43
CHAPTER 9 DEPRESSION, RECOVERY, AND WAR, 1920-1945 INTRODUCTION The Japanese economy experienced great changes as a result of World War I. With the disappearance of European and American products from Asian and African trade, these extensive markets suddenly be- came wide open to Japanese products. Export volume and prices shot up, and Japan's industries reveled in an unprecedented boom. A spate of new firms appeared in rapid succession; stock prices soared; and the whole country rang with the sound of hammers at work on new- factory construction. Products like steel, machinery, and chemicals, for which Japan had been dependent on imports, began to be pro- duced domestically. From its status as a debtor nation to the tune of ¥1.1 billion on the eve of the war in 1913, Japan had, by the end of 1920, transformed itself into a creditor nation with a surplus exceeding ¥2 billion. Despite social unrest such as the 1918 rice riots and the intensification of the labor and peasant movements that accompanied the galloping inflation produced by the war boom, the Japanese econ- omy expanded as a result of the war. When the war ended, however, so did the boom. Because of the renewed export competition and the resumption of imports that had long been suspended while Europe was at war, the international payments balance reverted to a deficit, and holdings of gold and foreign exchange began to diminish. This chapter will trace the path of the Japanese economy from the 1920s to the end of the Pacific War. 1 This period may be divided into three parts: the deflation and depression from the 1920s to 1931, recovery and chemical and heavy industrialization from 1932 to 1937, and the era of war and collapse through 1945. Table 9.1 indicates the growth rates of real gross national expendi- 1 An excellent study in English is Hugh Patrick's "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, ed. James W. Morley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). 451 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008 Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521223577.010 Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Simon Fraser University Library, on 10 Sep 2016 at 17:02:54, subject to the Cambridge

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CHAPTER 9

DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR1920-1945

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese economy experienced great changes as a result of WorldWar I With the disappearance of European and American productsfrom Asian and African trade these extensive markets suddenly be-came wide open to Japanese products Export volume and prices shotup and Japans industries reveled in an unprecedented boom A spateof new firms appeared in rapid succession stock prices soared and thewhole country rang with the sound of hammers at work on new-factory construction Products like steel machinery and chemicalsfor which Japan had been dependent on imports began to be pro-duced domestically From its status as a debtor nation to the tune ofyen11 billion on the eve of the war in 1913 Japan had by the end of1920 transformed itself into a creditor nation with a surplus exceedingyen2 billion Despite social unrest such as the 1918 rice riots and theintensification of the labor and peasant movements that accompaniedthe galloping inflation produced by the war boom the Japanese econ-omy expanded as a result of the war

When the war ended however so did the boom Because of therenewed export competition and the resumption of imports that hadlong been suspended while Europe was at war the internationalpayments balance reverted to a deficit and holdings of gold andforeign exchange began to diminish This chapter will trace the pathof the Japanese economy from the 1920s to the end of the PacificWar1 This period may be divided into three parts the deflation anddepression from the 1920s to 1931 recovery and chemical and heavyindustrialization from 1932 to 1937 and the era of war and collapsethrough 1945

Table 91 indicates the growth rates of real gross national expendi-

1 An excellent study in English is Hugh Patricks The Economic Muddle of the 1920s inDilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan ed James W Morley (Princeton NJ PrincetonUniversity Press 1971)

451

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TABLE 9 1

Growth rates of real spending and income 1900-1944

1900-131913-191919-311931-371937-44

GNE

19621662

-13

Gross domesticfixed capitalformation

4884

-0 78362

Privateconsumption

spending

18472232

-6 9

Exports andincome from

abroad

846558

123-114

Imports andmcome going

abroad

72515852

-85

Primaryindustries

1433

-0 733

Secondaryindustries

62624777

Tertiaryindustries

22740749

GNEdeflator

38136

-2 812

189

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin skotoku Choki keizai tokei vol 1 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha) 1974 pp 213 214 217

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INTRODUCTION 453

TABLE 9 2International comparison of real growth rates

United StatesGreat BritainGermanyItalyDenmarkNorwaySwedenJapan

1870-1913

46deg21271532223024

1913-1938

1107181719302439

bull From the average for the years from 1869 to 1878 and thento 1913From 1887 to 1913Source United States US Department of Commerce His-torical Statistics of the United Stales (Washington DC USGovernment Printing Office 1975) European countriesB R Mitchell European Historical Statistics (New YorkMacmillan 1975) Japan Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokuminshotoku Choki keizai tokei vol 1 (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1974) pp 213214217

tures (GNE) for these periods and the growth rates of real gross outputby type of industry This table shows that during each period therewere large differences in the growth rates of GNE and its componentsand of gross output by type of industry The rate of price increasevaried as well The principal features of these three periods can beseen in these variations Table 92 presents an international compari-son of real GNE growth rates Japans rapid growth from the 1950sonward is well known but its growth rate following World War I wasalso outstanding by international standards and may be viewed as theprelude to the rapid growth following World War II It is also possibleto regard such growth as the material basis for the policies of militaryexpansionism that led to the Pacific War2 Both these contradictoryperspectives contain some truth Hence emerges an additional themeof this chapter How was rapid growth achieved in this period andwhat did Japan obtain as a result

2 Yamamura Kozo Kikai kogyo ni okeru seid gijutsu no donyu in Washinton taisei to Nichibeikankei ed Hosoya Chihiro and Saito Makoto (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1978)Yamamura contends that technological progress in the machine tool industry during the 1920sprovided the material foundation for the military adventures of the 1930s

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454 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

THE ERA OF RECESSIONS

Although prices in the United States and Britain soared to more thantwice their prewar levels after World War I both countries returned tothe gold standard without devaluing their currencies against the priceof gold It was thought that reinstituting the gold standard at prewarparity would constitute a return to normalcy (in the words of Presi-dent Warren G Harding) However this amounted to adopting aseverely deflationary policy that would cut back postwar prices toprewar levels about half of the current prices World prices did in factfall in the 1920s John Maynard Keynes author of Monetary Reformand The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill publicly criticizedthese policies but his warnings went unheeded As is well knownKeynes was also critical of the harsh reparations demands imposed onGermany but this too was ignored As it turned out internationalfinance during the 1920s was sustained by the international capitalflow whereby Germany used the capital it received from America tomake reparations to England and France which used the same moneyto redeem their war debts in the United States But after the NewYork stock market crisis in 1929 American capital was withdrawnfrom Europe causing a financial strain in Germany that eventuallyprovoked a crisis that brought on world depression

These events had immediate repercussions in Japan as well Thegoal of Japans economic policy like that of Britain and the UnitedStates was to return to the gold standard at the prewar price of gold3

The Japanese government did not do so until the advent of the worlddepression in 1929 but during the 1920s the economy was constantlyconstrained by the worldwide deflation and by the governments goalof returning to the gold standard Accordingly the Japanese economyshowed a mild deflationary trend after World War I Moreover thebalance-of-trade deficit persisted The gold and foreign exchange (spe-cie) holdings that had accumulated during the war declined steadilyFor these reasons Japans domestic financial policy also shifted to-ward austerity This was a period of unprecedented testing for theJapanese economy which had developed under the influence of infla-tionary trends since the Meiji period It was particularly difficult forthe new heavy and chemical industries and for capital-weak new firmsthat had emerged during and after the war It was also difficult for

3 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Shawa zaiseishi-Dai 10-kan kinyu (I) (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1955) pp 155-80

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 455

agriculture which was troubled by competition from cheap rice im-ported from Korea and Taiwan and highly susceptible to trends in theNew York silk market

Chronologies of the Japanese economy of the 1920s often refer tothis period as one of recurring panics of greater or lesser magnitude4

The post-World War I boom turned into a panic with the stockmarket crash of 1920 The death knell of wartime prosperity hadsounded Domestic funds dried up as monetary austerity was imposedin order to suppress inflation and the mounting outlays for importsthat accompanied the shift toward deficit in 1919 in the internationalpayments account Despite this the business community continued toexpand and speculate boldly The result was ruin In only a fewmonths stock market prices and commodity market prices for riceraw silk and cotton yarn collapsed to less than half their formervalues There was a stream of trading company bank and factorybankruptcies and economic conditions became chaotic

The government and the Bank of Japan did their utmost to providerelief For example purchasing companies (kaitorigaisha) were orga-nized to handle inventory backlogs of raw silk and a policy of boldlending to depressed industries was established Losses suffered bysmaller zaibatsu like Furukawa Suzuki Kuhara and Masuda espe-cially hard hit by failures of speculative enterprises during the finan-cial panic provided new opportunities for the four leading zaibatsuMitsui Mitsubishi Sumitomo and Yasuda Because they maintainedsound management policies and did not depend on speculative profitseven during the war boom the large zaibatsu suffered few losses in thepanic In addition the leading spinning companies like Kanebo andToyobo had built up large secret reserves during the war and so theywere able to cover the declining prices of their inventories which werecaused by the panic and losses due to customer bankruptcies therebymaintaining their position unshaken The dominant position of thefour great prewar zaibatsu and the large spinning companies remainedfirm

In April 1922 when it appeared that the financial crisis had at lastbeen resolved a small panic was touched off when a trader (IshiiSadashichi) went bankrupt after losing heavily on daring rice specula-tions At the end of 1922 eleven small banks in western Japan failed inrapid succession Then on September 11923 the Tokyo-Yokohama

4 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen shuryogo ni okeni honpo zaikai doyoshi and Kantoshinsai yori Showa 2-nen kinyu kyokoni itaru waga zaikai in Nihon kinyushi shiryo MeijiTaisho ken vol 22 (Tokyo Okurasho insatsu kyoku 1959-60)

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456 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

region was dealt a crushing blow by a powerful earthquake and thedevastating fires that spread in its wake This crisis was weatheredwith the help of a government-implemented month-long moratoriumon payments in the Kan to area The Bank of Japan also averted apanic by rediscounting commercial bills that were to have been paid inthe area (earthquake bills) The Bank of Japans rediscounts totaledyen430 million5 The devastation wrought by the great earthquake wasenormous According to estimates made at the time in seventeenprefectures but primarily in Tokyo 554000 out of 2288 millionhouseholds lost their homes 105000 people lost their lives 30000were injured and 250000 lost their jobs The gross national wealth in1909 was estimated at yen86 billion and losses due to the earthquakewere put at between yen55 billion and yen10 billion6 These blows madeimpossible a return to the gold standard Exports declined sharplyalbeit temporarily and supplies for reconstruction increased importsConsequently the balance of payments went deeply into the red andthe exchange rate fell sharply Early in 1924 the government raisedsome foreign exchange by issuing yen600 million in foreign bonds inBritain and the United States However the extraordinarily high inter-est rate reflecting Japans international credit standing at the timebecame the target of criticism at home The reconstruction of theTokyo-Yokohama area firms that had sustained losses because of thedisaster was of course not simple and the balance sheets of manydeteriorated In 1925 as the postwar business slump continuedTakada shokai a large trading company failed

A financial crisis occurred in March and April of 19277 A largeKobe trading company Suzuki shoten which was hard hit by thepanic of 1920 had just barely managed to stay in business by borrow-ing huge sums from the Bank of Taiwan a colonial bank of issue InMarch 1927 the firm found itself unable to settle its loans of yen67million At the time there was a proposal before the Diet calling forthe government to dispose of a total of yen207 million in outstand-ing earthquake bills and to indemnify the Bank of Japan for lossesamounting to yen100 million The Bank of Japan was to extend long-term loans to banks holding earthquake bills and each bank in turnwas to have its holders of earthquake bill liabilities redeem theirobligations over a period of ten years While this proposal was beingdebated Suzuki shotens internal condition was revealed includingits relationship with the Bank of Taiwan and the unsound manage-

5 Toyo keizai shinposha ed Meiji Taisho kokusei soran (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1927)PP-759-6o 6 Nihonginkochosakyoku Sekai taisenp 876 7 Ibid p 866

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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TABLE 9 1

Growth rates of real spending and income 1900-1944

1900-131913-191919-311931-371937-44

GNE

19621662

-13

Gross domesticfixed capitalformation

4884

-0 78362

Privateconsumption

spending

18472232

-6 9

Exports andincome from

abroad

846558

123-114

Imports andmcome going

abroad

72515852

-85

Primaryindustries

1433

-0 733

Secondaryindustries

62624777

Tertiaryindustries

22740749

GNEdeflator

38136

-2 812

189

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin skotoku Choki keizai tokei vol 1 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha) 1974 pp 213 214 217

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INTRODUCTION 453

TABLE 9 2International comparison of real growth rates

United StatesGreat BritainGermanyItalyDenmarkNorwaySwedenJapan

1870-1913

46deg21271532223024

1913-1938

1107181719302439

bull From the average for the years from 1869 to 1878 and thento 1913From 1887 to 1913Source United States US Department of Commerce His-torical Statistics of the United Stales (Washington DC USGovernment Printing Office 1975) European countriesB R Mitchell European Historical Statistics (New YorkMacmillan 1975) Japan Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokuminshotoku Choki keizai tokei vol 1 (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1974) pp 213214217

tures (GNE) for these periods and the growth rates of real gross outputby type of industry This table shows that during each period therewere large differences in the growth rates of GNE and its componentsand of gross output by type of industry The rate of price increasevaried as well The principal features of these three periods can beseen in these variations Table 92 presents an international compari-son of real GNE growth rates Japans rapid growth from the 1950sonward is well known but its growth rate following World War I wasalso outstanding by international standards and may be viewed as theprelude to the rapid growth following World War II It is also possibleto regard such growth as the material basis for the policies of militaryexpansionism that led to the Pacific War2 Both these contradictoryperspectives contain some truth Hence emerges an additional themeof this chapter How was rapid growth achieved in this period andwhat did Japan obtain as a result

2 Yamamura Kozo Kikai kogyo ni okeru seid gijutsu no donyu in Washinton taisei to Nichibeikankei ed Hosoya Chihiro and Saito Makoto (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1978)Yamamura contends that technological progress in the machine tool industry during the 1920sprovided the material foundation for the military adventures of the 1930s

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454 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

