Defense Spending and Regional Development || Interregional Migration of Defense Scientists and Engineers to the Gunbelt during the 1980s

Clark University

Interregional Migration of Defense Scientists and Engineers to the Gunbelt during the 1980sAuthor(s): Scott CampbellSource: Economic Geography, Vol. 69, No. 2, Defense Spending and Regional Development(Apr., 1993), pp. 204-223Published by: Clark UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/143536 .

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Interregional Migration of Defense Scientists and Engineers to the Gunbelt during the 1980s*

Scott Campbell Department of Urban Planning and Policy Development, Rutgers University,

New Brunswick, NJ 08903

Abstract: The 1980s defense buildup largely benefited the preexisting centers of defense procurement in the "Gunbelt": the Pacific, South Atlantic, New England, and Mountain regions. I examine whether the interregional distribution and movement of scientists and engineers paralleled this concentration of defense contracts, using the 1982-89 National Science Foundation Survey of Scientists and Engineers. The Gunbelt modestly increased its share of the nation's scientists and engineers during the 1980s, with employees leaving the Midwest and Middle Atlantic for defense jobs faster than those employed in civilian businesses. However, most Gunbelt migration predated the Reagan buildup, due in part to Gunbelt military spending between the 1940s and the 1970s. Defense-funded professionals were also less interregionally mobile in the 1980s than those without defense funding. There is also a dramatic difference in the regional distribution of defense vs. nondefense professionals. Though all four Gunbelt regions have high concentrations of defense-funded scientists and engineers, only New England also has a high concentration of nondefense scientists and engineers. Finally, the timing of this migration suggests a "brain drain": Midwestern universities, in particular, essentially subsidize bicoastal high-tech regional development by exporting technical and scientific graduates to faster-growing regions of the nation. These results offer an insight into how American defense contracting during the cold war acts as a huge, implicit regional-industrial development program, with one of its central instruments being the support and relocation of scientists and engineers.

Key words: defense spending, labor migration, military industrial contracting, scientists and engineers, regional restructuring.

Since World War II, defense spending has arguably functioned as the nation's most powerful industrial policy. The traditional heartland of American commercial manufacturing, from Pennsylvania coalfields and Ohio steel plants through Michigan auto factories and Chicago machine shops, has lost its industrial leadership. New centers of aerospace and

*This paper was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant SES #909- 6116. The data tape was made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. I thank Ann Markusen for her comments, Yang Shao for her assistance with SAS programming, Mary Jane Cedarface, Roland Basset, and three anonymous review- ers for their comments.

electronics manufacturing have been built outside these declining industrial regions. Pentagon billion-dollar purchases of jets, missiles, satellites, radar, and other so- phisticated weaponry have functioned as a massive technology and economic development program for the American West, New England, and other isolated states, while the loss of defense contracts accelerated the Midwest's economic decline.

An earlier study (Markusen et al. 1991) explored the geographic history of Amer- ican defense production, naming this constellation of new military industrial districts the "Gunbelt." Using the geographic concentration of Department of Defense (DOD) dependent firms and defense contracts to define the Gunbelt, we found it stretching from New England,

204



INTERREGIONAL MIGRATION TO THE GUNBELT 205

Long Island, and Washington, D.C., to Florida, west to Texas, Colorado, and north to Seattle, with its center in Los Angeles. That "Gunbelt" derived from the existing term "Sunbelt" was not coinci- dental; we in part created the term because the rise of the Gunbelt is a neglected but significant part of the shift of American jobs from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt over the past 45 years.

This paper examines that other side of military industrial geography: the location and migration of defense-dependent scientists and engineers. Labor migration is the flip side of industrial relocation, focusing on the employee, rather than the firm, as the unit of analysis. Together the two processes shape deindustrialization and the rise of new industrial com- plexes-in this case, the rise of the Gunbelt and the decline of the industrial heartland (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Barff and Knight 1988; Knight and Barif 1987; Knudsen 1992; Plane 1989).

Defense labor migration has been less examined than defense plant location, perhaps because the former was seen as merely a result of the latter. The massive mobilization during the Second World War demonstrated, despite some at- tempts to target contracts to labor surplus areas, that most labor had to migrate to the new defense plant locations (Camp- bell 1993). In the people-follow-jobs framework, the two key aspects of defense migration were its role in industrial mobilization and its impact on the receiving region's housing and other services. Cunningham (1951, 24) noted high mobility among skilled aircraft employees: "The experience of most of the companies moving to distant locations has been that a large number of skilled laborers elect to follow the company even at their own expense." However, Cunningham also noted an increasing attraction to areas of high skill, such as Los Angeles and New York (then still an aircraft center), and that "continued dependence on a specialized labor market seems to be the trend" (p. 24).

Recent work on the geography of

defense production confirms this trend of labor and jobs following each other around (Markusen et al. 1991). This is especially true in the high-tech sectors, where the presence of highly educated, specialized work forces (such as exist in Los Angeles, Silicon Valley, Seattle, and the Boston area) is a strong attraction for military contractors. In turn, these defense contractors attract more scientists and engineers. Malecki and Bradbury (1992), for example, found that firms followed the locational preferences of professional workers in siting R&D facilities.

In our original Gunbtlt study (Markusen et al. 1991), it was difficult to identify the first iteration of this "hicken- and-egg process (see Muth 1971; and Greenwood and Hunt 1984). This was particularly true for Southern California's polycentric aviation-aerospace complex, where jobs, contracts, firms, and military installations have cumulatively attracted each other for over 70 years. In particular, Los Angeles suggests not only that the people-follow-jobs concept misses their mutual interaction, but also that jobs and firms are not the only factors in this cumulative development process. One must add defense contracts and military installations, plus the pro-aerospace boos- terism of Los Angeles and nearby commu- nities (Markusen et al. 1991, chap. 5).

In this paper I follow the interregional movement of scientists and engineers in defense-related jobs during the most recent military growth period, the 1980s Reagan defense buildup. I address seven hypotheses on the location and migration of defense scientists and engineers during this decade:

(1) The geographic distribution of defense-related scientists and engineers supports the concept of the Gunbelt, usually defined by the regional concentration of defense contracts and payroll.

