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he centre of Tartu city was heavilydamaged in July 1941 in a few days

of combat. The fighting took place becausethe momentum of the German invasionof the northern part of the Soviet Unionlapsed after the first couple of weeks ofrapid advance, making it possible for theSoviet forces to stabilise the fronttemporarily in central Estonia, andthereby gaining more time to prepare thedefences of Leningrad.

The fighting in and around the townwas a tactical sideshow in an operationalsideshow of a strategic sideshow. The Ger-man Army Group North offensive wassecondary to the main German effort, thestrategic offensive of Army Group Cen-tre against Moscow. The operational main

Tartu in the 1941 Summer WarBy Major Riho Rõngelep and Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen*

effort of the Army Group North was inthe axis east of the Lake Peipsi.

Only weak forces were initially detachedfor operations against Estonia. These Ger-man forces had their objectives in Northand Northwest Estonia, including the is-lands. That part of the country was usedfor bases by the Soviet air force and na-val aviation bomber forces. An ArmyCorps of two infantry divisions attackedtowards Pärnu and Viljandi respectively,when determined Soviet resistancestopped their lead elements.

The fighting in Tartu took place be-cause an Estonian armed rebellion hadliberated the Southeastern part of thecountry, making it logical for the Ger-man forces to test the possibilities of the

land bridge between the Võrts Lake andthe Lake Peipsi.

It also took place because the EmajõgiRiver connecting the two lakes and di-viding the town gave support to the hast-ily improvised Soviet defence. The fight-ing had three phases:

Initially the Estonian liberation anddefence of the southern part of Tartu andTartu county south of the Emajõgi.

Thereafter the German-Soviet fight forcontrol of the river line, both sides rein-forcing their initially deployed forces, theengagements gradually moving away fromthe town.

Finally the isolation and defeat of theSoviet forces north of the river, betweenthe two large lakes.

* Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.Major Riho Rõngelep is a Directing Staff member at the Baltic Defence College.

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Map of Tartu 1927Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive

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It is no longer easy to uncover what ac-tually happened that July in and aroundTartu. To the Soviet and German militaryhistorians it was an insignificant episode inthe fighting, preceding the Siege ofLeningrad. To the Estonians it was muchmore; it was an important manifestation oftheir will to regain independence. However,from the return of the Russians in 1944and until the late 1980s, the anti-Soviet ris-ing of 1941 could not be researched. AfterIndependence in 1991, the reconstructionhas been severely hampered by the very lim-ited amount of sources left in Estonia. Themain basis of the sources was the originalinterviews with surviving witnesses.

This is the first attempt to place theEstonian popular rising in South Esto-nia and Liberation of Tartu in early July1941 within the framework of the Ger-man operations, giving a more completepicture of the Summer War.

Prologue

Since the late 1920s Stalin had brutallymobilised and enslaved the Soviet society

to build a heavy industry that could sup-port a massive, modern military machine.By the mid-1930s he had succeeded increating a huge and well-officered force,in some conceptual and equipment areasleading in the world. However, in hisgeneral campaign to destroy all other cen-tres of independent power, the Sovietdictator turned against the Red Armysleadership and destroyed it in 1937-38,leaving theforce withoutits professionalbrain and hav-ing lost the willto show initia-tive and inde-pendent actionon a battle-field, which isthe core ofmilitary effec-tiveness.

When it be-came clear inspring 1939that a general

European war was close, Stalin realisedthat he had to do everything possibleto compensate for his self-inflicted mili-tary weakness. He needed time to re-stabilise the army. He also decided thathe needed geographical buffer space toreduce the strategic vulnerability whichwas the result of the 1920 borders. TheMolotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave himboth.

The cornerstone of the Defence League building at the meeting ofVõru and Riia Streets was laid 3rd September.Four weeks later the first Soviet troops had entered Estonia.

Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive

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Late September the eastern half of Po-land was absorbed, and when demands forbases in the Baltic states were backed by amassive deployment of troops towardstheir borders, the three governments gavein to the pressure. By 28 September, Es-tonia entered a Pact of Mutual Assistancewith the Soviet Union, accompanied bythe deployment of 30.000 Soviet troopson its national territory (twice the Esto-nian Defence Force total). The SovietUnion had gained rights to create navaland air bases on the Saaremaa, the Hiiumaaand at Paldiski as well as the right to useTallinn Port for two years. However, thearriving generals also demanded air basesinland, and the Estonian government wasin no position to reject that demand.Where the Red forces established theirbases, Estonia lost all control. Thus, whenthe Soviet demands for bases in Finlandwere rejected by the Finns, and the Win-ter War followed, the air bases in inde-pendent and neutral Estonia were usedby the Soviet bomber forces.