THE ERA OF RECESSIONS

Although prices in the United States and Britain soared to more thantwice their prewar levels after World War I both countries returned tothe gold standard without devaluing their currencies against the priceof gold It was thought that reinstituting the gold standard at prewarparity would constitute a return to normalcy (in the words of Presi-dent Warren G Harding) However this amounted to adopting aseverely deflationary policy that would cut back postwar prices toprewar levels about half of the current prices World prices did in factfall in the 1920s John Maynard Keynes author of Monetary Reformand The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill publicly criticizedthese policies but his warnings went unheeded As is well knownKeynes was also critical of the harsh reparations demands imposed onGermany but this too was ignored As it turned out internationalfinance during the 1920s was sustained by the international capitalflow whereby Germany used the capital it received from America tomake reparations to England and France which used the same moneyto redeem their war debts in the United States But after the NewYork stock market crisis in 1929 American capital was withdrawnfrom Europe causing a financial strain in Germany that eventuallyprovoked a crisis that brought on world depression

These events had immediate repercussions in Japan as well Thegoal of Japans economic policy like that of Britain and the UnitedStates was to return to the gold standard at the prewar price of gold3

The Japanese government did not do so until the advent of the worlddepression in 1929 but during the 1920s the economy was constantlyconstrained by the worldwide deflation and by the governments goalof returning to the gold standard Accordingly the Japanese economyshowed a mild deflationary trend after World War I Moreover thebalance-of-trade deficit persisted The gold and foreign exchange (spe-cie) holdings that had accumulated during the war declined steadilyFor these reasons Japans domestic financial policy also shifted to-ward austerity This was a period of unprecedented testing for theJapanese economy which had developed under the influence of infla-tionary trends since the Meiji period It was particularly difficult forthe new heavy and chemical industries and for capital-weak new firmsthat had emerged during and after the war It was also difficult for

3 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Shawa zaiseishi-Dai 10-kan kinyu (I) (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1955) pp 155-80

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 455

agriculture which was troubled by competition from cheap rice im-ported from Korea and Taiwan and highly susceptible to trends in theNew York silk market

Chronologies of the Japanese economy of the 1920s often refer tothis period as one of recurring panics of greater or lesser magnitude4

The post-World War I boom turned into a panic with the stockmarket crash of 1920 The death knell of wartime prosperity hadsounded Domestic funds dried up as monetary austerity was imposedin order to suppress inflation and the mounting outlays for importsthat accompanied the shift toward deficit in 1919 in the internationalpayments account Despite this the business community continued toexpand and speculate boldly The result was ruin In only a fewmonths stock market prices and commodity market prices for riceraw silk and cotton yarn collapsed to less than half their formervalues There was a stream of trading company bank and factorybankruptcies and economic conditions became chaotic

The government and the Bank of Japan did their utmost to providerelief For example purchasing companies (kaitorigaisha) were orga-nized to handle inventory backlogs of raw silk and a policy of boldlending to depressed industries was established Losses suffered bysmaller zaibatsu like Furukawa Suzuki Kuhara and Masuda espe-cially hard hit by failures of speculative enterprises during the finan-cial panic provided new opportunities for the four leading zaibatsuMitsui Mitsubishi Sumitomo and Yasuda Because they maintainedsound management policies and did not depend on speculative profitseven during the war boom the large zaibatsu suffered few losses in thepanic In addition the leading spinning companies like Kanebo andToyobo had built up large secret reserves during the war and so theywere able to cover the declining prices of their inventories which werecaused by the panic and losses due to customer bankruptcies therebymaintaining their position unshaken The dominant position of thefour great prewar zaibatsu and the large spinning companies remainedfirm

In April 1922 when it appeared that the financial crisis had at lastbeen resolved a small panic was touched off when a trader (IshiiSadashichi) went bankrupt after losing heavily on daring rice specula-tions At the end of 1922 eleven small banks in western Japan failed inrapid succession Then on September 11923 the Tokyo-Yokohama

4 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen shuryogo ni okeni honpo zaikai doyoshi and Kantoshinsai yori Showa 2-nen kinyu kyokoni itaru waga zaikai in Nihon kinyushi shiryo MeijiTaisho ken vol 22 (Tokyo Okurasho insatsu kyoku 1959-60)

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456 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

region was dealt a crushing blow by a powerful earthquake and thedevastating fires that spread in its wake This crisis was weatheredwith the help of a government-implemented month-long moratoriumon payments in the Kan to area The Bank of Japan also averted apanic by rediscounting commercial bills that were to have been paid inthe area (earthquake bills) The Bank of Japans rediscounts totaledyen430 million5 The devastation wrought by the great earthquake wasenormous According to estimates made at the time in seventeenprefectures but primarily in Tokyo 554000 out of 2288 millionhouseholds lost their homes 105000 people lost their lives 30000were injured and 250000 lost their jobs The gross national wealth in1909 was estimated at yen86 billion and losses due to the earthquakewere put at between yen55 billion and yen10 billion6 These blows madeimpossible a return to the gold standard Exports declined sharplyalbeit temporarily and supplies for reconstruction increased importsConsequently the balance of payments went deeply into the red andthe exchange rate fell sharply Early in 1924 the government raisedsome foreign exchange by issuing yen600 million in foreign bonds inBritain and the United States However the extraordinarily high inter-est rate reflecting Japans international credit standing at the timebecame the target of criticism at home The reconstruction of theTokyo-Yokohama area firms that had sustained losses because of thedisaster was of course not simple and the balance sheets of manydeteriorated In 1925 as the postwar business slump continuedTakada shokai a large trading company failed

A financial crisis occurred in March and April of 19277 A largeKobe trading company Suzuki shoten which was hard hit by thepanic of 1920 had just barely managed to stay in business by borrow-ing huge sums from the Bank of Taiwan a colonial bank of issue InMarch 1927 the firm found itself unable to settle its loans of yen67million At the time there was a proposal before the Diet calling forthe government to dispose of a total of yen207 million in outstand-ing earthquake bills and to indemnify the Bank of Japan for lossesamounting to yen100 million The Bank of Japan was to extend long-term loans to banks holding earthquake bills and each bank in turnwas to have its holders of earthquake bill liabilities redeem theirobligations over a period of ten years While this proposal was beingdebated Suzuki shotens internal condition was revealed includingits relationship with the Bank of Taiwan and the unsound manage-

5 Toyo keizai shinposha ed Meiji Taisho kokusei soran (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1927)PP-759-6o 6 Nihonginkochosakyoku Sekai taisenp 876 7 Ibid p 866

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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INTRODUCTION 453

TABLE 9 2International comparison of real growth rates

United StatesGreat BritainGermanyItalyDenmarkNorwaySwedenJapan

1870-1913

46deg21271532223024

1913-1938

1107181719302439

bull From the average for the years from 1869 to 1878 and thento 1913From 1887 to 1913Source United States US Department of Commerce His-torical Statistics of the United Stales (Washington DC USGovernment Printing Office 1975) European countriesB R Mitchell European Historical Statistics (New YorkMacmillan 1975) Japan Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokuminshotoku Choki keizai tokei vol 1 (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1974) pp 213214217

tures (GNE) for these periods and the growth rates of real gross outputby type of industry This table shows that during each period therewere large differences in the growth rates of GNE and its componentsand of gross output by type of industry The rate of price increasevaried as well The principal features of these three periods can beseen in these variations Table 92 presents an international compari-son of real GNE growth rates Japans rapid growth from the 1950sonward is well known but its growth rate following World War I wasalso outstanding by international standards and may be viewed as theprelude to the rapid growth following World War II It is also possibleto regard such growth as the material basis for the policies of militaryexpansionism that led to the Pacific War2 Both these contradictoryperspectives contain some truth Hence emerges an additional themeof this chapter How was rapid growth achieved in this period andwhat did Japan obtain as a result

2 Yamamura Kozo Kikai kogyo ni okeru seid gijutsu no donyu in Washinton taisei to Nichibeikankei ed Hosoya Chihiro and Saito Makoto (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1978)Yamamura contends that technological progress in the machine tool industry during the 1920sprovided the material foundation for the military adventures of the 1930s

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454 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

THE ERA OF RECESSIONS

Although prices in the United States and Britain soared to more thantwice their prewar levels after World War I both countries returned tothe gold standard without devaluing their currencies against the priceof gold It was thought that reinstituting the gold standard at prewarparity would constitute a return to normalcy (in the words of Presi-dent Warren G Harding) However this amounted to adopting aseverely deflationary policy that would cut back postwar prices toprewar levels about half of the current prices World prices did in factfall in the 1920s John Maynard Keynes author of Monetary Reformand The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill publicly criticizedthese policies but his warnings went unheeded As is well knownKeynes was also critical of the harsh reparations demands imposed onGermany but this too was ignored As it turned out internationalfinance during the 1920s was sustained by the international capitalflow whereby Germany used the capital it received from America tomake reparations to England and France which used the same moneyto redeem their war debts in the United States But after the NewYork stock market crisis in 1929 American capital was withdrawnfrom Europe causing a financial strain in Germany that eventuallyprovoked a crisis that brought on world depression

These events had immediate repercussions in Japan as well Thegoal of Japans economic policy like that of Britain and the UnitedStates was to return to the gold standard at the prewar price of gold3

The Japanese government did not do so until the advent of the worlddepression in 1929 but during the 1920s the economy was constantlyconstrained by the worldwide deflation and by the governments goalof returning to the gold standard Accordingly the Japanese economyshowed a mild deflationary trend after World War I Moreover thebalance-of-trade deficit persisted The gold and foreign exchange (spe-cie) holdings that had accumulated during the war declined steadilyFor these reasons Japans domestic financial policy also shifted to-ward austerity This was a period of unprecedented testing for theJapanese economy which had developed under the influence of infla-tionary trends since the Meiji period It was particularly difficult forthe new heavy and chemical industries and for capital-weak new firmsthat had emerged during and after the war It was also difficult for

3 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Shawa zaiseishi-Dai 10-kan kinyu (I) (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1955) pp 155-80

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 455

agriculture which was troubled by competition from cheap rice im-ported from Korea and Taiwan and highly susceptible to trends in theNew York silk market

Chronologies of the Japanese economy of the 1920s often refer tothis period as one of recurring panics of greater or lesser magnitude4

The post-World War I boom turned into a panic with the stockmarket crash of 1920 The death knell of wartime prosperity hadsounded Domestic funds dried up as monetary austerity was imposedin order to suppress inflation and the mounting outlays for importsthat accompanied the shift toward deficit in 1919 in the internationalpayments account Despite this the business community continued toexpand and speculate boldly The result was ruin In only a fewmonths stock market prices and commodity market prices for riceraw silk and cotton yarn collapsed to less than half their formervalues There was a stream of trading company bank and factorybankruptcies and economic conditions became chaotic

The government and the Bank of Japan did their utmost to providerelief For example purchasing companies (kaitorigaisha) were orga-nized to handle inventory backlogs of raw silk and a policy of boldlending to depressed industries was established Losses suffered bysmaller zaibatsu like Furukawa Suzuki Kuhara and Masuda espe-cially hard hit by failures of speculative enterprises during the finan-cial panic provided new opportunities for the four leading zaibatsuMitsui Mitsubishi Sumitomo and Yasuda Because they maintainedsound management policies and did not depend on speculative profitseven during the war boom the large zaibatsu suffered few losses in thepanic In addition the leading spinning companies like Kanebo andToyobo had built up large secret reserves during the war and so theywere able to cover the declining prices of their inventories which werecaused by the panic and losses due to customer bankruptcies therebymaintaining their position unshaken The dominant position of thefour great prewar zaibatsu and the large spinning companies remainedfirm

In April 1922 when it appeared that the financial crisis had at lastbeen resolved a small panic was touched off when a trader (IshiiSadashichi) went bankrupt after losing heavily on daring rice specula-tions At the end of 1922 eleven small banks in western Japan failed inrapid succession Then on September 11923 the Tokyo-Yokohama

4 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen shuryogo ni okeni honpo zaikai doyoshi and Kantoshinsai yori Showa 2-nen kinyu kyokoni itaru waga zaikai in Nihon kinyushi shiryo MeijiTaisho ken vol 22 (Tokyo Okurasho insatsu kyoku 1959-60)

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456 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

region was dealt a crushing blow by a powerful earthquake and thedevastating fires that spread in its wake This crisis was weatheredwith the help of a government-implemented month-long moratoriumon payments in the Kan to area The Bank of Japan also averted apanic by rediscounting commercial bills that were to have been paid inthe area (earthquake bills) The Bank of Japans rediscounts totaledyen430 million5 The devastation wrought by the great earthquake wasenormous According to estimates made at the time in seventeenprefectures but primarily in Tokyo 554000 out of 2288 millionhouseholds lost their homes 105000 people lost their lives 30000were injured and 250000 lost their jobs The gross national wealth in1909 was estimated at yen86 billion and losses due to the earthquakewere put at between yen55 billion and yen10 billion6 These blows madeimpossible a return to the gold standard Exports declined sharplyalbeit temporarily and supplies for reconstruction increased importsConsequently the balance of payments went deeply into the red andthe exchange rate fell sharply Early in 1924 the government raisedsome foreign exchange by issuing yen600 million in foreign bonds inBritain and the United States However the extraordinarily high inter-est rate reflecting Japans international credit standing at the timebecame the target of criticism at home The reconstruction of theTokyo-Yokohama area firms that had sustained losses because of thedisaster was of course not simple and the balance sheets of manydeteriorated In 1925 as the postwar business slump continuedTakada shokai a large trading company failed

A financial crisis occurred in March and April of 19277 A largeKobe trading company Suzuki shoten which was hard hit by thepanic of 1920 had just barely managed to stay in business by borrow-ing huge sums from the Bank of Taiwan a colonial bank of issue InMarch 1927 the firm found itself unable to settle its loans of yen67million At the time there was a proposal before the Diet calling forthe government to dispose of a total of yen207 million in outstand-ing earthquake bills and to indemnify the Bank of Japan for lossesamounting to yen100 million The Bank of Japan was to extend long-term loans to banks holding earthquake bills and each bank in turnwas to have its holders of earthquake bill liabilities redeem theirobligations over a period of ten years While this proposal was beingdebated Suzuki shotens internal condition was revealed includingits relationship with the Bank of Taiwan and the unsound manage-

