Deforming Bureaucracy

8/2/2019 Deforming Bureaucracy

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May 13, 2010Deforming bureaucracyFor a country like Pakistan, the evolution of bureaucracies has been forced and lateral, not

natural and linearBy Adnan Rehmat

All types of governments -- whether elected or self-appointed and whether benevolent orautocratic -- require bureaucracies to govern countries. It is not in the nature of bureaucracies to

offer corrections to governments on policies or even to inform priorities, merely to try and

implement them as ordered. For bureaucracies anywhere process, not service, drives them. One

cannot understand bureaucracies until understanding that for bureaucrats, procedure is king andthat performance is for governments. And for a country like Pakistan, which has see-sawed

between democracies and dictatorships, the evolution of bureaucracies has been forced and

lateral, not natural and linear, with the result that little works and even files of the president and

prime minister go missing somewhere between ministries.It does not help that for a bureaucracy that has alternately conformed to diametrically opposed

national priorities and agendas in Pakistan over the past few decades as politicians and generalshave held sway over uncertain games of musical chairs for abrupt periods in power, the country'sbureaucracy was an inheritance from the Raj era and designed for colonial duties in the first

place, rather than service-oriented as in a welfare state. Not even the bureaucracy in Pakistan will

contest the general perception that it is rusty and ineffective at best. At worst its capacity isseverely diminished due to overt politicisation and corruption in its ranks and the abject failure to

attract the best and the brightest of the country's citizens to it anymore.

Colonial bureaucracy

According to Andrew Wilder, who has recently researched the capacity of Pakistan'spolitical institutions, including the bureaucracy, Pakistan's colonial heritage has heavily

influenced its political culture as well as its bureaucratic and political institutions. The Indian

Civil Service was designed to rule the British empire in this part of the world. Whilerepresentative institutions were gradually introduced into colonial India, their role was advisory

rather than policy-making, and to deal with local administrative matters rather than substantive

issues. They were never intended to be democratic institutions that transferred power to elected

representatives, but rather were designed to help legitimise and strengthen the authority of thebureaucratic state. The power imbalance between the strong bureaucratic institutions that

Pakistan inherited from colonial India and the weak representative and democratic institutions

has been one of the greatest causes of political instability in Pakistan since its independence.With at least three distinct decade-long periods of military rule, Generals Ayub-Yahya, Zia and

Musharraf in particular helped create and consolidate the rot by institutionalising ad hocism and

skewering the natural progression of career bureaucracy. Each time there was a transition to

democracy, in the 1970s, 1990s and recently, there was little serious effort made to institutereforms that would inject back professionalism and meritocracy within the executive. This

ensured concentration of powers -- usually controlled directly by both civil and military

bureaucracies -- in the executive branch stayed put to the detriment of legislature as well as the

judiciary. Even now it is the executive supported by the bureaucracy that typically initiateslegislation, bypassing the legislature by promulgating presidential ordinances. Patronage

bureaucracy Another legacy holding sway in Pakistan's political culture and institutions, as well

as its electoral politics, notes Wilder, is the institutionalization of patron-client political


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associations between the bureaucracy and local elites. In exchange for benefaction in the shape

of land grants, pensions and titles, feudals, clerics and tribal chiefs were co-opted by colonialmanagers to provide political stability and collect revenues. After independence, this direct

patron-client relationship between the bureaucracy and local elites strengthened the image of the

bureaucracy as the providers of patronage, influence and security, thereby undermining the

development of political parties that normally would have played this intermediary role.Until the break-up of the country in 1971 the civilian bureaucracy played the dominant role in

Pakistan's policy-making and as such was insufficiently controlled or influenced by elected

politicians. During this period, there was limited scope for interference from politicians as thebureaucracy, particularly the elite Civil Service of Pakistan, maintained control over the

selection, training and posting of its members and was therefore able to retain its institutional

autonomy. The political unrest that brought down General Ayub's regime in 1969, followed bythe bloody civil war that dismembered Pakistan, seriously undermined the political strength and

legitimacy of both the civil and military bureaucracies.

