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Ruling:

The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A

was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing

governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the

remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining

balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus

the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse

however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation.

16. Senate v Ermita GR 169777

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing

E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on

Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid

of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as

null and void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the

consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The

doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of

necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Congress undoubtedly has a right to

information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch

withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason

therefor and why it must be respected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executivebranch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so

and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

17. Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Facts:

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of EO 626-A which orders the prohibition of the

interprovincial movement of carabaos and carabeef, as amendment to EO 626, which prohibited the

unlawful slaughter of carabaos. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation shall be subject to

confiscation and forfeiture by the government. Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo

when they were confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of

EO 626-A. Petitioner sued for recovery and filed a bond. The RTC of Iloilo City ustained the confiscation

of the carabaos and the bond, since the latter could no longer be produced. The court also declined to

rule on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack of authority and for its presumed validity. On

appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the trial court. He claims that the penalty is invalid

because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial

court as guaranteed by due process.

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Issues:

Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of EO626-A.

Ruling:

RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of EO 626-Reasoning. Lower courts are not

prevented from resolving constitutional questions whenever warranted, subject only to review by the

highest tribunal (SC). Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by the lower court.

18. CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing

along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the

opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on

August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules

and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up

passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding

public as well.

ISSUE:

Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is

Social Justice?

Ruling:

No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest

and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and

burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental

aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.

Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanizationof laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and

objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the

welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic

stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and

social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the

adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers

underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema

Lex.

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19. Isagani Cruz v DENR Secretary GR135385 December 6, 2000

Facts:

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the

public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian

doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the

rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al

contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral

lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law

violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

Ruling: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They

deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was

dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain

somehow against the regalian doctrine.

20. Chavez v PEA N. Amari GR 133250 November 11, 2008

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation

projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or

about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the

Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

Ruling: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as

private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from

acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom

Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the

public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of

77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of

the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of

the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of

290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to

Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other

than agricultural lands of the public domain.