DI R ECTION S I N DEVE LO P M E NT

-I IS M" i99R -,7.j ~ ~ 7

The Transition-from War to Peacein Sub-Saharan

MARR K ST_ ER r4 NGO WIEDERNOO7K

N't.

~~~~~~~~~~~~- e s * r S.'.=,YCs: ;jE-, i--

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

The Transition from War to Peacein Sub-Saharan Africa

Nat J. CollettaMarkus KostnerIngo Wiederhofer

The Worldl BankWalshingtoni, D.C.

© 1996 The International Bank for Reconstructionand Development / THE WORLD BANK1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433

All rights reservedManufactured in the United States of AmericaFirst printing May 1996

The findings, interpretiations, and conclusions expressed in this study areentirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to theWorld Bank, to its aftiliated organizations. or to the members of its Board ofExecutive Directors or the countries they represent.

In the cover panel are details from color woodcuts by Fred Mutebi, a Ugandanartist who has exhibited in Africa and Europe. We are grateful to Mr. Mutebifor granting perinission to use these works.

Nat J. Colletta is head of the Post-Conflict Rapid Response Team in the WorldBank's Africa Region. Markus Kostner is a human resource economist, andIngo Wiederhofer is a demobilization and reintegration specialist: both areconsultInts to the World Bank's Africa Technical Department.

Librarv of Con gres.s Cataloging-in-Publication Dacii

Colletta, Nat J.The transition from war to peace in Sub-Saharan Africa / Nat J. Colletta,

Markus Kostner. Ingo Wiederhofer.p. cm.- (Directions in development)

Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 0-8213-3581-21. Africa, Sub-Saharan-Economic policy. 2. Economic conversion-

Africa, Sub-Saharan. 3. Economic assistance-Africa, Sub-Saharan.4. Manpower policy-Africa, Sub-Saharan. 1. Kostner, Markus.II. Wiederhofer, Ingo, 1970- . IlI. Title. IV. Series:Directions in development (Washington. D.C.)HC80(.C6295 1996 96-10245338.967-dc2O CIP

Contents

Foreword ,

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xiii

Summary and Lessons I

1 Designing a DRPi: Best Practices 6Political Will: A Fundlamenital Preconditioni 6Targeting: The Central Element SDemobilization: The Essential First Step 12Reinsertion: The Transitionial Safety Net 15Reintegration: The Ultimate Objective 18

2 The Social and Institutional Context 23Social Dimensions: Rebuilding Social Capital 23Institutional Concerns: The Key 2 5ManageMLen1t Aspects: Critical ingredients 27External Assistance: Help and Hindrance 29

3 Early Warning Signals and Preventive Actions 32

4 The Economic Impact: Assessing the Peace Dividend 39The Costs of War 39Financial Returns 41The Impact on Inflationi 42Economic Returins 43

5 Country Experiences 44Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda 44Other Countries 65

6 Con1CIlSuOi 7Prevention: Arms and Developmenit 72Reconciliation: Fronm War-Torn to Civil Society 73Development Assistance at a Crossroads 75

Selected Bibliography 77

iii

Foreword

Ihe transition from war to peace and from economic crisis to revital-ization is a fragile process characterized by intense political, economic,and ethnic rivalries. Nowhere is this transition more compelling, andnowhere are the rivalries more deeply rooted, than in Sub-SaharanAfrica.

Although reported military expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa, ex-cluding South Africa, have declined significantly (from $3.5 billion in1987 to $1.9 billion in 1993), poverty, inequality, and ethlinic discrimina-tion continue to foster conflict and undermine the authority of severalAfrican states. The resulting fragmentation has led to an alarmingprivatization of violence: armed bands, often aligned with political, eth-nic, and othier special interests, rush1 to fill the vacuum left by a dimin-ished state security and administrative apparattis. Indeed, fragmenta-tion and violence threaten the very existence of some African states,such as Somalia and Liberia.

This weakening of the overall securitv umbrella that had readily re-ceived external financing dtiring the cold1 war has produced a flood ofdisplaced people and refugees. In Centrail and Eastern Africa alone,about 22 million people are displaced (within the country or externally).Natural disasters and faminie used to be the root of human sufferingand displacemenit in Africa; nowv, internal conflict is the leadin-g causeof emergencies in many countries.

The conveigence of a decade of econonmic deterioration with the endof the cold war hias created a climate in which a growing number ofAfrican governments, whether emerging from internal conflict or atpeace, are exploring ways to address persistent poverty by reallocatingscarce resources from military budgets. In this changing context, de-mobilization and reintegration programs (DnRPs) for military personnel

constitute the central element of the transition from war to peace. DRPsnot only provide assistance to an especially vulnerable and potentiallyvolatile group among the poor; they also help rebuild a secure founda-tioIi on which an economy can grow sustainably

Several countries have asked the donor commuLnity, including theWorld Bank, to provide technical assistance and financing for demobi-lization and reintegration efforts. In response, the World Bank's AfricaRegional Office has adopted a two-pronged strategy: first, it established,

v

vi THF TRANSII ION FRONi WAR TO PFACE IN SULB-SAHARAN AFRICA

in 1992, a working group to examine the African experience with DRPSand to assess the potential role of the Bank, and second, it began tooffer techlnical and financial assistance to those governments that soughthelp in the design and implementation of DRPs.

The efforts of the working group culnminated in the Africa RegionalDiscussion Paper "Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Per-sonnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies" (WorldBank 1993). The study, which was based on secondary data, focused ondesigni issues of the demobilizationi phase and identified the key fac-tors that influence the outcome of a DRi'. The report founid a wide auLdi-ence among client governments, donors, United Nations agencies, noni-governmental organizations, and academics.

Conculrently, the Bank provided technical and financial assistanceto the governments of Mozambique, Rwanida, and Uganda. In Ugandathe Bank played a central role in the developnment and implementationof a program that, over the past three years, has reduced defense ex-penditLres from 35 to 25 percent of the currenit nationial budget and hascut the size of the army almost in half, from 80,000 to 43,000 soldiers.The Bank also assisted in the design of a D)R' for Rwanida, but the tragicturni of internal political events and the ensuing change of governmentpreempted the progr-am. Recently, the government of Rwanda has againrequested1 the Bank's leadership in DRI' designi. This time, social recon-ciliation will be part of the overall program. Current assistance toMozambique focuses primarily on reintegration, with an emphasis ongenerating employment and training through support for microprojectsand through capacity building. This program has been recently ex-panded to target displaced persons and returnin-g refugees, as well asex-comba tants.

Other DRI's have been substantially completed (Chad and Zimba-bwe) or are well on their way to completion (Eritrea and Ethiopia).Many more African countries-for example, Angola, Djibouti, Liberia,Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Togo-have emerged as potential can-didates for DRP assistance, as have Bosnia, Cambodia, and Sri Lankaoutside Africa. Finally, DRIs for Somalia and the Sudan will most likelymaterialize in the more distant fitLure.

The growing experience with DRI's has helped the Bank to crystallizea numnber of key policy and programmatic issues. These include target-ing criteria and mechanisms, program options, costs and effectiveness,institutional arrangements for implementation, restoration of social capi-tal, econom1-ic impact (the "peace dividend"), and donor coordination.

In order to fill gaps in knowledge and to assist client governnments,intemational partners (multilateral and bilateral agencies and nongov-ernmental organizations), and Bank staff in improving the design and

FOREWORE) X ii

implementation of DRPS, the Africa Regional Office prepared a "best prac-tices" stidyv focusing on the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combat-ants. The studv, to be issued as a World Bank Discussion Paper (Collettaand others forthcominig), draws on the lessons learned from in-depthicountry stidies of Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. The experiences ofthese countries offer an extensive range of social, political, andi economiccontexts and programni models and containl a w ide variety of importantlessons.

This book, wvhich is based oni the "best practices" paper and sup-porting counitry stuLies, p rovides a windcov on the complex political,economic, and sociocultUral transitionIs thlat face m11any1 countries. These

insights will be shared withi our clients anid our partners as we worktogether toward enduring peace and pro sperity onl the AfricaLn coniti-nent.

E. V. K. JavcoxVi e Pres..i ei

Atfit ic Rgi,ionIal OfficeTlh, Wb,,ild B.,,k

Miarcil 1996

Preface

Africa was among the first battlefronts and final casualties of the coldwar. Many devastating conflicts have persisted for twenty years or more.Some countries (such as Ethiopia, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, and,more recently, Angola and Mozambique) are emerging from years ofcold war politics and internal civil strife, but pernicious internal strugglescontinue to plague others (Liberia, Somalia, and the Sudan, for example).