Politicized bureaucracyZulfiqar Ali Bhutto carved out his political strength from this bureaucratic weakness after

coming to power and set out to rectify the power imbalance between the elected and unelectedinstitutions of the state. Within weeks of assuming power he stamped his authority by

compulsorily retiring 1,300 bureaucrats and followed that up within months by sweepingadministrative reforms. This included introducing a policy of lateral recruitment to increase

political influence over a bureaucracy resistant to reform. Then through the 1973 Constitution he

sliced away the protection of tenure. Rapid politicization of the civil service followed. Thismodel of patronage, which dispensed with professionalism and performance and promoted

loyalty to rulers, has been religiously followed by all subsequent governments whether elected or

military. Thousands of civil officers are routinely transferred before and after elections to serve

the wishes of their political masters, making it difficult for bureaucrats to get postings, transfersor promotions without the support of political or military patronage.

While the politicisation of bureaucracy, as a result of Bhutto's administrative reforms, did havethe short term positive result of giving elected representatives more influence over unelectedinstitutions but permanent adoption of this model also resulted in the decimation of a neutral and

competent civil service. Of the dozen serious attempts to study administrative reforms since

Bhutto's hanging, almost all seek to restore constitutional security of tenure and safety fromprosecution for the civil servants -- arguing that insecure officers can't perform wonders. Both

Generals Zia and Musharraf seriously toyed with the idea of restoring these guarantees but

understood -- as did the governments of Benazir and Nawaz -- that to retain their grip on thepolity they would require a weak and subservient civil service rather than a strong and

independent one, and so backed off.

Militarised bureaucracy

General Zia was in fact clear in what he needed to do. He strengthened and consolidatedthe military's position not only as the country's strongest bureaucratic institution but also as its

strongest political institution. While he did reverse Bhutto's reforms, such as the lateral entry of

civilian bureaucrats, he offset this by increasing the lateral entry of military officers into thecivilian bureaucracy. In fact he instituted a 10 percent quota for former military officials in the

officer grades in the civilian bureaucracy. General Musharraf took this to unprecedented heights.

When he left in August 2008, there were over 10,000 serving and retired military officers in thecivilian bureaucracy his government had appointed.


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Even well before Musharraf staged a coup in 1999, the military was a state within a state. Today

arguably it is the state -- the elected civilian government and 18th constitutional amendmentnotwithstanding. The military controls all key state institutions through either direct control or

through invisible influence -- the civil service, foreign policy, economic policy, home policy,

intelligence agencies. The judiciary and the legislature are still recovering from the encumbering

if invisible influence of the army. The worry is that due to the emaciated civilian bureaucracy,the administration of state institutions is still transparently marked by the invisible hand of the

military and continues to depend on its capacity rather than civilian.

Considering that there is no concerted effort at broader reforms, over time, the effect is beingcompounded, especially since the elected government is increasingly noted for its poor

governance track-record of two years. There may have been political triumphs for it but good

governance is not one of them. The military has become organisationally and institutionallystronger in the last decade. It has ensured it gets much better governance and administrative

training than the civilian bureaucracy even as the latter suffers from institutional decay and heads

into the other direction.

Professional bureaucracy

Headed by former State Bank of Pakistan Governor Ishrat Hussain, the NationalCommission for Government Reforms, set up by the last military government but also tentatively

supported by the incumbent elected government, has completed an exhaustive two-year reviewof what ails the civil service of Pakistan and what can be done to prop it up as a standard bearer

of professionalism. The commission offers the following key recommendations as the only way

for Pakistan to get a service oriented bureaucracy that can help run the proverbial ship of stateproperly:

Greater accountability:The need to strengthen internal and external accountability mechanisms to address

widespread corruption within the bureaucracy;

Enhanced efficiency and transparency: The need to promote greater efficiency and transparency

by replacing manual processes with automated ones and rationalising antiquated and outdatedrules, procedures and regulations;