(2) A region's concentration of all scientists and engineers is a good indica-



206 ECONOMIc GEOGRAPHY

tor of its concentration of defense scientists and engineers.

(3) The Reagan-era military buildup led to a considerable migration of scientists and engineers in search of defense work, making defense scientists and engineers more geo- graphically mobile than their nondefense counterparts during the 1980s.

(4) The Gunbelt experienced a positive net in-migration of scientists and engineers during the 1980s, especially among defense scientists and engineers.

(5) Regions with a high concentration of defense scientists and engineers are growing at a faster rate than those with lower concentrations.

(6) Defense-led interregional migration into the Gunbelt has been unidirectional, in that those shifting into defense work are more likely to move into the Gunbelt and those shifting out of defense work are likely to leave the Gunbelt (the "ratchet effect").

(7) The "brain drain" of scientists and engineers from the industrial heartland (the Middle Atlantic and East North Central states) has been particularly significant among future defense professionals.

Data Source

This paper draws on the 1982-89 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers (SSE), completed for the National Science Foundation Survey by the Bureau of the Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990). The original sample was selected from the 1980 Census Sample file. Questionnaires were sent out in 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1989. The last survey based on the 1980 sample was conducted in 1991, although the results are not yet available. The survey is limited to profes-

sionals, and does not include blue- or pink-collar employees.'

The panel data set has three advan- tages: the ability to directly identify defense professionals; a rich array of ca. 140 variables; and the ability to isolate individual migration patterns. The data set has two limitations. The first is that all geographic variables were collapsed to the nine U.S. census regions, allowing for analysis of interregional, but not interstate or urban-suburban, migration. Second, the panel nature of the survey excludes new entrants to the labor market between 1982 and 1989.2

The SSE therefore does not offer a complete picture of defense employment and migration during the 1980s. How- ever, the weak geographic detail is balanced by its unique ability to identify DOD-funded professionals and cross- tabulate by a rich array of socioeconomic characteristics. It therefore complements other data sets such as the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) and Current Population Survey (CPS).

I have limited my statistical analysis to those survey respondents who were employed full time in 1989 and who knew whether or not their job was funded by government money. The stratified sample of 30,159 cases represents a total of about 2.9 million scientists and engineers.3 This

'The analysis by Ellis, Barff, and Markusen (this issue) of the census PUMS data allows for white-collar/blue-collar comparisons.

2 target segment had four criteria: (1) completed four or more years of college (two years for engineers) by 1980; (2) worked in one of 52 possible scientific or engineering occupations; (3) was either in the 1980 experienced civilian labor force or the labor reserve, with a target occupation for the last job held; and (4) most recent job was in one of the scientific or engineering target occupations (identified through "screening").

'The sampling frame identified from the 1980 census was first stratified by the 1982 sample by 11 occupational groups. The first 8 occupational groups were then further stratified by sex and race (black, white, and other).



Stratification was done to increase the numbers of women and minorities in the sample to improve estimation precision for these sub- populations. As a result, I have weighted each case.


number is less than the National Science Foundation's estimate of 5,286,400 scientists and engineers in the United States in 1988, of which 2.7 million were engineers (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991, Table No. 1005). The gap is likely due to the number of people dropped from the SSE sample between 1980 and 1989 and the exclusion of scientists and engineers not yet in the job market by 1982.

Measures of Defense Dependency

Most analyses of U.S. defense workers use indirect estimates of defense-related employment, whereby defense contracting levels for various industries are crossed with an industry-occupation ma- trix. The mathematics involved are simple, but the estimates are based on a problematic assumption: that the DOD and non-DOD breakdown is homoge- neous within industries and occupations (e.g., that the DOD/non-DOD ratio for aerospace engineers is the same for Seattle, Long Island, and Los Angeles).

The advantage of the SSE data set is that it gives an ability to directly identify scientists and engineers who list either the Department of Defense as their funding source or national defense as their primary work activity.4 The most expan- sive definition of defense-related scien-

Table 1 Scientists and Engineers by Funding

Source and Primary Work Activity, 1989

Employment Funding Source and Primary Unweighted Weighted Work Activity Frequency Frequency

All those funded by 4,490 304,900 DOD (14.9)a (10.2)

DOE-funded and national 144 8,560 defense-related job (0.5) (0.3) (no DOD)

NASA-funded and 7 890 national defense- (0.0) (0.0) related job (no DOD or DOE)

All other defense-related 404 43,280 jobs (1.3) (1.4)

Nondefense jobs 25,114 2,620,000 (83.3) (88.0)

Subtotal 30,159 2,978,000 (100.0) (100.0)

Those who either didn't 1,477 know or didn't answer

Total 31,646

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990). a Numbers in parentheses refer to percentages.

tists and engineers would be those who meet either criteria; the most restrictive would be those who meet both. Thus "defense dependence" may be defined either institutionally (DOD funding) or professionally (defense-related work activity) (Table 1). In this paper, I use the institutional definition of defense-related professionals as those whose jobs are directly funded by DOD.5 The resulting share of DOD-funded scientists and engineers is 10.2 percent of the weighted sample (14.9% of the unweighted sample). The share of jobs funded by DOD generally increased during the 1980s, from 8.0 percent (1982) to 9.0 percent

4 The three relevant questions in the survey are: (22a) "During the week of February 5, 1989, was any of your work at your job reported in item 11 supported by U. S. Government funds?" (22b) "Which of these agencies or departments were supporting your work? (Mark (X) all that apply.)" (23) "From this list of selected areas of national interest, indicate the ONE area to which you devoted the MOST professional time during a typical week at the job reported in item 11." [Note: "National Defense" is one of many options listed.]

5 Only a small number of respondents with defense-related work were funded by the Department of Energy (DOE) and/or NASA but not directly by DOD (Table 1).



208 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

(1984), down to 7.8 percent (1986), and up to 10.2 percent (1989).

