GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992Feliciano, J.:

FACTS: The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and otheroil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearingson said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriateaction. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

ISSUE:Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

RULING: The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff billsis within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…” The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sections 104 and401, the pertinent provisions thereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERAG.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]

FACTS:Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for

reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme

Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed

by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial  and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for

execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation

Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for

hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other

things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the

Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution

guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition,

elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative

power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:

Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of

legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in

those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation

officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be

appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office." 

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation

Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are

entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act

applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary

of a probation officer.

The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to

make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different

provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than

those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation

officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided

or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this

is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer,

probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.

Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA166 SCRA 533 (1988)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative PowerEXCEPTION: Subordinate LegislationTests for Valid Delegation of Legislative PowerFACTS: 

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD: 

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegatedis the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is toenforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be

adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were confiscated by the

station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao

or cara beef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon

his filing of a supersede as bond of P12, 000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court

sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the

confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as

raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright

confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due

process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under

Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of

instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.

Constitutional grant to the Supreme Court to review.

Justice Laurel's said, “Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the

constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply,

to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.”

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,

promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative

authority over the president under Amendment number 6.

Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controversy. In the due process

clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance

of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to

adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest they be confined to its

interpretation like a straitjacket.

There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as

such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts proved and fact

presumed. An example is a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains and

is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits

slaughter of carabaos with an exception.

While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it can’t be said that it complies

with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.

Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only

due to the urgency needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the

accused acquired the rights in the constitution.

The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate

carabaos was oppressive.

Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his defence and

punished immediately.

This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation of powers.

The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of

Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of

Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and

from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates

of eligibility foradmission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from

administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said

petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of

1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: 

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation

of medical education; (b) theexamination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control

and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." 

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in

Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

x x x 

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those

issued said certificate; and tocollect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which

shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: 

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by

any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a

record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate

of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of

good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d)birth

certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in

addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23

August 1985, established a uniformadmission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as

an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility foradmission into medical schools of

the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The

NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants

for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in

the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be

determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of

Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the

other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the

issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.

52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a

condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional

imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of

the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order

— of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical

safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of

governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether

there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition

for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general

community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the

regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable

method of protecting the health and safety of the public. 

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of

the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of

those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the

process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who

exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The

need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in

general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development,

are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the

NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]

medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to

hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation

in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly

effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for

disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court

denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

OR

Tablarin v. GutierrezG.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

Feliciano, J.

Facts:

                The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Issue:

                whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education

Held:

                The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. 

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.  It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.  This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.  Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one.  Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. 

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

OR

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was

purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the

seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as  a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the

auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that

the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by

Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor

their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,

cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since

barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being

created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created

without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated

such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of

Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the

government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is

essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in

itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate   

— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which

the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.  In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such

standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or

formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,

there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within

or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which

would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present,

still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what

the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes

hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any

subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be

changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently

legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

 

G.R. No. 165299 December 18, 2009PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., Petitioner,

vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent.

The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner notice of Violation. Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed. It was reported that petitioner’s wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was conducted but the results still failed. A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before LLDA. Petitioner requested another test. This time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and noon 5 September 2001. It is respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. This Public Hearing Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. PresidentialDecree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollute wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues. The mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD No. 984.CA held that LLDA has the power to impose fines.

ISSUE: WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.

HELD: YES. Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollutioncases.Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927), LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement. Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.