Rightsizing: The need for greater efficiency and affordability through rightsizing (most feasibly

through natural attrition) of the large number of government employees in the relatively

unproductive subordinate services (Grades 1 to 16);Reform of the cadre system: The need to promote equality of opportunities and career

advancement within the civil service rather than the tradition of giving preferential treatment in

terms of training, positions and promotions to certain elite cadres.Is this the roadmap to recovery? Given the chequered history of attempts to reform and deform

the civil services in Pakistan, it seems this is not likely in a hurry -- considering that the timing of

reforms is as relevant a tactical issue for military as it is for civilian dispensations. The popularly

elected political government wants to break a record by surviving five years and the militaryestablishment is keen to consolidate gains by repairing the damage from Musharraf's overstretch

of his last two years. Any serious reforms now will have short term consequences on the

principal stakeholders of the political system, including the parliament and the military, each ofwhich is in no mood to lose their respective influence and its attendant benefits. Meanwhile, the

only thing that will save Pakistanis from its bureaucracy is its inefficiency.


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3 comments:

1.salmanMay 15, 2010 09:10 AM

Pakistans civil bureaucracy has too often colluded with the military establishment to

retard the growth of democratic institutions and to gain or retain power even underelected civilian governments. At the same time, over-centralization and establishments

interference in political matters have undermined government capacity to tackle the

major problems. Meanwhile the civil service is resistant to radical change in order tosustain its hegemony. In case of Pakistan Peoples Party, bureaucracy always played a

monstrous role and hindered its functioning till the end. Perhaps PPP was always

ominous for the bureaucracy because of its poor friendly policies and agenda to empowerlower class. Bureaucracy must abandon its old bad ways as Pakistan is not in a condition

to absorb more shocks. PPP is no way of change and turned over a new leaf to nudge

country on the path of progress and key changes, so it must avoid hindering Government

function.

Reply

2.SalmanMay 15, 2010 09:13 AM

This comment has been removed by the author.Reply

3.Anima

Pakistan people linked with military bureaucracy, civilian bureaucracy, politicians, feudaland industrialists have created a nexus and benefit each other. Whenever any tried to

break this nexus, he faced music and President As if Ali Zardari has not been that lucky.His governments attempt to put the ISI under the Ministry of Interior could not succeed.It was a good step and way to block involvement of agencies in the political matters. It

would be most fruitful for Pakistan that civil and military organisations, instead of

sticking to their traditional turfs, should enter into negotiations for a gradual andrespectable retreat of the military from civilian administration. Military intervention in

political matters resulted in marshal laws and we witnessed worst dictatorships. It would

be more convenient that if military bureaucracy and other institutes confined them within

their specific fields only.1

1http://thebeautifulpakistan.blogspot.com/2010/05/deforming-bureaucracy.html
http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369http://www.blogger.com/profile/17607366075920429369


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THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACYThe German sociologist, Max Waber, says: "highly trained bureaucratic experts willprevail against the less expert ministers who ostensibly run the administrative units, the cabinet

which ostensibly guides over any policy and the legislature which ostensibly make policy." Thebureaucracy in Pakistan is not an exception to such predictions. It is this group of bureaucracy

who has been, along with the military generals, formulating the policies and political as well as

ideological framework of Pakistan. And being permanently in office, unlike the politicians, whocome and go at their behest, it is they who have the power to actually govern the state as an

administrative group.

In the formative years, from 1947 to 1951, it was a period of turmoil and turbulence, but

major decisions regarding foreign policy, economic development, fiscal arrangements, internal

security etc. were being taken by the bureaucrats. During the 1951-1958, the democraticgovernments were in the name but the shots were called by the bureaucrats while the military

was supporting them as a junior partner.

From 1958 to 1971, during the regimes of General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan, whilethe military was a senior partner and bureaucracy as a junior partner. Feudal politicians

supporting the system from the outside. The populist autocracy of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77),

witnessed the military and bureaucracy playing a second fiddle, because of the debacle in EastPakistan.

General Zia's first eight years (1977-1985) rule may be described as a bureaucratic rule

once again in which the military was a senior partner while bureaucracy as usual a junior partner.

A crowd of religious leaders, discredited feudal politicians, opportunistic professional groups,supported the system from the periphery. In the last three years of Zia's rule when he lifted the

martial law on 31st December 1995 after Junejo's government approved his changes in the

constitution, the democratic government was in name only and the military and civilianbureaucracy continued their role as senior and junior partners. Finally the autocratic democratic

rule from 1988 to 1999 was marked by a strong army and weak bureacuracy.