The damage inflicted on the social capital and economic potential ofthese countries has been horrific. Of the estimated 80 million to 110million land mines spread across 64 countries arounid the world, about20 million are strewn across nearly hlalf the couLntries of Africa. Theimpact of warfare on disinvestment, the destruction of physical infra-structure, and the deterioration of human capital through disability,death, and displacemilent is impossible to quaintify However, armedcontlict is surely one reason why at least 250 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa-nearly half the population-are living below the pov-ertv line in the mid-1'9 90s.

While war-ravaged countries are among the poorest in the world,their neighbors, in wvhich hundreds of thousands of people seek refugefrom the devastation of war, are often in no better position. Over thepast decade the African continent hosted about half of the world's dis-placed people, and by 1994, 21.4 million Africans had fled their homesbecause of coniflict. Of these, 6.2 million were living abroad, represenit-ing 38 percent of the world's refugees.

Despite these dire circumstances, the governments of the continenthave devoted a substantial percentage of gross domestic product ((;DI')to military expenditures (3.1 percent in 1992). Expenditures for defensehave crowded out those for human development; in many countries inSub-Saharan Africa they surpass expenditures for health and educa-tion combinied.

The ideological camps that once fueled militarv buildups recededwithi the end of the cold war, making it possible for many African gov-ernments to downsize their militaries and reduce defense expendituresso that hluman and material resources may be shifted to developmenitactivities. Demobilization and reintegration programs for military per-sonnel constitute a vital part of demilitarization in general, and of tran-sitions from war to peace in particular.

i \

X THE TI RANSITION FROM WAR IO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Indeed, increased demilitarization is a precondition for reviving civilsociety, reducing poverty, and sustainiiig developmenit in Africa. Therealization of this objective demands disarmament, demininig, and de-mobilization of forces, as well as the reintegration of ex-combatantsinto productive civilian roles. Demilitarization also requires the reduc-tion of the destrictive flow of arms into the continent.

World suppliers of arms continue to sell large quantities of militaryhardware to Sub-Salharan Africa, and this could be an obstacle to a rapidtransition to peace. In the past, principals in the cold war armed localfactions or entire countries; internal factions now relv on the controland sale of precious natural resources (ranging from forest woods todiamonds and oil) to sustailn their arms purclhases. The path to peaceon the continient is thus litteredl with minaes, both underground and inthe formn of violent sociopolitical rivalry.

The millions of displaced people scattered withinl and around theborders of warring countries are a grim reminder of the human conse-quences of sucIh conflicts. The relationshlip between poverty and con-flict is clear. What an Africa uliblemishied by internal conflicts woouldhiave looked like is hard to imagine

Rationale and Objectives

As with civil service reform, reductions in military forces can yield greatdividends for budgetary reallocationis. These dividends constitute animportant economic rationale for embarking on a demobilizationi pro-gram, particularly in peacetime. Furthermore, by reducing arms pro-curement and building security, D)RiS have an overarching impact onfiscal policv, investment behavior, formulation of policy in the socialsectors, and related poverty reduction efforts.

In war-torn societies, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are integral parts of the political-military solution to con-flict, and I)RP1S lie at the heart of transitioin from war to peace. It is thekey instrument for moving beyond humanitarian assistance to pov-erty reduction and sustainable reconstructioln. I)Ris, however, are highlycomplex operations that often affect more people from a lower humancapital and asset base (the poorer segmiienats of society) than does civilservice reform.

The principtal objective of this book is to inform Bank maniagemiienitand staff, client governmenits, interinationial organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGos) about best practices for improv-ing the design and implementation of programs for demobilization,reinsertion, and reintegration in client countries. Identifying higlh-impact, cost-effective progranm options and design features on the basis

PR EFAC F Xi

of experience is important for the success of DnIZ' operations both inpeacetime and in transitions from war to peace.

This book also provides early wvarning signals of w hat can go wrong inthe DVP process and suggests preventive actionis. litentionially, however, itdoes not offer a blueprinit for universal application because such a gener-alized prescription cannot substitIte for a thorougil uliderstanding of thepolitical, social, and economic conditions anid needs in a given country.Only suIcIh comprehensive knowledge can lead to an in-depth, couLitry-specific desigin process with good prospects ftr suIccess.

Because nirs address broad issuLes of populations in transition, thevmIav also hold valuable lessons for projects that support the economicand social reintegrationi of other vulnerable groups, such as repatriatedrefugees, internallv displaced populations, retrenched civil servants,and former employees of privatized parastatals. Such projects mightfocus on generic reinisertion and reintegration activities that includethe provision of safety nets, information, counselinig, and referral ser-vices, resettlement schemes, credit and Lbusiness advice, and retrainingand employment programiis.

Methodology

The research followed multiple approaches: collection of secondary datathat have become available since completion of the first DRP study; in-corporation of priniary data involving new information at the adminis-trative and field levels; and the authors' direct field visits and experi-ence in D)RP desigin work. Two assessments of the impact of DRPs-onequantitative, the other qualitative-were commissioned in Ethiopia andNamibia and undertaken by local researchers. In Ethiopia sixteen com-munities were assessed, and in Namibia interviews were held in twelvecommunllities. In addition, the program moniitoring and evaluation sys-tem provided an in-depth assessmenit of thirteen communities inUganda.

All impact assessments were based on purposive sampling and tri-angulationi of responses from the three groups most affected by the pro-gram: ex-combatants, familv members, and communitv members. Thefield visits also captured the reflections of program staff.

Even at this stage, some gaps in knowledge exist. As a result of theemergency nature of the programs, especially those in Ethiopia andNamibia, these gaps can never be completelv filled. The dual approachof the research strategy nevertheless suIpplies information that is suffi-ciently robuIst for drawinig lessons and making cross-couLitry compari-sons. We hope that the book will help improve the design and implemen-tation of futUre il*s in Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions.

Acknowledgments

This book has benefited from considerable input from colleagues bothwithin and outside the Bank. It is based in part otl in-depth field analy-sis of demobilization and reintegration in Ethiopia, Namibia, andUganda. Those three country studies, prepared with the assistance ofEmilio Mondo, Taimi Sitari, and Tadesse A. Woldu, are being publishedas a World Bank Discussion Paper, Caste Stfuilics it1 War-to-Pact Tranzsi-tion: 7'/u' Dcmob7ihi:ation and Rcintegrationi of Ex-Conbatants in Ethiopia,Naini7ia, and Ug9andta.

The book would not have been possible without the extraordinaryopenness and collaboration of the Ethiopian Commission for the Reha-bilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans;the Namibian Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation; theNamibian Development Brigade Corporation; and the Uganda Veter-ans Assistance Board. We would also like to thank the Swiss govern-menit, wlhich provided a grant to finance the overall project, and theU.S. Agency for International Development, which cofinanced the Ethio-pian field study.

Special thanks for comments and suggestions are owed to the mem-bers of the Africa Regional Working Group on Demobilization: NicolasGorjestani, Philippe Benoit, Laura Frigenti, Sarah Keener, ElisabethMorris-Hughes, Luiz Pereira da Silva, Sanjay Pradlhan, and BensionVaron.

Also appreciated are comments and support from Kevin Cleaver,Katherine Marshall, Jean-Louis Sarbib, Ishrat Ilusain, Peter Miovic, Jackvan Holst Pellekan, Fayez Omar, Steven Adei, Esther Hoveka, BruceSchimmin-g, Brian Falconer, Hasan Imam, Ritva Reinikka, HyoungsooZang, Charles Mordi, Mimi Klutstein-Mever, Ashton Douglass, KerstinWilde, Dawit Eshetu, ChukwuLma Obidegwu, Loganathan Kanagasabai,Iradj Alikhani, and Elizabeth Acul.

The final version of the book was edited by Donnia Daniels Verdier.Abigail Tardiff was the proofreader.

xiii

Summary and Lessons

In his speech at the 1995 annual meetings of the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund, James Wolfensohn, president of the WorldBank, declared that a priority of the Bank is to anticipate and be orga-nized for postconflict economic developmenit programs. A demobiliza-tion and reintegration program (DRP) for ex-combatants is the key to aneffective transition from war to peace. The success of this first step fol-lowing the signing of a peace accord signals the end to organized conflictand provides the security necessary for people affected by war to rein-vest in their lives and their country.