The figure of 10.2 percent differs from other estimates of the defense share of engineers and scientists (Henry and Ol- iver 1987). One simple reason is that the SSE survey includes a wide range of scientists and engineers, including social scientists, whose inclusion lowers the overall defense levels. It could also be due both to the conservative definition of DOD-related and to underreporting. DOD funding of one's job is self- identified, and DOD-funded professionals might fail to answer "Yes" for several reasons: they don't know; they don't realize that their work ultimately is DOD funded, especially for subcontractors (e.g., a mathematician whose algorithms ultimately go into missile guidance systems); they fail to mention DOD funding if their job is only partially DOD funded; or they withhold this information out of a sense of confidentiality or even denial about working for the military. Nevertheless, since my goal is not so much to estimate the total number of DOD-funded professionals as to profile their geographic tenden- cies (relative to their civilian-project colleagues), nonsystematic underreporting should not cause dramatic distortions in the results.

Profile of the Defense Scientist and Engineer

In 1989, the average scientist and engineer in the sample was a 46-year-old white male with a bachelor's degree, sometimes also with a master's degree, 21 years of experience, with a salary of $45,400 (total income $50,800), working in the private sector.6 Scientists and engineers funded by the Department of Defense in 1989 tended to be slightly

older (mean age 47.7 years), with more work experience (23.2 years), a higher annual salary ($53,000) and higher total income ($55,600). These nationwide differences parallel the findings of a 1990 study of defense employees in Los Ange- les County (Wolch, Law, and Takahashi 1990).

Men were more likely than women to be funded by DOD in 1982 (9.5% vs. 2.6%); this gap grew even larger by 1989 (11.7% vs. 3.6%), due largely to men's relative concentration in those sectors and occupations with high defense spending. Asian-American scientists and engineers were the most likely to have DOD-funded jobs in 1989 (14.0% of all Asians), blacks the least likely (7.6%), and whites some- where in between (10.5%).

DOD-dependency rates in 1989 varied widely by profession. This decade of large new military airplane and missile orders made aeronautical/astronautical engineers the most dependent on DOD funding (60.8%). They were followed by oceanographers (37.8%), electrical engineers (31.2%), materials engineers (27.7%), physical scientists (27.0%), physicists/ astronomers (25.7%), and industrial engineers (24.5%). At the other end of the spectrum were those occupations relatively free of DOD funding (under 5 percent): chemists, chemical engineers, mining engineers, petroleum engineers, biologists, biochemists, agricultural scientists, medical scientists, and all varieties of social scientists. The labor of scientists and engineers divides as follows: those who work with metals, electronics, air, and space tend to be DOD-funded. These are the elements of war. Those who work with the earth, organic materials, chemi- cals, and humans are much less likely to be DOD-funded. These are the elements of the peacetime economy.

The Geographic Distribution of Defense Scientists and Engineers Compared to the Gunbelt

Markusen et al. (1991) defined the Gunbelt as those regions containing the

6 Given top-coding of income and salary at $99,000, calculations of means will be underes- timates. For a detailed comparison of defense vs. nondefense professionals, see Campbell and Markusen (1993).




centers of military industrial contracting, as well as a disproportionate share of military personnel and installations. The Pacific and New England are the most concentrated regions for contracts, with the Mountain and West North Central regions a little above average, and the South Atlantic and West South Central just below average (relative to population). For military payroll, the South Atlantic dominates the list, with the West South Central, Pacific, and Mountain regions all slightly above the national average (Table 2).

The concentration of defense scientists and engineers generally parallels contracts and, to a lesser extent, payroll dollars, with some interesting exceptions. The Pacific and New England regions have the highest concentrations of defense scientists and engineers, and the South Atlantic and Mountain regions are also above average. Curiously, New En- gland's share of defense scientists and engineers is lower than its share of contracts, while both the Pacific and South Atlantic have a high number of defense scientists and engineers relative to their defense contracts. New England's lack of defense installations (reflected by its low military payroll) may explain this difference.

Perhaps one can best speak of not one, but several, overlapping "Gunbelts": an industrial Gunbelt, a scientific/engineering Gunbelt, and a military installation Gunbelt, with more overlapping between the first two than with the third. The Pacific and Mountain regions fall into all three categories, New England and the South Atlantic two, and the West South Central and the West North Central one. The three remaining regions-the Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and East South Central-are unambiguously outside the Gunbelt. Given my focus on scientific/engineering professionals, I therefore define the Gunbelt as the New

England, South Atlantic, Mountain, and Pacific regions throughout this paper.7

Each region is unique. The Pacific is the absolute heart of the Gunbelt, with the largest share of the nation's defense contracts (22.8%) and active military payroll (23.6%) in 1989, and high per capita levels of contracts ($700) and payroll ($398). The national average is $482 for contracts and $266 for payroll (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991). The New England states form a small but dense part of the Gunbelt. Though receiving few payroll dollars ($155 per capita), they were the most dependent on defense contracts ($1,232 per capita). The South Atlantic is nearly the exact opposite of New England: though its per capita defense contract dollars ($444) are not quite the national average, it has the largest share of defense payroll dollars ($497 per capita) in the nation. The dominant spatial division of labor between New England and the South Atlantic is high-tech factories in the north and military bases/offices in the south. Finally, the vast Mountain states have both above-average per capita contracts ($574) and payroll dollars ($318).

Ideally, we should draw the geographic boundaries of the Gunbelt at the metropolitan, or at least state, level. Unfortu- nately, the nine-region geographic scale of the SSE survey leads to some compro- mises. Texas (West South Central) and Missouri (West North Central) have high per capita contract awards, but these aircraft-producing states are exceptions in their otherwise defense-poor regions. At times, Kansas and Mississippi also have high per capita contract levels. By contrast, the South Atlantic is largely classified as part of the Gunbelt due to huge per capita contract levels around the nation's capital in Maryland and Virginia and within the District of Columbia, with much lower per capita levels in the

7 Stein (1985) also identified these four regions as having above-average per capita military receipts.




Table 2

Scientists and Engineers (S&Es), Defense Spending, and Population by Region (Percentages)

Active Defense Military Contract Duty Defense Nondefense

Population, Awards, Payroll, S&Es, S&Es, Region 1990 1989 1989 1989 1989

New England 5.3 13.6 3.1 9.4 7.2 Middle Atlantic 15.1 10.7 6.3 11.2 17.7 East North Central 16.9 8.7 6.0 8.6 18.5 West North Central 7.1 8.2 4.4 6.3 7.1 South Atlantic 17.5 16.1 32.7 19.1 15.4 East South Central 6.1 3.4 5.9 3.5 5.0 West South Central 10.7 10.0 11.4 7.5 9.4 Mountain 5.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 5.2 Pacific 15.7 22.8 23.6 27.8 14.6

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990, 1991).