The stark reality is that most regimes in Pakistan, even martial law, have played into its hands.Only in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's time was it eclipsed for a while, but it must be admitted to its

credit that it rebounded back into the driving seat in his last year. He introduced administrative

reforms in 1973 that, inter alia, modified the constitutional safeguards of public servants againstdismissal etc. Under Section 13 of the Civil Servant Act of 1973, the competent authority could

dismiss public servants of the rank of additional secretary (grade 21) and above in public interest.

The administrative reforms of 1973 were a major setback to the well-entrenched Civil Service of

Pakistan, as the CSP was made the prime target of these changes. A large number of officers

were again sacked like the Ayub Khan era. Constitutional guarantees of civil servants werewithdrawn. A system of lateral entry was introduced. At the same time, powers of arbitrary

dismissal of senior officers were given to the chief executive.

The ground for the reform was prepared by the purge of 1303 officers under Martial Law OrderNo. 14 in 1972, and the dismissal of 18 senior officer in 1973 to facilitate the "speedy

implementation of the government's socio-economic reforms. In the new dispensation it was not


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merit, hard work or efficiency, but loyalty to the master which was the basis for all recruitment,

promotions and postings. Bhutto inducted 514 lateral recruits into the bureaucracy in three yearsand diluted the authority of the Federal Public Service Commission.

During Zia's period, the bureaucracy was finally politicized, which not only meant pursuing the

policies of the ruling party, but also serving their personal whims and covering up their

misdeeds. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, so grandiose disorder, loot and plunder were letloose. The feudal lord had reached his destination along with a modern munshi, the bureaucrat.

The caretaker Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi amended the Civil Servants Act of 1973 to

provide security of service for the bureaucracy and to help it function without political pressure.Confirmation and seniority rules, subject to acceptance by the successor government, were also

promulgated. Under these rules, a seniority list was to be issued on a regular basis. The

discretionary powers of the President and the Prime Minister to relax the upper age limit ofpublic servants was proposed to be eliminated. The Civil Servants Act was amended but did not

include all the recommendations of Moeen Qureshi's government. Under the amended Act,

tenure and conditions of service could not be changed to the disadvantage of the civil servants. If

transferred, civil servants were to be place in equivalent posts.

In our society, bureaucracy is not a set of individuals who act according to their whims andfancies or merely to promote their selfish interest. Pakistan has inherited the bureaucratic

structure and procedures from the British colonial master. It has grown up, with the needs oftime, in a highly developed "power complex", like a machine or a system of self-sustaining

living organism. It exists on the basis of rules, regulations, laws and constitutional provisions. It

would be correct to say that bureaucratic "power complex" was invented by British to rule theircolonies. Britain itself did not have a "power complex" to regulate its life as the one it created

for India and other colonies. Its rule was responsible to none but to the government in London

through the governor-general.

The bureaucracy -- the Indian Civil Service -- was essentially a mercenary force in whichthe sons of the local collaborating elite were inducted to do the dirty work for the colonizers,

which they did with extreme "efficiency." Its interests and orientations were, therefore,

diametrically opposed to those of the people and those of the post-colonial independent societies.

The bureaucracy thus was the biggest hurdle in the way of decolonization of our society and thecreation of a truly democratic state in the post-independence era.

In the late forties and early fifties the political parties played different roles in the two wings of

Pakistan. While in the eastern wing the parties had a mass appeal and they could win elections onthe basis of their popularity, in the western wing such popular appeal was lacking and hence

elections could be managed at the bureaucratic level. It is this opportunity which pushed the

position of bureaucracy to greater heights and they could rise above the politicians in the westernwing. With the passage of time the failure to produce a constitution in time further lowered the

position of the politicians. The rise of three bureaucrats, Ghulam Mohammad Malik, Choudhuri

Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza gave moral support to the strength of the bureaucrats and

they could manipulate the Central government in a manner that suited them.This led to disenchantment between the two wings of Pakistan. The comparatively better position

of the bureaucracy and the politicians in the western wing of the country played a decisive role in

making the politicians weaker and weaker pushing up the bureaucrats to higher position of notonly executive control but also policy making. Governor General, later President, Iskandar Mirza

could also manipulate to form the Republican Party. Thus for all practical purposes the

politicians in the western wing came to play in the hands of the bureaucrats. Such a dual role of a


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government can be played better by the army personnel than the civil bureaucracy since army

commanders are more disciplined and hard working. Thus the door was opened for military rule,not because the politicians failed but because the bureaucrats would not give any chance to the

politicians to play a genuine role by going to the people for support. Democracy, which started

well in Pakistan, was throttle by the civil as well as military bureaucrats.