Reinsertioin and reintegration are not distinct phases after demobili-zation. Rather, they form part of a seamless web of transition from mili-tarv to civilian life, without a clear beginning or end. As reinsertionand reintegration proceed, the needs of ex-combatants change and callfor different support measures.

A successful DRP requires several actions: (a) classifying ex-combat-amts according to their characteristics, needs and desired way of eaminga livelihood (mode of subsistence); (b) offering a basic transitional assis-tance package (safety net); (c) finding a way to deliver assistance simply,minimizing transaction costs while maximizing benefits to ex-combat-ants; (d) providing counseling, information, training, employment, andsocial support while sensitizing communities and building on existingsocial capital; (e) coordinating centrally yet decentralizing implementa-tion authority to districts; and (f) connecting to ongoing developmentefforts by retargeting and restructuring existing portfolios.

This book examines ways to determine the impact of a DIZI' on ex-combatants. The key lessons draw n from this examination warrant closeconsideration by Bank staff, client governments, donors, and nongov-ernmental organizations (NGOS) involved in the design and implemen-tation of Dl0ls. These lessons are summarized below and are discussedin greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Political Dimensions

When a country is moving from war to peace, demobilization and rein-tegration issues should be addressed at the earliest stages of the peacenegotiation process. Strong political will and leadership, expressed in

2 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

terms of commitment, realism, and pragmatism, are crucial factors forsuccessful program implementation.

National reconciliation should be actively promoted through trans-parent policies and conflict resolution efforts at the community level.These can reduce suspicion and help rebuild trust.

The question of land ownership and distribution needs to be treatedcarefully and openly. Both traditional and legal rights to the land, aswell as historically rooted inequalities, have to be taken into account.

Targeting

Ex-combatants constitute a specially vulnerable group in need of prior-ity targeted assistance. Socioeconomic data should be collected to re-veal their characteristics, needs, and aspirations so that appropriateprogram interventions can be designed.

Careful analysis of the opportunity structure for ex-combatants (in par-ticular, the demand for labor and the availability of land, credit, informa-tion, and provision for skill development) is a prerequisite not only forprogram design but also for targeted counseling and adequate placement.

An authentic, nontransferable, and noncorruptible identification sys-tem is of paramount importance for avoiding targeting errors.

The particular challenges confronting veterans' dependents (the fam-ily), as well as female soldiers, child soldiers, and disabled ex-combat-ants, warrant the development of specially targeted interventions.

Demobilization

Ex-combatants should be released or discharged from military quar-ters as soon as possible so that they do not become a serious threat tosecurity. Prior to discharge, they should receive information about ci-vilian life-rights and duties, opportunities and constraints. If feasible,postdischarge orientation, with a focus on social support and economicopportunities, should be provided in the communities where ex-com-batants settle.

Especially in transitions from war to peace, neutral internationalmonitors and technical assistance can facilitate the design and imple-mentation of demobilization programs.

Reinsertion

Entitlement packages, which provide a safety net during the transitionfrom war to peace, should reflect the needs of ex-combatants and their

SUMMARY AND LESSONS 3

families in different socioeconomic environments. Such packages helpex-combatants and their families bridge the difficult period betweendemobilization and reintegration.

Monetizing the entitlement packages has several advantages overin-kind provision: transaction costs can be reduced, leakage can be bet-ter controlled, and beneficiaries can make flexible use of the entitle-ment.

Using local banks for transferring cash in installments allows ex-com-batants to access financial assistance throughout the reinsertion phase.Staggered payments made to beneficiaries through local banks also helpspread benefits and ex-combatants throughout the country. The capacityof the banking system or alternate payment systems, especially in ruralareas, must therefore be evaluated before transfers begin.

Reintegration

Ex-combatants should be assigned to target groups and subgroups onthe basis of their mode of subsistence and thus on their differing needsand aspirations. This allows for the development of a differentiated,relevant, and cost-effective approach.

Ex-combatants should receive no more support than is necessary tohelp them attain the standard of living of the communities into whichthey are reintegrated.

Reintegration in urban areas is more complex than in rural areas andrequires a more diversified approach. All support measures should bebased on a careful matching of opportunities and actual needs. Sup-port measures should, to the extent possible, be demand-driven.

Social Dimensions

It is the interplay of a community's physical and social capital and theex-combatant's financial and human capital that ultimately determinesthe ease and success of reintegration.

Efforts to strengthen social capital-for example, by using existingcommunity organizations and channels of communication-enable com-munities to take development into their own hands and facilitate rein-tegration of ex-combatants.

Informal networks of ex-combatants-discussion groups, veterans'associations, and joint economic ventures-are key elements for suc-cessful economic and social reintegration. Such associations can be ex-tremely helpful when social capital has been depleted.

A community support program that provides visible benefits to thecommunity is a critical adjunct to assistance for ex-combatants.

4 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Community sensitization and political awareness are paramount in thiseffort.

Care should be taken that ex-combatants are not stigmatized asunfit for inilitarv service or as conveyors of disease, violence, andmisbehavior.

Institutional Concerns

To put scarce resources to optimal use, program components should beranked by simplicity of implementation, with the simplest componentsfirst on the list.

Central coordination of DRI's by one civilian agency with overallresponsibility, balanced by decentralization of implementation authorityto districts and communities through existing organizational structures,makes for a powerful institutional arrangement.

Administrative costs need to be held down. The higher the transac-tion (administrative) costs, the smaller the resources available to ex-combatants.

The effectiveness of program interventions in relation to ongoingdevelopment initiatives is maximized by careful coordination withingovernmenit and among other project promoters.

Once the major program objectives have been fulfilled, remainingactivities should be integrated into the government's mainstream de-velopment efforts.

Elected representatives of ex-combatants, as well as field-based staff,can perform crucial roles in facilitating reintegration.

Local communities should be involved directly indecisionmaking, especially on important local matters, so that scarcepublic resources are allocated in a transparent and socially account-able manner.

Management Aspects

Staff training to improve skills and knowledge should begin before de-mobilization and should emphasize practical problem solving.

The most important contribution of a monitoring and evaluationsystem is to consistently improve ongoing operations-by keepingabreast of major trends in the program and by regularly reporting toand advising management.

Use of an external auditor improves management of funds. The ex-ternal auditor, in addition to ensuring control of program resourcesand transparency, gives confidence to the donors and to the beneficia-ries.

SUMMARY AND LESSONS 5

External Assistance

Timely availability of resources facilitates smooth operations. Donorbudget cycles and disbursement and auditing procedures have to beclosely meshed with implementation schedules for DRPs.

Capacity building and close coordination among the government,NCOS, community-based groups, and donors are central elements ofcooperation. Coordination of donor support by a lead donor has provedvery effective.

Economic Impact

The peace dividend needs to be understood in social and economicterms, as well as in financial terms. The reinvestment of some savingsfrom military downsizing into the development of a disciplined, high-quality defense force can itself produce a peace dividend by increasingsecurity, building confidence, and reducing public fear.

It is useful to link a country's overall macroeconomic reform pro-gram, especially as it concerns the public expenditure mix, to the plannedreintegration program.

Jump-starting the economy by rehabilitating critical infrastructurealso can be linked to reintegration programs that involve training andemployment schemes for both reconstructing material assets and build-ing human and social capital.

Continental demilitarization is a precondition for reviving civil soci-ety, reducing poverty, and sustaining development in Africa. The real-ization of this objective hinges on disarmament, the demobilization offorces, and the reduction of the flow of arms into the continent, on theone hand, and on the reintegration of ex-combatants into productivecivilian roles, on the other.

Revitalizing civil society entails the promotion of local associations,community participation, and peer accountability, all of which reduceindividual fear, enable collective condemnation of violence, andstrengthen local security. These are the minimal conditions for encour-aging people to reinvest in their communities both emotionally andfinancially.

1

Designing a DRP: Best PracticesDemobilization and reintegration programs are complex operations withoverlapping and interdependent phases, crosscutting issues, and manyparticipants. This chapter addresses the structure of a DRP. First, thepolitical di?nensions establish the fundamental preconditions on which aprogram needs to be built. With the help of targeting, the numbers andparticulars of ex-combatants-and therefore the magnitude of the prob-lem and program-can be identified. This in turn furnishes the basisfor the design of demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration, the threeinterdependent processes in the transition from military to civilian life.

