EN BANC

[G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992.]

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, (Second District of Bataan),

petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF

FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.

Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; AUTHORIZED BY

CONGRESS TO FIX TARIFF RATES AND OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS.

Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of

appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of

course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the

Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore

Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be

characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President,

that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the

Philippines. There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2]

of Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the

President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress]

may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other

duties or imposts . . . ." The relevant congressional statute is the

Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and

401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions

which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive

Orders Nos. 475 and 478.

2. TAXATION; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; CUSTOMS DUTIES;

NAME GIVEN TO TAXES ON THE IMPORTATION AND EXPORTATION

OF COMMODITIES. Customs duties which are assessed at the

prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently

imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus,

it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes

on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax

assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a

foreign country."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROTECTION AFFORDED TO LOCAL INDUSTRIES.

The levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in

some measure the effect of protecting local industries where

such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable

goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties

inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues.

Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever,

designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly,

customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the

proceeds of which become public funds have either or both the

generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social

activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult

to say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal

objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces

ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here,

the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on

imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have

some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the

effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At

the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for

the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff

rates or special duty.

4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL STANDARDS SET FOR THE EXERCISE OF

THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO THE PRESIDENT. Section 401 of

the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with

which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to

the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised

in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or

national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection

of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be

secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that

therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the

alpha and omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or

national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously

such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and

policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that

the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great

bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension

of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as

the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be

reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting

consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient

service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may

otherwise impose upon the community.

5. ID.; ID.; TARIFF RATES AND CUSTOM DUTIES; LEVIED UPON

ARTICLES NOT PRODUCED IN THE PHILIPPINES. Tariff rates are

commonly established and the corresponding customs duties levied

and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and

not produced in the Philippines. In such cases, customs duties may

be seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or

perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the

items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are

levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are

any competing local industries to protect.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE ORDERS

NOS. 475 AND 478, CONSTITUTIONAL. Executive Orders Nos. 475

and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the

desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that

reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under

Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not

successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and

legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled.

D E C I S I O N

FELICIANO, J p:

On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No.

438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and

charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,

an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional

duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles,

including crude oil and other oil products imported into the

Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased from

five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the

promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.

On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff

Commission to initiate the process required by the Tariff and

Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and

other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10

and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as

amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the

procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code,

scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity

to be heard and to present evidence in support of their respective

positions.

Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on

15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported

articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem,

except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which

continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%)

ad valorem. cdtai

Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission

submitted to the President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil

and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration and

appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued

Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in

addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%)

ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty

of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and

P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. prLL

In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,

petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.

He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of

Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as

follows:

"Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and

private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of

Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with

amendments."

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact

revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power

of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the

nature of revenue-generating measures.

Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478

contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which

Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to

increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional

duties only when necessary to protect local industries or products

but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the

government.

Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the

legality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to

restrain the implementation of those Executive Orders. We will

examine these questions in that order.

Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent

promulgation of Executive Order No. 517 did not render the instant

Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is

dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:

"Section 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. The additional duty

in the nature of ad valorem imposed on all imported articles

prescribed by the provisions of Executive Order No. 443, as

amended, is hereby lifted; Provided, however, that the selected

articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104

of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex `A'

hereof, shall continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine

(9%) percent ad valorem."

Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products

continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%)

ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special duty

of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of

imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478. prcd

Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24,

Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,

revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the

province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It

does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475

and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures,

are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead

by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the

Constitution provides as follows:

"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix

within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and

restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,

tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the

framework of the national development program of the

Government."(Emphasis supplied)

There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to

authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions

as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates

. . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."

The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of

the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions

thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly

invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section

104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part:

"Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and

subheadings and the rates of import duty under Section 104 of

Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued

under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby

adopted and form part of this Code.

There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles

the rates of duty indicated in the Section under this section except

as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that,

the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad

valorem.

The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to

Section Four Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic

investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the

President upon recommendation of the National Economic and

Development Authority.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or

national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed,

the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and

Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby

empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective

rates of import duty (including any necessary change in

classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but

in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the

basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased

rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred

(100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban

imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose

an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad

valorem whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic

investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the

NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection

levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code,

including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.

LexLib

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President

by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the

imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad

valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the

course of which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested

parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present,

produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear

the views and recommendations of any government office, agency

or instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their

findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days

after the termination of the public hearings.

c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of

import duty within the limits fixed in subsection `a' shall include the

authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty,

the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty

with respect to imports from the principal competing foreign

country for the most recent representative period shall be used as

bases.

d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the

Commission a copy of all customs import entries as filed in the

Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized

representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all

liquidated customs import entries and other documents appended

thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit.

e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary

to carry out the provisions of this section.

f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the

provisions of this section shall take effect thirty (30) days after

promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not

exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect at

the discretion of the President." (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated

authorizations found in Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and

Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized to act

under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect local industries

and products for the sake of the national economy, general welfare

and/or national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:

"E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the

protection of local industries and products for the sake of national

economy, general welfare and/or national security. On the contrary,

they work in reverse, especially as to crude oil, an essential product

which we do not have to protect, since we produce only minimal

quantities and have to import the rest of what we need.

These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the

government to raise government finances, contrary to Sections 24

and 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, as well as to Section 401

of the Tariff and Customs Code." 3 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the

language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs

Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority.

The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2)

words, one found in Section 401 (a) (1): "existing protective rates of

import duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of

Section 401 (a): " protection levels granted in Section 104 of this

Code . . . ." We believe that the words "protective" and "protection"

are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing

limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.

In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very

practical fact of which this Court may take judicial notice that the

Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code,

is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of

governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal

Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that

generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the

government The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation

[PAGCOR].)

In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the

prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently

imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. 4

Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to

taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff

or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a

foreign country." 5 The levying of customs duties on imported

goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local

industries where such local industries actually exist and are

producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very

same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing

governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes

are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only.

Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the

sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds 6

have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of

economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently,

it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is the

dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the

Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the

crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates

and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products

may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil

production. For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil

products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that

substantial revenues for the government are raised by the

imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.

In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build

into our constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one.

Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general

standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that

provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must

be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare

and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the

"protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that

can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that

therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the

alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare

and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take

seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative

standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for

instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute

the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as

important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare

and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so

customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the

purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy

quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized

local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.

It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly

established and the corresponding customs duties levied and

collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and not

produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete

with such articles and commodities: among the more interesting

examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from

the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or

European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7,

Notes); dates (Chapter 8, 8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar

(Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.01); special diagnostic

instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery

(Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes; X-ray screens,

etc (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be

seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps,

in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the items

involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and

imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any

competing local industries to protect.

Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475

and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the

desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that

reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under

Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not

successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and

legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled. 7

The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to

deal with petitioner's additional contention that, should Executive

Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and illegal,

there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products

equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to

adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949.]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of

First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of

Manila, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-2756. August 26, 1949.]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs.

EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.

[G.R. No. L-3054. Agosto 26, 1949.]

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido

Nacionalista, recurrente, contra EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS,

recurrido.

[G.R. No. L-3055. Agosto 26, 1949.]

LEON MA. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-3056. Agosto 26, 1949.]

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers

similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

L-2044

Paredes, Diaz & Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and

Araneta & Araneta for petitioner.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General

Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo and Assistant City

Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents.

Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos & Fernando as amici curiae.

L-2756

Araneta & Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.

Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.

Claro M. Recto as amicus curiae.

L-3054

Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B.

Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.

Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.

Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and

Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.

Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and

Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae.

L-3055

Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.

V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.

Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique Fernando, Ramon

Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano

R. Navarro as amici curiae.

L-3056

Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.

Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.

Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M.

Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio

Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENTION OF THE LAW,

HOW ASCERTAINED. The intention of an act is to be sought for in

its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be

subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of

the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as

additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.

2. ID.; ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue

thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined

to mean restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive

bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope. The words "limited

period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to

mean restrictive in duration.

3. PRESIDENT; EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF

DELEGATION OF. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of

emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be

an emergency."

4. ID.; LEGISLATURE HAD RESTRICTED THE LIFE OF

EMERGENCY POWERS. In the language of section 3 of Act No.

671, The National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency

powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented

from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought

on by war.

5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; AUTOMATICAL EXTINCTION

OF ACT NO. 671; CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and

"would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote

automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain

period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary

to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that

period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to

be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.

6. ID.; CONTEMPLATED PERIOD FOR ACT NO. 671;

CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION. When it became evident that

we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most

unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular

session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can easily be

discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers

upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the

inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor

than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so

vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its

authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive

of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been

conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption

and dislocation of the normal processes of government.

7. ID.; ID.; ID. The period that best comports with the

constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general

context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not

the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive

with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the

convening of that body.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 671 BECAME INOPERATIVE

WHEN CONGRESS MET IN REGULAR SESSION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS

THEREAFTER ISSUED, VALIDITY OF. Commonwealth Act No. 671

became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May

25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were

issued without authority of law.

9. ID.; SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATION IS

PRESERVED FOR CONGRESS ALL THE TIME. The Filipino people by

adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they

share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system,

with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of

government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not

excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the

history of the United States, the basic features of whose

Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of

the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another

department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a

legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even

when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged

in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that

under our concept of constitutional government, in times of

extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various

branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to

act, are called upon "to perform the duties and discharge the

responsibilities committed to them respectively."

10. JUDGES; DISQUALIFICATION; MEMBERS OF SUPREME

COURT; OBJECTION SHOULD BE MADE ON TIME. A motion to

disqualify a member of the Supreme Court filed after the said

member had given his opinion on the merits of the case cannot be

considered because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate

upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after

decision has been rendered.

11. ID.; ID.; MEMBER OF SUPREME COURT FORMERLY AS

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. The fact that a member of the Supreme

Court while Secretary of Justice had advised the Chief Executive on

the question involved in a certain case, does not disqualify him to

act when it is brought before the court, for he cannot be considered

as having acted previously in said case as counsel of any of the

parties when the Chief Executive is not a party thereto.

12. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHO MAY TAKE PART IN

THE ADJUDICATION; RULE 53, SECTION 1 WITH RULE 58, SECTION 1,

INTERPRETED. One who is not a member of the court at the time

an adjudication is made cannot take part in that adjudication. The

word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only

by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value

and binding force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated

(Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act

No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court).

Promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of

Court for filing and publication.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. One who is no longer a member of this

Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot

validly take part in that decision.

14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EACH OF THE GREAT BRANCHES OF

THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH ITS OWN DUTY.

Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge

victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the

great branches of the Government, within its own allocated sphere,

complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and

regardless of difficulties.

15. EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT LAWS. Executive Orders,

even if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief

Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in

exactly the same manner as the judgments of the Supreme Court,

municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be

considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.

16. ID. Executive orders issued by the President in pursuance

of the power delegated to him under section 26, Article VI of the

Constitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations.

17. JUDGES; REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTES TO ANNUL

EXECUTIVE ORDERS. There is nothing either in the Constitution or

in the Judiciary Act requiring the votes of eight justices to nullify a

rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President.

Hence, a mere majority of six members of the Supreme Court is

enough to nullify them.

D E C I S I O N

TUASON, J p:

Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other

two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them

present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is

decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we

will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of

interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No.

L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-

2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a

discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the

cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of

the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling

authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance

to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly

and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of

procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821.)

The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the

President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671.

Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62,

which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.