In the early summer of 1940 it becameclear to Stalin that his partner, Germany,

was winning the European war, and thathe could ignore any sentimental Frenchand British support to the Baltic statesindependence. The three states were in-vaded mid June following an ultimatumto each country and annexed into theSoviet Union after rigged elections. Esto-nia was invaded by 80.000 troops on 17June. According to the Swedish intelli-gence, Tartu became the garrison of the90th Rifle Division.

The Estonian military leadership dis-appeared as a result of deportations anddeath in prisons or camps. The army wastransformed to form the main part of the22nd Territorial Rifle Corps of the RedArmy (with the 180th, 181st and 182nd RifleDivisions, the first and last with head-quarters in Estonia). The surviving cadrewas exposed to pressure and brainwash-ing. The voluntary defence force, Kaitseliit(Defence League) was disbanded and dis-armed. The Baltic Sea Fleet moved itsheadquarters to Tallinn, and the 8th Armyestablished itself in Rakvere.

In the late spring of 1941, the numberof Soviet troops in the Baltic states had

risen to more that 500.000, increasinglyconcentrated in the South, close to theGerman border. Thus the 11th Rifle Di-vision, which arrived at Tartu in Febru-ary from Kuressaare, moved on to Vilniusin May (again according to the Swedishintelligence).

The situation in Estonia had becomedisastrous. The Soviet Union controlledall the institutions of the state, all areas oflife. During that spring the pressureagainst the Baltic peoples grew dramati-cally, with its peak in massive and well-prepared deportations on 14 June.Around 10.000 persons were picked upin Estonia alone, including the familiesof those already deported or killed dur-ing the previous months. The pressureand the risk of deportations led many tohide in the woods to avoid being picked-up, becoming Forest Brothers.

The Baltic peoples had had their expe-rience of what Soviet rule under Stalinmeant. The naivety about what could beexpected which had contributed to thedecisions not to resist had gone. It wasconcluded that only Germany could help.

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22 June to 9 July the framework

The German invasion came as a sur-prise to Stalin, but his subordinates hadcontinued and intensified preparations forwar in the weeks of May and June. Evenif the 14 June deportations may have beenunconnected to the defence preparations,they added to the pressure on the Balticpopulations and removed potentially dis-loyal elements.

On 20 June followed the announce-ment of General Mobilisation in Estonia,including both the former national army,now the 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps, andyoung conscripts. The invasion of theSoviet Union followed two days later.

Army Group North attacked intoLithuania from East Prussia with the maineffort in the direction via Kaunas andonwards to the River Daugava. Kaunaswas liberated by the Lithuanians ahead ofthe arrival of the Germans, and the lead-ing elements of the Panzergruppe 4 un-der General Erich von Manstein succeededin capturing bridges at Daugavpils on 26

June, splitting the defending Soviet 8 th

and 11 th Armies. The Baltic Sea Navystarted to evacuate its bases in Latvia on29 June. On that day Manstein broke outof the Daugavpils bridgehead in spite ofhard and aggressive resistance by the So-viet forces, and continued towardsOstrov. Other German forces capturedRiga on 1 July.

The 18 th German Army1 that followedthe Panzer Group and covered its West-ern flank, also attacked with its main ef-fort East of the Lake Peipsi via Pskov.The Germans correctly did not expectthe Soviets to deploy large forces in de-fence of Estonia, and the 18 th Army onlysent the XXVI Army Corps2 with the 217th and 61st Infantry Divisions up the coastof the Riga Gulf, crossing into Estonia atIkla on 7 July. Forces of the defendingSoviet 8 th Army met the German advance.The 10th Rifle Corps was used to delayand stop the German corps.

The threat to Leningrad was alreadyclear one week into the war. The defencepreparations became desperate. A line 100kilometres southwest of Leningrad from

the Finnish Gulf along the Luga riverending at the Ilmen lake was now selectedas the main forward defence of the city.All construction work in the city stoppedand 30.000 workers were sent to developthe defences in a special Rear Lines Con-struction Administration created for thatpurpose on 29 July. A special operationalgroup for the control of the defence linewas established one week later. On 30 Junethe decision was taken to raise a locallydrafted militia army. Without trainingthis loose mob was sent to man the Lugaline, only armed with light weapons andslaughtered by the advancing Germans ontheir arrival. Everything had to be doneto gain time and weaken the German of-fensive.

The Soviets also attempted to stabilisethe situation by shuffling the command-ers. On 4 July Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov, the commander of the 8th

Army responsible for the defence of theBaltic coast and Estonia was movedup to command the Front. LieutenantGeneral F.S. Ivanov became the 8th Armycommander.

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Beyond the mobilisation of the formerEstonian army that was going to be usedin the defence of the Soviet Union, theauthorities established Destruction Bat-talions to remove or destroy everythingthat could be used by the advancing Ger-mans: assets that could not be moved suchas infrastructure and industry. Estoniancommunists and everyone whom the So-viet authorities had succeeded in attract-ing during the year of occupation mannedthese units.

The mobilising Estonians realised thattheir units would be used outside thecountry and against what most saw as theirnational interests. They were to be sent toLeningrad, Pskov and Ostrov, and manyfled and joined the Forest Brothers,including a significant number of regu-lar officers who had not been removedby the initial purges and the deportations.

The number of persons willing to riskand able to participate in an armed rebel-lion had thus been rising at the same timewhere possibilities of success grew day byday. Thus during the first ten days ofJuly practically all South Estonia was lib-

erated by Estonians before the arrival ofthe German units. In the Southwest, therebellions gained control up to the lineover Viljandi-Pärnu, where the 8th SovietArmy was deployed in an attempt to stopthe German onrush.

From the first contacts, the relationsbetween the Estonians and German sol-diers were good. The invader was seen asa partner in the fight against a commonenemy. The German High Command wasapproached several times with the requestsfor additional weapons and the Germansresponded positively to those requests evenbefore their main units actually arrived.

Events up to 9 July preparing therebellion in Tartu

Organised resistance in Tartu had al-ready started in mid March 1941. One ofthe student groups took the initiative toco-ordinate its actions with other similargroups known to be active at the time.Like in most early resistance movements,the initial aim was to collect and spreadinformation.

In early summer of 1941 the young re-sistance movement gathered informationabout the communists and their move-ments, established contacts with the nowgrowing number of Forests Brothers andinvestigated the possibilities to get weap-ons. Some members of the organisationinfiltrated Soviet organisations and there-after served as information sources. Theresistance meeting place was in the previ-ous Estonian Healthcare Museum just op-posite of the NKVD (National Commit-tee of Internal Affairs/Narodnij Kommi-sariat Vnutrennih Del) building in KindralPõdra Street3 .

During early July of 1941 the activi-ties of the organisation intensified fur-ther, inspired by news from the Finn-ish radio about the approaching Ger-man troops. The group decided to lib-erate the town and developed plans ofaction. It was understood that in orderto avoid Soviet destruction of key in-frastructure, the liberation should takeplace prior to the arrival of the Ger-man units.

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Different groups were tasked to pre-pare taking control over key objects: tele-phone relay stations, postal offices etc. Asit was foreseen that the Soviets woulddestroy the bridges over Emajõgi, it wasdecided to concentrate all action and allforces in the parts of Tartu, south of theriver. The start of the operations againstthe different objects would be co-ordinated. In June, agreement had beenreached between the resistance and TartuUniversity Hospital about the treatmentof casualties.

On 6 July a squadron of Germanfighter aircraft attacked Raadi air baseNorth of the river. That day the last mem-bers of the communist party left the townfollowed by the NKVD and the remain-ing Red Army units. The pontoon bridgenear the Market Hall was also demolishedon that day.

On 8 July preparations started to blow-up the Stone Bridge at the North end ofthe City Hall Square. At 0637 the follow-ing morning a 1-ton charge was detonated,destroying the northern end of the 157years old bridge, and at the same time

severely damaging build-ings in the old town cen-tre with the falling largegranite stones. On thatday, 9 July, the only So-viet armed elements re-maining in Tartu were adestruction battalion andsome of the NKVD spe-cial groups that had todestroy the town imme-diately prior to the ar-rival of the Germans.