Carolinas and Georgia. The core of the New England Gunbelt is in Connecticut and Massachusetts, with over 90 percent of the region's contracts. In the Mountain region, most contracts go to the southern states of Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, with almost no dollars going to the Northern Mountain states. The Pacific is the most consistent part of the Gunbelt; only Oregon fails to receive above- average levels of defense contracts.8

Nevertheless, the interregional differ-

ences in military activity are large enough to make the intraregional differences, albeit bothersome, not fatal to the analysis. The Gunbelt, though a messy patch- work of states, metropolitan areas, and isolated rural sites, can reasonably be approximated within the limitations of U.S. census regional boundaries.

Regional Concentration of Defense vs. Nondefense Scientists and Engineers

Were the scientific/engineering Gun- belt synonymous with the highly educated, high-tech regions of the country, one would expect a similar regional distribution of defense and nondefense scientists and engineers. However, the fit is poor. The statistical correlation between a region's share of defense and nondefense professionals is rather low (0.54). The single best predictor of defense scientists and engineers share (among the variables in Table 2) is share of contract dollars (0.95), followed by defense payroll (0.80); even population has a better fit (0.65). Other simple correlations with the nine-region distribution of defense professionals are college R&D funds

8 Were the Gunbelt to be classified as those areas with per capita defense contracts above the national average, it would contain (in order) the District of Columbia and the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, Alaska, Virginia, Colorado, Maryland, Califor- nia, Arizona, Washington, Utah, Texas, and Hawaii. These 13 states and the nation's capital received 62.8% of all defense contracts (1989), while containing only 35.4% of the nation's population (1990). The list for 1982 is some- what different, with Maine, New Hampshire, Kansas, and Mississippi added to the list, and Colorado and Utah dropping under the national average. However, these differences should not be seen as structural trends over time, but rather as reflecting the year-to-year volatility of defense contract amounts, especially for smaller states.




(0.90), industrial R&D funds (0.70), and manufacturing employment (0.46).

Of the four Gunbelt regions with above-average concentrations of DOD- funded scientists and engineers, only New England also has a high concentration of nondefense scientists and engineers. For the Pacific, only a high DOD concentration counteracts a relatively low concentration outside defense to keep the overall concentration at roughly the national average. The South Atlantic's share of non-DOD scientists and engineers is so low that even its strong share of those in defense cannot elevate its overall concentration above average.

What does this partial discrepancy between the number of defense vs. nondefense professionals imply? It chal- lenges the notion that defense contracts have gone heavily to the Gunbelt simply because this region was already a center of commercial high-tech, with a preexisting labor market concentrated with scientists and engineers. Were this the case, the Middle Atlantic and even the East North Central (with above-average concentrations of scientists and engineers, and ranked second and first in total numbers) would be large recipients of defense contracts. Instead, defense contracting has helped create new centers of industrial technology-and high-skilled scientists and engineers-where often no base of technical professionals previously existed. The exception is New England, which did have a long tradition of skilled engineers and scientists well before the rise of modern military technology. Oth- erwise, the Gunbelt has an average (in the South Atlantic, below-average) concentration of all scientists and engineers. This gap between the Gunbelt's high share of DOD-funded scientists and engineers (62.8%) and its modest concentration of non-DOD-funded scientists and engineers (42.4%) suggests that the Gunbelt has created a specialized professional labor market funded by the Department of Defense-a labor market that is not simply an extension of the commercial sector market.

An alternative interpretation of this gap is that defense-related work might have squeezed out nonrelated defense work in Gunbelt areas. That is, the local professional labor supply could not keep up with the high demand by defense contractors for scientists and engineers, thus lowering their numbers in the commercial sectors.

The SSE data set does not allow us to test the validity of these two explanations. One would need a closer analysis of regional labor market supply and demand over time, including the ability of defense contractors to outbid commercial firms for high-skilled labor. In particular, one would need to interview commercial firms to see if firm expansion was obstructed due either to a lack of available scientists and engineers or to salary levels inflated by defense contractors.

The Concentration of Research and Federal Activity in the Gunbelt

The high density of defense scientists and engineers in the Gunbelt is part of a larger pattern of concentrated federal involvement in this part of the country. With only 44.1 percent of the U.S. population (1990), it received 59.0 percent of all contract dollars and 65.9 percent of all payroll dollars in 1989 (see Table 3). It also has a disproportionate share of both defense civilian personnel (59.5%) and military personnel (65.5%). The Gunbelt is less industrial than the rest of the country (16.4 % of labor is in manufacturing, vs. 19.2% nationally). Finally, though the Gunbelt receives 47.6 percent of all R&D spending from industry, it receives a much higher share of the nation's university research funds (57.3%) and federal research funds (71.2%, with 42% alone going to the South Atlantic). With less than half the nation's population, the Gunbelt receives more than half of the nation's dollars for defense contracts, payroll, and technological research and development. The concentration of retirees in the Gunbelt, especially military retirees, also concentrates federal retire- ment funds in the region. Curiously, a




Table 3

The Gunbelt's National Share of Selected Statistics

Gunbelt as % of U.S. Total

Federal R&D funds, 1987 71.2 Military duty payroll, 1982 65.9 Military duty payroll, 1989 65.7 Defense personnel (military) 65.5 DOD-funded scientists and engineers

(SSE Survey, 1989) 62.8 Defense personnel (civilians) 59.5 Defense contracts, 1989 59.0 University R&D funds, 1987 57.3 Defense contracts, 1982 57.3 Total funds for R&D, 1987 51.2 State/local higher education

appropriations, 1989 48.0 Industry R&D funds, 1987 47.6 University enrollment, 1988 44.9 Nonfarm employment (1989) 44.5 All scientists and engineers

(SSE Survey, 1989) 44.4 Population, 1990 44.1 Population, 1982 41.3 Manufacturing employment,

1989 40.6

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984, 1990, 1991).

greater share of its population lives in urban areas (80.1% vs. 75.5%), even though it contains the vast U.S. West. It is no coincidence that these regions grew at a much faster rate than the rest of the country during the 1980s (18.5% vs. 3.8%). The U.S. military has often been on the "front" in the expansion of human settlement in the American West and South.

