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Ruling:
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A
was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing
governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the
remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining
balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus
the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse
however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation.
16. Senate v Ermita GR 169777
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as
null and void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Congress undoubtedly has a right to
information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be respected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executivebranch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
17. Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court148 SCRA 659 (1987)
Facts:
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of EO 626-A which orders the prohibition of the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and carabeef, as amendment to EO 626, which prohibited the
unlawful slaughter of carabaos. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government. Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo
when they were confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of
EO 626-A. Petitioner sued for recovery and filed a bond. The RTC of Iloilo City ustained the confiscation
of the carabaos and the bond, since the latter could no longer be produced. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack of authority and for its presumed validity. On
appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the trial court. He claims that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process.
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Issues:
Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of EO626-A.
Ruling:
RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of EO 626-Reasoning. Lower courts are not
prevented from resolving constitutional questions whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
highest tribunal (SC). Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by the lower court.
18. CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940
FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on
August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
ISSUE:
Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is
Social Justice?
Ruling:
No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest
and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental
aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanizationof laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema
Lex.
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19. Isagani Cruz v DENR Secretary GR135385 December 6, 2000
Facts:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al
contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
Ruling: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain
somehow against the regalian doctrine.
20. Chavez v PEA N. Amari GR 133250 November 11, 2008
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
Ruling: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain.