DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D C 20350

S~~CNAV INSTRUCTION 5500 .3LA..

From: Secretary of the Navy

SECNAVINST 5500.31AOP-009D

4 JUN 1985

Subj : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) PROGRAM

Ref : (a)(b)

Encl : (1)(2)

(3)(4)

DOD Instruction 5240.5 of 23 May 84 (NOTAL)OPNAVINST 5530.14

Physical Security GuidanceTelephone/Miscellaneous Communications EquipmentGuidanceTSCM Support RequestsTSCM Support Units

.-

1. ZLUQQ=* To address the threat of technical surveillance (Rpenetration of areas in which sensitive discussions occur. Thisinstruction implements reference (a) which updates policies~responsibilities and procedures for the DOD Technical Surveil-lance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program. It contains information onthe availability of TSCM support and provides guidance abouttechnical security and the use of telephones and related equip-ment in sensitive discussion areas.

2. atlon SECNAVINST 5500.31, OPNAVINST C5500.46B andreport control s~mbol OPNAV 5500-3 (MIN:ETAUTH).

3. ~. Historically, hostile intelligence services (A(HIS) have employed technical surveillance devices in espionageoperations directed against U. S. installations, both in theUnited States and abroad. The devices employed have fallengenerally into three groups: wired microphones; modified tel-ephone/intercommunication systems; and radio frequency (RF)transmitters. Technology suited to clandestine surveillanceapplications, which is available now to virtually everyone, hasincreased the risk of technical surveillance penetrations. Tech-nical surveillance countermeasures, applied effectively, canlimit both the ease with which surveillance devices can be em-ployed and their ultimate success. Enclosure (1) addressesphysical security measures to be considered, in addition toreference (b), when establishing positive access controls forsensitive discussion areas. Enclosure (2) addresses the s~cialthreat posed by telephones and related equipnent within securediscussion areas. Local security measures, implemented pursuantto the guidance set forth in enclosures (1) and (2), can beaugmented with TSCM support conducted to detect the presence

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN MS

of technical surveillance devices. TSCM personnel will evaluatealso the space for technical and physical security vulnerabil-ities, and provide recommendations to eliminate any securitydeficiencies identified.

4. CM Perswel Traln_Lng. .

kelectlon and

a. RLS.QMQ. TSCM operations, as a specialized counter- (Aintelligence function~ require personnel with extensive investi-gative, electronic, and physical security skills. The minimumqualifications required for entry into the TSCM field are listedin enclosure (1) to reference (a).

b. Tra~. All Navy and Marine Corps TSCM agents shallreceive TSCM training at a facility apprwed by the Director,Naval Investigative Service (NIS) to ensure survey quality and tostandardize operational procedures. TSCM personnel will alsoundergo periodic refresher training and attend specializedcourses as necessary to maintain proficiency and to stay abreastof new technical penetration threats and advancing technology.

5. Ml&Z

a. ??rotecting sensitive discussion areas from technicalpenetration is the responsibility of every commander. A com-prehensive security program should be established for theprotection of all sensitive discussion areas. When discussionsat the SECRET level or above are held within a space on a dailyor otherwise regular basis~ this security program should includeTSCM support performed by qualified investigative agents. TheDirector, Naval Investigative Service serves as the TSCM programmanager within the Department of the Navy (DON) and is respon-sible for providing TSCM support, technical direction andcentralized management of all TSCM efforts. The NIS is the soleactivity within DON authorized to procure and use equipment forTSCM purposes, except for designated U. S. Marine Corps Counter-intelligence Teams acting under the operational control of thecognizant Marine Amphibious Force Commander and the technicaldirection of the Director, NIS. When not deployed in theirprimary tactical role, Marine Corps TSCM assets function underthe cognizance of the Director, NIS, primarily for the support ofFleet Marine Force (FMF) commands and secondarily for the supportof other commands. Navy and non-FMF commands shall obtain TSCMsupport only from or via Directorr NIS. This restrictionincludes support for sensitive DON sponsored projects atcontractor facilities.