5 Toyo keizai shinposha ed Meiji Taisho kokusei soran (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1927)PP-759-6o 6 Nihonginkochosakyoku Sekai taisenp 876 7 Ibid p 866

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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454 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

THE ERA OF RECESSIONS

Although prices in the United States and Britain soared to more thantwice their prewar levels after World War I both countries returned tothe gold standard without devaluing their currencies against the priceof gold It was thought that reinstituting the gold standard at prewarparity would constitute a return to normalcy (in the words of Presi-dent Warren G Harding) However this amounted to adopting aseverely deflationary policy that would cut back postwar prices toprewar levels about half of the current prices World prices did in factfall in the 1920s John Maynard Keynes author of Monetary Reformand The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill publicly criticizedthese policies but his warnings went unheeded As is well knownKeynes was also critical of the harsh reparations demands imposed onGermany but this too was ignored As it turned out internationalfinance during the 1920s was sustained by the international capitalflow whereby Germany used the capital it received from America tomake reparations to England and France which used the same moneyto redeem their war debts in the United States But after the NewYork stock market crisis in 1929 American capital was withdrawnfrom Europe causing a financial strain in Germany that eventuallyprovoked a crisis that brought on world depression

These events had immediate repercussions in Japan as well Thegoal of Japans economic policy like that of Britain and the UnitedStates was to return to the gold standard at the prewar price of gold3

The Japanese government did not do so until the advent of the worlddepression in 1929 but during the 1920s the economy was constantlyconstrained by the worldwide deflation and by the governments goalof returning to the gold standard Accordingly the Japanese economyshowed a mild deflationary trend after World War I Moreover thebalance-of-trade deficit persisted The gold and foreign exchange (spe-cie) holdings that had accumulated during the war declined steadilyFor these reasons Japans domestic financial policy also shifted to-ward austerity This was a period of unprecedented testing for theJapanese economy which had developed under the influence of infla-tionary trends since the Meiji period It was particularly difficult forthe new heavy and chemical industries and for capital-weak new firmsthat had emerged during and after the war It was also difficult for

3 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Shawa zaiseishi-Dai 10-kan kinyu (I) (Tokyo Toyo keizaishinposha 1955) pp 155-80

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 455

agriculture which was troubled by competition from cheap rice im-ported from Korea and Taiwan and highly susceptible to trends in theNew York silk market

Chronologies of the Japanese economy of the 1920s often refer tothis period as one of recurring panics of greater or lesser magnitude4

The post-World War I boom turned into a panic with the stockmarket crash of 1920 The death knell of wartime prosperity hadsounded Domestic funds dried up as monetary austerity was imposedin order to suppress inflation and the mounting outlays for importsthat accompanied the shift toward deficit in 1919 in the internationalpayments account Despite this the business community continued toexpand and speculate boldly The result was ruin In only a fewmonths stock market prices and commodity market prices for riceraw silk and cotton yarn collapsed to less than half their formervalues There was a stream of trading company bank and factorybankruptcies and economic conditions became chaotic

The government and the Bank of Japan did their utmost to providerelief For example purchasing companies (kaitorigaisha) were orga-nized to handle inventory backlogs of raw silk and a policy of boldlending to depressed industries was established Losses suffered bysmaller zaibatsu like Furukawa Suzuki Kuhara and Masuda espe-cially hard hit by failures of speculative enterprises during the finan-cial panic provided new opportunities for the four leading zaibatsuMitsui Mitsubishi Sumitomo and Yasuda Because they maintainedsound management policies and did not depend on speculative profitseven during the war boom the large zaibatsu suffered few losses in thepanic In addition the leading spinning companies like Kanebo andToyobo had built up large secret reserves during the war and so theywere able to cover the declining prices of their inventories which werecaused by the panic and losses due to customer bankruptcies therebymaintaining their position unshaken The dominant position of thefour great prewar zaibatsu and the large spinning companies remainedfirm

In April 1922 when it appeared that the financial crisis had at lastbeen resolved a small panic was touched off when a trader (IshiiSadashichi) went bankrupt after losing heavily on daring rice specula-tions At the end of 1922 eleven small banks in western Japan failed inrapid succession Then on September 11923 the Tokyo-Yokohama

4 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen shuryogo ni okeni honpo zaikai doyoshi and Kantoshinsai yori Showa 2-nen kinyu kyokoni itaru waga zaikai in Nihon kinyushi shiryo MeijiTaisho ken vol 22 (Tokyo Okurasho insatsu kyoku 1959-60)

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456 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

region was dealt a crushing blow by a powerful earthquake and thedevastating fires that spread in its wake This crisis was weatheredwith the help of a government-implemented month-long moratoriumon payments in the Kan to area The Bank of Japan also averted apanic by rediscounting commercial bills that were to have been paid inthe area (earthquake bills) The Bank of Japans rediscounts totaledyen430 million5 The devastation wrought by the great earthquake wasenormous According to estimates made at the time in seventeenprefectures but primarily in Tokyo 554000 out of 2288 millionhouseholds lost their homes 105000 people lost their lives 30000were injured and 250000 lost their jobs The gross national wealth in1909 was estimated at yen86 billion and losses due to the earthquakewere put at between yen55 billion and yen10 billion6 These blows madeimpossible a return to the gold standard Exports declined sharplyalbeit temporarily and supplies for reconstruction increased importsConsequently the balance of payments went deeply into the red andthe exchange rate fell sharply Early in 1924 the government raisedsome foreign exchange by issuing yen600 million in foreign bonds inBritain and the United States However the extraordinarily high inter-est rate reflecting Japans international credit standing at the timebecame the target of criticism at home The reconstruction of theTokyo-Yokohama area firms that had sustained losses because of thedisaster was of course not simple and the balance sheets of manydeteriorated In 1925 as the postwar business slump continuedTakada shokai a large trading company failed

A financial crisis occurred in March and April of 19277 A largeKobe trading company Suzuki shoten which was hard hit by thepanic of 1920 had just barely managed to stay in business by borrow-ing huge sums from the Bank of Taiwan a colonial bank of issue InMarch 1927 the firm found itself unable to settle its loans of yen67million At the time there was a proposal before the Diet calling forthe government to dispose of a total of yen207 million in outstand-ing earthquake bills and to indemnify the Bank of Japan for lossesamounting to yen100 million The Bank of Japan was to extend long-term loans to banks holding earthquake bills and each bank in turnwas to have its holders of earthquake bill liabilities redeem theirobligations over a period of ten years While this proposal was beingdebated Suzuki shotens internal condition was revealed includingits relationship with the Bank of Taiwan and the unsound manage-

5 Toyo keizai shinposha ed Meiji Taisho kokusei soran (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1927)PP-759-6o 6 Nihonginkochosakyoku Sekai taisenp 876 7 Ibid p 866

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 455

agriculture which was troubled by competition from cheap rice im-ported from Korea and Taiwan and highly susceptible to trends in theNew York silk market

Chronologies of the Japanese economy of the 1920s often refer tothis period as one of recurring panics of greater or lesser magnitude4

The post-World War I boom turned into a panic with the stockmarket crash of 1920 The death knell of wartime prosperity hadsounded Domestic funds dried up as monetary austerity was imposedin order to suppress inflation and the mounting outlays for importsthat accompanied the shift toward deficit in 1919 in the internationalpayments account Despite this the business community continued toexpand and speculate boldly The result was ruin In only a fewmonths stock market prices and commodity market prices for riceraw silk and cotton yarn collapsed to less than half their formervalues There was a stream of trading company bank and factorybankruptcies and economic conditions became chaotic

The government and the Bank of Japan did their utmost to providerelief For example purchasing companies (kaitorigaisha) were orga-nized to handle inventory backlogs of raw silk and a policy of boldlending to depressed industries was established Losses suffered bysmaller zaibatsu like Furukawa Suzuki Kuhara and Masuda espe-cially hard hit by failures of speculative enterprises during the finan-cial panic provided new opportunities for the four leading zaibatsuMitsui Mitsubishi Sumitomo and Yasuda Because they maintainedsound management policies and did not depend on speculative profitseven during the war boom the large zaibatsu suffered few losses in thepanic In addition the leading spinning companies like Kanebo andToyobo had built up large secret reserves during the war and so theywere able to cover the declining prices of their inventories which werecaused by the panic and losses due to customer bankruptcies therebymaintaining their position unshaken The dominant position of thefour great prewar zaibatsu and the large spinning companies remainedfirm

In April 1922 when it appeared that the financial crisis had at lastbeen resolved a small panic was touched off when a trader (IshiiSadashichi) went bankrupt after losing heavily on daring rice specula-tions At the end of 1922 eleven small banks in western Japan failed inrapid succession Then on September 11923 the Tokyo-Yokohama

4 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen shuryogo ni okeni honpo zaikai doyoshi and Kantoshinsai yori Showa 2-nen kinyu kyokoni itaru waga zaikai in Nihon kinyushi shiryo MeijiTaisho ken vol 22 (Tokyo Okurasho insatsu kyoku 1959-60)

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456 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

region was dealt a crushing blow by a powerful earthquake and thedevastating fires that spread in its wake This crisis was weatheredwith the help of a government-implemented month-long moratoriumon payments in the Kan to area The Bank of Japan also averted apanic by rediscounting commercial bills that were to have been paid inthe area (earthquake bills) The Bank of Japans rediscounts totaledyen430 million5 The devastation wrought by the great earthquake wasenormous According to estimates made at the time in seventeenprefectures but primarily in Tokyo 554000 out of 2288 millionhouseholds lost their homes 105000 people lost their lives 30000were injured and 250000 lost their jobs The gross national wealth in1909 was estimated at yen86 billion and losses due to the earthquakewere put at between yen55 billion and yen10 billion6 These blows madeimpossible a return to the gold standard Exports declined sharplyalbeit temporarily and supplies for reconstruction increased importsConsequently the balance of payments went deeply into the red andthe exchange rate fell sharply Early in 1924 the government raisedsome foreign exchange by issuing yen600 million in foreign bonds inBritain and the United States However the extraordinarily high inter-est rate reflecting Japans international credit standing at the timebecame the target of criticism at home The reconstruction of theTokyo-Yokohama area firms that had sustained losses because of thedisaster was of course not simple and the balance sheets of manydeteriorated In 1925 as the postwar business slump continuedTakada shokai a large trading company failed

A financial crisis occurred in March and April of 19277 A largeKobe trading company Suzuki shoten which was hard hit by thepanic of 1920 had just barely managed to stay in business by borrow-ing huge sums from the Bank of Taiwan a colonial bank of issue InMarch 1927 the firm found itself unable to settle its loans of yen67million At the time there was a proposal before the Diet calling forthe government to dispose of a total of yen207 million in outstand-ing earthquake bills and to indemnify the Bank of Japan for lossesamounting to yen100 million The Bank of Japan was to extend long-term loans to banks holding earthquake bills and each bank in turnwas to have its holders of earthquake bill liabilities redeem theirobligations over a period of ten years While this proposal was beingdebated Suzuki shotens internal condition was revealed includingits relationship with the Bank of Taiwan and the unsound manage-

5 Toyo keizai shinposha ed Meiji Taisho kokusei soran (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1927)PP-759-6o 6 Nihonginkochosakyoku Sekai taisenp 876 7 Ibid p 866

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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456 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

region was dealt a crushing blow by a powerful earthquake and thedevastating fires that spread in its wake This crisis was weatheredwith the help of a government-implemented month-long moratoriumon payments in the Kan to area The Bank of Japan also averted apanic by rediscounting commercial bills that were to have been paid inthe area (earthquake bills) The Bank of Japans rediscounts totaledyen430 million5 The devastation wrought by the great earthquake wasenormous According to estimates made at the time in seventeenprefectures but primarily in Tokyo 554000 out of 2288 millionhouseholds lost their homes 105000 people lost their lives 30000were injured and 250000 lost their jobs The gross national wealth in1909 was estimated at yen86 billion and losses due to the earthquakewere put at between yen55 billion and yen10 billion6 These blows madeimpossible a return to the gold standard Exports declined sharplyalbeit temporarily and supplies for reconstruction increased importsConsequently the balance of payments went deeply into the red andthe exchange rate fell sharply Early in 1924 the government raisedsome foreign exchange by issuing yen600 million in foreign bonds inBritain and the United States However the extraordinarily high inter-est rate reflecting Japans international credit standing at the timebecame the target of criticism at home The reconstruction of theTokyo-Yokohama area firms that had sustained losses because of thedisaster was of course not simple and the balance sheets of manydeteriorated In 1925 as the postwar business slump continuedTakada shokai a large trading company failed

A financial crisis occurred in March and April of 19277 A largeKobe trading company Suzuki shoten which was hard hit by thepanic of 1920 had just barely managed to stay in business by borrow-ing huge sums from the Bank of Taiwan a colonial bank of issue InMarch 1927 the firm found itself unable to settle its loans of yen67million At the time there was a proposal before the Diet calling forthe government to dispose of a total of yen207 million in outstand-ing earthquake bills and to indemnify the Bank of Japan for lossesamounting to yen100 million The Bank of Japan was to extend long-term loans to banks holding earthquake bills and each bank in turnwas to have its holders of earthquake bill liabilities redeem theirobligations over a period of ten years While this proposal was beingdebated Suzuki shotens internal condition was revealed includingits relationship with the Bank of Taiwan and the unsound manage-

5 Toyo keizai shinposha ed Meiji Taisho kokusei soran (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1927)PP-759-6o 6 Nihonginkochosakyoku Sekai taisenp 876 7 Ibid p 866