Political Will: A Fundamental Precondition

Demobilization and reintegration programs take place in specific so-cial and political contexts at several levels: the state, the community,the family, and the demobilized ex-combatants themselves are all af-fected. It is of paramount importance that demobilization and reinte-gration be addressed appropriately and adequately during the peaceprocess. Involving development agencies early in this process is ad-vantageous for linking relief to development.

Where the conflict results in a standoff with no apparent victor,mediation by a third party or by the United Nations is required. Insuch circumstances a critical political dimension of the peace processis usually the global incorporation of the military forces of the war-ring parties into a single security force (police and army). Ironing outthe details of a combined security force can be tedious, but the peaceagreement must address the issue comprehensively lest it remain anagging obstacle to swift demobilization and reintegration.

Conflict-related demobilization efforts commonly involve morepoliticization, sensitivity, and uncertainty than do peacetime DRIPs, es-pecially when there is no clear victor. In this context, the success of aDRI' depends on the political commitment of the parties to the peaceprocess. However, by the same token, the success or failure of the DRI'can determine the fate of that process.

For example, although the Angolan DRI' of 1993 failed primarily be-cause one side refused to accept defeat in the national elections andresumed its armed struggle, poor monitoring and management of the

6

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 7

demobilization process by the international community may have con-tributed to insecurity. Strong political leadership on the part of all po-litical and warring factions-as reflected in commitment, realism, andpragmatism-is thus a crucial factor for successful design and imple-mentation of DRPs.

Beyond such national political issues, regional security developmentscan promote or undermine a DRP. For example, the deterioration in rela-tions between Sudan and Eritrea has delayed completion of the demobili-zation process in the latter. Similarly, increasing security concerns onUganda's northern border have forced the remobilization of some Ugan-dan ex-combatants into home guards and local defense units, and conflictsin Liberia and Sierra Leone are linked by armies that know no borders.

DRP planning can be initiated before a peace accord is signed. In fact,assistance is more likely to be timely if preparations for the DRP aremade during the ceasefire or when a lasting accord seems within reach.Such efforts are warranted even if they turn out to be in vain in theshort term (as in Rwanda in 1994). At the very least, they provide criti-cal design information and serve as an incentive for ending the strugglewhen an exit strategy does materialize.

The reinsertion and reintegration of demobilized combatants takeplace in social and cultural environments that determine their constraintsand opportunities. When social capital has been eroded and ethnic orregional tensions prevail, reinsertion and reintegration are far more com-plex and difficult to achieve. For example, Ugandan ex-combatants weregenerally well received by communities in the center and southwest ofthe country, where the National Resistance Movement had its supportbase, but those attempting to resettle in the east of the country initiallyfaced comnmunity hostility. In Namibia some Ovambo ex-combatantswho fought on the losing side faced resentment on their return to thenorthern part of the country.

The demobilization of soldiers, especially in peacetime, is clearly inthe interest of the army command if living conditions and wages forremaining military personnel are thereby improved. Demobilization andincreases in army efficiency (including modemization) are two sides ofthe same coin. Although assisting armies is not within the purview ofdevelopment agencies (bilateral or multilateral), the legitimate interestof the government in establishing a functioning security apparatus mustbe taken into account even if part of the budgetary savings from thedemobilization accrues in the short term to a leaner, more disciplinedmilitary. Ultimately, the effectiveness of a DRP will depend on mutualtrust between government and donors and, consequently, on the de-gree of good governance.

Ex-combatants, who can potentially destabilize a country but whoalso share many characteristics of the poor population at large, can

8 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

justifiably be treated as a special target group for receiving prioritygovernment support. Despite their special status, ex-combatantsshould not receive preferential treatment over other vulnerable groups,if at all possible. Instead, ongoing government, donor, and NGO pro-grams should be incorporated into the design of the DRP.

For example, ex-combatants in Ethiopia received food from the Ethio-pian Red Cross Society and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissionunder those organizations' mandate to supply food to returning refugeefamilies. Such arrangements can ease reintegration pressure on ex-com-batants and reduce transaction costs. To lessen community resent-ment, the program should enhance community development and bewell publicized. Any unwarranted negative publicity should be ad-dressed professionally through press releases or radio broadcasting.

Well-conceived programs that address these issues can contributesignificantly to political and ethnic reconciliation, rehabilitation of theeconomic base, and restoration of social capital at the community level.The peace dividend of a DRP therefore needs to be understood in broadersocial and economic terms as well as in financial terms.

Targeting: The Central Element

Three steps have to be completed to ensure that a DRP is targetedeffectively: the primary and secondary beneficiaries need to be iden-tified on the basis of specific criteria; needs and opportunities haveto be ascertained; and an effective targeting mechanism must bedeveloped.

Identification of Beneficiaries

Ex-combatants are the primary beneficiaries of a DRP. The criteria fortheir selection should be transparent in order to avoid discriminationby ethnicity, region, or gender. Identifying ex-combatants for demobili-zation can be difficult. If they are to be demobilized from a regulararmy, army records (certificates of service or salary statements, for in-stance) can be consulted, although such data are normally confidential.If, as is likely for guerrilla forces, such records do not exist, other meth-ods have to be employed.

In the absence of official records, comrades' committees, which in-clude former commanding officers, may be the most effective source ofinformation, especially when combatants are not assembled in campsbut report individually. The role of these committees should be limitedto verifying that an individual was indeed a combatant; the commit-

DESIGNING A DRP BEST PRACTICES 9

tees should not be charged with other activities such as the verificationof an individual's employment status. Receipts issued to ex-combat-ants when they turn in their weapons to the government, the victoriousarmy, or United Nations agencies are other indicators of ex-combatantstatus. Finally, combatants can be encamped with the specific purposeof establishing their numbers and particulars. Special encampment alsohelps eliminate "ghost soldiers" from payroll rosters. Once combatantshave been identified, it is the responsibility of the army high commandto determine which of them are to be demobilized.

Every effort should be undertaken to register all ex-combatantsproperly and ensure equal treatment; inconsistencies in registrationreverberate throughout program implementation. Likewise, the par-ticulars of each ex-combatant should be recorded accurately. For ex-ample, the rank of soldiers should not be inflated, especially if ben-efits vary by rank; rank inflation leads to disparities, discontent, andhigher costs than necessary. Furthermore, combatants of defeatedarmies have to be assured that registration will not expose them toretribution, persecution, or extralegal punitive action.

Although ex-combatants are the immediate target group of a DRP,their discharge has significant implications for their families and com-munities. If the DRP will include spouses and children as beneficiaries,ex-combatants should be asked to identify these family members priorto discharge. It is useful to specify the family's community of settle-ment in advance because some communities are likely to be affectedmore than others. Consequently, all relevant communities may receivesome support.

Identification of Needs and Opportunities

Appropriate program design requires information in three areas: thesupply side (the characteristics, needs, and aspirations of ex-combat-ants); the demand side (the opportunities and constraints that ex-com-batants will face when they enter the labor market as employees or asself-employed workers); and the social environment to which ex-combatants will return. Preparatory studies are therefore crucial tosuccess. These should typically includes analysis of the socioeco-nomic profile of ex-combatants, the opportunity structure, the so-cial capital of the community, and the institutional structure neces-sary to implement the program.

SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE. Information on ex-combatants is best col-lected while they are still in camps or barracks. The sample survey (orcensus) mtLst include data on demographics, health status, educational

10 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

attainments, access to resources (land, capital, and other assets), workexperience, original location and desired place of relocation, and plannedoccupation after demobilization. If those who are to be demobilizedhave not yet been identified, care should be taken to ensure that ex-combatants do not associate the fact of having been interviewed withtheir possible demobilization. The information gathered provides thebasis for a socioeconomic profile of the ex-combatants.

The socioeconomic profile may not vary much among countries. Mostex-combatants share many of the characteristics of the country's poorpopulation: they tend to be illiterate, or functionally so; they are prob-ably in poor health; they have few or no nonmilitary skills; they mayhave lost their entire family and thus their immediate social network;and they have little capital, few assets, and limited access to land. Inaddition, ex-combatants have adapted to a military command struc-ture and often find it difficult to make decisions independently.

In some countries, many ex-combatants may be infected with the HIVvirus or other communicable disease, which could be spread throughoutthe country Wives and female ex-combatants often face particular socialconstraints and expectations, as do child soldiers, who often know noth-ing of civilian life. Finally, the disabled may be perceived very differentlyin different societies. In short, most ex-combatants belong to an espe-cially vulnerable group in need of priority assistance. The public needsto be educated about their needs and capabilities.