(R

2

SECNAVINST 5500.31A4 JUN 1985

b. A memorandum of understanding exists between the (RL Director, NIS and counterpart agencies of the Army and Air Force

to provide for cross-service TSCM support in certain overseaslocations. Although Army or Air Force TSCM assets may therefore :support DON activities in some instances responsibility forapproving and coordinating such support will remain with the NIS.Requests for TSCM support from Army or Air Force TSCM assets byDON activities require prior authorization from the Director,NIS.

c. TSCM surveys will be conducted in accordance with thisinstruction and reference (a).

6. Jliscussion

a. TSCM Sumort Due to thecost of technical manpowerf travel and equipment, ~easonableselectivity must be exercised in identifying spaces to receiveTSCM support. The support will be provided in accordance withthe following criteria:

(1) ~a S~aces/Facllltles,..

Support wil1 beprovided those spaces where discussions cl~ssified SECRET orabove take place routinely and which have continuous accesscontrols established as part of an effective security program topreclude undetected access. Guidance to achieve this objective

i. is contained in enclosure (1).

(2) Qmfaaws. Conferences, symposia, exhibits,clinics, conventions and meetings involving classified dis-cussions should be held in secure spaces that have eitherreceived TSCM support previously, or would otherwise qualify forit. When such facilities are not available, one-time meetingswill be supported if they are held in facilities not open to thegeneral public, have the potential for good audio and physicalsecurity throughout the conference and when the informationscheduled for discussion is classified TOP SECRET. TSCM surveysof unsecure facilities, such as base theaters, school audito-riums, unsecured classrooms etc.~ can provide at best onlymarginal assurance that no technical penetration exists. Accessby uncleared persons to such facilities before and after a clas-sified conference, or between sessions, creates opportunities forthe installation and subsequent removal of eavesdropping devicesdevices which may or may not be operative or even present duringthe actual survey. Adequate physical security and personnelaccess controls are essential ; without them, a TSCM survey servesonly to foster a false sense of security.

(A

(R

(A

(A

(A

3

SECNAVINST 5500.31A4 JIIN @85

(3) TSCM surveys of flagoffices and quarters, because of thei~ targetablity, may beprovided despite minimal security provisions. Priority consid-eration will be given to locations outside the United Stateswhere the threat is greatest. It should be noted that TSCMsurveys conducted under such conditions have no residual valueand it cannot be assumed after the survey that such spaces willcontinue to be safe for sensitive discussions.

(4) Mew/Renovated FacJlltles,.,

. Normally, new instal-lations or spaces having undergone major renovations will notreceive TSCM support until all construction is completed, thespaces are manned, are fully operational and security measures~as indicated here, are implemented. Pre-construction liaisonwith the nearest TSCM Support Unit is encouraged to ensure thestandards set forth herein are understood clearly and incorpo-rated into the construction or modification plans. TSCM supportunits are listed by location in enclosure (4).

(A

(A

(5) Automoti . TSCM support for automobiles will not (Abe conducted unless justified by extraordinary circumstances.Such support can only be of continuing value when the vehicle iskept under continuous security and maintained by clearedpersonnel.

(6) shim an~ TSCM support will not be (Afurnished normally to naval shi~s or aircraft because of the lowtechnical security threat which exists while they are deployed.

.

b. TSCM SUDDOrL No facility will qualify auto- (Amatically for routinely recurri~g TSCM service. In principle,once an area has been the subject of a fully instrumented TSCMsurvey with favorable outcome, the results are considered validas long as the security integrity of the facility is maintained.Recurring service will be provided only if considered appropriateby the TSCM program manager whose decision will be based upon adocumented threat vulnerability assessment and completed follow-ing current DoD policies. The frequency of such ~riodicsupport, where appropriate, will be determined also by the TSCMprogram manager based on the formalized threat assessment.Additional support may be requested when:

(1) There is evidence to suggest an area has been tech-nically penetrated.

(2) Extensive construction, renovation or structuralmodifications have required unescorted access by unclearedindividuals.

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN 1885

(3) Unauthorized personnel have gained uncontrolled or.unescorted access to the secure area. In the interest of bothgood security and economy of resources, it is incumbent oncommands to maintain the security integrity of sensitive facil-ities and to keep the use of this contingency to a minimum. TSCMsupport alone cannot substitute for good physical security andaccess controls.

(A

c* O~era~ Securitv IOPSECJ_. TSCM services are highly (Aspecialized counterintelligence investigations and as such, areparticularly vulnerable to compromise. Ml commands whichprovide or receive TSCM services are required to implement OPSECmeasures to ensure the success of the countermeasures effort.For this purpose, it must be assumed until the survey indicatesotherwise, that a clandestine intercept device is actually inplace. Should discussions concerning the pending support takeplace within the space, the device would likely be removed priorto the survey and later reinstalled or simply be switched offremotely. Under such circumstances the probability of surfacinga clandestine intercept device is diminished greatly. For thisreason, no discussion or verbal comments concerning the pendingsupport should be permitted in the spaces of concern. Writtenrequests for TSCM service are to be handled at the SECRET levelrand the number of persons apprised kept to an absolute minimum.Telephone requests for TSCM support are considered compromisedand are not authorized.

7. Action

a. Requests for TSCM support to augment a comprehensivesecurity program established for each sensitive discussion areaare to be submitted per paragraph 6 above? enclosure (3) and bein consonance with the following criteria:

(1) Requests for TSCM support should be submitted withas much lead time as possible. Known requirements to be sup-ported during the next fiscal year should be submitted by1 August. Unanticipated requirements should be submitted atleast 60 days prior to the requested visit. Extenuating circum-stances which require a faster response must be identifiedclearly and justified fully.

(A

(2) Where feasible, commands are encouraged to consol-idate the requirements of subordinate commands. Project managersand accrediting authorities responsible for the security of DONspecial programs and contractor facilities should also consol-idate their requirements into a single annual request.

‘5

SECNAVINST 5500.31A4 JUN 19$5

b. Due to the sensitive nature of TSCM support, corres-—

pondence which identifies upcoming visits and dates will be keptto an absolute minimum. Requests for TSCM support will beacknowledged upon receipt. A projected calendar year (CY)quarter in which requested support can be expected will beannounced. Normally, no additional correspondence will beinitiated to reduce opportunities for compromise. Requestingcommands will be notified by the Director, NIS should operationalcommitments require rescheduling of pending services. Notifi-cation will contain a new projected CY quarter for the conduct ofrequested services. When unforseen circumstances arise withinthe requesting command which would preclude a scheduled visit,the Director, NIS should be notified immediately.

c. As an adjunct to a command’ s security program, TSCMinvestigative agents can provide TSCM threat briefings to commandpersonnel. The briefings are classified and will be providednormally after completion of TSCM support for a facility orinstallation.

d. Commands will ensure that weaknesses identified as aresult of TSCM services are corrected. Unless justified, TSCMsupport will not be provided normally to areas that have hadprevious support if major deficiencies were identified and nocorrective action has been initiated.

e. Should a technical penetration be discovered, thefollowing actions must be taken:

(1) Secure the area to preclude removal of the device.

(2) Conduct no discussions of the discovery within thespace where the device was found.

(3) Conduct no altering tests nor make any attempts atremoval until a reply to the following report is received.

(4) The command will report the discovery details to theDirector, Naval Investigative Service (PLA: DIRNAVINVSERVWASHINGTON DC) by Immediate SECRET message or contact the nearestTSCM Support Unit and notify DIRNAVINVSERV as outlined above.TSCM Support Units are identified in enclosure (4). At aminimum, the report should include the following:

—..

L

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN i985(a) Time and date of discovery.

(b) Area, installation or facility involved.

(c) Specific location within facility where device wasfound.

(d) Identity of device by type (i.e. wired, microphone~modified telephone, RF transmitter etc.).

(e) Method of discovery.

(f) Estimate as to whether HIS was alerted to discovery.

(5) Information concerning the discovery of thetechnical penetration shall not be released to other personsuntil authorized by Director~ NIS. No representatives of anyforeign government shall be informed and no information will bereleased to the public or press regarding the discovery withoutDirector, NIS approval.

(6) Following any discovery of a clandestine listen-ing device and evaluation of the circumstances described by theinitial message report~ DirectorJ NIS will provide technicalassistance to accomplish field technical evaluation of thedevice.

----8. ~. The reporting requirement in paragraph 7 is exempt (Afrom Reports Control by OPNAV Instruction 5214.7.

?lj=:il-nder Secretary of the Navy

Distribution:SNDL A

21A22A23242628

(Navy Department)(Fleet Commanders in Chief)(Fleet Commanders )(Force Commanders )(Type Commanders )(Special Commands, Groups and Units) (less 26GG)(Squadron, Division and Group Commanders Ships)(less 28G)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN 11985

Distribution (continued)SNDL 41 “

42

50A

FA

FB

FC

FDFEFF

FGFKAFKNFKP

FKQFKR

FSFT

vl 2

(Military Sealift Commands) (less 41D and 41J)(Naval Aviation) (less 42C, 42G, 42J, 42K, 42L,42N, 42P, 42Q, 42R, 42S, 42T, 42u, 42w, 42Y,422, 42BB, 42CC, 42RR)(Unified Commands) (USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT,only)(Shore activities under CINCLANTFLT) (less FA28,FA32, and FA34)(Shore activities under CINCPACFLT) (less FB29,FB30, FB31, FB39, FB40, FB41, FB42, and FB44)(Shore activities under CINCUSNAVEUR) (less FC9and FC1l)(Shore activities under COMNAVOCEANCOM)(Shore activities under COMNAVSECGRU)(Shore activities under CNO) (less FF14, FF16,FF17, FF20, FF45, FF48, and FF49)(Shore activities under COMNAVTELCOM) (less FG9)(Shore activities under CHNAVMAT)(Shore activities under COMNAVFACENG)(Shore activities under COMNAVSEASYSCOM) (lessFKP6, and FKP9,(Shore activities under COMNAVELEXSYSCOM)(Shore activities under COMNAVAIRSYSCOM) (lessFKR7 and FKR8)(Shore activities under COMNAVINTCOM)(Shore activities under CNET) (FT1, FT2 and FT5,FF42, only)(CGMCDEC)

DCNOS and DMSOSMARCORPS L5 (80 copies)

copy to:SNDL B2A (Special agencies, staffs, boards, and

committees) (NSA and DIA, only)

Stocked:CO, NAVPUBFORMCEN5801 Tabor AvenuePhila., PA 19120-5099 (loo)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A4 JUN 1985

PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDANCE.-

1. Physical security is the most important countermeasure totechnical penetration. Access to a facility or space, or at aminimum to its immediate proximity, must be gained before a pene-tration can be accomplished. To understand the importance of therequirement for good access control~ an appreciation of thevarious technical penetration techniques must be gained.

a. 11.iredMi~ A technical surveillance penetrationemploying a wired micro ph~ne against an area with good physicalsecurity is difficult to accomplish. The task is made muchsimpler if the area contains unused wiring. By using existingwire runs which exit the secure Perimeterf a technical penetra-tion can be accomplished in a minimum amount of time withoutintroducing potentially alerting additional wire.

b. Ielemones and Interco~on systems Modifiedtelephone and intercommunication systems can provide a highlyexploitable means of taking audio from a space without installingwiring. This type of penetration is a universal threat becausespaces in which sensitive classified discussions occur contain atleast one telephone or intercommunication unit. Specific guide-lines for installing telephones and related communications equip-ment in sensitive areas to counter the threat they pose to audiosecurity are set forth in enclosure (2). No telephones should belocated in secure discussion areas, unless absolutely missionessential.

c. ltters Recent technical penetration discov-eries reveal a continue: trend on the part of hostage intel-ligence services to employ RF transmitters. This can beaccounted for by advances in technology which allow extremelysmall and efficient transmitters to be designed for quick instal-lation. They are disguised often as part of an ordinary piece ofoffice furniture. Discovery of RF transmitters is complicatedfurther by their use of complex modulation schemes and remotedeactivation capabilities which reduce the time they aredetectable and conserves battery power.

d. ~. Miniature tape recorders, which permitseveral hours of recording, have been improved greatly and mustbe considered more of a technical penetration threat than wastrue in the past. Should unescorted visitors who are not clearedproperly have routine access to sensitive areas, such devices canbe installed quickly and removed later or serviced with onlyminimal risk of detection.