Mobility of Defense Employees

To measure frequency of movement, I counted the number of interregional moves over six points in time: birth, last college attended, and place of employment in 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1989. Though it misses intraregional moves, as well as multiple or round-trip moves

between survey years, it functions as a workable measure of relative interregional mobility.9

Scientists and engineers changed regions on average once during these six time points. Those with DOD-funded jobs in 1989 moved slightly more than those not DOD-funded (0.95 vs. 0.91 moves). These two groups varied much more, however, in the timing of their interregional moves. Those who were DOD funded were more likely to have moved to another region during their youth, between birth and the end of their college education (49% vs. 41%), as well as between college and their job in 1982 (35% vs. 33%). During the working years of the 1980s, however, this pattern reversed: the DOD-funded were less likely to change regions (9% vs. 13%). Thus, DOD-funded scientists and engineers were more mobile in their early years before 1982 (moving to the Gunbelt, as we will see later), but much less mobile during the Reagan military buildup of the 1980s. Even controlling for sex, race, education, marital status, major sector, and age group, defense-funded scientists and engineers were less mobile during the 1980s.10 These results undermine a popular image of highly mobile defense- contracting professionals and support research results from 1975-80 PUMS data for Los Angeles County and the nation as a whole (Wolch, Law, and Takahashi 1990; Ellis, Barff, Markusen, this issue). Clearly, one must distinguish between uniformed military employees (the most mobile

9 The majority of interregional moves in this sample predated the 1980s. However, given that this sample excludes new job entrants since 1982, a group that was likely to have been highly mobile during the 1980s, some of the 1980s mobility is not picked up in the sample.

10 maximum-likelihood parameter estimate (dependent variable = interregional move between 1982-89) for the variable "defense-funded job in 1989" was -0.27 (p = .0000).




group in the survey) and the relatively stable defense-funded professionals.

Finally, mobility varied by region of birth, sex, race, and occupation. Those born in the bicoastal regions of the Gunbelt were the most likely to stay put, with greater economic opportunity (i.e., local job creation) at home. Men seem to be more mobile than women, though the difference is very small when controlling for other variables. Men changed regions at least once (58% vs. 57%), and at least twice (29% vs. 26%), at a slightly higher rate. By race, Asians were the most mobile, with 52 percent having changed regions at least twice between birth and 1989 (counting international moves). Fi- nally, scientists were more mobile than engineers, reflecting scientists' need to move around more to find highly specialized jobs, as well as a greater level of education leading to greater movement (i.e., moving to graduate schools). The most mobile occupations were oceanographers (68.5%, in search of oceans, no doubt) and atmospheric scientists (53.6%); the least mobile were computer scientists (23.8%), civil engineers (23.5%), and industrial engineers (20.5%).

Defense Migration into the Gunbelt during the 1980s

The changing regional distribution of sample scientists and engineers in the United States from birth through the 1980s breaks down into three areas: the growing regions of the Gunbelt (New England, South Atlantic, Mountain, and Pacific) plus the West South Central; the stagnant Deep South (East South Cen- tral); and the declining Manufacturing Belt (Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central). The South Atlantic and Pacific regions gained the most migrating engineers and scientists, with only 17.7 percent of the sample born in these two regions but with 31.6 percent of the sample in 1989. By contrast, 51.5 percent of the sample was born in the three Manufacturing Belt regions, but

only 41.4 percent remained by 1989 (see Fig. 1).

Most of this interregional shift took place before 1982; indeed, the largest shifts oc- curred between birth and the last college attended (reflecting either the decision of the youthful respondent's parents or the respondent's own location decision while se- lecting a college or graduate school). By contrast, 1982-89 was not a period of dramatic regional redistribution of scientists and engineers (though the Pacific, and especially the South Atlantic, did show significant increases). Migration into the Gunbelt modestly continued in the 1980s, increasing its sample share from 1982 (42.3%) to 1989 (44.7%). The decade's defense spending simply reinforced the preexisting dominance of these regions arising from the Second World War and the cold war.

Dominant Migration Paths during the 1980s

The heaviest gross migration activity, as indicated by change in region between 1982 and 1989, took place within the eastern edge of the United States, reflecting both this area's population concentration and changes in the labor market." The busiest paths were those leading into the Gunbelt: from the Middle Atlantic to New England (13,538 scientists and engineers represented by sample) and the South Atlantic (16,482), as well as from the East North Central into the South Atlantic (13,940) (Fig. 2). The only large migration from the Gunbelt was from New England to the neighboring Middle Atlantic (8,172), though this was much smaller than the number moving in the opposite direction in this well-integrated Boston-New York-Philadelphia corridor.

Movement within the Gunbelt was

11 L. Long's analysis (1988, 235) of the 1980 U.S. census noted that the most common reasons for interstate migration included job transfer (22.2%), taking a new job (18.7%), and looking for work (6.3%), in addition to wanting to be closer to relatives (8.6%).



214 ECONOMic GEOGRAPHY

90,000 80,000 70,000

60,000

50,000 40,000 30,000

20,000 10,000

0

New Middle East West South East West Mountain Pacific England Atlantic North North Atlantic South South

Central Central Central Central

D Birth E Last College EM 1982 Job 1984 Job * 1986 Job * 1989 Job Attended

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

New Middle East West South East West Mountain Pacific England Atlantic North North Atlantic South South

Central Central Central Central

Figure 1. Location of scientists and engineers from birth, through college and employment, 1982- 89. Top: DOD-funded. Bottom: not DOD-funded.

also significant, especially the surprisingly high number of scientists and engineers moving from the Pacific to the South Atlantic between 1982 and 1989 (6,782), much larger than the number moving in the opposite direction (3,978). Movement between the Pacific and Mountain states was also high in both directions. Interestingly, there was little movement between the Pacific and New England regions.