Liaison was estab-lished to the ForestBrothers to ensure theirsupport for uprising.Ensign Olev Reintalu wasappointed as overallleader of the resistance,and during a meeting inEstonian Healthcare Mu-seum on 09th of July itwas decided to start openoperations to liberateTartu the next morning,10 July, at 0730.

The Stone Bridge in 1939 seen from the South

from the same place after the demolition.Both photos are from Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp:Tartu Kivisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941; Tallinn 1997

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Ensign Olev ReintaluPhoto from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas

II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

Tartu City Centre 1938. Map: courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive.

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On 9 July, the 61st German InfantryDivision attempted an attack to the northclose to Viljandi from Western side of theVõrts lake in order to reach Tartu with areconnaissance patrol, but failed.

10 July the Estonian liberation of Tartu

At the time agreed, the activists gath-ered at the museum. Shortly thereafter thefirst prisoner was taken, who was a mem-ber of a destruction battalion. Then thesituation got more difficult, as a combinedSoviet force of around 300 took up a po-sition close to the railway line on RigaStreet, one of the most likely access routesinto the town for the Germans. In addi-tion to this force, a number of NKVDand destruction battalion members movedacross the remaining Western-most Lib-erty Bridge to the southern part of Tartu.Thus by early afternoon the Soviets hadre-established control over the town.

The situation developed further, whenduring afternoon a Soviet truck met threeGerman armoured cars, commanded by

The information about German unitsin town caused the Soviets to withdrawhastily across the river. Some of the Sovi-ets tried to hide in buildings to attemptan escape later.

Without meeting further resistance theGerman reconnaissance element continuedto the centre of town, where one of thearmoured cars continued along theEmajõgi river, firing at the Soviet trenchesacross the river.

As the Germans moved deeper into thetown, an increasing number of the Esto-nian resistance fighters joined them. Theappearance of the armoured cars was agreat moral support for the members ofresistance. The fact that German forces hadarrived to Tartu made the initially weakSoviet forces cautious. They did not crossthe river, therefore they could not imple-ment the destruction of Tartu. However,the small unit left the town again the sameevening, around 1800. It had only lastedlong enough to make the Soviets reactand encourage the resistance.

Thereafter the members of the resis-tance discussed the implications of the

Captain Glasenapp, in Võru Street closeto the down town. The German armouredcars were part of the reconnaissance unitthat reached Võru4 . There was a shortengagement and this event triggered theactual fighting for Tartu.

Captain Kurt von GlasenappPhoto from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas

II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

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event during the meeting on Riga Hill.The situation was critical. The Soviettroops were still just across the river, andas the Liberty Bridge was still intact, noth-ing kept them from returning. As thenumber of organised resistance memberswas still far too small to defend the town,recruiting amongst the remaining malepopulation started immediately. At thesame time messengers were sent to Võruwhere German units were stationed withrequests for weapons.

Then information spread that a Sovietattempt the night before had failed todestroy the armoury of the former 2nd

Estonian Division completely. It had beenabandoned, and the local population hadsucceeded in salvaging 300 rifles withammunition. The leader of the resistancemade sure that the weapons were collected,and that stroke of luck saved the situa-tion.

The now better-armed members of theresistance were organised close to the newlybuilt, former Defence League building onRiga Hill (where the Baltic Defence Col-lege is today). Groups were dispatched to

sectors along the river to stop possibleSoviet attempts to cross. Others were usedto clean the southern part of the town,getting rid of the small groups or singlepersons that had been left behind whenthe appearance of the German troopscaused panic among the Soviets. This tookthe character of individual resistance mem-bers going hunting with pistols or riflesand delaying the proper organisation inunits of many of the potential fighters.

In order to make it possible to distin-guish friend from foe (and as a result alsoto form the members of the resistanceinto combatants under international law)they were issued with white emblems withthe crest of the Estonian Republic or anarmband with the Estonian nationalcolours.

The evening on 10 July brought thefirst phase of the battle and the first ele-ments of the second to an end. At 2040the Soviets blew up the remaining Lib-erty Bridge to avoid it being taken bythe Germans or the Estonian resistance.