Enclosure (1)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN 1985

e. O~tical J)evices Protection from long-range opticalpenetrations must also ~e considered. Visual and opticalsurveillance of areas where classified material is discussed andmaintained is a viable method of technically penetrating a securearea.

2. For the most part, compliance with the guidance set forth inreference (b) for providing physical security measures to protectproperty and material will be useful in preventing technicalpenetrations. Additional precautions must be applied to thoseareas in which classified discussions are held. While preventingadequately surreptitious entry into a room, conventional measuresmay do nothing to preclude removal of audio via an unprotectedconduit such as an uncovered window or an air conditioning duct.Physical security protection must extend also to areas surround-ing tne space needing protection. By this providing a bufferarea around a secure space, many audio security vulnerabil itiescan be avoided.

a. Audio Patm All openings and electrical conduits whichmay pass usable audio to an uncontrolled area must be sealed.Ducts can be baffled acoustically to control audio which couldotherwise be retrieved.

b. Wlr~.,

cess All conductors, including those servicingtelephone, intercommu~ication and electrical systems, should beidentified to determine if they are in use. All conductors foundto be unused and excess should be removed or shorted together andgrounded within the secure area to preclude their use as part ofa clandestine system. Exploitation of such wiring would facili-tate greatly an audio penetration.

c. J2sGQLQ. All individuals allowed into sensitive areasshould be appropriately cleared or escorted. Introduction ofaudio devices into a space can be effected quickly, even byrelatively untrained personnel. Routine access by unclearedpersonnel and building maintenance workers can provide ampleopportunity for implanting a relatively undetectable eaves-dropping device. This risk is particularly evident in overseaslocations where indigenous personnel are used for these pur-poses. All uncleared personnel entering controlled access areasmust be closely escorted by cleared personnel who have

2

Enclosure (1)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN 1985

been briefed thoroughly on the technical penetration threat.Escorts should not only be alert to their charges removing items,but also to the possibility that a device could be left behind.Cleared personnel should be used for housekeeping services inhighly sensitive locations whenever possible, especially over-seas. A log of all repairs and alterations to the space shouldbe kept to include the identities of the individual workers andrepairs. This will provide a history of events occurring withinan area and aid in identifying perpetrators of any possibleclandestine installation found later.

3. d Secure areas cannot always be isolated fromadjoining spaces LO preclude either inadvertent or deliberateeavesdropping. Where space configurations and usage bring aboutthis circumstance, classified conversations can be masked by anartificially introduced noise source. This can be accomplishedby installing a tape system (not radio) within the security areaand directing the sound produced from prerecorded tapes at thoseareas where eavesdropping devices might be implanted. Speakersincorporated in such a system can be installed in voids and ductsto mask sensitive conversations. To provide the intended protec-tion, the artifical noise must be at a much higher level than thesensitive conversation. One method of obtaining this objectiveis to couple acoustically the artifical noise to the walls,ducts, windows~ pipes~ etc.~ using transducers. Another approachis to provide a barrierl such as a false wall, heavy floor-to-ceiling draperies or a false ceiling between the speakers andthe critical discussion area, to prevent the sound cover frominterfering with conversations.

4. J?au-t/Fu~. .

All furnishings and equipment shouldbe mission essential and ~heir use dedicated to the secure area.Shuttling furniture or equipment in and out of controlled areasincreases the possibility of a surveillance device being hiddenwithin them. Each item should be searched physically by a personfamiliar with the equipment. Equipment/furnishings introducedinto the controlled space will be checked by qualified TSCMpersonnel during the next scheduled TSCM support to the area.Equipment which processes classified information often representsa technical security risk by emanating radio frequency (RF)signals into free space and onto existing wiring (power~ tel-ephone, intercommunications, etc.) serving a facility. Inspec-tion and specific countermeasures for this equipment falls undertne purview of the TEMPEST program as outlined in OPNAVINSTC551O.93D (NOTAL). The use of non-mission essential radios andtelevision in classified discussion areas is particularlydiscouraged.