The socioeconomic profile could be used to categorize ex-combatantbeneficiaries into the following subgroups: rural and urban mode ofsubsistence, female ex-combatants, child soldiers, disabled ex-combat-ants, longer-serving ex-combatants, pensioners, and the especially vul-nerable (such as ethnic minorities). Those who were conscripted orserved for only a short time may not need specific reintegration sup-port, but they may still require assistance with reinsertion.

If necessary, these subgroups can be disaggregated further. For in-stance, the disabled can be categorized as less severely, moderately, ormore severely disabled. Within each of these subgroups, ex-combat-ants from either faction should receive equal treatment, unless the termsand conditions of service differ explicitly. Multiple support strategiesbased on such categorization could be designed to be mutually rein-forcing and could be presented as a needs-based, differentiated, rel-evant, and cost-effective menu-style approach.

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE. The study of the opportunity structurewould enable planners to identify those areas of intervention with thehighest absorptive capacity. This study would analyze various mar-kets, such as land, labor, credit, skills development, information, andtechnology. Its aim would be to identify the opportunities for market

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 11

access (reinsertion) open to beneficiaries. Such reinsertion opportuni-ties could then be matched with ex-combatants' needs and aspirationsthrough counseling, information, and referral mechanisms to smooththe transition to a productive civilian life.

SOCIAL CAI'ITAL. The study on social capital would assess the cohe-siveness of communities, the communities' levels of interpersonal trust,their potential for active participation in program implementation, theirattitude toward the broader issue of national reconciliation, and theircapacity to act as support networks. Combined with the regional dis-tribution of ex-combatants after demobilization, this study would alsoidentify the need to target special program assistance to communities.

Ideally, detailed results from all studies would be available beforethe DRP was designed. In practice, however, time constraints may pre-clude completion of full-fledged studies. In such circumstances a pre-liminary profile can be prepared on the basis of data gathered in focusgroup interviews conducted during encampment and merged withgeneral information on countrywide economic development. Concur-rently, a rapid qualitative assessment of the community and organiza-tional structures can be undertaken.

In principle, the survey of ex-combatants could include the identifi-cation of the needs of spouses and children, even though ex-combat-ants may not be able to report accurately on the needs of their familymembers. A full-fledged survey of these secondary target groups islikely to be expensive and time consuming. It may therefore be neces-sary to develop certain program interventions on the basis of evidenceabout the poor population at large; recent household survey data mightbe one source for that evidence.

Development of an Effective Target Mechanism

Once ex-combatants have been identified, they need to be issued non-transferable and noncorruptible identification documents. A dischargecertificate specifying the particulars of the ex-combatant (including aphotograph and signature or thumbprint) and outlining entitlementsmay be the simplest way for ex-combatamts to access program benefits.If benefits are to be transferable (on death, for example), a section onthe rights of next-of-kin would have to be included. The certificateshould be designed to be durable and easily portable. Documents forparticular subtarget groups may also be issued (for example, commu-nity verification letters for family members, or disability cards). Com-munity committees may be helpful in identifying needy ex-combatants.

The purpose of such identification documents is twofold: to enable

12 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

eligible ex-combatants to draw benefits, and to ensure that no one otherthan ex-combatants and their spouses and children receive benefits (thatis, to avoid leakage). To this end, a clear procedure for replacing lost orstolen certificates has to be developed.

Effective program implementation is just as important as a well-developed targeting mechanism. Especially where two or more oppos-ing armies are to be demobilized, every effort must be made to precludeany ethnic or political bias by program staff. Moreover, the greater thenumber of institutions involved in implementation, the closer their ac-tivities need to be coordinated to avoid targeting errors and duplication.The institutional structure for implementation should be kept lean bybuilding on existing structures, rather than create new bureaucracies.

Demobilization: The Essential First Step

Demobilization is the first part of the DRP process that a combatantpasses through. It consists of the following segments: cantonment (some-times termed "assembly" or "quartering"), predischarge orientation,discharge, transportation, and postdischarge orientation. Peacetime de-mobilizations can be undertaken in manageable phases that allow trialruns for pilot operations. Such a graduated approach enables govern-ments and donors to improve the quality of design and implementa-tion over time, in accordance with the lessons of experience.

A demobilization undertaken during a transition from war to peace islikely to take on the nature of an emergency relief operation. In this caseit may be politically expedient to first integrate the warring factions andonly later to initiate a phased demobilization, as happened in Uganda.Financial constraints may, however, preclude this option. Whicheverapproach is adopted, demobilization should be linked in the design stageto normal crop and school cycles, if possible. Such environmentally sen-sitive timing would facilitate economic and social reintegration.

Cantonment and Discharge

The cantonment of combatants in specified, easily accessible assemblyareas or discharge centers (often, existing barracks) is a preconditionfor effective demobilization. Adequate food and health services needto be provided in the camps to avoid breakdowns in discipline andsecurity and the outbreak of diseases. The duration of cantonmentshould be as short as possible: experience points to the difficulty ofsustaining discipline over longer periods and to the high costs associ-ated with this phase.

The provision of skills training or education (for example, adult lit-eracy classes) should not be a reason for longer encampment but, at

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 13

best, a result of it. Where longer cantonment cannot be avoided,implementors should ensure that the soldiers' routine includes engag-ing diversions such as entertainment and sports. Assembly for suchactivities also offers a unique opportunity to gather data for profilingand monitoring purposes.

In transitions from war to peace, disarmament takes place on sur-render, in the assembly areas or in the communities. Weapons are handedover to the victorious army, to United Nations military observers, or torepresentatives of government institutions. In peacetime operations, sol-diers are disarmed by the army before they leave the barracks for thedischarge centers. It is important to ensure that soldiers in the campsare indeed disarmed and that the arms are either removed or securedin safe areas. Arms must be registered and be properly disposed of (bytransferring them to an integrated national army after termination ofthe demobilization process, for example).

Neutral international observers can play a useful monitoring and man-agement role in these operations. If confidence in the peace process is frag-ile, parties to the DRP may attempt to circumvent complete demobilizationby hiding some of their forces. This practice not only contributes to thedestabilization of the peace process itself but might also complicate theeventual provision of reinsertion and reintegration benefits to those com-batants who are held back.

Predischarge Infonnation and Orientation

Soldiers who have spent many years in the military are likely to lackbasic knowledge about civilian life. Predischarge information and ori-entation sessions about what they can expect on their return to civilianlife have proved beneficial. Such sessions should give ex-combatants(and, if present, their partners) information about the program in gen-eral, health issues, and civil society. In particular, ex-combatants shouldbe briefed about their benefits and how these are to be provided andabout banking and financial matters, civic and community duties, train-ing and employment opportunities, access to land and credit, income-generating activities, and family and health issues (especially AIDS/HIV).

Female ex-combatants and female partners of ex-combatantsshould receive information on their legal rights, children's educa-tional issues, family and health issues, and any special income-gen-eration support measures available to them. Enough time shouldbe allocated for the orientation sessions; men and women shouldattend specific sessions jointly; and the information should be pre-sented in appropriate languages.

Reconciliation may also be addressed in these orientation sessions,but only if this can be done without politicizing the predischarge

14 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

program. Otherwise, ex-combatants may choose not to participate insome aspects of the demobilization process, such as reporting to dis-charge centers. Moreover, politicizing the orientation program couldendanger support from the international community.

Transportation

After discharge, ex-combatants have to be transported to their old com-munities or to their preferred destinations. Information about thesedestinations and about the numbers of spouses and dependents to betransported is crucial to the planning and execution of this complexlogistical operation. Ex-combatants and their dependents might sim-ply be given a transportation allowance, leaving travel details in theirhands. Experience suggests, however, that this process should be man-aged centrally so that transportation prices are not inflated and thesafety of ex-combatants can be ensured.

Contracts should be drawn up with either private or public trans-port companies to carry ex-combatants by truck, bus, or train. If avail-able, government vehicles from the army or a ministry can be used aswell. Implementors should make sure that the vehicles are roadworthyand that beneficiaries are insured during the journey If ex-combatantswill be carrying large sums in discharge payments, armed escorts shouldbe provided.

The repatriation of ex-combatants from abroad is commonly under-taken by specialized agencies such as the United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intemational Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC). These ex-combatants may or may not be assembledin the host country for predischarge orientation. In either case, finan-cial and logistical constraints will determine the diffusion of the ex-combatants (to regional reception centers, district capitals, or villages,for example).

