NOTE: This case is consolidated withG.R. No. 167707(Secretary of DENR vs Yap). This case is more popularly referred to as Boracay Landowners vs DENR568 SCRA 164 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Land Classifications Boracay Cases Positive Act by the Government in Reclassifying LandsThese are two consolidated cases.G.R. No. 167707Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was anunclassified landof the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.G.R. No. 173775During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006,then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoissued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the SupremeCourt (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.ISSUES:Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.HELD:Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be apositive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926ipso factoconverted the island into private ownership.Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable.It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under abona fideclaim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

1. Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resource (2000)

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a case for prohibition and mandamus as citizen and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) and its implementing Rules on ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of public domain and minerals and other natural resources, in violation of the Regalian doctrine. They likewise contend that providing an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domain and ancestral lands which might even include private lands within the areas violate the rights of private land owners. Petitioners likewise contend that provisions of the IPRA defining the jurisdiction and powers of the NCIP violate due process of law. Lastly, petitioners assail the validity of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President (OP) as lateral and autonomous relationship for purposes of policy coordination, thereby infringing upon the Presidents power of control over the executive department.

A groups of intervenors, including Sen. Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The Commission of Human Rights likewise asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect the rights of the indigenous peoples.

Decision:

The votes of the Court are split where 7 voted to dismiss the petition and 7 voted to grant. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority was not obtained, the petition was dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION (Justice Puno)

1. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System

1. The Laws of Indies

The Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards through the Laws of Indies and the Royal Cedulas. All lands became the exclusive dominion of the Spanish Crown, and the Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards. Private land titles can only be acquired from the government by purchase or other land grant from the Crown.

The Law of Indies was followed by the Mortgage Law of 1893 which provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds. The Maura Law of 1894 was the last Spanish law promulgated in the Philippines, which required the registration of all agricultural lands; otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

1. Valentin vs. Murciano

This case answered the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title.

In this case, plaintiffs entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land while defendants ourchased the land in 1892. The Court ruled that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in the Philippines by which plaintiffs could obtain ownership by prescription, without any action of the State, otherwise the same shall remain the property of the State. Thus, it required settlers on public lands to obtain titles deeds from the State.

1. Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance with the Philippine Bill of 1902, governing the disposition of land of public domain. It prescribe rules for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain, and to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands.

Act No. 926 was superseded by the Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, passed under the Jones Law. it limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave the Filipinos the same privileges.

It was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 141which remains the present Public Land Law.

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens System under Act 496 which placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system, requiring that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described.

1. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian Doctrine was enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions which basically states that all lands of the public domain as well as natural resources, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of state ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

1. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples as a distinct sector. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. Within their ancestral domains and lands the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and right to preserve their culture. To carry out the policies of the ACT, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

1. Indigenous Peoples

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/ IPs) refer to a group of people who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of peoples have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial.

Their unit of government is the barangay. In a baranganic society, the chiefs administered the lands in the name of the barangay, there was no private property in land. When Islam was introduced in the country in the archipelago of Maguindanao, the Sultanate of Sulu claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas.

When Spaniards settled in the Philippines, Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where church would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their house around the church. All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization and all lands not assigned to the pueblos were declared to be lands of the Crown., and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to the lands.

The American government classified the Filipinos into two: Christian Filipinos and non-Christian Filipinos, not to religious belief, but to geographical area, the latter referring to natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship. The Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. They passed Act No. 253 creating the bureau of Non-Christian Tribes to determine the most practicable means for bring about their advancement.

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State recognized the customs and interest of national cultural communities in the formulation of state policies.

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated PD 410 or the Ancestral Lands Decree, providing for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities.

The Aquino government shifted from the policy of integration to one of preservation. She created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office of Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the OP.

The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteed the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domain and ancestral lands.

1. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION

1. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of the Indigenous Peoples and do not constitute Part of the Land of Public Domain

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, continuously until the present except when interrupted by war or force majeure. It comprises of lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pastures, hunting grounds, burial grounds, and bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources.

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/ IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands, not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized, including residential lots, rice terraces, or paddies, private forests.

The delineation of ancestral domains and lands is conferred on the NCIP who shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain (CADT) upon finding that the application is meritorious, in the name of the community. Ancestral Lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Land Title (CALT). The CALTs and CADTs shall be registered in the Register of Deeds in the place where property is situated.

1. Carino vs. Insular Government

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation.