3

Enclosure (1)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN ~5

TELEPHONE/MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT GUIDANCE

1. Q2JEIal* The variety and complexity of commerical telephonesystems make the task of providing specific installation guidancedifficult. Every installation must be examined in light of theparticular environment involved. There are however, basic stepswhich should be followed to provide security against a technicalpenetration of any telephone system. The more complex a systemis, the more difficult it is to prevent a penetration. The bestway of eliminating the problem would be to exclude telephonesfrom areas in which classified information is discussed and/orprocessed. This approach is unrealistic in the majority ofsituations encountered. Although it is usually possible andrecommended to exclude telephones from secure conference rooms, aworking area is a different matter. Communications must beprovided; however, restricting the number of telephones to anabsolute minimum is essential.

2. w. Telephones in areas where classified information isdiscussed or processed constitute exploitable vulnerability.Three distinct risks are involved:

a. wiret~ . Kll telephone conversations are potentiallysubject to interception. The path followed by telephone linesoften presents several terminations where conventional “wire-tapping” is possible. ZUSO, the increased use of microwave linksreadily provides a means for intercepting telephone conversationsthrough the use of RF receivers. While the latter poses theleast risk of detection, a conventional wiretap approach isvirtually undetectable without physically examining the entirewire path~ an impossibility in today’s environment. For thesereasons, classified discussions are prohibited over telephonesystems which are not protected by authorized encryption tech-niques. This restriction applies also to the discussion of clas-sified information over intercommunications systems when suchsystems are integrated into the facility’s telephone equipment,even if all stations are within the secure perimeter.

b.. .

Telephone lines may carrymachine emanations from nearby ~uipment processing classifiedinformation to uncontrolled areas. Appropriate countermeasuresto address this threat fall within the purview of the TEMPESTprogram as outlined in OPNAVINST C551O.93D (NOTAL).

c. Conve.325atioM The potential exists for telephonesto be used as part of a cl~ndestine eavesdropping system even

Enclosure (2)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A4 Jul’!w

while “on-hook” (hung-up). Telephones in the ‘on-hook” condition -are found frequently to pass room conversations occurring intheir vicinity to unprotected areas as a result of accidental orintended modification or because of a design characteristic ofthe telephone instrument or its associated equipment.

3. atlon Criteria The installation of telephones withinsensitive discussion area: should be in accordance with thefollowing criteria:

a. le/Wire Control

(1) All telephone wires should enter the facility throughone opening and each conductor should be accounted for accuratelyat the point of entry. The accountability will identify, throughlabeling or log/journal entries, the existing use of everyconductor. This accountability applies to excess conductorswhich should be terminated at the point of entry and connected toappropriate connector blocks.

(2) When multiline telephone service is used within sen-sitive discussion areas, the associated Key Service Unit (KSU)should be installed within the area or in an adjacent area whichis provided equal security protection. This simple step willenhance security by reducing the number of conductors that entera facility. In this configuration, each telephone line requiresonly two conductors; whereas~

-.if the KSU is situated beyond the

controlled perimeter, each telephone line requires a minimum ofsix conductors.

b. ~olatio~. Telephone instruments should be isolated fromall incoming lines when not in use, i.e., in the “on-hook” cond-ition. Tne recommended methods of achieving isolation are:

(1) DISCOIMeC~ The simplest and most economicalmeans of isolating a telephon~ instrument is to fit each instru-ment with a plug and jack arrangement so the telephone can bedisconnected manually at all times when not in use. This methodis also the most effective one, but only if the user remembers topull the plug. Such plug and jack installations should bearranged so they are convenient to use and incorporate an audiblealarm to warn users to remove the plug upen completion of calls.This audible alarm must be isolated from outgoing lines when theplug and jack are removed. Figure (1) is a diagram of the recom-mended method. When multiline service is required, the plug andjack can.be incorporated by using a