Among those funded by the Defense De- partment in 1989, most movement was either into or within the Gunbelt. The South Atlantic region attracted large numbers of

defense scientists and engineers, especially from the Middle Atlantic (1,381), the Moun- tain states (1,596), and the Pacific (1,184). Movement from the Pacific to the Moun- tain region was also high (1,596), as well as in the reverse direction (1,094). By contrast, movement in and out of New En- gland was relatively low.

Defense Regions Grew Faster than Rest of Nation

One premise of the Gunbelt idea is that the concentration of defense activities has



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fueled regional growth (Markusen et al. 1991). A positive association between a region's defense dependence and its growth rate would suggest this growth potential of defense regions. With regard to population, this pattern is generally true: three of the fastest-growing regions of the country, the South Atlantic, Moun- tain, and Pacific, were all unusually defense-dependent. The exception is New England's sluggish population growth, which was less than the national average during the 1980s. Conversely, the West South Central's population grew at a relatively rapid rate (Table 4).

Defense dependency was also corre- lated with a region's changing share of scientists and engineers. The four regions with above-average levels of scientists and engineers funded by the Department of Defense (Pacific, New England, South Atlantic, Mountain) all increased their shares of the SSE sample. Conversely, the remaining five regions, with low DOD funding, lost their shares of the sample. No regions that were highly defense- dependent lost scientists and engineers, nor were there any low-defense growth regions.

The fact that the four Gunbelt regions are increasing their share of both defense activity and overall scientific/engineering employment does not in itself prove that the former causes the latter. The chicken- or-egg question of defense resurfaces. The Gunbelt's relatively modest share increase in defense scientists and engineers of 1.7 percent suggests that if DOD- funded jobs are an overall catalyst for regional growth, it is due to the already high level of defense professionals in the Gunbelt, rather than the marginal increase during the 1980s. A portion of non-DOD growth could be a lagged response to past DOD funding in sectors such as computing, aerospace, and semi- conductors. Thus, the growth impact of defense contracting in the Gunbelt would not simply be due to the direct DOD- funded jobs that it attracts, but also indirectly caused by stimulating the regional economy, generating new non- DOD jobs, and attracting migrants to work in these nondefense jobs. Defense spending may be stimulating growth even if the proportionate DOD-dependence does not grow.

Table 4

Regional Shifts in Scientists and Engineers (S&Es), 1982-89 (Ranked by DOD Dependency)

Defense Dependency,

1989 (DOD-funded Change in Share Change in Change in as % of All of DOD-funded Share of All Share of U.S.

Region S&Es) S&Es (%) S&Es (%) Population (%)

Pacific 17.8 +0.5 +0.8 +1.2 New England 12.9 +0.0 +0.5 -0.1 Mountain 12.7 -0.1 +0.2 +0.3 South Atlantic 12.5 + 1.3 + 1.0 +0.8 U.S. Average 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 West North Central 9.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 West South Central 8.5 -0.4 -0.3 +0.2 East South Central 7.6 +0.4 -0.1 -0.3 Middle Atlantic 6.9 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 East North Central 5.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984, 1990, 1991). Note: 1982 and 1989 population changes interpolated from 1980 and 1990.




Unidirectional Migration into the Gunbelt

Other work on defense labor has suggested that there is a certain "ratchet effect" for scientists and engineers coming to the Gunbelt and taking on DOD- funded jobs (Ellis, Barff, and Markusen, this volume). This apparent asymmetry of Gunbelt-DOD migration may reflect the generally greater economic opportunity in the growing Gunbelt regions, allowing scientists and engineers to move between defense and civilian projects without having to leave the region. One notable example of this effect was seen in Seattle during the "Boeing Bust" of 1968-71. The aerospace giant lost at least 60,000 jobs during this three-year period. Yet unlike similar industrial declines in the industrial heartland, there was no massive out- migration from Seattle. Instead, many engineers stayed to start other businesses, while others were rehired when Boeing rebounded in the mid-1970s. This lack of a "brain drain" saved Seattle from a worse downward spiral. California was also saved from a huge "brain drain" during defense lay-offs in the 1960s (Loomba 1967). One wonders now, with massive defense employment cuts in California and other states in the aftermath of the cold war and recession, how the Gunbelt's high-tech labor will respond (see Markusen et al. 1991, chap. 7).

To test this asymmetry, I compared the likelihood of those shifting into defense work to move into the Gunbelt to the likelihood of those shifting out of defense work to leave the Gunbelt (the "ratchet effect"). The SSE survey does reveal this asymmetry between 1982 and 1989, a period of high turnover of professionals moving in and out of defense jobs (see Lerner 1992). Among scientists and engineers outside the Gunbelt without DOD funding in 1982, 8.3 percent of those who shifted to a DOD-funded job in 1989 had also moved to the Gunbelt. By contrast, among DOD-funded Gunbelt scientists and engineers in 1982 who no longer had DOD jobs in 1989, only 4.9 percent had

left the Gunbelt. This result suggests that increased DOD-funded work has a stron- ger "pull" effect for in-migration into the Gunbelt than the "push" effect for out- migration due to the loss of DOD funding. However, this trend applied to all scientists and engineers as well: 7.3 percent of non-Gunbelt scientists and engineers in 1982 worked in the Gunbelt in 1989. By contrast, 4.2 percent of those in the Gunbelt in 1982 left the Gunbelt by 1989.

