconsideration.

While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?

HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.

The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.

[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990]

LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657(Commercial Farms).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms prayer the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26 and 31, 1989.

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

ISSUE: WON Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 is unconstitutional.

HELD: YES. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing corporate farms which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement production-sharing plans (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.

[G.R. No. 61293. February 15, 1990]

DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA, petitioners, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its Chairman, Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO, respondent.

FACTS: On December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Included in the properties offered to the public was a house and lot situated at 3377 New Panaderos Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4749 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the P9,800.00 proposal bond.

Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds were issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland consisting of twenty-six hectares located in Cordon, Isabela acquired by the Government from him under Presidential Decree No. 27. However, the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down payment "and all future installments." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" Thereafter, on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in cash the balance of the required down payment.

A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November 19, 1981, where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor GSIS "the balance of the purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIVE & 50/100 (P63,705.50) PESOS. Philippine currency, in SIXTY (60) monthly installments of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100 (P1,416.69) PESOS. Philippine currency, at twelve (12%) percent interest per annum, compounded monthly, beginning December 1, 1981." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner on December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became due, petitioner sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his Land Bank bonds commencing in January, 1982 until the exhaustion of the said bonds. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" Petitioner invoked the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251.

The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on January 22, 1982, denied petitioner's offer. The board resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of Trustees to reconsider Resolution No. 91. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position with the contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling in the case of Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System, etc., et al.. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Likewise, petitioner submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, dated February 12, 1982, wherein it was stated, inter alia, that if the GSIS accepts the Land Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or face value. To accept said bonds at a discounted rate would lessen the credibility of the bonds as instruments of indebtedness. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager, Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was adopted on May 18, 1982 by the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the request of petitioner. Hence, on August 5, 1982, the instant original action for mandamus was filed by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS.

HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions, a government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their face value. Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted in the amount of their face value; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will impair the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death, retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million members, the majority of whom are low salaried government employees and workers." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act onthe groundthat the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the publicdomainas well as minerals and other naturalresourcestherein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII ofthe Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestraldomainswhich may includenatural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestraldomains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE:Whether or not the IPRA law isunconstitutional.

HELD:The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzspetitionwas dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestraldomainsmay include publicdomain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]

PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City, respondents.FACTS: Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order31, Special Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority.- Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region- Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide- DAO 2: Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25 The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the SOs, the heirs of A peg Carantes filed application for CALC for some portions of land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping some of the land occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would be totally evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31 has no force and effect for preempting legislative prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected Systems), but it sustained SO25and DAO 2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586.- Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes.

ISSUE: WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid

HELD: Not a justiciable controversy. The petition was prematurely filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioners asserted right to possess the disputed land.- Definition of justiciable controversy: a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.- Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

[G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987]

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue:Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power Corporation), respondents.FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 573[3] withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of the public domain which included Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. They were primarily for use as watershed area. The parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit admission,[4]within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. Petitioner Edubigis Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands, an Application[5]for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels of land in the area. Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of the Napocor informing him of the fences and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado. Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are non-disposable and inalienable public land?

HELD: The two (2) parcels of land were public disposable and alienable lands before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation No.573, on June 26, 196. The property was, however, later reserved, under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June26, 196[9]. Since then, the property became non-disposable and inalienable public land. By their very nature or by executive or statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form and inconvertible into any character less than of inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state, for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a subsequent valid declassification. Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable and in disposable. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.

J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENUREADMINISTRATION FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

ISSUE: WON

HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.

[G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991]

MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents.

FACTS: Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950, leaving a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in Pampanga.On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age, alleged to be the legitimated daughter of said Pablo Leuterio.On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of the full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the decedent's intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of Pampanga, praying for his appointment as administrator.The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio (the latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol). After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque administratrix of Pablo Leuterio's estate.

The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the filing in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October 19, 1962 of a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights," in which she averred that she was the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and therefore entitled to succeed to the latter's entire estate, subject only to the rights accorded by law to her mother, Ana Maglanque.In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's estate as being "his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore, his capital.

ISSUE: WON the Probate Court had erred -

1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of the record of birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis, Pampanga;"

2) "in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of Gervacio Bagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and who are school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellant Maria Alicia Leuterio was studying;"

3) "in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the form of a deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;"

4) in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria Alicia Leuterio has been in the possession of the status of a natural child before and after the marriage of her parents * * ."