The first public exposure that who was really in control of Pakistan political system, behind thefacade of nominal parliamentary institution, came with governor general's dismissal of the Prime

Minister in April 1953. Ghulam Mohammad, a bureaucrat by profession had taken over

power as governor-general after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. His dismissal of primeminister Khawaja Nazimuddin's cabinet impugned the role of the legislature as the maker and

sustainer of government. This showed how in-effective was the link between the prime minister

and the institutions of party and parliament. Thus the establishment of a system of centralexecutive rule, rather than of cabinet government based on a representative legislature

encouraged the concentration of power in a group of officials divorced from mass politics.

Playing persistently over the wicket of "external security threat" from India, from the very

inception of Pakistan on the one hand and, negation to evolve strong, stable and genuine political

institutions and forces in the first decade of our independence on the other, paved the way to theemergence of new political actors along with bureaucratic lineal decedents of ICS. In 1958 the

army did not only overtly jumped in our politics but in fact it proved as a foundation stone forthe subsequent martial laws of 1969 and 1977, which in turn facilitated the emergence of military

bureaucracy and a group of people composed of both rural feudals and urban corporate interest,

that could be rightly called "capitalist and elite" force.The bureaucracy and the police play an important role in the running of the system. The

standards and quality of life being apparently enjoyed by the majority of our bureaucrats today

leave no room for doubt that it has over the years become an extremely lucrative and

comfortable business to be a bureaucrat. The comforts and glamorous lifestyles reserved for thebureaucracy in this country are with very few parallels in the contemporary world. The sizes of

the Deputy Commissioner houses, Superintendent of Police houses, Commissioner houses and so

on, alone are sufficient to support and corroborate this allegation.

According to a retired bureaucrat, the present bureaucrats could be divided into three categories:the obstinate uncompromising old type, the bewildered transient, and the accomplished ones.

The self-disciplined old type, still hanging on to his professional ethics, is treated by our society

as a fossil. He is today an insignificant residue, appearing as a mole, cyst or pimple on themuscular mass. His normal abodes are the dark, dingy, desolate and unfrequented corners of the

administrative world. The rulers are happy to keep him in cold storage because he can say "no"

to them. The bewildered transient is in the evolutionary process of forced conversion from theold to the new. He is unable to withstand the social compulsions around and the career ambitions

within. Internal conflicts notwithstanding, he goes along with the rulers unwillingly. The show,

however, is stolen by the new bureaucrat who nods, but he nods only to those who matter. All

the antennae of his personality are attuned to the corridors of power. He has perfected the art ofextracting the full price for selling his soul. His creative genius pours lyrical praise in royal ears.

His Midas touch converts don'ts into do's, because his dexterous dynamism is not deterred by

rules, regulations, procedures or systems. To sum up, he has been elevated from "governmentservant" to "government partner," eligible for a holy alliance with the politicians. For his career

prospects even the sky is not the limit.


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It is unusual for top politicians like prime ministers to say what they truly feel about the

bureaucracy. In a speech in mid-1996 PM Benazir Bhutto did the unprecedented. She calledsenior officers arrogant, mischievous and sycophantic and interested only in their own progress

and promotion. A very serious accusation was that they leaked out confidential information to

the secret agencies (and the World Bank) in order to curry favour with them, not bothering if

they let down the government they were supposed to serve. In her charge-sheet Ms Bhutto alsosaid something that had been left unsaid before, that senior officers only wanted posts in which

there was clout and money, and that most of them were as corrupt as the politicians whom they

blamed for the ills of the country.2

WHAT CAN BE DONE?There is no denying the fact that a democratic, politically stable, and moderate Pakistan

will serve its own interests. The democracy in Pakistan has not worked to its full potential not

because something is inherently wrong with it or with the country as such but simply because the

ruling elite resisted it in a bid to maintain the status quo. Unfortunately, like the previousmilitary regimes, the policies of the present military government are seen working in the same

direction.