Postdischarge Orientation

Many reintegration challenges confronting ex-combatants and theirfamilies are locale-specific, as geographic and cultural environmentstypically vary across a country. Consequently, ex-combatants and theirdependents should receive orientation shortly after their arrival at theirdestination of choice. Counseling sessions should focus on relevant lo-cal issues such as economic opportunities, local institutions, customaryrights of women, property rights, contract legalities, environmental in-formation, and the particular social reintegration context. These ses-sions may also offer an opporthnity to introduce the ex-combatants to

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 15

local officials, community leaders, and, potentially, other ex-combat-ants who have been demobilized previously.

Reinsertion: The Transitional Safety Net

Once demobilized and transported to their destinations of choice, ex-combatants have to establish their lives in a civilian environment. At thesame time, they may have very limited resources for sustaining them-selves in the short term. Reinsertion assistance-a transitional safety net-is therefore warranted for a period of about six to twelve months (typi-cally, one growing season). Such assistance should cover the basic needsof ex-combatants and, preferably, those of their families.Assistance shouldbe adjusted to the cultural environment and pegged to the mode of sub-sistence to avoid resentment in the host communities.

Reinsertion assistance would commonly target the major survivalconcerns of ex-combatants and their families-food, housing, healthsupport, and education for children (the "basic needs basket"). Cashbenefits compensate ex-combatants for the loss of their income sources.Support for housing, health, and children makes up for the loss of fringebenefits that soldiers received while in service. These latter entitlementscan be offered in cash or in kind, depending on three considerations:transaction costs, the financial capacity of the banking or postal sys-tem, and the logistical capacity of the implementing agency.

In the eyes of donors and NGOs, reintegration may be more attractivethan other segments of the DRP because its contributions to develop-ment are more readily apparent. However, no ex-combatant can bereintegrated without having been demobilized and reinserted. Demo-bilization and reinsertion are thus essential to the process, and theydeserve and require concerted donor support. Donor fatigue duringthese critical processes could inadvertently undermine the entire DRPeffort.

Cash Payments

Ex-combatants need cash payments to help them meet their expenses forfood, clothing, and other basic goods. Food can also be provided in kindthrough coupons, especially when an emergency food program is alreadyunder way. The entitlement can be calculated on the basis of indicatorssuch as the pay received while in service, the equivalent of the povertyline, or the average income of the population in the communities of re-settlement. Whatever the method of calculation, care should be takenthat the cash payments do not put the ex-combatants in a privilegedposition with respect to the civilian community members.

16 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Cash payments can be made in several ways. They can be paid upfront-when ex-combatants leave the discharge centers, for example-or in installments. The former method is easiest to administer but hasseveral drawbacks. Large cash injections may have an inflationary im-pact on the village economy, and ex-combatants may use the money"unwisely" (for instance, for purchasing alcohol or entertainment ser-vices). Moreover, carrying around large quantities of money could posesubstantial security threats to ex-combatants (and to program staff).

Installment payment of cash benefits is preferable. If the cash ben-efits are supposed to be used for consumption purposes only, it wouldbe advisable to make monthly or bimonthly payments. If cash benefitsare also to be used for investment purposes, payment in two or threelarge installments might be better. In this case, the amounts should belarge enough to pay for equipment or to use as collateral for loans.

Monthly payments may be small enough to be made in cash by thedistrict office without raising security concems. The use of bank accountsseems particularly appropriate when large payments are made in two orthree installments. (The first installment, however, might be paid in cashupon departure from the discharge center or at some other specified time.)If the installment option is chosen, the capacity of the banking system,especially in rural areas, needs to be determined beforehand, and de-posit and withdrawal procedures must be clearly defined.

The transaction costs incurred by the participating banks have to beincluded in overall program costs as a matter of course. Making pay-ments through banks has the added benefit of educating ex-combat-ants about formal financial intermediation, which may eventually con-tribute to rural capital formation and thus to the development of therural banking system.

Housing Assistance

Ex-combatants who did not serve for a long period mav be able to re-turn to their own homes, but usually, finding shelter is the most imme-diate concern of ex-combatants after their discharge. They often findtemporary accommodation with relatives and friends, but such lodg-ings-especially in rural areas-are likely to be crowded and may in-crease social stress. Many ex-combatants therefore have to find tempo-rary shelter by renting.

Housing assistance can take two different forms. Ex-combatants mayreceive a rent subsidy for six to twelve months, witlh the amount basedon the size of the average ex-combatant family. One drawback of thisarrangement is its potential to drive up rent in the communities. Alterna-tively, housing support could help pay for materlals and labor for build-ing a simple structure that the familv would then own. In the former

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 17

case, the subsidies would be short term and could be paid either up frontor in monthly installments. In the latter case, assistance would have alasting effect and could be provided in cash, in kind, or both ways.

In-kind materials, such as roofing sheets, are more likely than cash tobe used for the intended purpose. Nevertheless, some ex-combatants mightsell the in-kind contributions because they do not need them or becausethey need cash, especially if other inputs are delivered late. Support in theform of cash may therefore be preferable; furthermore, its transaction costsare lower, and ex-combatants can acquire the goods they need when theyneed them. Cash assistance could, however, create a short-term demandfor a small number of goods. If this happens, the price effects on the localeconomy would have to be carefully considered.

Health Support

A DRP may include the provision of health services for a short time, espe-cially if soldiers-and their families-received free health services fromthe army. Such assistance may be given in cash (thus effectively becom-ing part of the cash payment), or it could be provided through vouchersor special programs. For example, ex-combatants and their families indisease-prone areas-such as a malarial environment-could receive avoucher or money to exchange for the necessary medication.

Communities may justifiably be worried about the retum of ex-com-batants infected with HIV. Minimal medical screening may be under-taken during discharge, but cost considerations preclude the testing ofall demobilized combatants in most instances. It would also be moreappropriate to strengthen existing programs that benefit the communi-ties at large rather than launch a new initiative. In general, the deliveryof health services within a DRP should be through established govern-ment channels. The responsibility for the allocation of funds could bedecentralized to enable district-based staff to respond more effectivelyto the needs of a particular environment.

Education Supportfor Chlildren

Ex-combatants who suffer a loss of income may decide to curtail ex-penses for their children's education, especially that of girls. A programcomponent targeting children may relieve ex-combatants from a short-term cash shortage and enable children to continue schooling for at leastone school year. Such support could encompass the provision of fees,uniforms, books, and other materials. Education assistance should beprovided through vouchers that can be reimbursed at the schools (andshops) of choice rather than in cash.

18 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Education support, including materials, should be implemented inclose cooperation with and through the public education system, es-pecially at the local level. All biological children of ex-combatants-aswell as orphans in the care of ex-combatants, in hardship cases-ofprimary and secondary school age should be eligible for this support;their number can be established with the help of the monitoring sys-tem. Again, decentralized allocation of funds, on the basis of the num-ber of ex-combatants in each district, seems appropriate because schools(especially in rural areas) and program staff must necessarily be inclose contact with each other.

Reintegration: The Ultimate Objective

For ex-combatants, families, and communities alike, reintegration is acontinuous, long-term process that takes place on social, political, andeconomic levels. Social and political reintegration is broadly definedas the acceptance of an ex-combatant and his or her family by the hostcommunity and its leaders. Economic reintegration implies the finan-cial independence of an ex-combatant's household through produc-tive and gainful employment.

Long-term reintegration ultimately is the yardstick by which thesuccess of a DRP is measured. Successful long-term reintegrationcan make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and tothe restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve rein-tegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and in-dividual levels, including rent-seeking behavior through the barrelof a gun.

Reintegration assistance measures should be prioritized accordingto their degree of complexity-with the simplest steps being imple-mented first-to facilitate early confidence building and rapid imple-mentation. Speed of implementation should be an important criterionfor any reintegration measure because ex-combatants are most vulner-able in the first two years after demobilization. It is advisable both touse existing government and NGO manpower, technical resources, andinfrastructure and to avoid duplication of existing structures and pro-grams.

The components of a reintegration program should be complemen-tary and should be linked conceptually and in practice. All reintegra-tion support should be provided for a limited time only, however, toavoid creating dependence. Moreover, DRP'S should not attempt to re-form entire sectors of an economy. On the contrary, linking the DRP tonormal development programs (by restructuring existing portfoliosor through targeting ongoing programs) is desirable.