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 457

ment of some other banks as well This set off a run on severalbanks resulting in the suspension of operations for many The earth-quake bill proposal was ultimately voted down In April 1927 whenthe Privy Council rejected a proposal for an urgent imperial order forthe relief of the Bank of Taiwan the bank temporarily closed downSuzuki shoten went bankrupt and the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsedThe bank run had nationwide repercussions Banks throughout thecountry were closed on both April 22 and 23 In the meantime thegovernment announced a twenty-day nationwide payments morato-rium It then decided on a policy for reorganizing the Bank of Tai-wan and providing general relief measures for the banks through theBank of Japan Calm was thus at last restored Eleven percent of allbank deposits nationwide were withdrawn during this bank run andas many as thirty-two banks suspended operations8 Among the latterwere such presumed bastions of financial soundness as the FifteenthBank a depository for the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho)and the Bank of Omi which had provided extensive credit to thetextile industry

Owing to continuing deflationary declines in commodity prices andin the value of real estate and other financial assets many businessfirms continued to operate in the red and to depend on borrowedfunds But the banks supplying these firms with capital were unable tocollect on their loans The deterioration of economic conditions turnedinto a quickly spreading financial panic The smaller panics earlier inthe decade had occurred for virtually the same reasons as this one butthe failures of such nationally known Japanese firms as the Bank ofTaiwan Suzuki shoten and the Fifteenth Bank touched off a nation-wide crisis To cope with the situation the Bank of Japan distributedlarge quantities of capital The crisis was resolved but the return tothe gold standard was thereby once again postponed

One reason that the business conditions of companies and banksdeteriorated during this period was that the executives of many smallregional banks often were managing other firms as well After theirbanks had invested in these companies their operations stagnatedFinally these companies went bankrupt and with them their credi-tor banks as well Concerned about this the Ministry of Financeamended the Banking Law in March 1927 to prohibit bank managersfrom simultaneously managing other businesses and stipulated that

8 Ibid pp 927-99 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

pp 47-51

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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458 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

any bank with capital of under yen i million (yen2 million or less in thelarge cities) should increase its capital to yen1 million or merge withanother bank within five years For this reason the number of bankswhich had stood at 1575 at the end of 1926 fell to 651 by the end of193210 The banks business conditions markedly improved as a resultof these measures but at the same time local industries and smallbusinesses also felt the financial pinch

Because of the prolonged slump that lasted from the postwar crisisof 1920 until the financial panic of 1927 bankruptcies occurred inrapid succession particularly in the secondary industries that hadexpanded during the war Firms that managed to survive were forcedto scale down their operations and many workers lost their jobs Newhires were held down too On the other hand however the numberof small- and medium-sized factories increased Many workers wholost their jobs set up small factories in order to earn a livelihoodHowever these firms were low-income small urban commercial andservice enterprises that absorbed people who could not choose theirworking conditions and who sought employment simply in order tosurvive For this reason the populations of the large cities continuedto increase11 The farm villages were in a continuous recession from1925 onward owing to the worldwide surplus of agricultural commodi-ties and the fall in prices Farmers were forced to increase their produc-tion of silk cocoons in order to maintain their incomes But this re-sulted only in a further drop in international prices and so the farmerswere caught in a vicious circle whereby their redoubled efforts toincrease production only pushed prices lower

Again the only firms that continued stable operations in the midstof this turmoil were the leading textile companies and companies be-longing to the big zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumi-tomo and Yasuda which had abundant funds and sound managementpolicies Some zaibatsu banks were even hard pressed to find ways touse the large influx of deposits from the smaller and weaker banksafter the financial panic12 The zaibatsu extended their network ofinfluence in the economy by taking over through stock transfers thesounder firms owned by companies such as Suzuki shoten or by found-ing new firms in fields such as rayon and chemicals Each of thezaibatsu amassed for itself tremendous power in every field of indus-

10 Okurasho zaiseishi hensanshitsu Showa zaiseishi pp 79-11711 Takafusa Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan trans Robert A Feldman (New

Haven Conn Yale University Press 1983) pp 21822012 Ikeda Shigeake Zaikai kaiko (Tokyo Konnichi no mondaisha 1949) pp 116-17

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 459

try from finance and insurance to mining foreign trade warehous-ing chemicals paper metals and textiles As a group they reignedsupreme over the Japanese industrial world3 The power of thezaibatsu at this time probably attained its highest peak since the end ofthe Meiji period However with this notable exception the outlookfor the Japanese economy did not appear bright Nevertheless asTable 93 shows the economy mainly secondary industry continuedto grow in this troubled period Why

The fundamental condition for this growth likely resulted from thefact that the economy adjusted the balance of social demand and sup-ply not by quantitative controls but by price fluctuationst As in theexample of the vicious circle of expanding cocoon production volumeand the falling price of cocoons it was impossible to regulate thevolume of production in agriculture The core of the manufacturingindustry at this time was the production of consumer goods such asraw silk cotton cloth sugar and flour Competition among the firmsin these fields was fierce Even though temporary cartels were formedit was difficult to limit production volume and stabilize prices as theinterests of the individual firms did not coincide Intense competitionamong the three large firms in the paper industry shows that even inan oligopolistic industry it was not possible to support prices byrestricting production There were additional examples too such asthe impact of international dumping of products like ammoniumsulphate and matches or the heavy blow suffered by domestic coal as aresult of imports from Manchuria

Oligopolistic tendencies became conspicuous in a number of indus-tries such as electric power in which firms continued to merge Cartelswere formed autonomously in every industry as a way of dealing withchronic slumps Thus during this period monopolistic economicpower rapidly strengthened and the domination of monopoly capitalbecame conspicuous But although it is clear that large firms occupieda high position in Japans economic world it cannot be said that theyused their power to maintain price supports or price rigidity in themarkets Monopoly prices emerged after the passage of the ImportantIndustries Control Law in 1931 as a means of dealing with the worlddepression The law required outsiders to keep cartel agreements and

13 See Takahashi Kamekichi Nihon zaibatsu no kaibo (Tokyo Chud koronsha 1930)14 Sato Kazuo Senkanki Nihon no makuro keizai to mikuro keizai in Senkanki Nihon keizai

no kenkyu ed Nakamura Takafusa (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1980) pp 3-30 Satosclarification of the function of price fluctuations is applicable to the Japanese economy of thisperiod

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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TABLE 9 3Employed population by industry (thousands of persons)

Primary industriesAgriculture and forestry

Secondary industriesManufacturing

Tertiary industriesCommerce

Totals

1920(A)

14388138556274507153553398

27260

1925(A)

- 14056135406324510964324260

28105

1930(A)

14648140846151484873314902

29619

1935(A)

14450138716811549884105482

31211

1940(A)

14523139748212656577285000

32500

1940(B)

14192133638419684594034083

32231

Feb 1944(B)

14028131559951808975751555

32695

Dec 1945(B)

18053175205670431463461794

30069

Source Figures in columns marked A are annual averages from Umemura Mataji Sangyo-betsu koyo no hendo 1880-1940-nen in HitotsubashiUniversity Economic Research Institute Keizai kenkyit April 1973 Figures in columns marked B are estimates from Cabinet Statistics Office Kokuseichosa October 1 (for 1940 data) Cabinet Statistics Office Showa 19-nenjinkd chosa (for 1944 data) and Rinji kokumin loroku (for 1945 data) Presented inArai Kurotake Taiheiyo sensoki ni okeruyugyojinko no suitei report of the Japan Statistical Association

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 461

reinforced their powers of control The foregoing shows that economicgrowth was achieved in conjunction with the expansion of industriesbut at the same time it also indicates why business profits accompany-ing growth did not necessarily increase as well

The second main factor in Japans economic growth was the supplyof capital and the protectionist policies toward industry For examplein 1920 when the silk-reeling industry formed the Imperial Silk Fila-ture Company (Teikoku sanshi kabushiki kaisha) as a cartel to buy upand freeze surplus raw silk in order to support silk prices the govern-ment provided assistance in the form of huge loans5 Many large firmsborrowed low-interest funds indirectly from the Bank of Japan whenfacing crises There were also instances in which the government as-sisted companies by leasing plants and equipment16 In agriculture arice law was passed in 1921 The government began buying and sellingoperations to stabilize rice prices and it paid out subsidies under avariety of guises17 The tariff revision of 1926 substantially raisedduties on steel machinery and gave liberal protection to the heavy andchemical industries18

The third main factor was an increase in the governments publicinvestment Under the slogan of a positive policy the Seiyukaiparty in power from 1918 to 1922 vigorously spent public funds onthe construction and expansion of railroads harbors highways andbridges riparian improvements new and expanded educational facili-ties and subsidies for the improvement and reclamation of arableland1 These policies were an expression of the personal views ofPrime Minister Hara Takashi and Finance Minister Takahashi Kore-kiyo regarding the promotion of regional industries At the same timethey were a means of expanding party power at the regional level Thepartys main rival the Kenseikai (renamed the Minseito in 1928)stressed fiscal balance and strove to reduce public investment butwhen the party came to power in the mid-i92os public investmentspending remained at prior levels owing to the need for post-192 3earthquake reconstruction Large provincial cities also actively in-vested in order to modernize As a result of the impact of publicinvestment a large drop in the growth rate was avoided

The fourth factor behind growth was the development of the elec-

15 Nihon ginko chosakyoku Sekai taisen pp 585-8 598 16 Ibid pp 591-62017 Ouchi Tsutomu Nihon nogyo no zaiseigaku (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1950) pp

116-5918 Discussed in detail in Miwa Ryoichi 1926-nen kanzei kaisei no rekishiteki ichi in Nihon

shihonshugi Tenkai to ronri ed Sakasai Takahito et al (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai1978) 19 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 157-73

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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462 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

trie power industry and the effects of its spread20 Investment in elec-tric power generation in the mountainous areas and its transmission toregions around Tokyo and Osaka where demand was great flour-ished during this period Electrochemical industries using this electricpower (ammonium sulfate electric hearth furnace industries and thelike) sprang up and small factories using electric power expandedThe production of electric machinery electric cables light bulbs andradios naturally increased as well The development of streetcar net-works in the suburbs of the major cities the opening up of newresidential areas and the attendant stimulus to residential construc-tion also encouraged growth

In addition those industries built up during World War I such asmachinery steel and chemicals acquired foreign technology duringthis decade and eventually moved into full-scale production Japanwhich had once depended on imports for virtually all its machinery wasat last able to achieve self-sufficiency in this area Second as the heavyand chemical industries were taking root heavy industrial belts grew upbetween Tokyo and Yokohama and between Osaka and Kobe and apool of skilled male workers formed in these areas In order to retain theskills and know-how of these workers within their own organizationsand to thwart the budding labor movement many firms graduallyadopted policies such as the lifetime employment system and the senior-ity pay system later considered to be the distinguishing features ofJapanese management The joint labor-management conference sys-tem which was the prototype of the company labor union was also aproduct of this era

The Japanese economy which had continued to grow despite thesedifficulties was stricken by a severe crisis when the Great Depressionsuddenly hit in 1929 and the Minseito cabinet simultaneously liftedthe embargo on gold exports at the old parity21 Since 1897 the Japa-nese yen had been valued at 075 grams of gold The rate of exchangeagainst the dollar during this period was yen100 to $4978 In 1916 Japanand the other world powers placed an embargo on gold exports Al-though the European powers and the United States lifted their goldembargoes by 1928 Japan alone kept its intact The nation had anexcess of imports over exports (see Figure 91) the exchange rate wasconsiderably lower than it had been at the old parity and gold andforeign exchange reserves steadily decreased Even in 1929 the yenreached a minimum rate against the dollar in the range of yen100 to $43

20 Minami Ryoshin Doryoku kakumei to gijutsu shimpo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1976)provides a full-scale study of this question

21 Nakamura Takafusa Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku (Tokyo Nihon keizai shinbunsha 1978)

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 463

Thousand million yen(at 1934-1936 prices)

1920 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

Figure 91 Fluctuations in foreign trade the exchange rate GNEand prices [From Yamazawa Ippei and Yamamoto Yuzo Chokikeizai tokeimdash14 Boeki to kokusai shushi (Tokyo Toyo keizai shin-posha 1974)-]

Removal of the gold embargo at the old parity would mean a rise in theexchange rate causing a further increase in the already excessive im-ports In order to prevent this domestic demand would have to falland deflationary policies would have to be adopted to pull pricesdownward This meant forcing still further hardships on industryNevertheless Inoue Junnosuke the Finance Minister in the Hama-guchi cabinet resolutely lifted the gold embargo at the old parity

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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464 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Theoretically it would also have been possible to lift the embargo atthe so-called new parity under which the yens value in gold wouldhave declined in accordance with the market rate of foreign exchangewithout damaging business and economic interests22 Removal of theembargo at a new parity was hinted at the conclusion of the GenoaConference of 1922 Ishibashi Tanzan Takahashi Kamekichi andother economic journalists following Keyness criticism of WinstonChurchill advocated lifting the embargo at this new parity But therewere at least two reasons that Finance Minister Inoue did not choose todo so The first was his political judgment that a currency devaluationwould adversely affect the national prestige The second reason was hisdoctrine of consolidating the business world according to whichdeflationary policies should be adopted to promote exports and improvethe balance of payments noncompetitive firms should be eliminatedand the economys international competitiveness should be strength-ened The Minseito government took the same course that Churchillhad chosen for Great Britain in 1925 Both academic and financialcircles supported Inoues policy and applauded its resoluteness

While the impact of the American panic of October 1929 was stillreverberating throughout the world the Japanese government liftedthe gold embargo at the old parity in January 1930 These two blowsstruck the Japanese economy simultaneously and the country wasplunged into a severe depression As the advanced nations begandumping and domestic demand declined the chemical and heavy in-dustries which were uncompetitive by international standards sankand were forced to reduce their work forces The mining industrytoo confronted with competition from Manchurian coal dismissednearly 40 percent of its workers Although Japans world-class textileindustry was highly competitive many firms nevertheless chalked uplosses Osaka godobo one of the five leading spinning companies wasforced to merge with Toyo Spinning (Toyobo) Even at Kanebo re-puted to be the top firm a fifty-four-day strike occurred when man-agement proposed a 40 percent wage cut Every industry formed car-tels striving to reduce output and maintain prices The governmentenacted the Important Industries Control Law which empowered itto compel firms to follow the cartel agreements and it worked tostrengthen the self-regulation of industry23 Hardest hit however