The military has ruled the country for a large part of its existence and, both by default andintention, promoted specific policies and personalities. It presided over the national destiny in the

1960s, during the East Pakistan crisis and all through the late 1970s and 1980s and cannot

absolve itself of several crucial as well debilitating developments in the past. It is this very

institution which has encouraged and in many cases fostered and nurtured forces of violence,reaction and discrimination in society.

Given the present situation, the fundamental task remains the de-colonization and

democratization of the state. For that we need basic restructuring of the political, economic andsocial set up. Pakistan has evolved into a highly centralized, unitary and oligarchic

instrument which continues to operate in a neo-colonial framework. We need to introduce

radical constitutional and administrative reforms. The multinational character of the Pakistani

state must be recognized and the political and economic rights and powers of the constituentnationalities must be conceded. There must be total decentralization of power up to the lowest

tiers, so that development programs embody the local needs and aspirations, and the people at all

levels are involved in their implementation, and benefit from them.The federal structure, confronts the same dilemma that it had before the separation of East

Pakistan. Just as East Pakistan has a larger population than the other four provinces of West

Pakistan put together, Punjab today outnumbers (according to official census result that has beenchallenged by the smaller provinces) the combined strength of the remaining three provinces.

Unfortunately, narrow parochial considerations, political exploitation and decades of

authoritarian rule have further increased the mistrust and misunderstandings between provinces.

A repetition of the unfortunate events of the past be avoided by accordingly the demands of the

smaller provinces for real federalism. The federal government should be entrusted only withresponsibility for foreign affairs, defense, currency, inter-provincial trade and communications

and foreign trade. This is a popular demand of a number of political parties from the NWFP,Sindh and Balochistan.

Strengthening of the federation, removal of inter-provincial disharmony and restoration

of national cohesion was one of the seven-point agenda announced by General Musharraf on

2http://ghazali.net/book3/ch5/ch5.html


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October 17, 1999. However, the military government was unable to take any significant move in

this direction in the first twelve months. Criminalization of politics in Pakistan is a real issuebecause the electoral process has legitimized the power of, what may be called, crime syndicates

and has granted popular acceptability to individuals who used high public offices for criminal

plunder of national resources. There is a general consensus in Pakistan that democracy must be

restored but without a due process of law and checks on the power of the executive, it wouldremain a sham democracy. It appears that the people of Pakistan are losing faith in the present

political system. The turn out in the February 1998 elections was only 26 per cent of which the

Muslim League received about 15 per cent of the votes. Not more than 5 per cent of the adultpopulation of the country turned out to vote.

Our experience since the 1985 non-party elections of General Zia has proved beyond any

doubt that the same interest groups (feudal-capitalist-army) would return to the national andprovincial assemblies whenever elections would be held under the present system Therefore,

basic changes are required in the electoral system in order to make it possible for the ordinary

people to be represented in the national and provincial assemblies. Population of the country has

doubled since 1973 when the constitution was framed, this increase should be reflected in the

assemblies strength.Doctoring of election results has become an established norm with our ruling elite. To

ensure free and fair elections, the election commission should be made completely independentof government control. It cannot be denied that the Inter-Services Intelligence, which since 1976

has been directly under the prime minister, has been used to finance candidates and political

parties in order to influence the results of the elections. The ISI's political cell should beabolished and it should not have any political role.

Elections should be held on joint electorate and proportional representation basis. Voters should

be asked to vote for a party candidates and its program rather than for individuals. Political

parties, in order to qualify for participation in national elections, should be required tohold elections within the party. Besides, those who elect a person must have the right to recall

him whenever he renegades on his election promises and commitments or sells his loyalty. The

voting age, that was reduced during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime from 18 to 21 years should be

restored to 18 years.We need to introduce and strictly implement basic land reforms so that the feudal grip on

our political and economic process is broken once and for all. Landless peasants and below-

subsistence farmers may receive land, thus raising the level and quality of life of the rural massesand enabling them to enjoy basic human rights and freedom. Meaningful rural development

projects, involving the rural masses can be initiated and implemented, only when the feudal hold

is broken. Unfortunately, introduction of any land reforms was not on the agenda of the presentregime because any meaningful land reforms are likely to alienate a powerful feudal community

against the regime.