However, shortly thereafter the startof artillery fire against the southern part

of the town announced the return ofregular troops of the Red Army. Whatprobably had happened was that the newsof the German arrival had promted theSoviet 8th Army send the 16th Rifle Divi-sion, the only available formation, to Tartuto meet the threat. That division was thefirst element of the 11th Rifle Corps, whichlater got responsibility for holding thearea between the lakes of Peipsi and Võrts.Together with the 10th Rifle Corps of the8th Army it defended the approaches toLeningrad via Narva.

This Soviet reaction was matched by aparallel German decision. On that eveningthe 18th German Army placed the I ArmyCorps Reconnaissance Task ForceBurdach5 under command of the XXVICorps for use in the axis via Tartu. Whythat decision was taken is not completelyclear. The most likely causes are the re-ports of the armoured car patrol fromVõru and the contact thereafter made bythe Estonian Resistance groups fromTartu.

The liberation of Tartu was meant toprotect the town against destruction by

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demolition. However, now the southernpart of town centre along the river be-came exposed to an increasingly intenseartillery barrage, as well as to the Sovietefforts to clear fields of fire by torchingbuildings on the northern side of theriver. During this first night, the artil-lery fire was relatively light. It was prob-ably only meant to harass the deploymentof German troops.

During the evening and night the Re-sistance deployed its forces in defensivegroups along the river. Armed groups,which arrived from the surroundingcounties reinforced the defence. The firstregular Estonian Army officers arrived toTartu with their armed groups. Amongfirst of them was captain Karl Talpak.

The arrival of experienced officers in-creased the morale significantly. The nightwas relatively quiet. The Soviets tried onceto cross the river in the new workers resi-dential area of Karlova around onekilometre southeast of the town centre.Captain Talpaks group forced the at-tempt, probably a combat patrol, to re-treat.

medical kit for the fighters. The defencewas continuously reinforced with the par-tisan groups arriving from all over SouthEstonia. On that day Major Kurg, anotherregular officer, arrived to town with hisgroup. He thereafter, as the senior mili-tary officer in Tartu, took over commandof the resistance forces. His commandpost with security elements was establishednext to the Defence League Building.Contact was established with other resis-tance groups East and West, thereafterforming an Estonian armed presence allalong the river line. The forces in Tartu,a mix of the town resistance and arrivedForests Brothers, were now organisedas the Tartu Partisan Battalion with fournormal and one Guard company. Thestrength increased gradually to around 700.The total strength of the Resistance in theTartu area is estimated to have been around1000. The companies were assigned thefollowing tasks: the 1st and the 3rd Compa-nies were deployed to defend the Southriver bank in the town; the 4th Companytook positions in Western Tartu wherethe North bank dominates the South bank

Captain Karl TalpakPhoto from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas

II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

During 11 June the Estonian efforttook an increasingly organised form. Themembers of Women Defence Leagueorganised field kitchens and prepared

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making the risk of crossing significant;the 2nd Company took positions 10 kmsoutheast to Tartu (probably covering thearea at Luunja and towards the East). TheGuard Company was responsible forguarding stocks and emerging town in-stitutions.

The effort to clean the town of theremaining Soviet elements continued,when they made movement on the streetsdangerous by sniping at the members ofthe Resistance. Now the incidents weretaken care of by reaction groups com-manded by an officer or a non-commis-sioned officer (NCO). This was, as always,a very time consuming activity as build-ings had to be searched completely.

During the day the artillery barrageintensified, resulting in some serious dam-age. Soviet agents contributed to the de-struction by setting fire to a large num-ber of buildings with Molotov cocktails.Other Soviet agents were found control-ling the artillery fire, hiding on highground or in church towers.

According to the German narrative,elements of the Task Force Burdach ar-

rived in Tartu on the morning of 11 July,capturing the town in a daring raid.The Estonian Resistance is not mentioned.According to the Estonian sources, theGermans only arrived on the next day6 .

The liberation and defence of south-ern Tartu is one of the most importantachievements of the 1941 Summer War.It advanced and eased the German cap-ture of Estonia, and her oppressed peoplehoped, in vain, that it would lead to arenewed independence. It was initiated bya small group of patriotic students with-out military expertise. Their action be-came an issue of national pride in thelong dark decades ahead.