The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court

of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this

Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of

prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is

Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the

Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of

mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office

and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of

shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the required

export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the

Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054

relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the

operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other

purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an

elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of

prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from

disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-

3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to

defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the

holding of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The

petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks

this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or

otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the

constitutionality of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the

point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case

chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act

(Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and

effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to this

question that we will presently address ourselves and devote

greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the

constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any

dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that

hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in

furtherance of the main thesis.

Act No. 671 in full is as follows:

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF

WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE

PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET

SUCH EMERGENCY.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and

other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines,

makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary

powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.

"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the

Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the

existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and

regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national

policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other

things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or

any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or

instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the

Commonwealth including the determination of the order of

precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create

new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or

instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already

existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which

would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or

suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative

character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend

or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance

of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the

proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or

municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he

may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of

credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other

powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to

fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the authority.

"SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable

upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report

thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the

powers herein granted.

"SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and

regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until

the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by

law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such

restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations

to carry out a declared national policy."

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its

effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its

nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be

subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of

the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as

additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue

thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined

to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive

bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law

Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The

words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond

question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in

order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be

temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust

Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L.

R., 937, 938.)

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved

with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the

law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle

that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the

constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new

legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with

the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to

terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been

correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and

uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary

emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d],

912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would,

the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and

the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore,

this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate

its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them

except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for

Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not

right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President:

Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:

"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not

delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature

may not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view of the scope that

legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between

delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by

rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of

the delegate; . . ."

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of

Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations

promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the

Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of

the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the

express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued

in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the

National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the

former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the

Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly

failed to make a provision for its termination in the same way that it

did for the termination of the effects and incidents of the

delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the

rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was

to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only

make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones

already annulled by the legislature.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the

Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its

authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies

operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and

simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the

emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended

while Congress was in session and be revived after each

adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a

two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the

President during congressional recess, and the President in turn

could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws

enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two

instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by

the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former

President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals

after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and

the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export

control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the

language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National

Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the

President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding

sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the

war. Section 3 provides:

"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon

the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all

the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers

herein granted."

The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one

meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account

of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it

could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the

National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in

section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the

convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what

reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and

clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the

President was expected to continue making laws in the form of

rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as

unimportant, as the initial one.

As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement

regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should

carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the

carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National

Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of

the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who

was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in

his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for

a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted."

These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the

conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new

legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after

the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a

different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the

same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer.

He said he issued the call for a special session of the National

Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely

helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the

Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was

to open on January 1, 1942." (Italics ours.) It can easily be discerned

in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the

President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the

National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this

inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as

to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its

authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive

of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been

conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption

and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if

we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its

duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite,

limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports

with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the

general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main

if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period

coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period

ending with the convening of that body.

It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth

Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular

session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,

225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the

first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session

which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we

are giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National

Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general

legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate."

(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the

power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the

limitations imposed by the organic law.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of

deciding the question as to which department of government is

authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is

predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to

declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of

fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly

call that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power

and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of

interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied

the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it

is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to

say that war has not ended, and may act on the strength of his

opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have

construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the

proposition. There is no pretense that the President has

independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as

those under review. We take it that the respondents, in sustaining

the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No.

620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth and on no other

source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this

connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly

derived from the Constitution.

Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the

opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts

Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that

they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and

regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600

and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6,

1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of

adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless

sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical

deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the minds of the

lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse

not later than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for

the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was

predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous

repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the

curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the

Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the

President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them

into force and to issue new ones independently of the National

Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against

the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671

equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.

The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the

question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If

we were to assume that actual hostilities between the original

belligerents are still raging, the conclusion would not be altered.

After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved

if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was

desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of

the Emergency Powers Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of

total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble

referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the

Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization

of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National

Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for

immediate action and with which the National Assembly would not

be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and

calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the

National Assembly been in a position to operate.