General Musharraf has announced to levy income tax on farm income from the next

financial year that begins in July 2000. However, the feudal lords are resisting even a nominalfarm tax imposed by the provincial governments. On Jan. 13, 2000, disposing a petition by land

lords against the imposition of provincial income tax on agriculture income, the Peshawar High

Court declared agriculture levy as "illegal" and "unconstitutional."Meanwhile, on January 31, 2000, a number of senior and junior officers of the Pakistan

Army, through separate writ petitions, has challenged the imposition of Agricultural Income

Tax on their lands. Major Geneneral M Shafiqullah, Brigadier Muhammad Aslam and Lal


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Zumarad, Lt Col Manzoor Ahmad Waheed, Major Muhammad Yousaf, Irshad Ali

and Muhammad Abdul Wahid, Cap Masudul Haq, Lt Muhammad Jamil and HavaldarMuhammad Anwar in their separate writ petitions have challenged the imposition of agricultural

income tax on their lands.

The army officers are allottees of agricultural land under the Remount Breeding Scheme

prepared under Section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. They wereasked to pay Agricultural Income Tax under Act 1 of 1997 and coercive measures were under

process against them for recovery. They contended that under the terms and conditions of the

allotment of their lands, a tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912neither fell within the ambit of Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1947 nor within the Punjab Land

Revenue Act, 1967 and as such could not be deemed the owner of the land.

This confirms the fact that the forces of the status quo are too well-entrenched to allow anymeaningful change possible through drastic reforms in the present setup, while the new world

environment is raising the expectations of the people. Hence, no meaningful change is possible

unless our ruling elite responds to the international and regional realities of the post-cold war

era. It has to take a painful decision to loosen its grip over the society and surrender its

privileged position otherwise, the economic, social as well as political compulsions may triggerunforeseen events and force some catastrophic changes.3

IntroductionPakistan entered another phase of its history on 12th October, 1999, when the army took

over power for the fourth time. To no ones astonishment, the change of government wasenthusiastically welcomed by the masses as it raised false hopes that the countrys unjust

political, economic and social system would be reformed for their benefit. However, as the

military government of General Pervez Musharraf completed one year on October 12, 2000, itbecame apparent that it was following the path of the previous military governments to maintain

status quo that surely benefits only the privileged ruling elite that is a conglomerate of civilian-

military bureaucracy backed by feudal and capitalist class.

This work is an attempt to highlight the working of the ruling elite in maintaining the prevalentpolitical, social and economic set up of the country where more and more people are being

pushed every day into poverty as the world entered the new century.

The course of politics since independence has been determined and dominated by a smallsegment of society and nothing has happened during the half century of economic turbulence

and social chaos to alter the class composition of the leadership, which still comes from

the feudal-army-bureaucracy conglomerate. It cannot be denied that political power andauthority were snatched away by the bureaucrats and generals after the assassination of the first

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, in October 1951. The first chapter, Hegemony of

the ruling elite, traces the role of civil and military bureaucracy since 1951 when an ex-

bureaucrat, Ghulam Mohammad became the Governor General after the assassination of Prime

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. He dissolved the first Constitutional Assembly that was about tofinalize drafting of the constitution. His illegal action was condoned by Chief Justice

Mohammad Munir, in a verdict that still haunts the country. With the appointment of GeneralMohammad Ayub Khan as Pakistan's first Pakistani commander-in-chief in early 1951, the civil

and military bureaucracy, operating in tandem, began to tighten their grip on the institutions of

governance. General Ayub Khan , who later confessed to his own political ambitions, teamed up