From 12 July the escalation tolarger scale German-Soviet fighting

On 12 July the first stronger Germanelements from the Task Force Burdachcame to the support of the Tartu PartisanBattalion. It consisted of anti-tank gunplatoons7 . German speaking students andEstonian army officers were assigned toanti-tank guns crews as liaison officers and

interpreters. The German units took po-sitions close to the Tähtvere manor houseand park in the north western part of thetown.

Major Friedrich KurgPhoto from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas

II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

On the arrival, the German units weremet by accurate artillery fire, an indica-tion of the effectiveness of the Soviet ar-

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tillery observers who stayed behind.Heavy artillery fire against the area aroundthe Riga Hill forced Major Kurg to movehis command post to the south easternpart of the town, close to an exhibitionground here. Even if neither the Esto-

nian nor German narratives mention this they both ignore the effort of the other- there probably was division of respon-sibility leaving the Estonian Resistance todefend the central and eastern parts ofthe town8 .

Effective artillery fire led to a hunt forthe observers, and a vast number wasfound and killed that day. Thereafter thebombardment became less well-directed,still, however, destroying a large numberof buildings. The destruction of Tartu wasalso continued in the northern part ofthe town, which was controlled by theSoviets. Buildings were burned down sys-tematically, street by street. The Germannarrative mentions that the Soviet air forcebombed their positions in the Tartu areaon that day.

During the following days, the TaskForce Burdach carried the main bur-den of fighting the 16th Soviet Rifle Di-vision. The Estonian narrative mentionsa stabilisation of the situation, whereasthe German narrative underlined howdifficult it became to contain the Sovietformations aggressive forays across theriver.

On 12 July Army Group North ac-knowledged that the Soviets would fighthard for Estonia, not withdraw quicklyas they had from Lithuania and Latvia.The German 18th Army realised now that

The damaged town centre south of the river.Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

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the 8th Soviet Army in Rakvere was de-ploying two Rifle Corps in the defenceof North Estonia, and the 254th InfantryDivision was sent from Võru to join the61st Division near Viljandi. The 291st In-fantry Division was given orders to movefrom Kurzeme (Kurland) to join the 217th

Division North of Pärnu.Two more Soviet rifle divisions, the

48th and 125th were assembled by the 11th

Rifle Corps in North Estonia on 14 July,and two days later they appeared on thenorthern side of the Emajõgi9 , relievingthe 16th Division. The 48th Division haddeployed to the West and the 125th haddeployed to the East of Tartu. On thatday the good summer weather was re-placed by rain and thunderstorms, wors-ening the road conditions and hamper-ing operations. On 16 July, the 18th Armyalso decided to employ its last reserve, the93rd Infantry Division, in Estonia.

XXVI Corps now resumed its offen-sive operations in Western Estonia on 17July, but no significant progress was pos-sible until significant parts of the twoadditional divisions became available.

From 18 to 20 July the pressure of the11th Rifle Corps two divisions against theTask Force Burdach developed into acritical situation, and the 18th Army wasforced to send the 93rd Infantry Divisionto the Tartu front. Seconded elementsfrom that division doubled the strength

of Burdachs force on their arrival on 21July10 .

From 20 July, the 18th Army concentratedits attention in Estonia. The mission was tokeep the Soviet forces in Estonia from rein-forcing the defence of Leningrad. Its head-quarter (HQ) was now in Võru.

The view of Soola Street towards the river.Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

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The last phase of the Tartufighting, the destruction of

the 11th Rifle Corps

On 21 July, the 18 Army decided toaccomplish its mission by an operationfrom the Viljandi area, initially cuttingoff the 11th Rifle Corps by an advance inits back to the Peipsi Lake, thereafter cut-ting of the rest of the 8th Army in North-west Estonia by an advance to the Finn-ish Gulf.

Early next morning the offensivestarted with the 61st, 217th and 254th Divi-sions. The 61th Division captured twobridges in Põltsamaa intact at noon andcontinued towards Jõgeva, where Sovietforces on 23 July fought to avoid theGermans cutting the main road out ofTartu to the North. The 11th Rifle Corpshad realised the threat to the 125th and48th Rifle Divisions. The Task ForceBurdach and the 93rd Division foundthat the resistance of the forces in frontof them lessened. During the night 23-24July, the bulk of the Soviet forces with

the artillery left, leaving only acouple of rifle battalions as a screen.