The US SC ruled in favor of Carino and ordered the registration of the subject lands in his name. The court laid down the presumption of a certain title held as far back as memory went and under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to never have been public land. The registration requirement was not to confer title, but simply to establish it. In a nutshell,Carioenunciated the legal presumption that ancestral lands and domains were not part of the public domain, having maintained their character as private lands of the indigenous peoples since time immemorial

Why Carino doctrine is unique?Carino is the only case that specifically recognizes native title. Carino was cited by succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act

Other Separate Opinions:

Justice KapunanRegalian theory doesnt negate the native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial, adverting to thelandmarkcase of CARINO V.LOCAL GOVERNMENT, where the US SC through Holmes held: xxx the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Existence of native titie to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish crown as an exception to the theory of jure regalia

Justice Puno: Carino case firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State and was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902. The IPRA recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector in the society. It grants this people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands and defines the extent of these lands and domains

La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association Inc., et al. V. Victor O. Ramos, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Horacio Ramos, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR);

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100, 000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, MMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the president may execute with foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit Philippine mineral resources

3. Whether the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources

HELD:

1) RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financialassistance. The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat theseagreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

2) The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

3) The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal Blaan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the States need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our countrys competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement

Separate Opinion of Justice Panganiban

The FTAA is now to be implemented by a Filipino corporation, therefore the Court can no longer declare it unconstitutional. The CA case is a dispute between two Filipino corporations (Sagittarius and Lepanto) both claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP. Regardless of which side eventually prevails, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino firm. The present Constitution, moreover, does not limit foreign participation in the exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils to financial or technical assistance. The drafters choice of words and excerpts from deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the present Charter did not limit to financial or technical assistance the participation of foreign corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils. The drafters use of the phrase agreements xxx involving xxx technical or financial assistance in Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter does not absolutely show intent to exclude other modes of assistance. Rather the phrase signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other activities, provided they bear some reasonable relationship to and compatibility with financial or technical assistance. If the drafters intended to strictly confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance only, they would have employed restrictive or stringent language.

Excerpts from then deliberations of the Constitutional Commission likewise show that its members discussed technical or financial assistance agreements in the same breath as service contracts and used the terms interchangeably. The members of the Concom actually had in mind the Marcos-era service contracts that they were more familiar with (but which they duly modified and restricted so as to prevent present abuses), when they were crafting and polishing the provisions dealing with financial and/ortechnical assistance agreements.

The Concom discussions in their entirely had to do with service contracts that might be given to foreign-owned corporations as exceptions to the general principle of Filipino control of the economy

Aniceto Sumulong vs. Fortunato Sumulong G.R. No. S.P. No. 68699 June 16, 2006Facts:FortunatoSumulong applied for an application for a landregistrationfor a parcel of land before the RTC which was later assigned to the MTC pursuant todelegatedjurisdiction. He wants the land to be confirmed andregisteredin his name. In opposition, Aniceto filed a motion to reopen the case, lift the order of general default and to admit opposition contending he is a part owner and actual occupant of the land whose name was omitted by Fortunato in his application forregistration. This amounts to failure of Fortunato to comply with the requirement setforthin Section 15 and 23 of PD 1529 which makes the landregistrationproceeding null and void with the deliberate omission of his name as one of the occupants and part owner of said land as constituting fraud. He further contends thatthe applicationfailed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement because the market value of the property is more than P100,000 and should be heard before the RTC. The MTC ruled in favor of Fortunato holding that when the said landregistrationwas published it was a notice sent to the whole world and the MTC has acquired jurisdiction over it and Anicetos claim of no knowledge about theregistrationcannot be given any due course. Upon appeal, the CA denied Anicetos motion for reconsideration contending that theassessed valueof the property as provided in the tax declaration should be followed which is valued at P50,860.00 and upheld the lower courts decision.Issue:Whether or not the MTC has the proper jurisdiction to hear the case.Whether or not provisions from PD 1529 has been violated to render the landregistrationnull and void.

Held:The court held thatSection 34 of B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. 7691 provides thatdelegatedjurisdiction over cadastral land valued at less than 100,000 as ascertained from theaffidavitof theclaimantor tax declaration of property shall be before the MTC. It is not the assessed market value that should be followed. Hence the MTC has the proper jurisdiction over the land in dispute.