Enclosure (2) 2

-—

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 WN 1985

. single line instrument and a separate key strip with a plug andjack installed between them.

a-l—R1 IKxXsWIm

Wz 39KH

dI’ELEPHONE

w MALLL)RYzx

MDL SC62flOR EQU~

5d~H

A Ao // wRING L-2 e *

Kt=Plug and Jack Connections

Figure (1)

I

(2) tic . The Western Electric Company Model270 Automatic Telephone Disconnect Device (ATDD) is designed toprovide automatic disconnection of single or two-line telephoneinstruments and is available only to government agencies.Although more expensive than a plug and jack arrangement, themodel 270 is user transparent; i.e., it requires no action by theuser to intitiate or terminate a telephone call. The 270disconnect switch is also compatible with key telephone systemswhen installed between a key strip and a single-line instrumentin the same manner described for the manual plug and jackarrangement above. This will require the installation of a 270switch for each telephone instrument.

(3) ~ Is~ . The U. S. intelligence community hascollectively sponsored development of an optical isolator whichis superior to the WECO 270 ATDD and requires no action on thepart of the telephone user. The isolator is nearing the finalstages of production and should be available soon. The

3 Enclosure (2)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A4 JUN 1985

isolator is designed for universal adaptability and users shouldrealize a substantive cost savings. NIS will make an announce-ment when the optical isolators are available for procurement.

(4) ~xce~tion Until optical isolators become avialable,use of standard multiiine telephone instruments without isolationis appropriate, provided the following conditions are met: .

(a) The KSU must be of U. S. manufacture and instal-led in accordance with paragraph 3a(2) above.

(b) The KSU should employ high security Key Tel-ephone Unit (KTU) line cards.

(c) All instruments serviced by the KSU must bewithin the sensitive discussion area.

(d) The equipment must be installed and maintainedby cleared U. S. personnel.

Note: This exception is offered as an interim measure with theunderstanding the system will be fitted with the optical isolatorwhen it becomes available.

c. Hmdti&s. In cases where a “hold” feature is provided,either through the use of a multiline telephone set or a separateline selector key strip, no special handset is necessary. When a“hold” feature is not available, a security handset such as theWECO G-1OA, G-1OB, G-1OF, or equivalent is essential for protec-tion in those situations where the instrument is left “off-hook”for short periods of time while the user obtains information,files, etc.

d. ~. Since most standard telephone ringers havemicrophonics characteristics, the signaling of incoming callswithin sensitive discussion areas should be accomplished inaccordance with one of the following options:

(1) In facilities where the KSU is installed within thesecure perimeter, no special signaling apparatus is required ifthe KSU includes a local ring generator and is wired for commonaudible signaling. Any ringer or buzzer may be used. This typeof installation requires a backup power source if telephoneservice is required during commerical power outages.

4

Enclosure (2)

.

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN 1985

..(2) With any ringer or buzzer modified with an approved

isolator kit.

4. Svsta Such systems installed withinsensitive discussion areas pre~ent audio security hazards similarto those related to telephone systems. The design of many inter-communication systems allow audio in their vicinity to be inter-cepted at any point along the connecting cable run. Unlessnecessary for efficient operation, intercommunication systemsshould not be installed in sensitive discussion areas. Ifdetermined to be essential, all components of the system, includ-ing connection cables, should remain within the establishedsecure perimeter. Under no circumstances should intercom-munication systems that employ AC power lines or RF energy as thetransmission media be used.

5. S~eclallzed T-one,.

Ea~ The installation ofspecialized telephone equipnent, su~h as telephone answeringdevices and speaker phones, is discouraged within sensitivediscussion areas. Such systems add to system complexity andincrease the potential for undetected exploitation. In caseswhere operational need overrides the security ramifications,specialized telephone equipment should be installed in accordancewith the provisions of paragraph 3.