After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of

the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the

Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects

and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in

one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting

parliamentary government have given notice that they share the

faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its

faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of

government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not

excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the

history of the United States, the basic features of whose

Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of

the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another

department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a

legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even

when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged

in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that

under our concept of constitutional government, in times of

extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various

branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to

act, are called upon "to perform the duties and discharge the

responsibilities committed to them respectively."

These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this

decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea

that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his

extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills directly or

indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In

order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the

normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to

depart in these cases from the ordinary rule relative to the period

for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby

decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of

the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the

Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be

charged.

Moran, C.J., concurs in part.

Ozaeta, J., concurs.

Paras, J., concurs and also in separate opinion.

Feria, J., concurs in so far as the decision is not in conflict with his

separate opinion.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6266. February 2, 1953.]

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR. ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. VICENTE

GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Taada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P.

Laurel, Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for

respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; CONGRESSIONAL

DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT;

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671; LIMITED DURATION.

Commonwealth Act No. 671, passed in pursuance of section 26 of

Article VI of the Constitution, declared the national policy that "the

existence of war between the United States and other countries of

Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary

to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet

the resulting emergency," and authorized the President "during the

existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and

regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national

policy declared in the Act." To be constitutional, this Act must be

construed to be for the limited period fixed or implied therein.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPRESS REPEAL UNNECESSARY. Express

repeal of Commonwealth Act No. 671 is not necessary; otherwise it

would be unconstitutional since it may never be repealed by the

Congress, or if the latter attempts to do so, the President may wield

his veto.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HOUSE BILL NO. 727 CONSIDERED

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. Although House Bill No. 727,

approved by the Congress, repealing the Emergency Powers Acts,

had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a

regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent

resolution formally declaring the termination of the emergency

powers.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMERGENCY RESULTING FROM LAST

WORLD WAR. Commonwealth Act No. 671 lasted only during the

emergency resulting from the last world war which factually

involved the Philippines when said Act was passed on December 16,

1941. That emergency terminated upon the ending of said war.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; KINDS OF EMERGENCIES. Section 26 of

Article VI of the Constitution authorizes the delegation of powers by

the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.

The emergency spoken of in Commonwealth Act No. 671 is one "in

time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that

may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes such as

widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF PRESIDENT TO MAKE

APPROPRIATIONS. Even under the theory that insofar as the

Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given matter,

the emergency powers delegated in Commonwealth Act No. 671

are pro tanto withdrawn, the President cannot set aside funds for

special purposes, since the Congress has been approving

appropriation acts. If the President had ceased to have powers with

respect to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of

special appropriations; otherwise he may do indirectly what he

cannot do directly.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, C.J p:

As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion,

on August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court had already passed upon

the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December

16, 1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war

involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to

promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five

members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on

May 25, 1946 (when the Congress met in regular session) according

to Justices Ozaeta, Feria, Tuason and the writer, and on June 9,

1945 (when the Congress convened in special session) according to

Chief Justice Moran. Justices Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes

and Torres in effect concluded that the powers delegated to the

President had been withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon

by the Congress or on which the latter had demonstrated its

readiness or ability to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21,

1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December

24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,

1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the

Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second

appropriating funds for election expenses in November, 1949, were

therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act

No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted

legislation on the same subjects. 1

More or less the same considerations that influenced our

pronouncements of August 26, 1949 are and should be controlling

in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to

invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November

10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent

and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of

P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by

typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other

calamities.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of

war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law

authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such

restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations

to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National

Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section

1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United

States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the

Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with

extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency,"

and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of

the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may

deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section

1."

As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional

provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended

it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has

not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a

cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the

result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be

repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the

President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken

place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing

all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress

and the President or either as the principal authority to determine

the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, in

palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant

thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in

the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of

either the Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and

did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be

considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally

declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend

that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect,

would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while

Congress might delegate its powers by a simple majority, it might

not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,

it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take

them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."

2

Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,

whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that

he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that

the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at

the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency

created under the Act is coupled with interest.