22 Takahashi Kamekichi Taishd Showa zaikai hendoshi vol 2 (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha1954) consistently criticizes Inoues financial policies from this position

23 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai u-kan Sangyo tosei (Tokyo Tsusho sangyo kenkyu-sha 1964) pp 47-76

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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THE ERA OF RECESSIONS 465

were the farm villages already having been battered by economicslumps throughout the 1920s The countryside reeled under the sud-den drop in the prices of key commodities such as rice and silk co-coons 4 There were many instances reported of salary payments forvillage primary schoolteachers being postponed for half a year due toshortfalls in local tax revenues and of increases in the number ofhomes that had their electricity cut off In metropolitan areas thenumber of unemployed grew and the majority of recent universitygraduates were unable to find work

To cope with this crisis the Minseito government did not change itspolicies Instead it continued fiscal and monetary austerity waited fora recovery from the depression and attempted to maintain the goldstandard Figure 91 shows that even between 1929 and 1931 importsand exports increased steadily in real terms as did real GNE In nomi-nal terms however there was a marked decline in all three This demon-strates that the depression was concentrated in a decline in pricesreflecting the special characteristic of the Japanese economy In 1931export prices had fallen to 40 percent and the GNE deflator to 73percent of their respective 1929 levels As a result both firms and farmhouseholds went into the red and unemployment grew Although thispattern was typical of depressions since the nineteenth century this onewas the most severe in Japans history Amid the growing social unrestPrime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was wounded by a right-wingyouths bullet that claimed his life after he retired from office Neverthe-less the Minseito cabinet did not depart from its original policies

On September 181931 the Manchurian incident occurred DespiteTokyos policy of nonexpansion the Kwantung Army produced a suc-cession of military faits accomplis and expanded the battlefront Thisput the government in a difficult position On September 23 immedi-ately after the incident Great Britain went off the gold standard Be-cause of the financial crisis in Germany it had become impossible torecover British funds there As orders to reclaim funds invested inBritain came pouring in from continental investors threatened by thissituation it had finally become impossible to cope with the volumeFrom the perspective of the world economy as a whole the abandon-ment of the gold standard by Great Britain the home of the worlds goldstandard system marked a shift toward the international managed cur-rency system of the 1930s and afterward In Japan speculators whohad already recognized that maintaining the gold standard was impossi-

24 Nakamura Showa kyoko to keizai seisaku pp 107-12

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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466 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ble began both to sell yen and to buy dollars in hopes of realizing profitson the forthcoming decline of the yen The major speculators wereactually foreign banks in Japan and wealthy individuals but thezaibatsu banks especially the Mitsui and Mitsubishi banks were con-sidered to be the principal actors at the time The Mitsui Bank forexample had been investing in British government securities via theUnited States because it was difficult to make stable investments inJapan during the depression When those funds were frozen the bankbought dollars to cover them but this was erroneously reported asdollar buying speculation25

In the face of these trends the Minseito cabinet continued to sup-port the gold standard in accordance with its established policy Thematter turned into an issue that affected the political fate of theMinseito cabinet Finance Minister Inoue harshly criticized those pur-chasing dollars Mitsui and Mitsubishi regarded as the main specula-tors in dollars thus became the targets of social opprobrium Becausethe government and the Bank of Japan tightened monetary conditionsby raising the discount rate in order to absorb the speculators fundsthe depression became even more severe Dollar speculators particu-larly the foreign banks could not readily reverse their course andcancel their dollar buy-orders As the end-of-December delivery daterapidly approached for the bulk of the foreign-exchange dollars soldtheir expected hope of realizing speculative gains grew steadily dim-mer On December 11 the Minseito cabinet finally collapsed disagree-ing over Home Minister Adachi Kenzos insistence on a coalition withthe Seiyukai It is said that a speculators plot lay behind Adachisactions but even today the facts are not clear

Succeeding to power the Seiyukai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshibrought Takahashi Korekiyo to the office of finance minister OnDecember 13 1931 gold was reembargoed and payments of speciewere suspended This act proclaimed the end of the gold standard inJapan forever The relationship of trust and cooperation between Ja-pans financial circles and those in Britain and the United States gradu-ally cooled afterward This relationship cultivated by Japanese finan-cial circles since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it possiblefor Japan to raise foreign capital after the Kanto earthquake and tofloat local bond issues and electric power company bonds repeatedlyduring the 1920s But with the Manchurian incident the founding ofManchukuo and the outbreak of the Shanghai incident Thomas La-

25 Ikeda Zaikai kaiko pp 135-53

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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RECOVERY 467

mont of the Morgan Bank began to take an unfriendly view of Japan26

This cooling of international financial relationships meant that whenJapan faced a balance-of-payments crisis it could no longer lookabroad for help However for several years after Japans departurefrom the gold standard the Japanese economy followed a course ofrapid revival and development and so the balance-of-payments prob-lem became a severe constraint for Japan only after war began withChina in 1937

RECOVERY

With the exception of a six-month interim out of office TakahashiKorekiyo was at the fiscal and monetary helm as minister of financefrom the time Japan left the gold standard in December 1931 until hewas felled by an assassins bullet in February 193627 This was the era ofthe so-called Takahashi finance While avoiding abrupt changes Taka-hashi gradually relaxed the monetary conditions and promoted industryand foreign trade In order to do so he began lowering the discount ratefrom 1932 onward reducing it from 66 percent to 37 percent by July1933 He took a laissez-faire position on the falling exchange rateAllowed to settle to its natural equilibrium level the rate of exchangeagainst the US dollar had dropped from yen100 to $4978 to around $26by mid-1932 and after falling below $20 at the end of that year settledat about $3080 This was a devaluation of more than 40 percent Fiscalspending for the military and for rural village relief increased growingin 1932 by 32 percent over 1931 levels Central government expendi-tures declined from yen174 billion in 1929 to yen148 billion in 1931 andthen increased to yen195 billion in 1932 and yen225 billion in 1933 afterwhich they were fixed at a level of about yen22 billion Spending in-creases were financed with government bonds but in order not tosiphon private funds off the market with a huge government debt issuea Bank of Japan acceptance issues formula was adopted28 The Bankof Japan underwrote the bonds when issued and whenever there was asurplus of funds on the market as fiscal spending proceeded the Bankof Japan would sell bonds to financial institutions26 Mitani Taichiro Kokusai kinyu shihon to Ajia no senso in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu vol 2

Kindai Nihon to Higashi Ajia ed Kindai Nihon kenkyukai (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha1980) pp 126-7 This study is an outstanding piece of research on the Morgan TradingCompanys Thomas W Lamont

27 An excellent summary of Takahashis ideas and policies from the point of view of his contem-poraries may be found in Fukai Eigo Kaiko 70-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1941) chap21

28 Ibid pp 268-70

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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468 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

At the heart of the early phase of Takahashi finance which lasteduntil 1933 was a triad of policies consisting of low interest rates a lowexchange rate and increased fiscal spending Under these policies theJapanese economy began to recover rapidly In 1929 at the time thegold embargo was lifted Takahashi had argued publicly that there wasa difference between a nations economy and that of an individual29

Saving and economizing produced increases in individual assets butfor the nation as a whole they caused a decline in demand and de-pressed production Even the money spent at geisha houses becameincome for the geisha and cooks and this in turn was respent increas-ing demand for the nation as a whole If gold were disembargoedfiscal spending squeezed and public works investment suspendedTakahashi argued contractors and their employees would lose theirjobs first then as their expenditures declined the effects would spreadto other fields and both incomes and employment in general wouldfall thereby inviting a business slump Takahashi intuitively under-stood the theory of effective demand subsequently advanced byKeynes and from that point of view he criticized lifting the goldembargo at the old parity As finance minister Takahashis policieswere based on the concept of promoting effective demand

These policies were successful The economy expanded first as aresult of the revival of exports and then under the stimulation of in-creased fiscal spending According to a survey of the data in Table 94for the years 1932 to 1936 the largest contribution to growth was madeby exports Chiefly responsible for the export increase were textileproducts such as cotton and rayon fabrics industries in which depres-sion-induced rationalization-that is efforts to increase productivity-meshed with the low exchange rate to produce remarkable advancesThe rapid increase in Japanese exports during the depression provokedboycotts of Japanese goods in countries such as Britain India and theUnited States Discriminatory tariffs and import quotas were imposedon Japanese goods and there were numerous trade disputes30 Thesecond-fastest-growing sector after exports was private investmentwith both production facilities and residential construction growing atabout the same rate Purchases in government spending were lowerthan expected From 1933 onward Takahashi strove to hold down

29 Takahashi Korekiyo Kinshuku seisaku to kinkaikin in Zuisoroku ed Takahashi Kore-kiyo (Tokyo Chikura shobo 1936)

30 For the recollections of Inoue Kiyoshi Okada Gentaro Tawa Yasuo and others see AndoYoshio edShotua seijikeizashi e no shogen 3 vols (Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1972) vol1 pp 283-306

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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TABLE 94Increases in real gross national expenditure (yen billions)

19311936Amount of increase

during this periodRate of increase

during this period ()

GNE

13-32319338

6013

45-1

Personalconsumptionexpenditure

9-75413328

3-574

366

Governmentoperating

expenditures

16852183

0498

296-

Gross governmentfixed-capital

formation

09021427

0525

582_ y

39-5

Gross privatefixed-capital

formation

10582209

115

1088

Exports andincome from

abroad

20294580

2551

1257

(Less) Importsand income

going abroad

21054389

2284

1085

Source Calculated from Ohkawa Kazushi et al Kokumin shotoku Choki keizai tokei vol I (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1974) pp 214 218-21

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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470 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

fiscal spending increases including military spending and to reducethe issuing of public bonds It was once widely believed that the revivalof prosperity in the early 1930s was due to increased military spendingbut this is incorrect According to Miwa Ryoichi the rate of depen-dence of heavy and chemical industrial output on military demand wasat its maximum in 1933 at 98 percent and then declined to 7 percent in1936 For the machinery industry this rate peaked in 1932 at 28 percentbut fell to 18 percent in 19363 Even though the political clout of themilitary grew stronger the influence of military spending on the econ-omy was not all that great

Along with military spending an important item of fiscal expendi-ture during this period was the outlay for public works projects forrural village relief (expenditures to meet the national emergency -jikyoku kyokyuhi)2 At the beginning of 1932 rural village relief be-came a major issue The assassins of former Finance Minister InoueJunnosuke Dan Takuma of the Mitsui zaibatsu and Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 incident were farm village youthsfrom Ibaraki Prefecture In the wake of the bloody May 15 incidentrepresentatives from the peasantry and the provinces submitted astream of petitions to the Diet The political parties aligned them-selves with their demands In the summer of 1932 they settled on aplan that called for joint expenditure by the central and regional gov-ernments of a total of yen800 million on rural public works projectscreating opportunities for peasants to obtain cash incomes during thethree-year period from 1932 to 1934 The plan also provided for low-interest loans of yen800 million to farm villages over the same periodand for the amortization of high-interest obligations The level ofgovernment expenditure on rural relief compares favorably with theincreases in military spending during the same period If the supply oflow-interest funds is included as well the implementation of the planmay even be considered to have had a stimulating effect on the econ-omy surpassing even that of military spending The situation of therural villages gradually improved as the Ministry of Agriculture en-couraged the industrial associations movement and the self-reliancemovement (jiriki kosei undo)

Policies protecting infant industries were also reinforced In 1932tariffs were raised on most chemical and heavy industrial productsparticularly pig iron Considering the roughly 80 percent increase in

31 Miwa Ryoichi Takahashi zaiseiki no keizai seisaku in Senji Nihon keizai ed Tokyodaigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (Tokyo Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 1979) pp 165 167

32 Ibid pp 120-2

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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RECOVERY 471

TABLE 9 5The progress of chemical and heavy industrialization

Share of gross output produced by theIndex of gross output steel nonferrous metals machinery

for manufacturing industries and chemical industries ()

1920 614 3231930 1000 3501936 1758 4501940 2182 592

Source Calculated from Shinohara Miyohei Kokogyo (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1972) vol10 pp 142 143

import prices from 1931 to 1933 caused by the declining exchangerate it may well be that the chemical and heavy industries found itsubstantially easier to secure domestic markets for themselves Theshipbuilding and marine transport industries benefited when the gov-ernment began to pay subsidies in 19^2 for the dismantling of oldships and the construction of new ones33 Incentives had been grantedto the automobile industry since the beginning of the depression andafter 1936 still more substantial protection was added in connectionwith munitions production In this way various industries made asteady recovery seizing on new opportunities for development

The rapid growth of the rayon industry attracted much attention inindustrial circles By improving their technology leading firms likeToyo Rayon Teijin and Asahi Bemberg became the worlds largestproducers of artificial fibers establishing themselves as a major exportindustry in the latter half of the 1930s The technology of such indus-tries as electrical machinery and machine tools represented by Toshibaand Hitachi also began to approach world standards and at last becamecapable of meeting domestic demand With support from the militarythe aircraft industry also raised its level of technology As Table 95shows the expansion of chemical and heavy industrial output was re-markable Its share in the value of the output of manufacturing indus-tries rose by 10 percent from 1931 to 1936 to constitute 45 percent of thetotal

Another feature of this period was the emergence of the newzaibatsu such as Ayukawa Yoshisukes Nissan (Japan Industrial Com-pany) Noguchi Shitagaus Nitchitsu (Japan Nitrogen Company) MoriNobuterus Showa hiryo (Showa Fertilizer later known as Showa