HELD: "In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that there was an express desire on the part of Pablo to recognize Maria Alicia as his natural child. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate, baptismal certificate and the photographs do not bear the signatures of Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter with Ana Maglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to have been born, reared and raised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explain this by stating that Ana was a househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablo has no child with his previous wife, and it is not unusual if he looked upon Maria Alicia as if she were his own daughter in or outside his residence. Upon these considerations, the court a quo was correct in rejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan and Gervacio Bagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to Dar Juan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed their demeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. With respect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that he and Pablo were very close friends.

"What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is the absolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the lapse of 9 years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death in 1950.

In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it was "clear and patent error" on its part

1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation is based on voluntary recognition," and

2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case squarely on all fours with the case of Colorado et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of herein petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and for legitimation."

The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted.

It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate Court were aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as Pablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the Probate Court went to some lengths to stress the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify the exact character of the remedy that she was seeking -- whether it be voluntary, or compulsory, recognition -- quoting in this connection, the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, which culminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that a public document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" It said:

"There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the acknowledgment of a child by the father, made voluntarily; another is the action that should be instituted by the child against the father to compel the latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. The continuous possession of the status of a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. However, the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods of time prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 of the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)."

The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at the time. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" In fact, it is consistent with the statement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguished counsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz.:

"The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways: (a) by a voluntary recognition (Art, 131, civ. code); (2) by an involuntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action (Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code).

"A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the record of births; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument. (Art. 131, Civil Code).

"An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the father, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art. 135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code)."

It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to have understood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent from its declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 must be precise, express and solemn (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 161), whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2, Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either the existence of "an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such child (of) the status of a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was no factual basis on which to rest a declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo Leuterio of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter.

Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar doctrine, conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review, specially where those findings are the same as those made by the Trial Court. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains in the case at bar.

The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article 283 of the present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. That conclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the same Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognition thus by inference excluding compulsory recognition for the causes or under the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all" provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in his favor "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" While a contrary view, i.e., in favor of retroactivity, may find support in the excepting clause of Article 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights declared for the first time therein, though arising from acts done or events occurred under prior law provided no vested or acquired rights of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point in pursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal is concerned.

Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety -- as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious -- petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to either voluntary or compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Code of 1889 which was in force at the time of her asserted birth or, in the case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 of the present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment, Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence, sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function and prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied.

[G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994]

PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSES CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA, and LETICIA NOCON CHAN, respondents.On 11 July 1985, Firestone, Boomtown, spouses Cynthia D. Ching and Ching Tiong Keng, spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong, spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia, and Leticia Nocon Chan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio E. Margolles, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C. Espinosa, Lucia E. Laperal, Norma E. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, Alice E. Sotto, Veronica Gana, and Equitable Banking Corporation. Also included among the defendants were the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.

The complaint averred that the parcels of land in question were registered in the names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu was issued pursuant to a decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6625, dated 22 July 1969. On 04 February 1976, the property was subdivided by Gonzales and Espiritu into five lots, resulting in the issuance of five TCT.

Months after plaintiffs took possession of the premises, the defendants demanded that the plaintiffs vacate the premises. Claiming ownership, the defendants, on their part, traced their titles from Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 issued to the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Ma. Juliana Carlos on 26 March 1929 pursuant to Decree No. 35183 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406.

On 04 April 1956, OCT No. 4216 was cancelled and, in its place, TCT No. 43555 was issued to Lorenzo Gana and Veronica Gana married to Ramon Rodriguez. TCT No. 43555 was itself likewise cancelled (on the same day) and TCT No. 43556 was issued, this time in the name of Veronica Gana alone. On 13 August 1956, Veronica Gana sold the land to Patrocinio Margolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302.

Margolles subdivided the property into seven (7) lots, each lot being covered, respectively, by TCTs No. 379913, No. 379914, No. 379915, No. 379916, No. 379917, No. 379918 and No. 379919.

On 03 November 1972, Margolles sold 1/2 interest in the property to Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and TCTs No. 382176, No. 382177, No. 382178, No. 382179, No. 382180, No. 382181 and No. 382182 were thereupon issued in the names of both Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and Patrocinio Margolles.

On 17 May 1973, Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation reconveyed its interest to the property to Patrocinio Margolles and, again, new TCTs No. 410535, No. 410536, No. 410537, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were issued in the name of the latter. Subsequently, TCTs No. 410536, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. S-17992 was issued to Peltan Development Corporation.