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 19

Information, Counseling, and Referral

Ex-combatants commonly lack information about the economic oppor-tunities available to them on their return to civilian life. An information,counseling, and referral service can assist ex-combatants in crucial ways.First, it can provide answers to questions about access to reintegrationentitlements and other more general issues; counseling on job-seekingstrategies; information and counseling on training, employnment, andcredit opporthnities; and advice on microproject identification and de-sign. Second, it offers a means for linking ex-combatants to such oppor-tunities. This kind of service can play a key role in integrating the educa-tion, training, employment, and credit components of a reintegrationsupport program, and it can provide valuable monitoring information.Finally, it can provide critical social-psychological support during thisdifficult transition period.

Rural Strategy

Resettlement is not synonymous with reintegration. Access to arableland and to supportive social capital is the main determinant ofsuccessful rural reintegration. Any strategy for sustainable rural reinte-gration must identify suitable areas for resettlement and ensure thatex-combatants have clear title or secure rights to the land, either indi-vidually or as part of a resettlement program.

It may be preferable to locate ex-combatants in their communitiesof origin or where they have relatives (and hence an existing socialsupport system), rather than to try to build social capital among strang-ers in a new area. If the latter approach must be chosen, the beneficia-ries and members of surrounding communities must be involvedthroughout the process of economic and social reintegration for it tobe successful.

Additional components of rural reintegration include the rehabili-tation of basic infrastructure (such as water, health, and school facili-ties) through quick impact projects and the provision of appropriateseeds, tools, fertilizers, and draft animals. The needs of different oc-cupations-those of sedentary agricultLrists and pastoralists, for ex-ample-should be taken into account. Providing information aboutand access to ongoing rural credit schemes may also be useful.

Urban Strategy

Given the relative complexity of urban labor markets, support mea-sures for urban reintegration generally need to be more diverse and

20 THI TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

of longer duration than those for rural reintegration. Creation of pub-lic sector employment can be effective for preventing unemploymentin the short run. This may include public works schemes, limited ab-sorption into the civil service (including the civilian police force), andhiring into specialized services (the health field, for example). Speciallabor-intensive public works may provide immediate employment op-portunities for many unskilled ex-combatants.

However, these are short-term interventions that are costly to sus-tain. The preferable course would be to expand ongoing public worksprograms to cover ex-combatants. Large-scale absorption of ex-com-batants into the civil service ought to be avoided because such employ-ment could foster ex-combatants' dependence on the government andcould have deleterious budgetary implications.

Ex-combatants who acquired marketable skills in the military canbetter compete in the labor market if their skills can be verified. Skillscertification is the least expensive intervention and could have a ben-eficial impact. It should be done by the appropriate line ministry orcivilian agency to ensure credibility in the private sector. Ex-combat-ants who wish to complete their primary or secondary education shouldbe given the financial means to do so and provided with necessarytechnical assistance, such as help with applications.

Vocational training can provide ex-combatants with marketable skills.DRP implementors should refrain from duplicating existing facilities orestablishing elaborate independent programs and infrastructure. In-stead, they should contract existing training suppliers to enhance pro-vision and should make sure that ex-combatants have the financialmeans (in the form of vouchers, for example) to attend the traininginstitutions of their choice. Such training can be geared to the skills andneeds of the ex-combatants.

This approach would ensure that training is demand driven, enhancesconsumer choice, and improves local capacity. Vocational training initself is not enough, however, to ensure employment or economic rein-tegration. It should be linked to employment referral or self-employ-ment schemes. Tool kits can also be furnished to ex-combatant traineesor graduates to enable them to start a business or to enhance their valueto potential employers. Particular emphasis must be placed on the timelyavailability of these tools.

Job-creation programs supplying temporary wage subsidies or taxcredits to employers, or a combination of the two, can be an importantcomponent after training. These programs would help ex-combatantsgain practical experience with a private employer for six months to ayear. Such on-the-job training would also enhance ex-combatants'longer-term employment opportunities by providing job networkingand skills acquisition simultaneously.

DESIGNING A DRP: BEST PRACTICES 21

A major prerequisite for such programs is cooperation with the pri-vate sector, which the government should begin promoting early inthe design process. Apprenticeship in the informal sector combinesthe benefits of vocational training and employment subsidies at thelower end of the market and is thus a feasible and cost-effective optionfor most urban ex-combatants.

Microenterprise credit schemes can help ex-combatants securetheir economic independence and self-employment. Experiencesuggests that such schemes need to be accompanied by rudimen-tary business training and counseling for the beneficiaries, how-ever, and by significant micromanagement on the part of projectstaff. Whether such schemes should offer concessional credit ratesdepends on whether DRI' designers feel that socioeconomic andpolitical considerations outweigh purely economic concerns. Ingeneral, such schemes are the most expensive interventions andthe most difficult to manage.

Special Target Groups

Female ex-combatants often find it more difficult than male ex-com-batants to achieve economic reintegration. Special measures mayhave to be instituted to ensure that female beneficiaries have equaltraining and employment opportunities. For example, funding forchild care and provision of training to women in their areas of pro-fessional interest and in the villages where they reside should beconsidered. Women and child ex-soldiers may also receive prefer-ential access to specific program components through affirmativeaction. Efforts should be made to ensure that child soldiers are re-united with their families (or are placed in foster care), have accessto education, and receive psychosocial counseling.

Disabled ex-combatants commonly require tailored training andemployment assistance. They should have access to this specializedtraining (often in medical rehabilitation institutions) and to capital,which would enable them to ensure their financial independencethrough participation in microprojects and employment support pro-grams. In addition, the special needs of severely disabled and chroni-cally ill ex-combatants should be met through institutionalized care.

Soldiers who are close to retirement may be another primary targetgroup for demobilization. The general terms and conditions of serviceshould be applicable in these cases, and the government's pensionscheme should cover soldiers demobilized on the grounds of age. Di-rect reintegration support may be extended as well, but it should belimited to hardship cases. A similar approach should apply to soldiersserving under special contracts that are based on a gratuity scheme.

22 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Reintegration and Poverty

Demobilization and reintegration programs can be justified on twogrounds: they help defuse social tension, and they assist a particularlyvulnerable group in building a new life. However, reintegration is along and complex process without a clear conclusion; even compre-hensive programs in a favorable macroeconomic environment cannotby themselves ensure that the living standards of ex-combatants willequal those of the poorer segments of the civilian population.

In Uganda, for example, the annual income of ex-combatants dur-ing the reintegration phase of the DIRP was estimated at less than halfthe already low national average for the working population, despitea coherent policy framework. The success of a DRP must sometimes bejudged by whether strife is avoided, the basic needs of the most vul-nerable are met, and conditions for long-term progress are improved:outright eradication of poverty among ex-combatants may not alwaysbe possible.

Beyond Reintegration

Many ex-combatants, especially the disabled, pensioners, and womenheading households, may need assistance beyond the completion dateof the DMP. It is therefore important that DRP support be designed sothat it can easily be incorporated into ongoing or future governmentdevelopment efforts. Consequently, government funds (as well as do-nor and NGO funds) will have to be made available over the long runfor ex-combatants, even when they are no longer a separate targetgroup.

Support for the reintegration of ex-combatants (and for internallydisplaced persons and returning refugees) may have to be comple-mented by investments in economic and social infrastructure, espe-cially when population densities in communities increase significantly.Hence, to achieve maximum impact, a DRi' has to be anchored in acoherent, long-term program for reconstruction and development.

2The Social and Institutional Context

This chapter discusses the wider social and institutional aspects of re-integration. Social dimensions reflect an often neglected but neverthe-less important consideration for successful reintegration: the effects ofstigmatization and the acceptance or rejection of ex-combatants by hostcommunities. Institutional and management issues cut across the threeseamless phases by setting the framework for the implementation pro-cess and improving its functioning. Finally, external assistance has a fun-damental and complementary role in program implementation.

Social Dimensions: Rebuilding Social Capital

Combatants, particularly those who were recruited by force or who servedfor many years, may welcome the opportunity to leave the military legallyBy and large, they will be mentally prepared to face the challenge of reinte-gration. Specific subgroups, however, may face more profound problemswith social reintegration. For example, social reintegration is often difficultfor female ex-combatants, who are likely to have become accustomed to anindependent and egalitarian way of life in the military; they understand-ably find it hard to adapt to the expectations of traditional communities.

Female partners of ex-combatants who migrate to communities withdifferent ethnic, linguistic, or cultural backgrounds are often initiallyrejected. They are particularly vulnerable if their spouses abandon them,become incapacitated, or die. An array of special measures for promot-ing the social reintegration of women can be put in place: communitysupport groups can be created, women can be provided informationon their legal rights, and communities can be sensitized to women'sneeds and rights.