33 Ibid pp 123-5

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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472 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

denko) Nakano Tomonoris Nisso (Japan Soda) Okochi MasatoshisRiken Inc and Nakajima Chikuheis Nakajima hikkoki (NakajimaAircraft)34 Nissan controlled firms in mining automobiles chemicalsfisheries records marine transport and civil engineering through itsholding company This new zaibatsu grew rapidly by progressivelybuying up at low prices the stocks of firms whose operations werefoundering improving their performance and channeling the profitsinto Nippon sangyo Nissans holding company When Nippon san-gyos stock rose as a result its capital increased and these funds wereused to expand still further Nissans sphere of activities Nippon chisso(Japan Nitrogen Corporation) using electric power obtained from itsown hydroelectric generating operations to enter the chemical industrybuilt a large hydroelectric generating plant in north Korea in the 1920sand produced ammonium sulphate gunpowder and methanol with theabundant and cheap electrical power generated there The cost of Nip-pon chissos ammonium sulphate was especially low making this com-pany one of the strongest firms in Japan at the time Noguchi Shitagauthe firms founder also achieved great success in the rayon industryShowa Fertilizer which started out as a tiny provincial company ex-panded by adopting the process that the Tokyo Industrial Laboratoryhad developed for manufacturing ammonium sulphate and by linkingthis process to the development of hydroelectric stations NakanoTomonori attained success in the soda industry by presiding over JapanSoda and branching out into related fields As a Tokyo Imperial Univer-sity professor Okochi headed up the Institute of Physical and ChemicalResearch Devoting his attention to industrial applications of the tech-nology and products developed there he engaged in a broad range ofprojects from piston rings to synthetic sake Nakajima a navy officerpromoting a domestic airplane industry turned his hand to producingmilitary aircraft Toyota had produced automobiles since the 1920sbuilding on the technology it had developed to manufacture automaticlooms

These new zaibatsu grew by taking advantage of technology thathad been accumulating since the 1920s the economic developmentthat followed the reimposition of the gold embargo and the stagnationof monetary conditions The managers of these new zaibatsu had sev-eral things in common They were technical and military men notmanagement specialists they developed their firms on the basis of new

34 See Miyake Seiki Shinkokontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937) and Wada HidekichiNissan kontserun tokuhon (Tokyo Shunjusha 1937)

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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RECOVERY 473

technology they had few links with the existing zaibatsu and financialinstitutions and they had little capital All of them also started up newindustries using state capital Whereas they were engaged mainly inthe chemical and heavy industries and had the capability to producemunitions in wartime their technology was also useful in peacetimeAs such their firms could easily adapt to postwar economic growthBecause the economy of the 1930s had already produced pioneers likeToyota and Nissan it also had clear links with the post-i95os eco-nomic growth

Special laws to promote the development of the chemical and heavyindustries passed the Diet in rapid succession35 Beginning with theOil Industry Law passed in 1934 and the Automobile ManufacturersLaw in 1936 special laws covering the synthetic oil iron machinetools aircraft-manufacturing shipbuilding aluminum and light metals organic chemicals and heavy machinery industries had btpassed by 1941 Their provisions were generally similar Governmentapproval was required for the firms yearly plans via a governmentlicensing system unified standards and control over manufacturingand distribution were imposed firms were directed to respond to therequirements of the military and the public interest and the govern-ment could order the expansion and improvement of plants and equip-ment as well as changes in methods of operation and production plansThese special laws ruled that enterprises incurring losses be compen-sated according to government decree The laws also provided otherforms of protection such as exemption from land expropriation in-come taxes and corporate taxes the granting of bounties and subsi-dies special privileges for debenture flotations and the compulsoryamortization of plant and equipment The protectionist policy embod-ied in these special laws contributed greatly to the development of thechemical and heavy industries during the war and may be regarded asthe genesis of the postwar policy of promoting these industries

In the meantime the older established zaibatsu which had becomethe targets of social opprobrium did their best in the early 1930s toavert criticism The Mitsui zaibatsu partly because it was the mostseverely criticized set up a foundation called the Mitsui hoonkai(Mitsui Repayment of Kindness Association) to perform social workservices and forced the resignation of Mitsui bussans managing direc-tor Yasukawa Shunosuke who had been criticized for his aggressiveactivities Mitsubishi and Sumitomo made similar efforts Frequently

35 Maeda Yasuyuki Shoko seisakushi Dai li-kan pp 238-50

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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474 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

likened to the conversion (tenko) of Communist Party members suchbehavior was called zaibatsu conversion The activities of the olderzaibatsu were generally conservative in this period and their influencein the economy as a whole declined Because fiscal spending increaseswent to farm villages or to small- and medium-sized enterprises theexpansion of deposits in zaibatsu banks was also slow After 1933 theSanwa Bank of Osaka which had many provincial branches led involume of deposits

But as a consequence of the Showa financial crisis oligopolistic con-trol in individual industries advanced During the recovery periodhuge trusts were formed in the iron and paper industries In 1933 sevenprivate iron-steel manufacturing firms merged with the government-operated Yawata Iron and Steel Works to form the Nippon seitetsu KK(Japan Steel Company) which controlled 975 percent of domestic pigiron production and 515 percent of domestic steel ingot productionBefore the Showa financial crisis the market had been controlled bymeans of a cartel centered on the Yawata Iron Works but as a result ofthe merger it became possible to control the market through a singlegiant firm The same year Mitsuis Oji Paper Company OkawaHeizaburos Fuji Paper Company and Sakhalin Industries merged toform the Oji Paper Company a large trust that controlled 90 percent ofnewsprint production Because imports of steel products and machine-made paper were depressed by the low exchange rate these monopoliesended up dominating their respective domestic markets and after thewar they were broken up by the economic deconcentration policyDuring 1932 and 1933 large-scale business mergers were also carriedout in rapid succession in banking beer and machinery The functionsof cartels were also strengthened The large electric power companieshard-pressed during the depression and plagued by the pressure of theirloans from financial institutions acceded to the demands of the zaibatsubanks to form an electric power federation When prices for goodsproduced in industries dominated by trusts and cartels increased as aresult of these trends the criticism of these monopolies grew strongerIn 1936 the Important Industries Control Law was amended so as tosuppress the activities of the cartels 6

In the 1930s Japan also focused on the economic development ofthe puppet state Manchukuo and the economic penetration of northChina With support from the government in Tokyo the KwantungArmy in de facto control of Manchuria collaborated with the South

36 Ibid pp 68-72

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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RECOVERY 475

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) to set up the MantetsuEconomic Research Bureau and the First Economic Construction Planfor Manchukuo The plans essential goals which rested on an ideol-ogy critical of a free economy and domestic capitalism were to preventcapitalists from monopolizing profits to promote the good of allthe people to place key economic sectors under state control andto develop economic interdependence between Manchuria and Japan

With regard to currency the Manchukuo Central Bank was estab-lished and a managed currency (the yuan) linked to the Japanese yenat parity was issued Japan and Manchukuo thus had a shared cur-rency and the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc came into be-ing 38 This measure was in line with general worldwide trends after theabandonment of the gold standard that is the creation of a sterlingbloc centered on Great Britain and the Commonwealth and a dollarbloc centered on the United States In industrial development keyindustries such as steel gold mining coal mining oil ammoniumsulphate soda coal liquefaction electric power automobile trans-port and air transport were placed under state control Following theprinciple of establishing one company per industry special corpora-tions were created by the Manchukuo government and the SouthManchurian Railway each putting up 30 percent of the capital and theremainder being raised from the general public39 The Manchukuogovernment supervised the personnel and accounting of these specialcompanies but it also granted them special privileges such as profitsubsidies and tax exemptions Because Manchukuo was originallyfounded under the slogans of Denounce capitalism and Keep outthe zaibatsu direct investment from metropolitan Japan was ex-cluded The capital for industrial development was raised through theissue of South Manchurian Railway debentures Domestic capital waspermitted to be used in industries not considered key but a policy wasadopted to discourage the development of industries that competedwith domestic Japanese production such as rice cultivation and cottonspinning

Because this conception of Manchurian development was based onthe anticapitalist ideology of the Kwantung Army and the South Man-churian Railway the domestic economic community was hostile The

37 Kobayashi Hideo Manshu kinyu kozo no saihensei katei-1930 nendai zenhanki o chushinto shite in Nihon teikokushugika no Manshu ed Manshushi kenkyukai (TokyoOchanomizu shobo 1972) pp 151-74 38 Ibid pp 196-206

39 Hara Akira 1930 nendai no Manshu keizai tosei seisaku in Nihon teikokushugika noManshu pp 44-9

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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4 7 6 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

flotation of South Manchurian Railway debentures thus fared poorlyFurthermore it was impossible for the South Manchurian Railwaywhose personnel came mainly from railroad or military backgroundsto provide the workers necessary for extensive industrial developmentThis was the Achilles heel of the South Manchurian Railway Com-pany which on the pretext of cooperating in building the new coun-try was attempting to control the Manchukuo economy It was alsothe reason that the company gradually became estranged from thearmy After 1933 the Kwantung Army drew up a plan to split theSouth Manchuria Railway Company into a group of independent affili-ates (kogaisha) one for each sector The South Manchurian RailwayCompanys functions were limited to managing the railroad and actingas a holding company for the affiliate companies The KwantungArmy also devised a plan to strengthen its control over the affiliatecompanies The plan came to naught but rather than abandon it thearmy continued to look for an opportunity to put it into effect40

Driven by a sense of crisis and aware that it might he necessary tocomply with the armys plan the South Manchurian Railway plannedto move south of the Great Wall into north China After 1934 theKwantung Army cooperated with the North China Garrison army toestablish a de facto sphere of influence in north China by cutting it offfrom Kuomintang control and setting up pro-Japanese political re-gimes It also developed plans for obtaining from the area raw materi-als such as iron ore coal and salt which were in short supply inManchukuo The South Manchurian Railway did the research for thisproject1 In 1935 the railway established the Hsingchong (ReviveChina) Company as its affiliate The North China Garrison Armysucceeded in establishing a pro-Japanese regime in eastern Hopei anda regime with a certain degree of autonomy from Nanking in Hopei-Chahar After 1936 the Japanese negotiated with both these regimesfor rights to develop their raw material resources but the effort didnot make much progress owing to opposition from the Chinese Butthese practical maneuvers did enable the advance by Japans big spin-ning companies into the Tientsin area particularly after 1936

The domestic situation in Japan changed radically with the in-creased power of the military after 1936 On February 26 1936

40 Hara Akira Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai-Mantetsu kaiso to Mangyosoritsu o megutte in Nihon keizai seisakushi ton ed Ando Yoshio (Tokyo Tokyo daigakushuppankai 1976) vol 2 pp 211-13 296

41 Nakamura Takafusa Nihon no kahoku keizai kosaku in Kindai Nihon kenkyukai vol 2pp 159-204

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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RECOVERY 477

Takahashi Korekiyo was killed by a military assassination squad Un-der the newly formed Hirota cabinet which was dominated by thedemands of the military the economy strayed from the path of eco-nomic rationality Since 1934 Takahashi had consolidated the level offiscal spending had done his utmost to curb the expansion of militaryspending and had tried to reduce the size of government bond issuesThese policies seem to have reflected the views of Fukai Eigo gover-nor of the Bank of Japan and a close partner of Takahashi who agreedwith Keyness theory of true inflation According to this theory ifthere is a surplus of capital plants and equipment raw materials orlabor an expansion of demand will not induce inflation but if thatmargin of surplus is lost inflation will occur Fukai appears to havebelieved that Japan had achieved virtual full employment in the latterhalf of 193542 Takahashis opposition to an expanded scale of militaryand fiscal spending was thus based on such thinking

Finding it impossible to oppose the demands of the military Fi-nance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet attempted to cooper-ate with them He approved a five-year large-scale armament expan-sion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy43 The nationalbudget for fiscal year 1937 was almost 40 percent larger than that ofFY 1936 This budget expansion was to be covered by a large taxincrease and national bond issues To facilitate the issue of publicbonds Baba lowered the discount rate and revived a low-interest-ratepolicy Business leaders resisted the proposed tax increase but at thesame time they moved to increase imports in anticipation of inflationand a stronger demand for imported raw materials accompanying theexpansion in military demand As a result the balance of paymentswas heavily in the red at the end of 1936 At the beginning of the yearthe country had to begin shipping gold abroad Price increases alsobecame noticeable Babas policies failed immediately and after aclash with the Diet in January 1937 the Hirota cabinet was replacedby the Hayashi cabinet The new finance minister Yuki Toyotaroreduced Babas budget curtailed the tax increases and mended rela-tions with business leaders When the first Konoe cabinet was orga-nized in June 1937 Kaya Okinori and Yoshino Shinji two leadingbureaucrats took office as minister of finance and minister of com-merce and industry

In the army Ishiwara Kanji the planner and executor of the Man-

42 Fukai Kaiko yo-nen pp 322-331 See also Yoshino Toshihiko Rekidai Nihon ginko sosai ran(Tokyo Mainichi shinbunsha 1976) pp 186-8

43 Aoki Nobumitsu Baba Eiichi den (Tokyo Ko Baba Eiichi-shi kinenkai 1945) pp 263-4

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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478 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

churian incident took the lead in formulating a plan to expand directmilitary preparations for the expected outbreak of war with the SovietUnion to expand the chemical and heavy industries and to establish afirm base for munitions production This plans objective was to ex-pand the productive capacity of the Japan-Manchukuo economicbloc swiftly drawing on the resources of Japan Manchukuo andnorth China Table 96 shows that yen61 billion of the needed capitalwas to come from domestic Japan and yen24 billion from ManchuriaThe army plan which took approximately one year to draft waspresented to the Konoe cabinet which was organized with the missionof implementing it In the summer of 1936 Ishiwara seeking a reviewof the plan had shown the newly completed first draft to a few politi-cians including Konoe and to members of financial circles such asIkeda Shigeaki Ayukawa Yoshisuke and Yuki Toyotaro He ob-tained their informal consent to cooperate in implementing the planYukis appointment as finance minister Ikedas appointment as gover-nor of the Bank of Japan during the Hayashi cabinet and Konoessubsequent appointment as prime minister all were intended to encour-age the realization of this plan

The Konoe cabinet was unable to use such methods as fiscaland monetary stringency suppression of domestic demand reductionof imports and promotion of exports to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit Immediately after taking office Finance MinisterKaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino announced threeeconomic principles expansion of productive capacity balance of pay-ments equilibrium and regulation of the supply and demand forgoods This announcement indicated that their attention would beturned to establishing priorities for commodity imports and expandingproductive capacity within the constraints imposed by preserving thebalance-of-payments equilibrium It implied the necessity of imple-menting direct national controls over commodity imports and capitalEconomic controls were thus invoked across the board after the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 but even if the war had notoccurred it is highly likely that sooner or later controls would havebecome unavoidable