— 6. erlzed T-hone Svstew The latest telephone systemsavailable employ computer technolo& and afford a multitude ofoperating conveniences, but these systems are not recommended foruse within sensitive discussion areas. If the use of such asystem is an operational necessity, every effort should be madeto ensure the entire system is installed within the discussionarea or in an adjacent area which is provided equal securityprotection. No assurances relative to the system’s security canbe made unless it is so installed. Only computerized telephoneswitching systems compatible with the optical isolator underdevelopment should be used. Commands anticipating installing asystem are encouraged to contact NIS Headquarters for an evalua-tion. The optical isolators should be used when they becomeavailable.

7. Secure voice Tele@wtwa The presence of a secure voicetelephone within an uncontr~lled office does not, of itself,qualify the space for TSCM support. In fact, the uncontrolledoffice would constitute the weak link in secure voice communi-cations. Installation of secure voice telephones should berestricted to sensitive discussion areas afforded positive accesscontrols which are provided periodic TSCM support. Uncler theseconditions, the secure voice equipment can be used with greatersecurity confidence.

5

Enclosure (2)

SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUI!1985

TSCM SUPPORT REQUESTSL

1. All requests for TSCM support should be classified SECRET.

2. All requests should befollowing, as appropriate:

a. Send requests forto the Naval Investigative

forwarded in accordance with the

support for Pacific area commandsService Reqional Office Pacific, Box

76, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860, Attn:- Technical Services -Detachment Pacific (PLA for message traffic is NAVINVSERVREGOPACPEARL HARBOR HI) with an information copy to Headquarters, NavalInvestigative Service, Washington D.C. 20388, Attn: TechnicalServices Department. The PLA for naval message is DIRNAVINVSERVWASHINGTONJ DC.

b. Forward requests for support for Marine Corps commandsfollowing the existing editions of applicable Marine Corpsorders/directives.

c. Send all other requests to Headquarters NavalInvestigative Service.

3. Include the following in all requests:

a. Complete identification of the area requiring TSCMsupport, to include:— name of the area, room number, buildingnumber, address, location and command if other than requester.

b. Square footage of the area.

c. Identity and telephone number (AUTOVON, commercial witharea code, AUTOSEVOCOM) of the command point of contact and analternate.

d. Clearance requirements for TSCM support personnel.

e. Date and serial number of last TSCM report and thestatus of previous recommendations provided, if any.

f. Information that may impact on the scheduling ofsupportl i.e.l date scheduled construction will commence,completion date of construction in progress, etc. Shouldunexpected events which would interfere with a TSCM inspectionoccur after support has been scheduled, the requester shouldnotify the Headquarters, NIS to prevent unnecessary expendituresof manpower and travel funds.

Enclosure (3)

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SECNAVINST 5500.31A

4 JUN 1985

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)SUPPORT UNITS

Mailinq AddressHeadquartersNaval Investigative ServiceWashington, D. C. 20388

Commanding OfficerNaval Investigative ServiceRegional Office NorfolkNorfolk, VA 23511

Commanding OfficerNaval Investigative ServiceRegional Office San DiegoP.O. BOX 80667San Diego, CA

Commanding OfficerNaval Investigative ServiceRegional Office PacificBOX 76Pearl Harbor, HI 96860

Commandinq OfficerU. S. Naval Investigative ServiceRegional OfficeBOX 36FPO San Francisco 96651

Team Commander5th Counterintelligence TeamHQ Fleet Marine Force AtlanticU. S. Naval BaseNorfolk, VA 23515

Team Commander6th Counterintelligence Team3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFMarine Corps Air Station El ToroSanta Ana, CA 92709

Team Commander9th Counterintelligence TeamIII Marine Amphibious Force, FMFFpO San Francisco 96602

Messaue AddressDIRNAVINVSERV WASHINGTON DC

NAVINVSERVREGO NORFOLK VA

NAVINVSERVREGO SAN DIEGO CA

NAVINVSERVREGOPAC PEARLHARBOR HI

NAVINVSERVREGO SUBIC BAY RP

CG F!4FLANTPass to: G-2 (SCIO), 5CIT

CG I MAFPass to: G-2 (SCIO), 6CITINFO: CG THIRD MAW

CG III MAFPass to: G-2 (SCIO), 9CIT

Enclosure (4)