The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the

powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last

world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671

was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which

naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was

contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the

foresight that the actual state of war could prevent it from holding

its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following

statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we

were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most

unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular

session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National

Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which

reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their

loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law

granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under

the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war."

3 When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly

meant such factual war as that then raging.

As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that

"since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but

not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war

and who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction

resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last

war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is the

declared policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium

should be continued in force in a modified form." 4 It is important

to remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration

was made bore the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in

his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what

emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing

rains artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common

among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the

thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," an

admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are not

the result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.

If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the

legislative department on the alleged existence of emergency,

reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred

to, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.

Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution, in virtue of

which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers

by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.

The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of

the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other

national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or

from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons,

floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some provinces

and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but

were and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At

any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions,

and it cannot let the people down without somehow being

answerable thereover.

As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress

without his signature House Bill No. 727, did not invoke any

emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called

attention to an impending emergency that may be brought about by

present complicated and troubled world conditions, and to the fact

that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of

democracy and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic.

The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the

war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and

Japan on one side and the Allied Powers on the other; and

indications are that in the next world war, if any, the communist

countries will be aligned against the democracies. No departure can

be made from the national policy declared in section 1 of Act No.

671. New powers may be granted as often as emergencies

contemplated in the Constitution arise.

There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still

technically at war with Japan pending the ratification of the peace

treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the

second place, the last world war was between the United States and

Japan, the Philippines being involved only because it was then

under American sovereignty. In the third place, the United States

had already signed the peace treaty with Japan, and the Philippines

has become an independent country since July 4, 1946.

It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is

inconsistent with the claim that the emergency powers are non-

existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill

had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, especially because

this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary majority, to

declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.

Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen

and Senators and on House Resolution No. 99, urging the President

to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public

works and for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to

state, in reply, that the said petition and resolution cannot prevail

over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by

two chambers of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the

resolution of one house, there is more reason for accepting the

solemn declaration of two houses.

Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar

as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given

matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been

pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be

declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice

of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been

approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the

Government, public works, and many other purposes, with the

result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed

to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and

to withdraw the same from the President. If the President had

ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none

can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may

accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is

significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the

President to that of continuing "in force" appropriations which

would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even

assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the

President can by executive orders make new appropriations. The

specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which

would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the

general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem

necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and

to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although

the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been

normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the

President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would

necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.

Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President

should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of

speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the

people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a

government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In

line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic

in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless

and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter

and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the

consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between,

inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive

departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt

official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes

must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or

group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution,

however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation

of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times

of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to

the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any

national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone

must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not

create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation

lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their

faithful adherence to the Constitution.

Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared

null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from

appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds

set aside therein. So ordered, without costs.

Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 45685. December 22, 1937.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad

interim of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,

respondents.

Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.

DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai

Banking Corporation.

Vicente J. Francisco, Feria & La O, Orense & Belmonte and Gibbs &

McDonough for the respondent Unjieng.

No appearance for respondent Judge.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDGMENT; STAY OF EXECUTION; WRIT OF CERTIORARI;

SUPERSEDEAS BOND. Section 46 (a) of the Rules of this court

requires that in any civil case in which final judgment has been

rendered by this court, if any party thereto gives notice in writing of

his intention to remove the case to the Supreme Court of the United

States by writ of certiorari, this court shall grant a stay for the

period therein mentioned within which said party may give a

supersedeas bond, the sufficiency of which is to be determined by

one of the members of this court.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

PROCEEDINGS. It is admitted that certiorari and prohibition are

civil remedies but the certiorari and prohibition proceedings

originally instituted in this court were, like the proceedings for

probation, an incident of the criminal case. Apart from this, it will be

noted that the appeal taken is from the judgment of this court

declaring the Probation Act unconstitution and void. That judgment

does not command or permit any act to be done. There is nothing

there to be actively enforced by execution or otherwise. Because of

its negative or prohibitive character, there is nothing to supersede;

nothing, as petitioners assert, upon which the stay bond can

operate.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In reality, the supersedeas is intended to

operate on the decision and judgment in the criminal case entitled

"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al."