In Manchuria the Manchuria Five-Year Development Plan basedon Ishiwaras first draft was drawn up and immediately put into effectin 1937 It was thought that to carry out this plan skilled specialistsshould manage industrial production In November 1937 Nissans

44 Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan pp 268-85

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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TABLE 9 6Production targets in the five-year plan for key industries

Ordinary automobiles (1000s)Machine tools (1000s)Rolled steel (1000s of tons)Oil (1000s kl)Coal (1000s tons)Aluminum (1000s tons)Magnesium (1000s tons)Electric power (1000s kw)Shipbuilding (1000s tons)

(A) Production targets

Total

10050

130005650

110000100

912750

930

Japan

9045

90003250

72000709

11170860

Manchuria

105

40002400

38000303

140070

Total

3713

4850364

555602105

7210500

(B) Present capacity

Japan

3713

4400210

420002105

6750500

Manchuria

mdash45

15413560

mdashmdash

460mdash

(A) as a proportion of (B)

Total

273827

1562048481719

Japan

243520

1551733331717

Manchuria

mdash89

156280

mdashmdash30

Note Other than these the production target for weapons was yen960 million a 21-fold increase over current capacity and the target for airplanes was10000 (Japan 7000 Manchuria 3000)Source Juyo sangyo go-ka-nen keikaku jisshi ni kansuru seisaku taiko (an) Ministry of the Army May 29 1937 Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masaoeds Gendaishishiryo vol 8 MtcAusens6(l) (Tokyo Misuzushobo 1964) pp 730746

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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480 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

Ayukawa Yoshisuke founded Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo)Using Nissans capital and technology he gathered all the Manchuriancompanies in the heavy and chemical industries under its control45 TheSouth Manchurian Railway become a holding company concentratingon operating the railroad and its reorganization was accomplished onlyafter many setbacks

WAR

In July 1937 Japan plunged into an undeclared war with China Con-trary to expectations that it would be decided quickly the warstretched on The nations economic strength was strained by short-ages of key raw materials particularly oil and the tightening of eco-nomic controls Economically the outbreak of the China war was buta continuation of the trajectory along which the country had alreadybeen hurled The Japanese economy was administered with the soleobject of meeting the military demand Ordinary industry and popularlivelihood were sacrificed to that end Although several factors linkedto postwar economic growth were developed during this period theprocess as a whole was a march to destruction

The most persistent feature of the war economy was the continualstrengthening of economic controls War with China broke out justafter the government accepted the armys plan for heavy and chemicalindustrialization There was no alternative but to administer the econ-omy by strengthening controls and by giving priority in allocatinglimited materials and capital to meet military demand The necessityfor economic controls had been urged by young bureaucrats militarypersonnel and even economists since the 192OS46 The worldwidedepression made clear that the capitalist free economies had come to astandstill The need to control the economy and to institute planningcould be seen from the success of the Soviet Unions five-year plansThe military also contended that World War I had demonstrated thatthe next war would be a total war requiring the mobilization of theeconomy as well as the polity Research on the development of amobilization structure had in fact been conducted at the Natural Re-

45 See Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai in Nihon keizai seisakushi ran vol2 pp 209-96

46 Nagata Tetsuzan Kokka sodoin junbi shisetsu to seishonen kunren in Kokka sodoin no igied Tsujimura Kusuzo (Tokyo Aoyama shoin 1925) is a good example of early ideas onmobilization An outstanding summary of the mobilization scheme focusing on the militarymay be found in Mikuriya Takashi Kokusaku togo kikan setchi mondai no shiteki tenkaiin Kindai Nihon kenkyu vol 1 Shoma-ki no gunbu (Tokyo Yamakawa shuppansha 1979)sec 1

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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WAR 481

sources Agency since 1927 Ideological demands for a system of eco-nomic control had been tried in Manchukuo after 1932 but at hometheir realization was limited to the unification of the electric powergeneration and transmission industry in 1938 Full-scale economiccontrols in Japan proper were instituted only when other alternativeswere discounted

During the first three months of the China war in 1937 militaryexpenditures came to yen25 billion an amount virtually equal to thenational budget for the year Faced with a pressing need to checkincreases in imports and currency expansion the government passedthe Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Exportand Import Commodities Law In March 1938 the Diet enacted theNational General Mobilization Law Under these laws the governmentacquired sweeping powers (1) The establishment of firms capital in-creases bond flotations and long-term loans came under a licensingsystem (2) the government was empowered to issue directives concern-ing the manufacture distribution transfer use and consumption ofmaterials connected with imports and exports particularly their restric-tion or prohibition and (3) the government was also empowered toissue directives on the conscription of labor power the setting of work-ing conditions the disposition of firms profits the use of funds byfinancial institutions the administration use and expropriation of fac-tories and mines and the formation of cartels^7 These measures wereinvoked one after another as the war situation became more grave

In October 1937 the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuin) chargedwith comprehensive planning began operationslaquo8 Its major responsi-bilities were to regulate the supply and demand for major commoditiesnecessary for economic activity and to draw up a materials mobiliza-tion plan The required volume of key raw materials imports on whichJapan depended-for example iron and steel oil copper aluminumraw cotton wool and rubber-was calculated as the difference be-tween the combined military government and industrial demand andthe domestic supply Within the constraints set by the amount ofavailable foreign exchange an import plan was drawn up for eachcommodity and the commodities were allocated among the army thenavy and the private sector These plans were initially made for Octo-ber to December 1937 From then until the defeat plans were firstprepared every year and then subsequently every quarter To imple-

47 Maeda Shokd seisakushi Dai n-kan chaps 2 348 Mikuriya Kokusaku togo kikan setchi

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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482 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

ment the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries the planning board alsoprepared the Industrial Capacity Expansion Plan which it put intoeffect in 193949

Japan thus quickly entered a wartime controlled economy Eco-nomic control policies were unavoidable because of the political neces-sity of raising funds for huge military outlays ensuring raw materialsfor the import-dependent chemical and heavy industries and produc-ing munitions Japans foreign trade situation at this time is shown inTable 97 After 1938 the aggregate foreign trade balance was in theblack A breakdown of these figures however shows that an exportsurplus was maintained in the yen bloc in which settlements weremade in yen but in other areas in which convertible foreign exchangewas required there was a continuous import surplus For key rawmaterials such as coal iron ore and salt Japan could be self-sufficientin the yen bloc but for oil bauxite scrap iron rare metals such asnickel and cobalt crude rubber raw cotton and wool Japan wascompelled to depend on imports from dollar and sterling areas Effortsto promote further its chemical and heavy industries increased Japansdependence on the British and American currency areas The materi-als mobilization plan launched at a time of large import surpluses in1937 was drawn up on the assumption that an estimated yen3 billion inforeign exchange revenues from 1938 exports would be available butowing to a slump in the United States and the slack production ofcotton textiles for export the figure was slashed to yen25 billion bymidyear Because priority in the allocation of imported goods was formunitions and for use in expanding productive capacity the import ofmaterials used for consumer production such as raw cotton and woolwas cut back Because of the increasing squeeze on consumer goods aswell as poor rice harvests a rationing system for rice matches andsugar was adopted in 1940 Fearing soaring prices the governmentfixed prices and initiated price controls But these new controls onlystimulated black market dealings In order to crack down on suchactivity the economic police was established Allocations of munitionsgoods were made on the basis of a coupon system but it was notalways easy to obtain the actual goods Everywhere complicated con-trols proliferated

The Japanese continued to do their utmost to develop the resourcesof Manchuria and China The North China Development Corporation

49 See commentary in Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira eds Kokka sodoin vol i Keizai[Gendaishi shiryo^i) (Tokyo Misuzu shobo 1970)

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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TABLE 9 7The balance of international trade in the 1930s (yen millions)

19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941

Exports

11471410186121712499269331752690357636562651

Totals

Imports

12351431191922832472276437832663291834532899

Settlement balance

-89-21-56

-11127

-71-608

27658203

-248

Trade with the yen bloc(China Manchuri

Exports

02210276041105200575065807911166174718671659

Imports

236206281311350394437564683756855

i and Kwantung)

Settlement balance

-1570

130209225264354602

10641111

804

Exports

0926113414501652192420352384152418291789

992

Trade with the worldoutside the yen bloc

Imports

10001226163619722122237033462099223526972044

Settlement balance

-74-72

-186-320-198-335-962-575-406-908

-1052

Source Japan Ministry of Finance Customs clearance statistics 1931-41

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

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490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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484 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

and the Central China Promotion Corporation set up affiliates in theirrespective regions to develop natural resources Coal and iron oredevelopment were given top priority in China and the Japanese armywent as far as to reduce the number of trains transporting local foodsupplies in order to send coal to Japan In Manchuria ManchurianHeavy Industries headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke worked to establishevery kind of industry in the region including automobile productionHowever Ayukawas plan to try to introduce American capital andtechnology into Manchuria proved overly optimistic It ignored Amer-icas nonrecognition of Manchukuo and the Open Door principleWhen his plan finally failed Ayukawa had to resign0

In July 1939 the United States announced the abrogation of itsTreaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan In January 1940 theUnited States became free to restrict exports to Japan as a form ofeconomic sanction The outbreak of the European war in September1939 led to expectations that strategic goods imports would becomemore difficult From 1939 to 1940 Japan mobilized all the gold andforeign exchange it could and boosted its imports of petroleum prod-ucts rare metals and other strategic goods The Bank of Japans goldreserves were nearly depletedbull In July 1940 observing Nazi Ger-manys successful invasion of France and expecting the imminentdefeat of Britain Japans military drew up plans to invade Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to gain access to theirabundant supplies of raw materials such as oil rubber and tin Sup-port was growing for the reckless view that the war in China remainedunresolved because Britain and the United States were backing theKuomintang government and that Japan should act in concert withGermany to defeat Britain and force the United States to withdrawfrom Asia In September 1940 Japan advanced into northern FrenchIndochina (present-day North Vietnam) and signed a treaty of alliancewith Germany and Italy The United States responded by tighteningits export restrictions against Japan and then steadily turned thescrews to reduce Japanese economic power

In 1939 Japan instituted general wage and price controls and estab-lished a unified nationwide wage system The workers in the com-merce and service industries were conscripted for compulsory work inmunitions production The companies dividend rates were restrictedand finance was placed under comprehensive controls as well Intend-

50 Hara Manshu ni okeru keizai seijisaku no tenkai pp 248-9551 See the explanatory comments in Nakamura and Hara eds Kokka sodoin vol 1 pp lxix-

Ixxii See also in the same volume Okyu butsudo keikaku shian and Setsumei shiryo

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

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486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

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WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

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DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

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TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008 Core

term

s of

use

ava

ilabl

e at

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

term

s h

ttp

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doi

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1017

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OL9

7805

2122

3577

010

Dow

nloa

ded

from

htt

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cam

brid

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rgc

ore

Sim

on F

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Lib

rary

on

10 S

ep 2

016

at 1

702

54

sub

ject

to th

e Ca

mbr

idge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

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WAR 485

ing to increase munitions production the government in the fall of1940 put forth plans for a New Economic Order parallel to the NewPolitical Structure being organized at the same time52 The intent ofthis plan was to shift firms from a profit basis to a production basis toseparate the owners of capital from the managers of the firms todesignate government officials as managers to make firms increasetheir production in accordance with government directives and toorganize cartels called industrial control associations to implementgovernment economic controls such as production quotas and materi-als allocations The business community opposed this plan on theground that it was a communist idea that threatened the fundamen-tal principles of a capitalist economy A compromise was finallyreached but just barely

In early 1941 Japanese-American negotiations began During theirstormy course Germany invaded the Soviet Union In July Japanadvanced into southern French Indochina In response the UnitedStates froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargoon petroleum exports The embargo on petroleum Japans most criti-cal war materiel was the biggest trump card the United States heldJapans army and navy had reserves of 84 million kiloliters of petro-leum products an amount that could meet its military demand for nomore than two years of fighting Opinion within the army and navywas dominated by the belligerent view that Japan should go to warwith Britain and the United States to obtain raw materials from South-east Asia rather than give in to external pressure This mood propelledthe country into the Pacific Warlaquo

Six months after the beginning of hostilities Japan occupied a vastarea demarcated by a boundary running through Burma Thailand theMalay Peninsula Singapore Sumatra Java Borneo the Celebes andthe Solomon Islands Some observers thought that with petroleum sup-plies safely in hand the dream of the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere had been realized Many firms moved to invest in the develop-ment of mines rubber and raw cotton in the region and some even laidplans for hydroelectric power and aluminum refining The governmentdrew up the optimistic Plan for the Expansion of Productivity usingGreater East Asia as its arena The plan projected that within fifteenyears production would be expanded from three to five times the cur-

52 See Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira Keizai shin taisei in Nihon seiji gakkai nenpo1972-nen (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1972)

53 Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi vol 21Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami Shoten 1977) pp 115-16

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008 Core

term

s of

use

ava

ilabl

e at

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

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ore

term

s h

ttp

dx

doi

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1017

CH

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7805

2122

3577

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Dow

nloa

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from

htt

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Sim

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Lib

rary

on

10 S

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016

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702

54

sub

ject

to th

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mbr

idge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

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CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

486 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

TABLE 98Figures on the Pacific War and ocean-going transport

Losses of ship tonnageNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Ship constructionNo of shipsNo of tons (1000s)Volume of oceangoing transportPlanned (A) (1000s tons)Achieved (B) (1000s tons)Rate of plan achievement (BA )

Of amount achieved

1941(December only) 1942

1256

46

41408deg39601deg

956

Japan Manchuria and China (1000s tons)Southeast Asia and others (1000s tons)

202948

77265

4036839486

978

21914862

Volume of Southeast Asian raw material shipments to JapanOil (1000s kl)Bauxite (1000s tons)Crude rubber (1000s tons)Manganese ore (1000s tons)Totals including other items

(1000s of tons except for oil)