Margolles subdivided the remaining parcels covered by TCTs No. 410535 and No. 410537 into fifteen (15) lots, each of which was titled in her name, i.e., TCTs No. S-16369 up to No. S-16383, inclusive. These titles, except TCTs No. S-16372 and No. S-16373 which were retained in her name, were later cancelled and transferred to her brother and sisters, her co-defendants and co-petitioners in the present case. The transferees Virginia Villongco and Norma Espinosa later mortgaged their own lots to Equitable Banking Corporation.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the genuineness and authenticity of Original Certificate of Title No. A-S-47, against an overlapping Original Certificate of Title No. 4216, was sufficiently established;

(2) Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 was issued while the property was still unclassified public land; and

(3) Whether or not the claim of the petitioners was correctly barred by laches.

The first issue is basically factual. Ordinarily, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitioners have submitted, among other things, the following pieces of documentary evidence:

(1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners duplicate certificates, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;

(2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the Official Gazette (1927 editions), containing notices of the initial hearing in Land Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), instituted by the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, covering a parcel of land in Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias;

(3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, dated 23 March 1961, in LRC Case No. N-2126 (GLRO Record No. N-6564), denying the registration of a parcel of land by reason of the certification, dated 26 June 1959, of the Land Registration Commissioner, Antonio N. Noblejas, that a portion of the property covered in this post-war land case had been decreed under Decree No. 351823, issued on 05 March 1929, in the name of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), and while said case covered only a part of the property in dispute, it did show, however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Gana and Carlos;

(4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land Registration Commission's Verification Committee, sustaining the validity of Decree No. 351823 in favor of Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos;

(5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the Land Registration Commission, showing that a decree was "okayed" in GLRO Record No. 30406 (LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. for Decree" on "1-22-29" (22 January 1929) and that a decree was issued under the entry "Date Decree Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929);

(6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273 covering a parcel of land in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, surveyed for Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1926;

(7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415, pointing to the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC Case No. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos; and

(8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, stating that the information and documents submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.

HELD: The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside. It is our considered view that the appellate court has committed serious error in refusing to give any probative value to such evidence. All that the private respondents could basically proffer against OCT 4216 are that

(1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious,(2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalid having been issued on still unclassified land of the public domain.

Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section 321 of Act No. 190, states:

"Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office."

It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to produce the Decree is due to the burning of the Archives of the Court of First Instance of Rizal during the liberation of Pasig,

The Certification, dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara, Acting Chief of the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority, states that the pre-war record of LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No. 030406 for the province of Rizal, is not among the records on file with the Vault Section of the Docket Division since the same must have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war.

The respondents own witness, Eduardo Santos, Jr., has testified that the records of pre-war registration cases are thus incomplete as can be expected.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn6"

in consequence of which all pre-war land registration cases in Rizal have been destroyed. Certainly, the petitioners cannot be held to account for those lost or destroyed records.

The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have asked for the reconstitution of the LRC case and the decree in accordance with Act No. 3110 HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" and Republic Act No. 26, HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" or that they could have opposed, or intervened in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N-36579) where OCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, the petitioners, it is now contended, should be held bound by the order of default issued by the land registration court. The argument is unacceptable. The petitioners are not covered by the general order of default in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act No. 26 only covers lost or destroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is not extant; it has, in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, on the other hand, applies only to pending judicial proceedings. This Court has heretofore held, thus -

"The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. x x x.

"xxx xxx xxx.

"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must gain perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.

"x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law. x x x.

"x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and suf(f)er the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which has not committed any negligence or fault at all. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othing contained in (the) Act shall be construed to repeal or modify the provisions of Section Three Hundred and Twenty One of Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety." Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3 (aforequoted), Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule." Hence, even if the petitioners have failed to have the records of the LRC case reconstituted, they are not precluded from establishing by other evidence the requisite proof of validity of OCT No. 4216.

Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs. Court of Appeals,"x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copy of the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in court proceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on secondary evidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by Section 47 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under the Land Registration Act which was in force at the time OCT No. 351 issued, the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was an official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the land covered by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal."Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of Decree No. 1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) are based. x x x." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.)

The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141 (1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, Las Pias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na Mangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioners predecessors-in-interest.No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:

"Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply states that the tract of land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, Metro Manila containing an area of 197,525 square meters as shown and described on this plan Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal certified as such on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623. The certification refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of 99.6157 hectares.

"xxx xxx xxx.

"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D land only in 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. de la Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and inconclusive."

Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766, Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority (NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War.

In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appealsx x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These x x x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity x x x."

Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides:

"1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or disposable and p