To further test this ratchet effect, I used maximum likelihood analysis to compare changes in defense funding to a scientist's or engineer's movement in and out of the Gunbelt, while controlling for other possible factors affecting migration (sex, race, education, marital status, sector, age group). If a scientist or engineer shifted from non-DOD to DOD work from 1982 to 1989, he or she was more likely also to have moved into the Gunbelt (estimate = 0.1184; p = .0000) than those with no DOD funding in either year. By contrast, a scientist or engineer was statistically no more likely to leave the Gunbelt if he or she had shifted from a DOD to non-DOD job between 1982 and 1989 (estimate = -0.0263; p = .0674) than those with no DOD funding in either year. Most dra- matically, those in the Gunbelt in 1982 who had DOD funding in both 1982 and 1989 were unlikely to have left the Gunbelt (estimate = -0.9468; p = .0000). This suggests three responses to changes in defense funding: (1) if one shifted to a defense job, one was slightly more likely to move into the Gunbelt; (2) if one retained DOD funding from 1982 to 1989, one was almost sure to stay in the Gunbelt; and (3) if one moved out of a DOD-funded job, one was no more likely to leave the Gunbelt than someone who had never had DOD funding.

Defense migration between the Gun- belt and the rest of the country thus appears to be, if not unidirectional, at least asymmetrical. This suggests that defense spending irreversibly accelerated a process of migration to the Gunbelt. Nevertheless, the lion's share of new




DOD-funded jobs in the Gunbelt were picked up not by new migrants but by scientists and engineers already in the Gunbelt by 1982.

A "Brain Drain" of Scientists and Engineers Leaving the Industrial Heartland

Clearly there has been a high net out-migration from the Middle Atlantic and East North Central regions. The timing of this out-migration is significant: childhood migration represents the decision of parents; college-age migration reflects the search for a better education or a more appealing college setting; and post-college migration reflects the search for better employment or living opportu- nities. The more education and experience one has, the more the out-migration represents a loss to the region of a highly skilled person (i.e., a "brain drain"). Furthermore, if the sending region educated many future scientists and engineers at below cost (e.g., at a state university) and then lost many of them to other regions after college without a counterbalancing in-migration, the sending region essentially subsidized the human capital of other growth regions. If

the out-migration of those leaving for defense jobs is especially high, geograph- ically concentrated defense spending has likely exacerbated this brain drain.

Among those who eventually went on to work in DOD-funded jobs in 1989, about half were educated in the Gunbelt, especially in the Pacific region (Table 5). The Middle Atlantic and East North Central also educated many DOD-funded scientists and engineers. By contrast, a large majority of those not funded by DOD were educated outside the Gun- belt, primarily in the East North Central, followed by the Middle Atlantic.

The timing of this migration from the industrial heartland varies by region. For the Middle Atlantic, the biggest loss took place when future scientists and engineers went to college. The region experienced a slight rebound after college, with a net increase by the place of employment in 1982. However, there was no such rebound between the end of college and 1982 in the number funded by DOD, which continued to decline. By contrast, the Great Lakes states of the East North Central had a rather high level of future scientists and engineers in their colleges and universities; the big out-migration took place between their college years

Table 5

Location of Last College Attended by Scientists and Engineers, 1989 (Percentages)

Scientists and Engineers

Region All DOD-funded Not DOD-funded

New England 8.4 9.0 8.3 Middle Atlantic 17.2 15.1 17.5 East North Central 21.4 16.2 22.0 West North Central 8.4 7.6 8.5 South Atlantic 13.1 14.6 12.9 East South Central 5.1 3.7 5.2 West South Central 8.4 7.5 8.5 Mountain 5.1 6.4 5.0 Pacific 12.8 19.9 12.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Gunbelt 39.4 49.9 38.2 Non-Gunbelt 60.6 50.1 61.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990).




and the 1980s. This post-graduation decline was especially high among future DOD-funded professionals. The Midwest was also the largest sending region of future DOD-funded professionals to the Pacific, much higher than either New England or the South Atlantic (Fig. 3).

It may be concluded that, first, the Gunbelt is not merely a region of defense employment, but also of defense education. Second, the Gunbelt does not educate enough scientists and engineers to supply its own needs; instead, it attracts professional migrants from the rest of the country, especially from the Midwest and New York/Middle Atlantic area. These conclusions reflect the results of other research on the source of high-tech employment (Parzen 1982). A separate study of 275 engineers in the U.S. semiconductor industry, for example, found that 61 percent joined firms in the same metropolitan area as the last university attended, while the remaining 39 percent accepted jobs elsewhere (Angel 1989, 108). As a result, the geographic distribution of colleges training future defense professionals is neither identical to the general pattern of American higher education nor the final location of these defense professionals, but rather some- where in between. This suggests that the role of American universities in creating the Gunbelt has been not only to select and train scientists and engineers, but also to act as stepping stones in their migration from their birthplaces in America's older regions toward the new centers of technology, research, and industry.

To conclusively address the claim that the Industrial Heartland's universities have subsidized the Gunbelt, one would need to examine all the inputs and outputs of American higher education by region, following the flow of money for education, including federal grants to universities, state and local funding of colleges vs. tuition, as well as the migration patterns of scientists and engineers. This educational/regional accounting is worthy of another study, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, if

this subsidy is occurring, it is not neces- sarily due to Midwestern- universities spending disproportionately more money on education, allowing Gunbelt regions to avoid paying much for public higher education. In fact, the Gunbelt spent 48.0 percent of state and local appropriations for higher education in 1989, which is slightly higher than both its share of college/university enrollment (1988) and the national population. In addition, 57.6 percent of university funds for research and development in 1987 were spent by Gunbelt universities (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991). What may be happening is that the return on the educational invest- ment in the Midwest is lower than in the Gunbelt regions precisely because of out-migration.

The Gunbelt not only attracted a large number of scientists and engineers away from the American heartland during the 1980s, but it disproportionately selected certain types of these professionals. Women were especially attracted to the Gunbelt between 1982 and 1989; 6.3 percent of all women in the survey came to the Gunbelt in this period (only 1.8% left). By contrast, only 3.9 percent of all men in the survey entered the Gunbelt in this same period (and 1.8% left). As a result, the percentage of women scientists and engineers in the Gunbelt now slightly exceeds that of the men (45.8% vs. 44.8%).