----

-

14283236571

1514

1943

4371793

254769

3339733047

990

296243605

26237927889

1581

1944

9692058

6991700

2782020720

745

181512627

1500 565

68deg67J

909

1945

639(271)1503(756)

188560

94007279

774

2003137

____

-

bull Totals for Apr to Dec 1941 Jul to Dec 1942 ltJan to Mar 1945d Figures for 1944 are forecastsSource Nakamura Takafusa Senso keizai to sono hokai in Iiuanami koza Nihon rekishi vol21 Kindai 8 (Tokyo Iwanami shoten 1977) Tables 5 8 9

rent level The immediate problem however was how to fight a warwith the raw materials Japan now controlled

There were no longer any foreign exchange restrictions for rawmaterial imports from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity SpherePayment was made with Japanese military scrip or with Southeast AsiaDevelopment Bank vouchers Marine transport capacity rather thanforeign exchange became the critical bottleneck The tonnage of Ja-pans ocean-going capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War was 65million gross tons of which about 55 million gross tons excludingtankers and repair vessels could be mobilized (see Table 98) It wasthought that even if 29 million gross tons of army and navy warshipswere used for combat or military service 3 million gross tons includ-ing tankers would be kept in service for freight transport to providethe transport capacity necessary to keep production going at the levelcalled for by the 1941 Materials Mobilization Plan At the beginning of

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008 Core

term

s of

use

ava

ilabl

e at

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

term

s h

ttp

dx

doi

org

10

1017

CH

OL9

7805

2122

3577

010

Dow

nloa

ded

from

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

on

10 S

ep 2

016

at 1

702

54

sub

ject

to th

e Ca

mbr

idge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 487

10000tons

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Total holdings ofshipping capacity

Total weightof all goodsshipped in ordinarycommercial vessels

Holdings ofprivate vessels

Total volume ofprivate shipping capacity capable of operation(excluding tankers)

Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July

1942 1943 1944 1945

Figure 92 Shipping capacity and shipment of goods during WorldWar II [From Oi Atsushi Kaijo goeisen (Tokyo Nihon shuppankyodo 1952) appended tables]

the war based on estimated annual losses of 800000 to 1 million tonsand estimated annual production of 600000 tons of new ships it wasforecast that Japan could maintain 3 million gross tons of capacityThis forecast proved excessively optimistictrade

In reality the army and navy vessels were not replaced easily andlosses exceeded expectations Realizing the importance of shippingthe Japanese government tried to increase shipbuilding output butmarine transport tonnage continued to decline As Table 98 indicatesshipments of Southeast Asian raw materials in particular failed tomeet expectations Figure 92 shows the decline in shipping capacityas a barometer of fighting strength Japans ship tonnage (civilianvessels) for transporting general commodities reached a peak in Octo-ber 1942 as a result of the cancellation of military vessel requisitioningbut after the battle of the Solomon Islands its ship tonnage shifted

54 Ibid pp 116-17

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008 Core

term

s of

use

ava

ilabl

e at

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

term

s h

ttp

dx

doi

org

10

1017

CH

OL9

7805

2122

3577

010

Dow

nloa

ded

from

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

on

10 S

ep 2

016

at 1

702

54

sub

ject

to th

e Ca

mbr

idge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

into decline After the latter half of 1943 in particular it fell steadilybecause of the all-out American sea and air offensive Especially nota-ble was the decline of volume shipped which dropped in conjunctionwith the ships falling rate of operation After the fall of the Marianasin July 1944 t n e s e a lanes t 0 Southeast Asia were blocked and so itbecame impossible to procure raw materials anywhere but Japan Man-churia and China In 1945 when food shortages in the homelandreached crisis proportions the transport of grains and salt from Chinaand Manchukuo became the ultimate mission for shipping but eventhat was brought to a standstill by air attacks In regard to marinetransport Japan had already lost the war in the summer of 194455

Jerome Cohen summarized this situation It may be said that in largemeasure Japans economy was destroyed twice over once by cuttingoff of imports and secondly by air attack s6

Domestic production trends until defeat are shown in Table 99Wartime controls clearly expanded Japans chemical and heavy indus-trial production and reduced the output for private demand in suchindustries as textiles For this reason production in industries cater-ing to private demand including agriculture continued to declineafter the latter half of the 1930s The Japanese were forced to endureextreme hardship Even within the heavy and chemical industries theoutputs in various sectors achieved maximum levels in different yearsBecause production priorities focused on aircraft and ships during thePacific War the production of materials such as steel and chemicalsfell from 1943 onward Production efforts were concentrated solely onfinal products such as weaponry military aircraft and ships As aresult of extraordinary effort aircraft production increased from 6174planes in 1941 to 26507 in 1944 and the production of warships grewfrom 201000 to 408000 tons both peak levels of output Howeverthe eleventh-hour production effort was unable to turn around thedeteriorating war situation

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government wasbehind in its efforts to organize a wartime economic mobilization andbegan only in the fall of 1942 Because Japans early military successesexceeded expectations government leaders overlooked the necessityof all-out economic mobilization efforts When the American counter-

55 See ibid pp 123-3656 Jerome B Cohen Japans Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis University of

Minnesota Press 1949) p 10757 According to Okazaki Ayakoto Kihon kokuryoku doiai soran (Tokyo Kokumin keizai kenkyu

kyokai 1953)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008 Core

term

s of

use

ava

ilabl

e at

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

term

s h

ttp

dx

doi

org

10

1017

CH

OL9

7805

2122

3577

010

Dow

nloa

ded

from

htt

pw

ww

cam

brid

geo

rgc

ore

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

on

10 S

ep 2

016

at 1

702

54

sub

ject

to th

e Ca

mbr

idge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

TABLE 9 9Wartime production indexes (1937 = 100)

Agriculture Mining Manufacturingproduction production production

index Rice index Coal index Steel Machinery Chemicals Textiles Foods

8510010311411912312012112453

Source Agriculture Production indexes compiled by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry using 1933-5 as the base period (Dai 30-ji Norinshd tokeihyo)Mining and manufacturing Ministry of International Trade and Industry Showa 3S-nen kijun kokogyo shisu soran (Italicized figures are the maximumvalues reached by each index during this period)

1936193719381939194019411942194319441945

98100981059995100967659

102100991049283101958859

9210010611212012011811910851

9210010811312512512112712074

8710011512312813214015614652

75100110135163188195214252107

87100114122120120100878033

88100838375604831176

91100101104907869584732

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008 Core

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htt

pw

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idge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

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WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

490 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

attack began the failure to mobilize adequately became an irretriev-able handicap In any case once the need for the mass production ofaircraft and ships became clear the Japanese government attempted tomake the impossible possible For example in order to increasesteel production the government set up a large number of simpletwenty-to-one-hundred-ton-capacity small blast furnaces in KoreaManchukuo and China Their performance was extremely poor how-ever and they did not produce the expected results In order to copewith shortages of metal materials including scrap iron the govern-ment collected city streetcar rails the handrails of bridges and eventhe bells in Buddhist temples The textile industrys spinning machin-ery was scrapped and turned into raw materials for shells In the wakeof shutdowns and cutbacks many factories in the consumer goodsindustry were converted into munitions factories Good results wereproduced in the shipbuilding industry in 1943 by using a snowballmethod Shipbuilding volume was expanded by importing iron oreonly in the amount needed to build ships and the ships thus builtwere then used to import more iron ore In order to cut down on thevolume of ocean shipping various kinds of production facilities in-cluding blast furnaces were transferred to China and Manchuria andthe practice of on-the-spot production was adopted but this effortdisappointed expectations

In the fall of 1943 in order to increase munitions production espe-cially aircraft a Ministry of Munitions was established by merging theCabinet Planning Board and the relevant departments in the Ministryof Commerce and Industry At the same time a Munitions CompaniesSystem was inaugurated Key firms were designated as munitionscompanies those in charge of production were given titles as govern-ment officials employees were treated as impressed labor and notallowed to quit their jobs and the companies were responsible forincreasing production in accordance with government instructions58

But the government also compensated these firms for losses In eachindustry designated financial institutions took responsibility for sup-plying the necessary capital

The labor force presented a difficult problem during the war Out ofa population of slightly under 80 million 24 million had been con-scripted into military service by the end of 1941 In August 1945 thisnumber had swelled to 72 million To compensate for the resulting

58 Juyo sangyo kyogikai Gunjukaishaho kaisetsu (Tokyo Teikoku shuppan 1944) No coherentstudy of the munitions companies exists

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

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492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

WAR 491

labor shortage young men in consumer goods or tertiary industrieswere conscripted and mobilized to work in factories and mines After1944 students from the middle-school level up were employed inmunitions production and forced to suspend studies of any kind al-most entirely In the consumer goods industries especially textilesand in the tertiary industries firms either converted to wartime pro-duction or went out of business as raw materials and merchandisedisappeared Their machinery and equipment were scrapped for muni-tions production and their workers were put to work in factories andmines The government promoted the forced reorganization of busi-ness and it compelled small- and medium-sized enterprises to convertto munitions production or go out of business mainly in order tomobilize their workers59 The 1944 bulge in the secondary industrywork force and the deterioration of the tertiary industry work force asseen in Table 93 were the consequences of such policies

The quality of daily life suffered After 1938 it became impossible toobtain cotton and woolen goods In 1940 necessities such as rice miso(bean paste) and soy sauce were rationed but these too graduallyran short and food shortages for the urban population became severein 1943 The standard daily Japanese caloric intake was 2200 caloriesincluding 70 grams of protein but the actual daily intake in 1941 was2105 calories and 647 grams of protein By January 1944 rationsprovided a mere 1405 calories60 People tried to stave off starvation byforaging in the farm villages or buying on the black market outsideofficial distribution channels The government had put limited pricecontrols into effect after the start of the China war for fear of inflationIn 1940 the government began setting official prices for everythingbut it was impossible to eradicate illegal transactions From a 1937base-year value of 100 the consumer price index rose to 149 in 1940208 in 1944 and 254 in May 1945 If black market prices are includedthese indexes must be calculated as 161 for 1940 and 358 for 19446l

The latter figures are most likely closer to the actual situationAfter 1940 the government officially set wage levels on the basis of

type of employment educational background age and number ofyears of experience This was done because it was feared that wage-cost increases would cause price increases Because wage rates werecalculated on the basis of official prices they could never catch up

59 Yui Tsunehiko Chusho kigyo seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo Toyo keizai shinposha 1964)pp 342ff

60 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo Taiheiyo sensoka no rodosha jotai (Tokyo Toyokeizai shinposha 1964) p 149 61 Cohen Japans Economy p 356

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

492 DEPRESSION RECOVERY AND WAR

with actual consumer price increases Real wages sank to almost halftheir prewar level62

By the time of defeat in August 1945 Japan had lost approximatelythree million lives (more than half were military personnel) and aquarter of its national wealth The remaining total value of its nationalwealth was virtually the equivalent of what it had been in 1935 Thewar reduced the accumulation of the intervening decade to charredand smoldering ruins63 It is also true however that the conditions forsustaining postwar economic growth were already sprouting amongthose ruins The wartime munitions industry provided the prototypefor the chemical and heavy industrial sector which was at the heart ofpostwar growth Machine gun factories began to produce sewing ma-chines and range finder plants began making cameras Linkages be-tween big factories and small business subcontractors that developedin the munitions industry also became the basis for the postwar subcon-tracting system So too the designation of specific financial institutionsto finance munitions companies created close relations in which can befound the origins of the postwar financial groupings (kinyu keiretsu)Administrative guidance by government ministries and the Bank ofJapan often pointed to as a special characteristic of postwar Japanwas also a legacy of the wartime controls The seniority wage systemspread throughout the economy when wage controls were institutedand enterprise unions were the successors of the Patriotic IndustrialAssociations (Sangyo hokoku kai) organized in each firm after thelabor unions were broken up During the war the government pur-chased rice on a dual-price system buying cheaply from landlords butpaying a higher price when buying directly from producers in order toaccelerate increased rice production This practice had the effect oflowering rental rates thus clearing the way for the postwar land re-form Even though the recollection of the wartime period is repugnantto those Japanese who lived through it it was a stage preliminary torapid postwar growth

CONCLUSION

Both for the world and for Japan the period from 1920 to 1945 was anunusually stormy and convulsive era Looking back on the course that

62 Yamada Junzo Senjichu no rodosha in Gendai Nihon shihomhugi taikei vol 4 Rodo edAihara Shigeru (Tokyo Kobundo 1958) p 97

63 Keizai antei honbu Taiheiyo senso niyoru wagakuni no higai sogo hokokusho (Tokyo Keizaiantei honbu 1948)

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge

CONCLUSION 493

the Japanese economy pursued during those years one may point outthe following special features relevant to the postwar experienceFirst the trend toward chemical and heavy industrialization that be-gan during World War I constantly accelerated Second precedentsfor economic policies aimed at economic growth and full employmenthad already achieved success in the 1930s Third the prototype ofpostwar Japans distinctive economic system was molded during thewar years although not necessarily intentionally These circumstancesalso explain why Japan was able to achieve remarkably high growtheven by world standards in the 1920s and 1930s

However even from a strictly economic standpoint the economy ofthe 1920s and 1930s differed in several respects from that of the post-World War II era First politics were in absolute ascendancy over theeconomy Examples of this are the removal of the gold embargo at theold parity for reasons of national prestige the imposition of economiccontrols in conjunction with the military invasion of China and plansfor war with the Soviet Union and the plunge into the Pacific Warwithout a dispassionate assessment of the nations economic strengthSecond after the breakdown of the classical principle of laissez-fairemany policies were experimented with on a trial-and-error basis butno general principle clearly emerged in its place The failure of Inouesfiscal policies and the success of Takahashis are conspicuous examplesof this Third the economys extraordinary experience under wartimecontrols when all was concentrated on winning the war reduced thelives of the people to ruins

Cambridge Histories Online copy Cambridge University Press 2008Core terms of use available at httpwwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpdxdoiorg101017CHOL9780521223577010Downloaded from httpwwwcambridgeorgcore Simon Fraser University Library on 10 Sep 2016 at 170254 subject to the Cambridge