3http://ghazali.net/book3/conc/conc.html


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with the Defense Secretary, Major General Iskandar Mirza, to consolidate his grip over the levers

of power.This work also throws light on the feudal system in Pakistan that continues to exist and

flourish with all its evils and colonial legacies which has virtually disenfranchised the bulk of the

population by its monopoly of power. This system creates areas of oppressive influence for the

feudal lords, particularly in the vast rural areas constituting 70 per cent of country's population.With only two per cent of the population the feudal lords are able to capture bulk of the assembly

seats, thus denying the poor and middle class their legitimate share in the government. Any

electoral process which throws up Mazaris, Jatois, Mirs, Legharis, Tiwanas, Bhuttos, Nawabs,Sardars and the like as the elected representatives of the poor haris, laborers, petty shopkeepers,

office workers and other segments of the working class in this country is not fair, transparent and

well meaning. It makes a mockery of the most fundamental principle underlying the concept of ademocratic form of government, viz. that those who run the government must be the

representatives of the people.

In Pakistan's constitutional history, neither the politicians nor the military leaders

respected the Basic Law. General Zia had once proudly proclaimed that he could tear up the

constitution and throw it into the dustbin whenever he liked. This he nearly did with his wantondisfigurement of the constitution through the Eighth amendment. The second chapter deals with

the subversion of our constitutions by our democratic and military autocrats. Subversion of thebasic law began with the dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly in October 1954 when it

was about to complete the drafting of the constitution. Governor General Ghulam Mohammad

dissolved the Assembly that was clipping his powers. The second Constitutional Assembly,selected by the provincial legislatures, finally approved the first constitution that was enforced on

23 March 1956. Major General Iskandar Mirza, the first President of Pakistan, on 7 Oct. 1958

abrogated the 1956 constitution and appointed General Ayub Khan as the Martial Law

Administrator. The 1973 constitution, unanimously approved by the National Assembly, hasbeen distorted by our democratic and military rulers beyond recognition. It has also been put into

abeyance by two military governments.

The political power of the armed forces of Pakistan is greater than the power of the

elected representatives of the people as well as of the judiciary. Time and again the former haveproved their supremacy. Since the days of the speaker-ship of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the

legislature of Pakistan has been humbled on several occasions. The Constituent Assembly could

not be dissolved in 1954 without the backing and blessings of the Army Chief General Ayub

Khan. The third chapter, Generals in Politics, relates the story of our armys role in politics thatis now being formalized through the National Security Council appointed by General Pervez

Musharraf.It may not be a too harsh judgment to say that Judiciary in Pakistan has functioned at the

behest of authority and has allowed itself to be used to further the interest of the state against its

citizens. Given the five-decade long record of our higher judiciary, popular perceptions and

criticism, particularly of its judgments on constitutional petitions, is that hhenever martial lawwas imposed, the Courts seemed to have been waiting in the wings to provide it legal cover of

validation. Moreover, the courts have hardly ever pronounced any judgment against any ruler

while he was in office. Hence, our judiciary has played a very significant negative role in thedevelopment of political process in the country. Chapter four enumerates the Supreme Court

judgments since 1955 that backed almost all the illegal and unconstitutional actions of our rulers.

We inherited our bureaucracy from the British Raj that was evolved to rule a vanquished subject.


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Unfortunately, more than 52 years after independence, our bureaucracy bears the same Saheb

and Ghulam (lord and servant) mentality. Chapter five traces the role of bureaucracy inmanipulating the levers of power.

Accountability remains a popular slogan with our rulers since the days of first prime minister,

Liuaqat Ali Khan. However, it turned out to be an effective tool in the hands of our subsequent

rulers to suppress their political opponents. Chapter six deals with the accountability process thathas now been undertaken by the military regime as one of its seven major objectives.

Human rights violation has also become an important issue, particularly during the last

11 years of democratic rule when the governments resorted to mass arrest of people, condoned

extra-judicial killings and framed special laws to legitimize brutalities of the security forces.

Chapter eight enlists and human rights violations.Islam has played an important role in the politics of Pakistan since its establishment. However,

its systematic exploitation for political ends began with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and climaxed during

General Zias regime. This caused a havoc to our social fabric and only helped in promoting the

jihadi and obscurest in the country. Chapter nine highlights the negative role of religion in our

politics.

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4http://ghazali.net/book3/intro/intro.html

Documents

Deforming Bureaucracy