Many military forces recruit children, especially during wartime.There is little experience with measures in support of this extremelyvulnerable group, but common sense suggests that child soldiers shouldreceive psychosocial counseling, access to education and health ser-vices, and help in reuniting them with their families or with placingthem in foster care. In war-to-peace operations, it may be advisable toreintegrate them with displaced and refugee children rather than withadult ex-combatants. Communities should be sensitized to the par-ticular needs and abilities of this group.

23

24 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

For ex-combatants, the programming part of economic and social-psychological reintegration is just one side of the equation. Often over-looked, but equally important, are the attitudes and capacities of thereceiving community. The community side of the equation might beviewed as the social capital that must incorporate the human capital ofthe individual soldier. Just how well can a war-devastated social infra-structure receive and support ex-combatants?

Two social factors have emerged as particularly critical to the reinte-gration process. First is the negative label or stigma that an ex-combat-ant sometimes carries. In peacetime, there may be a generalized fearthat ex-combatants are illiterate thugs, conveyers of violence, crime,and sexually transmitted diseases. This fear is amplified when ex-com-batants are demobilized because they are deemed to be chronically ill(with AIDS/HIV infection, for example) or unfit for the military, perhapsbecause of alcoholism or lack of discipline. When communities rejectex-combatants, community fears and expectations may well become aself-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, stigmatizing labels must be avoidedduring implementation or promptly combated when they appear.

The second critical dimension concerns the degree of social cohesive-ness, trust, and organizational density-that is, the social capital-in thereceiving community. The social capital can be a support network for theex-combatant, providing information, a sympathetic ear, credit, and ac-cess to other productive assets. Ex-combatants should be encouraged tostrengthen their social networks by, for example, attending religious cer-emonies and participating in sports events or community groups.

Several approaches might help prepare the community and reducethe stigma that may be attached to ex-combatants. For example, dis-trict administrators and community leaders can be trained and chargedwith sensitizing the community through meetings with communitymembers. Radio broadcasts in local languages and popular folk media(for instance, theater groups) can further mutual understanding of thereintegration process. Religious support groups (such as church- ormosque-based committees) can play also a key role in supporting rein-tegration. Finally, psychosocial counseling by specially trained staff maybe offered to ex-combatants and community members alike.

Communication and sensitization activities conducted before ex-com-batants are discharged should stress that most ex-soldiers are returningas family units and that the benefit package they bring with them willnot only sustain them through a harvest season but could also contributeto the village economy. Care should be taken, however, that communitymembers are not led to make overly optimistic assumptions about theex-combatants' financial ability (to aid extended families, for example).

A program that provides visible benefits to host communities is muchlikelier to be successful than one that benefits only the ex-combatants.In addition, experience shows that social reintegration is often eased

THE SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 25

by the support of an extended family network, and ex-combatants mightwell be encouraged to reintegrate in the vicinity of their extended fami-lies. Finally, communities that mobilized their children for service inthe army should be educated about their responsibilities for receivingand assisting them as demobilized ex-combatants.

In the absence of dense social capital in the receiving communities,ex-combatants often form self-help support groups on their return.These groups, as well as mixed groups of ex-combatants and othercommunity members, can help alleviate initial community mistrustand alienation among ex-combatants. Program interventions shouldsupport formation of such groups. The restoration of social capital,the use of family networks, and the provision of mutual help amongex-combatants all help prevent ex-combatants from resorting to crime.

In general, the sensitivity of communities toward reconciliation isgreater in transitions from war to peace, but it is in this situation thatthe social capital is usually the most devastated. For a reintegrationprogram to be fully effective, then, a critical step is to understand thelocal sociocultural context that ex-combatants will encounter when theyreturn: the ethnic mix, the traditional land tenure patterns, and the or-ganizational density (which affects the community's ability to supportand nurture its returning sons and daughters). Rapid ethnographic as-sessments of social capital are the method of choice.

Institutional Concerns: The Key

Implementation of a DRP should be the responsibility of a single spe-cialized civilian institution. Even when that body must be establishedquickly, its structure should be well planned. Preferably, such an insti-tution should be outside the regular government structure but linkedto it by a board or advisory committee. The board's responsibility isbest limited to overall guidance and political backing. As a politicalbody, the board should avoid involvement in day-to-day management.

Although dissolving this single-purpose implementation agency af-ter the program is completed eliminates one layer of bureaucracy, someminimal services-information, regulation, and advocacy-will stillneed to be provided. The government can integrate outstanding activi-ties into its mainstream development efforts, and other ongoing needscan be met through a combination of government offices, NGOs, andcommunity-supported local organizations.

DRPS comprise two distinct types of interventions: short-term safetynets (possibly during an emergency situation) and longer-term devel-opment efforts. If a single institution is in charge of all DRP activities, itsstructLre has to be flexible enough to accommodate their diverse tasks.If other institutions or organizations (government agencies, donors, or

26 THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

NGOs) are involved in a DRP, the lead institution should have the clearand generally accepted mandate of coordination so that overlaps incoverage can be avoided in the program design. Existing specializedinstitutions may be the best vehicles for implementing certain programcomponents (for instance, the provision of health services).

The administrative costs of a commission (including field offices)may be high. The lower the transaction costs, the larger the amountsavailable to ex-combatants and the greater the donors' interest in theprogram. Particular attention should therefore be paid to administra-tive costs in relation to overall program costs. Total transaction costs ofapproximately 10 percent are tolerable. The administrative costs of thedemobilization phase of a transition from war to peace may run higher,however, because of the need for elaborate logistical systems.

Field Representation and Decentralization

A DRP can have implications for practically every part of a country.Decentralization of decisionmaking authority during program imple-mentation enhances flexibility and responsiveness to local conditionsand needs. Community offices at the provincial or district level bringthe program closest to its beneficiaries, and they should be establishedon the basis of the distribution of ex-combatants across regions. Theycan be staffed in part with officials from the local administration toensure that the DRP is linked to overall development activities. Forsuch an arrangement to be successful, the local administration has tobe actively involved.

To maximize a program's relevance, community offices ought tohave a fair amount of autonomy regarding decisionmaking and fundsallocation, and community-based staff should have the mobility toreach the ex-combatants in their constituency. Headquarters could belimited to a supporting role, provided that accountability does notsuffer, especially when implementation is complex. This arrangementrequires a great deal of coordination between the central and locallevels. Frequent, regular visits by headquarters staff to the districts orprovinces and regular (perhaps quarterly) meetings of all staff areparticularly beneficial.

Comnmunity and Beneficiary Involvement

The best strategy for overcoming community resentment is to activelyinvolve community members in the implementation process. This maybe done by including community representatives-say, traditionalleaders or elected members-in local committees with decisionmaking

THE SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL. CONTEXT 27

authority For example, they can be made responsible for the distribu-tion of tools and seeds and for the organization of labor. Local com-mittees should be consulted regularly by program staff.

It can also be useful to include officials of all relevant local adminis-tration offices in a committee at the provincial or district level. If noth-ing else, such committees may prevent administrators from obstruct-ing the DRP. Formal links to the local administration should ensure theincorporation of a DRP as a local multisectoral intervention into the regu-lar work program of local officials-in particular, in education, health,and agriculture.

On account of their motivation and their familiarity with reintegra-tion problems, representatives of ex-combatants can play an importantrole in program execution. Ex-combatants should be encouraged to electtheir representatives-say, once every two years. These representativescan interact horizontally with other ex-combatants for problem solvingand vertically with community-based program staff. It is advisable toreimburse these representatives for the expenses they incur while per-forming their duties, especially for travel and per diem.

The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs can serve as effective intermediaries between the government,donors, and beneficiaries in the implementation of a DRP. They oftenplay a prominent role in humanitarian relief efforts and have a grass-roots understanding of the communities within which they work.They are thus in a unique position to help community offices trans-late program design into effective intervention. The challenge formany NGOs is to transform themselves from emergency agencies intodevelopment agencies with pertinent technical knowledge and tocoordinate their activities with the central government.

Management Aspects: Critical Ingredients

Staffing

Appropriate staff personality, experience, and motivation are crucialfor successful program implementation. Community-based staff andex-combatant representatives (as well as community committees) arethe major mediators in disputes between ex-combatants and commu-nity members. It would therefore be advisable to employ qualified ex-combatants who are trusted by male and female ex-combatants andcommunities alike within central and community