PowerPoint Presentation
Did the CPA make the Souths secession inevitable?By Philippe
Bone
Outline Introduction The CPA: debate, theory and
contentImplementationCauses of failures A theoretical alternative
Conclusion Question timeBibliography
Music Break
Introduction: Recap & topic overview What we know about the
CPA? -It was an agreement designed to end the Second Sudanese Civil
War (1983-2005)caused 2 million deaths, 4 million uprooted (UNMIS)
The principal belligerents were mainly the SPLA and the Government
of Sudan. (South vs. North) -Khartoum began negotiations since
2002. Why negotiate? (Natsios) deteriorating military
situationinternational pressuremounting costs of the war belief
that Southern leadership could keep Sudan unitedWhat happened in
2011?-99% of South Sudanese voted to split from Sudan.Consequently,
was this always going to happen regardless of the CPA?
Guerrilla forces of theSudan People's Liberation Army celebrate
over a disabled tank. Fount at:
http://www.prio.no/images/pre/REPhotos/15.%20Sudan%20-%20SPLA%20soldater%20jubler%20over%20tilkjempet%20stridsvogn.jpgSouth
Sudan Voting ballot, Reuters. Southern Sudan Frontlines June
2001Found at:
http:///File:Southern_Sudan_Frontlines_June_2001.svg
CPA: Differing views? CPA as a Lost Opportunity Deng (2007)
It has been shown that the CPA has detailed guarantees that
would ensure its smooth and effective implementation.
CPA as flawedAalen (2013)
Power sharing did not make unity attractive, as initially
anticipated, but was in fact one of the factors contributing to the
separation of Sudan in 2011
CPA as the failure of external actors
Sullivan (2006)
The SPLM did not bring the CPA about on its own, it is not
likely that the SPLM will progress enough on its own to hold the
NCP to its CPA commitments.CPA as too difficult Natsios (2012)
(the CPA) would have been a challenge for a well-run and
well-organized government to implement the governments in Khartoum
and Juba were neither.
The purpose of the CPA? Theory? Christopher Clapham Common
throughout the 1990sChange of outside objectivesHad three key
features: Belligerents had to respect ceasefire Terms of the peace
agreement is made with external mediation around three aspects:
3.External parties would guard the process
Why they fail to create sustainable peace (Williams) I call
Tel-IT
Timing
External Actors
Legitimise violence
Inclusive
TransformativeThe three apps of peace New constitutional
structureGovernment of National Unity Elections Arend Lijpharts
consociationalism
Group autonomyProportionality Minority veto power
The CPA Creating Sustainable Peace? The Six Agreements
1. The Protocol of Machakos: Signed on 20th July 2002 2. The
Protocol on security arrangements: Signed on 25th Sept 20033. The
Protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed on 7th January 20044. The
Protocol on Power-sharing: Signed on 26th May 20045. The Protocol
on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains
and the Blue Nile States: Signed on 26th May 20046. The Protocol on
the resolution of conflict in Abyie: Signed on 26th may 2004
Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Main provisions
The creation of an autonomous GOSS in Juba and an interim GNU in
Khartoum. National elections by 2009 & In January 2011
secession referendum. English to be the official southern language.
Sharia only for Muslims Distribution of oil revenue Ceasefire and
withdrawal of opposing armies and creation of Joint Units Special
provisions for disputed regionsMake unity attractive
Who was the SPA signed by?
John Garang de Mabior (1945 2005)Leader of SPLM/AVice President
of Sudan June-July 2005President of Southern Sudan Autonomous
RegionJune-July 2005Ali Osman Taha (1944-present)First Vice
President of Sudan (1998-2005)Second Vice President (2005-2011)
Over simplification of the Conflict?Seen in bipolar vision North vs
South, Christian vs Muslim, Arab vs African Many other issues not
addressed.Other armed groups/oppositions not involved. TEL-IT not
at all inclusive?
CPA, the aftermath
Implementation SuccessesEnded the fighting Government of
National Unity created Autonomous region created South able to
share more of the wealth*Allowed the peaceful referendum
Music Break: Queen Zee, Refrendum
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ki7zb8HbQPc
Implementation failuresDelays Joint Unit Failures
CensusOilSpending on the armyUndermining of 2010 electionNCP kept
most of power and the money bordersLack of effort to make unity
attractive GNU never gelled On going war
What failed the CPA? Lack of will International distraction in
Darfur Failures of implementation Distrust Flaw of power sharing
Violence elsewhereAn unstoppable campaign for independence
Timing
External Actors
Legitimise violence
Inclusive
TransformativeDistrust
CPA: A Workable Theoretical alternative Lederarch, would are
argue yes,
ReconciliationStructure ProcessIntegrationResources and
co-ordination Well we have seen that CPA failedConsequently, in
order for it to work, a better approach could be:
ConclusionThe CPA made the South's separation inevitableWe can
see that it was going to fail by using TEL-IT The CPA would
naturally have failed to deliver on its promises of relieving
Southern grievances making independence inevitable.A Ledearchian
approach would have perhaps been more effective
Question Time Would Lederarch approach really ensured Sudanese
unity? Would the survival of John Garang secured a United Sudan?
What could be the continental impact of the precedent set by South
Sudan? Discus in terms of long and short term consequences . What
does the music video show us about the southern feelings ?
Bibliography Aalen, L. (2013) Making Unity Unattractive: The
conflicting Aims of Sudans Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Civil
Wars, 15:2, pp. 173-191. Amed, E. (2009) The Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership
in Sudan, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 44, No. 3, Power-Sharing in Africa
(2009), pp. 133-147.Are they heading for a crash?, The Economist,
23rd September 2010, available at:
http://www.economist.com/node/17103885Cockett, R. (2010) Sudan
Darfur and the failure of an African state, Yale University Press:
New Haven. Deng, L. B. (2007) The Sudan comprehensive peace
agreement: Will it be sustained?, Civil Wars, 7:3, pp.244-257.
Dimah, M. I. (2013) Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement Amidst
the Clash of Agendas: Attempts, Failures and Lessons Unlearned,
Civil Wars, Found online:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.817851Gawerc, M. (2006)
Peace-building: Theoretical and concrete perspectives, Peace and
Chance, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.435-478.Natsios, A. E. (2012) Sudan,
South Sudan & Darfur: What everyone needs to know, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. The background to Sudans Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, UNMIS, found online at:
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515Pillay, V. (2006)
building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies, In
Conflict Trends, issue 1, found at:
http://www.accord.org.za/publications/book-reviews/586-building-peace-sustainable-reconciliation-in-divided-societies.pdfSullivan,
P. (2006) Sudans CPA at one year of age, Working Paper, Berlin:
German Institute of International security. Thomas, E. (2009)
Against the gathering storm: Securing Sudans Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, Chatham House: London. Available at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0109sudan_r.pdfWilliams,
P. (2011) War and Conflict in Africa, Polity: Cambridge Woodward,
P. (2011) Towards Two Sudans, Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy, found online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.571005