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in that case,

rendered on January 8, 1934 (Criminal Case No. 42649), was

affirmed by this court on March 26, 1935 (G. R. No. 41200, 35 Off.

Gaz., 738. See also resolutions of December 17, 1935). The decision

of this court in that criminal case has already become final and the

petition for a writ of certiorari to review said decision was denied by

the Supreme Court of the United States in November of last year. At

bottom, supersedeas is being sought to stay the execution of the

final judgment in said criminal case. Thereby, the petitioner will

continue to be at large and this is the status quo desired to be

maintained. The suspensive effect of supersedeas can only operate

in this case on the judgment sought to be reviewed and cannot

arrest the execution of the final judgment rendered in the criminal

case against the respondent M. C. U. (Cyc. of Fed. Proc., Civil and

Criminal, Longsdorf, vol. 6, sec. 2869, p. 362.)

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The public interest and the interest of the

speedy administration of justice demand prompt execution of the

final sentence of conviction rendered against the petitioner. Said

petitioner has had all the time and opportunity which the law can

possibly afford to anyone in self-defense. He had the assistance of

able counsel and had opportunity to appeal to this court and the

Supreme Court of the United States, and the least that can be said is

that he must abide by this judgment and serve his term. It is further

to be observed that the petition for probation of the respondent M.

C. U. has already been denied by the trial court.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF FEDERAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED

STATES. As a rule of federal practice in the United States, section

8 cd. of the Act of Congress of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat., 936, 940;

28 U. S. C. A., sec. 350), provides that in any case the execution and

enforcement of final judgment or decree which is subject to review

by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari is

discretionary with "a judge of the court rendering the judgment or

decree or by a Justice of the Supreme Court," and this rule is

reiterated in paragraph 6 of Rule 38 of the Supreme Court of the

United States. (Robertson & Kirkham, sec. 413, p. 831 et seq.)

D E C I S I O N

LAUREL, J p:

After rendition of the judgment of this court in the above-entitled

case, 1 the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, on November 26, 1937,

gave notice of his intention to petition the Supreme Court of the

United States for a writ of certiorari for the review of said judgment

and, desiring to stay execution during the pendency of the

application for the writ and of the proceedings relative thereto in

the Supreme Court of the United States, now prays that the

corresponding supersedeas bond be fixed, as provided by the rules

of this court. The People of the Philippines and the Hongkong and

Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners in the above-entitled

case, oppose the application of the respondent for the granting of a

supersedeas bond.

The original action instituted in this court which resulted in the

declaration of unconstitutionality of the Probation Act (No. 4221)

was for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng,

thru counsel, states that as certiorari and prohibition are civil

remedies, it is mandatory upon this court to stay enforcement of its

judgment in the above-entitled case. (Sec. 46 [a] infra, Rules of the

Supreme Court of the Philippines.) He also calls attention to the

principle that probation can not be granted after the defendant has

begun the service of his sentence and to the policy of this court to

encourage review of its decisions and judgments on certiorari by the

Federal Supreme Court. In opposition, the petitioners state that the

judgment of this court declaring the Probation Act unconstitutional

and void is self-executing; that there is no judgment in the instant

proceedings to be executed and that the supersedeas will serve no

useful purpose. The petitioner gave answer to the foregoing

objections raised by the respondents and reiterated the arguments

advanced by him in support of his petition for the fixing of the bond.

Section 46 (a) of the rules of this court provides that:

"Whenever it is made to appear by notice in writing that any party

to a civil case in which final judgment has been rendered by this

court intends to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

a writ of certiorari for the review of the decision and judgment of

this court, and it appears that the case is one which, by reason of

the amount involved or the nature of the questions of law

presented, may be removed to the Supreme Court of the United

States by writ of certiorari, and it further appears that the party

intending to make application for such writ desires to stay the

enforcement of the judgment of thi