The 93rd Division had created asmall flotilla of fishing boats andcombat engineer assault boats. Itwas now used to occupy the islandof Piirisaar in the Lake Peipsi andto land forces on the coast Northof the Emajõgi, and during thenext days elements of the divisionadvanced up the shore of the lake.

Forward elements of the 61st

Division reached the lake 7kilometres south of Mustvee on thenight 24-25 July, and on the fol-lowing day the 254th Division oc-cupied the town. Parts of the 11th

Rifle Corps that had not escapedwere surrounded, and the follow-ing days the German forces had tomeet several attempts to break out.On 25 July, the 93rd Division gotcommand of all forces advancingnorth from Tartu.

On 29 July, the 18th Armystarted the next part of the offen-sive, the advance to the Finnish

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Gulf to cut off and destroy the Sovietforces in Northwestern Estonia. The XXVIArmy Corps commanded the 254th, 93rd,61st and later the 291st Division in theoffensive towards the Finnish Gulf. Thenewly arrived XXXXII Corps would latercommand the offensive to capture North-western Estonia and the islands.

Destruction of the surrounded rem-nants of the 11th Rifle Corps was left tothe 93rd Division and a task force fromthe 61st Division. That mission was ac-complished four days later, on 31 July,bagging 8.794 prisoners, 68 artillerypieces, 5 anti-tank guns, 5 tanks and 3armoured cars captured. Thus the 1941fighting in the Tartu area ended, threeweeks after it was started by a small groupof Estonian students.

Aftermath

In the offensive towards the coast, on5 August, the 61st Division at Järva-Jaanidestroyed the 16th Rifle Division that hadfought the first days in Tartu. As a resultof a successful advance towards Narva by

58th Infantry Division east of Lake Peipsi,the XXVI Corps offensive could swingNortheast, after reaching Tapa andRakvere on the same day. The 254th Divi-sion reached Kunda and the coast twodays later. The continued offensive bythe Corps met hard resistance that involvedthe survivors of the 125th and 48th RifleDivisions. It took 12 days of intense fight-ing to capture Narva, and the XXVI Corpsonly crossed the 1920-1940 Estonian-So-viet border on 20 August.

The XXXXII Corps with the 61st, 217th,and 254th Divisions remained in Estonia.On 27 August, Tallinn was surrounded, andthe following day the Soviets in the towngave up and surrendered, even if evacua-tion of the communists and others fromthe port was still ongoing. Haapsalu wascaptured on 31 August. The German inva-sion of the Estonian Islands started 14 Sep-tember and ended on 27 September.

In Tartu 1007 buildings had been de-stroyed. Purely Estonian part of the fight-ing had been intense, but short. Only 19resistance fighters had been killed and 23wounded. The number of civilians killed

is estimated to have been around 100,mainly as a result of artillery fire.

Tartu south of the Emajõgi after the fight-ing (a view along Aleksandri Street).Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

The reason why the Estonian humanlosses were relatively limited seems to bethat after 10-12 July the fighting movedaway from the town centre toward theriver east and west of the town. Thatwould also explain the very different Ger-man and Estonian impressions of theevents. That the Estonian picture of theperiod 12-24 July is less than complete isconfirmed by the interacting Soviet-Ger-man escalation in force build-up duringthat second phase, making it possible for

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the Germans to bag most of two rifle di-visions in the third phase.

The Soviet choice to fight for Estoniathat led to the fighting in Tartu did notchange anything. The terrain in the mainArmy Group North axis did not allowmuch additional deployment of Germanforces, so the use of 5 infantry divisionsin Estonia rather than in the main effortmade no difference. Leningrad wouldhave survived anyway.