On one hand, failure of Fortunato to declare Aniceto as one of the part owners of the land is in violation of the provisions of PD 1529. The court noted that both Fortunato and Aniceto are neighbors as certified by their Brgy. Cpt., Aniceto holds a Declaration of Real Property in the year 1977 with proof of receipt that he is paying real property tax. The court has reason to believe that Fortunato deliberately omitted Aniceto as part owner when heregisteredthe land. Such constitutes fraud rendering the landregistrationin his name as null and void.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-47331 June 21, 1983SPOUSES PABLO DE LOS REYES and ALEJANDRA DE LOS REYES,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and CARMEN R. CANTOS,respondents.Leon Gonzaga, Jr. for petitioners.Mario D. Ortiz for private respondent Cantos.FERNANDO,C.J.:The right sought to be vindicated in this certiorari proceeding by petitioners, plaintiffs in the lower court, arose from the undisputed fact that they arebona fideholders and possessors since 1949 of a parcel of land consisting of 6,163 square meters whereon they built that same year their residence. They still have a pending miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands for such property. They thereafter discovered that their house occupied five meters of the adjoining lot, at the time of the construction in 1949 still public land but subsequently applied for in a miscellaneous sales application by private respondents, defendants in the courta quo, who were granted a patent only in 1972. Thus arose the conflict over the five meters in question.The action was for reconveyance with damages. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action should have been filed by the Bureau of Lands on behalf of the Republic. With their sales application still pending, the lot in question is still public. That is to conform to a ruling of this Court that an action for reversion in such cases "shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines."1This doctrine was affirmed expressly in Magay v. Estiandan,2where this Court reiterated that where "the land in question is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is not the proper party to institute the reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines."3From the standpoint then of strict law, what was done by the lower court cannot be characterized as a violation of controlling legal principles. Still there are equitable considerations that call for this Court resolving the question raised.It is undoubted that there is a dispute appropriate for judicial determination. The contending parties are before the court. For petitioners, it is vital that their claim to the disputed five meters be passed upon. Their good faith is quite clear. As of the time their house was built, they werebona fidepossessors, thereafter applicants for the sale of such parcel of land including the five meters. Unfortunately, the patent granted to private respondents twenty-three years after the construction of their residence included the same five meters. 'Mere is justification then for equity to set matters right.Petitioners are thus entitled to the remedy sought, namely, ownership of the five meters in question, upon payment of just compensation to respondents to be determined as of the time the patent was granted in 1972.1. This conclusion finds support in Armamento v. Guerrero.4In that case, property covered by an original certificate of title pursuant to a free patent was granted by the Director of Lands on July 20, 1961 in favor of defendant Guerrero. In that case as well as here, there was a claim by plaintiffs that it was acquired through fraud and misrepresentation, their allegation being that they were in actual possession thereof as actual occupants as far back as 1955. Thereafter, a homestead application was made in 1959, resulting in a grant to them in 1964. It turned out that in the meanwhile, as it did likewise happen here, a free patent was if sued to defendant. Under such circumstances, this Court, stated: "The particular circumstances obtaining herein impel us to exercise our equity jurisdiction to the end that substantial justice may be dispended to the party litigants. To affirm the trial Court's Order of dismissal would leave the present controversy unresolved and pending investigation at the administrative level. Aside from the length of nine it would probably take for the case to reach the highest administrative authority, any final adjudication rendered by the latter may eventually be raised to the appellate Courts for judicial review. This circuitous and tedious process can be eliminated for the sake of speedy administration of justice by remanding the case to the trial Court for determination on the merits of the issue of validity of the issuance of Free Patent No. V-19129 and of the title which followed as a matter of course."52. Nor is it necessary that this case be remanded to the trial court on the question of the validity of the patent obtained by respondents. As of the time the house of petitioners was built in 1949, they were in actual possession of the lot for which thereafter a miscellaneous sales application was submitted to the Bureau of Lands. Unfortunately, the patent granted to petitioners in 1972 included five meters thereof. It would be unduly-time consuming, if there being no claim to the rest of the property included in such patent to the respondents, the question of the alleged fraud would still have to be inquired into. Under the circumstances that can be avoided by an outright determination that upon payment of the five meters in question, petitioners are entitled to be recognized as the owners thereof.3. As far as the Bureau of lands is concerned, there seems to be no thought of reclaiming the property from respondents. There is, therefore, an express grant which justifies such acquisition. In Lee Hong Kok v. David,6reference was made to the Regalian doctrine to the effect that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government.7The government, therefore, as the agent of the state is, in the language of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,8"possessed of the plenary power as thepersonain law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership?"94. The relevant facts thus justify the ruling that this litigation, presenting as it does an issue between the contending parties as to the disputed five meters, can. be resolved by this Court exercising its equity jurisdiction to award the same to petitioners upon payment of the due compensation determined as of the date when respondents acquired their patent.Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioners are entitled to ownership of such disputed portion upon payment by them of the just compensation to respondents for such five meters on the amount to be based on the value thereof as of the time the patent was granted on March 14, 1972.WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of September 20,1977 is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for the purpose of determining the compensation due private respondent Carmen R. Cantos for the five meters of the lot in question, upon payment of which plaintiffs would become the owners of such five meters. No costs.

[Digest] Manotok vs. Barque (2010)MANOTOK vs. BARQUE[1](G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605; August 24, 2010; VILLARAMA, JR., J.)

FACTS:Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)oThe subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square metersGRANTEDTCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.oMANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.1997 Barques petition was DENIED.Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks. --> Barques MR was deniedThey appealed to the LRALRA Reversed.oLRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1stbe sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property.2002 and 20032 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT No. 210177.oHence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.December 12, 2005, SC First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA.Manotoks filed MRDenied in April 2006 Resolution.oThereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached.Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.oOral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1stdivision decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CAs Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.oThe CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.

BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:ManotoksTheir grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.BarquesTeresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.ManahansThe lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.

ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National Government.

RATIO:From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records Management Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920 and 1923.Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.

Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the Secretarys approval.The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.oNO! These arguments fail.Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao Casesthe absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.oSC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY requirement.Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.

DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.oThe CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the National Archives.Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2]of the Friar Lands Act.Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias,the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4]and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.

CONCLUSIONSManotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural ResourcesThe decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.oAs we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.

RE: MANAHANSNo copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly observed that theclaim had become stale after the lapse of 86 years from the dateof its alleged issuance. Citing Liao v. CA the certificates of sale x x x became stale after 10 years from its issuance and hence cannot be the source documents for issuance of title more than 70 years later.

Dispositive:Manotok Appeal deniedManahan Petition for intervention deniedPetition for reconstitution of the Barque title deniedAll the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice to Reversion proceedings