A relatively large percentage of African- Americans in the survey moved into the Gunbelt between 1982 and 1989 (5.9%), compared to 4.2 percent for whites and 3.5 percent for Asians. Asians were already highly concentrated in the bicoastal Gunbelt (60.6% in 1989), compared to African-Americans (48.9%) and whites (45.1%).

Certain occupational groups migrated to the Gunbelt in unusually large numbers from 1982 to 1989: computer scientists, physicists, biologists, physical scientists, chemical engineers, and psychologists. The only occupations in which the Gunbelt lost its percentage share were earth scientists, civil engineers, and materials engineers.



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Overall, the occupations most concentrated in the Gunbelt in 1989 were those associated with three features: defense contracting, including atmospheric scientists (58.7%), aeronautical/astronautical engineers (59.5%), and electrical engineers (50.9%); coasts, including oceanographers (73.7%); and the American West, including mining engineers (59.9%) and nuclear engineers (75.4%). Other strongly represented occupations were physical scientists (70.7%), statisti- cians (53.5%), biologists (51.7%), and "other engineers" (53.4%).

Finally, those who moved into the Gunbelt during the 1980s were more educated than the overall sample: 51.2 percent of in-migrants had master's degrees and 29.5 percent had Ph.D.s (compared to an overall level of 44.7% and 17.5%). However, those moving out of the Gunbelt were also highly educated (56.4% with master's degrees and 33.1% with Ph.D.s). In the maximum likelihood analysis discussed above, the possession of a Ph.D. was the most powerful positive estimator of movement both in and out of the Gunbelt between 1982 and 1989. This supports a common assumption that high levels of education are associated with higher mobility.

Implications of Migration for the Gunbelt, the Scientist and Engineers Labor Market, and U.S. Regional Development

Migration is a messy, unpredictable phenomenon: people move for a wide variety of reasons. One should therefore not over-interpret a single move from Michigan to California, ascribing it to larger forces in the restructuring space- economy. Nevertheless, the Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engi- neers (SSE) allows us to see systematic patterns amid the multitude of reasons and paths of American interregional migration. The results both confirm some assumptions about the defense labor market and offer some surprises about the

timing, magnitude, and profile of defense- led migration.

The notion of a Frostbelt-Sunbelt restructuring has become a trite part of the geographic and urbanist dialogue-at times we become blas6 about its magnitude and implications. The SSE demonstrated that, among scientists and engineers, this Frostbelt-Sunbelt migration continues. However, high levels of defense spending, rather than just climate, help explain migration from the Frostbelt to the bicoastal Sunbelt (i.e., Gunbelt). This "brain drain" was especially high from the Midwest, though the Middle Atlantic also lost many of its highly educated scientists and engineers.

One surprising result was the diversity of the four Gunbelt regions. Only New England had high concentrations of both defense and nondefense scientists and engineers (the highest in the nation). The Mountain and Pacific regions had below- average concentrations of nondefense scientists and engineers, and the South Atlantic was well below average. Clearly, the Gunbelt and the nation's "science and engineering belt," though overlapping, are not identical. The concentration of defense activity does not always insure a high overall concentration of scientists and engineers. Conversely, the high concentration of well-educated technical and scientific professionals in the Middle Atlantic and East North Central regions does not lead to high levels of defense activity. Defense spending is a potential path toward a higher-skilled professional work force, but is no guarantee-at least in the short term.

The net migration of scientists and engineers to the Gunbelt during the 1980s was also smaller than expected. By 1982 these four regions already had a disproportionate share of DOD-funded professionals (61.4%), which remained stable through 1989 (62.8%). The Gun- belt's share of all scientists and engineers increased slightly over these seven years, from 42.5 percent to 44.9 percent, reflecting the growth of nondefense technology and scientific activity in the Gunbelt



222 ECONOMIc GEOGRAPHY

during the 1980s. This fits with the surprisingly low level of interregional mobility of defense professionals during the 1980s. My initial assumption that those in defense would be much more mobile than their nondefense counterparts proved to be false. Indeed, though those funded by DOD were relatively more mobile before and after college, they were less mobile during the 1980s.

In addition, migration to the Gunbelt from 1982 to 1989 was not dominated as much by DOD-funded people as expected. In part this was because so many non-DOD scientists and engineers came to the Gunbelt during the 1980s, attracted by the large growth in commercial sector activities. Most of the DOD jobs were picked up by existing residents of the Gunbelt, reflected in the higher share of existing residents with DOD jobs than recent in-migrants. This unexpected out- come reflects the fact that Gunbelt migration is not as simple as defense dollars attracting scientists and engineers to defense jobs in the Gunbelt. Many more moved there for nondefense work, though there seemed to be a synergistic interaction between these two sectors. Though the survey here cannot reveal which sector was the leader-and which the follower-I would at least suggest that some of the commercial scientific and engineering work was stimulated (or spun-off) by the large presence of defense work in the Gunbelt.

Finally, there are many scientists and engineers who came to the Gunbelt for defense work and then changed jobs into the commercial sector. Though they are no longer counted as DOD-Gunbelt migrants, defense spending was the initial impetus for their move. This interpretation is supported by the unidirectionality of Gunbelt migration: the number moving into the Gunbelt who had shifted into DOD work during the 1980s was much higher than the number leaving the Gunbelt after leaving DOD work. This "ratchet effect" makes the regional- demographic impact of defense spending last long after the spending ends.

What is the future of this Gunbelt migration? The data used' here ended in 1989, the year President Reagan left office, the Berlin wall was opened, and ten years of huge defense spending increases began to be challenged. During the past three years, military contracts have been cut back or canceled and many large defense contractors have begun laying off workers. Net migration into California-always assumed to be the growth machine of the Gunbelt-has begun to slow. Will the pattern of migration through 1989 now be reversed? Questionnaires for the final stage of the SSE survey were issued in 1991, and hopefully the results will be available by the end of 1993. This will give us the opportunity to see if the first year's defense cutbacks have altered interregional migration, or if the "ratchet effect" of defense migration will persevere through austere times.

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Defense Spending and Regional Development || Interregional Migration of Defense Scientists and Engineers to the Gunbelt during the 1980s