For the Estonians, however, that choiceled to tragedies, far beyond the destruc-tion and losses of the Summer War. TheSoviets used the time to evacuate ma-chinery, cattle, and vehicles as well as25.000 Estonians to the East. On top ofthat, 33.000 young Estonian men weremobilised and transported to Russia. Themobilised 22nd Estonian Territorial RifleCorps of about 7.000 Estonians was de-stroyed while fighting for the Soviets in1941: 2.000 were killed, and 4.500 takenprisoner by the Germans. The rest, therecruits, were initially used in the Con-struction Battalions, which were reallymobile forced labour camps. Then the

evacuated Estonian communist leadershipsucceeded in getting permission to usethe members of the construction battal-ions to form the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps.It came to consist of 27.000, includingaround 23.000 Estonians. The Corps wasused in the fighting of 1942 and 1943and suffered massive losses, due to un-professional leadership. Between 1.200 and2.000 succeeded in surrendering to theGermans. The Corps was used in 1944 inEstonia, especially in the hard fighting atthe Saaremaa at the foot of the Sõrve pen-insula in the end of November. Here thesoldiers of the Corps fought against theircountrymen in German uniform noneof them with a chance to escape. Thereaf-ter more Estonians were mobilised intothe Corps before it was sent to Kurzeme(Kurland), ending the German-Sovietfighting for the reoccupation of Latvia.

Bibliography

John Erickson: The Road to Stalingrad.Stalins War with Germany. Volume 1. Lon-don 1975.

Lars Ericson: Buffert eller hot? Debaltiska staterna i svensk militär planeringår 1941 in Bo Hugemark (ed.): I Orkanensöga. 1941 osäker neutralitet; Stockholm 1992.

Germany and the Second World War.Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union.Oxford 1998.

Germany and the Second World War.Volume IV. Maps. Stuttgart 1983.

Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp:Tartu Kivisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941;Tallinn 1997.

Werner Haupt: Baltikum 1941. DieGeschichte eines ungelösten Problems ;Neckargemünd 1963.

Vello Helk: Estlands Historie kort fortalt.Odense 1993.

Koguteos: Eesti Riik ja Rahvas TeisesMaailmasõjas IV; Stockholm 1957.

Herbert Lindmäe: Suvesõda Tartumaal;Tartu 1999.

Tiit Noormets: The summer War:the 1941 Armed Resistance in Estonia inThe Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States;Vilnius 1999.

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uppgörelsen 1941 in Bo Hugemark (ed.):I Orkanens öga. 1941 osäker neutralitet;Stockholm 1992.

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Third Reich Factbook (www.skalman.nu/third-reich).

1 Commanded by General Georg von Küchler(1881-1968)

2 Commanded by General Albert Wodrig3 Named after General Ernst Põdder (1879-

1932), one of the War of Liberation commanders.Now Pepleri Street.

4 This was probably a forward patrol from thelater arriving I Army Corps Reconnaissance TaskForce Burdach. On the 10th it was still em-ployed as a screen, linking the main force of the18th Army attacking east of the Peipsi, to its XXVICorps, attacking in Western Estonia.

5 The task force under Major General KarlBurdach (1891-1976) thereafter consisted of theReconnaissance Battalions 1 and 11, as well as theFirst Battalion of Infantry Regiment 2. The low

numbers of the units indicate that they were someof the original and thus best manned andequipped of the German army units.

6 The Estonian sources identify the Germans astroops from the 93rd Infantry Division. This is amistake. That division was still in Latvia, on theway forward. It had been freed from the pool ofreserve formations of the German Army and wasnow the last reserve of the 18th Army. It wasreleased for deployment to Estonia on 16 July.The decision to use it in the Tartu area followed acouple of days later, probably on 20th July, at thesame time as the 18th Army established its HQ toVõru to concentrate its operations in Estonia.On 21 July the division detached units to theTask Force Burdach that doubled its strength.But the 93rd Division did not get command overthe German forces in the Tartu sector until 25July.

7 The two Reconnaissance Battalions of the TaskForce consisted each of a horse cavalry squadron,a bicycle squadron, and a heavy squadron withone troop with three 37 mm anti-tank guns, atroop with two 75 mm infantry guns and a troopwith two armoured cars. There is no informa-tion that the infantry battalion from InfantryRegiment 2 was reinforced with anti-tank guns.

8 The map of the official German history indi-cates that the German line initially was extendedfrom the town towards the West along the river,and only later to the East.

9 Both divisions had originally been based inRiga, had apparently been withdrawn via Pskov,and were returning to the front via Narva.

10 The 93rd Division (commanded by GeneralOtto Tiemann), detached an infantry battalion(II/ Infantry Regiment 270), one anti-tank battal-ion (number 193), one combat engineer companyand one bicycle company to the task force.